Daniel Coats

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to address the issue concerning the procedures used by the Senate Armed Services Committee in evaluating nominations and, in particular, the nomination of Cmdr. Robert E. Stumpf. The Senate Armed Services Committee has received considerable public criticism since the Secretary of the Navy removed Commander Stumpf from the promotion list. The committee, and some of its members, have been the subject of numerous articles in the media relating to both substantive and procedural issues concerning this matter. Much of the material that has appeared in the media reports has been inaccurate and incomplete. Some of the material has been written by Commander Stumpf's lawyer. Others quote either Commander Stumpf, his attorney, or both. To this point, members of the Armed Services Committee have not responded publicly on the substance of the information provided to the committee by the Navy, nor on the deliberations conducted within the executive session. This is in accordance with established committee rules and procedures, including procedures designed to protect the privacy and reputation of nominees, with appropriate regard for the rights of Commander Stumpf. Last Thursday, Senator Thurmond, as the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the committee, placed a statement in the Record which began by reciting the chronology of events concerning the nomination of Commander Stumpf. I do not think there is any doubt or debate about the sequence of events. But I want to review those events for the Record. On March 11, 1994, the President submitted various nominations for promotion in the Navy to the grade of captain (O-6), including a list containing the nomination of Commander Stumpf. On the same date, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, in the letter required by the committee on all Navy and Marine Corps nominees, advised the committee that none of the officers had been identified as potentially implicated on matters related to Tailhook. After careful review, the list was reported favorably to the Senate on May 19, 1994, and all nominations on the list were confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 1994. Subsequent to the Senate's confirmation of this promotion list, but prior to the appointment by the President of Commander Stumpf to the grade of captain, the committee was advised by the Department of Defense that the March 11, 1994, letter had been in error because the Navy had failed to inform the Office of the Secretary of Defense that Commander Stumpf had been identified as potentially implicated in Tailhook. As a result, on June 30, 1994, the Armed Services Committee requested that the Navy withhold action on the promotion of Commander Stumpf until the committee had an opportunity to review the information that had not been made available to the Senate during its confirmation proceedings. It was entirely appropriate that the committee request the withholding of Commander Stumpf's promotion once it had been notified of the Navy's failure to report the potential implication of Commander Stumpf in Tailhook-related activities. It is also worth noting that the Armed Services Committee has no capacity to investigate nominations on its own. The committee must rely solely on the information provided by the Department of Defense, which, in this case, was incomplete. On April 4, 1995, the Navy provided the committee with the report of investigation and related information concerning Commander Stumpf. And I would note this is not all the information related to Commander Stumpf for his case. The committee is still receiving documents relating to that particular case. And subsequently, the Navy provided additional information in response to requests from the committee. And those requests are ongoing. On October 25, 1995, the committee met in closed session, consistent with its longstanding practice, to consider a number of nominations and to further consider the matter involving Commander Stumpf. After due consideration, the committee directed the chairman and ranking member to advise the Secretary of the Navy that, and I quote: Had the information regarding Commander Stumpf's activities surrounding Tailhook '91 been available to the committee, as required, at the time of the nomination, the committee would not have recommended that the Senate confirm his nomination to the grade of captain. The committee also directed that the letter advise the Secretary that, and again I quote from the letter: The committee recognizes that, in light of the Senate having earlier given its advice and consent to Commander Stumpf's nomination, the decision to promote him rests solely with the executive branch. A draft letter was prepared, reviewed by the Senate legal counsel, made available for review by all members of the committee, and was transmitted to the Secretary on November 13, 1995. On December 22, 1995, the Secretary of the Navy removed Commander Stumpf's name from the promotion list. The committee met next on March 12, 1996, to review the committee's procedures for considering Navy and Marine Corps nominations in the aftermath of Tailhook. At that meeting, the committee again reviewed the proceedings concerning Commander Stumpf. I do not think many people outside the committee fully understand the committee's procedures in handling controversial nominations. Just to make it clear, when the committee is notified by the Department of Defense that there is potentially adverse information concerning a nominee, that nomination moves to a separate, more deliberate track than those nominations about which there is no adverse information. The committee staff is required to research the information provided by the Department of Defense and to brief the members in an executive or closed session. Attendance at these executive sessions is limited to Members of the Senate and committee counsel. These restrictions are designed to minimize the number of people who may learn of information which may be very personal, sometimes inflammatory, and may involve allegations which have been found to not be substantiated. Following a procedure developed late in the 103d Congress, the chairman and ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee are charged with reviewing those cases prior to an executive session. In the case of Commander Stumpf, the committee followed those procedures precisely. The committee met in executive session on October 25, 1995, to discuss a series of nominations, as I indicated. Seven Tailhook-related nominations were considered that day. For the record, those members present voted to favorably recommend two of the seven and to return five of the nominations to the executive branch at the end of the first session. The one remaining Tailhook-related individual discussed during that meeting was Commander Stumpf. On December 22, 1995, as I earlier indicated, Secretary Dalton removed Commander Stumpf from the promotion list. Following that action by the Secretary of the Navy, a number of public articles, some written by Commander Stumpf's defense team, questioned the committee's integrity, its processes and its judgment. These allegations have been characterized by misinformation, distortions of the record, and misstatement of the facts. Numerous articles and sources have questioned the committee's procedures related to Tailhook nominations, alleging that the prospect of confirmation of service members nominated for promotion but involved in Tailhook are ``slim.'' The records of the committee show that the committee has received 23 nominations of service members potentially implicated in Tailhook. Only eight of those have been rejected by the committee. To put this in perspective, the committee has confirmed 43,270 Navy and Marine Corps officers since 1992. A published article says that ``one member of the committee now maintains that there were reasons other than Tailgate for rejecting Commander Stumpf.'' There have been other allegations that the committee had information other than that provided by the Navy. An article in the March 1996 edition of the Armed Forces Journal says that Commander Stumpf and Mr. Gittins, Commander Stumpf's attorney, believe there were anonymous phone calls to the committee. These allegations imply that the committee based its conclusions concerning Commander Stumpf on information which was unknown to Commander Stumpf and the Navy. While it is true that on occasion the committee does receive information from outside sources, since the committee does not have the capacity to independently investigate, committee procedures are to refer such information to the Department of Defense. In Commander Stumpf's case, there was no outside information provided to the committee. The committee did not consider any material other than that provided by the Navy when it determined that, as the November 13, 1995 letter to Secretary Dalton states, ``Had the information regarding Commander Stumpf's activities surrounding Tailhook `91 been available to the committee as required at the time of the nomination, the committee would not have recommended that the Senate confirm his nomination to the grade of captain.'' Mr. President, unfortunately, misrepresentations and misstatement of the facts related to the committee deliberations on this matter have put the Armed Services Committee at a severe disadvantage. Our policy has been to protect the confidentiality of the nominee, and we are limited in our ability to respond. Certainly in this case, the nominee, Commander Stumpf, does not share our concern. In fact, a Wall Street Journal article dated March 12, 1996, stated that Commander Stumpf and his attorneys have indicated that the committee should feel free to tell the entire world whatever it is that Senators think they know about him. It is noteworthy, Mr. President, that Commander Stumpf, in a letter to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee dated March 13, 1996, requested that he be permitted to testify before the committee but in a closed hearing, not open to the public or the media. Mr. President, I believe it is important that our Senate colleagues be advised that the committee, in reviewing nominations for promotion, carefully examines each individual case and, among other criteria, believes the standard set forth in title X of the United States Code pertaining to the responsibilities of a commander entitled ``Requirement for exemplary conduct'' are applicable, and I quote from title X: All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge. This standard, Mr. President, is repeated verbatim in article 1131 of the U.S. Navy Regulations issued in 1990. There are similar provisions in title X which pertain to the other services, as well as other provisions relating to members of the armed services. The committee does not take lightly these statutory and regulatory standards. Nor do they take lightly their constitutional responsibilities to provide their advice and consent on military nominations. A number of articles that have been written have referred to Senator Nunn's involvement in the committee's deliberations and decisions. While Senator Nunn has exercised his due diligence in this case, as he does with every other matter before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I would like to state for the record that as chairman of the subcommittee on personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I take responsibility for the procedures used by the subcommittee staff to review military nominations and I fully stand by those procedures used by the staff in carefully reviewing the nominations presented to the committee by the executive branch, including the procedures used to evaluate the nomination of Commander Stumpf. I have reviewed that material in depth. I have personally and carefully evaluated the file on Commander Stumpf. I have discussed the matter at length with the staff and I have concluded that, based exclusively--exclusively on the facts presented to the committee by the Department of Defense with with due regard for the statutory and regulatory standards governing the conduct of military commanders and officers, as well as long-established military precedents, that I could not recommend approval of Commander Stumpf's nomination to the committee. Each member of the committee is, of course, free to accept or reject any recommendation, and I certainly respect those who have come to a different conclusion in this matter. Each member is free to separately evaluate all of the material available to the committee on this nomination or any nomination. Each member is, of course, free to debate the case for or against either Commander Stumpf's nomination or any other nomination. In the final analysis, of course, each member is free to vote yea or nay on any particular case. I am disappointed that so many in the media followed the well- intentioned but misinformed lead of those who do not know the facts of the case and the committee's deliberations. The Armed Services Committee is an important part of the institution of the Senate. Everyone in this body is hurt when the Senate Armed Services Committee is vilified and members cannot respond because of loyalty to rules and procedures put in place to protect the confidentiality of the matters before it and the nominees before its consideration. Mr. President, I look forward to a time when respect for the privacy of an individual and respect for such a great institution as the U.S. Navy is not overridden by the desire of a journalist or an attorney or any others to take advantage of a situation to forward their own agenda. The Secretary of the Navy has removed Commander Stumpf from the promotion list. The committee no longer has any nomination before it pertaining to Commander Stumpf. The committee has no legal authority to take any further action concerning the promotion of Commander Stumpf at this time. As in every case in which a military nominee has been removed from a promotion list, the only process by which Commander Stumpf can be renominated for promotion is to be selected by another promotion board and be nominated by the President again, or, alternately, directly nominated by the President under his authority, granted by article 2 of the Constitution. As I have stated before, the decision of the committee after due deliberation was that, had the information regarding Commander Stumpf's activities surrounding Tailhook '91 been available to the committee as required at the time of the nomination, the committee would not have recommended that the Senate confirm his nomination to the grade of captain. That was the committee's determination then. That is the committee's determination now. Nothing that has transpired since has altered the committee's decision. I yield the floor.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10 a.m. on Monday, March 25; further, that immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, no resolutions come over under the rule, the call of the Calendar be dispensed with, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then proceed to the consideration of calendar No. 300, H.R. 1296, the Presidio legislation; and further, that Senator Murkowski be recognized at that time to offer a substitute amendment.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues' support for this very important product liability reform legislation. This legislation is a conservative, but significant attempt to begin the process of curbing a civil justice system gone awry, a system that has been overwhelmed by the logistical burdens and economic costs of unnecessary and unwarranted litigation. Mr. President, it is very appropriate that Congress begin to address this broad problem in the area of product liability reform. For it is this area of law that has become, perhaps, the most unruly, and which is having an increasingly adverse impact on the U.S. economy. There are several important provisions contained in this bill. However, I will limit my comments to the section dealing with biomaterials. The purpose of this section is to provide a defense to the suppliers of biomaterials, or parts, which are used in the manufacture of implantable medical devices. What this section will do is insure the continued availability of the raw materials that are absolutely critical to the development of implantable medical devices. Under the current legal system, claimants who sustain harm from a medical device are encouraged to go after the company with the deepest pockets, the one they can get the most money from. Often times, this entity is the innocent supplier of the raw, biomaterials, that are utilized in the manufacturing of the device. This, in spite of the fact that the biomaterials supplier did nothing to cause the injury or harm. Mr. President, the result of this vicarious liability on the part of the biomaterials supplier is that, economically, they cannot afford to supply the materials to the manufacturer because the risk of being innocently swept up into litigation is too high. You see, the volume of material they provide to the bio-manufacturer represents such a small percentage of their total sales that it is simply not cost effective to take the risk. They are driven out of the market by the risk of litigation. Located in my home State, Mr. President, in Bloomington, IN, there is a very special company: Cook International. This company truly represents what is great about our economic system. Unfortunately, it also represents how a system gone awry can harm both business and the consumer. Cook International manufactures medical devices. One product line is medical catheters. These catheters are high precision devices used for various medical procedures. A true American success story, Cook International began operating out of the founder's home. It has rapidly grown into an international corporation manufacturing the very finest in precision medical catheters. Vital to these instruments is teflon. However, under the threat of potentially being swept up in a product liability law suit, Cook's suppliers have served notice that they will soon cease to provide the vital materials for the manufacture of these life saving catheters. Without this legislation, Mr. President, companies like Cook will be forced to find new suppliers of biomaterials or simply cease to manufacture these products. The costs of this result can be measured in lost time, lost jobs, and lost lives. Mr. President, this is a very simply provision. If a company meets all specifications of the manufacturer; if they are in no way involved in the actual manufacturing or sale of the biomedical device; if they have acted in good faith in meeting their contractual obligation to the manufacturer; they cannot be swept up in a product liability lawsuit simply because they have deep pockets. This is fundamentally fair. I urge my colleagues to support this very responsible effort at reforming our product liability legal system. I urge them to do so in order to preserve and ensure the growth of the American manufacturing industry. I urge them to do so because it is absolutely vital to our biomedical industry.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will also just state, with what little time I have remaining, that the Coats amendment has the support of the AMA, the American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education. So the very organizations that are most directly involved in this have looked at the Coats amendment, and they have said it is a reasonable amendment and they not only do not oppose it, they support it. So the very organizations that are held up as being the objectors to this are supporters of the Coats amendment, and I hope my colleagues will use that as a basis for their determination.

Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. COATS. Second, let me state this idea of separating Federal from District funds is nothing more than a bookkeeping exercise. Essentially, what would happen is that the so-called District funds would allow the local government to continue funding abortion on demand. I do not believe that is something this Congress endorses. I do not believe that is something that we should not deal with as we have dealt before. The separation of Federal funds from District funds is a distinction without a difference, given the constitutional mandate and the practice of this Congress to appropriate all funds for expenditure in the District. We all know that the District has one of the more permissive, if not one of the most permissive abortion funding policies in the country. It is essentially unrestricted abortion on demand. I do not believe that is what this Congress wants to authorize for the District of Columbia, and we have, on numerous instances, addressed this issue. In the conference report that is before us on the omnibus funding bill, this was discussed at length. The language that is incorporated is language that has been agreed to by the conferees. It does allow the use of funds for abortions to protect the life of the mother or in cases of rape or incest. Members need to understand that. What we are not trying to do, what we are opposing, what I am opposing and others are opposing, is the use of those funds for unrestricted abortion, abortion on demand. That is the issue before us on the Boxer amendment, and I urge my colleagues to vote no on that and vote yes for the Coats amendment, which is a separate issue, and that is the discrimination issue relative to the use of Federal funds for hospitals that provide abortion. I yield. Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

Mr. COATS. If that is appropriate with the Senator from Maine.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I just want to inform the Senator from California and our colleagues that what I stated was that on the basis of letters that we have received from a number of trained physicians in obstetrics and gynecology that the similarities between the procedure which they are trained for, which is a D&C procedure, and the procedures for performing an abortion are essentially the same and, therefore, they have the expertise necessary, as learned in those training procedures, should the occasion occur and an emergency occur to perform that abortion. But to compare that with not having training for a bypass operation or kidney operation or anything else would not be an accurate comparison. There are enough similarities between the procedure they are trained for and the procedure the Senator from California is advocating they need to be trained for that is not a problem. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, Mr. President, letters that I have received which so state that training is adequate.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine for her diligent work with us in clarifying language here and for her articulate statement of support and the reasons why she supports this particular amendment. I will not repeat those, but I think they clearly make the case. I would like to respond, also, to the Senator from California, who indicated that one of the reasons why she opposes the Coats amendment is that we will not have medical personnel adequately trained to perform abortions if necessary. I would like to state for the record that an ACGME member--the certifying body--ACGME member submitted testimony to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee that the D&C procedures that are taught to every ob-gyn and procedures used in cases of miscarriages and those of induced abortion require similar experience. Numerous ob-gyn's have indicated to us--and I have a pile of letters here from them, indicating so, and I will be happy to submit those for the Record--that an OB-GYN who is trained, as they must be trained, to perform D&C procedures in the case of spontaneous abortions, are more than adequately prepared, should the need arise, to perform an induced abortion. Again, I have an extensive set of letters from those who are trained in those procedures, indicating that is the case. In short, a resident needs not to have performed an abortion on a live, unborn child, to have mastered the procedure to protect the health of the mother if necessary. Maternal health will not be improved by forcing ob-gyn's to perform abortions on live fetuses if an ob-gyn will not do an abortion in actual practice. But it is clear from the record that they will have sufficient training to do so if necessary. Second, I would like to just once again, for my colleagues' benefit, indicate the support of Dr. Bill Frist, the Senator from Tennessee, for this amendment, who has stated, ``The Coats amendment will protect medical residents, individual physicians, and medical training programs from abortion-related discrimination in the training and licensing of physicians.'' ``However,'' he goes on to say, ``in our efforts to safeguard freedom of conscience, there are limits to what Congress can impose on private medical accrediting bodies. I believe this amendment stays within the confines of the governmental role and addresses the matter of discrimination in a way that is acceptable to all parties. The Congress is responsible,'' he goes on to say, ``for the Federal funding that is tied to accreditation by the ACGME, and as public servants we must ensure that there is no hint of discrimination associated with the use of public funds, and that is exactly what this amendment does.'' Amendment No. 3508 I would like to respond to the issue raised in the second amendment, the amendment offered by the Senator from California, relative to the use of funds for abortions in the District of Columbia. It is clear, as the Constitution so states, that article I, section 8, gives this Congress exclusive legislation over all cases whatsoever in the District of Columbia. It is stated in the Constitution clearly. It has been the basis on which we have operated, and it is a constitutional basis. In all matters relative to the District of Columbia, the responsibility for protection of those and implementation of those and establishment of those is established in the Constitution of the United States. Public law 931-98, the home rule law, is consistent with this constitutional mandate, because it charges Congress with the responsibility for the appropriation of all funds for our Nation's Capital. The Congress, then, bears the ultimate constitutional and full responsibility for the District's abortion policies. Second is the question of separating or mingling. I ask the Senator from Maine if I could have an additional 2 minutes from her time?

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I appreciate the suggestion of the Senator from West Virginia for 1 minute to explain both the pro and con of these amendments. I think when we run a whole bunch together, that is necessary. I argued this morning in opposition to the Boxer amendment because it allows, essentially, unrestricted funding of abortion on demand in the District of Columbia. The amendment, I believe, violates the conference agreement and restricts the use of funds for abortion to protect the life of the mother and in cases of rape and incest. It also violates article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which gives the exclusive right of legislation for the District to the Congress. It is not possible to separate the funds appropriated by the Federal Government from the funds raised by the District of Columbia. I do not believe it should be the policy of this body to allow for, essentially, an unrestricted right to abortion in the District of Columbia. I urge a ``no'' vote on the Boxer amendment. Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, the amendment on which we are about to vote prevents the Government from discriminating against hospitals and ob- gyn residents who choose not to perform abortions. It protects those civil rights, but it also allows those who voluntarily choose to perform abortions to receive training in that procedure. The amendment is supported by Senator Frist. The amendment is supported by Senator Snowe. It is supported by the American Medical Association, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. It goes to the rights of institutions and individuals to say that they do not believe it is in their best interests to receive mandatory training for abortion procedures. It is a civil rights issue. I hope our Members would vote for it. Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, earlier this morning I proposed a unanimous-consent request to modify the amendment which I had offered last week, on Thursday, to the legislation that the Senate is currently considering. We have had some discussion with the Senator from California and others regarding this. I believe we have resolved concerns relative to this modification, at least regarding offering the unanimous-consent request. So I now repeat my unanimous-consent request to modify the pending amendment to H.R. 3019.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, let me just state, during our discussion last Thursday on this amendment, which I will describe in a moment, questions were raised by the Senator from Maine relative to some language and the interpretation of that language as it affected a portion of the bill providing for an exemption to the accreditation standards based on a conscience or moral clause relative to performing abortion. We have discussed that question over the weekend and made some clarifications in that language, which is the purpose of the modification. The Senator from Maine spoke this morning and the Senator from Tennessee spoke, relative to the procedures of the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education, its involvement in accrediting medical providers and medical training programs, and support for the Coats amendment to this particular bill. Let me describe that very briefly. The problem that we had here is that, prior to 1996, the ACGME, which is the American Council on Graduate Medical Education, did not require hospitals or ob/gyn residency programs to perform induced abortions or train to perform induced abortions. That was done on a voluntary basis. Until 1996, hospitals were only required to train residents to manage medical and surgical complications of pregnancy, that is those situations where treatment of life-threatening conditions to the mother or complications of a spontaneous abortion, miscarriage, or stillbirth, was part of the medical training. At the same time, 43 States have had in place statutes, as well as the Federal Government, to protect individual residents in hospitals from having to perform on a mandatory basis, or having to train on a mandatory basis, for the performance of induced abortions or abortion on demand. These procedures generally apply regardless of the reason to refuse to perform an abortion. Then in 1996, the Accrediting Council on Graduate Medical Education changed its standards, indicating that failure to provide training for induced abortions could lead to loss of accreditation for these hospitals and for these training programs. The reason this is important is that a great deal of Federal funding is tied to this accreditation. The Medicare reimbursement is tied to accreditation, loan deferral provisions are tied to accreditation, and a number of other federally provided support for hospital providers and for training programs for ob/gyn and others are tied to the accreditation. So, if the accreditation is removed, these institutions could lose their Federal funds. So the language that I offered in the bill that we offered to the Senate basically said that, one, we do not think it is right that the Federal Government could discriminate against hospitals or ob/gyn residents simply because they choose, on a voluntary basis, not to perform abortions or receive abortion training, for whatever reason. For some it would be religious reasons; for some it would be moral reasons; for some it could be practical reasons; for some hospitals it could be economic reasons. There are a whole range of reasons why a provider may choose not to engage in this mandatory practice. But at the same time, we did not feel that it was proper for us to mandate to a private, although somewhat quasi- public, accrediting agency how they determine their accrediting standards. We do not want to prevent ACGME from changing its standards. It has every right, even though I do not agree with all of its requirements, to set its own standards. Second, we do not want to prevent those who voluntarily elect to perform abortions from doing so. Nobody is prevented in this legislation from voluntarily receiving abortion training or from voluntarily offering that training in their hospital, nor do we prevent the Government from relying on those accreditation standards. I think you can make a case that the Government, by relying on a quasi-public entity for accreditation, may be too narrowly restricting in scope in terms of determination on Federal reimbursement, but we are not addressing that issue. So this legislation does not prevent the Government from relying on the ACGME for accreditation. We do not prevent the Government from requiring training of those who voluntarily elect to perform abortions. What we do do is attempt to protect the civil rights of those who feel that they do not want to participate in mandatory abortion training or performance of abortions. That is a civil right that I think deserves to be provided and is provided in this legislation. It is a fundamental civil right, as a matter of conscience, as a matter of moral determination, as a matter of any other determination, as to whether or not this procedure, which is controversial to say the least, ought to be mandated and whether that is a proper procedure for those who then are forced to participate in programs in order to receive reimbursement from the Federal Government for various forms of support. We do not believe that it is. There was some question about the so-called conscience and morals clause that was included in the accrediting standards, but we had testimony before our committee from a number of individuals who felt that that exception language was unnecessarily restrictive for those who felt, because they were a secular hospital or because they were residents in a training program at a secular hospital, that conscience- clause exception would not protect them from the loss of accreditation or protect their basic civil rights. I have just some examples of that. The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston wrote to us essentially saying, and I quote: Those involved in resident education at the University of Texas Medical Branch made a decision in the mid 1970's not to teach elective abortion as part of our curriculum. This decision was based, originally, on concerns other than moral issues. We encountered two significant problems with our Pregnancy Interruption Clinic, or PIC as it was known at the time. First, the PIC was a money loser. Since there was no reimbursement for elective abortions from either State funds or Medicaid a great deal of expense of the PIC was underwritten by faculty professional income. Faculty income was used without regard to the moral concerns of individual faculty members who generated the income. A second problem was more significant and involved faculty, resident, and staff morale. Individuals morally opposed to performing elective abortions were not required to participate. This led to a perception, by trainees performing abortions, that they were carrying a heavier clinical load than trainees not performing abortions. As fewer and fewer residents choose to become involved in the PIC, this perceived maldistribution of work became a significant morale issue. Morale problems also spilled over to nursing and clerical personnel with strong feelings about the PIC. It is a gross understatement to say that elective abortion is intensely polarizing. Because of bad feelings engendered by a program that was a financial drain, the PIC was closed. So here is a respected hospital, the University of Texas at Galveston, which basically said the moral, conscience reasons were not basically the reasons why this particular hospital chose not to participate in the program. They followed that up with a letter, which I will quote again. They said: Because we are a secular institution, and a state supported university, we would have no recourse under the new ACGME ``conscious clause,'' except to provide such instruction to our trainees. The ACGME ``conscious clause,'' providing an opportunity to invoke a moral exemption to teaching elective abortion, is restricted to institutions with moral or religious prohibitions on abortion. It does nothing to protect the faculty at State-run universities. I have a similar letter from Mt. Sinai Hospital: Your amendment is desperately needed to protect the rights of faculty; students and residents who have no desire to participate in abortion training but who do not work in religious or public hospitals. Since our institution would not, therefore, ``qualify" as one with a moral or legal objection-- Therefore, the moral and conscience clause would not protect them. Albany Medical Center in New York offers the same, and the list could go on and on. So, essentially, what we are saying here is that the amendment that I am offering is clearly one which is designed to protect the basic civil rights of providers and medical students in training who elect, for whatever reason, whether it is a moral or conscience reason or whether it is an economic, social or other reason, not to perform abortions. We do not believe that it is proper for the Federal Government to deny funds on the basis of lack of accreditation if that lack of accreditation is based on the decision of a provider or a program that they do not want to participate in a mandatory training procedure for induced abortions. I am pleased we were able to work out language with the Senator from Maine, which addressed her concerns to make sure that we did not prohibit ACGME from accrediting or not accrediting, because there are other reasons why facilities might not deserve accreditation. Federal funds certainly should not flow to those hospitals and to those programs that do not meet up to basic medical standards that the Government requires for its reimbursement. By the same token, we do not think that injecting a forced or mandatory induced abortion procedure on these institutions, for whatever reason, is appropriate. That is the basis of the amendment. The amendment has now been offered. It has the support of the Senator from Maine. The Senator from Tennessee, Dr. Frist, spoke this morning. He certainly knows more about these procedures and more about the medical concerns than this Senator from Indiana. He has looked this bill over very, very carefully and believes that the language incorporated in the Coats amendment is most appropriate, and he is supportive of that. I think that is a solid endorsement from someone who clearly understands the issue in great depth and understands the accrediting process, supports that process, but believes there ought to be this exemption. Mr. President, I have not yet asked for the yeas and nays on this. My understanding is that the vote will be ordered, along with other votes, after 2 p.m. So I will now ask for the yeas and nays for this amendment.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this is an appropriate time to ask unanimous-consent to modify my amendment. I send that modification to the desk.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will discuss this modification with the Senator from California and, hopefully, we can resolve the question here. At the present time, I want to yield time to the Senator from Tennessee. I will withhold the unanimous-consent request at this time so I can discuss it with the Senator from California. I yield whatever time the Senator from Tennessee needs.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, thank you. Last week, as we were looking at potential amendments for this legislation, the issue of the potential discrimination that might exist regarding payments from the Federal Government to medical hospitals and to individual residents in training, loans, and other Federal assistance that is available for these individuals and these institutions, was threatened by potential loss of accreditation to these institutions as a result of the Accrediting Council on Graduate Medical Education's change in their requirements for accreditation to mandate the training in abortion techniques. Previously, this had been done on a voluntary basis. Many hospitals, for a number of reasons, whether they are religious reasons, moral reasons or just purely decisions on the basis of the board of directors or governors of these institutions, determined that they would not have a mandatory program of abortion training. Voluntary programs existed. Those who sought that training had access and could receive that training, but it was not mandated. The change in regulations on the part of the Accrediting Council on Graduate Medical Education threatened to withdraw accreditation from many of these institutions unless they opted out under a so-called conscience or moral clause. It was my feeling and the feeling of many that this opt-out clause was not sufficient to address the concerns of a number of institutions, particularly nonreligious-based institutions. So I offered an amendment last week which was designed to clarify this. That amendment essentially said that any State or local government that receives financial assistance should not subject any health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the entity refused to undergo training in the performance of induced abortions or to require or provide such training to perform such abortions or provide referrals for the training for such abortions. We, in discussion with a number of other Senators, came across a possible misinterpretation of the exceptions to the section that basically said that nothing in this amendment that I am offering should in any way restrict or impede the accrediting council from making that accreditation. The concern was, if I state it correctly, that we would lose a valuable means of examining the various programs that existed in hospitals and resident training programs for determination of whether or not the Government should participate. It is legitimate that we have an accrediting process on which we can rely. What I was trying to do with my amendment was simply address the question of training for induced abortions. We had exceptions to that which basically stated that nothing in this act should prohibit the accrediting agency or a Federal, State, or local government from establishing standards of medical competency applicable to those individuals who voluntarily elected to perform abortions or prevent any health care entity from voluntarily electing to be trained or arrange for training in the performance of or referrals for induced abortions. We have had numerous discussions with the Senator from Maine relative to this language. Some negotiations over the weekend have resolved this. It preserves the entire impact of the Coats amendment and yet addresses and clarifies the concerns of the Senator from Maine. So I am pleased to announce this morning that we have reached agreement on this amendment. The amendment will be cosponsored by the Senator from Maine. We resolved the language differences. It also addresses an issue of second-degree, which would have prolonged the debate on this important broader bill, and so I am happy to report to my colleagues that we will be able to free up some time on that basis for discussion of the amendment that is offered by the Senator from California, Senator Boxer. The Senator from Maine is present this morning, and I know she has some comments to make in this regard. Let me say this. The Senator from Tennessee, Senator Frist, has been instrumental in helping us first understand the accrediting process and the importance of the accrediting process. As a medical doctor, he has some knowledge and personal experience with this issue and these questions that I cannot begin to bring to the debate. He and his staff have been immensely helpful in helping us to draft this legislation so we can accomplish what we intended to accomplish, but also retain the integrity of the accrediting process. I am very happy to yield to him. I will yield whatever time the Senator from Tennessee desires in order to speak to this amendment.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time that is now running during any quorum call be equally divided between both sides.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, before I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration--well, I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the current pending amendment.

Mr. COATS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, given the time, I yield the floor. Amendment No. 3532 To Amendment No. 3466