Daniel Coats

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. We have no problem with the Senator closing debate. I don't think 42 seconds is going to swing things one way or another, unless I come up with something really clever.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, what is the status of the time?

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Well, in response--perhaps I should let the Senator finish and then I will respond on my own time.

Mr. COATS. If I could finish my statement. The only thing we do not want is for those of us in Congress to tell the military how to protect itself. But we want to send a message that we do not care what the President's interpretation is; we are dealing with what Congress wants to say. What Congress wants to say is, Mr. President, I do not care what your exit strategy is, whether I agree with it or disagree with it. We believe that our troops should not be there indefinitely. We believe you should talk to our NATO allies and European allies and tell them that Congress does not support an indefinite troop commitment. We want our combat forces out of there. We want a European force--if you think it is necessary to stay there, you better tell the Europeans to put a European force together. If you want our support, logistics support, intelligence support, communications support, rapid reaction that might help you in a crisis, yes, we can consider that. But we want those combat troops out of there. I just don't want to confuse the President's policies--exit strategy, benchmarks, General Clark's interpretation. That is not what we are about here. We are talking about Congress' resolution. I ask the Senator if that is what we are up to?

Mr. COATS. And I want to make sure that everyone understands that the amendment that is before the Senate, the sense of the Congress, does not address that question, is not meant to address that question.

Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. COATS. I thank my colleague. I just want to make sure that I understand that what he is trying to say is that it is important, a discussion over what the benchmarks should be or could be or ought to be, or how it ought to be modified, and should not be confused with what we are attempting to do in this resolution. Discussing benchmarks, I say to the Senator from Texas, is perfectly legitimate, but not as an objection to the resolution that is before us. It is partly, maybe even primarily, I would ask the Senator, because of the benchmarks, because we agree that they are indefinite, because we agree they are not achievable that we want this resolution.

Mr. COATS. I yield the floor. Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will conclude, so that my colleague, Senator Levin, may proceed, simply by saying that we asked for the Department of Defense response to this amendment. They reported back. The Department of Defense says: The Department has no objection to the proposed amendment in general. The Department is concerned that paragraph (2) under Sense of Congress could be misinterpreted as a weakening of US resolve and commitment to the process initiated under the Dayton Agreement. While the Department agrees that there should not be a permanent US presence in Bosnia, the timing and nature of discussions on withdrawal of the international coalition should be driven by our continued progress on the ground and not by artificial deadlines. And The New York Times reported the following on June 13, 1996: There has been no change in the President's view of the current IFOR mission. It will last about a year.--Michael McCurry, White House spokesman, New York Times, 6/13/96. The Washington Post reported on July 25, 1996 the following: There is no successor mission. . . . We're not anticipating any such thing.--Vice President Albert Gore, Washington Post, 7/25/96. I agree in terms of their discussion about ``artificial deadlines.'' But I want to point out that the Dayton agreement clearly stated that the presence of the military was necessary to accomplish the military task. And I believe that military task has been accomplished. I think the debate on this floor, if there is to be a debate about our troop presence, should not be defining what the size of that presence should be and the timing of that presence. I think it should be on whether or not there ought to be a presence. There is going to be a legitimate debate, I believe, as to whether or not we want to stay involved in Bosnia. And the will of the Congress ought to be expressed on that, or the appropriations ought to be defined in a way to support whatever is necessary, if we are going to be there, determined by the military, or zero if we determine they shouldn't be there. That ought to be the debate, rather than defining what the mission should be, what the size of the force should be, and putting deadlines in terms of achieving those goals. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. COATS. But that is the essential question.

Mr. COATS. That is the Senator's question.

Mr. COATS. I will be glad to take a question from the Senator.

Mr. COATS. No, the Senator didn't take it that way at all. The Senator is simply trying to get an answer to his question as it applied to the language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment which has been talked about today, and trying to understand the role of the Commander in Chief vis-a-vis the role of Congress in that specific, requiring that specific requirement of the President as Commander in Chief relative to that language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment. I was just trying to clarify it.

Mr. COATS. That is the essential question.

Mr. COATS. I am not challenging the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. COATS. I say to the Senator, our vote will not preclude the Senator from offering an amendment on Bosnia. If the Senator's amendment is not a second-degree amendment to the underlying amendment, we strongly prefer to deal with our amendment as it stands and then have the Senator be recognized to offer an amendment on Bosnia.

Mr. COATS. As I understand it--parliamentary inquiry--if the Senator's amendment is not a second degree, does it not require unanimous consent to set aside the underlying amendment before going to his amendment?

Mr. COATS. The Senator, I believe, is correct. There is nothing in this amendment that I believe could be interpreted contrary to what the Senator has just stated.

Mr. COATS. Yes. Perhaps I was extrapolating wrongly. I thought the Senator was indicating that power would be vested with the Congress relative to the Byrd-Hutchison amendment which sets a level--attempts to set, to dictate a process which would set a level for total number of troops that would be engaged. Perhaps this Senator--

Mr. COATS. Would that amendment not lead to Congress making the decision on that?

Mr. COATS. I understand how Congress has the power to establish the level of the militia, the level of the Army, the number of individuals. I suppose if Congress said there shall be no more than 5,000 members in the U.S. Navy, that would impose a limit to how many troops could be deployed, and the maximum number you could deploy would be 5,000. But I don't see where once the level is established, and we have established a level of nearly 500,000 Active Army, for instance, I don't see how that would translate to Congress having the power to dictate how that 500,000 force level would be assigned.

Mr. COATS. Total.

Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?

Mr. COATS. The Senator feels that he should respond because----

Mr. COATS. But the question I asked the Senator is whether that power extends to once that force is raised, once Congress determines to raise an army, once Congress appropriates funds for that army, once Congress establishes force levels and sets the rules, at what point does Congress, does that extend--I should add, does that extend to the actual utilization by the Commander in Chief of the power--does the Congress have the power to determine how those forces then should be deployed to protect and defend the interests of the United States?