Howard Coble

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2652, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, and urge my colleagues to support this important bill. Developing, compiling, distributing, and maintaining commercially significant collections of information requires substantial investments of time, personnel, and money. Information companies, especially small businesses, must dedicate massive resources when gathering and verifying factual material, presenting it in a user- friendly way, and keeping it current for and useful to customers. H.R. 2652, Madam Speaker, prohibits the misappropriation of valuable commercial collections by unscrupulous competitors who grab data collected by others, repackage it, and market a product that threatens competitive injury to the original collection. This protection is modeled in part on the Lanham Act, which already makes similar kinds of unfair competition a civil wrong under Federal law. Importantly, this bill maintains existing protection for collections of information afforded by copyright and contract rights. It is intended to supplement these legal rights, not to replace them. The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act is a balanced proposal. It is aimed at actual or threatened competitive injury for misappropriation of collections of information, not at noncompetitive uses. The goal is to stimulate the creation of even more collections and to encourage even more competition among them. The bill avoids conferring any monopoly on facts or taking any other steps that might be inconsistent with these goals. The version under consideration today contains several noncontroversial technical amendments. The legislation is necessary, in my opinion, and well-balanced, and I urge my colleagues to support it. Madam Speaker, I would be remiss if I did not mention this. Much information has been disseminated about this bill, and I want to advise the Members of a couple facts that I think are pertinent. Last February, in fact, the afternoon of the hearing that was conducted, we met with representatives of the university community and asked them for specific instances where they would be concerned about this bill, that we might be able to correct some problems or concerns. None was forthcoming. As recently as yesterday, a representative from the university community made it clear that he could not give one specific instance where detriment would result, but that he felt that maybe some future unforeseen circumstance might crop up. Madam Speaker, that could happen with any legislation. I will be doggone if I am going to stand in the path of small businesses and perhaps encourage their bankruptcy ultimately in the fear of a prospective unforeseen circumstance. If that circumstance does arise, then we will repair it and correct it at the time. The libraries, we met with our friends from the American Library Association, again, last February, asking them, tell us what is wrong and we will fix it. A total of 10 amendments have been made a part of this bill, 10 amendments that were forthcoming from earlier opponents of the bill. I think we have done all we can do. I think we have a good piece of legislation here. I urge my colleagues to support it. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I have no speaker, but I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I will sum up very briefly. My friend the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) have pretty well touched it. I say to my friend the gentleman from California (Mr. Brown), I am not talking about you, but some people in this fray have inserted paranoia, deception and fear into this message, and then they are very cleverly targeting that message to a select group. Well, if you do that, chances are you are going to get some attention. But as the gentleman from Massachusetts said and as I said, this has been before us since last October. It has been on the table. We have begged people to come forward, and some did come forward, and we took their amendments and worked them into the bill. This is a good bill, Madam Speaker, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3718, as we know, is a freestanding version of an amendment which the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) offered to H.R. 1252, the Judicial Reform Act of 1998, last month; April 23rd, to be exact. The House at that time overwhelmingly adopted the DeLay amendment by a vote of 367 to 52. I think it is a good bill. I think it will help keep convicted felons off the streets, which of course is the intent, in a constitutionally permissible manner.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Delay).

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time, and I too yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, enactment of H.R. 3723, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, will ensure that users of the Patent and Trademark Office who pay for its operation are getting their money's worth. The bill before us today increases the Patent and Trademark Office's individual filing and maintenance fees by approximately $132 million to allow the agency to operate at 100 percent of its required needs, as outlined by the administration, but it does not provide additional monies to use for other nonPatent and Trademark Office purposes. The result of this change would actually lower patent and trademark fees for the first time in history and will result in a savings of approximately $50 million in fees charged to the inventors of America. In addition, Mr. Speaker, the bill before us contains a technical amendment that has been suggested by the appropriators for scoring purposes. I believe we must assist the men and women who pay the fees that enable the Patent and Trademark Office to operate. They are the ones who contributed an element of inventiveness to our economy that would otherwise be nonexistent. I therefore urge the Committee to report H.R. 3723 favorably to the full House. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 3723.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3723) to authorize funds for the payment of salaries and expenses of the Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. In closing let me say this, and I am sure the gentleman from Massachusetts will agree with me: I want to reiterate the fact that the Secretary of State and Under Secretary Stu Eizenstat have done yeoman's work in trying to get this difference of opinion resolved, and I feel fairly good about its coming to fruition before too long.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 567, the Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, and urge the House to adopt the measure. House Resolution 567 is the implementing legislation for the protocol related to the Madrid Agreement of the Registration of Marks, commonly known as the ``Madrid Protocol.'' The bill is identical to legislation introduced in the preceding two Congresses and will send a signal to the international business community, United States businesses, and trademark owners that the 105th Congress is determined to help our Nation, and particularly our small businesses, become part of an inexpensive, efficient system that allows the international registration of marks. As a practical matter, Mr. Speaker, ratification of the protocol and enactment of H.R. 567 will enable the American trademark owners to pay a nominal fee to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which will then register the marks in the individual countries that comprise the European Union, or EU. Currently, American trademark owners must hire attorneys or agents in each individual country to acquire protection. This process, as my colleagues can conclude, is both laborious and expensive and discourages small businesses in particular and individuals from registering their marks in Europe. The Madrid Protocol took effect in April of 1996 and currently binds 16 countries to its terms, but not the United States. Our participation in the protocol is critical not just for the world community, but for those American individuals and small businesses who otherwise lack the resources to acquire worldwide, country-by-country protection for their trademarks. Mr. Speaker, opposition to the protocol and the substantive provisions of H.R. 567 is nonexistent, as best I can determine. However, a sticking point to ratification does exist. The State Department has been trying for some time to reconcile differences between the administration and the EU regarding the voting rights of the ``intergovernmental'' members of the protocol in the assembly established by the agreement. Under the protocol, the EU receives a separate vote in addition to the votes of its member States. The Secretary of State has been working tirelessly to reconcile differences with the EU regarding the voting rights issue and the result has been positive. Mr. Speaker, I remain confident that the problem will be resolved in the not-too-distant future. Passage of this legislation is intended to encourage a positive outcome in the negotiations. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 567 is an important and noncontroversial bill that will greatly benefit those American businesses and other individuals who need to register their trademarks overseas in a quick and cost- effective manner. I implore my colleagues to pass the bill today. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 567, the bill now under consideration.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 567) to amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, in order to carry out provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to extend my remarks regarding H.R. 2589, the ``Copyright Term Extension Act,'' which was passed by the House on March 25, 1998. The writers, screen actors, and directors guilds have expressed concern about their inability to obtain residual payments that are due to their members in situations where the producer of the motion picture fails to make these payments, for example where it no longer exists or is bankrupt. The guilds may be unable to seek recourse against the exclusive distributors, transferees of rights in the motion picture, because those parties are not subject to the collective bargaining agreement or otherwise in privity with the guilds. Although the collective bargaining agreements generally require the production company to obtain assumption agreements from distributors that would effectively create such privity, some production companies apparently do not always do so. Section 5 of H.R. 2589 would address this problem without interfering with the collective bargaining process and the ability of the parties to determine the terms of their relationships. It would, in certain circumstances, impose on distributors the obligations to make residual payments and provide related notices that are currently required by the collective bargaining agreements governing the motion picture. It does so by making the distributor subject to the applicable obligations under the assumption agreements, incorporating the applicable terms into the transfer instrument by operation of law. The provision would not affect broadcast and cable licensees because it excludes transfers that are limited to public performance rights. The ``reason to know'' language is intended to be interpreted in light of common sense and industry practice. Because many motion pictures made in the United States are produced subject to one or more collective bargaining agreements, the distributor would ordinarily perform some check on whether the motion picture is subject to such an agreement, for example by inquiring of the producer. The provision would not, however, require a burdensome or exhaustive investigation. Publicly available information that indicates a work's status, such as records of a guild's security interest in the motion picture filed with the Copyright Office, would ordinarily provide ``reason to know'' within the meaning of the Act. The guilds may wish to provide an easily accessible source of information, such as a World Wide Web Site, that identifies which motion pictures are subject to a collective bargaining agreement. If the existence of such a site is made known in the industry, the listing of a particular motion picture would clearly give reason to know of that picture's status. In order to protect distributors who have negotiated transfers based on misrepresentations, the provision makes the producer who fails to inform distributors of its collective bargaining agreement obligations liable to those distributors for any resulting damages. Disputes about the application of the provision and claims for damages from misrepresentation would be resolved in federal district court, with the court having discretion to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I will not consume 5 minutes. As we all know, cameras in the courtroom is an issue adamantly opposed by some; enthusiastically supported by others. This amendment, it seems to me, does no harm. It modifies the cameras in the courtroom approach slightly, but I think there the error is harmless, and I will not resist the amendment, not oppose the amendment.

Mr. COBLE. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and I do so not real comfortably because of the fact that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) has been a very valuable member of the Committee on the Judiciary and, more specifically, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. But I say to the gentlewoman from California, there is a matter that probably should have come a little earlier. I realize that we cannot always be perfect as far as timing is concerned. But Rule 501 simply requires a court to observe principles of common law when deciding whether to confer privileged status to an individual or relationship unless an action is civil and involves State law, in which case State law on the matter would be applicable. A privilege means, as most of my colleagues know, that a court may not compel testimony against a privileged witness or party. For example, many States will not compel a person to testify against his or her spouse or to reveal confidential conversations between them. The amendment creates a broad privilege that would prevent a court from compelling a witness to testify against a child or a parent of that witness or from revealing confidential conversations between the two. The overwhelming majority of Federal and State courts, Madam Chairman, have rejected such a parent-child privilege. The Judicial Conference--well, let me say it a different way. I do not mean to say that we should only comply with what the Judicial Conference wants. But we do stay in touch with the Judicial Conference, and the Judicial Conference has not informed the committee that it plans to recommend any changes to Rule 501, which is of some significance I think. Recognition of a parent-child privilege might prevent a parent from acting in the child's best interest by notifying authorities. Similarly would the alleged benefits of such a privilege outweigh the harm caused by a child whose testimony could not be compelled against a parent indulging, for example, in drug trafficking. The scope of the privilege is not explained in the Lofgren amendment. I do not think the scope of the privilege is explained in the amendment. For example, would it only apply to unemancipated minors? What about stepparents? What about grandparents? And I guess I alluded to this earlier, Madam Chairman, that this was not the subject of the subcommittee hearing nor the full committee markup. And I think the idea is, essentially, untested at the State level; and I just do not believe that we can anticipate the consequences of enactment. And I just believe that it is ill-timed, among other reasons that I just mentioned. Madam Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren).

Mr. COBLE. Madam Chairman, the gentleman from North Carolina is precisely correct; that is the intent, to apply to both. Amendment Offered by Ms. Lofgren

Mr. COBLE. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. H.R. 1252, the Judicial Reform Act of 1998, is a restrained but purposeful effort to combat specific areas of abuse that exist within the Federal judiciary. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), as he spoke to the Committee on Rules yesterday, said this bill perhaps goes too far for some Members, not far enough for others. But that is not unlike much legislation that we consider in this hall. Before describing what the bill does, however, let me emphasize what it does not do; namely, it will not compromise the independence of the Federal judiciary, which is an indispensable attribute for that branch of the Federal Government, nor is H.R. 1252 an attempt to influence or overturn legal disputes. Above all, we most certainly are not creating a novel, more lenient standard of impeachment to remove particular judges from the Federal bench without cause or to intimidate them with a threat of doing so. That said, the Judiciary Reform Act of 1998 is largely an amalgam of ideas developed by various Members of Congress that will curtail certain abusive practices within our Federal court system. Specifically, the bill consists of six procedural changes in furtherance of this end. In addition, the four other reforms that will improve other matters related to article 3, Federal courts. The six core revisions set forth in the bill concern the following matters: First, a featured component of the bill was initially developed by our colleague and good friend, the late Sonny Bono. It would require three judge panels to hear constitutional challenges of State laws enacted pursuant to voter referenda. Under current law, a single judge possesses the power to invalidate the results of a State-wide referendum. Second, H.R. 1252 would permit interlocutory or interim appeal of class-action certifications championed by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady). This provision would enable litigants to a class-action suit to appeal a decision certifying a national class prior to the conclusion of a trial. Currently, defendants may expend a great deal of financial resources through trial only to find upon appeal that a class was improperly certified at the outset of litigation. Third, the measure infuses greater objectivity in the current process by which citizens may register complaints against Federal judges for misconduct. Present law on the subject is premised on a peer review system by judges from the same circuit. Pursuant to the change set forth in this bill before us, complaints which do not speak to the merits of a decision, or are not otherwise frivolous will be referred to a different circuit. This means that truly substantive complaints will be more objectively reviewed by judges who have no personal ties to the judge who is the subject of the complaint. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Bryant) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pease) contributed to this section of the bill. Fourth, H.R. 1252 would inhibit the ability of Federal courts to require States and local municipalities to raise taxes on the affected citizenry to pay for projects that the States and municipalities are unwilling to fund themselves. While a Federal court may possess the technical right under certain conditions to devise such a remedy to redress a constitutional harm, we have carefully crafted some parameters that will constrain the practice of judicial taxation. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Manzullo), whose district is home to a city which is subject to a judicial taxation order, contributed to this portion of the bill. Fifth, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) worked with our former colleague Dan Lungren, who presently serves as Attorney General for California, to create a procedural right for a litigant to request one time only that a different judge be assigned to his or her case. Some judges are so possessed of an injudicious temperament or are otherwise biased as to warrant this revision. Sixth, it is has come to our attention that some Federal judges are unalterably opposed to enforcing the death penalty, even to the point of dragging their feet on expeditious consideration of habeas corpus petitions to forestall execution. Based on comments made by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), this section of the bill would prevent the chief justice of a circuit from reserving all such petitions for one judge on an exclusive basis. Mr. Chairman, there are three other items contained in the Judicial Reform Act that do not otherwise speak to abusive judicial practices but will nonetheless improve the functioning of our Federal courts. They are: One, the permitted practice of televising proceedings in our Federal appellate courts and, for a 3-year period, in our district or trial courts, suggested to at the discretion of the presiding judge; Second, the expedited consolidation of cases pertaining to complex, multi-district disaster litigation; And, third, the allowance of an additional 30 days, or a total of 60 days, for the Office of Personnel Management to appeal adverse personnel decisions consistent with appellate procedure for other Federal agencies. Again, Mr. Chairman, these provisions are straightforward and restrained in their application and will assist in promoting equity for litigants and taxpayers within the Federal court system. I urge all Members to support passage of H.R. 1252. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be open for amendment at any point.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I did not hear what the gentleman said.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, today I am pleased to introduce the ``United States Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999,'' which contains the first actual decrease ever in patent user fees for our nation's inventors. The introduction of this legislation follows a hearing the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary held last month in exercise of its oversight responsibilities concerning the operations of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (``PTO''). The Subcommittee heard testimony from witnesses representing the Administration, PTO users, and PTO employee unions. This hearing covered the PTO's budget, including how its fee revenues are collected and spent, the expiration of the patent surcharge fee, the diversion of PTO funds to other government agencies, and other relevant issues. The Administration announced that in light of the lapsing of Section 10101 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (``OBRA''), the patent fees established under subsections 41(a) and (b) of title 35 of the U.S. Code would revert to their pre-OBRA level. It was stated that, unless adjusted, the fee would fall $131,526,000 short of the amount the PTO needs to execute the program recommended by the President in his FY 1999 budget. To compensation for this reduction in fees revenues, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman stated that an increase was needed in the base patent fees in an amount equal to the reduction in revenue which result from the lapsing of the surcharge authority. While I and other Members of the Subcommittee are very supportive of ensuring that the PTO is adequately funded to provide the services requested by patent and trademark applicants, the Administration's request received by the Subcommittee would actually raise $50 million more than the amount the President stated in his budget the PTO will need in FY 1999. Commissioner Lehman explained that this revenue, along with $66 million from FY 1998, would be used to fund other government agencies and programs. This continuing diversion of PTO fee revenues was strongly opposed by inventors and the trademark community, who pay for patent and trademark applications to fund only the services they receive from the PTO. The Patent and Trademark Office is 100 percent funded through the payment of application and user fees. Taxpayer support for the operations of the Office was eliminated in 1990 with the passage of OBRA. OBRA imposed an massive fee increase (referred to as a ``surcharge'') on America's inventors and industry in order to replace taxpayer support the Office was then receiving. The revenues generated by this surcharge were placed into a surcharge account. The PTO was required to request of the Appropriations Committee that they be allowed to use the revenues in the surcharge account to support the portion of its operations these revenues represented. It was anticipated in 1990 that Congress would routinely grant the PTO permission to use the surcharge revenue since it was generated originally from fees paid by users of the patent and trademark systems to support only the cost of those systems. Unfortunately, the user fees paid into the surcharge account became a target of opportunity to fund other, unrelated, taxpayer-funded government programs. The temptation to use the surcharge, and thus a significant portion of the operating budget of the PTO, was proven to be increasingly irresistible, to the detriment and sound functioning of our nation's patent and trademark systems. Beginning with a diversion of $8 million in 1992, Congress increasingly redirected a larger share of the surcharge revenue, reaching a record level of $54 million in FY 1997. In total, over the past seven fiscal years, over $142 million has been diverted from the PTO to other agencies and programs. Mr. Speaker, the time has come for Congress to stop diverting the fees of inventors and trademark applicants to fund other taxpayer- funded government programs. Accordingly, in the United States Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act, FY 1999, I am proposing a schedule of fees that would recover only the amount of money which the Administration has stated it needs to execute the program recommended by the President for the PTO in FY 1999 and FY 2000. This legislation not only fully funds the stated needs of the PTO, it will provide a real decrease in fees paid by patent applicants--the first actual decrease in fees in at least the last fifty years, indeed, perhaps since the patent system was established in 1790. The decrease in fees provided by this legislation will provide tangible assistance to America's inventors, while ensuring that they get their monies worth, especially since their creativity and ingenuity are so crucial to the welfare of our nation. I urge my colleagues to join me in authorizing one of our country's most important agencies in a manner that responds fully to both the stated needs of the Office and its users.