Steve Chabot

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett). (Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds. Mr. Speaker, we have once again heard this described as an assault on a woman's right to choose. I want to reiterate that the woman has made her choice to keep that baby. It is the criminal that took away that choice. We just want to punish that criminal more severely than he is under existing law. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham), a proponent of this bill.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Akin).

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Largent).

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, the Lofgren substitute amendment would provide an enhanced sentence for a violent crime that causes an interruption to the normal course of the pregnancy resulting in prenatal injury, including termination of the pregnancy. This substitute clearly must be opposed. First, the substitute ignores the injuries inflicted by violent criminals upon the unborn. It appears to operate as a sentencing enhancement. A sentencing enhancement is when you get attacked and the attacker throws you down and hurts your arm, your leg and your back, too. The attacker's penalties gets enhanced by the additional penalties done to the victim. But I challenge anyone to sit back and reflect on the loss they would feel if they were a pregnant woman who lost her unborn child or a relative of that woman. Would the loss felt be the same as the loss of an appendix or pancreas? I think not. Would you feel the same regret you felt for a bone if a bone were broken or a slipped disk in one's back? Surely not. The loss that a person would feel would be a distinct and a unique loss, and the criminal law should appropriately reflect that loss in a separate offense protecting the unborn children. It is our goal to protect them and the mothers in this instance. The law does not simply punish criminals. The law, and especially criminal law, embodies the judgment of civilized society. As such it must credibly and fully respect and reflect the magnitude of the loss felt when a woman loses her unborn child to violence. This can only be done by creating a separate offense to protect the separate unborn person. Second, the substitute is hopelessly ambiguous. So ambiguous that it puts in jeopardy the prosecution of any criminal for violence against the unborn. The confusing verbiage in the substitute amendment is incomprehensible; and if adopted, it will almost certainly doom any prosecution for injuring or killing an unborn child during the commission of a violent crime. The substitute amendment provides an enhanced penalty for ``interruption to the normal course of the pregnancy resulting in prenatal injury, including termination and pregnancy.'' The amendment then authorizes greater punishment for an ``interruption'' that terminates the pregnancy than it does for a mere interruption of a pregnancy. What is the difference between an interruption of a pregnancy and an interruption that terminates the pregnancy? Does not any interruption of a pregnancy necessarily result in a termination of the pregnancy; or have supporters of the substitute managed to find a way to place a developing human being in some sort of suspended animation. Mr. Speaker, what does the phrase ``termination of pregnancy'' mean. Does it mean only that the unborn child died, or could it mean that the child was just born prematurely without suffering any injuries. These ambiguities make the substitute almost impossible to make any sense of. But maybe this is not what the substitute does. It is so ambiguous that it admits of several readings. It is more like a bowl of tea leaves. Subsection 2(a) of the substitute amendment appears to operate as a mere sentence enhancement authorizing punishment in addition to any penalty imposed for the predicate offense. Yet the language of subsection 2(b) describes the additional punishment provided in subsection 2(a) as punishment for a violation of subsection (a), suggesting that subsection 2(a) creates a separate offense for killing or injuring an unborn child. Which is it? What is going on here? Let us not support a substitute that is more like a Magic 8-Ball. This ambiguity is magnified by the fact that subsection 2(a) requires that the conduct injuring or killing an unborn child ``result in the conviction of the person so engaging.'' So does this indicate a conviction must be obtained before the defendant may be charged with a violation of subsection 2(a); or does it mean that the additional punishment must be imposed at the trial for the predicate offense, so long as it is imposed after the jury convicts based on the predicate offense. Mr. Speaker, is a separate charge necessary for the enhanced penalty to be imposed? The substitute amendment simply makes no sense except perhaps to criminals who will understand its significance crystal clear. They get away with the heinous crime. Unlike the current language of the bill, the substitute stunningly contains no exemptions for abortion-related conduct, for conduct of the mother, or for the medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child. This omission leaves the substitute amendment open to the charge that it would permit the prosecution of mothers who inflict harm upon themselves or their unborn children, or doctors who kill or injure unborn children during the provision of medical treatment. This substitute as written is a magnet for a constitutional challenge. The substitute amendment also appears to mischaracterize the nature of the injury that is inflicted when an unborn child is killed or injured during the commission of a violent crime. Under the current language of the bill, a separate offense is committed whenever an individual causes a death or a bodily injury to a child who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place. The substitute amendment seems to transform the death of the unborn child into the abstraction ``terminating a pregnancy.'' ``Bodily injury'' inflicted upon the unborn child appears to become ``prenatal injury.'' Both injuries are described as resulting from an ``interruption to the normal course of the pregnancy.'' These abstractions ignore the fact that the death of an unborn child occurs whenever a pregnancy is violently ``terminated'' by a criminal. They also fail to recognize that a ``prenatal injury'' is an injury inflicted upon a real human being in the womb of his or her mother. For example, if an assault is committed, for example, on a Federal employee, and her unborn child subsequently suffers from a disability because of the assault, that injury cannot accurately be described as an abstract injury to a ``pregnancy.'' It is an injury to a human being. Our bill recognizes that. The substitute does not. The substitute is thus fatally flawed and must be rejected. The substitute amendment is so poorly drafted and ambiguous that obtaining a conviction of a violent criminal under it will be almost impossible. The substitute amendment is also subject to constitutional attack because it contains no exemption for abortion-related conduct, for conduct of the woman, or for medical treatment. And finally the substitute amendment ignores the injuries inflicted by violent criminals upon unborn children, transforming those injuries into mere abstractions. For these reasons, the substitute amendment should be rejected. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the former chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary and the current chairman of the Committee on International Relations. (Mr. Hyde asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHABOT. I do, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, it is a crime bill as well as a constitutional issue.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHABOT. Pardon me?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I am saying that is one among many of the other issues. I was going to say it also has jurisdiction over constitutional amendments and all kinds of issues.

Mr. CHABOT. Pardon me?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. It is because the Subcommittee on the Constitution has jurisdiction over this particular issue, issues of privacy, issues of civil rights, a whole range of issues.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding time to me, and I thank him for his leadership on this very important issue. Mr. Speaker, as we conduct this debate today, we going to hear from opponents that, for various reasons, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001 is unconstitutional. We will also hear that the legislation in some mysterious way applies to abortion. I want to make very clear from the beginning that these assertions are false. In fact, these arguments only serve as a smokescreen, a distraction from the real issue at hand. What are the real issues? Those of us supporting this legislation believe that when a criminal commits an act of violence against a woman and her unborn child, the criminal should face punishment for both the harm caused to the mother and for injuring or killing the innocent child that she is carrying. Opponents of the legislation feel otherwise. They believe that the criminal should not face separate sanctions for harm inflicted on the unborn child, even if the unborn child, a child that the mother greatly wanted to bring into this world, is killed. With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to address the legal issues that have been raised regarding the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. First, questions have been raised about Congress' constitutional authority to enact this legislation. The challenge to the bill on this ground is completely without merit. It is clear that Congress has such constitutional authority because the bill will only affect conduct that is already prohibited by Federal law. H.R. 503 merely provides an additional offense and punishment for those who injure or kill an unborn child during the commission of one of the existing predicate offenses set forth in the bill. If there is any question regarding the constitutionality of the act's reach, that question is addressed to the constitutionality of the predicate offense, not H.R. 503. Opponents of this legislation also argued that it somehow violates the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. This argument is also without merit. To begin with, H.R. 503 simply does not apply to abortion. On page 4 of the bill, beginning on line 9, prosecution is explicitly precluded ``for any conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law.'' So it does not apply to abortion. The act also does not permit prosecution ``of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child or of any woman with respect to her unborn child.'' So it does not apply to abortion, period. The act could not be more clear in exempting abortion. Moreover, there is nothing in Roe v. Wade that prevents Congress from giving legal recognition to the lives of unborn children outside the parameters of the right of abortion marked off in that case. In establishing a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, the Roe court explicitly stated that it was not resolving ``the difficult question of when life begins,'' because ``the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.'' That is what the Court said. What the court held was that the government could not override the rights of the pregnant woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy by adopting one theory of when life begins. The Supreme Court explicitly confirmed this understanding of Roe in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. That was a 1989 case. Courts addressing the constitutionality of State laws that punish killing or injuring unborn children have recognized the lack of merit in the argument that such laws violate Roe and as a result have consistently upheld those State laws. For example, in Smith v. Newsome, which was decided in 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that Roe was immaterial to whether a State can prohibit the destruction of a fetus by a third party. The Minnesota Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in 1990 in the case of State v. Merrill, holding that Roe v. Wade protects the woman's right of choice. It does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus. In 1994, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Davis that the Roe v. Wade principles are inapplicable to a statute that criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. In State v. Coleman, a 1997 case, the Ohio court, my State, the Court of Appeals stated, ``Roe protects a woman's constitutional right. It does not protect a third-party's unilateral destruction of a fetus.'' Opponents of this legislation have also argued that the use of the term ``unborn child'' is ``designed to inflame.'' They contend that the use of this term may, in the words of those dissenting from the Committee on the Judiciary report, result in a major collision between the rights of the mother and the rights of the unborn. This objection reflects nothing more than the semantical preferences of the most radical abortion advocates. It is based upon an apparent lack of knowledge of the widespread use of the term ``unborn child'' in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals, in State statutes and in State court decisions, and even in the legal writings of abortion advocates themselves. The use of the term ``unborn child'' by the Supreme Court can be illustrated by reference to Roe v. Wade itself, in which Justice Blackmon used the term ``unborn children'' as synonymous with ``fetuses.'' Justice Blackmon also used the term ``unborn child'' in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, in which the court struck down Georgia's abortion statute. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have also used the term ``unborn child'' as synonymous with fetus. These cases include City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, decided back in 1983; Webster v. Reproductive Health services, decided in 1989; and International Union v. Johnson Controls, decided in 1991. There are so many decisions by the United States Courts of Appeal using the term ``unborn child'' that it would be too time consuming to go through them all. There are also at least 19 State criminal statutes similar to H.R. 503 that currently use the term ``unborn child'' to refer to a fetus, and these statutes have been consistently upheld by the courts. Even abortion advocates such as Catharine MacKinnon have used the term ``unborn child'' as synonymous with the term ``fetus.'' In an article that was published in the Yale Law Journal entitled ``Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law,'' Professor MacKinnon conceded that a ``fetus is a human form of life'' that is ``alive.'' In her defense of abortion, Professor MacKinnon expressed her view that ``many women have abortions as a desperate act of love for their unborn children.'' Finally, opponents of H.R. 503 have argued that the bill lacks the necessary means requirement for a valid criminal law and is therefore unconstitutional. This argument reflects a lack of understanding of H.R. 503 and the well-established doctrine of transferred intent in the criminal law. Under H.R. 503, an individual may be guilty of an offense against an unborn child only if he has committed an act of violence with criminal intent upon a pregnant woman, thereby injuring or killing her unborn child. Relying upon the doctrine of transferred intent, H.R. 503 considers the criminal intent directed toward the pregnant woman to have also been directed toward the unborn child. The transferred intent doctrine was recognized in England as early as 1576 and was adopted by the American courts during the early days of the Republic. A well-known criminal law commentator describes the application of the doctrine to the crime of murder in language that is remarkably similar to the language and operation of this legislation as follows: ``Under the common-law doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the author of whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he killed the intended victim,'' which is essentially what we have under this legislation. Mr. Speaker, it is clear that the legal challenges to this bill cannot withstand serious scrutiny. It is clear that this law does not in any way impact abortion. It is especially clear that the opposition of the bill, in fact, stems from an objection to the very concept of unborn children. The opponents insist that a concept that is a well- recognized one in the law is somehow dangerous and subversive. These arguments should be soundly rejected. The only people who have anything to fear from this bill are the criminals who engage in violent acts against women and the unborn children that they are carrying. So, again, let me remind my colleagues of what the true question is before us. Do you believe that a violent criminal who kills or injures an unborn child, a child who is loved and wanted by a mother and usually the father, should face an additional offense and punishment for their acts? I believe that the American people would answer that question with a resounding yes, and I hope the House would do the same today. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) for his leadership on this issue. I also thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, for his leadership. I urge Members to vote in favor of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule for consideration of the bill, H.R. 503. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act is a carefully constructed piece of legislation that will help fill the gap in Federal law with regard to protecting unborn children from violence. Current Federal law provides no additional punishment for criminals who commit acts of violence against pregnant women and kill or injure their unborn children. Thus, except in those States that recognize unborn children as victims of such crimes, injuring or killing an unborn child during the commission of a violent crime has no legal consequences whatsoever. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 503 would correct this deficiency in the law by providing that an individual who injures or kills an unborn child during the commission of certain predefined violent Federal crimes may be punished for a separate offense. I would like to reiterate what the gentlewoman from North Carolina said about a particularly heinous case. This legislation would ensure that prosecutors have the tools they need to prosecute criminals like Gregory Robbins, who was an airman at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in my State of Ohio, when he wrapped his fists in a T-shirt to reduce the chance that there might be bruising and visible wounds on the mother of the child and beat his 8-months pregnant wife in the face and abdomen, and he killed the unborn baby in doing that. Military prosecutors were able to charge Robbins for the death because under Ohio law, there is a fetal homicide law, and they were able to do so under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But had Mr. Robbins committed this act just across the Ohio River, just across from my district which is Cincinnati, in Kentucky, a State which has no fetal homicide law, he would have received no additional punishment for killing the unborn child. By enacting H.R. 503, Congress will ensure that violent criminals who commit violent acts against pregnant women are justly punished for injuring or killing those unborn children. Without the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the crimes against these innocent victims will continue to go unpunished. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this rule, and I urge my colleagues to support the rule and H.R. 503 to provide meaningful protection for violence against unborn children. We ought to stop that in this country, and this is the appropriate legislation to do so.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, the House will today be taking up a very important piece of legislation, H.R. 503, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. It is a very carefully constructed bill which will fill a gap which presently exists in Federal law. Right now, under Federal law it provides no additional punishment for criminals who commit an act of violence against pregnant women and kill or injure the unborn children that they might be carrying. I want to commend the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham) for his leadership in preparing this long overdue piece of legislation. Let us protect pregnant women in this Nation, and let us also protect the innocent unborn children that they are carrying.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) for his leadership on this very important constitutional amendment. Madam Speaker, the amendment of money taken out of the pockets of Americans in taxes is simply too high, and it adds to the difficulties many families face in making ends meet. Congress must reduce the tax burden on every American right now, but at the very least, we must act to protect hard-working families from future excessive taxation, which has happened consistently over time. Congress has increased taxes, unfortunately, many times in this body. By making it more difficult to raise taxes, H.J. Res. 41 will do just that. Specifically, the tax limitation amendment would require any legislative measure changing the Internal Revenue laws to receive the support of two-thirds of the Members of each House voting and present, meaning that any tax increase would require a supermajority vote to become law. The amendment would not apply to legislative measures that are determined not to increase the Internal Revenue by more than a de minimis amount. This supermajority requirement could be waived when a declaration of war is in effect or a majority of Congress adopts a joint resolution, declaring that the United States is engaged in military conflict, which causes an imminent serious threat to national security. Additionally, in order to implement the amendment, Congress will ultimately need to adopt legislation defining terms and flushing out the necessary procedures. The tax limitation amendment will cover personal and corporate income taxes, estate and gift taxes, employment taxes, and excise taxes. The amendment would not apply to tariffs or user fees or voluntary payments, or bills that do not change the Internal Revenue laws, even if they have revenue implications. Madam Speaker, 14 States currently have tax limitation provisions for tax increases. Out of those, 12 States require a supermajority for any tax increase. We need this amendment to help stem the tax-and-spend policies which have too often ruled Washington. Much of what goes on in this town involves the taking and spending of other people's money. Average Americans now have to spend most of their time working just to cover their tax burden; and, hopefully, have enough left over to maintain a reasonable standard of living for themselves and for their families. That is just inappropriate. Madam Speaker, in the 1950s, the Federal Government took only about 5 percent of the average American family's money. That was after fighting World War II and the Korean War. Since then in peacetime with a generally strong economy, that figure has increased five-fold. Now 25 percent of what the average family earns comes here to Washington, D.C. Today the Federal Government takes about a quarter of what we earn, and I am not sure anyone around here with a straight face could even suggest that government has gotten 500 percent better. Since 1992 alone, the Federal Government has raised taxes at the gas pump, on working seniors receiving Social Security, and on mom-and-pop small businesses. Yet the average family's real after-tax income has not really increased over the years. At best, working families are just treading water, and the Government keeps trying to soak them in order to fund more and more, oftentimes very wasteful, programs which come out of Washington. The tax limitation amendment would require Congress to focus on options other than raising taxes to manage the Federal budget, help to impose fiscal discipline and to constrain the growth of government, something we definitely need in this town. That is why I think H.J. Res. 41 makes a worthy addition to the Nation's most sacred document. Madam Speaker, I strongly support this proposed constitutional amendment, and would urge my colleagues to support the rule. I want to commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) for putting forward this constitutional amendment which is long overdue.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Speaker, this week is National Victims' Rights Week. I would like to take this opportunity to ask my colleagues in Congress to follow the lead of 32 States, including my State of Ohio, and pass a Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment. The amendment would allow crime victims to confront their assailants in court, at sentencing and parole hearings, require that they be notified about the release or escape of a perpetrator from custody, and guarantee them the right to seek restitution from their attackers. For far too long, victims of crime in this country have had to stand on the courthouse steps with meaningful justice just beyond their reach, not allowed to view proceedings in person, too often not permitted to speak out on behalf of a murdered loved one, not even notified when a violent abuser is turned loose. Crime victims deserve to be treated better. They deserve to be treated with dignity in our criminal justice system. With the adoption of this amendment, we will finally say loud and clear that victims have inalienable rights too, which should be recognized by our Constitution.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Speaker, Jim and Carol Siniawski lost their little boy last month. Their son Justin lost his brother. I lost a special friend. It was an honor and a privilege to have gotten to know Jake Siniawski. Jake suffered from a rare blood disorder called Fanconi anemia, which ultimately claimed his life. He was only 10 years old. While he was quite ill for much of his short life, his obituary in the Cincinnati Post noted that Jake was an inspiration to everyone and lived life to the fullest every day. The medical community worked hard to provide a cure for Jake. The good people of St. Bernard's Church sponsored a marrow-typing blood drive in an effort to find a compatible bone marrow donor. His family and friends and neighbors always remembered him in their prayers. Those who loved him did all that they could. I have talked about Jake on this floor in the past, and I know my colleagues in the United States Congress join me in expressing our condolences to Jake's loving family. Madam Speaker, we can help boys and girls like Jake by participating in the National Marrow Donor Program. All it takes is a simple blood test. It could save a life. God bless you, Jake.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Monday, March 26, 2001, it adjourn to meet at 12:30 p.m. on Tuesday, March 27, for morning hour debates.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 2 p.m. on Monday next.

Mr. CHABOT

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. Amendment Offered by Mr. Chabot

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), for making it possible for the House to consider this resolution on the eve of the Fourth Special Commission on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. I want to commend the author of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson), with whom I have worked very closely on this issue. He has been a real leader, working on behalf of stolen American children and their left-behind parents. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to be a principal Republican cosponsor on this important bipartisan legislation, and I look forward to traveling to The Hague next week to present this resolution to the 60 member countries represented at the Commission. H. Con. Res. 69 expresses the sense of the Congress on the Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction and urges all contracting states to the convention to recommend the production of practice guides. The resolution stresses that providing a uniform process for resolving international child abduction cases is more important than ever, and urges that practice guides be developed for the convention that build on recognized best practices under the convention. Adoption of this resolution today, I believe, will send a strong message to representatives of those Hague Convention signatories who will be meeting over the next several days that the United States Government is serious about insisting that all contracting parties to the Hague Convention comply fully with both the letter and the spirit of their international obligations under the convention. By adopting the practice guides suggested in the resolution, Hague countries can create a better environment for the eventual safe return of abducted children to their custodial parent. The Hague Convention provides for a child that has been abducted to or retained in a country other than his or her country of habitual residence to be speedily returned to the country of habitual residence. Sadly, the process has not always worked well. The State Department reports that there are at any given time more than 1,000 open cases of American children either abducted or wrongfully retained in a foreign country. Thousands more are thought to go unreported. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children estimates that there are 165,000 parental kidnapping cases each year and that approximately 10 percent involve a parent who has taken a child abroad without permission. Mr. Speaker, the production and promotion of practice guides as proposed in this thoughtful resolution can provide great assistance in the implementation and operation of The Hague Convention. Last year this House adopted a resolution that I authored with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson) that urged noncomplying countries to take the necessary measures to bring themselves into compliance with The Hague Convention. Let us take another step today to help these stolen children and their left-behind parents. Let us adopt this resolution. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson). I also want to again thank him for his leadership in this very important area of the law.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on International Relations be discharged from further consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 69) expressing the sense of the Congress on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and urging all contracting states to the Convention to recommend the production of practice guides, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment to the preamble.