Thad Cochran

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Our information, derived at our hearings through expert witnesses, was that we have the highest capability of any country in the world in terms of supercomputer manufacturing technology. We manufacture the state-of-the-art supercomputers. We do not have any competitors. Japan manufactures some high-performance supercomputers but their export policy is more restrictive than ours. They require licensing, we do not. What we are suggesting here is that the policy of our administration is flawed in that it ought to make the determination in those questions where end use and end user is relevant as to whether you can or cannot make the sale, the Government ought to monitor and verify that this sale is permissible. And it applies to only 6.34 percent of the total computer sales of all American exporters in the export market.

Mr. COCHRAN. If the distinguished Senator would yield, I appreciate very much not only his question but also his very helpful involvement in this issue and cosponsoring the amendment. But he gets to the central point of the debate here. It is not that this amendment sets any new levels of prohibition or granting authority for export sales. It does not change any of those levels. The level that is established by the administration is the 2,000 MTOPS level. We do not change that for tier 3 countries, as demonstrated in the chart I showed a while ago. We were told in our hearing that 250 MTOPS is about the current power of a PC which is sold in the market here in the country now. And that under the so-called Moore's Law that doubles every 18 months. So it would be 4\1/2\ years before you get to a level where you would even reach the 2,000 MTOPS level which is the trigger level for tier 3 countries that have to have a license if the end use or the end user is military. If they're civilian, you do not have to have a license at all. What this amendment changes is who determines the end use or the end user. Our amendment says it should be the administration's responsibility. Current policy is that exporters have the responsibility of making that determination. That is the only thing we change.

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, amendment No. 420 was offered by me, and is cosponsored by the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Durbin. It seeks to modify the existing export control policy that had been instituted by the administration with respect to the exporting of high-performance or so-called supercomputers. supercomputer export controls Madam President, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, the Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them constitute ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States,'' and that he had therefore decided to ``declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.'' The President reaffirmed this Executive order on November 15, 1995, and again on November 11, 1996. We have had several hearings recently on the subject of proliferation in my Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. And the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, Senator Levin, is the ranking member of that subcommittee. We have examined cases of proliferation by the People's Republic of China and proliferation by Russia, and I can tell you that the facts-- brought out in open session--are disturbing. The facts tell a story of both Chinese and Russian sales of technology, components, and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, as well as sales of highly capable advanced conventional weapons and other critical military technologies, to nations like Iran. The facts demonstrate that President Clinton was entirely correct in describing this problem as a national emergency. Just last month, the Director of Central Intelligence sent Congress an unclassified report entitled, ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.'' The report covers only the period July through December 1996 and levies serious proliferation charges against, among others, Russia and China. The report says: China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs. China also was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting period. Iran also obtained considerable CW-related assistance from China in the form of production equipment and technology. The intelligence community report--and I note that this report is not the product of any single part of the intelligence community, but represents the consensus view of the entire intelligence community-- goes on to say, and again I quote: Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods to foreign countries during the reporting period, especially to Iran. Russia was an important source for nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and Pakistan. Madam President, the facts that emerged during my subcommittee's hearings on Russian and Chinese proliferation are completely supported by this latest report of the intelligence community. And we should not be comforted by the fact that it reports on the proliferant behavior of these nations only during the last half of 1996. For those who claim that Chinese and Russian behavior on proliferation is getting better, the best I can say is that it certainly is not yet good enough. I raise the issue of proliferation because it is the principal reason we have offered this amendment on supercomputer export controls. The use of high-performance computers to upgrade existing weapons capabilities or develop new ones is not some fantasy or something that might happen in the future. It is known fact. High-performance computers help make it possible to develop and improve weapons capabilities that threaten the United States. Keeping them out of the wrong hands makes America safer. Dr. Seymour Goodman, in a report used by the administration as its basis for weakening U.S. export controls on high-performance computers, wrote: . . . continued export controls will slow the exacerbation of existing nuclear threats. Control of HPC [high-performance computer] exports, by limiting those exports or imposing appropriate safeguards, to countries known to possess nuclear weapons will impede their development of improved weapons and reduce their confidence in their existing stockpile by limiting the opportunity to conduct simulations in lieu of live tests. Similar or more rigorous controls on HPC exports to countries with nuclear weapons development programs could impede their development of second-generation weapons. The June 1997 Intelligence Community report to Congress couldn't be more clear on this issue. It states: . . . countries of concern continued last year to acquire substantial amounts of WMD-related equipment, materials, and technology, as well as modern conventional weapons. China and Russia continued to be the primary suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to countries to concern. This amendment will help reduce the proliferation danger facing the United States by requiring an individual validated license to export all supercomputers to so-called Tier 3 countries, which include China and Russia. Because of the new export control policy for supercomputers announced by the Clinton administration on October 6, 1995, there currently is no such requirement. We must act to change that policy now. This policy, which has been in place for almost 18 months, groups all nations into four country tiers and establishes export licensing requirements for high-performance computers based upon their country of destination. Tier 1 countries, consisting primarily of our NATO allies, are free to receive high-performance computers of unlimited capability without an export license from the United States, while, at the other end of the spectrum, Tier 4 countries, consisting of the last trustworthy, cannot legally receive any of these supercomputers. Almost all countries in South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa are in Tier 2, and can receive supercomputers capable of up to 10,000 MTOPS--MTOPS are Millions of Theoretical Operations per Second, the standard measure of computing capability--before an export license is required. The end-use and end-user are the critical factors for exports to any of the 50 nations comprising Tier 3. If the end-use and user are civilian, the policy allows exports of supercomputers capable of up to 7,000 MTOPS before an export license is required. If the Tier 3 end-use or user is military, U.S. export licenses are required for any high- performance computer capable of more than 2,000 MTOPS. But it is the U.S. exporter, not the administration, which has the responsibility under this policy for determining the end-use and user for Tier 3 exports between 2,000 MTOPS and 7,000 MTOPS. This responsibility, difficult under any circumstances, is complicated by a company's natural focus on making sales. Our amendment addresses only these Tier 3 exports, as depicted by the diagonally-striped area on this chart, which I am going to show the Senate at some point in this discussion. Our amendment applies to only a small portion of high-performance computer exports. In fact, according to the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration, of the 1,436 supercomputers exported from the United States from the date the new policy went into effect through March 1997, only 91 went to Tier 3 countries. That amounts to 6.34 percent of total supercomputer exports. Does it not make sense for our Government to be willing to check to make sure that 6.34 percent of our supercomputer exports go to the right place? Is it unreasonable to require the administration to be sure that American supercomputer sales aren't going to people and places who would damage American national security? Our amendment doesn't prohibit the transfer of a single supercomputer. It requires that the existing standards for transfers be monitored by our Government. Our amendment changes only one aspect of the policy, shifting the burden of determining end-use and end-user in Tier 3 countries from the exporter to the administration. Why is this so important? Listen to another part of last month's report to Congress by the Intelligence Community, which says, ``Many Third World countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--are responding to Western counterproliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more convoluted procurement networks.'' American exporters are not capable of determining whether a potential purchaser is a ``procurement front'' or part of a ``more convoluted procurement network,'' and it is wrong to place this burden on them. The administration, and many exporters, will tell you that the current policy is working, that closer scrutiny isn't required, but look at this chart and what it shows you. There are American supercomputers in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons complexes. According to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, these supercomputers are ``10 times faster than any previously available in Russia.'' According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences--which works on everything from the D-5 ICBM, capable of reaching the United States, to uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons--its American supercomputer provides the Academy with ``computational power previously unknown'' and is available--this is a quote from them--to ``all the major scientific and technological institutes across China.'' American high performance computers are now available to help these countries improve their nuclear weapons and improve that which they are proliferating, courtesy of a policy that can be called many things, but can't reasonably labelled as ``working.'' Just last week we learned through press reports that an American supercomputer sent to Hong Kong is now in China under the control of the People's Liberation Army. In addition to the 47 American supercomputers that have been shipped to China since this new policy took effect, 20 unlicensed American supercomputers have been shipped to Hong Kong. At least now we know where one of the Hong Kong supercomputers is. What about the others? does this look to anyone like a policy that's working? This is a real problem. It is a problem that exists now. It is not a hypothetical problem. It is not a problem that may develop in the future. This is a serious problem that threatens our national security. There are some opposing this amendment who claim that setting the threshold at 2,000 MTOPS is too low, and consequently will make it impossible for American computer manufacturers to sell personal computers--PC's--abroad. That is just not true. It is a last minute desperation shot at the Cochran-Durbin amendment. Let's look at the facts: The first fact is the 2,000 MTOPS threshold opponents express concern over was not dreamed up by us. It is the administration's limit. No. 2, industry suggests that by some time in the fourth quarter of 1998--this date came, incidentally, from IBM's Director of public policy, who recently visited with my staff about this amendment--IBM will produce, according to him, a PC capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS for sale in the international marketplace, he said. But IBM couldn't answer several basic questions about this PC. Its Director of public policy didn't know the name of the PC, the expected price that would be charged for it, how many would be produced for the U.S. market, how many would be produced for potential foreign market sales, or even how many would be produced for this Tier 3 market, which this amendment is narrowly related to. It is worth remembering that this amendment that we are talking about only affects Tier 3 countries, and he's talking to us as if our amendment affects all sales to everybody--in the United States, foreign countries, everywhere--and that is just not true. IBM doesn't just build these machines overnight on an impulse or a whim or a guess about what is out there in terms of potential sales. If it is going to have a new top-of-the-line PC out within 15 to 16 months, as they claim through this director of public policy, it must already have ordered the chip to run this PC. Doesn't it stand to reason that if such a PC were just around the corner, IBM would be able to answer some of these basic questions that I said the director could not answer? If not, is it possible that IBM is being overly optimistic about its capability, its projections, about the timeframe involved, and all the other arguments that have been advanced against this amendment? Fact No. 3: Right now, according to William Reinsch, who is the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, ``High end Pentium- based personal computers sold today at retail outlets perform at about 200 to 250 MTOPS.'' Did you hear that? We are not talking about 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS, like some of these computer lobbyists are saying to Senators are going to be affected by this amendment. The PC's that are out on the market today are at much lower ranges of capability. Let's give Secretary Reinsch the benefit of the doubt and say today's top-end PCs are capable of running at 250 MTOPS. Secretary Reinsch said on June 11 before my subcommittee in an open hearing that ``computer power doubles every 18 months, and this has been the axiom in the industry for, I think, about 15 years.'' This axiom is known as Moore's Law. The math is straightforward. If top-end PC's are capable of 250 MTOPS today, 18 months from now they will be capable of 500 MTOPS; 36 months from now, they will be capable of 1,000 MTOPS; 54 months from now, in 4\1/2\ years, they will be capable of 2,000 MTOPS. Fifty-four months from now is not, contrary to the claims of some computer manufacturers, the fourth quarter of next year, as was suggested to us by the director of public policy of IBM. Of course, Moore's Law doesn't even mean that 54 months from now there will be PC's on the market capable of 2,000 MTOPS. It only suggests that our manufacturers should be able to build these powerful PC's 54 months from now, if Moore's Law continues to be sustained. None of our manufacturers will build PC's this powerful unless there is a broad market demand for such a highly capable PC, and it is unclear if the market will even be demanding such a powerful PC many times more powerful than today's top-of-the-line PC's in just under 5 years. If 4 or 5 years from now industry's optimism proves to be correct, I will be pleased to return to this floor and offer legislation modifying the 2,000 MTOPS level. But the suggestion that by next year we will have PC's many times more powerful than our most powerful today can only be guesswork, wishful thinking. Fact No. 4: IBM currently sells, again according to its director of public policy, a workstation that is capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS. Wouldn't it make sense that future demand for the much anticipated 2,000 MTOPS PC should be similar to the current demand for the workstation that is already on the market? According to the Commerce Department, from January 25, 1996, when the administration's supercomputer export control liberalization took effect, to March of 1997, 1,436 American high-performance computers were exported to countries in tiers 1, 2, and 3. Of these 1,436, just 91, or 6.34 percent, went to tier 3 countries. I do not know how many of these 91 were IBM's workstation that is just over 2,000 MTOPS. We know that at least 6 of the 91 were not manufactured by IBM--4 Silicon Graphics machines that are now running at Russia's nuclear weapons labs; one Silicon Graphics machine in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which is a key part of China's nuclear weapons complex; and one Sun Microsystems machine that we just learned last week is now running at a Chinese military facility in Chungsha after being diverted from Hong Kong. So up to 85 of the 91 exported over 14 months to tier 3 countries could have been this IBM workstation, though I doubt that all of them consisted of that one machine. But even if all 85 were these IBM workstations, does this sound like the kind of volume that will overwhelm the Government's licensing apparatus? Certainly not. The specter of American jobs being lost to unwieldy export controls is just another part of the argument against the Cochran-Durbin amendment that is not based on the facts. Another argument made against our amendment is that the right way to keep organizations from getting American supercomputer technology who shouldn't be receiving it is for the Department of Commerce to publish a list of prohibited end users with individual validated licenses required for any high-performance computer export to a country or entity on the list. This argument against the amendment at least has the virtue of implicitly admitting that American supercomputers should not be in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons design labs, but it is another argument that is simply not based on the facts. Shortly before the recent July Fourth recess, I spoke on the floor of the Senate explaining why such a list would be, in many ways, worse than the current situation. I won't go through all those reasons again in the interest of time now, but I continue to believe that such a list would be necessarily incomplete because of the requirement to protect intelligence sources and methods. It could be used as the Department of Commerce's guide for proliferators, and it would make it only too easy to make a sale to a location not on the list, thus encouraging makers of weapons of mass destruction to establish phony front organizations for the purposes of acquiring U.S. supercomputers. They wouldn't be on that list. In fact, the Department of Commerce on June 30 published such a list, and its inadequacy is obvious. The June 30 list, called by the Commerce Department the ``Entities List,'' consists of 13 locations in 5 tier 3 countries that can receive an American supercomputer only if you have a license, only subject to a license. So now the total list of proscribed end users consists of 15 entities. On this list are Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16 in Russia which have already received at least five American supercomputers and parts of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which also is now manufacturing more modern nuclear weapons with America's finest technology. Because of this list, now America's computer exporters know that they need a license to ship a high-performance computer to any of these entities. What about other entities, though? What about the Chinese company that shipped ring magnets to Pakistan last year for use in its nuclear program? Why isn't that company on the list? It has been subjected to sanctions imposed by our Government, and it is not on our Government's list as a prohibited end user. What about the Chinese company or government entity that shipped M-11 missiles to Pakistan and now, according to press reports, is helping Pakistan build a factory for the indigenous manufacture of M-11 missiles? Why isn't that entity on the list? What about the Russian company or government entity helping Iran to upgrade its nuclear program and ballistic missile programs, why aren't they on the list? Madam President, this list does not solve the problem. If anything, it makes it more confused, it makes it more difficult for American exporters to determine who should or should not receive American high- performance computers. In many ways, this list is worse than nothing. There are many who believe the entire high-performance computer export control policy of this administration is a failure. However one views this policy as a whole, there is one aspect of it that we know is not working and it can be fixed now. We know that American supercomputers are now in Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons labs. We know that they should not be there. We know that our Government, with the resources of the intelligence community, is better able to determine the identity of end users and end uses than is industry. Industry has no way to be able to determine the end use and user of its products to the degree of confidence that our intelligence agencies can do. Right now we have the opportunity not to impose new restrictions on our supercomputer manufacturers but to shift the burden of making end- use and end-user determinations from industry to Government. Look at this chart again and you will see that we are talking about only a very small part of the overall policy. The entire chart describes the policy and shows the number of tiers, 1 through 4, the varying capabilities on the basis of millions of theoretical operations per second, MTOPS, along the left side. And the only part of the entire export business of American supercomputers that is affected by this amendment is this part shown in the diagonal lines. The fact is, we are talking about only 6.34 percent of supercomputer exports under this policy that will be affected by this amendment. The Cochran-Durbin amendment will not prevent a single supercomputer export to anyone who should have one, but it will help ensure, though, that only those who should have them will have them. The only supercomputer sales that would be blocked by our amendment are those going to foreign entities who the U.S. Government determines shouldn't have it. It will not prevent legitimate sales to legitimate users in the U.S. or outside the U.S., but it will help prevent a repeat of the errors that have allowed American supercomputers to go to Russia and to go to China and be used in their nuclear weapons labs. Let's be clear what this debate is about. It is about U.S. national security. If you think Russia and China shouldn't be using American supercomputers to improve the quality of their nuclear arsenals and the quality of the weapons systems and components and technology that they are selling in turn to others, vote for the Cochran-Durbin amendment. President Clinton was right when he called the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States,'' and that it constitutes a ``national emergency.'' These weapons, delivery systems and technologies are more readily developed and enhanced by high-performance computers, and who makes those computers? The United States. If the United States is going to demonstrate that it is serious about this issue, we must do more than complain to Russia and China every time one of those nations engage in proliferation. The American fight against proliferation must start at our own borders. I urge Senators to vote against the Grams-Boxer substitute and support the Cochran-Durbin amendment. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] be added as a cosponsor to our amendment.

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I know I don't need to ask consent to return to the Cochran amendment. But the Lugar amendment has been offered and has been the pending business. I ask that we return to the regular order, to amendment No. 420.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at the request of the majority leader, I am pleased to make the following announcement relating to the schedule of the Senate. For the information of all Senators, this morning the Senate will resume consideration of S. 949, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. By previous consent, there will be 20 minutes for debate equally divided between Senator Murkowski and Senator Bumpers, with a vote occurring in relation to the Bumpers amendment at approximately 9:50 a.m. Following the vote on the Bumpers amendment, there will be 20 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form with a vote on or in relation to the Dorgan amendment No. 517 regarding capital gains. Following that vote, there will be 10 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form on the Dorgan motion to refer. The Senate then will proceed to a vote in relation to the Dorgan motion. All other amendments offered last night and amendments offered during today's session will be subject to rollcall votes throughout the day as we make progress on the Taxpayer Relief Act. Therefore, Senators can anticipate numerous rollcall votes on this bill during today's session of the Senate.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it gives me a special pleasure this morning to welcome our guest Chaplain who has delivered the opening prayer, Dr. Charles E. Poole. He is currently serving as pastor of the First Baptist Church of the city of Washington, DC, but he and his family will be moving soon to Mississippi where he has accepted the call to serve as pastor of my church, Northminster Baptist Church in Jackson, MS. We are delighted to have this very special person come to our State and serve in this way. We appreciate very much his being our guest Chaplain this morning and delivering such a fine prayer. Dr. Poole earned his undergraduate degree from Mercer University in Macon, GA, and graduate degrees in divinity from the Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in Wake Forest, NC. Before he became pastor of the First Baptist Church in Washington, he served for several years as the pastor of the First Baptist Church of Macon, GA. He was also on the board of trustees of Mercer University in Macon for 5 years. He is an outstanding clergyman who is well respected here in the Washington area. His sermons and other writings have been published and very favorably received. He and his wife Marcia have two children, Joshua and Maria. We are looking forward to getting to know all of them better. We thank him, on behalf of all Senators, for his contribution to today's session.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it was my pleasure last week to welcome back to Washington, His Excellency, Desaix Anderson, who has returned from Vietnam where he served for almost 2 years as our Government's Charge d'affaires in Hanoi. He worked very effectively to help establish a new relationship between our two countries and in the process created a bond of friendship and mutual trust that will serve us well as we build on that well-laid foundation. He is now writing a book on the United States-Vietnam relationship and because of his experience and intelligence, I'm sure it will be an important contribution to our understanding of this unique subject. Before he left he discussed his impressions of the current situation and recent events at a meeting of the United States-Vietnam Trade Council on April 7. It gives such an encouraging assessment of the possibilities for the future in that country Senators should take note of it. I ask that a copy of Mr. Anderson's remarks be printed in the Record. The remarks follow: America's Relations With Vietnam--Accomplishments, Challenges, and Potential (Remarks of Desaix Anderson) In the year and half since normalization, Vietnamese and Americans, working together, have laid the foundations for a totally different relationship between our two countries. While cognizant of our tortuous history of the past fifty years, our leaders agreed in 1995 to look to the future, to build on common goals seeking peace, stability, and prosperity in our nations and in the East Asia Pacific region. We realized that building trust and mutual confidence was the most important requirement to construct this new relationship. On that basis we began to pick up the links of personal and non-governmental contacts which emerged and survived over the years, despite the estrangement between our governments, and to call on the goodwill which we have found to be widely flourishing in both countries, and to begin to construct the foundation for a friendly, contemporary relationship. To enjoy a normal relationship, that foundation has to be composed of hundreds of thousands of expanding networks not just between governments but between our peoples, as well. So, I salute the US-Vietnam Trade Council, Virginia Foote, the NGO's, the Vietnam vets, the Vietnam Veterans Association, hundreds of American businessmen and women, the media, itinerant English teachers, universities, tour groups, the Vietnam-America Friendship Association, individual Americans, as well as the Government officials and leaders who have played their roles in initiating this new relationship. accomplishments All we have sought to do and accomplished fits nicely under the rubric former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake brought to Vietnam last July, in saying, ``America's vision of Vietnam is of a strong and prosperous country, well integrated into regional and global institutions.'' Hear the breadth of what has been going on. We are cooperating diligently with the Vietnamese to account for missing Americans--our top priority--even as we work to find ways to strengthen further bilateral and unilateral efforts to reach successful conclusions. We adopted for cooperation two important Vietnamese goals-- strengthening health and education. The Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, with strong support from HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, are spearheading efforts contributing to Vietnam's health system. A CDC doctor will soon join the embassy staff to work full time on public and private health cooperation between our countries. The embassy, through some 30 Fulbright scholarships and 25 international visitor grants annually and the contribution of an American studies collection to Hanoi University, is strengthening bilateral educational ties. In addition, thirty or so American universities are working with Vietnamese counterparts to upgrade Vietnam's education system. Our Agriculture ministries are cooperating closely to exchange information, develop policy alternatives, and promote exchanges such as the 18 upcoming Cochran fellowships for young Vietnamese to study in professional fields in the

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have listened carefully to the comments of my good friend from Minnesota in support of his second-degree amendment. I must say that the language of the amendment is appealing in some respects, particularly the suggestion that the General Accounting Office ought to be asked to conduct a review of this situation and the apparent risk to our national security caused by the export policies of this administration with respect to the sale of supercomputers and its technology to foreign purchasers. There is some question in my mind about the efficacy of the last part of the amendment particularly, because in our hearings in the Governmental Affairs Committee the administration officials talked about the fact that the reason they did not publish and make available a list of end users or potential purchasers of these computers at this time was because of diplomatic considerations and the questions about whether it puts in jeopardy our intelligence-gathering capabilities and a number of other issues that concerned them enough so that they do not now make available this list even privately to exporters of supercomputers. So to require them to publish it in the Federal Register and to make it available to the general public is probably something that ought to be reconsidered and not approved by the Senate. They should not be compelled to do that. It seems to me that the reasons they gave in our hearing for not doing it even privately was enough and sufficient in my mind to raise questions about whether we should compel them to do it publicly. But looking back at the earlier complaints and the comments from my friend about the Cochran-Durbin amendment, let me say that this is not an effort on our part to roll back regulatory policy with respect to military end users. It is an effort to change the procedures and to put the onus and the responsibility for determining whether a sale is permissible or consistent with national security concerns on the administration rather than on the sellers of the computers. Computer companies do not have the capacity to make determinations on their own about the use to which the computers they are selling in the international market will be put, or the relationships between prospective purchasers and governments, particularly in the case of China or Russia. The U.S. Government, though, has the capacity, through its contacts worldwide, to do a much more reliable and accurate job of assessing whether or not someone would be a purchaser who would use these computers to enhance the lethalness of nuclear weapons or missile technology to put our own citizens at risk, the lives of Americans at risk, in a way that they would not otherwise be, but for the sale of our computer technology. So it is for that reason and that reason alone not to prevent the sale to legitimate purchasers who will use it for civilian or other appropriate purposes. It is in those situations where there is very real concern based on knowledge that we have about the potential harmful use--harmful to our own interests--that we ought to have the power, we ought to have the process reserved to the Federal Government to prohibit that sale in those selected situations. Right now the policy of our Government is to prohibit the sale of this category of computers if it is for the purpose of being used for a military use or sold to a military organization. It is prohibited under current law, under current regulations. So the suggestion that the Senator makes that we are imposing new restraint on trade in this amendment is not true insofar as it concerns the sales for military purposes. Current policy simply says to the exporters, if you know it is going to be used by a military organization, you cannot sell it--2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS speed computers cannot be sold under current U.S. law and under current regulations. So this amendment that we are offering does not impose a new definition that restrains the sale of computers. It simply says that the Commerce Department is going to give you the OK. Once you tell us who you will sell it to, they will tell you whether it is permissible or not. That is all we are saying. The current policy is it is up to the exporter to decide whether this is a military end use or an end user. If they sell it to someone they knew was a military end user, they violate the law right now. The problem is a lot of exporters, the people in the business of manufacturing and marketing supercomputers, do not have the capacity to make this determination. Also, there are motivations that are different. They are in the business of making money. They are in the business of selling as many as they can. The stockholders of these companies want to see sales go up, and so when there is a close question--we are not questioning anybody's motives here today--but where there is a close question and you really do not know for sure, the temptation is to go on and make the sale, particularly if there is really no hard evidence there. Now, there have already been those cases where there is enough evidence that people have sold computers to end users who are military organizations or who are involved in nuclear weapons programs, that they are now under investigations by a Federal grand jury. This is serious business. That could have been prohibited, maybe, if you had the Commerce Department saying, ``OK, it is fine, go ahead and make this sale. Here is your license.'' Then the civilian marketer is off the hook. The Commerce Department makes the decision. That is the issue. Do we leave it up to the honor system that has been developed by the Clinton administration, which is not working--46, we thought it was 46, but it turned out to be 47 as a result of the hearing we held of new information of these computers that are in the hands of Chinese entities and we do not know what they are being used for. Or if our Government knows, they cannot tell us in a public hearing session. We have to go behind closed doors to find out what they really know. From what we can talk about right now, we know that this policy ought to be changed, and for the business of ``this is not the right place, this is not the right time,'' and the jurisdictional question--well, the Commerce Department has jurisdiction over commerce issues, the Banking Committee has some jurisdiction, our Governmental Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over compliance with nonproliferation treaty provisions. We are constantly monitoring the question of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in our committee, and we came upon this information through the exercise of our oversight responsibilities. It is a matter of some urgency, in our view, that this matter be addressed, and we think the U.S. Senate will agree with that. I think we have suggested a very modest but a very necessary first step in the process of reform of our policies over exporting computers. This administration came into office having made a promise to the computer industry that they were going to make some dramatic changes in the rules so that they could sell more computers in the international marketplace. That is fine. That is fine. But they have adopted a policy that is not working. It is not working to protect our national security interests, which is important. It is working in that it has helped sell a lot more computers and a lot of people have gotten rich under this new policy. I do not have a problem with that. No complaints are being made about that. But it was supposed to be a policy that both enhanced our ability to compete in the international computer market but at the same time protected our national security interests. It worked on the one hand, but it has failed on the other. We now see the Atomic Energy Minister in Russia, whose name is Mikhailov, bragging in a public forum about the new supercomputer technology they have bought from the United States that is 10 times more powerful and sophisticated than anything they have had before. This agency is in the business of modernizing the nuclear weapons that the Russians have. We have this Nunn-Lugar builddown program supposedly trying to dismantle these weapons of mass destruction, and we are very actively involved with the Russians in that regard. But at the same time, to be selling them the technology to make the weapons, they are more accurate, more lethal, capable of destroying potential adversaries like the United States, it seems we are working at cross-purposes with ourselves. We are trying to work to keep down the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and here we are, in this instance, contributing to the proliferation of more lethal nuclear weapon systems. Certainly that is true in the case of Russia and China. We know that. We know that. So what do we do about it? Nothing? Have some hearings? Have the GAO spend another year looking at things? We agree GAO ought to look at this. We are asking them to do that, too. They have already begun some work at our request. I agree with the Senator that we need to do more, but to just say the Senate should not act on this suggestion, this is a modest first step. It is not a suggestion for comprehensive reform at this time. We need more information. We need to do more work to decide on the details of a comprehensive, workable policy than is on the books now and administered by our Commerce Department. So, but for the provisions of the amendment offered by the Senator that I have suggested caused me some concern, I would like to be able to support the amendment so that we could then go on and vote to approve the amendment as amended, but I cannot do that at this point. I hope the Senate will not agree to the amendment. I know under the announcement that was made earlier today on behalf of the majority leader, there will be no votes on amendments today. They will be set aside and we will come to them later. So there will not be a vote today. Knowing that there will not be, I will not push the issue any further, except to suggest to the Senate that this is an issue that ought to be debated, considered carefully, and we ought to vote for this amendment that I have offered with the cosponsorship of Senator Durbin. Incidentally, I asked the other day, after we had described the amendment, that Senator Abraham be added as a cosponsor. I have now been asked to seek unanimous consent that Senator Lugar be added as a cosponsor. I make that request at this time, Mr. President.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today, I am introducing the Successful Reading Research and Instruction Act. It establishes a panel that will include parents, scientists, and educators to conduct a study of the research relevant to reading development and advise the Congress of its recommendations for disseminating its findings and instruction suggestions to those who would like to have them. Reading is the skill students must master to meet life challenges in a confident and successful manner. For a child, breaking the code of written language not only opens academic opportunities; it is a cornerstone to building high self esteem. Both reading and self esteem affect the knowledge and experiences that form a child's character and future. Teaching children to read is the highest priority in education today. Many teachers and parents I've talked with are frustrated and confused about what method of reading instruction is best. Every American should be concerned that 40 to 60 percent of elementary school children are not reading proficiently. Even more disturbing is research that shows fewer than one child in eight who is failing to read by the end of first grade ever catches up to grade level. Success in reading is essential if one is to progress socially and economically. In fact, most of the federally funded literacy programs are targeted to helping adults learn to read because the education system failed them, and more than likely, failed them at an early age. This indicates that we need to start solving the problem of poor readers at the beginning, instead of working backward. It seems to me that the first step to finding a solution is to seriously analyze sound, rigorous research on the subject. Mr. President, at a hearing on April 16, of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, I brought to the attention of the Secretary of Education, Richard Riley, research by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development mandated by the Health Research Extension Act of 1985, and asked that he use such research in the development of federally supported reading programs. This research is ongoing, in a collaborative network with multidisciplinary research programs to study genetics, brain pathology, developmental process and phonetic acquisition. NICHD has spent over $100 million over the past 15 years, and has studied approximately ten thousand children. On June 11 of this year, when officials from the National Institutes of Health came before the same appropriations subcommittee, I asked Dr. Duane Alexander, the Director of NICHD, about this study. Dr. Alexander's testimony about the research confirmed what I suspect most teachers already know--at least 20 percent of children have difficulty learning to read. But the research also suggests that 90 to 95 percent of these can be brought up to average reading level. As a result of this research, techniques for early identification of those with reading problems and intervention strategies are now known. But administrators, teachers, tutors and parents are not aware of the key principles of effective reading instruction. The NICHD findings underscore the need to do a better job of teacher training, as researchers found fewer than 10 percent of teachers actually know how to teach reading to children who don't learn reading automatically. I am surprised that the Department of Education hasn't looked to this study and found a way to effectively get the information to teachers, schools, parents, and most importantly, teacher colleges. What scientists have learned from their studies of reading hasn't been passed on to the teachers who are teaching, so parents are telling us their kids aren't reading. It is time we put all this experience together; come up with suggestions for dealing with the problems and, if schools, teachers, parents or higher education institutions want the information, let's make it available. This is a proposal to develop answers that are based on scientific, model based research. I think it can be a helpful beginning for successful reading instruction. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Dr. Duane Alexander's testimony and a copy of my bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, today, I am introducing the Successful Reading Research and Instruction Act. It establishes a panel that will include parents, scientists, and educators to conduct a study of the research relevant to reading development and advise the Congress of its recommendations for disseminating its findings and instruction suggestions to those who would like to have them. Reading is the skill students must master to meet life challenges in a confident and successful manner. For a child, breaking the code of written language not only opens academic opportunities; it is a cornerstone to building high self esteem. Both reading and self esteem affect the knowledge and experiences that form a child's character and future. Teaching children to read is the highest priority in education today. Many teachers and parents I've talked with are frustrated and confused about what method of reading instruction is best. Every American should be concerned that 40 to 60 percent of elementary school children are not reading proficiently. Even more disturbing is research that shows fewer than one child in eight who is failing to read by the end of first grade ever catches up to grade level. Success in reading is essential if one is to progress socially and economically. In fact, most of the federally funded literacy programs are targeted to helping adults learn to read because the education system failed them, and more than likely, failed them at an early age. This indicates that we need to start solving the problem of poor readers at the beginning, instead of working backward. It seems to me that the first step to finding a solution is to seriously analyze sound, rigorous research on the subject. Mr. President, at a hearing on April 16, of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, I brought to the attention of the Secretary of Education, Richard Riley, research by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development mandated by the Health Research Extension Act of 1985, and asked that he use such research in the development of federally supported reading programs. This research is ongoing, in a collaborative network with multidisciplinary research programs to study genetics, brain pathology, developmental process and phonetic acquisition. NICHD has spent over $100 million over the past 15 years, and has studied approximately ten thousand children. On June 11 of this year, when officials from the National Institutes of Health came before the same appropriations subcommittee, I asked Dr. Duane Alexander, the Director of NICHD, about this study. Dr. Alexander's testimony about the research confirmed what I suspect most teachers already know--at least 20 percent of children have difficulty learning to read. But the research also suggests that 90 to 95 percent of these can be brought up to average reading level. As a result of this research, techniques for early identification of those with reading problems and intervention strategies are now known. But administrators, teachers, tutors and parents are not aware of the key principles of effective reading instruction. The NICHD findings underscore the need to do a better job of teacher training, as researchers found fewer than 10 percent of teachers actually know how to teach reading to children who don't learn reading automatically. I am surprised that the Department of Education hasn't looked to this study and found a way to effectively get the information to teachers, schools, parents, and most importantly, teacher colleges. What scientists have learned from their studies of reading hasn't been passed on to the teachers who are teaching, so parents are telling us their kids aren't reading. It is time we put all this experience together; come up with suggestions for dealing with the problems and, if schools, teachers, parents or higher education institutions want the information, let's make it available. This is a proposal to develop answers that are based on scientific, model based research. I think it can be a helpful beginning for successful reading instruction. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Dr. Duane Alexander's testimony and a copy of my bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Illinois for the great force of his argument and for the clarity of his statement in support of this proposal. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Abraham] be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on the 11th of June, my Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on the subject of proliferation and U.S. dual-use export controls. The hearing focused almost entirely on the subject of U.S. exports of high-performance computers, also known as supercomputers. In preparing for and conducting this hearing, we learned that the administration's policy on supercomputers, which are an integral component for developing, producing and maintaining nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and practically all advanced weapon systems, could put American lives and interests at risk. I am offering this amendment as a necessary first step to staunch the flow of American-made supercomputers to countries and places they should not be going. On October 6, 1995, President Clinton announced a new export control policy for supercomputers which decontrolled supercomputer exports to a great extent. He said that he had ``decided to eliminate controls on the exports of all computers to countries in North America, most of Europe, and parts of Asia.'' Continuing further, ``For the former Soviet Union, China, and a number of other countries, we will focus our controls on computers intended for military end uses or users, while easing them on the export of computers to civilian customers.'' There is, of course, a delicate balance that must be struck between presenting U.S. national security by controlling dual-use exports and promoting exports. We must be careful not to place American manufacturers in a position where they cannot export goods that other countries are exporting, though, of course, our national security interests dictate that some goods cannot be sold to some countries no matter how irresponsibly other countries behave. For example, the willingness of some Western European countries to work with Libya to construct a chemical weapons complex does not justify the involvement of United States companies in similar ventures. President Clinton's October 6, 1995, announcement liberalizing U.S. export controls on supercomputers established four country tiers to guide American exporters, at the same time eliminating restrictions on the export of computers capable of less than 2,000 million theoretical operations per second-- this is referred to as an MTOPS--for all except tier 4 countries, it is unrestricted if the computers are capable of less than 2,000 MTOPS. Whether it makes sense to decontrol computers capable of up to that level is one of the issues which should be studied more extensively. I will ask the General Accounting Office to do so. Country tier 1, consisting primarily of NATO allies, effectively establishes a license-free zone for U.S. high-performance computer exports. Computers of unlimited capacity under this policy can be exported to any tier 1 country without regard to the identity of the end user or the intended end use. The policy for country tier 2, which includes countries such as South Korea, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, allows unlicensed exports to any country within this tier of computers capable up to 10,000 million theoretical operations per second. And the policy continues the virtual embargo against those nations--the terrorist nations such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea--that comprise country tier 4. There are many deficiencies in this new policy, Mr. President. Our amendment addresses what we consider to be the most significant deficiency in need of immediate attention. It is a problem specific to the part of the policy pertaining to country tier 3 which I want to describe now. The policy announced by President Clinton for tier 3 countries, which include Russia, China, and some others, is based entirely upon the questions of who the end user will be and for what end use the supercomputer is intended. End use and end user are the critical factors for tier 3 exports. The tier 3 policy requires an export license to be granted by the Department of Commerce under only two circumstances: First, if the computer to be exported is capable of 2,000 MTOPS and is going to a military end use or end user; and second, if the computer to be exported is capable of 7,000 MTOPS and is going to a civilian end use and end user. This policy requires no export license for manufacturers who want to sell supercomputers capable between 2,000 and 7,000 MTOPS to buyers in tier 3 countries when there is to be a civilian end use and end user. It is the exporter--not the Department of Commerce, not the U.S. Government--who is given the latitude under the policy for determining whether the purchaser's representations are accurate, that it is not a military end user and will not use the supercomputer for a military purpose. The Clinton administration policy further requires American exporters to act on the honor system, policing themselves and deciding themselves whether or not the end user is going to be a military entity or will be putting the supercomputer to a military use. Unfortunately, some companies have already been tempted to take a chance. Maybe they were not sure; maybe they were tempted by the profits of the transaction. Whatever the motivations and the understandings or lack of information, or for whatever the reason, we have known that some transactions have involved the sale of supercomputers, without objection from our Department of Commerce or our Federal Government to those who may be putting computers to a military use, or maybe military entities themselves. We know now, for example, based on statements from the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and from United States Government officials, that there are at least five American supercomputers in two of Russia's nuclear weapons labs: Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16. Minister Mikhailov of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has not been reluctant to proclaim what these high-performance computers will be used for, and he said in a speech in January they will be used to simulate nuclear explosions, and that the computers are, in his words, ``10 times faster than any previously available in Russia.'' Four of the five supercomputers we are aware of publicly in Russia's nuclear weapons labs came from Silicon Graphics, a company in California, I think. According to the CEO, Edward McCracken, it was his company's understanding that the computers were for environmental and ecological purposes. It may be that Silicon Graphics was unable to determine whether a Russian nuclear weapons lab was going to be the military end user or if its supercomputers would be put to a military end use. But it seems from the statements made by the Atomic Energy Minister in Russia that they certainly are available to them for those purposes. We also know at least 47 high-performance computers have been exported without licenses to the People's Republic of China. One of the computers sold also by Silicon Graphics is now operating in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is a key participant in military research and development, and works on everything from the DF-5 ICBM--which, incidentally, is capable of reaching the United States--to uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. There can be no question about the Chinese Academy of Science's status as a military end- user. According to the Department, its new Silicon Graphic Power Challenge XL supercomputer provides it with computational power previously unknown, which is available to all the major scientific and technological institutes across China. We can only hope that some of these institutes in China are using the supercomputer's technology for peaceful purposes, but we cannot help but suspect that some may be a part of the weapons development program in China, which is on a fast track to modernize their nuclear weapons system and capabilities and their missile technologies and all the rest. At our recent hearing, we had the benefit of testimony from the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, William Reinsch, who said that the Clinton administration doesn't know if any of the supercomputers in China or Russia are being used for weapons-related activities, but the Commerce Department is in a difficult position. You have to appreciate how difficult it must be to have the responsibility for both promoting exports and controlling exports, and that is the dilemma that this Department is in. But we have to realize that nuclear weapons labs are potential end users and have been shown already by the evidence before our committee that they have obtained American supercomputers and they may be put to a military end use. In 1986, the Department of Energy published an unclassified report entitled, ``The Need for Supercomputers in Nuclear Weapons Design.'' The report's conclusion included this statement: ``The use of high- speed computers and mathematical models to simulate complex physical processes has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the nuclear weapons design program.'' These computers continue to be important to the design and production of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. I do not see how we can tolerate the continuation of a policy that makes it easier for Russia and China to modernize their nuclear weapons and delivery systems. We ought not to be in the business of helping them to improve the quality of our weapons, their technology, their delivery systems, particularly when there is evidence of proliferation from those countries to other countries. This amendment, I want to point out, does not include a comprehensive revision of our export control policy. It is targeted to one specific part of the policy. We hope that with the findings that are obtained from the General Accounting Office study and our further studies in our subcommittee, which is reviewing this entire issue and proliferation problems generally, that we will be able to come up with and work with the administration and hopefully develop a consensus agreement on a modification of our export policy. We think the time is here, it is now, when we need to stop the unrestricted flow of these supercomputers to potential users all around the world that can threaten our Nation's security and put at risk American citizens. It is not like some other country has these systems available for sale on the market. They do not. We are the state-of-the- art producer of the supercomputers. Japan has the capacity to produce supercomputers as well, but their export policy is more restrictive now than ours is. So we are the culprit, if we are putting in the hand of military end users and military weapon system producers in other countries technologies that are superior to what they have now and that can be used to make more lethal their nuclear weapons and their missile systems. We are putting in jeopardy the lives of our own citizens. I am hopeful that this amendment, in concert with other efforts that we are making, will help improve our capacity to monitor these exports and require license in those situations where we think this export might present a proliferation problem, because we know from previous experience in Russia and China, as well, private companies have demonstrated that they do not have the adequate restraints to make determinations about where and how their exports are distributed into other country's hands. We know that transshipments are occurring. We also know that it is difficult to verify in a country like China what the private company that may be the purchaser of a supercomputer really intends to do with it once they have it. It is difficult to get access, to get information, and so a private company has a very difficult time developing an information base on which it can really make a conclusion about the end use or the end user. That is another reason to change this policy. The Commerce Department is going to have to do a better job of compiling information about those who are in the market worldwide for these supercomputers and making this information available to our exporters and the companies that have these supercomputers for sale. Mr. President, I encourage the Senate to look very carefully at this proposal. I hope that the amendment will be agreed to. Senator Durbin and I were involved in questioning witnesses before our subcommittee just recently on this subject, and we are convinced that this is a policy that has to be changed, and the time to change it is right now. Our amendment does not in any way change the policy President Clinton announced in October 1995, though it is my judgment that the entire policy is in need of serious evaluation and revision, and I will also be asking the General Accounting Office to assist me in this evaluation. Our amendment requires the Department of Commerce, in concert with other parts of the executive branch, to determine whether an entity in a tier 3 country is a military or civilian end-user, and whether the end-use will be for a military or civilian purpose. By their exports to Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons labs, private companies have demonstrated that they do not do an adequate job of making this determination. Government has the resources and information available to make the best determination possible, and should step in to ensure that America's national security is not being compromised for sake of a more profitable quarter. In a country like the People's Republic of China, how can any private company have the resources to determine whether an end-user is military or civilian? Some suggest that the process can be left unchanged, but that the Commerce Department can do a better job of helping industry make the proper end-use and end-user determination by publishing a list of end- users to which high performance computer exports are prohibited. I disagree with this suggestion. Any published list would necessarily be incomplete, for a complete list would compromise U.S. intelligence sources and methods. Any published list would also serve as a marketing tool for the world's proliferators, making their job of finding specific clients easier. And, any published list would be only too easy to manipulate by both the purchaser and the exporter who may not be willing to operate under the honor system. If, for example, Chelyabinsk-70 is on the list of prohibited locations, does that mean that a Chelyabinsk-71, not on the list, can receive U.S. exports of high performance computers? What's to stop an exporter like Silicon Graphics from accepting the convenient suggestion that, ``yes, Chelyabinsk-70 does nuclear weapons work, but at Chelyabinsk-71 we conduct only environmental research.'' Publishing a list could reduce, but not eliminate, the problem we face, though in so doing other serious problems would be created. Congress needs to change the current process so the Government--with the most access to information with which to make the most informed determination of military end-use and end-user--makes the decision on whether to ship these computers to countries who are modernizing their weapons and delivery systems and engaged in proliferation of these technologies. America should not be participating in the qualitative upgrade of Russian and Chinese proliferant activities. The Commerce Department maintains that President Clinton's supercomputer export control policy is working. Commerce continues to make this claim despite the fact that the administration's policy has allowed American supercomputers to be shipped to Russia's and China's nuclear weapons complexes, and who knows where else. If this policy is working, what would a policy that wasn't working look like? Would there be more supercomputers in Russia and China, or would we know absolutely that our supercomputers were in Iran, North Korea, or other terrorist states? The cold war's end does not decrease the need for the continued safeguarding of sensitive American dual-use technology. While there may no longer be a single, overarching enemy of the United States, there is little doubt that many rogue states, and perhaps others, have interests clearly contrary to those of the United States. Helping these nations-- or helping other nations to help these nations--to acquire sensitive dual-use technology capable of threatening American lives and interests makes no sense. I thank Senator Durbin for his work with me on this issue, and look forward to continuing to work with him to get to the bottom of this problem. I encourage all of my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk for myself and Mr. Durbin.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation designating the U.S. Post Office facility located in Taylorsville, MS, as the ``Blaine H. Eaton Post Office Building.'' A native of Smith County, Mississippi, Mr. Eaton attended Jones Junior College from 1932-34 and was named Alumni of the Year in 1984. He also attended the University of Mississippi and George Washington Law School. He began his professional career as a farmer and cotton buyer for Anderson-Clayton Co. and in 1942, he became the first executive secretary to my predecessor in the Senate, U.S. Senator James O. Eastland. Blaine Eaton served our Nation in the U.S. Navy from 1944 to 1946. Upon returning home from the war, he was elected to serve in the Mississippi State House of Representatives, and he effectively served the people of Smith County for 12 years. His leadership as chairman of the Highway and Highway Finance Committee resulted in the successful passage of the Farm-to-Market legislation that is still benefiting Mississippians today as the State Aid Road Program. After leaving public office in 1958, Blaine became the manager of the Southern Pine Electric Power Association. His outstanding service and accomplishments were recognized by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association with the Clyde T. Ellis Award for distinguished service and outstanding leadership. Although retiring from his professional career in 1982, Blaine remained active in community service and enriched the lives of many by volunteering his time and leadership abilities to such organizations as the Lions International, the Hiram Masonic Lodge, the Southeast Mississippi Livestock Association and the Economic Development Foundation. He was also a loyal member of the First Baptist Church of Taylorsville where he taught Sunday School classes for 25 years. With the death of Blaine Eaton in 1995, our State lost one of its finest citizens. Designating the Taylorsville Post Office as the ``Blaine H. Eaton Post Office Building'' will commemorate the public service of this extraordinary Mississippian who dedicated his life to the betterment of the community and State he loved so much. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation designating the U.S. Post Office facility located in Taylorsville, MS, as the ``Blaine H. Eaton Post Office Building.'' A native of Smith County, Mississippi, Mr. Eaton attended Jones Junior College from 1932-34 and was named Alumni of the Year in 1984. He also attended the University of Mississippi and George Washington Law School. He began his professional career as a farmer and cotton buyer for Anderson-Clayton Co. and in 1942, he became the first executive secretary to my predecessor in the Senate, U.S. Senator James O. Eastland. Blaine Eaton served our Nation in the U.S. Navy from 1944 to 1946. Upon returning home from the war, he was elected to serve in the Mississippi State House of Representatives, and he effectively served the people of Smith County for 12 years. His leadership as chairman of the Highway and Highway Finance Committee resulted in the successful passage of the Farm-to-Market legislation that is still benefiting Mississippians today as the State Aid Road Program. After leaving public office in 1958, Blaine became the manager of the Southern Pine Electric Power Association. His outstanding service and accomplishments were recognized by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association with the Clyde T. Ellis Award for distinguished service and outstanding leadership. Although retiring from his professional career in 1982, Blaine remained active in community service and enriched the lives of many by volunteering his time and leadership abilities to such organizations as the Lions International, the Hiram Masonic Lodge, the Southeast Mississippi Livestock Association and the Economic Development Foundation. He was also a loyal member of the First Baptist Church of Taylorsville where he taught Sunday School classes for 25 years. With the death of Blaine Eaton in 1995, our State lost one of its finest citizens. Designating the Taylorsville Post Office as the ``Blaine H. Eaton Post Office Building'' will commemorate the public service of this extraordinary Mississippian who dedicated his life to the betterment of the community and State he loved so much. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, several days ago a former staff member of mine in Hattiesburg, MS, brought to my attention a speech that was made at the University of Southern Mississippi to the honors college by Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General of the United States. It was on the subject of ``business crime goes international.'' In the remarks, former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh talks about the international problems that are created for U.S. businesses by criminal conduct in other countries--extortion, bribery in connection with Government contracts, and the like--and options for dealing with this in a more effective way to help enhance U.S. competitiveness throughout the world. It was such an excellent speech that I ask unanimous consent to have the speech of Dick Thornburgh printed in the Record.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Budget Resolution assumes reductions in spending of $290 billion over the next 5 years. To accomplish this goal we, of course, must adopt changes in federal programs. The Governmental Affairs Committee has received reconciliation instructions requiring $4.8 billion in savings over a 5-year period be obtained from programs under our committee's jurisdiction. Most of this committee's programs involve Federal employees and retirees. In March, the President sent his budget proposal to Congress in which he recommended $6.5 billion in savings from Federal employee and retiree benefit programs. Included in the President's proposal was $1.7 billion to be saved by delaying annual cost-of-living adjustments for Federal retirees. As chairman of the Subcommittee with jurisdiction over this subject I opposed that proposal, and so did the chairman of the full Committee, Senator Fred Thompson. The President's Federal employee-related proposal had four basic components: First, the President proposed delaying the receipt of civilian Federal retiree cost-of-living adjustments from January until April through the year 2002, which would have cost the typical Federal retiree $726 over the next 5 years. I thought the proposal was unfair since it singled out Federal civilian retirees for this change. No other group of retirees was treated this way. Most Federal retirees are not wealthy people. Most are like other Americans who have retired from private sector jobs and are just barely making ends meet. The average yearly income for a Federal retiree-- after taxes and out-of-pocket costs of health care and life insurance premiums--is $14,864. This hardly allows for a comfortable lifestyle, considering the average Federal retiree faces annual living costs of $22,098. Our subcommittee opposed the singling out of Federal civilian retirees for a COLA delay, and this position was adopted by Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Thompson in his Annual Views and Estimates report submitted to the Senate Budget Committee. I was very pleased that Budget Chairman Domenici agreed with us and not the President. Second, the President's budget also assumed a savings starting in January 1999 be achieved by requiring employees to pay a greater share of their health care premiums. Under current law, the Government pays, on average, 71 percent of the premiums of the health insurance plans in which Federal employees and retirees enroll. That calculation is based on 60 percent of the average premium of the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program's Big Six health insurance plans. In 1990, Aetna--one of the Big Six high-option plans--dropped out of the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program. In order to prevent enrollees' share of the premium from rising, Congress enacted legislation establishing a proxy plan. The President's budget proposal allowed for the expiration of the proxy plan, thereby shifting approximately $4 billion of health care premium costs from the Government to the employee over 5 years. The Federal Employee Health Benefit Program, unlike Medicare, is not facing a fiscal crisis. In fact, it works so well, I believe we should use it as a model for future health care reform. However, I do not think the President's willingness to simply accept conversion to a Big Five-based formula by default, thereby lowering the government's share of the premium to about 67 percent, is equitable. Doing so would not only shift substantial costs to enrollees but it would allow for the continued use of an outdated formula. As subcommittee chairman, I intend to propose a new formula-- possibly based on a weighted average of all plans--which will maintain the current rate of contributions to the FEHB plans by the government and its employees. Regardless of any change in the FEHBP formula, it is possible health insurance premiums will increase over the next year due to medical inflation and federally mandated increases in basic coverage. Congress should not aggravate the situation by shifting an additional $4 billion in costs onto enrollees. Third, the President's budget plan also increased Federal agency contributions to the retirement fund for civil service retirement system employees by 1.51 percent beginning October 1, 1997 and ending September 30, 2002. Currently, agencies match employee contributions of approximately 7 percent. Fourth, the President recommended an increase in Federal employee retirement contributions--0.25 percent of base pay in 1999, another 0.15 percent in 2000, and a final 0.10 percent in 2001--adding up to a total of 0.50 percent increase. The higher contribution rate would expire on December 31, 2002. I believe the President's proposed Federal employee budget package goes far beyond fairness. President Clinton has advocated a disproportionate contribution by those who have been asked to give again and again over the past several years. Federal employees and retirees across the country know there is no justification for the President's proposed package of changes--and it does not serve the interest of fairness to the Federal workforce. The Federal Government may be the largest employer in the Nation, but it is far from being a model employer. You might ask, what is the Federal Government offering its workforce in order to attract and retain qualified personnel who can respond to the challenges of providing efficient, effective service to the American people? Federal employees have witnessed the slow erosion of their pay and benefit package over the last several years. Because of the requirements of the budget resolution some changes must be adopted. As we work toward the goal of achieving the $4.8 billion in savings required of our committee, Federal employees will have to share the burden of deficit reduction, but they will not be singled out to accept burdens not imposed upon other Americans. Without question, public employees play an important role in our society. The hope is that by offering a balanced and fair compensation package, we can continue to attract and retain a talented and skilled workforce to deliver federal services. The reconciliation package which I will work to develop will have that as a goal as well as deficit reduction.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, in 1950 when William Faulkner accepted the Nobel prize for literature, he said that man would not only endure, he would prevail. I recalled of those words this morning when I was coming to the Chamber to describe my impression of Senator Strom Thurmond. He has not only survived and set a record because of his endurance but he has prevailed and set an example that all of us can study with profit. His character, his integrity, his commitment, his energy, his enthusiasm for his work and for the Senate, his respect for our Government and our country and its people, and his devotion to duty all set him apart. So it is not just because of his tenure that I praise him this morning but it is more importantly for all of these other qualities that have made him so special and so much appreciated as a Senator. I have felt it to be a real honor to serve in the Senate with Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. He truly is one of the most outstanding Senators who has ever served. And he has been easy to get to know and easy to like, easy to work with because of his cordiality, his warmth, and his willingness to be helpful. He can also give you good advice and be persuasive in a way that makes you want to do what he wants you to do. I recall going to the well of the Senate to vote when he was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and I had planned to vote against his position on an amendment. He grabbed me by the arm and began holding it with his famous firm grip, and he said, ``Now, you ought to do what's right on this'' and started talking to me. And in that little while I realized I was going to vote with him and not the way I had thought I was going to vote when I went to the well of the Senate. I later told somebody that I had been ``Thurmonized.'' That's when you are talked to in a fashion that is very persuasive, very courtly and charming, very distinctively like Strom Thurmond can talk to you. We have worked closely on agriculture matters. We have worked to ensure that the farmers of South Carolina and those involved in their specialty crops, such as the peach orchard owners, have the kind of investment in research that is necessary to maintain our technological edge, and our productivity, so that we can be competitive in the global markets. He is the farmer's friend. He has said on a number of occasions, and I have heard him say it, ``We have to be sure we do right by the farmers; they're very important to this country.'' He has the same kind of attitude towards those who serve in the military, and as chairman of the Armed Services Committee he has done as much as anyone, more than most, to help ensure that we have a military which is well equipped, well trained, and is second to none in the world. By reason of his own personal experiences, he knows what it takes in a time of crisis to prevail. He has been a wonderful example in so many ways. He has been devoted to his family. I can recall his talking to the then majority leader, Senator Byrd, about getting out early one night so we could go trick or treating with our children. And he was, of course, in his seventies at that time. But he wanted to be sure that family time was made available, and we got out early that night, I recall, because of the insistence of Senator Thurmond that we have time to spend with our families on Halloween night. There are many other things that come to mind, personal recollections. I never will forget being invited by him when I was a brand new Senator, to come to Charleston, SC to address the annual dinner of the Hibernian Society. He told me all about what to expect. He said, ``The main thing to remember is don't talk long.'' He said, ``They don't want a long speech.'' Well, I took that to heart. I didn't talk long. And what I really came to realize when he was introducing me was that the people there were interested in his introduction a lot more than they would be in my speech. He brought the house down. They were there to hear vintage Strom Thurmond, and he was terrific. He started describing me as he introduced me. He said, ``He is the first person to ever win statewide office in the State of Mississippi on the Republican ticket.'' Well, they cheered. And he said, ``And he thinks just like we do. He believes in balancing the budget.'' And they cheered and hollered. And then he said, ``And he believes in a strong national defense.'' And they jumped up and hollered again. And after a while, I realized my speech following this was not going to be worth giving; they were being entertained, but they were also showing their respect, their love for their Senator, Strom Thurmond. I was delighted to be invited and honored to be the speaker, and I did not talk long. It was a very successful experience because of that. It was a great pleasure working with Senator Thurmond on the Judiciary Committee during my first 2 years in the Senate, which was a very interesting time of transition. Another part of the genius of Strom Thurmond is to manage transition. The President talks about making change our friend. Strom Thurmond has been doing that for so long it is second nature. And the fact is he has been able to not only manage transitions and help ease the pain of transition for this country in so many different areas that he has been a true leader of our country in that respect. He is a wonderful example and a wonderful man, and it is a great privilege for me to be able to speak today in his honor.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I congratulate and commend my friend and colleague from Mississippi for his wonderfully eloquent statement, and for taking time, today, to pay tribute to a very special friend. Twenty-five years ago, Jonna Lynne Cullen came to my office in Jackson, MS, to congratulate me on my election to the Congress. She and my wife, Rose, along with my distinguished colleague the majority leader, were classmates at the University of Mississippi just 13 years before that. She told me, when she came to the office, all about the process of organizing the House of Representatives and offered to assist me and my staff as I began my job as the new U.S. Congressman from the Fourth Congressional District of Mississippi. Her advice and counsel to me were very helpful, and I gained more respect for her, for her insight and her knowledge, as time went on. As a member of the staff of the House Rules Committee, she was where the action was. She was where you knew what legislation was coming up and what the process was. And she was a great source of information and encouragement for me, as someone who had never worked as a member of the staff or had been closely involved in the workings of the Congress before my election in 1972. Her appreciation of the Congress was contagious, and so was her enthusiasm. Everyone I knew liked her. In time, her capabilities and dedication were rewarded with an offer to work at the White House. At the Office of Management and Budget, she helped guide to passage some of the most important budget reforms ever adopted. During her career as a member of the staff of the House, and in the Executive Office of the President, she was one of the most dependable, conscientious, and effective employees who has ever worked at either place. Since then, she has been involved in a wide range of activities, most of which have been related to business or Government. She began her own business, J.L. Gourmand, Inc., to manufacture and market her Pesto Plus products. She organized women's groups to support other entrepreneurs and professional women here and around the world. She traveled to other countries to help explain to those with new democracies how best to guarantee the blessings of self-government. And she developed her considerable talent with water colors as a painter of flowers, which are collected and appreciated throughout the National Capital area and in the houses of her friends and admirers all across the country. And that is a lot of houses, because she has many friends and admirers. All of her friends, and I am so pleased and privileged to have been one of her close friends for the past 25 years, wish we could see a modern miracle make her well because nobody could be a better or more unselfish friend than Jonna Lynne Cullen. With our good wishes we also send to her our thanks for all she has done and all she has given to make the Congress and the country so much better off, because of her good work and her well-lived life.

Mr. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, last week I received a letter from the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] on the subject of a task force which he had been asked to chair convened by the Council on Foreign Relations on the subject of Russia, its neighbors, and an enlarging NATO. Senator Lugar's letter discusses the highlights of the findings and agreements that were reached by this impressive task force made up of experts on foreign policy and national security. I think it is important for the Senate to consider and review carefully the task force report and the information in that as we are beginning serious consideration now in the Foreign Relations Committee and soon in this Chamber proposals for the enlargement of NATO. We have already had other agreements which have been widely publicized this week-- the charter or the framework between Russia and the United States on the subject of NATO enlargement. So it is very timely, in my view, for us to begin to get all of the information and all of the viewpoints that we can from those who deserve respect on these issues so we will be fully advised as we are called upon to make decisions on proposals from the administration. In his letter, Senator Lugar points out that ``The Task Force reached a strong bipartisan consensus that the enlargement of NATO and improved NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible.'' First he pointed out that the goal of this task force ``was to determine whether Russia's concerns could be managed and its internal transition bolstered without stopping or slowing NATO enlargement. The Task Force also looked,'' he said, ``at the security concerns of the Baltic states and Ukraine.'' He says the Task Force ``agreed that it is in the United States interest to try to achieve both'' enlargement of NATO and a strengthening of NATO-Russian relations. So we also should ``negotiate from a position of strength and not allow the NATO Alliance to be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. We strongly caution,'' he said, the Task Force said, ``that NATO's core mission of collective defense of its members--both old and new--not be diluted in any manner.'' Other highlights include an urging of the administration and NATO allies ``to take very specific steps, to reassure the Baltic states and Ukraine that they will not be left in a security no-man's land.'' And in conclusion, he says the Task Force recommends endorsing ``NATO's decision to add new, `full' members at the Madrid summit in July 1997, and suggests the Alliance remain open to the possibility of adding more new members in the future.'' The Task Force said, and he quotes from their findings: We believe that the goal of NATO's enlargement with Russia should not be to provide compensation for enlargement. Rather, it should be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship that builds on opportunities offered by a new Europe, a Russia in transition and an adapting NATO. The Task Force recommended also ``To engage Russia, negotiate a formal NATO-Russia charter,'' which is being done, ``and a consultative mechanism that offers both sides incentives to cooperate on shared problems,'' and to ``Update Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,'' which we approved this week. In conclusion, he points out that the Task Force suggests that we, Reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to dictate the terms of Baltic or Ukrainian relations with NATO. The Task Force urges the administration and the Alliance to offer special assurances to the three Baltic states and Ukraine, including confirmation that NATO's open-door policy applies to all Partnership for Peace states; increased efforts to include all four countries in Partnership for Peace planning and training exercises; affirmation that the United States shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of all European institutions; and conclusion of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen practical consideration over the coming years. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter from Senator Lugar and the media remarks that he made on May 5 at the announcement of the task force findings and report be printed in the Record.