Steve Chabot

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. If the gentleman will continue to yield, using the AMA again, for example, they do not like the fact that abortionists would have to go to jail if caught.

Mr. CHABOT. I would be happy to provide a long list of organizations that are in favor of this legislation. Be happy to trade lists with the gentleman. This is an inhumane, barbaric, brutal procedure which ought to be banned.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, if I had time, I could list all the organizations in favor of this legislation. But just using the AMA, for example, they have sent us letters indicating they are opposed to this legislation, but what they do not like at this point is the fact a doctor could go to jail.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I wish to respond to something the gentleman from Michigan said relative to a health exception and why a specific health exception is not in there. No matter how narrowly drafted a health exception might be, it gives the abortionist unfettered discretion in determining when a partial- birth abortion might be performed, and abortionists have demonstrated that they can justify any abortion on this ground. Dr. Warren Hearn of Colorado, for example, the author of the Standard Textbook on Abortion Procedures, who also performs many third-trimester abortions, has stated, and I quote, ``I would certify that any pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health.'' It is unlikely, then, that a law that includes such an exception would ban a single partial-birth abortion. Partial-birth abortion, after all, is the termination of the life of a living baby just seconds before it takes its first breath outside the womb. This procedure is violent, it is gruesome, it is, in the words of one of the Senators from New York some years ago, a Democratic Senator, I might add, it is infanticide. Now, proponents of this procedure will tell a different story today. They want us to believe it is about politics or ideology. They will do anything to divert attention from the cold, hard facts about partial- birth abortion. I would remind everyone that we have seen these same tactics for many years, and that the misinformation touted by the abortion lobby was exposed as blatant propaganda back in 1997. My colleagues might recall that the executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers admitted that he ``lied through his teeth'' when he stated that partial-birth abortions were rarely performed. He went on to admit that the procedure is most often performed on healthy mothers who are about 5 months along in the pregnancy, and they are performed with healthy fetuses. So as we debate this compassionate bill today, I ask that my colleagues remember the truth. Partial-birth abortion remains an untested, unproven, and dangerous procedure that has never been embraced by the mainstream medical community. I would like to take a few minutes to discuss this legislation in a little more detail. Two years ago, in the Stenberg v. Carhart case, the United States Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban, which was similar but not identical to bans passed by previous Congresses. To address the constitutional concerns raised by the majority in Stenberg, our legislation differs from previous proposals in two areas: First, the bill contains a new, more precise definition of the prohibited procedure that, as expert medical testimony received by the Subcommittee on the Constitution indicated, clearly distinguishes it from more commonly performed abortion procedures. Second, our legislation addresses the Stenberg majority's opinion that the Nebraska ban placed an undue burden on women seeking abortions because it failed to include an exception for partial-birth abortions deemed necessary to preserve the health of the mother. The Stenberg court based its conclusions on the trial court's factual findings regarding the relative health and safety benefits of partial- birth abortions, findings which were highly disputed. Under well- settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, the United States Congress is not bound to accept the same factual findings that the Supreme Court was bound to accept in Stenberg under the so-called clearly erroneous standard. Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications System, the United States Congress is entitled to reach its own factual findings, findings that the Supreme Court consistently relies upon and accords great deference, and to enact legislation based upon these findings so long as it seeks to pursue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of the Constitution and draws reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence. The first section of our legislation contains Congress's extensive factual findings that, based upon extensive medical evidence compiled during congressional hearings, partial-birth abortions pose serious risks to women's health. So the partial-birth abortion itself poses a serious medical risk on a woman's health. It is never medically indicated, and it is outside the standards of medical care in this country. In fact, the district court's factual findings in the Stenberg case are inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of authority regarding the safety and medical necessity of partial-birth abortion. According to the American Medical Association, and I quote, ``There is no consensus among obstetricians about its use, and it has never been subject to even a minimal amount of the normal medical practice development,'' and ``It is not in the medical textbooks.'' That is according to the American Medical Association. In addition, no controlled studies of partial-birth abortions have been conducted nor have any comparative studies been conducted to demonstrate its efficacy compared to other abortion methods. Furthermore, there have been no articles published in peer-reviewed journals that establish that partial-birth abortions are safe or superior in any way to established abortion procedures. Leading proponents of partial-birth abortion also acknowledge it poses additional health risks because, among other things, the procedure requires a high degree of skill to pierce the infant's skill with a sharp instrument in a blind procedure. Dr. Warren Hearn, the author of the Standard Textbook on Abortion Procedures, who also performs many of these types of procedures, has testified that he ``had very serious reservations about this procedure, and it is definitely not the safest.'' I would strongly encourage my colleagues in the House to no longer make available in this country this barbaric, inhumane practice of partial-birth abortion.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, today, on behalf of a bi-partisan coalition, I have introduced the ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002.'' Partial-birth abortion is the termination of the life of a living baby just seconds before it takes its first breath outside the womb. The procedure is violent. It is gruesome. It is infanticide. The ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' would ban this dangerous procedure in which a physician delivers an unborn child's body until only the head remains inside the womb, punctures the back of the child's skull with a sharp instrument, and sucks the child's brains out before completing delivery of the dead infant. The great majority of these abortions are performed on unborn infants from the 20th to the 26th week of pregnancy and more often than not on the healthy babies of healthy mothers. The ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2002'' is similar to the previous bans on partial-birth abortion approved by the House in that an abortionist who violates the ban will be subject to fines or a maximum of two years imprisonment, or both; a civil cause of action is established for damages against an abortionist who violates the ban; and a doctor cannot be prosecuted under the ban if the abortion was necessary to save the life of a mother. A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited. Rather than being an abortion procedure that is embraced by the medical community, particularly among physicians who routinely perform other abortion procedures, partial-birth abortion remains a disfavored procedure that is not only unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, but in fact poses serious risks to the long-term health of women and in some circumstances, their lives. It is also a medical fact that the unborn infants aborted in this manner are alive until the end of the procedure and fully experience the pain associated with the procedure. As a result, at least 27 states banned the procedure, as did the United States Congress which voted to ban the procedure during the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses. Unfortunately, the two federal bans that reached President Clinton's desk were promptly vetoed. Although the House of Representatives overrode both Presidential vetoes, the Senate failed to do so. Then, two years ago in Stenberg v. Carhart, the United States Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban as an ``undue burden'' on women seeking abortions because it failed to include an exception for partial-birth abortions deemed necessary to preserve the ``health'' of the mother. Thus the Court essentially rendered null and void the reasoned factual findings and policy determinations of at least 27 state legislatures that this gruesome, inhumane, and dangerous procedure should be banned. The Stenberg Court based its conclusion ``that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [partial birth abortion] would be the safest procedure'' on the trial court's factual findings regarding the relative health and safety benefits of partial-birth abortions--findings which were highly disputed. Yet, because of the highly deferential ``clearly erroneous'' standard of appellate review applied to lower court factual findings, the Stenberg Court was required to accept these questionable trial court findings. Those factual findings are inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of authority regarding the safety and medical necessity of the partial- birth abortion procedure--including evidence received during extensive legislative hearings during the 104th and 105th Congresses--which indicates that a partial-birth abortion is never medically necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious risks to a woman's health, and lies outside the standard of medical care. In fact, a prominent medical association has concluded that partial-birth abortion is ``not an accepted medical practice,'' and that it has ``never been subject to even a minimal amount of the normal medical practice development.'' Thus, there exists substantial record evidence upon which Congress may conclude that the ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' should not contain a so-called ``health'' exception, because to do so would place the health of the very women the exception seeks to serve in jeopardy by allowing a medically unproven and dangerous procedure to go unregulated. Although the Supreme Court in Stenberg was obligated to accept the district court's findings regarding the relative health and safety benefits of a partial-birth abortion due to the applicable standard of appellate review, Congress possesses an independent constitutional authority upon which it may reach findings of fact that contradict those of the trial court. Under well-settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, these congressional findings will be entitled to great deference by the federal judiciary in ruling on the constitutionality of a partial-birth abortion ban. Thus, the first section of the ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' contains Congress's factual findings that, based upon extensive medical evidence compiled during congressional hearings, a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman. The ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' does not question the Supreme Court's authority to interpret Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Rather, it challenges the factual conclusion that a partial-birth abortion may, in some circumstances, be the safest abortion procedure for some women. The ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' also responds to the Stenberg Court's second holding, that Nebraska's law placed an undue burden on women seeking abortions because its definition of a ``partial-birth abortion'' could be construed to ban not only partial-birth abortions (also known as ``D & X'' abortions), but also the most common second trimester abortion procedure, dilation and evacuation or ``D & E.'' The ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002'' includes a new definition of a partial-birth abortion that clearly and precisely confines the prohibited procedure to a D & X abortion. Despite overwhelming support from the public, past efforts to ban partial-birth abortion were blocked by President Clinton. Now, we have a President who is equally committed to the sanctity of life, a President who has promised to stand with Congress in its efforts to ban this barbaric and dangerous procedure. It is time for Congress to end the national tragedy of partial-birth abortion and protect the lives of these helpless, defenseless, little babies.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. Contrary to the statement of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) that this is some kind of inside joke, what this actually does is it reveals clearly those of us in this House who are seriously committed to reducing the tax burden on the American people and making it tough to raise that tax burden in the future. Those folks who believe that will vote ``yes.'' It separates them from the folks that really do not care how high taxes are or how high they might go in the future. They will vote ``no.'' The amount of money taken out of the pockets of working Americans in the form of taxes is simply too high. This House has made significant efforts this year and in previous years to reduce the tax burden on the American people. We have done that in cooperation with the President. We have been successful in passing some of those pieces of legislation into law. It is also important that we protect hard-working American families from a future of excessive taxation. Let us face it. Taxes are just too high in this country. By making it more difficult to raise taxes, H.J. Res. 96, the debate that we will hear this evening, it will do just that. H.J. Res. 96 would impose fiscal discipline and constrain the growth of Federal Government by requiring a two-thirds vote for any bill that increases the internal revenue by more than just a de minimis amount. The amendment would exclude any increase from the lowering of an effective rate of any tax. Congress may enforce and implement the amendment through legislation as authorized by law. In addition, if the United States needs to increase revenues to wage the war on international terrorism or engage in military conflicts abroad, the amendment provides that the supermajority requirement could be waived if the Congress declared war or adopted a joint resolution to engage in military conflict which caused an ``imminent and serous threat to national security.'' Supermajority voting is not a radical idea. There are 10 instances in which the Constitution already requires a supermajority vote. For example, conviction by the Senate following an impeachment; overriding a Presidential veto; consent to a treaty; and amending the Constitution require more than a simple majority, and there are others. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, 14 States currently have tax limitation provisions for all, most, or some tax increases. Out of those, 12 States require a supermajority for any tax increase. This amendment will help to stem the tax-and-spend policies that too often rule this place, that rule Washington. American working men and women now have to toil from January to late April just to satisfy their tax obligation. Only after Big Government's insatiable appetite for taxes is satisfied, can American families begin to look out for their own needs. In the 1950s, the Federal Government took about 5 percent of the average American family's money, and that was after fighting World War II and the Korean War. Since then, that figure has increased by five times. It has up to about 25 percent of the American families' money going just to pay their Federal income taxes. If you add State and local taxes on top of that, it is even higher. Today, the Federal Government takes about a quarter of what we earn, and I am not sure anyone here would even suggest that government has become 500 percent more productive and efficient. Add that to the tax burden imposed by States and localities, and working families face an even larger tax bill. The tax limitation amendment would greatly help American families who are already struggling to pay mounting tax bills. It would also require Congress to focus on options besides raising taxes to manage the Federal budget, helping to impose fiscal discipline, something we need in this place, and to constrain the growth of government, something we talk about a lot but far too often do not do. Mr. Speaker, let us do right by working American families by supporting this legislation.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is saying if the person who is going to get the abortion is driving the vehicle, would they themselves be responsible?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit. Mr. Speaker, these individuals that are referred to in this motion to recommit, siblings and grandparents and religious leaders, ministers, that sort of thing, do not have the authority now to authorize any medical procedures for a minor child or to council or guide that child as she makes important medical decisions. So why should the fundamental rights of parents to consult and advise their pregnant daughters be thrown aside, only in the context of abortion? The purpose of this bill is to ensure that the rights of parents to be involved in their daughter's abortion decision is not interfered with. Judicial bypass procedures contained in all parental notice and consent statutes allow a pregnant minor in some circumstances to obtain an abortion without having notified or gained the consent of her parent or legal guardian in cases of sexual abuse or incest and those types of things, for example. Those who want to add these exemptions have a fundamental problem with the underlying State laws that only provide parents a right to consent to or receive notice of this procedure. The inclusion of these individuals is a matter for each individual legislature to decide, not Congress. The purpose of H.R. 476 is to enforce State laws as they are. If extended family members or religious leaders are truly interested in the best interests of the pregnant young girl, they will encourage and support her as she takes the difficult step to either inform her parents or guardian about her pregnancy, or to pursue a judicial bypass. It is certainly not in the best interests of a pregnant young girl for anyone, including a religious leader or extended family member, to assist her in evading the laws of her home State and secretly transporting her miles away from those who love her most in order to undergo a potentially dangerous procedure that carries with it serious medical consequences, serious long-term consequences. Parents are in the best position to make decisions about their minor children. Parents have their children, they love their children, they nurture their children, they care for them. They are in the best position, not anybody else. For these reasons and others, I urge my colleagues to vote against this motion to recommit. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. CHABOT. I would suggest that the gentleman do that.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield again, since I have answered it four times, I would like to read the bill. The bill clearly says, ``Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, in force in the State where the individual resides, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.''

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, ``transport'' would be to take a person across a State line for the purpose of an abortion. It would not include a taxi cab driver, for example, if the taxi cab driver was not involved in a conspiracy to transport that person across the State line.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield on his time?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, could the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) repeat the question?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. As chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, I will address some of the Constitution issues and the legal issues relative to H.R. 476. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 476, The Child Custody Protection Act, is a regulation of interstate commerce that seeks to protect the health and safety of young girls, as well as the rights of parents, to be involved in the medical decisions of their minor daughters, by preventing valid and constitutional State parental involvement laws from being circumvented. As such, it falls well within Congress's constitutional authority to regulate the transportation of individuals in interstate commerce. There is a solid body of case law which confirms that the authority of Congress to regulate the transportation of individuals in interstate commerce is no longer in question. Particularly instructive is the Mann Act, which flatly prohibited the interstate transportation of women for ``prostitution'' or for ``any other immoral purpose.'' Upholding the Act, the Supreme Court held that under the commerce clause, ``Congress has power over transportation `among the several States,' '' and characterized this power as being ``complete in itself,'' and further held that incident to this power, Congress ``may adopt not only means necessary,'' but also means ``convenient to its exercise,'' which ``may have the quality of police regulations.'' Congress's commerce clause authority to enact H.R. 476 is not placed in question by the fact that it seeks to prohibit interstate activities that might be legal in the State to which the activity is directed. Application of the Mann Act has been upheld in the transportation of a person, for example, to Nevada, even though prostitution in Nevada is legal. And Federal prohibitions on the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce as well as placing letters or circulars concerning lotteries in the mail, regardless of whether lotteries are legal in the State to which the tickets are transported, have also been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Rather than exercising its full authority under the commerce clause by simply prohibiting the interstate transportation of minors for abortions without obtaining parental notice or consent, H.R. 476 respects the rights of the various States to make these often controversial policy decisions for themselves, and ensures that each State's policy aims regarding this issue are not frustrated. Nothing in H.R. 476 affects the ability of minors residing in States that have chosen not to enact a parental involvement law, or where a parental involvement law is currently not in force, from obtaining an abortion without the knowledge of their parents. Thus, it will not supersede, override, or in any way alter existing State parental involvement laws. Opponents argue that H.R. 476 violates the rights of residents of each of the United States and the District of Columbia to travel to or from any State of the Union for lawful purposes. First, it does not appear that the Supreme Court has ever held that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is limited by the right to travel. Even assuming, however, that Congress's authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause is limited by the right to travel doctrine, the Supreme Court recognized in Saenz v. Roe that the right to travel is ``not absolute,'' and is not violated, so long as there is a ``substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.'' Congress obviously has a substantial interest in protecting the health and well-being of minor girls and in protecting the rights of parents to raise their children. In upholding the constitutionality of parental notice and consent statutes, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that ``during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.'' Based upon this reasoning, the court has allowed the States to enact laws that ``account for children's vulnerability'' and to protect the unique role of parents. Thus, ``legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.'' Opponents of H.R. 476 also contend that its criminal intent requirement renders it unconstitutional. However, the bill's requirement that defendants ``knowingly'' transport a minor with the intent that the minor obtain an abortion prevents H.R. 476 from acting as a strict liability law. Although H.R. 476 does not require defendants to be aware that the conduct is criminal, a mens rea requirements still exists, since the defendant must intend or know what he or she is doing in a physical sense, apart from any knowledge as to its legality. Furthermore, as the court has stated, ``The State may, in the maintenance of a public policy, provide that he who shall do particular acts shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.'' A stranger that secretly takes a minor across State lines for a dangerous medical procedure without ascertaining her parents' consent is certainly aware that he or she has acted, in some measure, wrongly. By finding the transporter liable when he ``in fact'' abridges a State law, H.R. 476 puts the transporter under a duty to ascertain parental permission before action is taken in order to guard against a possible violation. At the heart of the debate surrounding the Child Custody Protection Act is a disagreement about whether common sense legislation should be enacted in order to preserve the health of pregnant young girls and support parents in the exercise of their most basic right. This debate has already been held in almost all of the Nation's State legislatures, 43 of which have reasonably concluded that parents should be involved in these decisions by their minor daughters. These laws have been validly enacted and Congress is well within its authority to ensure that the channels of interstate commerce are not used to frustrate the policy goals of these laws. Thus, I urge my colleagues to support American families and vote in favor of this important bill.

Mr. CHABOT. Will the gentleman yield on his own time?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, if the person has knowledge and conspires to transport a minor across the State line----

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, the gentleman says ``she is driving.'' Who is he referring to?

Mr. CHABOT. If the gentleman will yield further, if a person is involved in a conspiracy to transport a person across State lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion, and is doing that in violation of a parental notification law and is not the parent, then they would be involved and they would be responsible. Whether it is a person accompanying, in my opinion, a person just accompanying would not be criminally responsible.

Mr. CHABOT. If the gentleman will continue to yield, the gentleman needs to read the language that is in the statute.

Mr. CHABOT. The language indicates if a person transports a person across the State line, then that person is responsible. It depends upon the level of their involvement.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, today I want to recognize the Hamilton County Republican Women's Club of Cincinnati, Ohio, in celebration of its 75th anniversary. Since 1927, this organization has diligently promoted and participated in our democratic process. The HCRWC has helped hundreds of candidates at the local, state, and federal levels, and supported countless issues of importance to the greater Cincinnati community. Grassroots organizations like the HCRWC supply campaigns with dedicated volunteers who donate their own time to do the invaluable behind the scenes work necessary to keep the democratic electoral process functioning. Mr. Speaker, organizations like the Hamilton County Republicans Women's Club are the backbone of the American political process. I wish the club and its members continued success in raising political awareness and increasing political participation in Cincinnati and beyond for years to come.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. Chairman. I rise in strong support of the bill and in opposition to this particular amendment. It undermines the principles of H.R. 2341, which is that large interstate class actions should be allowed in Federal court because many State courts are not effectively processing these lawsuits. As chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, I welcome the opportunity to address the criticism that this legislation would diminish State court authority or otherwise offend basic federalism principles. Opponents of this bill have suggested that removing a lawsuit filed in State court to Federal court deprives the State court of its right to decide matters of State law. But all State law-based actions do not presumptively belong in State court. Federal diversity jurisdiction, established by no less than the Framers of the United States Constitution, allows State law-based claims to be moved from local courts to Federal courts to ensure that all parties will be able to litigate on a level playing field and that interstate commerce interests will be protected. Additionally, the expansion of diversity included in the Class Action Fairness Act is consistent with current diversity laws, since it allows Federal courts to hear large cases which have interstate implications. By nature, class actions fulfill these requirements. Mr. Chairman, in most State law-based class actions, the proposed classes encompass residents of multiple States. Thus, the trial court, regardless of whether it is a State or Federal court, must interpret and apply the laws of multiple jurisdictions. It is far more appropriate for a Federal court to interpret the laws of various States as opposed to having one State court dictate the substantive laws of other States. For that and other reasons, I would oppose this particular amendment, and I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for yielding me time, and also for his leadership in moving forward on this important piece of legislation. Last summer, over 70 original cosponsors joined with me in introducing H.R. 2175, the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act. The purpose of this bill is to respond to recent legal and cultural developments and protect all infants who are born alive by recognizing them as a ``person, human being, child or individual'' for purposes of Federal law. Recent court decisions have called into question the rights entitled to newborn babies. Under the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in the Stenberg v. Carhart case, the long-accepted legal principle that infants who are born alive are persons entitled to the protections of the law has been called into question, bringing our culture and legal system closer than ever believed possible to accepting infanticide. By failing to recognize as legally significant the location of an infant's body at the moment it is killed during an abortion, the Court's ruling opened the door for future courts to conclude that the location of an infant's body at the moment it is killed during an abortion, even if fully born, has no legal significance whatsoever. The principle that born-alive infants are entitled to protection of the law is also being questioned at one of America's most prestigious universities. Amazingly, Princeton University bioethicist, Peter Singer, argues that the life of a newborn baby is ``of no greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness or capacity to feel.'' Thus, ``Killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often, it is not wrong at all.'' Think of that. If such logic is allowed to go unchecked, the end result will be legal and moral confusion as to the status of newborn infants that are on the outskirts of viability or were marked for abortion prior to their unintended birth. As chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, I presided over hearings during which the subcommittee received credible and disturbing testimony that such confusion already exists. According to eyewitness accounts, live-birth abortions are being performed on healthy infants as late as the 23rd week of pregnancy, and beyond, that suffer from nonfatal deformities resulting in live-born premature infants who are simply allowed to die, sometimes without the provision of warmth or nutrition. Our subcommittee was told of a living infant who was found in a soiled utility closet; another who was found naked on the edge of a sink; and another infant who, horribly, was wrapped in a disposable towel and thrown in the trash, only to be later found after falling out of the towel and onto the floor. One witness, Nurse Jill Stanek, told the subcommittee about a live- birth abortion performed on a healthy infant at more than 23 weeks of gestation, and stated, ``If the mother had wanted everything done for her baby, there would have been a neonatologist, pediatric resident, neonatal nurse, and respiratory therapist present for the delivery, and the baby would have been taken to our neonatal intensive care unit for specialized care. Instead, the only personnel present for this delivery were an obstetrical resident and my coworker. After delivery, the baby, who showed early signs of thriving, was merely wrapped in a blanket and kept in the Labor and Delivery Department until she died 2\1/2\ hours later.'' In my hometown of Cincinnati, a woman delivered a living 22-week-old baby girl after going through with the first steps of an unsuccessful partial birth abortion procedure. Reportedly, the attending emergency room physician placed the live baby in a specimen dish and asked that the baby be taken to the lab. The medical technician, Shelly Lowe, refused after she saw the baby girl gasping for breath. Instead, she held the baby, whom she named Hope, for 3 hours, singing to her and stroking her cheeks, until she died. Ms. Lowe has said that she ``wanted her to feel that she was wanted; that she was a perfectly formed newborn entering the world too soon through no choice of her own.'' Had any of these newborns been assessed for their likelihood of long- term survival, medical research suggests that there is a strong chance that they would have survived. Infants born alive at 23 weeks currently have almost a 40 percent chance of sustained survival; those born at 24 weeks, a greater than 50 percent chance of survival; and those born at 25 weeks now have an 80 percent chance of survival. With medical technology rapidly improving, these survival rates will only improve. The definition of ``born alive'' contained in H.R. 2175 was derived from a model definition of ``live birth'' that was promulgated by the World Health Organization in 1950 and is, with minor variations, currently codified in 30 States and the District of Columbia. Like those laws, H.R. 2175 would not mandate medical treatment where none is currently indicated. While there is debate about whether or not to aggressively treat prematurely born infants below a certain birth weight, this is a dispute about medical efficiency, not regarding the legal status of the patient. H.R. 2175 would not affect the applicable standard of care, but would only ensure that all born-alive infants, regardless of their age and regardless of the circumstances of their birth, are treated as persons for purposes of Federal law. I urge all Members to support this bill of compassion that says that all of America's children are precious and deserving of the most basic dignities afforded human life.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be passed over without prejudice.