Saxby Chambliss

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. The political world this week has been focused on the U.S. Supreme Court and the arguments that have taken place over there with respect to what has been referred to as ObamaCare. I rise today to discuss how the 2-year-old health care law is forcing more government intrusion into the lives of Americans. After all, what could be more intrusive than the Federal Government telling you the type of health care coverage you must purchase? ``Purchase this product or face a penalty.'' With this law, I believe the American people have recognized that Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. Just this week, a poll conducted by The Hill found that 49 percent of likely voters believe that the Supreme Court will rule against the constitutionality of the health care law, while only 29 percent believe it will be upheld. The American people have to ask themselves whether we should be able to punish citizens based whether they purchase a product from the private sector. The Commerce Clause only allows the Federal Government to regulate ``existing activity'' that affects interstate commerce. I hope this distinction will be recognized by our justices on the Supreme Court. With no end in sight to escalating health care costs, Republicans want to see innovation within the private sector to bring about changes to our health care system. Today, Medicare and Medicaid are running up our national debt and bankrupting our states. One would think less government involvement, not more, would help bring health care costs under control. Instead, the health care law builds on this administration's desire to have the Federal Government control Americans' health care decisions. To this end, the Obama administration has created 159 new boards, bureaucracies and programs under ObamaCare. As of this month, the administration has released more than 12,000 pages of regulations related to the law. The secretary of Health and Human Services will have the power to make more than 1,700 rulings affecting Americans and the health care they seek. Time and time again, my colleagues and I have warned that adding more red tape and bureaucratic oversight that will affect the relationship between you and your doctor is not the prescription Americans are looking for. We want to protect the relationship between the patient and physician. Consultation between the patient and the physician should be the determining factor in what procedures that patient chooses, not someone who sits on a panel in Washington, DC. However, this may well be the case as the health care law concentrates power in the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. This is the same task force that in November 2009 recommended that women between the ages of 40 and 49 no longer obtain annual mammograms. These are the types of recommendations that Washington bureaucrats could make in the future. I especially understand the importance of early detection of cancer, having been there myself, and will fight to see that individuals, through the recommendations of their doctors, are in charge of determining their own health care procedures. Throughout the debate 2 years ago we constantly heard from folks on the other side of the aisle that if you liked your health care coverage, you could keep it. Well, guess what. According to the latest CBO estimates, you can ask 5 million people who will see their employer-sponsored health care end in 2016 whether they had the opportunity to keep what they like. Further, the incentives for employers to drop their coverage and move employees onto a taxpayer-subsidized plan means we could see up to 35 million Americans lose their current coverage over the first 10 years of implementation of this law. Washington is now in the business of reducing the flexibility of consumer-driven health care policies such as health savings accounts and flexible spending arrangements. Congress created health savings accounts to allow health care consumers who wish to participate in the program more control over their own money and how they choose to spend that money for health care services. Now contributions to these arrangements will be limited to $2,500 per year, and over-the-counter medications will require a prescription if they are purchased within these tax-free dollars. This is already leading to doctors having to fill out more paperwork so an individual can walk into a drugstore to purchase aspirin or cold medicine. Yet again this is another glaring example of bureaucratic meddling in the lives of American consumers. Small businesses are also feeling the intrusive effects of ObamaCare. In the most recent survey of small businesses by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an astounding 74 percent of small business owners surveyed said the health care law makes it harder for businesses to hire more employees. Think about that for a moment. Three out of four small business owners are having difficulty hiring because of the uncertainty of health care costs. Finally, our States are also feeling the heavy hand of more government control. The Medicaid expansion that begins in 2014 will make it increasingly difficult for State leaders to balance their budgets due to strict maintenance of effort requirements. These requirements prevent States from designing health care programs specifically tailored for their own citizens. Medicaid currently consumes about one-quarter of State budgets and ObamaCare creates the largest expansion of the program since its inception. Through 2023, the cost to States is now estimated to be an additional $118 billion. In my home State of Georgia, the expansion will cost the State about $2.5 billion through 2020. Money in the budget to pay for this expansion will come at the expense of higher education, transportation, and law enforcement services. Nationally 24.7 million people who will be added to the Medicaid rolls will be entering a broken system where patients are denied access to about 40 percent of the physicians because reimbursement rates do not keep up with medical costs. Two years ago the legislative process that unfolded before us was not something any Senator should be proud of today. Backroom deal making and forcing legislation through under a subversive process left the American people angry and upset with Congress. If we don't understand that, just look at the approval rating of Congress today, and this played a major role in that approval rating. I hope in the future we will have an opportunity to revisit the system. Our system does need reforming, but it needs to be done in the right way and it needs to be done in a very transparent way. I hope we can come up with a solution that is actually supported by the American public, not solutions that make the American public angry. I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise for a very special honor to be given to the Girl Scouts of the United States of America on their 100th anniversary. One hundred years ago in Savannah, GA, Juliette Gordon Low brought together a group of 18 girls from very different backgrounds to give them opportunities to develop physically, mentally, and spiritually. From that meeting, Ms. Low came to recognize the need for an organization that would help girls develop self-reliance and resourcefulness in the face of a changing society, and in their future roles as professional women. From that modest single troop in Savannah, Ms. Low's vision has grown into the largest organization for girls in the world, with 3.2 million Girl Scouts and more than 50 million Girl Scout alumnae. Despite their growth, the Girl Scouts of today have stayed true to Ms. Low's vision, focusing on topics such as leadership, science and technology, business and economic literacy, and outdoor and environmental awareness. It is admirable that the Girl Scouts throughout their 100-year history of supporting women's leadership have truly been a voice for all girls regardless of background. As Girl Scouts, young women develop their leadership potential through activities that enable them to discover and develop their values and skills, and to take action to make a difference in the world. And while we all know about the beloved American institution that is the Girl Scout cookie sale, it is not just about the cookies. Scouting also provides girls with the skills and self-confidence to become leaders in their own lives. Girl Scouts have an impressive record of success. Former Girl Scouts make up a majority of women who have served in Congress, and 53 percent of all women business owners are former Girl Scouts. We are fortunate that the guidance and opportunities that Girl Scouts have provided during the last 100 years will remain for the next generation of women leaders for Georgia as well as for the United States. Madam President, I ask our colleagues to join me in congratulating the Girl Scouts of the United States of America, founded in the great State of Georgia, on 100 years of supporting female leadership. I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about our Nation's energy policy. Georgians, as well as folks all across America, are shocked every time they pull up to the gas pumps, both at the price of gas per gallon and at the jaw-dropping total cost each time they fill up their tanks. With rising food prices and a weak economic recovery, skyrocketing gas prices could not come at a worse time. This situation illustrates why it is imperative for Congress to focus on creating a policy to expand and diversify our energy sources so the American people are no longer held hostage by prices at the pump. The necessity of congressional action has become all too clear as gas prices continue to rise and unrest in the Middle East threatens the global economy. We cannot afford to keep sending hundreds of billions of dollars per year to foreign countries, many of which are not America's friends, to meet our energy needs. Doing so poses a threat to our national security and further harms our Nation's struggling economy. Unfortunately, the President and his administration have made some decisions that contribute to rising gas prices and that prevent us from being able to take advantage of vast energy resources located right here in North America. First, the President's recent decision to reject the Keystone XL Pipeline was extremely disappointing. Canada is a trusted ally and friend to the United States, and by tapping into its vast oil reserves, we could have substantially lessened our need to import oil from other, potentially hostile, nations. Not only would this project instantly have created many jobs, it would also have helped secure our Nation's energy future. In addition, the long line of burdensome regulations coming from the administration threatens both economic growth and energy costs in the United States. Instead of navigating through this unprecedented regulatory environment, more and more industries will choose to take their business overseas. This could potentially include refiners and other businesses essential to domestic energy production. In fact, we are already seeing the movement of the deep oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico to China--a classic example of what could happen even more so in the future. Rather than hindering domestic production of oil and gas, we must encourage the development of the abundant energy resources we have right here in the United States, and we must do so in an environmentally responsible manner. I will continue to support domestic oil and gas exploration and production. It is an essential component of a comprehensive energy policy that will enable America to become more energy independent. As I hear more reports of new oil and natural gas deposits found within our borders and off America's shores, I am stunned that we are not doing more to encourage the development of these resources. I can't think of a better means of improving our economy, by both reducing America's energy imports and encouraging job growth. Unfortunately, the administration continues to hold up and unnecessarily delay the approval of drilling leases and permits. Now is not the time to tie up valuable and much needed American energy production in bureaucratic redtape. A responsible energy policy that includes increased domestic energy production; improved energy efficiency through technology; improved conservation; and a diversified energy supply with the use of renewable fuel sources will keep gas prices low, lessen our dependence on foreign oil, and strengthen our economy. I am hopeful we will take action on some form of comprehensive energy legislation during this Congress. For the sake of our national security and our economy, we need to tackle this issue now instead of procrastinating and letting others handle it. I made this same speech 4 years ago when we saw gas prices approach $4 a gallon. Here we are 4 years later with the same hurdles standing in front of us with respect to the lack of a long-term energy policy in this country. So I hope that in a bipartisan way we can develop an energy policy, even if it is short term and even if it is narrowly focused, that will provide relief to Americans with respect to the rising gas prices, which are going to impact every single product that is made in America today.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Senator Chambliss pertaining to the introduction of S. 2151 are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and ask that I be followed by Senator Brown of Ohio, who assured me he would be waiting in the Chamber when I concluded. But since I see he is not here, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, otherwise known as the SECURE IT Act. This bill provides a strong foundation for Congress to enact what I hope can be a truly bipartisan approach for improving the ability of all Americans to protect themselves against the ever- increasing cybersecurity threat. This bill was dropped today under the leadership of Senator McCain, Senator Hutchison, Senator Grassley, Senator Murkowski, and myself, and I am very pleased to be a part of that group who has worked very hard on this bill for a number of months. There are a few who dispute the significance of the problem posed by the threat of cyber attacks. The financial harm inflicted by these attacks is now costing Americans billions of dollars each year. Denial- of-service attacks have been shutting down the Internet presence of business and organizations for years. Beyond the economic costs, malicious cyber activity is damaging our national security. Every day, cyber criminals and foreign adversaries steal large amounts of sensitive information from the networks of government and private sector entities. These trends need to be reversed before these malicious activities are measured in terms of lives lost rather than in terms of dollars as we are seeing today. For years the Senate Intelligence Committee has been following the growing cybersecurity threats. Early on, one of the most common questions asked in the cybersecurity context was, Who is in charge? While this seems like the natural place to start, it is important to understand why this is really not the right question. First, there is no consensus on who should be in charge. Some have argued it should be the Department of Defense. Some say it should be the Department of Homeland Security. Others think it might be best to start from scratch. All of these options have very obvious drawbacks. Second, and more important, we have been looking through the wrong end of the telescope in trying to answer this question. Rather than trying to find a governmental entity that should be in charge of cybersecurity, it turns out that the answer is actually much simpler: each and every one of us is in charge of our own cybersecurity. I know some people will scoff at this answer because it is too simplistic for such a complicated problem or they just don't trust us to act in our own best interests. I think they are wrong on both counts. So, if we--and by ``we,'' I mean all of us who use and rely on computer networks, whether individuals, groups, organizations, corporations, or government agencies--are in charge of our own cybersecurity, the real question then is, What should be done to reduce the threat of malicious cyber activity? I believe the answer to that question is contained in the bill called the SECURE IT Act that we have filed today. The SECURE IT Act consists of four key areas of common ground identified in various legislative efforts: first, information sharing; second, Federal Information Security Management Act reform; third, enhanced criminal penalties; and fourth, cybersecurity research and development. We have seen firsthand the positive impact better information sharing can have on our national security. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack, improved information sharing throughout the government and especially within the intelligence community has greatly enhanced our national security. I believe a similar improvement to information sharing in the cyber context will pay huge, long-term dividends in terms of our safety and national security. Once there is an understanding that information sharing will work best if it empowers the individual rather than a discrete government entity, the move from a regulatory approach to one that encourages voluntary sharing of cyber threat information by removing unintended barriers quickly follows. The information-sharing title of the SECURE IT Act is based on this voluntary approach and on the principle that government cannot and should not solve every problem. The cosponsors of this bill relied upon a number of principles and practical considerations to develop the information-sharing provisions in this bill. First, private sector innovation is the engine that drives our economy. Private sector entities have a vested interest in protecting their assets, businesses, and investments. What they often lack is information to help them better protect themselves. Therefore, our information-sharing provision authorizes private sector entities and non-Federal Government agencies to voluntarily disclose cyber threat information to government and private sector entities. The only time cyber threat information must be shared with the government is when it is directly related to a contract between a communications service provider and the government, which ordinarily is a term included in that contract anyway. The only new requirement is that such information will ultimately need to be shared with a cybersecurity center. Information sharing is and must be a two-way street, but there are no quid pro quos here. Because the government often sees different threat pictures than the private sector, our bill also encourages the government to immediately share more classified, declassified, and unclassified cyber threat information. As one example, consider how improved information sharing might safeguard transportation industry systems. Suppose a commercial airline company detects a virus in their reservation system. The virus is stealing information, including customers' credit card numbers, and sending it to a hacker's server overseas. The airline, after investigating internally, determines where the stolen data is being sent. Under our bill, the airline may share the Internet address that is receiving the stolen credit card information with any other companies, such as other airlines, as well as with the government. With this warning from the first airline, other transportation companies can check their systems to see if any of their data is being sent to the hacker's server. Moreover, using the hacker's Internet address, law enforcement is able to begin an investigation to identify other victims of the same hacker. The cybersecurity centers will also be able to notify private entities of the nature of this particular threat. In this example, it is unlikely that the airline will ever need to share or release any customer's personally identifiable information. Second, my cosponsors and I intentionally omitted a critical infrastructure title because we believe a top-down regulatory approach will stifle the voluntary sharing of cyber threat information by the private sector. Consistent with this principle, our information-sharing title does not provide any additional authority to any government entity to impose new regulations on the private sector. In fact, the bill prohibits government agencies from using any shared cyber threat information to regulate the lawful activities of an entity. In short, the bill leaves the existing regulatory regime unchanged. The real difficulty with trying to regulate in this area is that malicious cyber activities occur in real time and are constantly changing. The bureaucracy-driven regulatory process is simply not nimble enough to keep up with the leading cybersecurity practices. Another disadvantage to a regulatory approach is that it gives hackers insight into existing cybersecurity performance requirements and, as a result, potential vulnerabilities. As industry representatives have told us, this could actually make us less safe, not more safe. Thirdly, our bill does not create any new bureaucracy to facilitate the sharing of cyber threat information. Rather, it relies upon the existing cybersecurity centers and gives private entities the flexibility to share their cyber threat information with any cyber center. To ensure thorough dissemination within the government, each cybersecurity center is required to pass on to other centers any cyber threat information it receives from an entity. Ultimately, we expect that our current decentralized cybersecurity center structure will be energized by an increase in shared cyber threat information. We also think these centers, with their ongoing relationships with many private entities, provide a more robust and secure environment for information sharing than creating new cybersecurity exchanges or a new national center. Another advantage of our ``no new regulatory authorities'' and ``no new bureaucracy'' approach is it is also a ``no new spending'' approach. Our bill does not authorize any new spending, which is particularly important given our current economic situation. Fourth, our bill contains clear and unconditional protection from civil and criminal liability for entities that rely upon the authorities in the information-sharing title. Specifically, a private entity cannot be sued or prosecuted for using lawful countermeasures and cybersecurity systems to defend its networks and identify threats. In addition, neither a private entity nor a Federal Government entity can be sued or prosecuted for using, disclosing, or receiving cyber threat information or for the subsequent action or inaction by an entity to which they gave cyber threat information. These clear liability protections are necessary to encourage robust information sharing. If they are watered down or made conditional on sharing with the government, private sector lawyers will likely discourage their clients from sharing cyber threat information and, at a minimum, sharing will be delayed while lawyers have to be consulted. The final practical consideration that governed the drafting of our information-sharing title was to provide sensible safeguards for the protection of personal privacy. We accomplished this in a number of ways. This information-sharing title is focused on the sharing of only ``cyber threat information.'' It is a key definition in the bill. If you study it carefully, you will see it is limited primarily to information related to malicious cyber activities. There is no authorization or liability protection for using, sharing, or receiving information that falls outside of this definition. Nor can private entities use their cybersecurity systems to get information that falls outside this definition. Moreover, it helps to remember that people engaged in malicious cyber activities are essentially trespassers who have no standing to assert privacy interests. Besides this relatively narrow definition of ``cyber threat information,'' there is an additional privacy mechanism that limits the collection and disclosure of cyber threat information for the purpose of preventing, investigating, or mitigating threats to information security. In other words, if what you are doing is not for these purposes, then you cannot do it under this bill. Another way this bill protects privacy is by requiring the government to handle all cyber threat information in a reasonable manner that considers the need to protect privacy and allows the use of anonymizing information. Since information sharing is voluntary under our bill, private sector entities can take any steps to protect their own privacy interests and the privacy of their customers. Moreover, our bill allows private sector entities to require the recipients of their cyber threat information to seek their consent before further disseminating the information. Finally, Congress will be able to conduct its oversight since our bill requires an implementation report to Congress within 1 year of enactment, with follow-on reports every 2 years thereafter. These reports will give Congress detailed insight into a number of areas, including the degree to which privacy may be impacted by the provisions in this title. Now that I have identified the key components and advantages of our approach to information sharing, let me explain why we were compelled to draft this separate bill. All of the cosponsors of the SECURE IT Act agree with Senators Lieberman and Collins and the White House that Congress needs to address the cybersecurity threat. When we attempted to participate in the cyber working groups, it became clear pretty early on that it was going to be difficult to come up with a consensus product. My experience with working on bipartisan bills such as the Intelligence Authorization Act is that we generally start from scratch and only put in those provisions that are agreed to by both sides. If a provision receives an objection, it is not included, but it is understood it may be an amendment during markup or on the floor. This approach always gives us a great starting point that enjoys the overwhelming support of both sides. Since the working group process had essentially reached an impasse on the issue of critical infrastructure regulation and how best to promote information sharing, the cosponsors of the SECURE IT Act joined together to develop a bill that would cover ``common ground'' and could serve as a better starting point for negotiations. We have listened to all sides in putting this bill together--government, industry, private groups, cybersecurity experts, and our colleagues on both sides of the aisle in both the Senate and the House. There should be nothing surprising in our bill. Our ranking member group has been telegraphing our priorities for months now. If we are serious about passing cybersecurity legislation in this Congress--and I hope we are--we should be working together to pass a bill with the support of a large group of Senators far in excess of the 60 we need, as we have done in the past on many major pieces of legislation. I believe the ``common ground'' approach of the SECURE IT Act puts us on a clear path to reaching this goal. This is important national security legislation. Fortunately, Leaders Reid and McConnell have an outstanding record of garnering overwhelming bipartisan support for national security legislation, and I am confident they will seek to do so again. I look forward to continuing these discussions and getting a strong bipartisan bill signed into law.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, otherwise known as the SECURE IT Act. This bill provides a strong foundation for Congress to enact what I hope can be a truly bipartisan approach for improving the ability of all Americans to protect themselves against the ever- increasing cybersecurity threat. This bill was dropped today under the leadership of Senator McCain, Senator Hutchison, Senator Grassley, Senator Murkowski, and myself, and I am very pleased to be a part of that group who has worked very hard on this bill for a number of months. There are a few who dispute the significance of the problem posed by the threat of cyber attacks. The financial harm inflicted by these attacks is now costing Americans billions of dollars each year. Denial- of-service attacks have been shutting down the Internet presence of business and organizations for years. Beyond the economic costs, malicious cyber activity is damaging our national security. Every day, cyber criminals and foreign adversaries steal large amounts of sensitive information from the networks of government and private sector entities. These trends need to be reversed before these malicious activities are measured in terms of lives lost rather than in terms of dollars as we are seeing today. For years the Senate Intelligence Committee has been following the growing cybersecurity threats. Early on, one of the most common questions asked in the cybersecurity context was, Who is in charge? While this seems like the natural place to start, it is important to understand why this is really not the right question. First, there is no consensus on who should be in charge. Some have argued it should be the Department of Defense. Some say it should be the Department of Homeland Security. Others think it might be best to start from scratch. All of these options have very obvious drawbacks. Second, and more important, we have been looking through the wrong end of the telescope in trying to answer this question. Rather than trying to find a governmental entity that should be in charge of cybersecurity, it turns out that the answer is actually much simpler: each and every one of us is in charge of our own cybersecurity. I know some people will scoff at this answer because it is too simplistic for such a complicated problem or they just don't trust us to act in our own best interests. I think they are wrong on both counts. So, if we--and by ``we,'' I mean all of us who use and rely on computer networks, whether individuals, groups, organizations, corporations, or government agencies--are in charge of our own cybersecurity, the real question then is, What should be done to reduce the threat of malicious cyber activity? I believe the answer to that question is contained in the bill called the SECURE IT Act that we have filed today. The SECURE IT Act consists of four key areas of common ground identified in various legislative efforts: first, information sharing; second, Federal Information Security Management Act reform; third, enhanced criminal penalties; and fourth, cybersecurity research and development. We have seen firsthand the positive impact better information sharing can have on our national security. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack, improved information sharing throughout the government and especially within the intelligence community has greatly enhanced our national security. I believe a similar improvement to information sharing in the cyber context will pay huge, long-term dividends in terms of our safety and national security. Once there is an understanding that information sharing will work best if it empowers the individual rather than a discrete government entity, the move from a regulatory approach to one that encourages voluntary sharing of cyber threat information by removing unintended barriers quickly follows. The information-sharing title of the SECURE IT Act is based on this voluntary approach and on the principle that government cannot and should not solve every problem. The cosponsors of this bill relied upon a number of principles and practical considerations to develop the information-sharing provisions in this bill. First, private sector innovation is the engine that drives our economy. Private sector entities have a vested interest in protecting their assets, businesses, and investments. What they often lack is information to help them better protect themselves. Therefore, our information-sharing provision authorizes private sector entities and non-Federal Government agencies to voluntarily disclose cyber threat information to government and private sector entities. The only time cyber threat information must be shared with the government is when it is directly related to a contract between a communications service provider and the government, which ordinarily is a term included in that contract anyway. The only new requirement is that such information will ultimately need to be shared with a cybersecurity center. Information sharing is and must be a two-way street, but there are no quid pro quos here. Because the government often sees different threat pictures than the private sector, our bill also encourages the government to immediately share more classified, declassified, and unclassified cyber threat information. As one example, consider how improved information sharing might safeguard transportation industry systems. Suppose a commercial airline company detects a virus in their reservation system. The virus is stealing information, including customers' credit card numbers, and sending it to a hacker's server overseas. The airline, after investigating internally, determines where the stolen data is being sent. Under our bill, the airline may share the Internet address that is receiving the stolen credit card information with any other companies, such as other airlines, as well as with the government. With this warning from the first airline, other transportation companies can check their systems to see if any of their data is being sent to the hacker's server. Moreover, using the hacker's Internet address, law enforcement is able to begin an investigation to identify other victims of the same hacker. The cybersecurity centers will also be able to notify private entities of the nature of this particular threat. In this example, it is unlikely that the airline will ever need to share or release any customer's personally identifiable information. Second, my cosponsors and I intentionally omitted a critical infrastructure title because we believe a top-down regulatory approach will stifle the voluntary sharing of cyber threat information by the private sector. Consistent with this principle, our information-sharing title does not provide any additional authority to any government entity to impose new regulations on the private sector. In fact, the bill prohibits government agencies from using any shared cyber threat information to regulate the lawful activities of an entity. In short, the bill leaves the existing regulatory regime unchanged. The real difficulty with trying to regulate in this area is that malicious cyber activities occur in real time and are constantly changing. The bureaucracy-driven regulatory process is simply not nimble enough to keep up with the leading cybersecurity practices. Another disadvantage to a regulatory approach is that it gives hackers insight into existing cybersecurity performance requirements and, as a result, potential vulnerabilities. As industry representatives have told us, this could actually make us less safe, not more safe. Thirdly, our bill does not create any new bureaucracy to facilitate the sharing of cyber threat information. Rather, it relies upon the existing cybersecurity centers and gives private entities the flexibility to share their cyber threat information with any cyber center. To ensure thorough dissemination within the government, each cybersecurity center is required to pass on to other centers any cyber threat information it receives from an entity. Ultimately, we expect that our current decentralized cybersecurity center structure will be energized by an increase in shared cyber threat information. We also think these centers, with their ongoing relationships with many private entities, provide a more robust and secure environment for information sharing than creating new cybersecurity exchanges or a new national center. Another advantage of our ``no new regulatory authorities'' and ``no new bureaucracy'' approach is it is also a ``no new spending'' approach. Our bill does not authorize any new spending, which is particularly important given our current economic situation. Fourth, our bill contains clear and unconditional protection from civil and criminal liability for entities that rely upon the authorities in the information-sharing title. Specifically, a private entity cannot be sued or prosecuted for using lawful countermeasures and cybersecurity systems to defend its networks and identify threats. In addition, neither a private entity nor a Federal Government entity can be sued or prosecuted for using, disclosing, or receiving cyber threat information or for the subsequent action or inaction by an entity to which they gave cyber threat information. These clear liability protections are necessary to encourage robust information sharing. If they are watered down or made conditional on sharing with the government, private sector lawyers will likely discourage their clients from sharing cyber threat information and, at a minimum, sharing will be delayed while lawyers have to be consulted. The final practical consideration that governed the drafting of our information-sharing title was to provide sensible safeguards for the protection of personal privacy. We accomplished this in a number of ways. This information-sharing title is focused on the sharing of only ``cyber threat information.'' It is a key definition in the bill. If you study it carefully, you will see it is limited primarily to information related to malicious cyber activities. There is no authorization or liability protection for using, sharing, or receiving information that falls outside of this definition. Nor can private entities use their cybersecurity systems to get information that falls outside this definition. Moreover, it helps to remember that people engaged in malicious cyber activities are essentially trespassers who have no standing to assert privacy interests. Besides this relatively narrow definition of ``cyber threat information,'' there is an additional privacy mechanism that limits the collection and disclosure of cyber threat information for the purpose of preventing, investigating, or mitigating threats to information security. In other words, if what you are doing is not for these purposes, then you cannot do it under this bill. Another way this bill protects privacy is by requiring the government to handle all cyber threat information in a reasonable manner that considers the need to protect privacy and allows the use of anonymizing information. Since information sharing is voluntary under our bill, private sector entities can take any steps to protect their own privacy interests and the privacy of their customers. Moreover, our bill allows private sector entities to require the recipients of their cyber threat information to seek their consent before further disseminating the information. Finally, Congress will be able to conduct its oversight since our bill requires an implementation report to Congress within 1 year of enactment, with follow-on reports every 2 years thereafter. These reports will give Congress detailed insight into a number of areas, including the degree to which privacy may be impacted by the provisions in this title. Now that I have identified the key components and advantages of our approach to information sharing, let me explain why we were compelled to draft this separate bill. All of the cosponsors of the SECURE IT Act agree with Senators Lieberman and Collins and the White House that Congress needs to address the cybersecurity threat. When we attempted to participate in the cyber working groups, it became clear pretty early on that it was going to be difficult to come up with a consensus product. My experience with working on bipartisan bills such as the Intelligence Authorization Act is that we generally start from scratch and only put in those provisions that are agreed to by both sides. If a provision receives an objection, it is not included, but it is understood it may be an amendment during markup or on the floor. This approach always gives us a great starting point that enjoys the overwhelming support of both sides. Since the working group process had essentially reached an impasse on the issue of critical infrastructure regulation and how best to promote information sharing, the cosponsors of the SECURE IT Act joined together to develop a bill that would cover ``common ground'' and could serve as a better starting point for negotiations. We have listened to all sides in putting this bill together--government, industry, private groups, cybersecurity experts, and our colleagues on both sides of the aisle in both the Senate and the House. There should be nothing surprising in our bill. Our ranking member group has been telegraphing our priorities for months now. If we are serious about passing cybersecurity legislation in this Congress--and I hope we are--we should be working together to pass a bill with the support of a large group of Senators far in excess of the 60 we need, as we have done in the past on many major pieces of legislation. I believe the ``common ground'' approach of the SECURE IT Act puts us on a clear path to reaching this goal. This is important national security legislation. Fortunately, Leaders Reid and McConnell have an outstanding record of garnering overwhelming bipartisan support for national security legislation, and I am confident they will seek to do so again. I look forward to continuing these discussions and getting a strong bipartisan bill signed into law.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I wish to thank the chairman for his willingness to enter into this colloquy. We had a discussion, as Senator Inhofe said, during the conference meeting last week in which it now is apparent that the process through which the depot language was inserted was not proper. Senator Levin has been very up front and straight forward with us, and I appreciate his willingness to do this today. I know the chairman has already acknowledged there are problems, and I appreciate his commitment to not only discuss it today but to revisit these issues as soon as the next Senate session convenes and address this issue through a truly inclusive process during which all Members and stakeholders can express their views. Clearly, there was a process problem related to how these provisions wound up in the bill, and I think we can all agree that for issues that are as central to so many Members as the definitions of ``depot maintenance'' and ``core,'' the process needs to be inclusive and extensive and both Houses of Congress need to be equally involved. That simply did not happen in this case. Specifically, related to the substance of the provisions, I am extremely concerned the rewrite of the 10 USC 2464 ``core'' statute replaces all references to ``core logistics'' functions in the original statute with ``depot maintenance and repair'' functions. This basically redefines ``core'' to be depot maintenance only, to exclude other logistics functions such as supply chain management and product support. This does constitute a very significant change, and I would argue that it is exactly in these areas of logistics functions beyond simple depot maintenance where the government has the greatest interest in protecting their own capabilities. Yet the bill defines these activities out of the core definition. This could very easily result in the government's ability to employ and therefore maintain expertise in areas such as program management, supply chain management, and product support management atrophying. I have no doubt that private industry applauds this change because they would be the ones to presumably pick up this work. However, we should not kid ourselves into thinking industry would be cheaper. If the government loses this or any other depot-related capability, they will have an extremely hard time rebuilding that expertise, and this will only incentivize industry to charge more for their efforts. This is clearly a problem and one of the issues we need to address next year. Secondly, the waiver in the 2464 rewrite is much broader than previously and allows for a waiver for military equipment that is not an enduring element of the national defense strategy. Perhaps this could make sense at some level if we knew what this meant, but we don't. What an ``enduring element of the national defense strategy'' is has never been defined; hence, we will be at the mercy of the subjective interpretation of the Department of Defense. That is not the way it should be, and we need to fix that. The current ``core'' waiver in 2464 is much narrower and more defined. The presumption and philosophy in the current waiver is that work, other than work on commercial items, will be considered core, and only considered not core when it is clear it no longer needs to be. The committee's rewrite changes that presumption based on new standards which are unclear. In addition to the two specific issues I have raised, there may be other unintended consequences to these changes of which we are unaware since we have had limited time, as Senator Inhofe said, to vet them and are just now receiving feedback from some of the stakeholders. During the chairman's remarks and in response, I would appreciate his commitment to revisit these issues as soon as we can next year. I encourage DOD to go slowly in implementing any changes since there is a good chance we will make additional changes next year. I appreciate as well his commitment to include a legislative package in next year's national defense authorization bill that gets it right. Again, I thank both Senator Levin and Senator McCain for allowing us to address this issue and for their willingness to cooperate as we move forward next year to clear this matter up.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that LTC John Novak, a legislative fellow in my office, be granted floor privileges during the remainder of today's session.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today in full support of a balanced budget amendment. I am proud to be a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 10, along with all of my fellow Republicans. Shortly, the Senate will vote on two proposals for balancing the Federal budget. One of those proposals, offered by my colleague from Utah, Senator Hatch, will provide a strong and meaningful change to the way this Congress performs it spending function. I thank the Senator for his continued hard work on trying to balance the budget, something he has been working on since 1995. Unfortunately, he, like all of the Members of this body, has seen the recent and disconcerting rise in debt. It is appalling that we continue to head down a path to destruction and fiscal lunacy. The American people are fed up with this. How do we know that? Recent polls say that only 9 percent of the population believes in the spending path Congress has chosen. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2011, we had in excess of $1.3 trillion in deficit spending. In November of this year we surpassed $15 trillion in total debt. This rampant overspending will not end without a drastic change--without taking away the power to overspend. Not only have the American people told us this, our financial markets have told us this as well. Unbearable debt in the European markets is depressing our domestic financial markets. If left unchecked our own debt will continue to lower economic outlook. It is reprehensible that an issue of this magnitude and significance is subject to the partisan bickering and gamesmanship that often rears its head in politics. I encourage my colleagues to give solemn consideration to the proposal before us, as it will turn us immediately away from our overspending. We have to truly examine issues that are very difficult for a lot of us to deal with, and we have to make some very tough decisions. Too frequently, we have engaged in political theater instead of earnest efforts to resolve these long-term budget issues. The American people expect and deserve an honest budget debate and an honest budget process. When we pass this legislation and it is ratified by the States, the American people will finally get an honest budget, and they will get it every year. As many of my colleagues have noted, the idea of preventing a burdensome and crushing debt for future generations is a thing of the past. The time is now. The crisis is now. Congress has been shirking its budget responsibilities for so long that we are now the ones feeling the effects of the debt. I would like to take a moment to talk about some of the things the Republican proposal accomplishes. The President will continue to submit his yearly budget proposal--a budget proposal that is not only balanced but limits the size of the Federal Government to 18 percent of GDP. By comparison, last year spending was at almost 24 percent of GDP. Further, this legislation requires a supermajority to surpass the spending caps for things like emergency spending. We will end a longstanding budget gimmick of government spending in the name of emergencies for things that are not truly emergencies. The rules would be even stricter governing spending of money in times of war instead of the general exemption we have now. This proposal will also force Congress to fix and save Social Security. Finally, one of the most important parts of this proposal is that a two-thirds vote of each House is required to increase taxes, helping prevent higher tax rates to pay for balancing the budget. We can no longer allow the American people to suffer by not providing the economic basis for recovery and growth. The equation is simple: A balanced Federal budget that is free of excessive debt leads to a healthy economy and sustainable job-creation activities.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to join Chairman Feinstein in thanking my colleagues for their support of the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act. Over the past several months, the committee has worked hard to resolve the final details of the bill and concerns raised by other committees and individual Members. The end result of this effort is a solid bill that ensures vigorous congressional oversight and provides needed authorities to the intelligence community. Of course, the vast majority of what the committee authorized is classified, so I cannot discuss specifics. I can say that the classified annex is designed to improve the operations of the intelligence community--from counterterrorism and counterproliferation to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and everything in between. This bill also implements fiscal discipline. Difficult economic times demand austerity, but cuts in this bill are specific and targeted to eliminate waste while preserving the critical work the intelligence community does to protect our country. In the unclassified area--and one of great importance to me--we reached an agreeable compromise with the Administration that gives the committee the information we need about the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees. As the recidivism rate among former detainees rises over 27 percent, it is critical that the committee have full insight into the transfer and resettlement process. The vast majority of detainees are free when they are transferred, and this committee needs to know whether the countries charged with monitoring them are capable and willing to do so. Several provisions in this bill will help the committee do that. The bill also addresses concerns from other committees with national security interests and from the House. As we go forward, I hope the committees of the Senate will do a better job of making sure that committees with oversight of national security issues get the information they need, without automatic objections based on perceived jurisdictional lines. Too often, the intelligence committee includes other committees on receipt of reports or other products, but does not get the same treatment in return. That's just not good for oversight or for fulfilling our responsibility to the American people. I am also pleased that we were able to reach reasonable solutions for authorities requested by the intelligence community. The bill allows for the reimbursement of burial expenses for certain government employees who are killed as the result of hostile or terrorist activities or die in connection with a risky intelligence activity. In these difficult financial times, we worked hard to make sure that the provision is in line with benefits for the families of fallen soldiers and with the funeral costs generally paid by ordinary Americans. We also ensured that individuals in the same agency, like the FBI, are entitled to receive the same reimbursement. The bill also refines the administration of the CIA's foreign language proficiency requirements and allows for more flexible personnel management by the Director of National Intelligence. I thank Chairman Feinstein for her hard work and leadership in getting this bill through the Senate. I also thank the committee staff for once again showing their dedication and commitment to protecting the national security of this country.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the second Feinstein amendment, No. 1126, I believe. I have the privilege as serving as vice chairman on the Intelligence Committee with Chairman Feinstein. We have a good working relationship and agree on most every issue that comes before the committee. I know the diligence and seriousness with which she takes every issue but particularly this one. We have had a number of discussions about the fact that we have a lack of a detainee and interrogation policy in this country now, and I know she is concerned about that and is trying to make the situation better. I remain committed to work with her on a solution. Unfortunately, I am going to have to oppose her amendment today because of my concerns about the limitation it imposes on the authority to detain Americans who have chosen to wage war against America. My first concern is that it appears, from the debate yesterday, that there is confusion among some Members about what this amendment does. For example, my colleague and friend from Illinois, Senator Kirk, argued that he is in favor of robust and flexible U.S. military action overseas, including against American citizens such as Anwar al-Awlaqi. Senator Kirk said he supports the Feinstein amendment, however, because he believes in a zone of protection for citizens inside the United States. But the Feinstein amendment does not apply to only those American citizens who commit belligerent acts inside the United States; it would also prohibit the long-term military detention of American terrorists such as Anwar al-Awlaqi, who committed terrorist acts outside the United States. As a result, this amendment would have the perverse effect of allowing American belligerents overseas to be targeted in lethal strikes but not held in U.S. military detention until the end of hostilities. That makes no sense whatsoever. I am also concerned about the ambiguity in the amendment's language and the uncertainty it will cause our operators, especially those overseas. The amendment exempts American citizens from detention without trial until the end of hostilities. But short of the end of hostilities, the amendment appears to allow detention without trial. Is it the Senator's intent to allow for some long-term detention of Americans without trial? This is troubling because we don't know how the prohibition will be interpreted by our operators or the courts that will hear inevitable habeas challenges. Would the military be permitted to hold a captured belligerent for a month, a few months, or a few years, as long as it was not until the end of hostilities? Or would the military interpret the amendment as a blanket prohibition against military detention of Americans for any period of time? If the military rounded up American terrorists such as Adam Gadahn or Adnan Shukrijumah among a group of terrorists, would they have to let these Americans go because the military would not be permitted to detain them? Would more American belligerents be killed in strikes if capture-and-detain operations were perceived to be unlawful? I don't believe we can leave our operators with this kind of uncertainty. Finally, we should all remember the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act do not provide for a new authority to hold U.S. citizens in military detention. American citizens can be held in military detention under current law. Contrary to some claims that were made yesterday and debated on this floor, these Americans would be given ample due process through their ability to bring habeas corpus challenges to their detention in Federal court. The Supreme Court has held in the Hamdi case that the detention of enemy combatants without the prospect of criminal charges or trial until the end of hostilities is proper under the AUMF and the Constitution. Hamdi is a U.S. citizen. This is not a new concept. In reaching its decision, the Hamdi Court cited the World War II case, Ex parte Quirin, in which the Supreme Court held: [C]itizenship in the United States as an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency. In conclusion, I understand Senator Feinstein's motivation, but I just don't believe this amendment does what she wants it to do, and there will be unintended consequences that could seriously hamper overseas capture operations. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Feinstein amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today, along with my colleague, my fellow University of Georgia graduate, Senator Isakson, to honor a man who died last week who became a legend in his own time in our great State, a legend who was respected by, as we would say, folks on both sides of the aisle. That term for this man means he was respected by Georgia Tech football fans as well as University of Georgia football fans. The man I am talking about is Larry Munson. Larry Munson was not a southerner by birth, but he became a southerner and Georgia Bulldog by passion. He was the Georgia football announcer for over four decades. During those four decades, he not only witnessed some of the most memorable football games, but he made some of the most memorable calls. His way of describing a football play will go down in the annals of broadcasting as not only being unique, not only being fascinating, but it will go down in the annals of sports broadcasting as being some of the best and most professional calls ever made on a football field. But there was more to Larry Munson than the ``Run, Lindsay, run,'' more to Larry Munson than the ``Oh, you Herschel Walker,'' more to Larry Munson than ``We just stomped on them with a hob-nailed boot.'' He was a man who had passion for life, a man who had a thorough understanding of his profession, and a man who worked very hard at his profession. He used to get up every Saturday morning before a football game and have coffee with our legendary coach, Vince Dooley. Coach Dooley said he finally had to stop having coffee with Larry Munson because Larry was ever the pessimist, from a football standpoint. Coach Dooley would come to those coffees feeling good about his chances in the ball game that day, and by the time he finished having coffee with Larry Munson, he had to go back and rewrite his playbook. Larry Munson was simply a man who loved the University of Georgia. He loved calling football games, and he loved putting his emotions into those calls. He was also a man who cared not just about the University of Georgia but about his students. He used to have what he called a Wednesday night movie night where he would invite students to join him at a theater in Athens, GA, and he would share time--his time--with students that he loved. He did this for years and years and years. I have heard stories from some of those folks who attended those movie nights that Larry Munson was more passionate about movies than he was about University of Georgia football, which is hard to imagine. As we look back on the life of Larry Munson, those of us who live and breathe Georgia football will always remember the passionate calls, the way he put his heart and soul into the football game, but we will also remember the man Larry Munson, who enjoyed life, enjoyed people, enjoyed his profession, and who gave so much back to his profession. He was a man who loved the outdoors. He came south from his birthplace of Minneapolis many years ago. He remained a true southerner not just for his 40 years of broadcasting at the University of Georgia but in his bass fishing, for example. I remember when he would come down to our part of the world in south Georgia to speak to a touchdown club, or whatever it may be, and he would always call up and say, ``Where is the best bass pond in south Georgia? That is where I want to be this afternoon before my speech.'' He thoroughly enjoyed the outdoors, and he enjoyed being around people. That was obvious in the way he expressed himself behind the microphone when he called football games. As we celebrate the life of Larry Munson, we celebrate more than his historic calls. His passion for football, his passion for his family, and his passion for friends exceeds any passion he had for football. He was a great man, a great friend, and he will certainly be missed by our State and particularly by our university. With that, I yield to Senator Isakson.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Debbie Shaw, a fellow in Senator Coburn's office, be granted floor privileges during the consideration of S. 1867.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to oppose the Udall amendment, which would eliminate the bipartisan detainee provision that the chairman, the ranking member, and committee members worked so hard to craft. These provisions are necessary to provide some certainty for our intelligence professionals in how our government will handle terrorist detainees and how long detainees can be questioned for intelligence-gathering purposes. We have heard quite a lot over the past few days from administration officials about how our intelligence and law enforcement professionals need flexibility. In fact, Director of National Intelligence Clapper wrote to the Intelligence Committee arguing for flexibility and stressing the need for a process that, as he said, ``encourages intelligence collection through the preservation of all lawful avenues of detention and interrogation.'' With that, I agree wholeheartedly. The problem with the status quo, however, is that the administration refuses to use all of its lawful avenues of detention and interrogation available to it, choosing instead only to use one, and that is article III courts. For nearly 3 years, Members of Congress have pressed the administration to establish an effective and unambiguous long-term detention policy, but they have refused. The intent behind these bipartisan provisions is simple: We must hold detainees for as long as it takes to gather information our intelligence and law enforcement professionals need to take down terror networks and to stop attacks. Frankly, the best place, in my opinion, for this is Guantanamo Bay, But when it comes to Gitmo, the administration is no longer concerned about ``flexibility.'' Instead, we hear that Guantanamo is ``off the table.'' In fact, in a hearing, when I asked the current Secretary of Defense, prior to the SEAL Team 6 takedown of Osama bin Laden: If you captured him, what would you do with him, he quizzically looked back and said: Well, I guess we would send him to Guantanamo. Well, we know that would not have happened had we not taken him down. This is unfortunate because intelligence and law enforcement professionals, including some at high levels in the administration, acknowledge privately that what hampers intelligence collection from detainees is the administration's unwillingness to take new detainees to Guantanamo for questioning. When our operators overseas are unsure about where they would hold captured detainees, it causes delay, sometimes missed opportunities, and sometimes capture operations become kill operations. We cannot afford this kind of uncertainty and the Udall amendment simply kicks the can down the road with a report about a problem we already understand. The time to act is now. Without Guantanamo, long-term military detention elsewhere is the next best option and is the appropriate option for terrorists with whom we are at war. The detainee provisions in the Defense Authorization Act will ensure that the administration uses all of the detention options it says it wants, not just article III courts, and offer the flexibility the administration says it needs. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Udall amendment and give our intelligence professionals and military operators some certainty as they fight the war on terror.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Udall amendment.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise to voice my support for the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1867. This is one of the most important bills the Senate considers each year, and this is the ninth Defense authorization bill I have been involved in drafting since being elected to the Senate. It sets funding levels and implements policies for the Department of Defense and provides pay raises for our men and women in uniform. After extended debate, this bill, which authorizes $662 billion for the Department of Defense and national security-related aspects of the Department of Energy, was passed unanimously out of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee was in a difficult situation this year, considering our Nation's fiscal crisis. As I have firmly believed all along, everything, including defense spending, must be on the table to address our fiscal circumstances. In the midst of intense budget negotiations, I am pleased we can offer and debate a bill that addresses the real need to reduce government spending in a responsible and calculated manner. As several of my colleagues have already stated on the Senate floor, the National Defense Authorization Act cuts a considerable amount from the defense budget, as requested by the President. It is $27 billion less than the administration requested and $43 billion less than the amount appropriated for 2011. These were very difficult decisions to make, but it was the fiscally responsible thing to do given our Nation's fiscal situation. I am pleased the committee was able to make these cuts without jeopardizing our national security. Given the unstable state of affairs around the world, now is not the time to slash important programs that help our military carry out their responsibilities. We still have widespread enemies and interests around the world. With this in mind, the bill authorizes $3.2 billion for DOD's Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle fund; authorizes $10.3 billion for U.S. Special Operations Command, an increase of 6 percent above fiscal year 2011 levels; and authorizes more than $2.4 billion for DOD's counter- improvised explosive device activities. In recent months, we have seen what a remarkable impact a small, elite force of U.S. soldiers can have, and I am pleased this bill authorizes a deserved funding increase for U.S. Special Operations Command in order to expand their resources, training, technology, and equipment to accomplish their missions. Along with funding, this bill will extend the authority of Special Operations Forces to provide support to operations fighting against terrorism around the world. Regarding our ongoing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas, the bill allocates $11.2 billion for training and equipping the Afghan security forces commensurate with recommendations from the Commander of U.S. Central Command, and fully supports the budget request of $1.75 billion in Coalition Support Funds to reimburse key partner nations supporting U.S. military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. I am also pleased that I will be leaving later on today, along with Senator Burr, and heading to Afghanistan to visit our troops and to visit with our commanders on the ground, both from an intelligence standpoint as well as an operational standpoint. This is the fourth Thanksgiving I have had the opportunity to be on the ground with our troops and to look them in the eye, with their boots on the ground, and tell them how much we, as policymakers, but more importantly we, as Americans, appreciate the great sacrifice each and every one of them is making and how much we appreciate the great job they are doing of protecting America and protecting Americans. This bill also authorizes $500 million for counterterrorism, capacity-building activities, including targeted efforts in east Africa and Yemen, and fully supports the budget request of $524 million to support the activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq in overseeing and implementing foreign military sales to the Iraqi security forces. Keeping in mind the strategic value of our nuclear deterrent and our ongoing need to modernize and maintain our nuclear triad, the bill authorizes $1.1 billion to continue to develop the Ohio-class replacement program, the SSBN(X), to modernize the sea-based leg of the nuclear deterrent system. The U.S. military requires the capability to counter a growing amount of nontraditional threats. In this bill, we strengthen our forces on the threat of cyber warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It is no secret that American computer networks are the victim of attempted hacking from state and non-state actors around the world on a regular basis. With funds authorized in this bill, the Department of Defense will be able to better guard against the threat of cyber attacks. I am also pleased that in this bill we were able to focus on the well-being of our brave men and women fighting on the front lines for our freedom overseas, as well as their devoted family members back at home who make sacrifices every single day. The bill authorizes $100.6 billion for military personnel, including costs of pay, allowances, bonuses, death benefits, and permanent change of station moves. The bill also authorizes a 1.6-percent across-the-board pay raise for our service men and women as well as authorizes over 30 types of bonuses and special pays aimed at encouraging enlistment, re-enlistment, and continued service by Active-Duty and Reserve component military personnel. Our attention remains on improving the quality of life of the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families, as well as Department of Defense civilian personnel, through fair pay, policies, and benefits, including first-rate health care, while addressing the needs of wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families. Let me also briefly address the amendment I have just filed. I have been working for the last several weeks with my colleagues, Senators Isakson, Hatch, Lee, Inhofe, and Coburn, on an issue related to the reorganization of the Air Force Materiel Command. Let me first say that I support this reorganization. It is the first major reorganization of the Materiel Command by the Air Force in some 60 years. I support the Air Force's need and desire to make themselves more efficient and more effective, and for the most part, I believe the proposed reorganization will do that. In these tight budget times, when we are all going to have to accept streamlined budgets and resources, some loss of jobs and positions is, unfortunately, inevitable, and I realize that. However, there is one issue with respect to this proposed reorganization that I think we are all having a hard time understanding and that relates to how the reorganization may affect the way the Air Force organizes for sustainment of weapon systems. The proposed reorganization would take some of the key personnel who are helping to orchestrate these sustainment efforts and put them in a separate chain of command from their partners in carrying out those sustainment efforts. This is hard to understand. And, in a time when our Air Force is working harder than ever and keeping their aircraft in the fleet longer than ever, it is hard to imagine how a change such as the Air Force is proposing here will help sustainment of weapon systems. We are working with the Air Force on this issue, and we are still in negotiations, but this is an issue for which we have yet to receive a satisfactory explanation, and we have not reached a conclusion of this issue. I think the Air Force needs to clearly understand that there is a risk here. There is a risk that this reorganization may have some unintended consequences specifically related to the readiness of our Air Force. This is serious. We have not seen any explanation for how the Air Force arrived at their proposed course of action on this specific issue or why they think it will improve readiness. I would also note that the way the Air Force is seeking to reorganize in this respect goes against some of the basic principles and recommendations of a recent, very thorough report on this specific issue. It is with these issues in mind that we are filing this amendment. I very much look forward to the Air Force's explanations on this issue and to having this reorganization be executed in a way that allows the Air Force to conserve personnel and resources, organize more efficiently, and sustain weapon systems to support the warfighter in the most effective way possible. In conclusion, I am extremely proud of the hard work the Armed Services Committee Members and staff have done to put together this Defense authorization bill. I would particularly like to compliment our leadership, Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain, on the job they have done and their willingness to work with Members of the Committee on our specific issues--issues such as the one Senator Ayotte and I discussed on the floor yesterday, along with Senator Graham, Senator McCain, and Senator Levin, regarding detainee policy, of which we have none at the present time and to which folks such as Senator Ayotte have given a great deal of thought and have come up with some very logical ways in which we can address this issue of detainees so that we can get actionable intelligence from those detainees and, at the same time, ensure they are treated in ways that are respectful to our system of jurisprudence on the military side as well as on the civilian side. I want to also say that we have had a couple of hiccups along the way, but staff on both sides, the majority and minority, have addressed those hiccups, and we have been working very closely to try to ensure that the issues we raised with staff after the bill was filed have been addressed and are in the process of being taken care of. As a reflection of the extremely tight budget environment, we have taken responsible reductions in spending; however, we maintain our commitment to the Armed Forces by providing funds and authorizations to protect our national security and support our men and women on the front lines, as well as their dedicated families here in America. I look forward to the remainder of the debate on this bill when we return after our Thanksgiving break. To all of our men and women who wear the uniform of the United States of America, Happy Thanksgiving.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, first of all, let me say to the majority leader that our thoughts and prayers go out to folks in Nevada, and we certainly hope this emergency situation is rectified in the near term. In Georgia, we had about 400,000 acres destroyed by a forest fire back earlier this summer, and it is always a tragedy. Loss of property is one thing, but injury and potential loss of life, obviously, is very much a part of that, and our hearts go out to all the residents. Our thanks go out to these brave men and women who are fighting those fires out there, as they did in my State, to get them under control. Amendment No. 1304 Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and that my amendment, which is at the desk, be made pending.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today to bring to the Senate an issue of critical importance. Last night, the Senate was able to pass by unanimous consent legislation that will provide much needed transparency to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process of examining and resolving bank failures. Not only is this an issue that has severely impacted the wellbeing of my state of Georgia, but this Nation is suffering as a whole. There are some communities across the country that are no longer have a bank to serve them and will continue to suffer on their economic development efforts because the sole bank in their community has failed. Since 2008 there has been over 400 bank failures nationwide. Seventy of those failures have occurred in Georgia. This year alone 18 banks in Georgia have failed. While that represents over 27 percent of all the banks in my State, this is not just a Georgia issue. There are nine other States that have extraordinarily high rates of failures including: Florida, Illinois, California, Minnesota, Washington, Michigan, Nevada, Missouri, and Arizona. Unfortunately, there will continue to be bank failures in this country and this bill will provide the Congress with information about the underlying fundamentals that cause these failures. The bill directs the FDIC IG, in consultation with Treasury and Federal Reserve IGs to study FDIC policies and practices with regard to Loss Share Agreements; the fair application of regulatory capital standards; appraisals; FDIC procedures for loan modifications; and the FDIC's handling of Consent Orders and Cease and Desist Orders. Further, the GAO will be directed to a study those questions the FDIC IG is unable to fully explore such as the causes of the high number of bank failures; procyclical impact of fair value accounting; analysis of the impact of failures on the community; and, the overall effectiveness of loss share agreements for resolving banks. The swift passage of this legislation by the House of Representatives in July was a rare instance of bipartisan support and a sincere acknowledgement to the American people that bank failures on the whole need to be carefully considered by the Congress. The FDIC does a commendable job of ensuring that depositors at banks they regulate are going to be able to access their money in the event of a bank failure. I want the FDIC to know that their good work does not go unnoticed by this body, however it is clear that Congress needs more information about the underlying causes of these bank failures and it is imperative that the US Congress send a clear message that ``if there is a better way, then we must pursue it.''

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. I am sorry. I thought you gave us two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the motion of the Senator from Colorado. As the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, let me just say in response to the statement from the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee that there has not been a lack of discussion of this issue, both within the Armed Services Committee and within the Intelligence Committee. While I am not permitted to talk about what has gone on within the Intelligence Committee, I assure my colleagues that this has been a major issue from a discussion standpoint for a number of months. In fact, it has been a point of discussion for almost 3 years now. I will get into some of that in my comments. Secondly, just in quick response to the comment of the Senator from Illinois, the assistant majority leader, when he talked about how we would treat U.S. citizens under this, I know how smart he is, and he is my friend, but he obviously hasn't read the bill. There is a specific exclusion for citizens of the United States being required to be detained by the military in this bill. Over the past several years, there has been an ongoing debate concerning our Nation's ability to fully and lawfully interrogate suspected terrorists. One thing remains clear: After all of these years after 9/11, we still lack an unambiguous and effective detention policy. The consequences of that failure are very real. If we had captured bin Laden, what would we have done with him? If we had captured Anwar al-Awlaki, what would we have done with him? If today we capture Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida, what would we do with him? Many of us have posed these same questions to various administration officials, and the wide variety of responses only confirms that there is no policy. That is unacceptable, and that is why the detainee provisions in this bill are so absolutely critical. I think it is fair to say that if we had captured bin Laden or Awlaki, we could have gained very actionable intelligence from either one of them, and that is our primary goal. But how would we have done that? We have no detainee policy; there is no place we could have taken them for long-term interrogation. The closest thing to a policy we have heard from the administration is that Guantanamo is off the table. But that is not helpful when they provide no other alternatives. We have heard some administration officials say holding detainees on ships for brief periods of time solves this detention problem. Now, Senator McCain just addressed that issue, and we have a great U.S. Navy. It is not the intention of the U.S. Navy to function in a way of sailing ships around the world and having terrorists brought to ships for detention. A state-of-the-art facility like Guantanamo Bay is off the table, but holding someone on a ship, never intended to be a floating prison and prohibited from long-term detention by the Geneva Conventions is somehow a humane replacement for Guantanamo? That simply does not make sense. The intent behind the detainee provisions in this bill is very simple: We must be able to hold detainees for as long as it takes to get significant foreign intelligence information without them lawyering up, as the Christmas Day bomber did so famously after only 50 minutes of interrogation. Again, to my friend from Illinois, who talked about the fact that once this young man's parents got involved, that after his Miranda rights had been given to him, he gave us an awful lot of intelligence-- and that is true in his case--I doubt very seriously that Zawahiri's parents, who probably are not even alive, are going to step up and tell their son: You ought to go in and talk to these folks and give them all the details about the way you helped plan the September 11 attacks on the United States of America. We just know with high-value targets that is not going to happen on a wholesale basis, and we simply need to be in a position to gain actionable intelligence from every one of those individuals. While I fully support the detainee provisions in this bill, I believe there are other improvements that can and should be made. For example, I am cosponsoring Senator Ayotte's amendment which will allow our intelligence interrogators to use lawful interrogation methods beyond those set forth in the Army Field Manual. We need to be clear on exactly what this means. This amendment does not authorize or condone torture, and every technique used in every interrogation must comply with our laws and treaty obligations. I believe there needs to be flexibility in how we interrogate terrorists. But even more so I believe it is foolish to publicize--as the Army Field Manual does--the specific techniques that can be used in interrogating a suspected terrorist. Over the years, we have heard repeatedly from the intelligence community that the element of surprise is sometimes our greatest asset in gathering timely intelligence from detainees. Senator Ayotte's amendment gives the intelligence community the ability to use techniques that have not been broadcast over the Internet. In my opinion, that makes a lot of sense. I hope my colleagues will agree because the folks we are dealing with in the terrorist world today-- these guys who are the meanest, nastiest killers in the world; who wake up every morning trying to figure out ways to kill and harm Americans-- are not stupid. They carry laptops. They know how to use the Internet. We gain valuable information oftentimes through the airwaves. We know how smart they are, and we know they have the capability of going on the Internet today and reviewing the Army Field Manual. They know exactly the way they are going to be interrogated and the type of techniques that are going to be used to gain intelligence from them. The Armed Services Committee has worked very hard on a bipartisan basis to come up with legislation that will improve congressional oversight of detainee matters, as well as provide greater assurance that detainees who pose a threat to our national security are not released so they can return to the fight. As the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have a specific interest in making sure our intelligence community has the ability to gather timely and actionable intelligence from detainees. I believe this bill will help our intelligence interrogators do exactly that, and I urge my colleagues to support these provisions fully as was done on a unanimous basis within the Armed Services Committee when this issue was discussed, debated, and talked about thoroughly during the markup. I yield to my friend from New Hampshire.

Mr. CHAMBLISS

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. This is the ninth Defense authorization bill I have been involved in since I have been a Member of the Senate. I must say the refusal by the majority leader to bring this Defense authorization bill to the floor is truly disheartening. It is critically important that we address the issues not only of what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan but the day-to-day operations of our military from the standpoint of pay raises, quality of life, purchase of weapons systems for future use--any number of issues that are included. The refusal of the majority leader to bring this to the floor because of his objection to a very critical aspect of this bill truly is disheartening. During committee consideration of the bill, the committee considered and adopted, by a vote of 25 to 1, a comprehensive bipartisan provision relating to detainees. We have no detainee policy in this country today. If we had captured bin Laden, what would we have done with him? If we had captured Anwar al-Awlaki, what would we have done with him? Certainly we could have gained actionable intelligence from either one of those individuals, but we have no detainee policy in this country today. We have nowhere to take them, where we can hold these individuals and ensure that they do not get lawyered up quickly and that we are unable to get the type of information we need to get from individuals such as that. Over the past several years there has been an ongoing debate about the importance of being able to fully and lawfully interrogate suspected terrorists. One thing is clear after all these years: that our Nation still lacks this clear and effective policy. This bipartisan detainee compromise goes a long way toward ensuring we can get timely and actionable intelligence from newly captured detainees connected to al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. The compromise also provides for a permanent process for transferring Guantanamo detainees to other countries. We are in the midst right now of a review within the Intelligence Committee of the thought process that went into the transferring of detainees by both the Bush administration and the current administration. I will tell you that there are real flaws in that policy. Those flaws have resulted, according to the DNI--General Clapper--of a recidivism rate of Guantanamo detainees of 27 percent. That means 27 percent of the individuals we have released from Guantanamo and sent to other countries that have been willing to take them under various agreements--27 percent of them have returned to the battlefield and are killing or are seeking to kill Americans. The policy not only about detainees but policies with regard to what we do with Guantanamo detainees is extremely important. There were a number of us who were involved in the amendments that went into the authorization bill in committee. Senator Graham from South Carolina was. Senator Ayotte from New Hampshire was integrally involved. Let me turn to Senator Ayotte and, from the perspective of the people of New Hampshire, ask: Where does the Senator think we are with respect to a detainee policy in this country today?