Chris Cannon

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Heaven help us, from experts sitting in Washington who get paid to continue the problem instead of solve the problem. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Appreciate your time. Let me just point out that production and conservation are both matters of innovation. We're going to talk tonight about new ways to innovate in production, and also in other areas of conservation. A new motor would conserve a great deal, a new, more efficient motor would conserve a great deal of energy. And I think that if you doubled the efficiency of engines on the highway today, or if you had an engine that doubled the efficiency, the threat of that doubling of efficiency would almost immediately result in a plummeting of the price of oil overnight, without any additional production. We're joined now by Congressman Peterson from Pennsylvania. And Mr. Peterson has been a great advocate of developing our natural gas resources with reasons why this is a critical part of what we're doing in the country. And I would yield to Mr. Peterson as much time as he may consume. And hopefully, at the end of your presentation, we can chat a little bit about what this means for America.

Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. CANNON. You and I have been talking about this issue for years now, and we've seen no increase, a modest increase in some drilling in the inter-mountain west, but very little new sources. And what's happened to costs of gas, that is, natural gas, over the last 3 years?

Mr. CANNON. So here we are, the Middle East of coal. We have more coal than we know what to do with. We've stopped using coal. We don't use coal to liquid. We don't use those things because we can't sequester the CO2. That means, instead of expanding, coal declines. Coal declines. Natural gas goes up. So now all of sudden you just listed all the things that we use natural gas in. And I add those things all to be an inflationary environment where, in particular, food prices go up, or continue to go up, having doubled, in some cases tripled over the last couple of years.

Mr. CANNON. Those are the best blue-collar jobs in America and Democratic policies are driving them offshore.

Mr. CANNON. I don't think so either, and I don't think the American people think so. And I think the American people are really fed up. You can't double or triple people's natural gas costs, their heating costs in their homes. You know, personally sometimes I drive in the wintertime even without a coat on. If I jumped out of my truck and went into that store, I'm not sure I would be comfortable, but that's one of the costs that we're imposing on people. We cannot--the American people are not going to allow us to maintain these idiotic policies that lock up resources while people are actually going hungry in other parts of the world because we're using corn for ethanol and we are taking natural gas, and instead of turning it into fertilizer, we're bidding it off to the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indians.

Mr. CANNON. You and I are on the Resources Committee together. We are going to have a vote on this issue, and every American is going to know because every talk show host and every newspaper is going to talk about this vote because this vote is about the cost of energy. And included in that mark-up we are going to have a vote on ANWR, and we will have other votes that I think will be profoundly important. It was in the mark-up a year ago that the Democrats, over our objections and over our votes, insisted that BLM not be allowed to go forward with its regulatory scheme for oil shale. We're now a year behind on that. It was in the appropriations bill last year. The Democrats put a provision that prohibited the use of any money that BLM had for processing permits on BLM property. Thank heaven that we have school trust lands that can be developed for oil shale. But without that, we would be in real trouble.

Mr. CANNON. And you and I talked about the increase in price that went from $2 to $9 briefly and then it came back down a little bit, but we talked about how if we don't do this Outer Continental Shelf Development, if we don't do the inter-mountain west and other and gas resources, we'd be in the predicament that, lo and behold, we're in today. We're talking about families doubling the price of heating their homes, businesses, doubling or tripling the price of heating their business because of failed policy. We have energy. We need to develop it.

Mr. CANNON. That's right. You cannot compete.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment made in order under the rule.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment that is necessary to refine the vague language contained within this bill. The legislation requires the lands included in the National Landscape Conservation System be managed for values, without ever defining what the term values means. As we all know, values have different meaning to different people. In the case of land management agencies, values can range from cultural and historic resources to things as nebulous as ``smell-scapes.'' The loose definition of the underlying bill leaves the Federal Government open to litigation based on what someone may or may not determine to be consistent with what they believe are the values of lands included within the National Landscape Conservation System. Our Federal land management agencies are currently overwhelmed with litigation which distracts from their primary mission of land management. This amendment will prevent unnecessary and onerous litigation. While the underlying legislation has a savings clause, it does not prevent the bringing of a lawsuit. We have been assured time and again that activities on these lands currently allowed will continue without a problem. However, the language does not include important and defined terms such as multiple use. To illustrate the problem, in the event that multiple use activities such as grazing are currently accruing on lands within the NLCS system and an individual or group decides that grazing activities are not consistent with the values of NLCS lands, they can sue to stop the grazing activities. Consequently, a permitted activity is left open under this new regime to lawsuits based on the loose definition of values. Most of the parameters by which management is to occur are clearly defined. Passage of the underlying bill would create standards which are not practical to administer. This will allow external groups of all kinds to challenge the BLM's management of NCLS lands based upon what the perceived values of these lands are. My amendment merely will prohibit lawsuits against the Bureau of Land Management based on how they manage the lands under the NLCS system. Given the huge cost that we are now suffering with litigation, preventing unnecessary litigation should be a goal of this body. I urge all of my colleagues to support getting dollars to the ground for management, rather than tying them up in legal proceedings. I urge support for this amendment and reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CANNON. I appreciate the gentleman accepting this amendment. Mr. Chairman, without further ado, I yield back.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.

Mr. CANNON. Yes, Mr. Speaker, in its current form.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, it is essential that we keep the second amendment protections on BLM lands. This motion to recommit will prevent the NLCS from imposing a complete ban on the right to bear arms like the National Park Service. In 2006 the National Park Service prevented visitors from protecting themselves, and 11 individuals were murdered, 35 were raped, and 16 were kidnapped. We cannot let the NLCS become an area where the public won't go because they can't protect themselves. There's a crisis on our Federal lands, especially along the southern border, and a National Park Service second amendment restriction will ensure only the drug traffickers, rapists, and murderers will have guns. The ability to carry firearms on these lands for personal protection is a mere lawsuit and a sympathetic judge away from being denied. The Altmire amendment already agreed to preserve certain rights, but the vague language of this legislation leaves second amendment rights woefully unprotected. The second amendment was never meant to provide cafeteria-style rights for legislators, for us to pick and choose. The second amendment is a constitutional right which you either support or oppose. This motion to recommit will unequivocally make sure that is the case. I urge a ``yes'' vote on this motion to recommit. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Madam Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. CANNON. I hope the gentlewoman will remain on the floor so that on my time I will be able to yield for a colloquy.

Mr. CANNON. Madam Speaker, I would ask the chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, who has oversight of this matter and which committee I rank on, to remain on the floor so we could have a colloquy on this issue. It appears that she has left the floor. That's unfortunate. Her response to my inquiry about yielding was that she didn't have enough time, and we are standing here today with very little time to debate an issue that is dramatically important. It's important for this institution, and, by the way, people on both sides of the aisle have said and the Speaker and majority leader have both made a point of how important this issue is to this body. It is vitally important to me that we retain the rights of this body as it relates to administration, whether that's a Republican administration or Democratic administration. In his opening statements, Mr. Diaz-Balart gave a quote from former Attorney General Janet Reno in which she said there was no right to do what we're trying to do today. I would have loved to have asked the chairman on the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law if she thought that was the case or if she disagreed with what the scope of the right of the administration is to not appear. Obviously, there is a sense in this case that we ought to get something done; and, in fact, we have done a great deal. We have had hundreds of hours of depositions, literally tens of thousands of pages, tens of thousands of e-mails. We have asked questions of everyone involved in the matter in the case. And what have we come up with? I wanted to ask the chairman what the evidence we are going to present to the U.S. Attorney is that he can take and say, I have a need to get this information from these people in the administration who won't show up to the House. I have a need to understand these facts which seem to be in confusion. I have a need to decide what between these two different stories is the truth. But we haven't said that to him. We don't have evidence that we can give the U.S. Attorney. What we are giving to him is a desire to continue a witch hunt which has produced up to today zero, nothing, as far as I can tell; and I've been in every meeting, every hearing, and followed on every single deposition that we have had. There is nothing that indicates that anybody has lied or that there is a reason that the White House has been involved. And, therefore, there is no reason that I can understand, and I have asked many times on the record in committee hearings what those reasons are, what it is, what the discrepancies, what the problems are for which we need to subpoena people in the White House and create a showdown, a showdown between our institution and the White House. And I ask the gentleman, as the chairman of the committee has just risen to his feet, and I would love to yield to him if he is willing to answer that question: What are the discrepancies?

Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's position. The gentleman has said that eloquently in the past on many occasions. But we are now talking about getting a subpoena, enforcing a subpoena in a criminal process against people for whom we have no evidence, as far as I can tell, and I will be happy to yield to the gentleman if he has evidence, no evidence that they have been involved. There are no discrepancies in the testimony that we have had before us, is there?

Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's candor, and I appreciate the very gracious way the gentleman has handled this whole investigation. But it comes back down to this: we have no evidence. Let me just finish by saying that having seen this, if there was a conspiracy, and I know that the majority believes there is something evil that is happening out there, then we ought to have given enough time and enough context to be able to track that down and prove that this administration has done something wrong. As opposed to what the gentleman has just said, we have had a number of statements by the chairman of this committee saying that there is evidence of corruption. But we have had no evidence of corruption, none at all adduced anywhere from all the investigations we have done, and there is no basis for these contempt citations. I ask that we vote against them. Cooper & Kirk, Washington, DC, December 4, 2007. Hon. Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Smith: We write in response to your request for our views regarding the legal issues raised by the Judiciary Committee's resolution recommending that the House of Representatives find Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten in contempt of Congress. Each of us has had substantial experience in the Executive Branch, including in the Office of Legal Counsel. Charles J. Cooper served as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of legal Counsel from November 1985 through July 1988. Howard C. Nielson, Jr. served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel from June 2003 through August 2005. In addition, our law firm has successfully litigated a number of significant separation of powers cases. We have reviewed the opinions of the Justice Department regarding the assertion of executive privilege and testimonial immunity in response to the Miers and Bolten subpoenas. We have also reviewed the committee report relating to this matter, the additional views of the Chairman and Subcommittee Chair, and the minority views. The positions asserted by the Administration reflect the longstanding and considered views of the Executive Branch, views repeatedly affirmed by Administrations of both parties. These views were held during our tenures in the Office of Legal Counsel, and we continue to believe that they are sound. Moreover, we believe that a decision by the House to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt would likely be a legally futile gesture that could ultimately undermine Congress's ability to obtain information from the Executive Branch. As an initial matter, even if the House votes to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt, and even if a contempt citation is referred to the appropriate United States Attorney, the United States Attorney will have no choice but to decline to take action on the matter. It has long been the position of the Executive Branch that ``the criminal contempt of Congress statute does not apply to the President or presidential subordinates who assert executive privilege.'' Application of 28 U.S.C. 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 356 (1995) (opinion of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger). As then- Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson explained the position of the Executive Branch in 1984: ``First, as a matter of statutory interpretation reinforced by compelling separation of powers considerations, we believe that Congress may not direct the Executive to prosecute a particular individual without leaving any discretion to the Executive to determine whether a violation of the law has occurred. Second, as a matter of statutory interpretation and the constitutional separation of powers, we believe that the contempt of Congress statute was not intended to apply and could not constitutionally be applied to an Executive Branch official who asserts the President's claim of executive privilege in this context.'' Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 102 (1984); see also id. at 119, 129 (documenting similar positions taken by the Eisenhower and Ford Administrations). While the Chairman and Subcommittee Chair note that Justice Department opinions such as the Dellinger and Olson memoranda are not binding on Congress or the Judiciary, such opinions are binding on members of the Executive Branch--including the United States Attorney to whom a contempt citation would be referred. Furthermore, because a prosecutor's ``decision whether or not to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion,'' Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985), it is highly unlikely that Congress could obtain any sort of judicial review of the United States Attorney's refusal to submit the contempt citation to a grand jury. Assuming Congress could somehow obtain judicial review of the claim of executive privilege, we believe that it could not overcome that claim on the facts presented here. To be sure, there is a paucity of judicial authority resolving executive privilege disputes between Congress and the Executive; still, the following factors should persuade a court to uphold the claim of executive privilege here. First, the threshold arguments that executive privilege has not been, or cannot be, properly invoked to protect the communications at issue here appear insubstantial. The Chairman and Subcommittee Chair have identified no authority--and we are aware of none--requiring the Executive Branch to submit a privilege log to sustain a claim of executive privilege in a legislative proceeding. The letter sent to Chairman Conyers by Counsel to the President Fielding, written ``at the direction of the President'' to ``advise and inform [Congress] that the President has decided to assert Executive Privilege,'' Letter of Fred F. Fielding to Chairmen Leahy and Conyers at 1 (June 28, 2007), plainly suffices to invoke executive privilege under controlling precedent. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744, n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1997). And In re Sealed Case clearly establishes that executive privilege extends to ``communications of presidential advisors which do not directly involve the President,'' id. at 751, and protects ``communications that these advisors and their staff author or solicit and receive in the course of performing their function of advising the President on official government matters''-- whether or not the President is aware of those communications. Id. at 752. Given the essential role of the President in appointing and removing United States Attorneys, communications to or from senior presidential advisors regarding the replacement of United States Attorneys plainly fall within the scope of the privilege recognized by In re Sealed Case. As the D.C. Circuit explained, where ``the President himself must directly exercise the presidential power of appointment and removal . . . there is assurance that even if the President were not a party to the communications over which the government is asserting presidential privilege, these communications nonetheless are intimately connected to his presidential decisionmaking.'' Id. at 753. Second, there is nothing novel or unprecedented in the claim of privilege here. On the contrary, many historical precedents support the Administration's refusal to disclose confidential communications and deliberations relating to the appointment or dismissal of executive officers. For example, as early as 1886, the Cleveland Administration rejected Congress's attempt to obtain communications relating to the dismissal of a district attorney (the historical predecessor of today's U.S. Attorneys). As President Cleveland explained, ``the documents related to an act (the suspension and removal of an Executive Branch official) which was exclusively a discretionary executive function.'' History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide Information Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 767 (1982) (opinion of Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson); see also id. at 758-759 (discussing similar refusals to provide information regarding the appointment or removal of executive officers by the Jackson and Tyler Administrations). Furthermore, D.C. Circuit precedent addressing executive privilege expressly recognizes that ``confidentiality is particularly critical in the appointment and removal context.'' In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Third, when the judiciary has adjudicated executive privilege disputes between Congress and the Executive, it has required Congress to establish that the information it seeks ``is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of [Congress's] functions'' to overcome even a generalized claim of executive privilege. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). To satisfy this burden, it is not enough for Congress to show that the information it desires ``may possibly have some arguable relevance to the subjects it has investigated and to the areas in which it may propose legislation.'' Id. at 733. Rather, it must identify ``specific legislative decisions that cannot responsibly be made without access to materials uniquely contained in'' the documents or testimony it seeks. Id. Furthermore, decisions such as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and In re Sealed Case that limit executive privilege to accommodate the special needs of the criminal justice system offer little support for Congress here. As the D.C. Circuit has explained: ``There is a clear difference between Congress's legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes.'' Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d at 732. Cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (``Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated.''). Given the voluminous documentary evidence and testimony already provided by the Executive Branch--not to mention the additional documents and testimony that the White House has offered to make available in attempt to resolve this controversy, see e.g., Letter of Fred F. Fielding to Chairmen Leahy and Conyers at 1-2 (June 28, 2007)--it seems clear the lingering factual ambiguities identified by the Committee Chairman and the Subcommittee Chair are inadequate to overcome even a generalized claim of executive privilege under controlling precedent. And a judicial determination to that effect would plainly prejudice Congress's ability to obtain sensitive information from the Executive Branch not only in this investigation but in future investigations as well. The Justice Department's determination that Ms. Miers is immune from compulsion to testify before Congress likewise reflects the longstanding and consistent position of the Executive Branch. As Attorney General Reno explained in a formal opinion to the President, ``It is the longstanding position of the executive branch that `the President and his immediate advisors are absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a Congressional committee.' '' Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1999) (quoting Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Executive Privilege at 5 (May 23, 1977). This view is not only that of the current Administration and the Clinton Administration. As documented in Attorney General Reno's opinion, this view also reflects the position of the Reagan, Carter, and Nixon Administrations. See id. (collecting opinions from Assistant Attorneys General Theodore B. Olson, John M. Harmon, Roger C. Crampton, and William H. Rehnquist). This view also reflects the position of the Johnson and Truman Administrations. See History of Refusals, 6 Op. O.L.C. at 771-72, 777-78. And as documented by the Justice Department in its opinion regarding Ms. Miers, the Executive Branch--including, again, Administrations of both parties-- have long taken the position that the same immunity extends to former Presidents and their Advisors. See Memorandum from Stephen G. Bradbury, Principal Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Immunity of Former Counsel to the President from Compelled Testimony at 2-3 (July 10, 2007) (documenting positions taken by the Truman and Nixon Administrations). In short, we believe the President's assertions of executive privilege and testimonial immunity in this instance are entirely constitutionally sound. We also believe that a determination by the House to hold Mr. Bolten and Ms. Miers in contempt of Congress would be futile as a legal matter and might ultimately prejudice Congress's ability to obtain information from the Executive Branch. Sincerely, Charles J. Cooper. Howard C. Nielson, Jr.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Madam Chairman, this amendment will undo an important provision of the Bankruptcy Code that was enacted just 2 years ago in the bipartisan Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. It will increase risk for student lending, risk that the lending market will respond to by restricting the availability of credit. The bankruptcy law currently allows student loans to be discharged if the graduate is facing an undue hardship. This policy provides balance by protecting truly unfortunate graduates, while still preserving the integrity of student loans. This amendment will eviscerate this policy by removing the undue hardship requirement for private sector student loans, allowing these loans to be discharged 5 years after graduation. Federally guaranteed loans can still be discharged only upon a showing of undue hardship. Accordingly, the private market, which is the most sensitive to risk, bears the burden of this change. Students looking for loans in the future will have a hard time finding them. Inevitably, students would encounter higher interest rates, shorter payment periods, and other more restrictive lending terms as lenders look to avoid potential losses in bankruptcy. The amendment, in short, would damage, not advance, the cost of education. There is no free lunch and there is no free bankruptcy. We can do better for our students, and we can do better for our system of higher education. This amendment would undo an important provision of the Bankruptcy Code enacted just 2 years ago. If there is one thing that is important in commercial law, including bankruptcy law, it's stability. Lenders and investors must have confidence that Congress will not constantly change the rules of the game. We will send the wrong message if a mere 2 years after BAPCPA's passage we begin to tinker with the provisions of the new bankruptcy law. Regrettably, the pattern is already beginning to emerge in this Congress. It can and should be stopped. Capricious treatment of creditors in bankruptcy can have only one effect, the chilling of lending and investment. Changes in the Bankruptcy Code ought to receive the scrutiny of the Judiciary Committee. Since the Davis amendment is not being considered by the Judiciary Committee, the congressional experts on bankruptcy have had no opportunity to vet it through in regular order. This amendment will do more harm than good and will affect the availability of student loans in the future. I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to start out by thanking Chairman Conyers, who has worked extraordinarily hard for a very long period of time, as he pointed out, on this bill; and also Mr. Danny Davis, who has been a real brick and worked very hard on this. I rise in support of this concurrent resolution making corrections to H.R. 1593, the Second Chance Act of 2007. On November 13, 2007, the House passed the Second Chance Act of 2007. This resolution makes technical changes in three sections of the bill. First, the resolution modifies sections 111 and 112 to require that States pay no less than 50 percent of grant funds to establish reentry courts and the Prosecution Drug Treatment Alternative program. Second, the resolution eliminates in section 231(g) the technical requirement that eligible elderly prisoners who qualify for early release also satisfy the existing law for the compassionate release program. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CANNON

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Second Chance Act. This is an important bill not only to ex-offenders but to our communities and families. This bill is a modest, commonsense response to the increasing number of offenders returning to our communities each year. The Second Chance Act is a bipartisan approach to prisoner reentry that will better coordinate Federal agencies and policies on prisoner reentry with an eye towards less crime and taxpayer savings. The Second Chance Act addresses important areas for offenders and communities, including: jobs, housing, substance abuse, mental health treatment, and support for families. This legislation brings together State and local governments to work together on the problem of prisoner reentry. A modest expenditure to help transition offenders back into their communities can save taxpayers millions of dollars in the long run because the cost of paying for inmates is a serious burden to our citizens. The average cost to house a Federal inmate is over $25,000 a year. If we can reduce recidivism we can save taxpayers millions of dollars. I supported the Second Chance Act when our former colleague Representative Rob Portman introduced the bill in 2004. He should be acknowledged for his diligent work on this important issue and paving the way for us to be here today. After Mr. Portman left Congress, I took over as the primary sponsor and this Congress I cosponsored this legislation for the reasons I have stated. I believe there are some fundamental ideas that we hold as Americans. The first is that there is a God and that we will all at some point face divine judgment. You don't have to believe in God to be an American, but most Americans, believers or not, when given a choice will support limiting government to promote the welfare of their fellow man. For believers like me, this legislation does that. It is part of our Judeo-Christian ethics that we have a responsibility to care for widows, orphans and those less fortunate, including, always and explicitly, prisoners. The issues addressed in the Second Chance Act are not only safety and cost savings but reflect a moral imperative. The President laid out in his State of the Union Address in 2004 the need for this bill, stating, ``America is the land of second chance and when the gates of prison open, the path should lead to a better life.'' This bill will give those released from prison a better chance to improve their circumstances by turning away from crime and turning into productive contributing citizens. I want to thank Congressman Danny Davis, Chairman Conyers, Judiciary Ranking Member Lamar Smith and Congressman Sensenbrenner, Congressman Forbes, and Congressman Coble for their work and leadership on this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support the Second Chance Act of 2007.