Saxby Chambliss

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to speak today about our Tax Code as well as our economic future. There is a problem with our Tax Code, one that hits home with nearly all Americans; that is, its complexity. In the past few years I have met with hundreds of constituents who are worried about this issue. Individuals, small businesses, farms, and large corporations alike struggle with meeting their obligations to the IRS because of the complexity of our current Tax Code. Earlier this month the IRS Taxpayer Advocate revealed some startling figures in the Agency's annual report to Congress. It estimates that individuals and businesses spend 6.1 billion hours each year complying with the IRS tax filing requirements. The complexity of the Tax Code is so burdensome that 9 out of 10 taxpayers now pay a professional preparer or use often costly commercial software to assist in tax preparation. Then there is the problem with our corporate taxes. The United States has the highest marginal effective tax rate among the largest developed nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. According to recent studies by the Cato Institute, that rate for U.S. corporations is almost 36 percent. In fact, only Argentina, Chad, and Uzbekistan have higher tax rates than does the United States. While the U.S. corporate rates have remained high, other countries are lowering their rates. Sweden, for example, has become the latest country to announce that it will lower corporate tax rates, in part to help attract more foreign investment. Our corporate tax rates continue to be higher than they should, and we lose our competitive advantage to other nations in part because of that high tax rate. I want to talk about a way to fix both these problems. Since joining the Senate, I have introduced in each new Congress the Fair Tax Act. Today I am reintroducing this legislation because of my belief that the Fair Tax Act can fix the problems built into our current Tax Code. The fair tax will promote freedom and economic opportunity by eliminating our current archaic and inefficient Tax Code and replacing it with a simpler, fairer means of collecting tax revenue. It will repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, capital gains taxes, all payroll taxes, self-employment taxes, and the estate and gift tax in lieu of a 23-percent tax on the final sale of goods and services. Elimination of these inefficient taxing mechanisms will not only bring about equality within our tax system, it will also bring about simplicity. It will provide tax relief for business-to-business transactions. These transactions, including those for used goods that have already been taxed, are not subject to the sales tax, so there would be no double taxation. Some of my colleagues have asked how the fair tax would affect our revenue on our entitlement programs. Social Security and Medicare benefits would remain untouched under the Fair Tax Act. There would be no financial reductions to either of these vital programs. Instead, the source of the trust fund revenue for these two programs would be replaced simply by the sales tax revenue instead of by payroll tax revenue. Another question I get is how the fair tax would affect impoverished Americans. Under the Fair Tax Act, every American would receive a monthly rebate check equal to the spending up to the Federal poverty level, according to Department of Health and Human Services guidelines. This rebate would ensure that no American pays taxes on the purchase of necessities. We have made nearly 5,000 changes to the Tax Code since 2001--I have supported some of them, and I have not supported others--all in the name of improvement and economic benefit. I believe we can do better than simply lowering our taxes. I know we can make a bigger impact on our economic future by ridding ourselves of a tax structure that is holding us back. Ronald Reagan once said: I believe we really can, however, say that God did give mankind virtually unlimited gifts to invent, produce and create. And for that reason alone, it would be wrong for governments to devise a tax structure or economic system that suppresses and denies those gifts. With that statement, I could not agree more.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to speak today about our Tax Code as well as our economic future. There is a problem with our Tax Code, one that hits home with nearly all Americans; that is, its complexity. In the past few years I have met with hundreds of constituents who are worried about this issue. Individuals, small businesses, farms, and large corporations alike struggle with meeting their obligations to the IRS because of the complexity of our current Tax Code. Earlier this month the IRS Taxpayer Advocate revealed some startling figures in the Agency's annual report to Congress. It estimates that individuals and businesses spend 6.1 billion hours each year complying with the IRS tax filing requirements. The complexity of the Tax Code is so burdensome that 9 out of 10 taxpayers now pay a professional preparer or use often costly commercial software to assist in tax preparation. Then there is the problem with our corporate taxes. The United States has the highest marginal effective tax rate among the largest developed nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. According to recent studies by the Cato Institute, that rate for U.S. corporations is almost 36 percent. In fact, only Argentina, Chad, and Uzbekistan have higher tax rates than does the United States. While the U.S. corporate rates have remained high, other countries are lowering their rates. Sweden, for example, has become the latest country to announce that it will lower corporate tax rates, in part to help attract more foreign investment. Our corporate tax rates continue to be higher than they should, and we lose our competitive advantage to other nations in part because of that high tax rate. I want to talk about a way to fix both these problems. Since joining the Senate, I have introduced in each new Congress the Fair Tax Act. Today I am reintroducing this legislation because of my belief that the Fair Tax Act can fix the problems built into our current Tax Code. The fair tax will promote freedom and economic opportunity by eliminating our current archaic and inefficient Tax Code and replacing it with a simpler, fairer means of collecting tax revenue. It will repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, capital gains taxes, all payroll taxes, self-employment taxes, and the estate and gift tax in lieu of a 23-percent tax on the final sale of goods and services. Elimination of these inefficient taxing mechanisms will not only bring about equality within our tax system, it will also bring about simplicity. It will provide tax relief for business-to-business transactions. These transactions, including those for used goods that have already been taxed, are not subject to the sales tax, so there would be no double taxation. Some of my colleagues have asked how the fair tax would affect our revenue on our entitlement programs. Social Security and Medicare benefits would remain untouched under the Fair Tax Act. There would be no financial reductions to either of these vital programs. Instead, the source of the trust fund revenue for these two programs would be replaced simply by the sales tax revenue instead of by payroll tax revenue. Another question I get is how the fair tax would affect impoverished Americans. Under the Fair Tax Act, every American would receive a monthly rebate check equal to the spending up to the Federal poverty level, according to Department of Health and Human Services guidelines. This rebate would ensure that no American pays taxes on the purchase of necessities. We have made nearly 5,000 changes to the Tax Code since 2001--I have supported some of them, and I have not supported others--all in the name of improvement and economic benefit. I believe we can do better than simply lowering our taxes. I know we can make a bigger impact on our economic future by ridding ourselves of a tax structure that is holding us back. Ronald Reagan once said: I believe we really can, however, say that God did give mankind virtually unlimited gifts to invent, produce and create. And for that reason alone, it would be wrong for governments to devise a tax structure or economic system that suppresses and denies those gifts. With that statement, I could not agree more.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I oppose Senator Wyden's amendment also because it imposes an unreasonably burdensome reporting requirement on the DNI and is inconsistent with the purpose of FISA, which is to obtain foreign intelligence information. This amendment would require the diversion of scarce intelligence personnel and resources away from the identification of foreign intelligence information but, rather, to assess whether any wholly domestic communications have been inadvertently collected under FAA authorities. This is an unnecessary and pointless exercise. The collection system was designed to comply with FISA's clear prohibition against the intentional collection of wholly domestic communications. I will read how specific this is in the law. This is directly out of section 702, which the amendment seeks to attack. There are limitations against collection of information under the following guise: An acquisition authorized under subsection (a)-- Which is to collect information from those located outside the United States. We: may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States; may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. It goes further into detail and is very specific about the fact that there is no authorization to target U.S. persons. As the chairman said, it is our duty, as members of the Intelligence Committee, to do the oversight required to make sure these laws are complied with, and we do that. We do it in a very deliberate and direct way by not only having the individuals responsible for the collection of this information made available to the committee, but it goes all the way to the top. The individuals who collect it, as well as the leaders of the intelligence community, come in once a year--and they will come more often than that if there is a problem we need to address--and we review this information. The Senator from Oregon, the distinguished Presiding Officer, members of the Intelligence Committee, know the type of oversight that is available to us. So if there is any question about what is done and whether section 702 is not being complied with, we have the opportunity to ask the questions. The amendment by the distinguished Senator from Oregon actually goes further than what he said was a simple yes-or-no question and requires that the intelligence community go into great detail on any estimate or any finding where a U.S. person may have been involved. Is that the type of information we need for our intelligence community to spend their time on versus trying to find bad guys around the world? I think the answer is pretty simple. As we said yesterday, if there is a problem and the problem is addressed by the intelligence community and the Intelligence Committees on both the House and Senate side, it is not abused. If there is a problem, we fix it. There are minimization procedures that are in place which address this issue that are used when necessary. If we do our job, there is absolutely no reason for this amendment--and we do our job. The chairman is very diligent in making sure the annual reviews are set at specific times of the year. Every member of the committee has an obligation to be at the hearings to ask the tough and right questions. As far as I know, every member of the committee has done that. We have provided the right kind of oversight. I encourage my colleagues to vote against this because it is simply an unnecessary amendment, and it is the last amendment we have to consider. As we said over and over yesterday, we have to get this bill on the desk of the President by December 31, which is 3 days away. It is important we conclude this morning, that the bill be sent to the President's desk so we can sign it, and we can continue to provide the right kind of supervised collection against foreign individuals to make sure America and Americans are protected. I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I would echo what the chairman said-- that the very well trained, dedicated staff of the Intelligence Committee is available to assist any Member in reviewing the classified information that is the subject of section 702. That is why they are there. The Senator from Oregon is right. Every Member of Congress doesn't have that highly trained, top-secret staff member, and there are reasons for that. There are reasons why the Intelligence Committee members do have those types of staffers. Those staffers are available at any time for discussion of this issue or, for that matter, any other issue relative to national security that is within the purview of the Intelligence Committee. So I again say that this amendment is simply totally unnecessary because there are specific and direct prohibitions in the law as well as in court decisions that do not allow our respective intelligence community agencies to listen in or review e-mails or whatever on U.S. citizens unless it is under some sort of court order where probable cause must be shown. We need to make sure we are equipping our intelligence community agents with every single tool necessary to combat terrorists around the world. This section is critical to doing that. I urge a vote against the amendment.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, earlier today, we were successful in passing H.R. 5949, the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, with strong bipartisan support. I am pleased that we are now in a position to pass the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, again with strong bipartisan support. These two bills are the result of Chairman Feinstein's exceptional bipartisan leadership of the Select Committee on Intelligence. It has been my privilege and honor to work with her these past two years during my tenure as Vice Chairman of the Committee. This bill looks a little different than the version we passed out of Committee back in July, by a vote of 14-1. The final product is the result of our extensive efforts to successfully address the concerns raised by the Executive branch, the House of Representatives, and, of course, our own membership. It is a good bill. It contains a number of provisions requested by the administration that will provide the intelligence community with certain authorities necessary to perform its vital mission for our country. Most important, it authorizes the funds appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of our government. This congressional budgetary oversight is crucial to our national security. I am also pleased that the bill contains a provision which will require government officials, who are responsible for authorizing the disclosure of national intelligence or intelligence related to national security to the media or the general public, to notify the congressional intelligence committees on a timely basis with respect to such disclosures. It is my hope that the House of Representatives will take this bill up quickly, pass it, and then send it on to the President for signature.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today in support of H.R. 5949, the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012. Before I speak on it as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I wanted to say that this bill, along with many other products that have come out of the Intelligence Committee, has been put together in a strong bipartisan way under the leadership of our chairman Senator Feinstein, who has been a great advocate for the national security of the United States and a great advocate for our men and women in the intelligence community. I would be remiss if I did not say as we conclude this year, which is the second of the 2 years I have been vice chair, what a privilege and pleasure it has been to work with her. I thank her for her leadership and all of the issues we have worked on together. This bill, which passed the House with broad bipartisan support, provides a clean extension of the FISA Amendments Act until December 31, 2017. Earlier this year, with strong bipartisan support, the Senate Intelligence Committee also reported the bill with a clean extension, although it had a slightly earlier sunset of June 1, 2017. So we have two bills--one from each Chamber--that recognize that the FAA must be reauthorized for the next 5 years. Both bills also confirm that there should be no substantive changes to the FAA itself. But time is running short before these vital authorities expire, as they expire on December 31. So it makes the most sense for the Senate to simply pass the House bill and send it to the President for his immediate signature so that we have no gap in collection on those who seek to do us harm, as they are out there every day seeking to do that. As we debate the merits of passing a clean extension of the FAA, I think it is important to remember why the FAA is so necessary. The terrorist attacks by al-Qaida on September 11, 2001, highlighted a significant shortfall in our ability to collect foreign intelligence information against certain overseas targets. Our intelligence community took operational measures to address that shortfall but eventually realized that additional FISA authorities were needed to fully address the problem. More than 5 years ago, after an adverse ruling from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court, the Director of National Intelligence requested that Congress act immediately to stem the sudden and significant reduction in the intelligence community's capability to collect foreign intelligence information on overseas targets. So Congress responded--first with the Protect America Act of 2007 and then with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. By providing a statutory framework for acquiring foreign intelligence information from overseas targets, the FAA has enabled the intelligence community to identify and neutralize terror networks before they harm us either at home or abroad. While I cannot get into specific examples, I can say definitively that these authorities work extremely well. I encourage all of my colleagues to go to the Intelligence Committee's spaces and review the classified materials provided by the intelligence community. These materials give the classified examples that clearly demonstrate the FAA's success. Let me briefly highlight what some of those authorities do. Under section 702, the government may target persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. However, there are a number of important limitations on this authority that are designed to ensure that this section 702 collection cannot be used to intentionally target a U.S. person under what we call reverse-targeting within the community. These acquisitions are authorized jointly through a certification by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence and are approved by the FISA Court. The plain language and legislative history of section 702 makes clear that Congress understood there would be incidental collection of one- end domestic and U.S. person communications. There has to be. If we impose an upfront ban on the collection of such communications, we could never do the acquisition in the first place because it is often impossible to determine in advance whether an unknown target overseas is, in fact, a U.S. person. So we need the broad ``any person'' authority at the outset to ensure that the acquisition can occur in the first instance. Moreover, Congress also understood that this incidental collection would likely provide the crucial lead information necessary to thwart terrorists like the 9/11 hijackers who trained and launched their attacks from within the United States. But because of legitimate concerns about the privacy of U.S. persons, Congress also placed specific safeguards on section 702 collection, including review and approval by the FISA Court of the AG-DNI certification and targeting and minimization procedures, a requirement that all acquisitions be consistent with the fourth amendment, and explicit prohibitions against certain conduct, such as intentionally targeting a U.S. person. Because there are instances, however, in which we may need to target U.S. persons overseas who have betrayed their country as terrorists or spies, the FAA does include specific ways to do this. Similar to the authorities in title I of FISA, sections 703 and 704 allow the FISA Court to authorize collection against certain U.S. persons overseas. Before the FAA, this type of collection was authorized by the Attorney General and not by a court. The FAA enhanced the protections for U.S. persons by requiring individual FISA Court orders based on probable cause that the U.S. person is a foreign person, agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power. As I understand it, most of the objections to the FAA relate to section 702 and what we call incidental collection. I recommend again that my colleagues review the unclassified FAA background paper that was sent by the AG and by the DNI to Congress last February. That document was earlier made a part of the Record at my request. This paper describes the FAA authorities in some detail, and it highlights the layers of oversight by all three branches of government. These multiple oversight mechanisms are there primarily to protect U.S. persons. I can tell you firsthand from my work on the Intelligence Committee on both the House and the Senate side that it is vigorous oversight. Every aspect of the FAA gets looked at closely by the executive branch, from the dedicated personnel responsible for operating the system, up through the managerial chain of command to the relevant inspectors general and all of the lawyers at the National Security Division at the Department of Justice and at the agencies responsible for FAA implementation. Twice a year, Congress gets reports on its implementation on top of what we learn from hearings, oversight visits, briefings, and notifications, as well as other reports that are given to Congress. The judicial branch, the FISA Court, plays its own key role by reviewing the certifications and the targeting and minimization procedures and ensuring that all of those comply with the law. I cannot say that the implementation of the FAA has been perfect. Certainly there have been a few mistakes along the way over the past several years. Sometimes technology does not always work the way it is supposed to, and sometimes there is a disconnect between the way a collection device actually works and the way it has been described by the lawyers. But I can tell you that on those few occasions where something has not been quite right with how these authorities have been used, the oversight mechanisms put in place by the FAA have worked exactly as intended by Congress. When a problem arises, the Justice Department knows about it, the FISA Court knows about it, and Congress knows about it. The collection related to the problem stops until the problem gets fixed. In my experience, the FAA is one of the most tightly overseen activities within the intelligence community. I know some people believe more oversight is needed, but I do not think there is justification for that. I am concerned that if we add more IG reviews, for example, we run the risk of taking scarce resources away from actual analysis and operations. That is not the right course, especially when we know the existing oversight mechanisms are working so well. These FAA authorities are simply too important to lose. We have a bill before us that has passed the House and can be sent straight from this body to the White House for signature by the President. The President has said he will sign the House bill as soon as he receives it from this body. I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for a clean extension of the FISA Amendments Act until December 31, 2017. I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I appreciate the comments of the leader. I think the chairman and I--and I assume those who have amendments that will be remaining, I guess one amendment remaining and then final passage. If we could complete debate tonight, we would be prepared, at the pleasure of the leader, to go ahead and finalize the FISA amendments.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, through the Chair, if I could ask the Senator from Oregon, is the Senator talking 15 minutes on his amendment and 15 minutes on passage? Fifteen minutes on each, on your amendment and vote on it and go to final passage?

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the legislation we are going to be voting on today. I want to refer to the Leahy amendment just referred to by the Senator from Illinois. Senator Leahy's amendment will act as a complete substitute to the bill that is on the floor and, if passed, it will require a conference with the House of Representatives. It is December 27, and the House is not coming back until the December 30. There simply is not time, even if the amendment was substantive enough that it ought to be considered for passage, to get that conferenced with the House and get this bill on the desk of President by December 31, which is when these provisions expire. The first change the Leahy amendment makes is to reduce the extension sunset from December 31, 2017, back to December 1, 2015. That date coincides with the expiration of certain other FISA provisions; namely, the roving wiretap authority, the business records court orders, and the lone wolf. It may seem like it ought to make sense that we have all of these expiring at that time but, frankly--having been involved in the intelligence community for the last 12 years--it actually works in reverse from that and it would have a negative influence on the community itself. If we match the FAA sunset with the PATRIOT Act and IRPTA sunsets, it provides no real benefit to congressional oversight and could actually increase the risk that all these authorities will expire at the same time. If they all expired at the same time, the community would certainly be at a real disadvantage from an operational standpoint. The Leahy amendment also makes a number of modifications to the executive branch oversight provisions that simply, I believe, are not necessary. For example, the amendment would require the inspector general of the Intelligence Community, ICIG, to conduct a mandatory review of U.S. person privacy rights in the context of the FISA Amendments Act implementation. If we truly believe this sort of review by the ICIG is necessary, we don't need a statutory provision. We can simply get a letter from the Intelligence Committee directing that be done, and it will be done. So trying to think we need a statutory provision on that type of issue--if there is any contemplation that it exists--is simply not necessary. I am also concerned the Leahy substitute incorrectly elevates the ICIG to the same level as the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence by adding the ICIG as a recipient of FISA Amendments Act reviews that are conducted by the DOJ IG and other intelligence community element inspectors general. That doesn't make a lot of sense because the attorney general and the DNI are the only ones responsible for jointly authorizing the collection of foreign intelligence information under the FAA. They are the ones who need to review compliance assessments conducted by the relevant IGs, including those conducted by the ICIG. If there is concern about whether the ICIG can even conduct these type of reviews, then I think the FAA is clear on that point. Since the ODNI is authorized to acquire or receive foreign intelligence information, the ICIG can conduct these reviews to the same extent as any other inspector general of an element of the intelligence community. He doesn't need redundant statutory authorization. It is important to understand that the word ``acquire'' as used here doesn't mean acquisition in the actual physical collection of foreign intelligence information. Rather, ``acquiring'' here simply means to come into possession or control of, often by unspecified means. We know this because in the annual review provision in the very next paragraph sought to be amended, the FAA uses the more precise conducting and acquisition terminology which clearly indicates that it affects only those elements that are actually collecting foreign intelligence information. This same annual review provision would also be modified by section 4 of Senator Leahy's amendment. His changes would expand the agency heads responsible for conducting these annual reviews to any agency with targeting or minimization procedures as opposed to the current law, which applies to only those agencies that are actually responsible for conducting an acquisition; that is, the physical collection of foreign intelligence information. Right now, any IC element that receives downstream FISA collection must comply with FISA's retention, dissemination, and use limitations. They don't have any kind of blanket authority to use this information. But the elements required in the annual reviews are geared more toward the actual collectors of the foreign intelligence information than they are toward downstream IC elements that are already required to comply with FISA's retention, dissemination, and use limitations. The Intelligence Committee has been conducting oversight on this collection program long before it was ever codified in the FISA Amendments Act. We worked closely with the Judiciary Committee to carefully monitor the implementation of the FAA authorities by the executive branch. In the end, I am fully satisfied the FAA is working exactly as intended and in a manner that protects our rights as Americans. As I have just explained, I do not believe Senator Leahy's proposed changes are necessary, nor do I believe they improve upon the current practice. I wish to just quickly address what the Senator from Illinois said about the collection on U.S. persons. If one is collecting on someone who is in Pakistan and they call somebody in the United States, he may be a U.S. citizen or he may be a non-U.S. citizen, and if we are collecting on him under a proper court order, there can be at times collection on somebody inside the United States. But the FISA Amendments Act has a provision for dealing with that so that we have what we call minimization provisions in place that immediately do not allow the use of any information collected on a U.S. citizen in an unlawful manner. The FISA Court is very tough, they are very strict, and they don't just grant an authority to allow our intelligence community to gather information on foreign suspects or foreign entities or somebody who is working for a foreign power in any kind of household manner. They are very strict in their requirements of what must be shown in order to be able to collect. So in the rare times there is a U.S. citizen on the other end of the line, the minimization provisions kick in, and they work. They work very well. The Leahy substitute simply will not allow the community to do the job we need to get done. Secondly, I wish to address the Merkley amendment. Again, I oppose this amendment. When Congress created the FISA Court back in 1978, it was understood that this court would have to operate behind closed doors given the sensitivity of the national security matters the court considers. Each time FISA has been amended, whether it is section 501 dealing with business records or 702 relating to targeting foreign terrorists overseas, Congress has maintained the same high level of protection for the court's decisions. The Merkley amendment would make those decisions public. Section 601 of FISA already requires the Attorney General to provide copies of all decisions, orders, or opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include significant construction or interpretations of the provisions of the entire act. So there are some reporting requirements right now in place. The Merkley amendment would further require the Attorney General to declassify and make available to the public any of those decisions that relate to section 501 business record court orders or section 702 overseas targeting provisions. I believe the American people understand there are certain matters that simply do not need to be made public, particularly when it comes to dealing with bad guys around the world, men who get up every morning and think about ways they can harm and kill Americans. Our folks in the intelligence community are doing a darn good job of gathering information on those types of individuals. Those are not the types of FISA Court orders, given by the court to gather that information that ought to be made public. In matters concerning the FISA Court, the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees serve as the eyes and ears of the American people. Through this oversight, which includes being given all significant decisions, orders, and opinions of the court, we can ensure that the laws are being applied and implemented as Congress intended. If a significant FISA Court decision raises concerns, the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees will ask questions--and we have done that from time to time. We hold hearings, we get briefings, we receive notifications and semiannual reports--all designed to give Congress good insight into the real-life applications and interpretations of the FISA Act. This amendment does nothing to advance that oversight, but it could cause real operational problems. If we put in the public domain declassified opinions or unclassified summaries of the most significant court orders, we would give our enemies a roadmap into our collection priorities and capabilities. I know one of the responses is going to be that the specific intelligence sources and methods could be redacted, but that only solves part of the problem. These guys we are dealing with, these bad guys around the world are smart guys. They are not idiots. When they look at a declassified piece of intelligence information that has redacted portions, they are able to piece the puzzle back together again and figure out exactly who those sources are and what their methods are, which is going to put our intelligence gatherers in jeopardy from a national security standpoint. There is already substantial oversight of sections 501 and 702 by the FISA Court, the Department of Justice, the intelligence community, and the Congress. I can't think of any two provisions in FISA that have received more attention and more scrutiny than sections 501 and 702. Yet, as a result of this vigorous oversight, we also know these sections are two of the most carefully implemented by all of our investigative authorities. This amendment sets a dangerous precedent and would undermine some of our most sensitive investigations and investigative techniques. Passing it would also impede our chances of getting a clean FAA extension to the President, as I mentioned earlier in my comments. Lastly, I wish to quickly mention the Paul amendment. Again, I am going to oppose this amendment because it is inconsistent with the Constitution and it contradicts decades of established Supreme Court precedent and Federal law. Contrary to what this amendment says, there is no fourth amendment violation when the government gets information from a third party about a person who has voluntarily given that information to the third party. The Paul amendment would limit the ability of our intelligence community and our prosecutors to take information that a bad guy has given to a third party, and we get that information from a third party, from that information being used in a prosecution against that bad guy. In the U.S. v. Miller 1976 Supreme Court case, the Court stated that it ``has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.'' Clearly, that is language directly contrary to the Paul amendment. The Paul amendment says the government would always have to either have consent or a search warrant to get information held by the third party in a system of records. This amendment would have a significant impact not just on criminal cases, from drugs to violent crime to child offenses, but on national security matters. Often, the information obtained from a system of records as described in this amendment is what we call building-block information. It is the basic information the law enforcement and intelligence communities use to build an investigation long before there may be probable cause. This type of information can be used not just to build cases but to rule out people as suspects--in short, ensuring they won't be subjected to more intrusive and investigative measures such as search warrants. Yet this amendment elevates building- block information in the hands of a third party to the equivalent of privately held information in which there is reasonable expectation of privacy. Even though a person voluntarily hands over information to a third party, this amendment says we should put the genie back in the bottle and now create a reasonable expectation of privacy. What is more, if the government gets information from a third party without consent or a search warrant, this amendment says it can never be used in a criminal prosecution. The message here to banks, hotels, shipping companies, fertilizer stores, you name it: Don't bother being Good Samaritans and give law enforcement tips about suspicious activities. We will just take our chances and hope we get enough probable cause in time to stop whatever crime or terrorist act may be planned. Simply stated, this amendment is contrary to case law and contrary to constitutional provisions. I urge all of my colleagues to vote against the Paul amendment, the Merkley amendment, as well as the Leahy amendment when we begin voting at 5:30.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Sure. I would be happy to.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Well, here is my problem with that provision, and it is twofold. First of all, there is the proverbial elephant's nose under the tent theory, that this is the beginning of opening other things down the road. I think that in this world in which we operate, this cloak-and-dagger world of the intelligence community--and we don't often like to think about the fact that it is necessary in modern times, but it is more necessary today than ever before because of the enemy we face--I think there is a real danger in beginning to open any of those opinions. The second part of it is kind of tied to that as well. As I said earlier, these folks we are dealing with are very smart individuals. These bad guys carry laptops, they communicate with encrypted messages that we have to try to pick up on with the right kinds of authorizations that the FISA Court gives us and do our best to figure out what they are doing in advance of them taking any action. And while we may not think about a provision in an opinion coming out of the FISA Court being a tipoff to bad guys about what we are doing or, more significantly, what they are doing that is alerting us, you better believe those guys are going to be examining every one of these opinions that we make public, and they are going to be reviewing those opinions, and they are going to, at some point in time, pick up on some small piece of information that is going to give them a shortcut next time they plan an attack against America or Americans. So I think for us to say that it is the personal opinion of the Attorney General that, well, maybe this does not involve national security, but maybe it does, and we ought to go through those other steps that the Senator alluded to--those bad guys are going to be looking at every single one of those, and at some point in time it is going to come back to haunt us.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do intend to object, first of all, I say to the leader, thanks for moving toward the FISA bill because--the Senator is exactly right--this is a bill that must get done before the end of the year so we can make sure our intelligence community is able to gather, in a lawful and legal way, the kind of intelligence that helps keep America safe and secure. There are two documents; first, a Statement of Administration Policy from the White House where they have agreed to the bill that has already passed the House, and second, a letter from the leadership of the intelligence community--namely, the Director of National Intelligence as well as the Attorney General--directed as the leadership, both of which letters and statements support the House bill. It is because of that and because of the fact that if the House bill comes through here--and I understand we may have to have debate, may have to have amendments debated, whatever the leader says--but the important thing is that we can hopefully get that bill passed and send it directly to the President's desk. So I would ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter from the DNI and the Attorney General dated February 8 as well as the Statement of Administration Policy dated September 10. Mr. President, I do object.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Today I wish to commend the career of a man who has devoted his entire life to agriculture. After more than 35 years serving in various leadership capacities in the U.S. poultry and agricultural industries, Dr. Don Jackson, president and chief executive officer of JBS USA, is retiring. Don's agricultural career arguably began in the early 1950s on his father's ranch in Phoenix, AZ. Don, the fifth out of seven children, was one heck of a high school football athlete--securing a game- clinching interception in the State semifinal game and helping to lead his team to the State championship in his senior year. Don studied as an undergraduate at Arizona State University and then moved to Colorado State University, where he graduated in 1978 with a master's degree and Ph.D. in animal science. Don officially began his career in agriculture as a nutritionist in the feed and poultry division of Central Soya. When the company's poultry division was sold to Seaboard, Don remained with the organization, serving in several operational and executive roles. From 1996 to 2000, Don served as Seaboard's chief executive officer. In 2000, ConAgra acquired Seaboard's poultry division and Don moved to Foster Farms, where he served as president for 8 years. In late 2008, Pilgrim's Pride Corporation called on Don to serve as chief executive officer and lead the company out of bankruptcy. In December 2009, Don helped successfully negotiate the sale of a controlling interest in Pilgrim's Pride to JBS USA, and a short year later, Don was selected as president and chief executive officer of JBS USA, a leading processor of U.S. beef, pork, poultry, and lamb and Australian beef and lamb. Don has been married to his high school sweetheart, Teresa, for 41 years, and they are the proud parents of six children who have given them seven beautiful grandchildren. For the past 28 years, Don has called Athens and Atlanta, GA, home, and he passionately roots for the Atlanta Braves and the University of Georgia Bulldogs. I commend Don for his years of service and congratulate him on an incredibly successful career. American agriculture has benefitted from his passion, energy, wisdom, and humor, and I am proud to call him a Georgian. We wish Don well as he embarks on his well-deserved retirement.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Igor Dubinski, an Army fellow in my office, be allowed floor privileges for the remainder of the consideration of S. 3254.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak as in morning business.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in support of an Ayotte amendment, No. 3245, an amendment that makes permanent the current prohibition on the use of defense funds to transfer or release Guantanamo Bay detainees into the United States. This amendment is identical in substance to section 1027 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, except that it prohibits the use of the funds permanently. We know the President said he would close Guantanamo almost 4 years ago. I thought it was a bad idea then; I think it is an even worse idea today. We should move beyond campaign promises and think about what makes sense on this issue. The stubborn refusal to increase the Gitmo detainee population has been the key stumbling block in establishing an effective long-term detention policy. The American people have been pretty unified in their opposition to bringing Gitmo detainees to the United States, and I believe we should listen to them. I understand that Senator Feinstein just released the GAO report she requested regarding facilities and factors to consider if Gitmo detainees were brought to the United States. I have reviewed this report, and I have to respectfully disagree that this report offers any support whatsoever for the idea that Gitmo detainees can or should be moved to the United States. The very first page of the GAO report lays out in stark terms the serious problems that would come into play if detainees from Guantanamo were transferred to the United States: legal and cost considerations, compliance with U.S. and international laws, collecting intelligence information, and ensuring the safety and security of the general public and personnel at these facilities. The report makes very clear that the Department of Justice does not have the authority to maintain custody of detainees under the AUMF. In other words, even without the prohibition on transfers of detainees to the United States, it would be illegal for the Bureau of Prisons or the Marshals Service to take custody of Guantanamo detainees. Moreover, the Department of Justice told the GAO--and I quote--it ``does not plan to transfer detainees to the United States,'' saying it raises legal, policy, and resource issues that descriptions of current policies and practices contained in the GAO report cannot fully address. Essentially, the Department of Justice is saying that on top of those issues already described in the GAO report, such as insufficient standards for law or war detention, severe overcrowding, and ``implications for the public safety,'' there would be even more issues that are not mentioned at all. And that is from a Department of Justice that has fully supported the idea of moving Gitmo detainees into the United States. Housing these detainees in DOD corrections facilities does not seem to be the answer either because of equally troubling legal and safety issues for detention of these individuals, including the Geneva Conventions' prohibition on detaining prisoners of war in penitentiaries. These are just some of the reasons Congress has prohibited the transfer of these detainees to the United States and why those prohibitions must continue. This prohibition made sense last year and it still makes sense today. The GAO report only confirms that. The detainees who remain at Gitmo include the ones who have been determined to be too dangerous to transfer, including the individuals who were responsible for the masterminding of the attack on September 11, which we just celebrated the 11th anniversary of. So if that is the case, why on Earth would we put these detainees whom we will not send to other countries in cities and towns across the United States of America? The Federal Government's primary responsibility is to keep the American people safe. Keeping these detainees at Gitmo accomplishes that goal. I urge my colleagues to support the Ayotte amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Senator Grassley, who is scheduled to speak next, has been kind to give me 45 seconds, so I appreciate that. In July and August, the cosponsors of both the underlying bill, the Lieberman-Collins bill, and the SECURE IT bill, of which I am a cosponsor, met regularly, and I was hopeful we could resolve the significant differences between these two bills. Unfortunately, we did not reach an agreement, and even though we had been promised an open amendment process on this underlying bill, the majority leader once again filled the tree and filed cloture. Unfortunately, nothing has changed since then, so I am compelled to do the same thing today. We all understand the serious threat that is facing our country from cyber attacks and intrusions, but that does not mean Congress should just pass any bill. Frankly, the underlying bill is not supported by the business community, for all the right reasons, and they are the ones who are impacted by it. They are the ones who are going to be called on to comply with the mandates and the regulations. Frankly, it is not going to give them the kind of protection they need from cyber attacks. So I regret to have to stand up today and say that I intend to vote against cloture on this bill, and I yield to Senator Grassley.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. I thank my friend from South Carolina, as well as my friend from Arizona, with respect to the debate they have been engaged in, for bringing this issue to the forefront, and being willing to stand up and say: Hey, if you talk about foreign aid in a coffee shop in Seneca, SC, or Phoenix, AZ, or Moultrie, GA, it is not the most popular topic. Most people back home think we can balance the budget if we eliminate foreign aid. But the fact is, as Senator Graham said, it is a fairly minuscule amount in the overall context. Right now we are at a critical juncture in our country with respect to our fiscal house and with respect to any number of domestic and foreign policies. As we go into the election, the American people are going to have a choice to make, but we are also at a crossroads with our foreign policy in this country. All people have to do is pick up this morning's paper or turn on the TV and they will see what is happening in countries that are the subject of this particular amendment. There are tens of thousands of people protesting in Pakistan today. There are folks in Egypt who are still protesting. There are folks in Libya who are still protesting. We are 10 days away from the Ambassador to Libya from the United States of America having been killed. We know that part of the world is in turmoil. We know that part of the world also has been very critical to our fight in the war on terror. When the President of the United States is asked if Egypt is an ally, and he can't answer that question affirmatively, that tells us what kind of foreign policy this particular President has. He doesn't know what his foreign policy is if he can't tell us whether Egypt is an ally. Well, in spite of all that has happened in the last 10 days--and all of us still grieve for the loss of four very brave Americans who put their lives in harm's way as civilians to advocate what is in the best interests of our country. But I will assure you, if Ambassador Stevens were here today, he would say, absolutely, the direction in which the Paul amendment takes us is the wrong direction to go. I know what the intelligence community thinks about this particular direction. I know the intelligence community thinks in spite of all of our problems with Pakistan--and we have had our very open and overt problems with Pakistan over the last several months and couple of years. But the fact is we have American soldiers in harm's way today in Afghanistan who are fighting to protect the freedoms of this country and who are fighting to make sure we remain the safest, most secure country in the world. We cannot decouple Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is very important that we maintain a strong relationship with Pakistan. Even though it is difficult and even though it is fractured, it is of critical importance that we maintain that relationship. It is important because of what is happening in Afghanistan, but it is also very important for another reason. We had a debate in this body about a year ago on what is called the START treaty, which is a treaty that we have with Russia for the elimination of certain nuclear weapons over a period of time. During the course of that debate, we talked about the elimination of Russian nuclear weapons versus weapons in the United States. And that is good to a certain extent. But none of us in this body who have any idea about intelligence around the world have a great fear of any country getting hold of an ICBM, a major intercontinental ballistic missile, sticking it into a sleeve somewhere, and shooting it toward the United States. What we do have a fear of is somebody getting hold of what we call tactical nuclear weapons, sticking them into a suitcase and bringing them to the United States or putting them in a position to kill and harm Americans. Pakistan has tactical nuclear weapons. As long as we maintain a strong relationship with them and as long as they are our ally--however you characterize that--then we have the ability to at least dialogue with the Pakistanis with respect to their nuclear program. Even today, with all that has happened over the last 10 days and all the condemnation around the world from democratic countries, and particularly within the United States the condemnation of what has happened and the consternation and appall at what is taking place from the standpoint of demonstrations in Pakistan and in Libya, the Libyan Government and the Pakistani Government have given us all the help they can possibly give us, particularly in Libya. That is a government in transition. It is a temporary government, and we need to make sure the people of Libya have the opportunity to, hopefully, have a democratic form of government one day. If we sever ties with them today, folks, that is over. We can just make certain of the fact that we have one more territory, one more country where terrorists have the opportunity to be trained to kill and harm Americans. With respect to Pakistan, the PAC government has sent the Palace Guard to guard the Embassy of the United States. That is their most elite troops. Again, our relationship is frayed and it is fractured, but they are doing their level best to try to make sure the Americans who remain in Pakistan are protected. If we all of a sudden decide that we are going to cut them off from financial aid, is that going to improve the situation? Is it going to give us some sort of satisfaction? It may from the standpoint of folks who don't like the idea of foreign aid period. But from a national security standpoint, it is simply the wrong thing to do. There will be one country that will gain from this. The country that will gain from this is the most notorious terrorist-sponsoring nation in the world, and that is Iran. Iran has a very powerful presence in Pakistan today. They want to have a powerful presence in Libya. I assure you if we cut off the minimal amount of aid that is being talked about with this amendment, then we are simply fostering the ability of Iran to have a larger voice and a larger presence in countries that are very fractious and very vulnerable today. So while in spirit I agree with my good friend Senator Paul, this is not the right time in the history of our country and not the right time in the history of the world to take action that is simply not in the best interest of the United States.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to state the Senate's lack of leadership in addressing sequestration will have long-term effects on our Nation's robust intelligence community which had to be rebuilt after 9/11. These budget cuts will make it very difficult for the intelligence community to keep Americans safe in future years. America hungers for leadership and, unfortunately, the Senate lacks leadership from the majority on these issues that affect the safety of all Americans.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, let me add to what Senator McCain has said. We have been working very hard with the sponsors of the bill, Senators Lieberman and Collins, who have been receptive and open to our dialog over the last several days and weeks. It is an indication, No. 1, that everybody in this body recognizes the seriousness of this issue, but it is also a recognition of the complexity of this issue. There are about four or five committees of jurisdiction that have a piece of the issue of cyber security and, unfortunately, we didn't go through the regular order of giving all those committees the opportunity to go through the regular markup process. That may or may not have solved some of the issues we are now dealing with. But we are down to the final minutes before a cloture vote. Unfortunately, I will vote against cloture and I recommend that my colleagues do likewise and that we continue over this break to negotiate on the remaining issues we have. They have been narrowed in number and scope. Both sides are negotiating in good faith because we all understand this is an issue of such critical importance. The basic philosophical difference we have is that we all seek to protect the private sector from cyber attacks that may have a huge impact on life or on our economy. The issue is, primarily, does the government know better how to do that or does the private sector know better how to protect itself, as we think it does. While we understand the government has a role to play, we have capabilities and capacities within the Federal Government that the private sector doesn't have, and we recognize that. That is why we have been negotiating in good faith to try to find that common ground between the government and the private sector to ensure the protection of the basic critical infrastructure in this country. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Georgia Peanut Commission. In 1961, Georgia peanut farmers came together to form a commission that would promote their industry, perform research, educate the community, and conduct outreach around the State. Thus, the Georgia Peanut Commission was born. We have come a long ways since 1961. As we celebrate this 50th anniversary, it is important to note that Georgia peanut farmers in 1961 harvested 475,000 acres of peanuts with an average yield of 1,200 pounds per acre. But thanks to the evolution of technology and techniques and the hard work and the innovation of Georgia's peanut farmers, farmers in 2011 in Georgia harvested the same amount of land with a yield of more than 3,500 pounds per acre. Agricultural producers face a combination of challenges, including unpredictable weather and market volatility that determine profit or loss in any given year. Through the Georgia Peanut Commission, Georgia peanut farmers have persevered through the hardships. Georgia leads the Nation in peanut production, producing nearly 50 percent of our Nation's annual crop. Anyone who has ever stopped by a congressional office on Capitol Hill and taste-tested the complimentary peanuts we offer can thank the Georgia Peanut Commission. Those little red bags are recognized by hungry constituents and staffers alike as a symbol of Georgia agriculture. Annually, the commission distributes 2 million of those little red bags. The peanut industry is vital to Georgia's economy, contributing some $2 billion annually, and creating nearly 50,000 jobs across the sector. In the past 50 years, peanut farmers with the help of the commission have reduced production costs through research and have worked to stimulate and increase consumption. Last year, the Georgia Peanut Commission broke ground at the site for its new headquarters in Tifton, GA, which will be the first net-zero energy building affiliated with State government in Georgia. There are many changes happening in rural America. The facade of these rural towns may look different year after year, but the challenges confronting our small towns and communities have not changed. The Georgia Peanut Commission has been critical to the foundation of not just rural Georgia but our entire State's economy. I am proud to recognize the work the Georgia Peanut Commission has done for our State and congratulations to them on their 50th anniversary. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Well, I am dying to hear his explanation too, let me say that. First of all, let me say that I join in with everything my two colleagues have said with respect to, No. 1, the volume of the leaks that have come out in recent weeks. We all know this town has a tendency to leak information from time to time, but never in the volume and never with the sensitivity of the leaks we have read about on the front page of newspapers around the country as we have seen in the last few weeks. Irrespective of where they came from, to have folks who may be implicated in the White House, and the White House appointing the two individuals who have been charged with the duty of prosecuting this investigation, reeks of ethical issues. I don't know these two U.S. attorneys, but everything I know about them is they are dadgum good prosecutors and they are good lawyers. But why would we even put them in the position of having to investigate in effect the individual who appointed them to the position they are in? That is why we are arguing that a special counsel is, without question, the best way to go. I am interested to hear the response from my friend from Illinois to that issue. Let me talk about something else for a minute, and that is the impact these leaks have had on the intelligence community. The No. 1 thing that individuals who go on the intelligence committees in both the House and the Senate are told--and I know because I have served on both of them and continue to serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee--is to be careful what you say. Be careful and make sure you don't inadvertently--and obviously advertently--reveal classified information. Be sure that in your comments you never reveal sources and methods. Well, guess what. The individuals who were involved in these leaks were very overt in the release of sources and methods with respect to the issues Senator Graham referred to as having been leaked. Not only that, but lives were put in danger, particularly the life of the individual who was an asset who worked very closely with respect to the underwear bomber issue. We know that to be a fact. But there is also a secondary issue, and that is this: We have partners around the world we deal with in the intelligence community every single day, and we depend on those partners and they depend on us to provide them with information we have and likewise that they give to us. A classic example was detailed of one of these particular leaks on the front page of the New York Times. Today why in the world would any of our partners in the intelligence community around the world--those partners who have men and women on the front lines who are putting their life in harm's way and in danger every single day to gather intelligence information and share that information with us--why would they continue to do that if they are now concerned about that information being written about on the front page of newspapers inside the United States and blasted all over television or wherever it may be? The answer is pretty simple. Very honestly, there are some strong considerations being given by some of our partners as to how much information they should share with us. That creates a very negative atmosphere within the intelligence world. Lastly, let me say that we dealt in the Intelligence Committee with our authorization bill recently in which we have tried to address this issue from a punishment standpoint. There are certain things that individuals are required to do when they leave the intelligence community and go write a book. One of those things is they have to present their book to an independent panel of intelligence experts, and that panel is to review the information and then decide whether any of it is classified and shall not be released. In one of the instances we have, one of those individuals never submitted his book to that panel. In another instance, an individual submitted his book to the panel, and the panel said: You need to be careful in these areas. And the advice from that panel was pretty well disregarded. One of the provisions in our bill says if someone does that, if someone fails to submit their book to that panel, or if they disregard what that panel tells them to do, then they are going to be subject to penalties. Part of those penalties include the possible removal of their right to a pension from the Federal Government--the portion the government is obligated to pay them, not what they have contributed. Our intelligence bill is being criticized by some individuals out there. And guess who it is? It is the media and it is the White House. What does that tell you about their fear and their participation in the release of classified information? So this issue is of critical importance. It simply has to stop for any number of national security reasons, but the ones that have been addressed by my colleagues obviously are to be highlighted. I look forward to whatever comments the Senator from Illinois may have with respect to justifying--I know he is not going to justify the leaks because I know him too well, but whatever his justification is for proceeding in a prosecution manner the way the Department of Justice is going versus what the Bush administration did and appointing a special counsel in a case that, by the way, pales in comparison to the leaks that took place in this particular instance.