Howard Coble

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, The ``On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act'' is being introduced to address concerns raised by a number of on-line service and Internet access providers regarding their potential liability for copyright infringement when infringing material is transmitted on-line through their services. While several judicially created doctrines currently address the question of when liability is appropriate, providers have sought greater certainty through legislation as to how these doctrines will apply in the digital environment. In July of last Year, Chairman Henry Hyde and I introduced a bill, H.R. 2180, to begin the discussion in this Congress on this issue. Since that time, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, which I chair, has held two legislative hearings on that bill. In addition, Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, a senior Member of the Subcommittee, has invested months of his time leading negotiation sessions between on-line service and Internet access providers, telephone companies, libraries, universities and copyright owners. This bill is the result of those hearings and negotiation sessions and represents a common base from which to begin the markup process. It does so by codifying the core of current case law dealing with the liability of on-line service providers, while narrowing and clarifying the law in other respects that all parties agree should be addressed. This bill offers the advantage of incorporating and building on those judicial applications of existing copyright law to the digital environment that have been widely accepted as fair and reasonable. The bill takes a minimalist approach, and has been drafted in as simple a manner as possible, imposing limitations on liability without reference to specific technologies, without detailed procedures and codes of conduct, and without setting out a long list of factors that must be met in order to qualify. The bill distinguishes between direct infringement and secondary liability, treating each separately. This structure is consistent with evolving case law, and appropriate in light of the different legal bases for the policies behind the different forms of liability. As to direct infringement, liability is ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by another. Thus, the bill essentially codifies the result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date; Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc. In doing so, it overrules those aspects of the Playboy v. Frena case, inasmuch as that case might apply to service providers, suggesting that such acts could constitute direct infringement, and provides certainty that Netcom and its progeny, so far only a few district court cases, will be the law of the land. As to secondary liability, the bill changes existing law in two primary respects: no monetary relief can be assessed for the passive, automatic acts identified in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On- line Communications Services, Inc., and the current criteria for finding contributory infringement or vicarious liability are made clearer and somewhat more difficult to satisfy. In a change from the bill as introduced, additional criteria are no longer included. Injunctive relief will, however, remain available, ensuring that it is possible for copyright owners to secure the cooperation of those with the capacity to prevent ongoing infringement. Finally, the various safeguards that were included in the bill as introduced are incorporated in the substitute, as modified to reflect comments and suggestions submitted by interested parties. These safeguards include language intended to guard against interference with privacy; a provision ensuring that nonprofit institutions such as universities will not be prejudiced when they determine that an allegedly infringing use is fair use; a provision protecting service providers from lawsuits when they act to assist copyright owners in limiting or preventing infringement; and a provision requiring payment of costs incurred when someone knowlingly makes false accusations of on-line infringement. Section-by-Section Analysis Paragraph 512(a)(1) exempts a provider from liability on the basis of direct infringement for transmitting material over its system or network at the request of a third party, and for the intermediate storage of such material, in certain circumstances. The exempted storage and transmissions are those carried out through an automatic technological process that is indiscriminate--i.e., the provider takes no part in the selection of the particular material transmitted--where the copies are retained no longer than necessary for the purpose of carrying out the transmission. This conduct would ordinarily include forwarding of customers' Usenet postings to other Internet sites in accordance with configuration settings that apply to all such postings. It would also include routing of packets from one point to another on the Internet. This exemption codifies the result of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (``Netcom''), with respect to liability of providers for direct infringement. See id. at 1368-70. In Netcom the court held that a provider is not liable for direct infringement where it takes no ``affirmative action that directly results] in copying . . . works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby software automatically forwards messages received from subscribers . . . and temporarily stores copies on its system.'' By referring to temporary storage of copies, Netcom recognizes implicitly that intermediate copies may be retained without liability for only a limited period of time. The requirement in paragraph 512(a)(1) that ``any copy made of the material is not retained longer than necessary for the purpose of carrying out that transmission'' is drawn from the facts of the Netcom case, and is intended to codify this implicit limitation in the Netcom holding. Paragraph 512(a)(2) exempts a provider from any type of monetary relief under theories of contributory infringement or vicarious liability for the same activities for which providers are exempt from any liability for direct infringement under paragraph 512(a)(1). This provision extends the Netcom holding with respect to direct infringement to remove monetary exposure for claims arising under doctrines of secondary liability. Taken together, paragraphs (1) and (2) mean that providers will never be liable for any monetary damages for this type of transmission of material at the request of third parties and for intermediate storage of such material. Copyright owners may still seek an injunction against such activities under theories of secondary liability, if they can establish the necessary elements of a claim. Paragraph 512(a)(3) similarly exempts a provider from monetary relief under theories of contributory infringement or vicarious liability for conduct going beyond the scope of paragraph (1), where a provider's level of participation in and knowledge of the infringement are low. Such conduct could include providing storage on a server and transmitting material from such storage in response to requests from users of the Internet. In addition, the provision modifies and clarifies the knowledge element of contributory infringement and the financial benefit element of vicarious liability. Even if a provider satisfies the common-law elements of contributory infringement or vicarious liability, it will be exempt from monetary liability if it satisfies the criteria in subparagraphs (A) and (B). As under paragraph (2), copyright owners may still seek an injunction even if the provider qualifies for the exemption from monetary relief. The knowledge standard in subparagraph (A) is nearly identical to that used in the bill as introduced, and is intended to be functionally equivalent. In addition to actual knowledge, it includes ``information indicating that the material is infringing.'' This would include a notice or any other ``red flag''--information of any kind that a reasonable person would rely upon. It may, in appropriate circumstances include the absence of customary indicia of ownership or authorization, such as a standard and accepted digital watermark or other copyright management information. As subsection (b) makes clear, the bill imposes no obligation on a provider to seek out such red flags. Once a provider becomes aware of a red flag, however, it ceases to quality for the exemption and, under existing law, it may have a duty to follow up. This standard differs from existing law, under which a defendant may be liable for contributory infringement if it knows or should have known that material was infringing. The financial benefit standard in subparagraph (B) is intended to codify and clarify the direct financial benefit element of vicarious liability as it has been interpreted in cases such as Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors, F. Supp. (N.D. Ill. 1997). As in Marobie, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving ``a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.'' Nor is subparagraph (B) intended to cover fees based on the length of the message (per number of bytes, for example) or by connect time. It would, however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material. The number of factors required to establish eligibility for the exemption under the bill is two, as compared with six under the bill as originally introduced. Several of the original factors were rendered unnecessary because direct infringement and secondary liability are no longer combined in a single exemption. In addition, the reduced number of factors reflects an effort to further simplify the bill, and to avoid further contention over the specific formulation of several of the factors.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce today the ``Trade Dress Protection Act.'' This bill is intended to clarify the law with respect to the applicable legal standards for the protection of trade dress, which includes product designs and packaging. Several years ago, Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court, in the case Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), held that trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under federal trademark law without a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning. The Court, however, had no occasion to comment on the test that should be applied in determining whether trade dress is inherently distinctive. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Two Pesos, a number of federal courts of appeals have issued conflicting and confusing opinions regarding the showing necessary to establish if trade dress is inherently distinctive. My bill is intended to provide the courts, as well as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, with guidance as to the relevant factors to consider in determining whether or not product designs or packaging are inherently distinctive. It has been drafted in conjunction with the Administration to make the registrability and protection of trade dress as efficient as possible for both the applicant and the examiner. The ``Trade Dress Protection Act'' addresses a number of other issues as well. Under U.S. trademark law, trade dress is not subject to protection if it is functional. However, the Trademark Act does not define the term ``functional'' and some courts still rely on widely discredited tests; for example, whether the trade dress in issue is an important ingredient to the commercial success of the product. My bill, Mr. Speaker, attempts to define the term ``functional'' in a manner consistent with prevailing case law and provides the courts and the PTO with a number of factors to consider when engaging in a functionality analysis. The ``Trade Dress Protection Act'' also clarifies the law with respect to which party to a lawsuit bears the burden of proof on the issue of functionality. This issue has provoked a sharp split among the federal courts of appeals. My bill also provides the PTO with a new statutory basis upon which it may refuse to register matter that, as a whole, is functional. The number of applications seeking registration of trade dress has increased markedly over the past few years, and my bill updates the Trademark Act to provide the PTO with the statutory tools necessary for it to carry out its mission. Finally, my bill contains a number of technical amendments to the Trademark Act to correct drafting and other errors. Due to the importance of the issues raised by this bill, the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, which I chair, will hold a hearing on the measure on February 12. My colleagues and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the scheduled witnesses and to advancing this legislation this session.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Brown) for having brought this to the floor today. Mr. Speaker, I do not have a prepared statement. I am going to do this from the seat of my pants. But that is probably the way Sonny would have done it, so I do not think I will violate any protocol as far as he is concerned. The distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, has already indicated that Sonny was a valued member of the full committee. He and I sat on the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, and I came to know Sonny very well in that capacity. Mr. Speaker, some recent weeks ago a group of mine from North Carolina from my congressional district asked me to bring a celebrity back home for a special event, and I asked them to identify a celebrity since we are not all celebrities here. They mentioned the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Largent), the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Watt) and Sonny Bono, Steve and J.C. being football luminaries and Sonny the entertainer. I said, ``You all name who your favorite of the three would be.'' ``We don't have a favorite,'' they said. The chairman finally came to me and said, ``How about Sonny Bono? See if we can get him down here.'' I went to Sonny, and he responded favorably, and he showed up in Greensboro, North Carolina, at the home of Charlie and Mary Elizabeth Irving back in November. A cold rain had fallen that entire afternoon, and Sonny was the headline. I say to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), he packed them in. They were standing outside as the soft rain fell listening to Sonny talk for 35 to 40 minutes. Mr. Speaker, time and again he referred to himself as a simple man from the streets; but his words were warmly embraced not only by those exposed to the rain outside but by those who were protected from it inside. My constituents who attended that event that night came to know him favorably even though he was only there for a little over 2 hours. In fact, that event, I say to the gentleman from California, may well have been his final public appearance. Shortly after his untimely death, a syndicated columnist wrote an article that appeared in the largest daily in my district, the Greensboro News and Record, depicting Sonny as a clown, a buffoon, an inept, unqualified Congressman. My constituents who visited with him that rainy night in November were hopping mad. They weren't angry; they were hopping mad about it. They called our offices down home and up here taking great umbrage in that article. I responded to the article pretty clearly, refuting and disavowing the unkind and uncivil portrayal of Sonny Bono in her article. Mr. Speaker, I bet 125 to 150 people saw me within 24 hours after my article appeared. They were personally offended by the syndicated columnist's article.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman from California for his contribution. Indeed, that is true. In fact, I told one of the columnists who called me for a comment about Sonny as a result of having shared membership on the Judiciary subcommittee I mentioned earlier. I said, oftentimes, he would give the appearance that he just fell off the turnip truck yesterday, but before you knew it the dart was released from his hand and the next time you saw the dart was when you were removing it from your own eye. Sonny, as the gentleman from California just pointed out, had the ability to laugh at himself. It is too bad more of us on this Hill do not have that ability and do not practice it more often. He was the butt of the joke, and I think he enjoyed being the butt of the joke. Mr. Speaker, as the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary previously said during his time on this matter, ``Sonny, do not forget us,'' because, as Cher said at the funeral, she said, ``He was the most unforgettable character I have ever met.'' I can assure you, Sonny, we in this people's House will never forget you. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) for this time.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, regrettably, I must rise in opposition to this Conference Report, because I fear that the provisions pertaining to the availability of funds to the United States Patent and Trademark Office set a terrible precedent and could have the effect of stifling long-term innovation in this country. The House version of the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill included a provision, contained in every appropriations bill to date, which allows the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which does not receive any taxpayer funding, to spend all that it collects from its base user fees for its operations by stating that such funds ``shall remain available until expended.'' Unfortunately, the Senate version of the bill, for the first time since the PTO became self-sufficient, capped the amount of its user fees that the PTO may spend, diverting the rest to the general treasury to be used for other purposes. I appreciate the efforts of the Chairman of the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Rogers], in trying to reconcile the differences between the House and the Senate versions of the bill. I know he did the best he could to keep the House version. However, a ``cap'' on the fees still exists in the compromise bill and I am dismayed to see, for the first time in history, that the PTO will not be able to spend appropriately all of its base fees which are set by the Congress. We should not sanction a new tax on American innovation by holding back funds which come directly from the pockets of applicants for PTO services. In my opinion, all these fees are necessary for the efficient operation of our Patent and Trademark Office. Remember, not one tax dollar goes to the PTO. All the money they spend comes from applicants and should be available for processing applications quickly and efficiently. Any other result will stifle the engine of our growing economy in the information age. I therefore will regrettably vote ``no'' on this Conference Report. We must stand up for inventors and trademark applicants in America.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I just want to say that this bill is about preventing theft. It will close a gap that currently exists in the Copyright Act to arrest electronic piracy. I thank the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte]; the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank]; and the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Cannon] and others on the subcommittee for the hard work that they did, and I specifically thank the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte] for having alluded to the manager's amendment included in today's bill. I have submitted for the Record an extensive statement describing the intent of that amendment, and I again thank all of the members of the subcommittee for their good work, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Packard]. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Coble] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2265, as amended.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks on the bill under consideration.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. H.R. 2265, Mr. Speaker, is a much needed legislative response to a 1994 court case that created a loophole which currently prevents the Department of Justice from prosecuting Internet copyright theft. The bill represents the hard work of industry representatives, officials from the Department of Justice and the Copyright Office, and the members of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property and the full Committee on the Judiciary. Again, this is a good bill that has been brought to the floor in a bipartisan manner, and I urge its adoption. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2265, the No Electronic Theft [NET] Act. Introduced by Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia, this bill represents an important legislative response to those persons who cavalierly appropriate copyrighted works and share them with other Internet thieves. Industry groups estimate that counterfeiting and piracy of intellectual property--especially computer software, compact discs, and movies--cost the affected copyrights holders more than $11 billion last year; some claim the actual figure is closer to $20 billion. Regrettably, the problem has great potential to worsen. The advent of digital video discs and the development of new audi-compression techniques, to cite two prominent examples, will only create additional incentive for copyright thieves to steal protected works. The NET Act constitutes a legislative response to the so-called LaMacchi case, a 1994 decision authored by a Massachusetts Federal court. In LaMacchia, the defendant encouraged lawful purchasers of copyright software and computer games to upload these works via a special password to an electronic bulletin board on the Internet. The defendant then transferred the works to another electronic address and encouraged others with access to a second password to download the materials for personal use without authorization by or compensation to the copyright owners. While critical of the defendant's behavior, the court precluded his prosecution under a Federal wire fraud statute, stating that this area of the law was never intended to cover copyright infringement. The court also noted that the relevant criminal provisions of the Copyright Act and title 18 of the United States Code historically required prosecutors to prove that a defendant acted ``willfully'' and for ``commercial advantage'' or ``private financial gain''--a threshold standard which did not apply to LaMacchia, who never benefited financially from his transgressions. Accordingly, the NER Act proscribes the willful act of copyright infringement, either for ``commercial advantage or private financial gain''; or by reproducing or distributing one or more copies of one or more copyrighted works with a total retail value of more than $1,000. The legislation specifically encompasses acts of reproduction or distribution the occur via ``electronic means'' which is to say, by computer theft. In addition, ``financial gain'' is defined as the acquisition of ``anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.'' This change would enable the Department of Justice to pursue a LaMacchia-like defendant who steals copyrighted works but gives them away--instead of selling them--to others. This legislation includes stiff penalties and prison terms for infringers. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, during its markup of the NET Act, passed an amendment to ensure that the bill would not modify liability for copyright infringement, including the standard of willfulness for criminal infringement. After full committee consideration of H.R. 2265, negotiating sessions that included representatives of the Copyright Office, the Department of Justice, and relevant industry organizations produced compromise language, now inserted in the bill, that provides additional protection for entities which transmit copyrighted works over the Internet. More specifically, this language is intended to clarify that a finding of willfulness cannot be established solely from evidence of reproduction or distribution of copyrighted works, and thus that prosecutions based solely on such evidence will not be pursued. While it is not the majority rule, some cases have held in the past that evidence of reproduction or distribution of such works, by itself, is sufficient to establish willfulness under 17 U.S.C. 506. This language rejects the holding of those cases, and clarifies that in order for criminal liability to attach to a defendant's conduct, the Government must prove something more than the mere reproduction or distribution of copyrighted works in establishing willfulness. It should be emphasized that proof of the defendant's state of mind is not required. The Government should not be required to prove that the defendant was familiar with the criminal copyright statute or violated it intentionally. Particularly in cases of clear infringement, the willfulness standard should be satisfied if there is adequate proof that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of the rights of the copyright holder. In such circumstances, a proclaimed ignorance of the law should not allow the infringer to escape conviction. Willfulness is often established by circumstantial evidence, and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, a violation act of infringement performed by the defendant is required by this section. Evidence of reproductions or distributions, including those made electronically on behalf of third parties, would not, by itself, be sufficient to establish willfulness under the NET Act. Finally, the requirements of a showing of financial gain or commercial advantage under 17 U.S.C.506(a) is not intended to imply that all types of financial gain or commercial advantage can, by themselves, trigger a finding of willful infringement. I should emphasize strongly that this bill addresses criminal, not civil, copyright liability. To repeat: nothing in H.R. 2265 affects civil liability for copyright infringement. Mr. Speaker, the public must come to understand that intellectual property rights, while abstract and arcane, are no less deserving of protection than personal or real property rights. The intellectual property community will continue its works in educating the public about these concerns, but we in the Congress must do our job as well by ensuring that piracy of copyrighted works will be treated with an appropriate level of fair but serious disapproval. We will fulfill this obligation today by passing H.R. 2265. Allow me to conclude by acknowledging the conspicuous hard work of the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte, who is also the bill's sponsor; and the ranking subcommittee member from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank. They and the other members of our subcommittee have truly worked in a bipartisan manner to expedite passage of the NET Act. I reserve, Mr. Speaker, the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte], the author of the bill.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2265) to amend the provisions of titles 17 and 18, United States Code, to provide greater copyright protection by amending criminal copyright infringement provisions, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Cannon], who has worked dutifully on this bill.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill under consideration.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 672) to make technical amendments to certain provisions of title 17, United States Code.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. H.R. 672 contains much needed technical amendments to the Copyright Act. The Copyright Office needs these amendments in order to administer the Copyright Act efficiently and effectively. H.R. 672 also clarifies that the distribution of a phonorecord before January 1, 1978, did not constitute a publication of the musical work embodied therein. In 1995 the ninth circuit, in La Cienega versus Z.Z. Top, overturned nearly 90 years of Presidential decisions and held that a phonorecord did constitute a publication of the musical work embodied in it. As a result, thousands of pre-1978 songs are at risk of falling into the public domain because the authors and music publishers relied on the Copyright Office decisions and did not place a copyright symbol on the phonorecords. We must protect the copyright holders who justifiable relied upon judicial and Copyright Office decisions. The United States cannot afford to let its rich musical heritage be lost into the public domain, and I urge the Members to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 672. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I will say very briefly I want to thank the ranking member, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], Members on both sides of the subcommittee, and the staff. We worked very effectively and harmoniously together to craft this very important piece of legislation.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I, too, yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Packard]. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Coble] that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to H.R. 672.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the citizens of the Sixth District of North Carolina, we would like to congratulate an outstanding public servant for going above and beyond the call of duty. Gary Thomas, Forsyth County Clerk of Court, has earned this recognition for his work in performing his duties so admirably. Mr. Thomas should be congratulated for his extraordinary work. Mr. Thomas, using his skills from his days as a detective, tracked down a constituent of mine, Mr. Elmer Holt, to give to him a bequest in the amount of $18,530.67, which had been left to Mr. Holt by the late C.H. Davis. If Mr. Thomas had not found Mr. Holt, the inheritance would have been turned over to the State because of the 2-year deadline. Knowing this, Mr. Thomas began an exhaustive search that would conclude with a Randolph County family receiving an unexpected check for a large sum of money. The search for Elmer Holt led Mr. Thomas to three Elmers in North Carolina. Thomas was looking for the Elmer who previously had a friendship with a Mr. C.H. Davis. Mr. Thomas' conservation with a Ms. Debbie Hold Smith proved to be the key to the puzzle of which Elmer should receive the bequest. Debbie Holt Smith turned out to be the daughter of the Elmer Holt for whom Mr. Thomas was searching. Thomas declined to tell Ms. Smith why he needed to talk with Elmer Holt. She agreed, however, to discuss the issue with her father. A confused Ms. Smith spoke with her father and discussed with him whether he ever knew a C.H. Davis. Elmer Holt recalled that he had befriended a Mr. Davis when he was younger and had done business with him. He remembered the late Mr. Davis as a generous man had always promised to leave him something in his will when he died. A letter to Elmer Holt from C.H. Davis was all the evidence that Mr. Thomas needed to realize that the Elmer Holt he had found was indeed the correct Elmer Holt. With the letter in hand, Debbie Holt Smith and her father went to Mr. Thomas' office in Winston-Salem to receive the unexpected surprise. Mr. Thomas gave them a check for more than $18,000. A check they never would have seen if it had not been for his hard work. Gary Thomas deserves recognition for his outstanding work in Forsyth County on behalf of our constituent. It is not very often that a public servant goes so far beyond the call of duty to find a missing beneficiary who is about to lose his bequest. We are extremely proud of him.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. COBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1534.

Mr. COBLE

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Gallegly], the principal author of the legislation before us. (Mr. GALLEGLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)