Thad Cochran

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, last week the Department of Defense conducted its most recent flight test of our National Missile Defense system. A great deal has been said and written about this test in the last few days--much of it erroneous--and I think it is important that we draw the correct conclusions about what this test does and does not mean. The test conducted last week was one of a series of 18 scheduled flight tests of the National Missile Defense system, and only the second to actually attempt to intercept a strategic ballistic missile by colliding with it in space. The first test this past October was primarily a test of the vehicle that actually hits the target missile. Last week's test was significantly more complicated and involved additional, newly developed elements of the National Missile Defense system, such as the ground-based radar and the Battle Management Command, Control and Communications system. In fact, a senior Defense Department official told reporters before the test that the battle management system is: ``the most difficult and sophisticated part of this entire program.'' The latest test began with the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. After its rocket engine burned out, the target missile deployed both a mock warhead and a balloon decoy intended to try to fool the interceptor missile. The missile was tracked by satellites and by the National Missile Defense system's ground-based radar at Kwajalein Atoll in the South Pacific, and the interceptor missile was launched to meet the target. It sighted the target missile and then closed on it. While the interceptor did not hit the target warhead, it appeared that all of the systems tested functioned properly until the final six seconds of these, when the infrared sensors on the interceptor vehicle did not operate correctly--as they had in the October test. While the failure to hit the target is disappointing, it is hardly justification for all the negative comments I have heard about last week's test. It's important to remember that a test program involves the testing of weapon systems to see if they perform as they were designed. The purpose of this test program is to uncover problems and correct them. If it were possible to take a design straight from the drawing board to the field, we wouldn't need testing programs. We test because we expect to find problems and try to solve them. What's remarkable about the National Missile Defense testing is not that the intercept vehicle missed on the second test but that it succeeded on the first one. Many newly introduced elements had to work right on this most recent test even to achieve a near miss, and the really significant news on this test is that all of the new elements which added complexity to the challenge seemed to have performed very well; the only thing that apparently didn't work properly was the one element which was already proven to work in the October flight. Some of the critics of missile defense have said this test was a major setback for the program. It was not. In fact, it demonstrated significant progress in the development of a workable and reliable National Missile Defense capability. The October flight was primarily a test of the intercept vehicle and its ability to identify a target in space, discriminate between the warhead and a decoy, and collide with the warhead. It did exactly what it was designed to do, but critics of the program claimed that had the decoy not attracted the intercept vehicle's attention, it never would have detected the warhead. They argued that the system can not work when there are decoys, and only did work because there was a decoy. As ridiculous as that sounds, it has been echoed by those who have long opposed missile defense in any form. An editorial in the New York Times claimed that the October success was ``lucky'' and occurred ``almost by accident.'' Now wait a minute and think about this. When two objects--each about the size of a chair, launched 4300 miles apart and traveling at a combined speed of 15,000 miles an hour--collide in the vastness of space 140 miles above the Earth's surface, that's not an accident. That's a demonstration of some very capable technology and engineering. Clearly, for some, no amount of evidence will be convincing. But repeating something that's wrong doesn't make it right. Predictably, some are urging the National Missile Defense program be slowed down or even shelved in the wake of last week's test. For some critics, delay or cancellation is always the right course of action when it comes to missile defense. Others suggest abandoning this program for another approach using different basing modes, but that will only delay the National Missile Defense deployment we need now. Still others believe the administration's assessment of technological readiness should be delayed in order to remove the decision from presidential politics. This, too, would be a mistake. We have a National Missile Defense program because we have a growing vulnerability to the threat of ballistic missile attack. That threat will not wait for us to conduct a test program with perfect results, something that has never happened with any weapon system. Delay in deploying a defense against these missiles only serves the interests of our adversaries. This threat is growing. We must all remember that this program is not just an academic exercise. The Senate passed the National Missile Defense Act last spring; in September the Intelligence Community released a new National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat which, according to its unclassified summary, judges that some rogue states may have ICBMs much sooner than previously thought, and that those missiles will be more sophisticated than previously estimated. In just the past few weeks, British authorities intercepted components bound for Libya for missiles with three times the range of Tripoli's current arsenal. According to news reports from last week, the Director of Central Intelligence cannot rule out that Iran may already be able to build a nuclear weapon. And this past weekend, North Korea said it was reconsidering its declaration to refrain from any more long-range missile tests, though of course a moratorium on flight testing, however long, does not mean that North Korea isn't making progress on its missile development programs. While the threat continues to intensify, we've already had too much delay in deploying a missile defense system. In fact, we are behind today precisely because those who counsel delay have long had their way, not because of any inherent problems with the technology. What's required now is that we stay the course we set for ourselves when we passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. That act makes it the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense system as soon as technologically possible. With the successful test in October and last week's test incorporating additional elements of the National Missile Defense system, the talented men and women of our armed forces and industry have demonstrated that this system is technologically possible. The test program is in its early stages and much can and will be done to refine the system between now and the start of missile production. But there is no question that this technology is not just within our reach but is actually in our grasp now. I congratulate the Defense Department for the extraordinary technical accomplishments it has achieved so far, and urge it to continue to work to improve this important program.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor and to support the passage of the Deceptive Mail Prevention and Enforcement Act, S. 335. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, for her successful efforts to get this legislation adopted to curb deceptive mailings. She has provided strong leadership and sound guidance on this important issue. As Chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senator Collins has worked effectively to examine the problems relating to sweepstakes and promotional mailings and develop this legislation to strengthen our laws. I applaud her work in crafting this bill and her continuing efforts to protect consumers. The Deceptive Mail Prevention and Enforcement Act includes new safeguards to protect consumers against misleading and dishonest sweepstakes and other promotional mailings, including government look- alike mailings. The bill grants additional investigative and enforcement authority to the United States Postal Service to stop unscrupulous mailings and establishes standards for all sweepstakes mailings by requiring certain disclosures on each mail piece. This bill is an important step toward the prevention of deception in sweepstakes and other promotional mailings. I compliment Senator Collins on her efforts, and I am pleased to support the passage of the Deceptive Mail Prevention and Enforcement Act.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to make technical corrections to the status of certain land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and to take certain land into trust for the Band. Mr. President, the lands involved in this bill are lands currently owned by the tribe. Over the last 20 years, the tribe has attempted to transfer the land to reservation land, through the regular processes of the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The land transfer applications have the support of the State of Mississippi and the local neighboring governments. Countless times over the years, the tribe has been told by the Department that land transfer applications have been lost and that action would occur soon. Housing, a school and a medical clinic are among the construction plans that are detained because of the inaction by the Department and BIA. Mr. President, this tribe is simply out of time. The school waiting to be replaced has over two pages of safety violations from the BIA. The medical clinic will not pass its next inspection. Thousands of Mississippi Choctaw citizens have substandard living conditions because of the lack of available housing. Mr. President, the Choctaws are held up as the best example of self determination. Yet, the federal government seems determined to throw obstacles in the course of their success. The history of these land acquisition applications and the treatment of the tribe is intolerable. The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the bill and advises it has no budgetary impact. I urge the Senate to pass this bill.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to make technical corrections to the status of certain land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and to take certain land into trust for the Band. Mr. President, the lands involved in this bill are lands currently owned by the tribe. Over the last 20 years, the tribe has attempted to transfer the land to reservation land, through the regular processes of the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The land transfer applications have the support of the State of Mississippi and the local neighboring governments. Countless times over the years, the tribe has been told by the Department that land transfer applications have been lost and that action would occur soon. Housing, a school and a medical clinic are among the construction plans that are detained because of the inaction by the Department and BIA. Mr. President, this tribe is simply out of time. The school waiting to be replaced has over two pages of safety violations from the BIA. The medical clinic will not pass its next inspection. Thousands of Mississippi Choctaw citizens have substandard living conditions because of the lack of available housing. Mr. President, the Choctaws are held up as the best example of self determination. Yet, the federal government seems determined to throw obstacles in the course of their success. The history of these land acquisition applications and the treatment of the tribe is intolerable. The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the bill and advises it has no budgetary impact. I urge the Senate to pass this bill.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, a report on the National Missile Defense program has been completed and will be released shortly by a panel of experts which is chaired by retired Air Force General Larry Welch. The director of the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization requested this report which examines the National Missile Defense program and makes several recommendations for improvement. Many will remember that General Welch and his panel issued a previous report last year which examined aspects of both the National Missile Defense program and several Theater Missile Defense programs. Generally speaking, the newest Welch Report is a helpful critique of the National Missile Defense Program. Given the importance of this program, additional knowledge of its inherent risks will help BMDO to structure and run the best program possible. In particular, I support the report's emphasis on giving the BMDO program manager, as well as the Lead Systems Integrator, increased authority in running this program. The report's emphasis on additional ground testing and purchasing additional hardware--such as a second launcher for the Kwajalein test site--makes good sense. Any program subjected to scrutiny on the level of the Welch Panel's will face some criticism about particular aspects of how the program is being conducted. But one key phrase in the report is worth keeping in mind, and I quote: ``Given the set of challenges and the phased decision process, the JPO [BMDO's NMD Joint Program Office] and LSI [Boeing, the Lead System Integrator] have formulated a sensible, phased, incremental approach to the development and deployment decision--while managing the risk.'' Every DoD program has some degree of risk; the risk in each program, NMD included, can be mitigated by additional time and money. However, the NMD program is not being developed in a vacuum, a point clearly made by North Korea's flight test of the three-stage Taepo Dong I ICBM in August of 1998. We don't have the luxury of time. Because of the proliferation threat, our choice is simple: We can accept additional program risk, or we can leave the United States vulnerable to rogue threats of coercion by placing a premium on wringing risk from the NMD program. The emphasis must be on protecting America and American interests. The continued vulnerability of the United States is unacceptable, which is why many of the Welch Report's recommendations should be implemented as quickly as possible. Because of the threat we have no choice but to accept a high-risk program. We ought to accept as much risk as we can stand, because the consequences of not being prepared for the threat are so high. ``High'' risk is not synonymous with ``failure,'' as demonstrated by the recent successful intercept conducted by this program. Decision points in the National Missile Defense program should not be adjusted because of a high level of risk in the program, but only if the level of risk becomes unacceptably high. To date no senior Defense Department official has told me that the level of risk in the NMD program is unacceptable. Much of this report focuses on a lack of hardware to test and insufficient simulation facilities. That is the reason Congress added $1 billion for missile defense last year. The Welch Report also calls for flight tests against more varied targets. After the recent successful NMD flight test, there was an unfortunate rush to judgment by some who wanted to indict this program as a fraud for not attempting the most complex intercept test immediately. These critics were obviously unaware of the fact that it was the Welch Panel, during its investigation, which recommended to BMDO that the recent flight test be simplified. I support the Welch Report's suggestion for realistic testing, and hope that everyone will keep in mind the importance of testing the basics first, and then proceeding to more complex tests. There are, of course, some problems with testing against more realistic targets that have nothing at all to do with the NMD program. According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, BMDO believes it is--and I quote from a note BMDO sent to my staff--``constrained by START treaty limitations''--from testing against more realistic targets. This surely must be a misunderstanding within the Defense Department that will be resolved quickly. I want to commend the members of the panel who produced the Welch Report. I hope that some of their concerns have been ameliorated by the recent NMD intercept, which occurred too late to be included in their report.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, recent comments by several Russian Government officials about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and our plans to deploy a national missile defense are very troubling to me. For example, the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ivanov, was quoted last week as saying: There . . . cannot be any bargaining with the Americans over the anti-ballistic missile defense. This may be a clever negotiating tactic, but it is not a very productive one. It unnecessarily pushes the United States to make a choice between defending ourselves against limited ballistic missile threats and withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We have already decided, by the adoption of the National Missile Defense Act, that we will defend ourselves as soon as technologically feasible against limited ballistic missile attack. We should not be forced to withdraw from the treaty. The Russians should understand that our system is directed at rogue threats and will not jeopardize their strategic deterrent force. We have an opportunity to work cooperatively to ensure that we are protected, both Russia and the United States, against emerging ballistic missile threats without undermining strategic deterrence. The ABM Treaty needs to be changed to permit the deployment of defenses against limited ballistic missile threats and to allow the parties to utilize new defensive technologies. There should be no restrictions, for example, on the use of sensor capabilities such as the space-based infrared system and cooperative engagement capability. We should also be able to take advantage of new basing modes and advanced technologies such as the airborne laser. The ABM Treaty must be interpreted to allow the parties to use the best technologies that are available in their own defense against rogue threats. The strategic deterrent of each nation can be preserved at the same time limited missile defenses are permitted and considered acceptable under the ABM Treaty. Another Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said last week: Russia does not see as acceptable such an ``adaptation" of this treaty. Russia will not be a participant in destroying the ABM Treaty. The Russian Government's contention that adapting the ABM Treaty to modern realities is akin to destroying it is unfortunate. In fact, the opposite is true. To refuse to adapt this treaty to the new realities is to guarantee its irrelevance. One reality is the new ballistic missile threat. The other is that the United States is going to respond to this threat and protect itself by deploying a missile defense system. The sooner the Russians understand our commitment to defend ourselves, the more likely it is we can agree to sensible modifications of the ABM Treaty for our mutual benefit and safety.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Under rule XXII, I yield my hour to the majority manager.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for bringing the problem of Impact Aid fund distribution to the attention of the Senate. In my State, the Impact Aid payments to schools is a relatively small sum, about $300,000. So, it is especially important that those funds are distributed in an accurate and timely manner. I hope that in our consideration of reauthorizing the elementary and secondary education programs, that Impact Aid is given careful review. I will work to be of assistance in this effort. Again, I thank my friend from Oklahoma for his leadership on this issue. And, I thank the chairman of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, the Senator from Vermont, for his willingness to address the issue.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I join my distinguished colleague in advising the Senate that today our State of Mississippi, mourns with a heavy heart, the passing of Walter Payton, who died yesterday. His accomplishments on the football field at Jackson State University and at Soldiers Field in Chicago as a member of the Chicago Bears are well known to all of us. He was the greatest running back in the history of football. He reflected a great deal of credit on our State not only because he was a great football player but because of his personality, his generosity, and his kindness to his family and friends. I know he would often fly members of his family and friends--including a member of my staff, Barbara Rooks, who is a close friend of the Payton family--to Chicago for football games. He was devoted to his mother, Mrs. Aylene Payton and his sister Pamela and he was very close to his brother Eddie, who was a great football payer too as a well as a professional golfer. Eddie Payton also coached the Jackson State University golf team to the national championship. The family is well respected in so many ways. I could go on for a long time and tell you more about his mother and what a dear lady she is and the exemplary community spirit of all the members of Walter Payton's family. I extend to his wife Connie and their children Jarrett and Brittney my deepest sympathies. The articles in the New York Times today describe well his remarkable career, and they include accolades from fellow players, coaches, and friends. I ask unanimous consent that these articles on the life and career of Walter Payton along with his biography as an Enshrinee of the Pro Football Hall of Fame be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield a moment to me?

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I rise today on a substantive issue which has caused me considerable concern recently. It has to do with the issue of our national missile defense and the fact we passed legislation earlier this year on that subject, and we now hear the administration discussing its options under the National Missile Defense Act. We hear responses from around the world about the intent we have that is now in our law to deploy a limited national defense system. I want to speak on that subject for a minute or two. When we passed the National Missile Defense Act, we all realized, and the President did, too, when he signed it, that the ABM Treaty, the antiballistic missile defense treaty, that exists between the United States and Russia, prohibits the deployment of a national missile defense system and that the treaty would have to be amended if it was to remain in force. Some statements being made on the subject now by our own administration, as well as by Russian officials, cause me considerable concern. For example, the Secretary of State recently said that the administration was examining ``the possibility of adjusting [the ABM Treaty] slightly in order to have a National Missile Defense.'' Since article I of the treaty expressly prohibits a national missile defense, the Secretary's suggestion that only a slight adjustment is required in the treaty language is a huge understatement, and it is likely to mislead the Russians and others as well. The National Missile Defense Act acknowledges our policy of pursuing arms control arrangements, but it requires the deployment of a limited national missile defense which contradicts the initial premise of the ABM Treaty. A number of Russian Government officials have said they will not negotiate changes in the ABM Treaty. A Russian foreign ministry spokesman has been quoted as saying it is ``absolutely unacceptable to make any changes in the key provisions of the treaty and the Russian side does not intend to depart from this position.'' A Russian defense ministry official has said: ``There can be no compromise on this issue.'' Additionally, it has been reported that Russian and Chinese Government representatives have introduced a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly demanding the United States forego deployment of a missile defense system and strictly comply with the treaty's prohibition on territorial defense. It is entirely inappropriate for the U.N. to consider seriously a resolution that would presume to dictate to the United States what we should or should not do in defense of our own national security. Ballistic missile threats are real and have caused our Government to adopt a policy that requires a deployed national missile defense. It is my fervent hope our own Government will acknowledge clearly that the National Missile Defense Act means what it says and stop encouraging misunderstanding by the Russians, the Chinese, or anyone else of our intentions to defend ourselves against ballistic missile attack. We also hope the point will be made that we are not trying to undermine or threaten Russia's missile deterrent. Our relationship with Russia has improved considerably in recent years. I hope this new era of mutual respect and understanding will continue to be strengthened. We are getting into an unfortunate situation, however, where candor and honest exchange of information and intentions are taking a back seat to half-truths and bluster. The latter course will lead to misunderstanding and possibly disaster. At no time in the history of the relationship have honesty and unequivocal dialog been more important between Russia and the United States. The ABM Treaty is out of date and must be changed to reflect today's realities. The sooner everyone acknowledges this fact and gets busy negotiating the changes that are required, the better off we will all be.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, this is a sad day for the Senate. I know a number of Senators have spoken in memory of Senator Chafee. I must add I really feel a sincere sense of loss today, and I know the Senate feels that collectively because we truly have lost one of our finest Members. John Chafee was a person who was not afraid to say what he thought about any issue that would come before the Senate. He had, to use the cliche, the courage of his convictions. He had the courage to stand up and say what he thought should be said on any issue, without regard for how it would affect the way he would be viewed by Members of the Senate or by the general public, but simply he felt compelled to say what he thought because he thought it was right and should be said and that was why he was here: to express his views, to try to be an influence in the process, to try to shape policies and legislation in a way he thought would be helpful and for the good of the country. I admired him considerably and respected him enormously. He was a person of unquestioned character and integrity in every sense you can say those words. He was someone we could all look up to because of those traits, and we will miss him very, very much. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I fully support the interpretation of my colleagues from Maine, Alaska, and Mississippi. The Navy has cost- effectively produced the DDG-51 destroyer program under a very successful multiyear procurement, and no provision of the Conference Report conflicts with Section 122 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, October 13, 1999, in open session, to recieved testimony on force structure impacts on fleet and strategic lift operation.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources by granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, October 13, for purposes of conducting a subcommittee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 2:30 p.m. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S. 167, a bill to extend the authorization for the Upper Delaware Citizens Advisory Council and to authorize construction and operation of a visitor center for the Upper Delaware Scenic and Recreational River, New York and Pennsylvania; S. 311, a bill to authorize the Disabled Veterans' LIFE Memorial Foundation to establish a memorial in the District of Columbia or its environs, and for other purposes; S. 497, a bill to redesignate Great Kills Part in the Gateway National Recreation Area as ``World War II Veterans Park at Great Kill''; H.R. 592, an act to designate a portion of Gateway National Recreation Area as ``World war II Veterans Park at Miller Field''; S. 919, a bill to amend the Quininebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage Corridor Act of 1994 to expand the boundaries of the Corridor; H.R. 1619, an act to amend the Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage Corridor act of 1994 to expand the boundaries of the Corridor; S. 1296, a bill to designate portions of the lower Delaware Valley River and associated tributaries as a component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System; S. 1336, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct and operate a visitor center for the Upper Delaware Scenic and Recreational River on land owned by New York State, and for other purposes; and S. 1569, a bill to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate segments of the Taunton River in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for study for potential addition to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other purposes.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, October 13, 1999, at 10:15 a.m., to hold a hearing.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem be permitted to meet on October 13, 1999, at 9:30 a.m., for the purpose of conducting a hearing.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Committee on the Judiciary requests unanimous consent to conduct a closed hearing on Wednesday, October 13, 1999, beginning at 10 a.m., in Room S407, the Capitol.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, October 13, 1999, at 9:30 a.m., to mark up S. 964, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Equitable Compensation Act and S. 1508, the Indian Tribal Justice Systems Legal and Technical Assistance Act of 1999 followed by a hearing on S. 1507, the ``Native American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 1999.'' The hearing will be held in room 485, Russell Senate Building.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions be authorized to meet for a hearing on ``Pain Management and Improving End-of-Life Care'' during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, October 13, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full Committee on Environment and Public Works be granted permission to conduct a hearing Wednesday, October 13, at 10 a.m., Hearing Room (SD- 406), on issues relating to the Clean Water Act, including the following bills: S. 669, Federal Facilities Clean Water Compliance Act of 1999; S. 188, Water Conservation and Quality Incentives Act; and S. 1706, Water Regulation Improvement Act of 1999.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, October 13, for purposes of conducting a joint committee hearing with the Committee on Governmental Affairs, which is scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. The purpose of this oversight hearing is to receive testimony on the Department of Energy's implementation of provisions of the Department of Defense Authorization Act which create the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the conference report.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, all time has been used on the conference report on the Agriculture appropriations bill?

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.