William Cohen

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. The word proselytizing, I was looking for the word. I have not found it.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I believe we can dispose of part one of the amendment simply by voice vote, and then ask for the yeas and nays on the second part.

Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on part 2 of the amendment.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. COHEN. Not more than 5 minutes.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Breaux maintenance of effort provision. While I want to let States step up to the plate and implement innovative welfare to work programs with the assistance of Federal Government--not interference--I believe a Federal-State partnership is a key part of successful welfare reform. Therefore, Congress must make a strong statement on the need for State investment in welfare. We need to encourage States to provide their own funds as a condition of receiving the Federal block grant. Under current law, States have an incentive to spend their own money on AFDC and related programs. That incentive is the Federal match. Fourteen States receive one Federal dollar for each State dollar they invest. The rest of the States receive more than a dollar-for-dollar match. Under Senator Dole's maintenance provision, States can satisfy the requirement by spending money on any program which is modified or altered in any way by the Dole bill. This would mean State spending on food stamps, State foster care, Head Start, or even SSI State supplemental benefits would satisfy the requirement in the Dole amendment. I support the Breaux amendment to require a State match, using a formula of a dollar for dollar to determine the Federal match for each welfare dollar a State spends. If a State reduces its spending below 90 percent of its 1994 spending on AFDC and related child care programs, administrative costs, and job training and education funds--for each dollar the State spends below that threshold, the Federal grant to the State will be reduced by $1. This amendment is extremely important. It maintains an incentive for a [[Page S 13332]] State to spend its own resources to aid its own people. Understand, however, that the State match does not require a State to spend money. If a State is successful in trimming its caseload or cutting administrative costs, there is no requirement that it maintain its spending. But if a State is going to realize savings in the welfare program, I think the Federal Government should share in the savings, too. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate with considerable care, and I must say I find myself in agreement with at least the very last point made by the Senator from Louisiana about the need to try to approach welfare reform on a bipartisan basis, because I do not think either Republicans or Democrats necessarily have the right solution. I have read a great deal by sociologists. I have listened to the commentators on television, those who are advocating change. There is a general consensus that we have to change the system, but there is no agreement on what those changes should be, and few are confidently predicting what the ultimate consequences of any reform are likely to be. It seems to me that welfare recipients generally can be divided into three groups. On the one hand we have people who lose their jobs after working years and years and are temporarily in need of assistance and should have that assistance. There are those at the other end of the spectrum that I think we all recognize that, by virtue of some disability or some other handicap as such, they are unable to work and they deserve our support and not our scorn. Then there are those in the middle category, people whom we feel generally should be expected to work, who have been caught up in a cycle of welfare over decades, if not generations, even though they would seem able to work. We have to reform the system in order to encourage, if not require, these people to break the cycle by entering the workforce long-term. So I have looked at the various proposals, and I come to the conclusion, after listening to my colleague from Louisiana, that there should be a maintenance of effort undertaken by the States. A couple of reasons lead me to that conclusion. On the one hand, I believe, as my colleague from Maine, Senator Snowe, and also my colleague from Vermont indicated, there is a partnership between States and the Federal Government. The State is under no requirement to spend $1. The State does not have to spend anything if they do not want to. They can decide they do not want to take care of welfare recipients; that those who are out of work, either voluntarily or involuntarily, that is not their problem. But States that take this view should not expect to continue to receive the same amount of Federal welfare dollars. Without a maintenance provision, some States may engage in a race to the bottom by setting their benefits low to discourage residents in States providing minimum benefits from moving to States with more generous benefits. This concern has been dismissed by opponents of this amendment but remember: For years, many conservatives have argued that welfare recipients moved from State to State to get generous benefits. In a recent survey done in Wisconsin, 20 percent of newly arrived Wisconsin welfare recipients admitted that they had moved to get a bigger check. We must also address the vulnerability of the new block grant program to cost-shifting. Increasingly, we have seen States which excel in shifting recipients in the general assistance and AFDC programs into the SSI Program, a program funded entirely by Federal dollars. By shifting their cases to the SSI Program, the States can be big winners: States are able to recoup interim general assistance payments that they provide to the beneficiary, from the date of application for SSI to determination of SSI eligibility. Even more important, States will avoid future costs by shifting populations to a program entirely funded by the Federal Government. One State contracted with a for-profit corporation at a cost of $2.7 million to shift cases from the State's disability rolls to the SSI Program. The State enjoyed net savings of $27 million in 1992 because of this concentrated effort to more people to the SSI Program. I predict that we will see additional cost-shifting onto the Food Stamp Program. Without a strong maintenance of effort provision, States who retain food stamps as a Federal program can do what other States are already doing--pay lower AFDC benefits. When that happens the Federal Treasury will bear the burden as the food stamp benefit increases because the cash benefit is low. We must steer away from doing anything to encourage States to make unreasonable cuts in their welfare spending. We do not want Federal programs to become a magnet for new recipients who hope that the Federal Government will absorb reductions by the State. This increases budget costs for the Federal Government. Just as important, the results we hope to attain through reform of welfare have only a small chance of being realized because we have excused the States from shared fiscal responsibility. For these and other reasons, Mr. President, I wanted to indicate I intend to support the Breaux amendment, and I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I rise to describe for my colleagues an important element of the bill that will help preserve our shipbuilding sector and the jobs of skilled mariners. At my urging, the committee authorized $50 million for the national defense features [NDF] program. I am gratified to report that the Appropriations Committee has since agreed to appropriate $50 million to jump-start this worthy program. Given its importance to our national security, I thought it would be helpful to expand on the committee's report. At my urging, the Secretary of Defense earlier this year provided to Congress a study of the costs and benefits of an active Ready Reserve Force [RRF] program employing privately owned commercial ships equipped with national defense features as an alternative to government-owned strategic sealift. Although submitted 14 months late, the report was welcomed by the committee because it confirmed that the program offered important benefits to the Nation. [[Page S 12552]] Unfortunately, the Pentagon's fiscal year 1996 budget request contained $70 million to purchase existing, foreign-built RO/RO ships for the RRF, but nothing to fund the NDF program. The committee believed the $70 million requested to purchase these foreign-built and -owned RO/RO ships is not in the national security interest, is not cost-effective, and would weaken our national defense shipbuilding industrial base. Accordingly, the Committee recommended authorizing $50 million to procure and install national defense features on vessels built in, and documented under the laws of, the United States. This program will provide substantially superior ships, help preserve rapidly dwindling seafaring manpower and skills, save or create a significant number of jobs in the shipbuilding and supplier industrial base, and assist U.S. shipyards in reentering the commercial shipbuilding market. The DOD report demonstrates that an active RRF program, comprised of newly U.S.-built commercial vehicle carriers equipped with national defense features, would have important benefits. The report finds that procuring these vessels would be a cost-effective means of recapitalizing the aging, lower readiness RRF fleet at the end of the decade. The DOD report noted, however, that securing entry into the commercial market will be a critical element for the success of the program. As my colleagues may know, the principal car carrying trade is with Japan. Remarkably, only 3 of the 50 vessels operating in it today fly the American flag. In my view, the entry of new U.S.-built commercial car carriers equipped with national defense features in this trade would be in the national interest. Under one proposal now on the drawing board, for example, a fleet of ten refrigerated car carriers would be constructed in the United States to carry vehicles from Japan to the United States and produce and other refrigerated products to Japan at commercially competitive rates. Equipped with hoistable strengthened decks, these vessels would be well-adapted for carrying both heavy equipment and ammunition. Designed to move at speeds and with loading and unloading capabilities that far exceed those of used, foreign-built vessels, a fleet of this size would appear to be large enough to ensure vessels would be available for loading at designated ports of embarkation within the time demands contemplated in an emergency. I am particularly interested in this type of proposal because it would lead to the construction of new ships in U.S. shipyards. As my colleagues no doubt appreciate, we must do something to help our shipyards supplement their military work with commercial orders. the President of the American Shipbuilding Association, for example, recently pointed out in a letter to members of Congress that ``[c]onstruction of military sealift ships is critical to the Nation's defense, to sustaining the Navy's shipbuilding base, and to our industry's efforts to supplement declining orders with commercial work.'' By encouraging the entry of new U.S.-built vessels equipped with national defense features in this trade, Congress and the Administration can advance the national interest. I, therefore, would again urge the Department of Defense and our trade negotiators to emphasize to the Government of Japan the importance of augmenting American participation in this trade as a means of advancing the mutual defense and security interests of our two nations. And I would urge my colleagues not only to support this provision of the bill, but also to support the provision of the fiscal year 1996 appropriations measure that would allocate $50 million to get this program underway. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. COHEN. I would like to bring to the manager's attention a problem with the disposal of surplus property in Presque Isle, ME, from the former Loring Air Force Base. The designated local reuse authority is having difficulty with the Department of Interior in the disposal of the Federal property known as the BonAire Housing Complex. I understand that it is the intention of the chairman to assist the Maine delegation in resolving this matter.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the distinguished Chairman for his assistance on this matter.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding. Mr. President, let me thank Senator Thurmond for his confidence in asking Senator Warner and me to represent the Republican side in the negotiations with Senator Nunn and also Senator Levin. The four of us have enjoyed working together over our years of service on the Armed Services Committee, and it was a special privilege for me to be able to sit down for hours and hours, well into the night, in fact, on several occasions, working from at least 5 in the afternoon until midnight on at least two occasions, but the issues that were involved were serious. They required that kind of attention to detail. Notwithstanding some of the comments that were made earlier today by some of our colleagues, words do make a difference. Poets are not the only individuals who pinch words until they hurt. Arms controllers do as well. Words within the field of arms control carry specific meaning, and it was very important that we took great care as we tried to hammer out a compromise between our respective positions, in making sure that we would not do damage to longstanding precedents and longstanding interpretations. Notwithstanding the fact there has been some criticism leveled at this bipartisan proposal, we believe the care which we have taken to describe in some detail, with some great sensitivity, I might add, the meaning of the words that were used, carries significant implications for arms control and national security. We have to remind our colleagues again and again we are not seeking to rekindle the debate over star wars, some sort of astrodomic system that is going to hover over the United States and protect this county from an all-out assault from the former Soviet Union or any major power that may emerge in the future. We could not do that. We do not envision that. We agree, in light of the proliferation of missile technology that we are agreed upon, that there is a grave danger of missile technology proliferating at an ever and ever faster rate that poses a threat to the United States, also to the former Soviet Union. They also should have great concern about the proliferation of this kind of technology. How do we quantify it? How great is that threat? I do not think any of us are in a position to make a judgment. But we do not want to be in the position 3 or 4 or 5 years down the road of having some accidental launch, an unauthorized launch, or a limited attack against the United States and all the President of the United States could do would be to tell the people targeted: ``Sorry, we will do the best to clean up the thousands if not millions of dead after the missile hits. We have no means of protecting you. And, yes, we understand what 5 o'clock traffic is in Washington, New York, and every major city and the chances are you will not be able to get out of the city on 30 minutes' notice, and so all we can do is hope to minimize the slaughter that will take place by sending in our rescue teams, assuming they survive the blast.'' That is an untenable position, and so we have to have some means of defending against these types of limited, accidental, or unauthorized launches, and there should be no dissent on that. This is not a matter of partisanship. There is no dissent that we need to have that capability. In June, when the Armed Services Committee marked up the Defense authorization bill, the committee voted to put the United States on the path to deployment of a highly effective system to defend the American people against limited missile attacks. Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site defense. And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also evolve and a research-and-development program to provide options for the future. Since the National Missile Defense Program approved by the committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we added $300 million above the $371 million requested. We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result, reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A related matter involved negotiations being conducted with Moscow to define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems. Over the last year and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted toward accepting Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable ways--in effect, to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was never intended to cover theater defenses. The committee addressed this troubling situation with two steps. First, we voted to write into law the Clinton administration's initial negotiating position on what constitutes an ABM system. And second, we adopted [[Page S 12585]] bill language to prevent the administration from implementing any agreement that would have the effect of applying ABM Treaty restrictions to TMD systems. Last month, when the Defense authorization act came to the floor, the committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile defense. And another amendment was offered eliminate the policy to deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems. As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed in relatively close votes. Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979 and have spent some of that time in the majority. It has not been our practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on the minority. Instead, we have usually sought to develop as broad a consensus as possible on important issues of national security. In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader consensus. Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing ``the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack.'' His amendment setting forth this basic principle, which was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5. And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also approved by a very large margin, 69-26. I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this is a clear indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus. the bipartisan amendment The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four Senators designated by the two leaders to attempt to resolve this issue. In order to reach agreement on this amendment, both sides made concessions, although it should be noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less concessions than clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's intent. Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues. missile defense policy In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language. The bipartisan text states that ``it is the policy of the United States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system.'' The difference with the original text is that it substitutes the words ``develop for deployment'' for the word ``deploy.'' This change is consistent with the fact that what we are funding in this bill is research and development on national missile defense, not procurement. There will be a number of authorization and appropriations bills to be acted upon before we begin to fund the actual deployment of the system. I would note that the words ``develop for deployment'' were in the committee-approved bill, in the NMD architecture section, and so this clarification is consistent with the committee's intent. Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states-- as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site system is essential if we are to defend all of the United States and not just part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD architecture section, which states that the system must be optimized to defend all 50 States against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks. This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the compromise at various places that the system must be ``affordable and operationally effective.'' An NMD system confined to a single ground- based site would not be operationally effective, as noted in the ninth finding. The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD system will be one that ``can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats.'' This passage was of great importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving threat. The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system ``will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense.'' There were strong feelings on our side about the words ``will be augmented.'' In the end, we agreed to change this to ``can be augmented.'' Again, while the committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years. The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words ``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' clarify the ballistic missile threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the intent of the committee's bill. At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent and the realities of the congressional budget process. Funds to begin deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate. Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor consideration, and conference action. Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the Senate last month. This states that it is U.S. policy to ``carry out the policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of 1995) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.'' It also states that it is United States policy to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for the NMD systems specified in the NMD architecture section. At the urging of Congress in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, President Bush initiated such negotiations with Moscow. It is my understanding that tentative agreement was reached to provide for the deployment of ground-based multiple-site NMD systems. But the Clinton administration discontinued those negotiations. Under this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to once again engage Moscow in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or otherwise allow for multiple-site NMD systems. The policy section then states that ``it is the policy of the U.S. to * * * consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to consultations between the President and the Senate.'' I would note that both amendment to the treaty, as provided for in articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the treaty, as provided for in article XV, are ``processes specified within the ABM Treaty.'' Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never advocated abrogation of the treaty and the bill reported out by the committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that took place during the committee mark-up made it clear that there was absolutely no intent to abrogate. These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with Moscow [[Page S 12586]] taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the bipartisan amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the committee. Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are ``the policy of the United States.'' Not the policy of the Senate or the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are not its policy but merely the sense of the Congress. The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy section and which will be in the form of sense of the Congress. In fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a statement of U.S. policy. Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S. policy. nmd architecture The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications in section 235, regarding the architecture of the national missile defense system. The committee's bill stated that the NMD system ``will attain initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment states that the NMD system will be ``capable of attaining initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' This is a useful clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks within a specific period of time. Section 235 also states that the NMD ``system shall include * * * ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks.'' The committee's version of this provision was identical except that the bipartisan amendment inserted the words ``capable of being.'' I found this suggestion from the other side to be acceptable because I do not think it really changes the meaning of the original text. Interceptors are inherently ``capable of being deployed at multiple sites.'' I cannot conceive of any technical reason that an interceptor would be incapable of being deployed at multiple sites. Accordingly, ``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' does not, as far as I can tell, in any way limit the NMD system proposed by the committee. Indeed, one could argue that the only way that ground based interceptors are ``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' is if there are multiple sites. So, I am pleased that this change helped to produce a bipartisan resolution to this matter, even if I cannot find any substantive result of this change. In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a concession. The committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense ``to develop an interim NMD capability to be operational by the end of 1999.'' In order to achieve agreement with the other side, we have modified this to require the Secretary ``to develop an interim NMD plan that would give the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational capability by the end of 1999 if required by the threat.'' In both versions, the interim capability would have to not interfere with deployment of the full up NMD system by 2003. Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the Secretary of Defense analyzing ``options for supplementing or modifying the NMD system by adding one or a combination of sea-based missile defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or space- based directed energy systems.'' As I discussed earlier, such options for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many Members. To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile defense. It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site NMD system with options for layered defenses as the threat changes. But it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made for several years. tmd demarcation The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. I would like to summarize the resolution that was achieved in section 238, which was completely rewritten with the assistance of many Senators. The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty ``does not apply to or limit'' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note that ``the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that would substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution.'' What this means is that any agreement that would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems under the ABM Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate. Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject. Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater missile defenses. This prohibition would not apply to the portion of an agreement that implements the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-per-second criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the Senate. But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to impose any restrictions other than the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer- per-second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD systems or system components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles, and restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles. Under section 238 of the bipartisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the administration is barred from implementing any of these potential restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation, or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades. At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238 controls is the implementation of any restrictions on TMD systems. Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way. I want to commend Senator Nunn, once again, and Senator Levin and Senator Warner for the many, many hours that were spent negotiating over specific words. As I mentioned before, words matter a great deal when we are talking about arms control. I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. COHEN. Would the Senator from Virginia be willing to delete from the Record the depositing of any legal responsibility on my doorstep?

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. I would like to bring to the manager's attention a problem with the disposal of surplus property in Presque Isle, ME, from the former Loring Air Force Base. The designated local reuse authority is having difficulty with the Department of the Interior in the disposal of the Federal property known as the BonAire Housing Complex. I understand that it is the intention of the chairman to assist the Maine delegation in resolving this matter.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the distinguished chairman for his assistance on this matter. gear infac

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, in June, when the Armed Services Committee marked up the Defense authorization bill, the committee voted to put the United States on the path to deployment of a highly effective system to defend the American people against limited missile attacks. Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site defense. And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also evolve and a research and development program to provide options for the future. Since the national missile defense program approved by the committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we added $300 million above the $371 million requested. We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result, reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A related matter involved negotiations being conducted with Moscow to define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems. Over the last year and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted toward accepting Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable ways--in effect, to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was never intended to cover theater defenses. The committee addressed this troubling situation [[Page S 12338]] with two steps. First, we voted to write into law the Clinton administration's initial negotiating position on what constitutes an ABM system. And second, we adopted bill language to prevent the administration from implementing any agreement that would have the effect of applying ABM Treaty restrictions to TMD systems. Last week, when the defense authorization act came to the floor, the committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile defense. And another amendment was offered to eliminate the policy to deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems. As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed in relatively close votes. Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979 and have spent most of that time in the majority. It has not been our practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on the minority. Instead, we have usually sought to develop as broad a consensus as possible on important issues of national security. In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader consensus. Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack. His amendment setting forth this basic principle, which was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5. And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also approved by a very large margin, 69 to 26. I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this a clear indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus. The Bipartisan Amendment The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four senators designated by the two leaders to resolve this issue. In order to reach agreement on this amendment, both sides made concessions, although it should be noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less concessions than clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's intent. Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues. Missile Defense Policy In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language. The bipartisan text states that ``it is the policy of the United States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system.'' The difference with the original text is that it substitutes the words ``develop for deployment'' for the word ``deploy.'' While I do not believe there was anything inappropriate with the committee's language, this change is consistent with the fact that what we are funding in this bill is research and development on national missile defense, not procurement. There will be a number of authorization and appropriations bills to be acted upon before we begin to fund the actual deployment of the system. I would note that the words ``develop for deployment'' were in the committee-approved bill, in the NMD architecture section, and so this clarification is consistent with the committee's intent. Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states-- as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site system is essential if we are to defend all of the U.S. and not just part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD architecture section, which states that the system must be optimized to defend all 50 States against limited, accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks. This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the compromise at various places that the system must be ``affordable and operationally effective.'' An NMD system confined to a single ground- based site would not be operationally effective, as noted in the ninth finding. The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD system will be one that ``can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats.'' This passage was of great importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving threat. The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system ``will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense.'' There were strong feelings on our side about the words ``will be augmented.'' In the end, we agreed to change this to ``can be augmented.'' Again, while the committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years. The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words ``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' clarify the ballistic missile threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the intent of the committee's bill. At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent and the realities of the congressional budget process. Funds to begin deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate. Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor consideration, and conference action. Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the Senate last week. This states that it is U.S. policy to ``carry out the policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of 1995) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.'' It also states that it is U.S. policy to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for the NMD systems specified in the NMD architecture section. At the urging of Congress in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, President Bush initiated such negotiations with Moscow. It is my understanding that tentative agreement was reached to provide for the deployment of ground-based multiple-site NMD systems. But the Clinton administration discontinued those negotiations. Under this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to once again engage Moscow in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or otherwise allow for multiple-site NMD systems. The policy section then states that ``it is the policy of the U.S. to . . . consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to consultations between the President and the Senate.'' I would note that both amendment to the Treaty, as provided for in Articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the Treaty, as provided for in Article XV, are ``processes specified within the ABM Treaty.'' Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never advocated abrogation of the Treaty and the bill reported out by the committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that took place during [[Page S 12339]] the committee mark-up made it clear that there was absolutely no intent to abrogate. These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with Moscow taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the bipartisan amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the committee. Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are ``the policy of the United States.'' Not the policy of the Senate or the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are not its policy but merely the sense of the Congress. The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy section and which will be in the form of sense of the Congress. In fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a statement of U.S. policy. Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S. policy. NMD Architecture The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications regarding the architecture of the national missile defense system. The committee's bill stated that the NMD system ``will attain initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment states that the NMD system will be ``capable of attaining initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' This is a useful clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks within a specific period of time. In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a significant concession. The committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense ``to develop an interim NMD capability * * * to be operational by the end of 1999.'' In order to achieve agreement with the other side, we have modified this to require the Secretary ``to develop an interim NMD plan that would give the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational capability by the end of 1999 if required by the threat.'' In both versions, the interim capability would have to not interfere with deployment of the full up NMD system by 2003. Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the Secretary of Defense analyzing ``options for supplementing or modifying the NMD system * * * by adding one or a combination of * * * sea-based missile defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or space-based directed energy systems.'' As I discussed earlier, such options for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many Members. To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile defense. It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site NMD system with options for layered defenses as the threat changes. But it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made for several years. TMD Demarcation The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. Senator Warner will discuss this at greater length, but I would like to summarize the resolution that was achieved in section 238, which was completely rewritten with the assistance of many Senators. The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty ``does not apply to or limit'' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note that ``the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that would substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution.'' What this means is that any agreement that would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems under the ABM Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate. Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject. Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater missile defenses. This prohibition would not apply to the portion of an agreement that implements the 3500 kilometer or 5 kilometer per second criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the Senate. But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to impose any restrictions other than the 3500 kilometer or 5 kilometer per second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD systems or system components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles, and restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles. Under section 238 of the bipartisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the administration is barred from implementing any of these potential restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation, or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades. At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238 controls is the implementation of any restrictions on TMD systems. Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the Senate will move shortly to take up H.R. 2108, the District of Columbia Convention Center and Sports Arena Authorization Act of 1995. This legislation, which passed the House of Representatives last Friday, has two purposes. [[Page S 12514]] The first is to authorize the District of Columbia to pledge revenues generated by the sports arena tax as security to borrow funds. These funds are to be used to pay for preconstruction activities, mostly site acquisition and preparation, for the new arena to be built in the Gallery Place area. Over the next several years, revenue from the new arena tax, which has been imposed on the District's business community, will be used to repay the debt. The second purpose is to authorize the Washington Convention Center Authority to spend certain revenues for operating the current convention center and for costs associated with developing plans for a new convention center. These revenues are also generated by a special tax, in this instance an additional tax imposed on the District's hotels and restaurants. Both of these projects are considered critically important to the future economic stability and growth of the District. The financial recovery of the Nation's Capital is important not only to those who live in the District but to all Americans. A new convention center and sports arena will help to revitalize areas of the city, generate badly needed revenue for the District, and create new businesses and jobs for the residents of the District and the surrounding communities. Both will also enhance civic pride and promote tourism. As a result, both projects have broad based support among local citizens and businesses. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, I conducted a hearing earlier this week on this legislation. The responsibility of the subcommittee and, ultimately, the Congress is to examine the financial soundness of the District's plans for spending these special tax revenues. In light of the District's current financial crisis, there is an even greater obligation to ensure the District is proceeding in a fiscally responsible manner before the Congress approves the pending legislation. One aspect of the proposal that I have been concerned about over the past few days is the leasing arrangement being considered by the District to house some 720 employees that must be relocated from the buildings which are to be demolished on the proposed site. According to press reports, the council was expected to vote on a proposal from the Mayor to lease space for employees in two buildings owned by a local developer. The council, however, learned that the District had never independently confirmed whether the vacant buildings could be renovated by the October construction deadline and consequently the council did not vote on the $48 million lease. The Mayor subsequently negotiated a modified lease which was not submitted to the council before it adjourned its special session on August 10. Concerns have been raised about the wisdom of the District entering into a long term lease at a time when the District and the D.C. Financial Control Board are looking at making significant cuts in personnel. In addition, some have suggested that the District may have space to relocate the affected employees to existing D.C. owned or leased buildings. The first year lease costs for one of the buildings are included in the District's preconstruction costs and will be paid for by the arena tax. The remaining costs will be paid from the District's general fund and, therefore, any lease agreement will affect the District's 1996 budget and beyond. Consequently, Senator Levin, who is the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, and I believe it would be prudent for the Financial Control Board to review any leasing agreement given that the Board is currently reviewing the District fiscal year 1996 budget. As a result of discussions with the Mayor and the Control Board, the Mayor has agreed by letter that he will furnish a copy of the lease to, and cooperate with, the Board to enable it to provide a written analysis of the lease. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter to me from Mayor Barry be printed in the Record.

Mr. COHEN. In addition, he will also make every effort to have the D.C. Council consider the lease by September 13. Finally, I want to note that passing this legislation does not resolve any controversies surrounding the process by which the agreement for the new arena has been reached. These are matters for the citizens of the District and their elected representatives to decide and for the appropriate regulatory and judicial forums to resolve. Final action by Congress on this bill should not be construed as interfering with or affecting the administrative or legal rights of any individual or organization pertaining to the District's decisions on the arena or convention center.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, the argument has been made to support this amendment that this ship is not in the President's budget. The fact is that the President's budget is lower than the budget approved by the U.S. Senate. So, because the President's budget is smaller, the argument is we have to reduce down what we think is required for the national security interests of this country. We fundamentally disagree with the President on this issue. We think we have to do more in the way of procurement, not less. We cannot continue to go on any kind of a procurement holiday, as some in the military have expressed. We have had a shortfall in readiness. We have tried to measure up to that shortfall. But we are now compromising on procurement. In fact, our procurement budget as a percentage of that budget is lower now than it was back 45 years ago. We cannot go down any lower. So we decided that we have to do more. Some have argued that this is like buying a dress. We are not talking about dresses. We are talking about warships. We are talking about war- fighting capability. This is a war-fighting capable ship. It is the kind of ship that we are going to have to deploy to those amphibious operations that we are talking about off the coast of Iraq, or Iran, or the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and Haiti, and elsewhere; Bosnia. Those are the kinds of deployments that this ship is going to be used for. Is there no need for this ship? The President says there is a need in the 6-year plan. They just do not want it in this year's plan. So that is the argument made by my colleagues from Mississippi. We can buy this now, and the reason to buy it now and not later is to save $700 million. That is the reason we are buying it now. We are not buying an unneeded dress, or an unneeded ship. We need the ship, and we provide the money to pay for the ship. So the notion somehow that this is unnecessary, this is simply window dressing, so to speak, that we do not really need this kind of capability is absurd. We need the ship. We ought to pay for it this year. We can save money in doing so. There is not a person in this country who said if you have a requirement for it that you ought not to buy it at the best possible price. This is the best way to achieve savings for the American people. Mr. President, I hope that when it comes time for this motion to table that we will listen to the Senator from Alaska, who has looked at this, and to the Senator from Hawaii who has looked at this, and the Armed Services Committee which has looked at this and said this is a requirement that the Navy has. It has expressed this. Two consecutive CNO's have said we need this capability. What the Senate would like to do, if you follow this amendment, is to defer it to the future. Well, if you defer it to the future, there is a chance you might not have the money in the future. If you defer it to the future, it is going to cost you another three- quarters of a billion dollars. That is the kind of economics I think has brought this country to a point where it no longer is willing to support what is necessary for strong national defense. So I hope at the conclusion of the debate the Senator from Alaska makes a motion to table and our colleagues will resoundingly move to table and defeat the amendment.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. I would like to engage the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense regarding our Maritime Patrol Aircraft [MPA] force. As my colleague knows, the P-3 squadrons which comprise our Maritime Patrol force make an invaluable contribution to anti-submarine warfare missions.

Mr. COHEN. I am very concerned about the loss in operational capability of our Maritime Patrol Aircraft force. The services of P-3 squadrons are historically in very high demand by the unified commanders. In recent years, that demand has increased dramatically as the ability of the P-3 aircraft to carry out littoral warfare missions has become more apparent. Simultaneously, however, budget pressures have forced the Navy to cut P-3 force structure in its budget request. The current maritime patrol aircraft force structure consists of 22 squadrons, 13 active and 9 reserve squadrons. The Navy has reduced the number of active and reserve P-3 squadrons from 24 active squadrons in 1990 to 13 active and 9 reserve in 1994. The fiscal year 1996 budget request would support Navy plans to reduce MPA force structure to 20 squadrons, 12 active and 8 reserve squadrons. There is strong justification for maintaining no less than 13 active and 9 reserve squadrons. The Unified Commanders need to maintain at least 22 squadrons. In a letter dated February 4, 1995, Navy Secretary Dalton informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that, ``at the proposed fiscal year 1996 MPA aircraft force levels, it is not possible to meet the unified commanders' minimum maritime patrol forward presence requirement of 40 aircraft with only active Maritime Patrol Aircraft assets.'' It is expected that the Unified Commanders' minimum MPA requirements will be met in 1999.

Mr. COHEN. That is correct. The Armed Services Committee also recognized that Maritime Patrol Aircraft are ideally suited to meet a variety of mission requirements for littoral operations very effectively and efficiently and authorized an additional $35 million to sustain the MPA force structure at 13 active and 9 reserve squadrons in fiscal year 1996. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Unified Commanders have all expressed their support for the action taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the chairman of the Appropriation's Subcommittee on Defense. amendment no. 2412

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, last April the trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds issued a stark warning that the trust fund that pays Medicare benefits will be bankrupt by 2002, and that ``the Medicare Program is clearly unsustainable in the present form.'' In his speech a few weeks later to the delegates at the White House Conference on Aging, President Clinton echoed the trustees' warning about the pending Medicare crisis, saying that he ``cannot support the status quo, and neither can you.'' The Medicare trustee's report sounds an alarm that we simply cannot afford to ignore. Medicare is on a collision course toward bankruptcy. The longer we wait to change this course or apply the brakes, the more certain we are to crash. Mr. President, last week, the House minority leader, Mr. Gephardt, circulated a letter characterizing the pending Medicare crisis as ``more fiction than fact.'' Apparently, those who are dedicated to waging class warfare are prepared to resort to the tactic of treating fact as fiction. It is not a novel tactic, but ironically, one that is drawn from a novelist's nightmare vision of the future: Repeat a falsehood often enough and the people eventually will accept it as truth. The truth is that the 1995 trustees' report paints a bleak picture for the future of Medicare. Next year, the trust fund will start paying out more in benefits than it gets in revenues from the payroll tax. To quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Any government, like any family, can for a year spend a little more than it earns. But you and I know that a continuance of that habit means the poorhouse. Right now, Medicare is on a sure path to the poorhouse. By 2002--less than 7 years from now--the Medicare trust fund will be totally bankrupt. By law, it will be unable to pay benefits, leaving 36 million of our most vulnerable Americans--the aged and disabled--without coverage to pay their hospital bills. Politically, it would be easy to ignore the pending crisis and continue with business as usual. However, as Samuel Johnson once wrote: When a man knows he is to be hung in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully. Reforming Medicare is not about providing tax cuts, nor is it about balancing the budget. Even if the Federal budget were in balance, the Medicare trust fund would still be in jeopardy and the same reforms would be necessary to preserve and improve the program. Let there be no mistake--Medicare needs reforming for Medicare's sake. Let us also be clear that no one is talking about cutting Medicare spending. Under the budget resolution passed last June, Medicare spending will continue to grow at an average rate of 6.4 percent over the next 7 years and will increase to $273.3 billion in 2002. That's $92.2 billion more than the $181.1 billion that will be spent in 1995. So far most of the focus has been on resolving Medicare's short-term bankruptcy crisis. However, we cannot ignore the fact that Medicare's real problems begin in about 2010, when the baby boomers begin to retire, dramatically increasing the numbers of people eligible for Medicare and reducing the size of the work force. The demographics of the next century are daunting. Today there are 33 million Americans 65 and over. But the aging of the baby boom generation will swell the number to 70 million by 2030, imposing new burdens and challenges for the Medicare and Social Security systems. Today, it takes four workers to support a Medicare beneficiary. By the middle of the next century, there will only be two workers available to support each beneficiary, greatly increasing the amount each will have to pay in taxes to support the program. Medicare must therefore undergo significant structural changes if it is to survive to meet the health care needs of future retirees. The ability to change is key to survival, and the fact is that the Medicare Program has changed very little in the 30 years since its creation. While private health care systems have evolved over the years, Medicare has remained stagnant. We must find ways to make the program sensitive to the needs of older persons while at the same time making it more cost-effective. Sixty-three percent of working Americans get their health care through some kind of managed care program. By contrast, only 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in the kinds of managed care plans that have become a way of life for their children and grandchildren. Most care continues to be provided on a fee-for-service basis, which offers [[Page S 11726]] no incentives for efficiency and, in fact, encourages higher costs and overutilization of services. As a consequence, Medicare costs are rising in excess of 10 percent a year, while private health spending is growing at less than half that rate. There continues to be gaps in Medicare coverage. Medicare generally does not pay for preventive care and beneficiaries do not have access to benefits like prescription drugs that are routinely provided through private health plans. Many Medicare beneficiaries would gladly elect to trade their current fee-for-service coverage for a more coordinated system of care that gives them expanded coverage for prescription drugs and other benefits they currently do not enjoy. Americans in the private health care system generally have some choice about the kind of health plan they are enrolled in. Most Medicare beneficiaries do not. Congress should consider giving Medicare beneficiaries a full range of choice of health care plans, with incentives for beneficiaries to choose cost-efficient coverage. We should also consider allowing people to stay in their employer's health plan when they turn 65, even after they have retired. Medicare could reimburse employers for the cost of the premiums and perhaps provide a tax break as an additional incentive for them to continue coverage. This would not only allow Medicare beneficiaries to remain in a health plan they are comfortable with, but it would also keep them in a pool with younger, healthier people to lower the cost of their coverage. And, finally, we must rid Medicare of the fraud and abuse that robs the program of as much as $18 billion a year. Medicare has become a prime target for opportunists who bilk the system by overbilling, unbundling services, and doublebilling. I have introduced legislation for the past 2 years to crack down on fraud and abuse, and it is time to pass these reforms. There are no easy answers--either substantively or politically--to Medicare's financial problems in either the short or long term. If we are to summon the political will to overcome the current crisis and revitalize Medicare to meet the needs of the future generations, we must abandon the politics of fear and take up the politics of trust. This should not be a partisan issue. Those who hold a fiduciary duty to oversee the Medicare system say that immediate action is necessary, and the President apparently agrees. Given the sheer magnitude of the financing shortfall, bipartisan cooperation is essential if we are to establish the kind of lasting reforms that will be necessary to keep the promise of Medicare for not just current but future generations. Mr. REID addressed the Chair.