Thad Cochran

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, recently, the National Reading Panel submitted its report to Congress. That report shows the best current research on how children learn to read. One of the significant studies included in the research is the product of the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development. The research actually began as a result of the 1985 Health Research Extension Act which charged NICHD with the research task of finding out why children have trouble learning to read. The U.S. Department of Education reports a 42% increase in the number of students with specific learning disabilities receiving special education services over the past decade, with 2.7 million students ages 6-21 currently being served under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. As many as 90 percent of these students have significant, if not primary, special education needs in the area of reading. In the NICHD study, one of the most important discoveries was that 90-95% of those children with reading difficulties could be on track with their peers by third grade if they are identified at an early age and given the appropriate training. And that, Mr. President, is the greatest step we can make toward successful learning for these children. Currently, there is no readily available, scientifically based, easy- to-use screening tool to test children for reading readiness skills. And, there is no coordinated effort for parents and other early care providers to identify children who show signs of early literacy difficulties and to provide them research-based information and support. The National Center for Learning Disabilities has recently completed a plan to provide parents, early childhood professionals, and other care providers with an easy to use early literacy screening tool, access to information about the critical importance of early oral language and literacy experiences, and resources that will inform and enhance early instruction and learning. The Report to the House-passed version of the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes a recommendation that NICHD fund this initiative. I hope that as we work through the differences in this bill, adequate funds will be provided to NICHD to fund the National Early Literacy Screening Initiative.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Chairman's response, and I hope he will work in conference to provide funding for the Jackson State University Transportation Institute. bus facilities

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, as the Senator from Alabama is aware, this bill includes funding for a number of transit planning and research grants under the National Planning and Research Program. The Committee report that accompanies the bill identifies a number of individual research projects, including several university based projects, and the amount of federal funding to be provided for each. I commend the Chairman and the Subcommittee for their support for University based research into transit and related transportation matters. I would inquire of the Chairman whether he was aware of Jackson State University's transportation research capabilities and their plan to establish an institute at the University to utilize the disciplines of information technology, engineering, environmental science, public policy and business to provide technical and other assistance to transportation planners, local governments and others involved in multimodal transportation?

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on behalf of the manager of the bill, I make the point of order that the amendment violates rule XVI.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, we are awaiting the offering of other amendments on the Defense appropriations bill. There is no order, as I understand it, agreed upon between the leaders for another amendment to be offered at this time. So for any Senator who has an amendment to this bill, this is a good time to come and offer the amendment. We can have a debate on it. The leadership has announced--at least the Republican leader has announced he wants to complete action on this bill tonight. To do that, we are going to have to make progress with the amendments. There are several pending amendments on both sides. So we urge Senators to come and cooperate with the managers of the bill so we can dispose of this legislation by the end of this session tonight.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at the Naval Academy Board of Visitors meeting this week I learned that the Naval Academy is required to use funds generated by the Visitor's Center to repay a long-term government loan. I believe that these funds would be better utilized by the Midshipmen Welfare Fund that supports extra-curricular activities not covered by appropriated funds. Knowing of the strong leadership of the chairman and the Senator from Hawaii and support of our Service Academies, I inquire as to whether they would be willing to review this repayment program in conference, and if the facts merit, work to eliminate this requirement?

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his explanation and his cooperation with the managers in the handling of the bill. We are equal opportunity expediters here. We want to expedite action on both sides of the aisle. I am sure the Senator understands that. So we are working hard to try to get Senators to come to the floor now to continue the presentation of amendments, if they have them, on the bill. In the meantime, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, when we were debating the authorization bill earlier this week, it had come to my attention that there would be an amendment offered dealing with the testing program of the National Missile Defense System and that some criticism was going to be cited in support of that amendment attributed to Mr. Ted Postol, who is a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. That amendment has not yet been offered. We are now on the appropriations bill. I expect we will hear, during the debate on this bill, suggestions that we are either appropriating too much money for national missile defense or the program is flawed or in other ways criticism of this program on various--some imagined, some maybe real-- bases, complaining about the national missile defense appropriations and theater missile defense appropriations contained in this bill. I am rising today almost as a preemptive debate against these criticisms which I expect will be made by some Senators. They will use Mr. Ted Postol from MIT as the authority for their arguments. So I wish to give the Senate some background, particularly in view of the New York Times article this morning as an example of merchandising, again, of a lot of these arguments that have been made by Mr. Postol. On May 11, Mr. Ted Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote to a number of Clinton administration officials claiming to have discovered evidence that the National Missile Defense system now being tested will be easily defeated by simple countermeasures, that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's own data proved this, and that BMDO and its contractors conspired to hide this information by tampering with flight test data. Mr. Postol also claimed that BMDO had altered the National Missile Defense flight test program in order to hide the truths he claimed to have discovered. Mr. Postol says he discovered the fatal weakness in the NMD system after studying BMDO data from Integrated Flight Test 1A, which was conducted in June, 1997, and was a test of a prototype kill vehicle built by the Boeing Company for the NMD interceptor missile. The test was not an attempt to destroy the target, but only to understand the seeker's performance. It was intended specifically to understand how well the infrared sensor on the kill vehicle performed, compared to expectations, when it encountered a target warhead and a number of decoys and other penetration aids. Mr. Postol contends that the results of Flight Test 1A showed that the NMD kill vehicle could not distinguish between a simple balloon decoy and an actual warhead, and that the entire test program, beginning with Integrated Flight Test 2, was restructured using far simpler targets to cover up this deficiency in the capacity of the vehicle to operate properly. This contention by Mr. Postol is just not true. The facts are that Flight Test 1A involved a kill vehicle built by the Boeing Company. Flight Test 2 was conducted with a kill vehicle built by Raytheon, and used exactly the same target complex as Flight Test 1A, contrary to Mr. Postol's claims. Simpler targets were used in Flight Tests 3 and 4 because these tests had different objectives. Flight Tests 1A and 2 were intended to characterize the performance of the competing seekers; Flight test 3 was the first attempt to intercept and destroy a target warhead. Just as testing of any new aircraft begins with a taxi test, then a simple takeoff and landing, the first NMD intercept testing began with a single warhead accompanied by a balloon decoy. Subsequent tests will become progressively more difficult, an approach which follows the recommendations of a panel of experts headed by retired Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch. In fact, the Welch panel recommended that the Defense Department attempt its first intercept without countermeasures of any kind, in order to begin the testing as simply as possible, but BMDO believed it was worth the risk to attempt a more complicated test. Mr. Postol appears to be unaware that the Boeing kill vehicle is no longer being used in the flight test program. The competing kill vehicle built by Raytheon, which has independently developed software, was selected for the NMD system and has been used in every test since Flight Test 1A. Mr. Postol claims to have discovered in the data from Flight Test 1A that--and I quote--``the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be defeated by the simplest of balloon decoys.'' The fact is that in Flight Test 3, on October 2, 1999, exactly the opposite happened, when the EKV disregarded a balloon decoy and successfully destroyed its target. This isn't the first time Mr. Postol has been notoriously wrong about our missile defense program. In 1994, when the United States was preparing to conduct the first flight test of its Theater High Altitude Area Defense--or THAAD--system, he and some of his colleagues at MIT, in an article in Arms Control Today, claimed to have demonstrated that theater missile defenses like THAAD would--and I quote--``almost certainly have significant capabilities against strategic RVs [reentry vehicles]'' and that any agreement permitting such capabilities would-- I quote--``significantly erode the ability of the ABM Treaty to control strategic defenses by allowing systems that could defend areas of tens of thousands of square kilometers.'' As it turns out, in spite of that suggestion by Mr. Postol and his colleagues from MIT, even the government of Russia never complained about THAAD or similar systems which Mr. Postol said would so upset the strategic balance. And when other technical experts challenged his conclusions, Mr. Postol adopted the tactics of questioning the competence and integrity of his critics. A technical team under contract to the Defense Department reviewed Mr. Postol's THAAD findings and found they contained errors. Mr. Postol's response was to write a series of letters to government officials, accusing the technical team whose findings differed from his of ``spreading false and misleading information'' that ``impugns the scholarly reputation of myself and my colleagues.'' He accused the general officer heading the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of mismanagement and of ``providing false information to members of the Russian Duma'' in an attempt to--in his words--``influence the Russian debate through subterfuge.'' Mr. Postol demanded that the Defense Department retract its study and issue a letter acknowledging its errors. DoD did none of this because they were right all along and it was Postol and his MIT colleagues who were wrong again. Two years later, in 1996, Mr. Postol's campaign against missile defenses had taken a new approach. In addition to arguing that systems like THAAD would undermine the Russian strategic deterrent, Mr. Postol argued that they would be easily defeated by countermeasures. He said in effect that U.S. TMD systems were so good that they would threaten the Russian strategic force and at the same time so bad that they could be easily defeated by even the simplest of countermeasures. Both those claims could not be true. Nonetheless, Mr. Postol continued to promote this argument, and created detailed drawings illustrating how an aspiring missile power might go about deploying countermeasures to U.S. defensive systems. These ideas were elaborated in an 80 page document which Mr. Postol distributed widely and which was eventually made available on the internet, so that anyone--including those who would benefit most from measures that could defeat U.S. weapon systems--could obtain it. The claims that Theater Missile Defenses would both threaten deterrence and at the same time be overwhelmed by simple countermeasures is now being made by Postol and his co-authors for National Missile Defense. He is arguing that any nation which can build a long-range ballistic missile can necessarily build in measures that will allow it to penetrate missile defenses. At the same time, these scientists believe, or say they believe, that deployment of a limited NMB system--even though they believe they can scientifically prove it will not work--will cause Russia to maintain higher force levels and China to construct a strategic buildup. All of this is contained in an elaborate, glossy, 175-page document which Mr. Postol and his colleagues have distributed widely. It is relatively easy to conceive of devices that are theoretically possible using scientific principles. The best science fiction employs just such an approach. But it is another thing altogether to transform those concepts from the realm of ideas into hardware. Actually engineering a complex device like a weapon system is far different from merely imagining it. For every idea that is transformed into hardware and subjected to the real world's trials, many others, thought up by smart people with Ph.D.s from the best universities, are discarded as impractical. Countermeasures are no less subject to this reality than are the weapon systems they are intended to frustrate. Imagining is one thing; designing, building and testing is quite another. Countermeasures aren't free. Every countermeasures which someone attempts to put on a ballistic missile costs real money. Countermeasures also consume weight and space, which mean lowered performance or less payload. Countermeasures introduce complexity, which means more things can go wrong and engineers must spend more time trying to ensure they go right. Engineers trying to perfect countermeasures are diverted from other activities they could be working on, such as extending a missile's range or improving its reliability. In short, successful pursuit of countermeasures means sacrificing something else, and some may not choose to make that sacrifice. Countermeasures are an issue that must be taken seriously by the designers of our missile defense systems. And, fortunately, they are. Whether the weapon is an artillery piece or a ballistic missile, it will have to confront efforts to counter it. In fact, missile defense is itself a countermeasure to the ballistic missile. Missile defense should not be abandoned because of the probability that someone will attempt to develop a countermeasure. The talented men and women of our National Missile Defense program--who are operating in the real world in which ideas must be translated into hardware that works--are anticipating and preparing for countermeasures. This is a point that has apparently been lost on Mr. Postol and his concerned colleagues, who would have us believe that new capabilities materialize because they can imagine them. I believe we are going to see more not less criticism as we move forward to implement the provisions of Public Law 106-38 and deploy our national missile defense system. Some of the critics have impressive academic credentials. Fortunately, however, people who are impressive experts in the design and construction of our modern weapons are working hard to carry out the mandates of our government to build missile defense systems that will protect our country and all our American citizens. An interesting article was published this week in the June 5 issue of National Review, written by John O'Sullivan, entitled ``By Winding Stair,'' which discusses missile defenses and its antagonists. This is an interesting article and is relevant to the subject I have discussed. I ask unanimous consent a copy of that article be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to improve the process used by the United States Postal Service to establish postage rates for nonprofit and other reduced-rate mailers. Under the current rate setting procedure, nonprofit postage rates have changed significantly, often rising more than corresponding commercial rates. In fact, in some cases, nonprofit mail rates have increased so much that the nonprofit rates are higher than similar commercial rates. According to the Postal Service, the unpredictable rate changes experienced by nonprofit mailers stem from difficulties the Service has had with gathering accurate cost data for small subclasses of mail. By establishing a structured relationship between nonprofit and commercial postage rates, this legislation would protect all categories of nonprofit mail from unpredictable rate swings in the future. The bill would set nonprofit and classroom Periodical rates at 95 percent of the commercial counterpart rates (excluding the advertising portion), set nonprofit Standard A rates at 60 percent of the commercial Standard A rates, and set Library and Educational Matter rates at 95 percent of the rates for the special subclass of commercial Standard B mail. The Postal Service recently proposed to increase postage rates for all classes of mail, and this proposal is now pending before the Postal Rate Commission. As part of its request, the Postal Service asked for nonprofit postage rates that are premised on the enactment of this, or similar, legislation to change the process for setting nonprofit mail rates. Without this legislation, nonprofit mailers will face potential double-digit rate hikes. This bill achieves an appropriate balance between nonprofit and commercial postage rates, and provides nonprofit mailers with much needed rate predictability. It is a compromise solution that is supported by the United States Postal Service and several major commercial and nonprofit mailer associations, including: the Alliance of Nonprofit Mailers, the National Federation of Nonprofits, the Direct Marketing Association, the Magazine Publishers of America, and the Association of Postal Commerce. I invite my colleagues to support this effort to protect nonprofit mailers by improving the method for establishing nonprofit postage rates. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to improve the process used by the United States Postal Service to establish postage rates for nonprofit and other reduced-rate mailers. Under the current rate setting procedure, nonprofit postage rates have changed significantly, often rising more than corresponding commercial rates. In fact, in some cases, nonprofit mail rates have increased so much that the nonprofit rates are higher than similar commercial rates. According to the Postal Service, the unpredictable rate changes experienced by nonprofit mailers stem from difficulties the Service has had with gathering accurate cost data for small subclasses of mail. By establishing a structured relationship between nonprofit and commercial postage rates, this legislation would protect all categories of nonprofit mail from unpredictable rate swings in the future. The bill would set nonprofit and classroom Periodical rates at 95 percent of the commercial counterpart rates (excluding the advertising portion), set nonprofit Standard A rates at 60 percent of the commercial Standard A rates, and set Library and Educational Matter rates at 95 percent of the rates for the special subclass of commercial Standard B mail. The Postal Service recently proposed to increase postage rates for all classes of mail, and this proposal is now pending before the Postal Rate Commission. As part of its request, the Postal Service asked for nonprofit postage rates that are premised on the enactment of this, or similar, legislation to change the process for setting nonprofit mail rates. Without this legislation, nonprofit mailers will face potential double-digit rate hikes. This bill achieves an appropriate balance between nonprofit and commercial postage rates, and provides nonprofit mailers with much needed rate predictability. It is a compromise solution that is supported by the United States Postal Service and several major commercial and nonprofit mailer associations, including: the Alliance of Nonprofit Mailers, the National Federation of Nonprofits, the Direct Marketing Association, the Magazine Publishers of America, and the Association of Postal Commerce. I invite my colleagues to support this effort to protect nonprofit mailers by improving the method for establishing nonprofit postage rates. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, the Senator from New York (Mr. Moynihan) and fellow Smithsonian Institution Board Regent in introducing the legislation authorizing a permanent base facility structure at Hilo, Hawaii for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Submillimeter Array. The Submillimeter Array is part of the world-class web of major data- gathering facilities of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. Other facilities are located in Arizona and its headquarters in Massachusetts. Together these facilities support some of the world's most advanced studies and discoveries in astronomy, astrophysics, earth and space science. This legislation will authorize the planning, design, construction and outfitting of the necessary laboratory and other operational space for the array of radio telescope antennas installed atop the ancient volcano, Mauna Kea. Funding is authorized in the amount of $2,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2001 and $2,500,000 for Fiscal Year 2002. The new base station will replace a current system of rented, overcrowded space shared with astrophysical operations of other organizations and countries. Mr. President, I am proud of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 110-year history and its reputation around the world. Its work and discoveries are considered to be some of the most significant of the Twentieth Century. From the first orbiting space observatories to the newest images of our galaxy, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory has worked independently and collaborated with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to explore and explain the wonders of the universe. I hope the Senate will work quickly to pass this legislation so the work of the Submillimeter Array can proceed.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, the Senator from New York (Mr. Moynihan) and fellow Smithsonian Institution Board Regent in introducing the legislation authorizing a permanent base facility structure at Hilo, Hawaii for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Submillimeter Array. The Submillimeter Array is part of the world-class web of major data- gathering facilities of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. Other facilities are located in Arizona and its headquarters in Massachusetts. Together these facilities support some of the world's most advanced studies and discoveries in astronomy, astrophysics, earth and space science. This legislation will authorize the planning, design, construction and outfitting of the necessary laboratory and other operational space for the array of radio telescope antennas installed atop the ancient volcano, Mauna Kea. Funding is authorized in the amount of $2,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2001 and $2,500,000 for Fiscal Year 2002. The new base station will replace a current system of rented, overcrowded space shared with astrophysical operations of other organizations and countries. Mr. President, I am proud of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 110-year history and its reputation around the world. Its work and discoveries are considered to be some of the most significant of the Twentieth Century. From the first orbiting space observatories to the newest images of our galaxy, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory has worked independently and collaborated with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to explore and explain the wonders of the universe. I hope the Senate will work quickly to pass this legislation so the work of the Submillimeter Array can proceed.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, just a few days ago, the Congressional Budget Office released a paper entitled ``Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense.'' I bring this paper to the Senate's attention because I believe it is misleading and confusing. It has given support to critics of the program who also have contributed to the confusion. Some reporters and editors have characterized this study as a ``budget estimate'' of our National Missile Defense program which shows that the costs will be far higher than previously predicted. This is not so. The paper is not a budgetary scoring of legislation that the CBO traditionally engages in. This is a paper of a kind the CBO occasionally produces in response to Congressional requests, providing it can spare analysts from their other duties. The request for this paper was recently made by members of the Senate and the CBO acknowledges that it had insufficient time to fully consider all of the questions it was asked to address. The paper puts the total cost for a National Missile Defense system at $49 billion. I say ``a'' National Missile Defense system because the CBO paper did not examine the program actually in place and for which we have received estimates in the past, but rather one that its analysts thought should be in place. Mr. Ken Bacon, the Defense Department spokesman, characterized the estimate as an ``apples to gold apples'' comparison. The Defense Department has stated previously that acquisition and operation of a single site NMD system with 100 interceptors would cost $25.6 billion through 2015. The CBO estimate of $49 billion is for a dual site NMD system with 250 interceptors. Some news reports, such as one published in the Wall Street Journal on April 25th have erroneously reported a figure of $60 billion for this year, which they arrive at by adding the cost of Space-Based Infrared Satellites. However, even the CBO paper correctly notes that those satellites will serve other missile defense programs, as well as other entirely different mission areas, and are not part of the cost of the NMD system. Mr. President, I am convinced that a single interceptor site by itself will be insufficient to adequately protect the United States from missile attack, and additional capability will be needed. Whether that should be a second ground-based site, as the CBO paper assumes, one based at sea, or some other approach remains to be determined. But we should not confuse the CBO's ``golden apple'' estimate with the estimates we have received previously, which address a different, single site NMD system. Even where the CBO paper tried to make a direct comparison, it still based its estimate on the program it thought should exist rather than the one that does. For example, the paper determined that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization should buy 75 percent more interceptor missiles than it plans to for testing and spares in the so-called ``Capability 1'' single site system. It made different assumptions about construction costs, using the 30 year old Safeguard system in North Dakota as its model. And it based its costs on 30 operational flight tests over the first five years of system operation, three times the number actually planned. Projecting costs for a complex weapon system still under development is an uncertain enterprise, and different analysts can reasonably reach different conclusions about what assumptions are warranted. It would have been reasonable for CBO to present its conclusions to those who are actually building the NMD system and seek their views on whether the different assumptions were warranted. This, after all, is the procedure followed by the General Accounting Office when it produces such a study. It sends out a draft for comment by the relevant agencies and either incorporates the comments of those agencies or explains why it does not agree. Unfortunately, we have been told by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization that, despite repeated offers to assess the CBO findings, CBO declined to present its conclusions before publishing this paper. That is unfortunate; had it done so, there might be less confusion about what this paper says. I believe it is also important to note some costs that CBO did not consider in this study. The study doesn't examine the potential costs to the United States of not having a missile defense system. We should keep in mind that the NMD program is not like a new tactical fighter or guided missile destroyer or armored vehicle, replacing an earlier generation. We have no defense against long-range ballistic missiles launched against our territory. That means that should the day come when some nation--for whatever reason--launches a missile at the United States, without a National Missile Defense system we will have no choice but to watch that missile strike its target. If that missile is equipped with a weapon of mass destruction, the results would be the most catastrophic event ever to take place in the United States. An assessment of these costs is nowhere to be found in the CBO report. Nor is the cost to U.S. leadership of our continued vulnerability to missile attack. A missile doesn't have to be used to be useful in deterring actions by other nations, and we need only look at our own experience to confirm that. The United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on ballistic missiles over the last 40 years, none of which have ever been used. We did so because we believed those weapons would deter other nations from taking certain actions that would harm our interests. The United States can be deterred, too, by the threat of missile attack. Our former colleague, Secretary of Defense Cohen, provided an example of how that can happen when he spoke to our Allies in Munich in February. He said, If Saddam Hussein had five or ten or twenty ICBMs with nuclear warheads, and he said that, if you try to expel me from Kuwait, I'll put one in Berlin, one in Munich, one in New York, one in Washington, one in Los Angeles, etc., one in Rome--let's spread the wealth, one in England, London--how many would have been quite so eager to support the deployment of some five hundred thousand convention troops to expel him from Kuwait? We would have had a different calculation, asking, ``What kind of a risk are we running? . . . We never want to be in the position of being blackmailed by anyone who will prevent us from carrying out our Article 5 obligations or responding to any threat to our national security interests.'' Ther are significant costs to the ability of the United States to act in its national interests if it is vulnerable to missile attack. This report from the CBO doesn't place a dollar value on that. Mr. President, while our debates on various defense programs can be served by additional views, I think this new paper from the Congressional Budget Office has done more to create confusion than to contribute usefully to the debate. I urge Senators to keep its limitations in mind as they consider it.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on April 13, 2000, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education received the report of the National Reading Panel. The subcommittee also heard testimony from Dr. Duane Alexander, Director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; Dr. Kent McGuire, Assistant Secretary of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement; and Dr. Donald N. Langenberg, Chairman of the National Reading Panel and Chancellor of the University System of Maryland. The National Reading Panel was created as a result of legislation I introduced in 1997, titled the ``Successful Reading Research and Instruction Act.'' Subsequently, the report accompanying the Fiscal Year 1998 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act called on the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and the Department of Education to form a panel to evaluate existing research on the teaching of reading to children, identify proven methodologies, and suggest ways for dissemination of this information to teachers, parents, universities and others. I was convinced at the time that there was an absence of consensus on a national strategy for teaching children to read. Meanwhile, we had statistics which showed that 40 to 60 percent of elementary students were not reading proficiently and there seemed to be no plan to help remedy the situation. The Health Research Extension Act of 1985 had mandated research on why children have difficulties learning to read. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development had conducted this research and in 1997, they had some answers. However, Congress hadn't asked for the results and the information was literally trapped in the academic and research world. Since 1997, we've made some progress. Today more people know that reading research exists, but very few of us are able to decipher what it means, or how to translate it into meaningful practice. Mr. President, what most parents want to know is simple, ``How can I make sure my child will learn to read?'' Until now, the response to that question was often vague, and the so-called ``expert'' or ``research based'' methods were conflicting. Consequently, there is a great deal of confusion among parents, teachers and school administrators about improving reading skills of children. Meanwhile, the Federal government has spent nearly $100 million on programs which one researcher described as, ``at best, it shouldn't hurt.'' The National Reading Panel identified over 100,000 studies on a variety of topics related to reading instruction. It held regional hearings to receive testimony from teachers, parents, students, university faculty, educational policy experts and scientists who represented the population that would ultimately be the users of its findings. The panel used the information from these hearings and their preliminary research to identify five topics for intensive study: alphabetics; fluency; comprehension; teacher education and reading instruction; and computer technology and reading instruction. The panel then narrowed its review to materials which met a defined set of rigorous research methodological standards. It is the development of these standards which the panel describes as ``what may be its most important action.'' By finding successful techniques that meet the same kind of scientific review that are used to test medical treatments, the panel presents its recommendations with a confidence that has never before been applied to the teaching of reading. One of the National Reading Panel's objectives was to ensure that good research results were readily available. On April 13, the report was sent to every Senator and Member of Congress. Within the next few weeks, the report and supporting documentation will be delivered to state education officials, colleges and universities, and public libraries. A long-term strategic plan that will address wider dissemination and classroom implementation will be ready by next fall. It is my hope that the report of the National Reading Panel will guide us in making informed decisions on reading issues. I commend the efforts of the National Reading Panel and I hope educators will implement their recommendations and use the new teaching methods and programs outlined in the report.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I am pleased to announce that today the Senate will be in a period of morning business throughout the day with time reserved for Senators Durbin, Thomas, Craig, Murkowski, and Brownback. Cloture was filed on the gas tax bill on Friday. Therefore, pursuant to rule XXII, all first-degree amendments must be filed by 1 p.m. today. By previous consent, the cloture vote has been scheduled to occur at 2:25 p.m. on Tuesday. That vote will be the first vote of this week. The Senate will also consider the marriage tax penalty bill during this week's session and the budget conference report. Therefore, Senators can expect votes to occur on Friday. I thank my colleagues for their attention and cooperation.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on several occasions I have discussed missile defense programs and the importance of moving as quickly as possible to develop and deploy missile defense systems--both theater and national--to protect forces that are deployed around the world and our citizens here at home. Of all the programs designated as ``Major Defense Acquisition Programs'' by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, only the Airborne Laser program has distinguished itself by being on schedule and on budget while meeting or exceeding all of its technical requirements. The spectacular performance of this program is the standard all defense programs should aspire to. Our debates on defense programs usually focus on budgets, schedules, performance, requirements, and threats, but seldom do we pause to recognize success; more specifically, we hardly ever acknowledge the human component of success. The many accomplishments of the Airborne Laser program did not just happen by accident. Rather, the program has succeeded because of the human element; because of the many people who, over the course of the last three decades, have advanced our science and engineering to the point where the United States will be able to put chemical lasers on 747 aircraft and use them to defend America, its interests, and its deployed forces. Most recently, the Airborne Laser program has succeeded because of the leadership of Col. Mike Booen and Dr. Paul Shennum, both of whom will be leaving the program in April after having driven the Airborne Laser program forward for the last four years. They deserve special recognition for their efforts. Colonel Booen was named Deputy Airborne Laser Program Director in the summer of 1996 and promoted to Director in November of that year. While Colonel Booen has been an energetic and tireless advocate for the Airborne Laser program and its people, his latest achievements are just the most recent in a notable career that includes early promotions, academic recognition as a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Academy, and assignments as a Defense Department Manned Space Flight Engineer and Deputy Chief of the Secretary of the Air Force's Staff Group. In recognition of his success Colonel Booen has been selected to become the next Director of the Air Force's System Program Office for the Space-Based Infrared System. It is an assignment of critical importance to our nation's security, and I look forward to continuing to work with Colonel Booen as he resuscitates that program. Over a distinguished career of 40 years with Boeing, Dr. Paul Shennum has developed a reputation as a leader who leads with energy and integrity, embraces change, encourages innovation, and challenges people to contribute more than they thought they could. Dr. Shennum is one of the rare program managers who can be counted on to provide factual answers when asked a question. He does not give evasive responses, however convenient they may sometimes be for his company or the Pentagon. His straightforward approach with the Pentagon, Congress, and within his industry team has been instrumental in the Airborne Laser's outstanding program performance. I wish him the best in his well-deserved retirement. The Booen-Shennum team has succeeded because both of these men understand what the word ``leadership'' means. They know it involves fixing on an objective, setting high, but realistic, standards, and leading the government and industry components of the Airborne Laser team effectively to that objective. They have refused to accept excuses for work that hasn't met their standards. They have inspired their colleagues to accomplish more than many thought possible. They appreciate effort, but expect results. And it is results, unparalleled in any other defense program, that Mike Booen and Paul Shennum have given us. Colonel Booen and Dr. Shennum have demonstrated how a government- industry team should act. This program is not a team in name only, thanks to the constant efforts of Colonel Booen and Dr. Shennum. They have caused the team members, including the various defense contractors, industry and government employees to really work together to achieve a common goal. In their relentless pursuit of excellence, Col. Mike Booen and Dr. Paul Shennum have reminded us that America's defense programs will ultimately succeed or fail because of the people involved. I congratulate them and thank them for doing such a great job. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished chairman of the committee, Mr. Lugar, for his work on the legislation before the Senate today. The Senators from Kansas and Nebraska deserve commendation also because of their active influence in shaping this bill. I wish I could support this effort to reform crop insurance, but it has a built in bias against Southern agriculture. I supported the measure that was put before the Committee by the Chairman and I voted against the substitute amendment that was offered during the committee markup by the Senators from Kansas and Nebraska. Their amendment prevailed, and it is now the pending business before the Senate. The Chairman's mark offered farmers a choice between higher government contributions to their crop insurance premium or a new risk management payment that they could use for eligible activities which lower the financial risk of their farming operation. Farmers in Mississippi preferred the Lugar bill. Mississippi has the third lowest crop insurance participation rate in the country. This bill will not increase the participation rate in my state and I don't think it will eliminate the need for Congress to provide disaster assistance in the future. The bill now before the Senate, while including some of the programmatic changes that I have advocated and introduced in a bill with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, Mrs. Lincoln, falls short of the reform that we have promised agriculture producers. Here are two specific examples. First, it contains a subsidy structure which heavily favors regions of the country which already have high crop insurance participation rates and low premiums. This bill will make premiums even lower for those producers, while at the same time, effectively raising rates for producers that purchase coverage in the middle levels. The effect of this subsidy structure is that farmers who currently purchase catastrophic coverage and want to move into higher levels of coverage will only benefit from this legislation if they buy at the lowest and highest levels of coverage. Otherwise, they would be better off under current law. Second, farming is not a ``one-size-fits-all'' enterprise, but some believe that crop insurance should be. This bill fails to provide benefits for those producers that find crop insurance to be uneconomical. Certainly many of the changes that are incorporated in this bill will result in lower premiums, but for some producers in Mississippi, that will not be enough. I am encouraged that the Committee has provided $500 million in a pilot program that may address the needs of those who find that crop insurance is not a good business decision. However, the funds provided are significantly less than those that were included in the Lugar bill and will likely not produce a program that will be meaningful. I hope that this amount will be increased in conference so that it can provide meaningful assistance while not setting dangerous precedents for future farm bill debates. I'm hopeful this legislation can be improved in conference with the other body. Mr. President, I will vote no on this bill, I will work with the Chairman and other committee members to resolve these concerns in conference.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing three Senate joint resolutions reappointing citizen regents of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. I am pleased that my fellow Smithsonian Institution Regents, the Senator from New York (Mr. Moynihan) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Frist), are cosponsors. At its meeting on January 24, 2000, the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents recommended the following distinguished individuals for appointment to the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents: Mr. Manuel L. Ibanez of Texas; Mr. Alan G. Spoon of Maryland; and Ms. Sheila E. Widnall of Massachusetts. I ask unanimous consent that the biographies of the nominees and the text of the joint resolutions be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing three Senate joint resolutions reappointing citizen regents of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. I am pleased that my fellow Smithsonian Institution Regents, the Senator from New York (Mr. Moynihan) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Frist), are cosponsors. At its meeting on January 24, 2000, the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents recommended the following distinguished individuals for appointment to the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents: Mr. Manuel L. Ibanez of Texas; Mr. Alan G. Spoon of Maryland; and Ms. Sheila E. Widnall of Massachusetts. I ask unanimous consent that the biographies of the nominees and the text of the joint resolutions be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one of the most significant threats to America's national security. States like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing ambitious programs and the technology needed to threaten the United States. Unclassified reports from our intelligence agencies indicate that these efforts have intensified. Iranian ballistic missile progress is largely the result of substantial assistance from North Korea, China, and especially, Russia. There is no doubt that foreign technology and assistance are essential to Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. The U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified Semiannual Report to Congress on Proliferation states, ``Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and ACW [advanced conventional weapons] technology from abroad.'' The type of foreign assistance that is the subject of this legislation serves to increase the sophistication and rate of development of Iran's ballistic missiles. We must do more than we are doing now to impede its progress and, at the same time, prepare defenses against the use of such weapons. The rapid development of the Shahab-3 demonstrates how foreign assistance accelerated Iran's ballistic missile programs. The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong ballistic missile. But instead of simply purchasing the missile as Pakistan did, Iran chose to modify the design of the missile with Russian and Chinese assistance and produce the missile on its own. In February 1997, George Tenet, then Acting Director of the CIA, testified that with North Korean assistance, Iran could develop the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, ``in less than ten years.'' Less than a year later, in January 1998, Director Tenet testified, ``Iran's success in gaining technology and material from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that [Iran] could have a medium-range ballistic missile much sooner than I assessed last year.'' Six months later, in July 1998, Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3. An unclassified Intelligence Community report released in January of this year assessed that Iran has achieved an ``emergency operational capability'' with the Shahab-3. Proliferation to Iran continues. According to the U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified Semiannual Report on Proliferation, summarizing proliferation that occurred in the first half of 1999, Russian entities during the first six months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous ballistic missiles. * * * * * During the reporting period, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran. * * * * * Throughout the first half of 1999, North Korea continued to export ballistic missiles-related equipment and missile components, materials and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East . . . This report to Congress also states, ``. . . economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran.'' Because Russian government officials continue to show an unwillingness or inability to stop this dangerous assistance to Iran, the legislation we are considering should be passed to authorize and direct more effective sanctions. North Korea's continuing relationship with Iran is also of great concern. Iran has already received sufficient technology from North Korea to build a copycat three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile on its own. Moreover, senior Intelligence Community officials have testified that they expect North Korea to continue to sell ballistic missiles to Iran. Therefore, we must expect Iran to acquire the technology for the longer-range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile when North Korea begins its export. It is too optimistic, given the North Korea-Iran ballistic missile relationship, to expect Iran's capabilities to lag North Korea's for very long. There are several significant consequences of the continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Iran. I'll mention two. First, this assistance will allow Iran to develop more advanced ballistic missiles faster, cheaper, and easier than it otherwise would have on its own. Iran's defense minister has announced that it is working on the more advanced Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles, and the Iranians even claim that they are going to launch a satellite into orbit by the second half of 2001. According to press reports, Iran's Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 ballistic missiles will use Russian engine technology, leading to an Iranian ICBM based in large part on Russian technology. Diminishing this proliferation is essential to slowing Iran's long-range ballistic missile program. Second, Iran is bound to become a supplier of ballistic missile technology and expertise as its own program proceeds. CIA Director Tenet recently made this point, testifying that, ``Iran's existence as a secondary supplier of this technology to other countries is the trend that worries me the most.'' We are already seeing indications that Iran is no longer merely a recipient of ballistic missile technology. According to unclassified intelligence community reports, Iran is assisting Libya's ballistic missile programs. Press reports also indicate Iran is helping Syria and others develop or acquire ballistic missiles. The legislation before the Senate will improve our efforts to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology to Iran. I urge its approval.