Thad Cochran

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his excellent remarks. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Texas is prepared to speak, I am prepared to yield to her 10 minutes. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it should be noticed by those who are interested in the subject of missile defense that what we are actually debating and deciding this morning is whether or not the Senate should proceed to consider the bill that has been introduced by me and the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye. This bill is not going to be voted on up or down today; what we will have a vote on at 11:30 is whether or not to proceed to consider the bill. When the majority leader decided to call up this legislation, there was an objection made to proceeding to consider the bill. So under the procedures of the Senate, the majority leader, who is in charge of making decisions about the schedule of the Senate and how we take up legislation in the Senate, was obligated to file a motion to proceed to consider the bill. That motion is debatable. Under notice from the opponents of the bill, it was clear that motion would be debated at length. So to get to the bill, it was decided by the majority leader that a cloture motion should be filed on the motion to proceed, bringing debate on the motion to a close. If we get 60 votes on that cloture motion, then we can proceed to consider the bill and it can be open for amendment, and Senators who have alternative ideas, or think that the current policy is the policy we should have for missile defense, can make those points and the Senate can consider those views. But until this cloture motion is approved, we can't get to that point. We can't get to the point of considering this bill on its merits and considering any amendments which Senators would have. So I am trying to put in context what is before the Senate, what the issue is here. The issue this morning is whether or not the Senate thinks this is a matter of such seriousness and consequence to our national security that we ought to consider it, that we ought to debate it, that we ought to let the Senate work its will on a proposal to change our policy with respect to national missile defense. I can't think of a more interesting and serious time, given the events which are occurring in the world today, for the consideration of this issue. It is on everybody's mind, Mr. President, because of the tests which have been undertaken in India of a nuclear warhead. India now announces to the world they are prepared to use this as a part of their nuclear weapons arsenal, that they have it available, and that they are a nuclear weapons state. This is a dramatic change in the situation in India. It is a dramatic change in the security interests of the entire world. At this time, we find the United States relying upon a policy with respect to missile defense of developing a national missile defense system in two stages, unlike any other defense acquisition program that we have ever had, or that we now have. We have a technology program-- one that is developing the capabilities to have an effective defense system, but we do not have any policy with respect to ever putting that system in the field, or to integrating it into our national defense structure. That decision hasn't been made. We are suggesting in offering this bill that the time has come for the United States to say to the world we are going to develop and deploy a national missile defense system. We are going to protect the security interests of the United States and the territory of the United States. As a matter of national policy, the Federal Government is going to obligate itself to undertake to protect the security interests of the citizens of the United States and the United States itself from ballistic missile attack. It seems to me that is an obligation that is very clear for us, in moral terms, as a government. With India having a missile capability of a range of about 1,400 miles already, according to recent reports that are available to the Senate, Pakistan having tested for the first time on April 6 a new medium-range missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers, and India announcing that it is concerned that Pakistan is a covert nuclear weapon state, although it hasn't announced that, we are seeing evidence that around the world--in North Korea, in Iran, and, of course, in Russia and China--there are nation states that are developing, or now have, longer range missile capabilities than ever before. Some have the added capability of nuclear weapons and, some have other weapons of mass destruction that can be delivered with those long-range missile systems. And the United States is defenseless against attack from long- range ballistic missiles. It has been our policy up until now to have the capacity to destroy any nation that would think about using a nuclear weapon against us. Russia and the United States have had over a period of time this mutual assured destruction relationship: If you destroy me, you can be assured I will destroy you. That confrontation and that balance of power has prevented any use of a missile system or nuclear weapon against the territory of the United States, even though that is not a very happy relationship to have. Now, we hope, we are moving toward a better and more stable relationship, but there is still always the chance of an unauthorized launch even from Russia. We are working to destroy and build down the weapons stockpile. That is good. But we are not yet to the point where there is no risk. This is not a risk-free relationship with Russia. There could be an accidental launch. If there is, we have no defense whatsoever. With respect to China, it is certainly unlikely that we are going to have any missile attack from there. Nonetheless, there is an emerging long-range missile system capability in China that is growing more sophisticated, that is going to continue to grow and develop more lethality and longer ranges, and it presents a threat--unlikely, but, nonetheless, there could be an unauthorized or accidental launch of a missile from China. Already we are seeing the North Koreans developing--and already deploying--some medium-range missile systems. They are now developing, we are told, a missile with a range of 6,000 kilometers. That missile could reach Alaska. It could reach Hawaii. Who knows what their plans are for continuing to develop missiles with increased ranges. We found out, through a year-long series of hearings that we conducted last year in our Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, that it is much easier now than ever before for nation states who want to improve and develop their missile systems, and to give them longer ranges, to do so with the access they have to information from the Internet and to experts in Russia and other nation states where they already have the capabilities. Iran provides an example of the surprises we face. One surprise occurred when we found out that Iran had acquired the technology, the components, and the expertise to put together a medium-range missile system. They are in the process of doing that now. One State Department official said that they could have that missile system available by the end of this year. Last year, when we had the Director of Central Intelligence before a committee of the Senate talking about the advancements that had been made in Iran, he said that he thought--this is in 1997--that it would be up to 10 years before Iran would have medium-range missile system capability. Then he sent word up, that because of new developments and the acquisition of expertise and components from Russia, Iran had made surprising advances and they would have the capability to deploy such a system much sooner. It is because of gaps and uncertainties, he said, that you can't predict when people are going to get these technologies and other equipment from foreign sources, or how quickly they can develop an ICBM threat--you just can't predict that. So we have seen in Pakistan now, in India, of course, in China, Russia, in Iran, and in North Korea solid evidence of what we are talking about today. And that is that there is in the world today a real threat to the security of this Nation because of the emerging capabilities and technologies for developing and deploying long-range missiles, that there are available in these countries weapons of mass destruction that can be carried by these missiles over long ranges, and that it is time for the United States to acknowledge this threat and say as a matter of policy that we are going to deploy a national missile defense system. That is what this bill says. It doesn't set out what kind of architecture the missile defense system should have or any deadlines for doing it. We would rely upon the orderly processes of authorization and appropriation, as we have for all other defense acquisition programs, to determine how soon it is developed and when it is deployed. But what we are saying today is that, as a matter of policy, we are going to deploy a national missile defense system. I think it is also important to notice that this does not require a violation of any existing arms control agreement. In our early discussions of this legislation, we heard others say that this puts in jeopardy the ABM--the antiballistic missile--agreement. It does not. That agreement contemplates that a party to the agreement could have a national missile defense system. It permits a single site for interceptor rockets. We have been proceeding under the current administration plan that this is the kind of a system that would be developed, and eventually, if--under the administration's policy--a threat is perceived to exist, then an effort would be made to deploy the system. So the real difference in what we are presenting to the Senate today is that this is a policy that is announced to the world and to rogue states that may be saying, ``Look, the United States is defenseless. We have an opportunity to put some pressure on them by developing a missile system that is capable of striking the United States. We can coerce them, intimidate them, and blackmail them because they are not at this point considering deploying a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.'' We would end that kind of thinking in nations who may be taking that approach by saying, ``Yes, we are. You are not going to see the United States any longer taking a wait-and-see approach.'' And that is what the administration's policy is--to wait and see if a threat develops. We are saying, ``Mr. President, you have signed Executive orders over the last 4 years, starting in 1994, saying that the United States is confronted with a national emergency because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems around the world.'' The President has acknowledged that, and he signed Executive orders that say that. But now it is time to say we are going to do something about it, we are going to do something to protect our security interests against this national emergency that exists. Up until now, we have said we will wait and see if there is a real threat. That puts us at risk here in the United States. I am saying that we had better get busy. We had better get busy and develop and deploy a system. It would be much better for all of us if we deployed a system that may be a year or two years early getting to the field than waiting until it is a year too late. That is the issue and it is important given what is happening in the world today, given the fact that our intelligence agencies were not able to even detect that this test in India was about to take place, given that they weren't able to detect, as far as I know, that Pakistan was going to test, or even had, the new missile they tested in April, and given they weren't able to detect that Iran was going to be able to put together a medium-range ballistic missile within 1 year rather than within as many as 10 years. The latest assessment was as many as 10 years; now it is perhaps within 1 year. These are not the only surprises, they are just the most recent ones. Some of us have known about these surprises before now, but now the whole world knows about them. They are acknowledged at the highest levels of our Government. If we can't detect that India is about to test a nuclear warhead, if we can't detect that Pakistan has a missile system that has a range five times greater than what we thought they had, if we can't detect that Iran is developing a medium-range missile with technology and components imported from other countries, and they will be able to put that in the field as many as 9 years earlier than we had thought 1 year ago, then we need to change our policy and quit assuming that we are going to be able to detect the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile system somewhere in the world that can threaten the territory of the United States. That is the point of this legislation. We can't be sure. And if we can't be sure that we can detect the threat, we need to be prepared to defend against that threat. The Senate ought to consider this issue, and so today we are going to vote on cloture on the motion to proceed to consider that issue. I urge the Senate to vote to invoke cloture. We don't need to drag out a debate on a motion to proceed to this issue. Sure, there are other things that are on the schedule for today, and the leader has committed to taking up other bills after this vote, but I am optimistic that we will have enough Senators who understand the seriousness of this and the urgency of this for us to turn to the missile defense bill. I hope Senators will consider this, and I am happy to yield to other Senators. I know the distinguished Senator from Michigan is in the Chamber. We have had a number of Senators who have asked for time. I hope my friend from Michigan will allow me to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma, who has another commitment at 10 o'clock, for whatever time he may consume between now and 10 o'clock. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the privilege of the floor be extended to Dr. Anne Vopatek, a fellow on my staff, during the consideration of S. 1873 and all relevant motions thereto.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. COCHRAN. I assume that under that agreement this Senator is in charge of the time for the proponents of the bill and the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, is in charge of the time for the opponents of the motion.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at the request of the majority leader, I am pleased to advise all Senators of the schedule of legislative business for today's session of the Senate. This morning, between now and 11:30 a.m., the Senate will debate the motion to proceed to the missile defense bill. Following that debate, the Senate will proceed to vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to the missile defense bill. And following that vote, the Senate will begin consideration of S. 1244, the charitable contributions bill, under a short time agreement. At the conclusion or yielding back of the time, the Senate will proceed to a vote on passage of that bill. Following that vote, it is the leader's intention to begin consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill. Therefore, Members should expect votes throughout today's session with the first votes occurring at approximately 11:30 a.m. As a reminder to all Members, several time agreements were reached last night with respect to two high-tech bills, and those may be considered at some point this week. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Parliamentarian if there is a time agreement for the consideration and debate of the motion to proceed to the missile defense bill.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. So, Mr. President, Senators should know it's very important that the conference report be adopted. It is a good compromise between the Senate and the House. It involves other provisions that have been discussed eloquently and forcefully by my friends who have spoken before me. I urge the Senate to approve this conference report.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Senator Lugar from Indiana, and my good friend from Kansas, the distinguished Senator who was formerly chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, in asking the Senate today to support this conference report. Senators may remember that when the 1996 farm bill was written, it reauthorized agriculture research programs for only 1 year. There was included in the committee report a suggestion that there be a thorough reevaluation made by the committees of jurisdiction of the way the Department of Agriculture awarded grants to colleges and universities around the country and funded research programs at Agricultural Research Service facilities. That study was undertaken throughout 1997. I think it began in March of last year. The committee held a series of hearings and reviewed suggestions and options for improving these programs. This conference report is the product of that study and that carefully developed improvement to the Agricultural Research Service programs that are funded by the Department of Agriculture. I am convinced that we will do a better job under this conference report of identifying the priorities in production agriculture, in food production, and in management of our resources in agriculture than we ever have before under the way we were handling the funding of these programs. That is the driving force behind this conference report. The reason it is so important for the Senate to approve this conference report is that it puts this in place now. Mr. President, if that were all this legislation accomplished, some may say that this legislation is unnecessary, but it does more. It also provides $600 million over the next five years for new competitive agricultural research grants at federal laboratories and colleges and universities. Our appropriations process is beginning at this point. We have the job of allocating, under the discretionary funding allocations that our appropriations subcommittee will receive, funds for these agriculture research programs. With the guidance of this legislation, it will be a much more coherent process and an orderly process, and I can't contemplate what a mess we would be in if this conference report were not agreed to. Under current law, about $200 million of the delivery expenses for catastrophic crop insurance must be provided annually in the agriculture appropriations bill. This legislation would provide full mandatory funding for those expenses over the next five years. This conversion from discretionary to mandatory spending will ensure that farmers will not have to be concerned with the uncertainty of annual funding bills and whether catastrophic crop insurance protection will be available in the coming growing season. In addition to the support this bill has from the agriculture community, it also enjoys support from those interested in the provisions which will bring parity between the Food Stamp Program and the Supplemental Security Income Program for those immigrants legally residing in the United States. This was an important component of the compromise we reached with the House of Representatives. This bill has received support from almost every sector of agriculture. I ask unanimous consent that a letter I received from over 100 organizations, colleges and universities in support of the conference agreement be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, let me say, first of all, that I appreciate very much the majority leader calling up the missile defense bill on yesterday. At his authorization and direction, a cloture motion was filed on the motion to proceed to consider that bill when an objection was raised by the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee and the ranking Democrat, Senator Levin, on the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee that I chair. Last year, we had a series of hearings looking into the growing proliferation problem in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems to deliver those weapons by countries that many in our Nation probably weren't aware were developing the sophistication in long-range missile systems that were being developed. I think yesterday the announcement in India of the detonation of a nuclear device as a test confirms once again what a dangerous environment we are in, in terms of proliferation of capabilities, of having nuclear weapons, of having missile systems that can deliver those weapons over a long range. To put that in context yesterday, Pakistan, just a few weeks ago, tested a new missile that our security analysts and our intelligence agencies weren't aware that they had-- another example of how we cannot predict with any degree of certainty or accuracy how soon countries are going to develop missile systems, nuclear weapons with the capability of delivering those weapons systems over long ranges. The Pakistani missile that was tested was a 1,500- kilometer range missile--five times greater in capability than a report that was filed by the Defense Department said that Pakistan had in November of 1997. Think about that. We get an annual report from the Defense Department using the intelligence capabilities of our CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency--all of the resources that our country has, to put together this report for the Congress. And in November of 1997 they said that Pakistan had in its inventory a 300-kilometer range missile, and then in April they test a 1,500-kilometer range missile. What has happened? They have had assistance from other countries. Some say it was China who provided the technology and wherewithal to come up with this new, longer range missile. Some say it was North Korea. Pakistan says it was developed from within with their own technology, their own scientists. Whatever the reason and however this came to be, it is alarming, and now we see India reacting to that new development by testing a nuclear weapon that is twice as powerful as the atomic bomb that was used in World War II by the United States against Japan. The point is, this is a very, very dangerous situation that we see developing in that part of the world, but in other countries, too. In Iran. We have seen demonstrated in Iraq the capacity to almost put a satellite in orbit with a missile launch vehicle 10 years ago. That surprised the United States. That surprised our intelligence-gathering agencies. I am hopeful that the Senate will notice that the time has come for us to stop playing politics with missile defense and national security and work together in a bipartisan way to develop and deploy, as soon as technology permits, a national missile defense system to protect the security of the United States. We will have that vote on cloture, as the majority leader pointed out, on Wednesday--cloture on the motion to proceed to consider the bill, not on the bill itself. It will still be open for amendment. It will still be open for debate by Senators who want to discuss this issue, but I hope the Senate will invoke cloture so that we can proceed to consider the bill, to discuss the issue further, particularly in view of these developing events that confirm what a dangerous proliferation situation we find ourselves in in the world today, and we are defenseless against long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at this point in the order of business, the majority leader had indicated that it would be appropriate to call up Calendar Order No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense bill. On behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense bill.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to proceed be withdrawn.

Mr. COCHRAN. That is the intention of this Senator. Thank you.

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I would like to make one closing point that I think should be made regarding the nature of the threat that exists now from other nations that are rapidly increasing both the range and sophistication of their missile systems. I talked about Iraq, our experience in the Persian Gulf war, what we have known about the capability which they developed very quickly after the purchase of systems from North Korea. We talked about Iran and the medium-range Shahab-3 and -4 systems that they are developing. We talked about Pakistan's testing last month a 1,500-kilometer-range missile, when 6 months ago the Defense Department's report on proliferation around the world said that Pakistan had only a 300-kilometer-range missile and a shorter-range missile in their arsenal. No mention was made of any longer-range missile. But I have neglected to point out what is happening, and what we know has happened, in North Korea, which has led to an assessment that they are developing missiles with much greater ranges than that. There is under development the Taepo-Dong 2 missile with a 6,000-kilometer intercontinental capacity, which would put within its range portions of Alaska and Hawaii. These are facts. These are reports that have been made public. We know that they have already deployed systems that are of shorter range than that, creating a very unstable and stressful situation because of the missile threat in that region of the world. We are kidding ourselves if we continue to assume that there is no emerging threat. These threats have emerged, they exist now, and they show the capacity of nation states to develop, with their own technology, their own technicians, weapons systems that are going to have longer and longer ranges and the capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That is the reality. And when a CIA Director says that he cannot predict when rest-of-the-world nations will have intercontinental ballistic missiles because of ``gaps and uncertainties''--when we don't have the capacity to make those findings and projections--it seems to me that the facts are clear, and the facts are serious. They should cause us great concern and convince the Senate that it ought to take action in the passage of this legislation, and change our policy of ``wait-and-see'' to one of ``deploy as soon as the technology is ready.'' It is going to be in our interests to deploy a system 1 year sooner than it is needed rather than 1 year after it is needed. Madam President, I had notified other Senators that we were going to withdraw the motion to proceed to consider this bill. There will be other opportunities to talk about it when it comes up on Wednesday, if a vote on cloture is ordered then, or Senators may talk about it as in morning business during the remainder of this evening. But if other Senators do not wish to talk on the subject, it is my intention to withdraw the motion. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. COCHRAN. Reserving the right to object, Madam President, and I don't want to object, but I had hoped we could conclude this debate here and I would withdraw this motion. I know of no Senators coming over to speak, unless the Senator from Oregon is seeking to speak on this motion to proceed to the bill. I heard there were other Senators who were interested. If the Senator will permit me a couple of minutes, then I will withdraw this motion and he can proceed as in morning business. But right now, the business is the motion to proceed to consider this missile defense bill. It won't take long, I assure the Senator, if he will indulge me.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this legislation was introduced by me and the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, last month. It is legislation that would change the policy of our country with respect to the deployment of a national missile defense system that would protect our Nation against limited ballistic missile attack. Since its introduction, 48 other Senators have joined us as cosponsors of the legislation, and the Senate Armed Services Committee has reviewed the legislation and reported it for the consideration of the Senate. The committee report is available as Calendar Order No. 345, and I invite the attention of Senators to the report. The legislation was produced because of the findings of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, which I chair, which conducted hearings over the past year looking into the threat caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for delivering those weapons of mass destruction, particularly missile systems. We had numerous expert witnesses who talked about the basics of how missile systems are developed, how the Atlas system was developed in our own country. General Bernard Schriever, who was the manager of the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile program, told of the challenges faced by those who worked to build this first long-range missile system for the United States almost 50 years ago. He told of how, with the passage of time and the development of new technologies and communications systems and the easy access to scientific and technical information, those hurdles that were so difficult to overcome back then are now not difficult at all; that nation states who are intent on developing the capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction over long distances now can achieve those results not with a 10-year program, but almost overnight if they have the determination, are willing to commit the dollars necessary to acquire the component parts, and have access to outside assistance in the form of either components or technical expertise. You can see evidence of that and why that is really a new concern for us as a country without a national missile defense system, without the capacity to defend ourselves against an accidental launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, or an unauthorized launch from another country possessing these systems, or from a rogue nation which puts all of these ingredients together without our being able to detect it and threatens the security of this country. So this is an effort to change our national policy from the current 3+3 program of the administration, which is to develop within 3 years, starting in 1997, a national ballistic missile defense capability, and then, if a threat is perceived to exist thereafter, to deploy such a system within 3 years from the date that the threat is perceived to exist. That is the 3+3 program of this administration. We are seriously concerned that this is inadequate to meet the threat that currently exists. First of all, the 3+3 program assumes that there is no threat at this time to the security of the United States or to the citizens of the United States. The legislation we have introduced says that there is a threat, we are vulnerable. There could be--although it might be unlikely--an accidental or unauthorized missile attack from Russia or from China, both of whom, as we know, have intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities right now. There is also an emerging threat that exists right now, because of events that have occurred over the last several years that we have not been able to detect or discover through our intelligence gathering agencies. I am going to cite some examples. And I invite the attention of Senators to the bill itself, which recites a series of facts that were uncovered during the course of the hearings our committee conducted last year. The case of Iran is a good example. When that country was provided missile components from Russia, we realized that they were capable of acquiring new expertise not discernible by the Central Intelligence Agency. As a matter of fact, during testimony that was provided to the Senate, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that it was anticipated that Iran would not be able to develop a medium-range missile system for some 8 years or 9 years into the future. Now, 1 year after that testimony was delivered to the Senate in 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence suggested that because of outside assistance obtained by Iran from other countries, it appears that they would be able to deploy a medium-range ballistic missile much sooner than had been earlier predicted. Even though the Director of Central Intelligence did not say exactly when that capability could be fielded, a State Department witness told the Senate that, within a year or a year and a half, that missile system could be deployed by Iran. So what had been viewed as a threat which could occur 8 or 9 years in the future, now, according to testimony recently received, it is clear it could be fielded some 7 or 8 years earlier than had been anticipated as recently as a year ago. Another example is the case of Pakistan, which recently--a month ago, April 6--tested a ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers. If you look at a report that was made available to the public back in November of 1997 on proliferation issues, it suggests that Pakistan has missiles at this time with ranges of 300 kilometers. Now we see them test a missile last month with five times the range of what was said to be in their arsenal back in November, 6 months ago. These are two examples of why the Director of Central Intelligence has said that he is not able to predict with any degree of certainty when other nations, rest-of-world countries, will have intercontinental ballistic missile capability--because of ``gaps and uncertainties.'' He used that phrase in his testimony to the Senate. Another example of these surprises involved Iraq. You will recall that Secretary Cohen, then Senator Bill Cohen, made comments on the floor of the Senate about the surprise that had occurred when Iraq was able to launch a vehicle that almost put a satellite in Earth orbit and--not only that--demonstrate the capability of using missiles with much longer ranges, with much more sophistication than anyone in our country had anticipated. That was an example of a surprise to our intelligence agencies, who had not anticipated that those capabilities had been developed in Iraq. Iraq surprised us in other ways. With the purchase of Scud missiles from North Korea and improvements that were made in Iraq, almost overnight the world was confronted with a nation state that had a lethal missile capability; was threatening its neighbors and others; was developing weapons of mass destruction which could be carried as warheads by these missiles; was threatening others with destruction, suggesting that if it had a missile system that would reach the United States, it might use it. Actual threats were being made about catastrophic damage being inflicted on the United States by Iraq. Fortunately for the defense of our security interests in that region, the Army had been developing the Patriot missile defense system to protect troops in the fields. It was a short-range system; that was really all we had. When the Persian Gulf war broke out, Americans were able to see that this system was effective. It was not the best or the most perfect system you could have because many of the Scud rockets got through. Some of them broke up over Israel. Some of them inflicted property damage all around the region. Twenty-eight soldiers were killed in Dahran. United States troops were killed with those missiles because we were unable to protect their security at that time. We didn't have a system that was good enough to be perfect or fail-safe. There are risks. But here we are now almost 10 years later and what have we done to improve the capability to protect the citizens of the United States against threats that we have heard from others--which the bill recites--and against the emerging sophistication and range of new missile systems that are under development in other parts of the world? We have gotten ourselves, I think, in the mindset of thinking about Russia and China as the only nations that we have to worry about who have intercontinental ballistic missile capability. We have had with Russia a relationship that has kept either one of us from using our missile weaponry and we are very grateful for the fact that we have come through this period of confrontation with the old Soviet Union without having a catastrophic tragedy as a result of these weapons of mass destruction. But now we can't just focus our attention on Russia and China. We have to consider what is going on in the rest of the world where there are ``gaps and uncertainties'' in our ability to know exactly what is going on with respect to weapons development and missile development. But what we know is what we have been able to observe. And what we have observed is a steady and in some cases a rapid acceleration of capability and sophistication in countries that do not consider themselves friends of the United States. Some have talked about threatening us with missile attacks, destroying the United States. Other comments have been made by people like Muammar Qadhafi. Others who have expressed their anger toward the United States do not share our values. We have to consider this to be a serious threat. The administration's policy is a wait-and-see policy. Let's do research and let's proceed with the development of a missile defense system, but let's wait and see if there is a threat to our security interests posed by intercontinental ballistic missiles, and then we will proceed to deploy the missile defense system. You listen to anyone who has observed the funding process, the request for appropriations and authorization to proceed to the development of this program, and everybody agrees that there hasn't been enough money put in the program to reach a point where you will have a system deployment. The administration assumes we will have developed a defensive missile system within 3 years. We are into that now, looking at the second year of that program, and the Secretary of Defense has already sent up a request for additional moneys over and above what the President had said they would want for the program, admitting in a letter he has written in response to this legislation that there had not been robust enough funding to achieve that result. I don't think you can find anybody who says that they are really going to complete this. They have now awarded a contract to a lead system integrator to develop a program pulling together all the component parts that had been under separate research and development, to try to make a coherent system that could be deployed. But I don't know of anybody who believes that can really be done in 3 years. What we are trying to say to the Senate and to the administration with the filing of this bill and calling up this legislation is that we need to get serious. This is a threat which exists now. It is emerging in other nation states--some rogue states--and we are not doing enough to protect the security interests and the safety of American citizens with the current policy. It is immoral to sit back and do nothing or to do no more than talk about it. If you look at the executive orders that have been signed by the President over the last 5 years, he has said repeatedly that we are confronted with a national emergency as a result of ballistic missile developments and weapons of mass destruction that we find going on in the world today--a national emergency. I wonder what would be the judgment of the historians who would observe us in this situation. We are coming upon the end of a fiscal year where it is projected we will have a budget surplus of $30 billion--some say it may go as high as $50 billion--and we wake up one morning to a ballistic missile threat that is very real, or a ballistic missile attack that is made against our country. The American people are going to say what were we doing. And the administration said we asked for 3 billion dollars in this fiscal year. That doesn't sound much like a national emergency to me. What I am beginning to realize is that if you talk like you are concerned about the problem and you sound sincere about wanting to do something about it or solve a problem, that that is enough. You don't really have to deliver. That is the political situation that I think we see today. We are hearing rhetoric, we are hearing promises, we are hearing a plan announced to get us to a point where we will have a ballistic missile defense system, but when you cut through all the talk and all the orders declaring it to be a national emergency, all of the budget requests, all of the testimony before the hearings and you find out what is really going on, you see a program that has already been described as a ``rush to failure,'' because of the architecture, the way it is constructed, the way the program is managed, all of the reasons that we have seen described in glowing terms by those who say we are doing the right thing, we are doing just enough to keep us on a steady course so we can protect the security of the country. I don't believe we are doing enough. I don't believe we are managing the program in a correct way, and I don't think we are going to get to a point where we have the capacity to protect our security or the safety of American citizens at a time when there is a threat that we have to be concerned about. I think we need to be concerned now. That is what this legislation does. I hope that Senators will look at our proposal. It says simply that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a system to defend our country against a ballistic missile attack as soon as the technology is available. That is all this bill says. The Congressional Budget Office was asked to assess the cost of the legislation. They say that passage of this legislation has no cost impact. The progress of the program to develop and deploy a system would depend upon the annual authorization and appropriations process, like any other acquisition program. And that is the point. This program has not been treated like any other acquisition program, and that is the problem. That is why it is a ``rush to failure.'' It is a rush to act like you are doing something, but not really accomplishing what you are saying you are setting out to accomplish. You are experimenting. You are conducting some tests on various component parts, whether it is communications, missile systems, guidance systems, the interceptors that are needed, the sensors that are necessary. All of those things are being tested. Some are considered successful; some have been considered unsuccessful. We had testimony from General Lyles, who runs the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, who said that they have learned something from all of these tests. To that extent, all of the tests have been successful in that we build on the knowledge gained. Some of the critics who say it is a bad idea to have the capacity to defend our country against ballistic missile attack say that unless you have a perfect test that shows an interceptor hitting an in-coming missile, it is a failure, and it proves that we don't know how to do it. Well, look back to 1991, when the Persian Gulf war occurred, when we saw Patriot missiles intercepting Scud rockets. Some of the Patriots were intercepting and blowing the Scuds up, or were near hits. The fact is that some of those interceptor missiles were working even then. We have proven that we can hit a bullet with a bullet. We have the technology to do that today. What we don't have is the will to deploy a system to defend our country. Now, let me say something about the relationship with Russia and the ABM Treaty. Some are saying, ``Well, doesn't this mean you are backing out of the ABM Treaty?'' You have a treaty with Russia that says each will not develop a defense system against the ballistic missiles of the other. Well, first of all, the ABM treaty doesn't have anything to do with some of these nation states who are developing their own sophisticated and long-range weapons systems. We don't have a treaty with them. We don't have a mutual-assured destruction arrangement with them. We don't have any defense against their missiles. Even under the ABM treaty, there is an opportunity to deploy a single-site missile defense system, and it is under that premise that our program has been developed up to this point--with a view that, if in the minds of those who defend the current policy a threat is perceived to exist at some future date, then we will deploy a system that is compatible with the provisions of the antiballistic missile agreement with Russia. The treaty also permits that agreement to be amended. Whenever it is considered to be in the national interests of either country, negotiations can take place. As a matter of fact, our President was urged by the Senate to commence negotiation for the purpose of amending the agreements. We know that the administration has undertaken demarcation talks to try to distinguish between theater ballistic missile defense systems and the national ballistic missile defense system contemplated by the ABM Treaty, so that we can proceed to develop theater defenses like the Patriot, Navy Upper-Tier, the Airborne Laser system of the Air Force, and the Theater High Altitude Defense Area Program of the Army--looking at the different options that we have for protecting our troops and limited areas against ballistic missile attack. And so the ABM Treaty has some relevance in the debate, of course; but it is not an impediment to the adoption of this bill. It would not contravene or in any way fly in the face of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty. Some are beginning to realize that inevitably, at some point, we may have to discuss with Russia further amendments to the ABM Treaty. Russia may consider those amendments to be in their interest, too. They are located in close geographical proximity to some of these other countries that we have already mentioned. Not to suggest that there is any threat now, but there may be. Later, the Russians may have reason to agree with us that this is not only in our mutual interest, but it is in their individual interest. And so this is not a referendum on the ABM Treaty. We do not seek to amend it or withdraw from it, or violate it by the passage of this legislation. I am hopeful that after Senators review the report of the Armed Services Committee, the fact that the committee has recommended the approval of this legislation, and the findings that were made by our subcommittee, some of which are recited in the language of the bill itself, that it will be the will of the Senate to adopt this bill and to say to all--the American citizens who may be worried about the vulnerability that we find ourselves in now, and those who may be contemplating stealing a march on the U.S. by developing quickly a long-range missile capability that could be used to threaten, intimidate, blackmail, or coerce our leadership--that we are not going to sit idly by and wait and see any longer. We are going to do what is necessary to develop and deploy a national missile defense system against limited ballistic missile attack. So don't waste your money, don't get carried away and go on a spending spree with a national program to develop a weapons system that is going to intimidate the United States, because we are not going to be intimidated. We are not going to be defenseless any longer. And, finally, this is not a vote today to deploy a system now. It is a vote today to say it is our policy to deploy a system when it is technologically possible, when an effective national missile defense system can be deployed. So I hope that Senators will agree with this. Fifty Senators are sponsors of this legislation. I urge its adoption by the Senate. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have been authorized to announce to the Senate on behalf of the majority leader that this cloture vote will occur on Wednesday at a time to be determined by the majority leader, after notification of the Democratic leader.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to proceed to Calendar Order No. 345, S. 1873, and I send a cloture motion to the desk on behalf of the majority leader.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased that the order has been entered for the consideration of the conference report on the agriculture research bill. As Senators may remember, when we passed the 1996 farm bill, the research programs were only authorized to the year 1997. This allowed the committees of jurisdiction to undertake a reevaluation of the way in which Federal dollars are allocated to research facilities that are operated by the Department of Agriculture and that are used for grants for research and extension service activities at colleges and universities throughout the country. As a result of that review, this legislation was produced. It improves the way those funds are allocated. It targets those funds to the highest priority subjects for agriculture research in our country. It is this Senator's hope that the Senate will approve the conference report and we can proceed to consider other related legislation. I point out the fact that we are in the appropriations process now for the next fiscal year. The passage of this conference report will facilitate the handling of the appropriations bill for the Department of Agriculture and other departments of the Government. If we are sent back to rewrite the bill in conference on a motion to recommit, it will slow down the process. It will make it more difficult to achieve the kind of coherent funding procedure that we would otherwise be able to enjoy.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, my purpose is to raise an issue that I gave to the managers of the bill earlier. It relates to an amendment that I proposed to offer and was hoping that the managers would be able to accept.

Mr. COCHRAN. I withdraw my reservation.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, may I ask the manager of the bill whether or not this unanimous consent request would preclude raising another amendment other than the one that the distinguished Senator from Maine is going to raise prior to third reading?

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, when the distinguished Senator from Georgia brought this problem up and I had a chance to look at some of the information, the GAO audit showed there are 3,000 audits of this kind performed each year. Of those audits, the report showed that 47 percent of them took place in Southern States. I looked further and saw that the GAO found that there were more random audits that took place in my State of Mississippi than in all of the States of New England combined. I couldn't believe that. I wondered why on Earth is that and then we find out that it is the working poor who are being targeted by these random audits. The numbers are just startling. Between 1994 and 1996, 94 percent of random audits were performed on individual taxpayers who earned less than $25,000 per year. If you think about that, these are people who probably don't normally retain a lawyer or maybe even a CPA or other tax advisor in the preparation of their audits. So what the amendment would do, which I cosponsor with the Senator from Georgia, is to require the IRS to give notice of why they are conducting an audit of taxpayers like this. It raises a question of just obvious unfairness. On its face, it is unfair and it ought to be changed.