William Cohen

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. I want to inquire in terms of when we intend to proceed to vote on my amendment. Is it following the resolution of the Brown amendment, at some time later this evening?

Mr. COHEN. All right. Amendments Nos. 5059 Through 5065, En Bloc

Mr. COHEN. I understand that. We will dispose of the other two amendments. There was no indication how long the Brown amendment may take this evening. I am just trying to find out whether or not we----

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, this is one of the so-called Burma amendments. I will take a few moments to explain the nature of what I am seeking to achieve. I am offering this amendment on behalf of myself, Senator Feinstein, and Senator Chafee, and Senator McCain. Let me begin, Mr. President, by stating that nothing that we do or say on the floor of the Senate today is going to magically bring democracy, freedom and prosperity to the long-suffering people of Burma. Burma's history, since gaining independence after World War II, has been a series of oppressive regimes unable to set the Burmese economy on its feet, unwilling to grant the peoples of Burma the democracy and justice that motivated their heroic struggle for independence in the years leading up to the British withdrawal. When decades of isolation and economic mismanagement gave way in the late 1980's to a transitional period under military rule, there was a slight glimmer of hope that Burma might finally be moving toward a more bright and democratic future. But stolen elections, student riots, and the jailing of democratic politicians, including the Nobel Prize winning leader of the democracy movement, Aung San Suu Kyi, soon made clear freedom's day had not yet arrived for Burma. Over the past 5 years, Burma's military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, as it is called--its acronym--has pursued policies of economic restructuring, leading to economic growth. But its continued oppressive tactics and the oppression of the forces of democracy, the use of conscripted labor, and the quest to pacify ethnic unrest in various parts of the country have all brought us to where we are today. Mr. President, the amendment that I am offering seeks to substitute language that the Foreign Operations Subcommittee has offered in this bill. While I disagree with the subcommittee's approach to the issue, I would like at this time to pay personal recognition to Senator McConnell for his longstanding dedication to the issue of Burmese freedom. It is an issue little discussed in the Senate until recently. I think that the considerable attention the issue now receives owes a great deal of credit to Senator McConnell's persistence to this issue. So I want to commend him for his untiring efforts, drawing our attention to this issue. I want to also recognize Senator McCain and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts for their sustained involvement in the debate over America's Burma policy. Mr. President, the choice today is not whether the subcommittee's approach or the one that I am offering in this amendment is going to turn Burma into a functioning democracy overnight. Neither will accomplish that. And it is not a question of who is more committed to improving the lives of the Burmese people or who has greater respect for the tireless eloquence and courage of Aung San Suu Kyi. All of us involved in this matter respect Suu Kyi immensely and share her aspirations for a democratic and prosperous future for the Burmese people. But the question is, does the approach laid out by the subcommittee increase America's ability to foster change in Burma and strengthen our hand and allow the United States to engage in the type of delicate diplomacy needed to help a poor and oppressed people obtain better living standards, political and civic freedoms, and a brighter future as a dynamic Asian economy--one of the next of the so-called Asian Tigers? I think, Mr. President, with all due respect, the answer is no. By adopting the subcommittee language the Senate will be sending the follow message: That the United States is ready to relinquish all of its remaining leverage in Burma; That America is shutting every door and cutting off all of its already-depleted stake in Burma's future; That the Congress is ready to further bind the hands of this and any future administrations, taking away those tools of diplomacy-- incentives, both in a positive and negative sense--which are crucial if we are ever going to hope to effect change in a nation where our words and actions already carry diminished clout. All of us deplore the behavior of the Burmese junta. We all sense the plight of the Burmese people. We know the United States must support the forces of democratic change in Burma. I fully support the appropriation in this year's foreign operations bill to aid the democrats in the struggle. I think we have to recognize the reality of the situation in Burma and our influence over there. Burma is not identical to previous situations in which the United States has successfully pressured governments who are antithetical to our values of democracy and freedom. First, let me say Burma is not South Africa. Burma is not South Africa. Back in the 1970's and 1980's, the oppressive nature of the apartheid regime in South Africa led the Senate to impose heavy sanctions and isolation to end the regime. In order to do that, we had the support of not only our Western European allies but of the front- line nations, those surrounding South Africa, who also lent their support and joined in the effort to bring an end to apartheid. Unlike South Africa in the 1970's and 1980's, Burma is not surrounded by nations ready to shun it. As a matter of fact, Burma's neighbors and other states in the region reject the view that isolating Burma is the best means to encourage change. They are pursuing trade and engagement, and will do so regardless of what we do or say. Those nations over there who are closest and in closest proximity are maintaining their relations with Burma, seeking to bring about change over a period of time. Isolating Burma is simply not going to work, and we will not have the support of our allies. We will not have the support of our Asian friends. Second, Burma is not Iran. Do not make that comparison to Iran. The Revolutionary Islamic Government of Iran is known as a sponsor of terrorism and promoter of sectarian unrest throughout the Middle East and beyond. Not only does Iran flout the rights of its own citizens, it sponsors international terrorism, works to undermine neighboring governments and pursues the development of nuclear weapons. As a result of this, Iran is largely a pariah state. While we might have disagreements with our friends and allies around the world regarding our Iranian policy or our policy toward Iran, there is general recognition that the revolutionary government there is pursuing policies contrary to the interests of regional stability and peace. There is no such consensus on the Burmese junta. While many of their neighbors express irritation about the refugee flow caused by the SLORC's ongoing battles with the various ethnic groups, they view the efforts to oust SLORC as a threat to peace and stability in the region. The subcommittee's proposal will not make American policy more effective or make possible a more cooperative policy or regional consensus in dealing with SLORC. Let me say that Burma is not China. I do not happen to be a particular supporter of the Clinton administration's China policy in general. A central tenet of the policy is that the United States can threaten sanctions on Chinese exports to the United States in order to convince the government of Beijing to live up to its agreements. We have had a longstanding debate over our policy with respect to China. I know many people might disagree with the administration's proposal. I recall, for example, when President Bush was in the White House, there was strong opposition coming from the Democratic side to having anything to do with China, because we wanted to impose sanctions because of their terrible record on human rights. I recall many Members stood on this floor and talked about the butchers of Beijing, kowtowing to the Chinese, and imposing this policy of sanctions. President Clinton, when he was candidate Clinton, adopted that policy. Then, when he took office, he saw it was not going to work. We did not have the support of our allies. We did not have the support of our other friends in Asia. So the administration changed its policy toward China, and it is because of that we have some leverage; we have considerable leverage because the Chinese export many billions of dollars of goods to this country. So now, by engaging the Chinese, we are able to exercise some influence in some areas of concern to the United States, including human rights, but also with respect to our intellectual property rights, which we feel have been violated time and time again. So we cannot compare this to China because we do not have that kind of policy leverage over Burma. We do not have the kind of export-import relationship with Burma that we have with China, so we do not have the leverage to help in bringing about change. For all of the reasons I am suggesting, it is important we create a Burma policy in tune with the realities of Burma today and not the examples of South Africa, Iran or China. The alternative that I offer today sets a course for a coherent American Burma policy which upholds our values and, at the same time, expresses our interests in regional stability. It does, however, make American values and interests clear in a way that gives the administration flexibility in reacting to changes, both positive and negative, with respect to the behavior of the SLORC. In addition, I hope that the amendment I propose would not only allow for exceptions to the subcommittee's proposal, but I want to create some conditionality here, Mr. President. I propose to allow exceptions to the policy of no assistance to Burma in three critical areas. First, humanitarian assistance: We do not want to impose sanctions that are basically going to be directed against the people, the Burmese people. That is only going to impoverish them more. So I would have no sanctions across the board in terms of including humanitarian assistance. Second, there is an exception for counternarcotics effort. The counternarcotics provision, I think, is important, because, as Senator McCain has pointed out on so many occasions, the real victims of a failure to crack down on the narcotics trade in Burma are the millions of Americans who are harmed, both directly and indirectly, by our Nation's epidemic drug abuse. Burma is estimated to be the source of two-thirds of the world's production of heroin. So, does it make sense for us to eliminate all efforts to have a counternarcotics program in Burma? Are we not serving our national interests by at least maintaining some policy consistent with trying to stop the flow, interdict the flow, find other alternatives for the Burmese people to replace their crops with other types of crops? My amendment would allow a limited counternarcotics effort in Burma. It is certified to be in our national security interests in accord with our human rights concerns. The subcommittee's bill would prohibit all counternarcotics efforts in Burma. My amendment would not end the flow of heroin, but I think at least it does not throw in the towel in an effort to stem that poisonous stream. The amendment I offered recognizes that, to be effective, American policy in Burma has to be coordinated with our Asian friends and allies. This is not the case of the unilateral actions offered by the subcommittee. Mr. President, I have traveled in recent years throughout Southeast Asia, and I have discussed foreign policy, certainly, with many of the leaders there. Frankly, they do not see eye to eye with our policies. That does not mean that we have to necessarily conform our policies to the way in which they view the situation in Burma, but it does mean that we should look on each and every occasion to consult with and, when possible, cooperate with the other nations of ASEAN, if we hope to effect change in Burma. It seems to me that we can get on the floor, point to the oppression of the Burmese junta, and we can satisfy ourselves that we are seeking to punish them. But if, in fact, we do not have the support of our allies, and we do not have the support of those neighbors in the region friendly to us who are seeking to work us with on a multilateral basis, then we can stomp on this stage here and produce no visible effect or improvement on behalf of the Burmese people. Burma is located in one of the most dynamic regions of the world. It is the most dynamic region of the world. I suggest, Mr. President, that we have seen the flowering of democracy and freedom in parts of the world where values were quite alien to those that we support. We have seen developments, for example, in South Korea and Taiwan that have proven democracy can evolve out of formally authoritarian regimes. The same thing can happen in Burma. The best way to do that is to adopt a policy which gives the President some tools to influence the situation. The subcommittee's proposal is all sticks, no carrots. What we seek to do is give the President some limited flexibility to improve the situation on behalf of the Burmese people. I hope my colleagues will recognize this is not an effort to contradict what the subcommittee seeks to achieve, but rather provides the President with flexibility. It does not matter whether you support this President or not. Someone asked me whether or not I was carrying the water of the administration. Let me say, Mr. President, I have never considered myself to be a waterboy for anybody. I have never carried water for any administration, if I thought it was simply seeking to accommodate the administration. I think there is only one team. There is not a Republican or Democratic team; there is only one team when it comes to foreign policy. We all ought to be on the same side. We ought to try to develop a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. I am not seeking to carry the water of the administration, any more than I have in the past, when I was accused of not acting on behalf of an administration. What we need to have is a policy which this President or, what I hope to be President Dole after the next election, has the flexibility to achieve the goals that we all desire, and that is the promotion of democracy and humanitarian relief.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, today the Senate will pass H.R. 3235, the Office of Government Ethics [OGE] Authorization Act of 1996. OGE was created by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to provide overall direction to the executive branch in developing policies to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure ethical conduct by executive branch officers and employees. Senator Levin and I have long been proponents of strong ethics laws. We serve as the chairman and the ranking minority member on the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia which has jurisdiction over ethics matters within the executive branch. Senator Levin and I have made many changes to strengthen the ethics laws since OGE was created. We authored the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act which provides for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing by top level executive branch officials, and we worked together to strengthen the revolving door and lobbying disclosure laws. Last year, I, along with Senator Levin, introduced S. 699, a bill to reauthorize OGE. The bill was reported out of the subcommittee with no amendments and approved by the full Committee on Governmental Affairs last August. It is nearly identical to legislation which passed the Senate last Congress. The legislation makes a number of technical changes to the ethics laws and, for the first time, grants OGE gift acceptance authority to address the problem that arises when Federal Government facilities are not adequate either in terms of size or equipment resources to accommodate OGE's ethics education and training programs which are held around the country. This authority is intended to enable OGE to accept the use of certain non-Federal facilities, such as an auditorium that might be offered by a State or local government or a university, which may be better suited for OGE's needs. Federal agencies are not permitted to accept gifts unless they have specific statutory authority to do so. While OGE has not had this authority in the past, 23 agencies and departments do have some type of gift acceptance authority. The bill requires the Director of OGE to establish written rules to govern the exercise of this authority to safeguard against conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts in the acceptance of gifts. Currently, other agencies that have gift acceptance authority do not have to prescribe regulations governing its use. While other agencies would not be required to follow the example of OGE's regulations in making their own determinations about their gift authority, OGE's regulations would provide useful guidance to other agencies. OGE has been without an authorization since September 30, 1994, when the previous authorization expired. In April, Congressman Canady, Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, introduced a bill very similar to the legislation Senator Levin and I introduced. In an effort to complete action on this measure as quickly as possible, my staff has been working with Congressman Canady's staff. I am pleased to say that Senator Levin and I support H.R. 3235, the reauthorization bill which has come over from the House. There are a few differences between the bill that is before us today and the bill Senator Levin and I introduced last year. I would like to take a few minutes to outline these differences for my colleagues. First, the House bill reauthorizes OGE for 3 years opposed to the 7 years proposed in the Senate bill. While OGE has been reauthorized for 5 or 6 years in previous years, the House felt this was too long. The 3 year authorization continues to ensure that reauthorization does not occur during the first year of a Presidential term when a large portion of OGE's resources are devoted to the nominee clearance process. I continue to support a longer reauthorization than what has been proposed by the House, and while I will not be here when OGE needs to be reauthorized again, I hope that the Congress will once again move toward a long reauthorization. Second, the House bill includes a provision to correct an unintended effect of the 1989 Ethics Reform Act with respect to the post employment or revolving door rules applicable to high level executive and legislative branch employees who leave Government to work on political campaigns. Under current law, senior executive and legislative branch employees are subject to a 1-year cooling-off period during which they cannot contact their former offices on behalf of another party. There are some exceptions to the current ban, for example, if a Federal employee leaves to work for a State or local government or for an international organization like the U.N. However, there is no exception for employees who leave to go work for a political campaign. So, if an administrative assistant or legislative director takes a leave of absence from a Senator's staff to work on the Senator's reelection campaign, the former staffer is prohibited from contacting the Senator or his or her staffers with the intent to influence official action. There is a consensus that the current post-employment law doesn't make sense as it applies to campaign work. In drafting the post- employment rules, no one had the campaign example in mind. Moreover, leaving Government service to work on a campaign doesn't involve the kind of abuse the revolving door rules are intended to address, that is, individuals trading on Government information and access for private gain. In 1991, there was an effort to fix this problem by adding a new exception to the post employment law for staff who leave Government to work on campaigns. The Bush administration supported this legislation, and it passed the House as part of the honoraria reform bill. A companion amendment was circulated in the Senate, but the provision never became law because honoraria reform stalled in the Senate. The language contained in the House bill is identical to an amendment Senator Levin offered to the OGE bill last Congress which was passed by the Senate. It provides that executive and legislative branch employees who would otherwise be subject to the 1-year cooling-off period are not barred from communications with their former offices on behalf of a candidate, political committee, or political party. To guard against potential abuse of the exception or the appearance of impropriety when former employees represent multiple clients, such as when someone works for a consulting firm rather than directly for a campaign, the exception would apply only to individuals who work, No. 1, solely for candidates, campaigns, or political parties, or No. 2, for entities whose only clients are candidates, campaigns, or political parties. The exemption would not apply to FEC employees because of their duties in overseeing the campaign process and would go into effect when the bill becomes law. Therefore, an employee who left Government within the last year, and is still subject to the 1-year cooling off period, can take advantage of this exception. Finally, the bill addresses another unintended problem with the post employment restrictions. The 1-year cooling-off provisions apply to senior employees of the executive branch. Senior officials are defined as those serving in positions listed on the executive schedule, positions in the uniformed services ranked 07 or above, particular positions within the White House Office, or a position which the pay is equal to or greater than executive level V. This has included SES employees at levels five and six. Congress has frozen the executive level pay levels for a number of years. However, the pay levels for SES employees are set by the President through Executive order and have continued to increase. As a result, the pay level for SES level four employees has increased above the pay level of executive level V. What this means is that these SES level four employees will now be treated as senior executive branch employees and be subject to the 1-year cooling off restrictions even though they have not taken on any additional duties or responsibilities. It was not Congress' intent to have SES level four employees subject to these post employment restrictions. H.R. 3235 fixes this problem by amending the statute to read that these restrictions will apply to SES levels five and above not executive level V and above. In closing, OGE is a small office with large responsibilities. Over the years, we have imposed more responsibilities on OGE and we have not always provided the necessary staff or resources to carry out those responsibilities. Specifically, I would note the additional functions OGE had to perform when it became an independent agency in 1989 and in complying with the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. Congress moved to make OGE a separate agency because it was believed that OGE was not independent enough. In addition, Congress wanted to enhance the agency's prestige and authority within the executive branch given its important and sensitive responsibilities. While OGE's budget has increased rather significantly since we last reauthorized the agency in 1988, OGE still has a lean budget with which to operate when you consider the critically important responsibilities of the agency. That said, in light of looming budget deficits, OGE, like all agencies will be called upon to meet its responsibilities in the most cost-effective manner possible. Mr. President, OGE's mission is critically important in ensuring strict ethical standards in Government. I hope my colleagues will move expeditiously to pass this important measure reauthorizing OGE. Finally, I want to take this opportunity to thank Senator Levin for his efforts on this legislation and his many years of service on Government ethics issues.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Special Committee on Aging will hold a hearing on Tuesday, July 30, 1996, at 9:30 a.m., in room 628 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The hearing will discuss suicide among the elderly.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, will hold a hearing on Wednesday, July 17, 1996, at 9:30 a.m., in room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, on oversight of the implementation of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I are offering today the Travel Reform and Savings Act as an amendment to the DOD authorization bill. This amendment has bipartisan support and is intended to enable Federal agencies to adopt the best of private sector travel management practices. It will save over $800 million each year from regulatory and statutory changes in Federal travel management. This effort originated with two hearings I held this Congress on reforming the Federal Government's travel process. At the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management hearings on the costs associated with processing Federal travel vouchers, GAO, DOD, GSA and other executive branch agencies agree that the Government's policies focus too much on compliance with rigid rules, and that Federal travel practices are outmoded and too bureaucratic. There was also agreement that the travel process needs to be radically redesigned or reengineered and simplified by adopting the best practices of private industry. Successfully adopting these practices will save the Government an estimated $6 billion during the next 5 years. I am encouraged by the efforts of the Department of Defense and other agencies in reforming administrative costs connected with temporary duty travel. We are beginning to see progress and we should redouble our efforts to save the taxpayer money from unnecessary travel overhead expenditures. The Travel Reform and Savings Act primarily deals with another segment of Federal travel, Permanent Change of Station travel, or the cost of moving Federal employees to a new duty station. The amendment is based on many of the recommendations made by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, a cooperative effort between the Office of Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Treasury, and the Office of Personnel Management to improve travel and relocation management. This amendment proposes to offer alternative methods of reimbursement for househunting, and housing transaction expenses. These alternative methods would reduce administrative time and paperwork associated with auditing vouchers. If found cost effective to do so, this legislation would provide authority to pay for property management services, transportation of an employee's privately owned motor vehicle within the continental United States, and home marketing incentives. Furthermore, the amendment would authorize payment for limited relocation allowances to an employee who is performing an extended assignment, repeal the long- distance telephone call certification requirement and transfer authority to the Administrator of General Services to issue implementing regulations. The Travel Reform and Savings Act is intended to reduce the Government's relocation and travel costs and to ease administrative burdens while providing equitable reimbursement to employees. Enactment of the legislation will eliminate unnecessary paperwork requirements, cut redtape, and result in substantial savings to taxpayers.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, early this week Senator Dole delivered an important speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council in which he addressed the need for leadership in the 21st century. Senator McCain and I were privileged to have witnessed Senator Dole's first speech on foreign policy dealing with our relations with our Asian allies and friends. But in Philadelphia, Senator Dole called attention to our relationship with Europe, an area which, of course, by his previous service in World War II, he is infinitely familiar with. He talked about the need to call our attention back to leadership. He said our success has not been the result of luck, but of leadership. I think he was absolutely correct in pointing out that communism and the Berlin Wall did not fall. They were demolished by a clear vision and consistent leadership. I recall, Mr. President, that once when Mikhail Gorbachev came to the United States, he made a statement, I believe out in San Francisco, and he said: ``The cold war is over. Let's not debate or argue about who won the war.'' That prompted a prominent columnist to observe that would be the equivalent of having Max Schmeling knocked out by Joe Louis and getting up from the canvas and saying, ``This fight is over. Let's not argue about who won the fight.'' It was worth arguing about who won the fight because of the demands placed upon the American people and their agreement to measure up to those demands itself. Senator Dole touched on many aspects in his speech. I am going to ask unanimous consent that the full statement be included in the Record. But he noted, for example, that when the United States was focused almost exclusively on Mikhail Gorbachev, he was one who reached out to Boris Yeltsin, who at that time was being shunned by virtually everybody. He realized before Gorbachev's star was eclipsed that others had to follow. Others recognized his demise later. So Bob Dole was in the forefront of not just focusing on one individual, but focusing on our relationship with the country. Mr. President, instead, we seem to have pursued a grand bet instead of a grand bargain. We are betting once again on an individual. We had stuck with Mikhail Gorbachev even as Yeltsin was coming up to the forefront. Now we have shifted to a fascination with Boris Yeltsin, who once mounted a tank in the streets of Moscow, who is now mounting tank assaults in the streets of the cities of Chechnya, killing thousands of innocent citizens, going from fighting a coup in the Kremlin to fomenting coups in the independent republics of the Caucasus. Mr. President, we need to make very clear, in terms of our relationship with Russia, that we intend to maintain help, maintain the independence of countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, some of whom will become as important to the United States as the gulf states have been over the years, and whose states we fought a war to preserve that independence. We need to make clear, as Senator Dole did in his speech, ``that Russian economic blackmail and military meddling in their former empire will carry costs in terms of relations with the United States.'' Mr. President, I have a number of other points I would like to make. I ask unanimous consent that the text of Senator Dole's address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council be printed in the Record.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, we need to make it clear, that we will not ignore continued Russian violations of biological, chemical and conventional arms control agreements. In contrast to an approach based on romanticism, Senator Dole outlined: An approach based on realism and a clear understanding of American interests. A strategy that will reinforce the independence of the states of the former Soviet Union, that will support the new democracies of Europe, and that will strengthen NATO and lead to its enlargement. A policy that will deal with Russia as it exists today, so that we can effectively use what leverage we have to encourage Russia to become the country we hope it will be--free, prosperous, respectful of and cooperative with its neighbors. But not a policy that is based on the illusion that Russia already has reached this stage of development. Mr. President, there are many important elements to Senator Dole's speech, and I urge all Senators to take the time to read it. Mr. President, I now yield my remaining 4 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of discussion this evening about the amendment offered by my colleague from Georgia, an amendment which I cosponsored. I know it has generated considerable controversy because some have questioned the consequences of and even the motivation for such an amendment at this time. But I would just like to indicate that I think it is important that we try, as best we can, to return to a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. I would include within foreign policy our defense policy as well. This is something that, when I came to the Senate in 1979, we assumed would be the policy of this body--at least to try to forge a bipartisan coalition that would support foreign policy initiatives and certainly our defense policy, knowing unless we are united, we can only cause confusion, certainly within the country, and confusion amongst our allies as well. The issue of NATO expansion is not new. We have been talking about it for some time. Yet suddenly, by virtue of the submission of this amendment, some of my colleagues assumed there may be some political agenda, some hidden agenda on the part of my colleague from Georgia and the cosponsors that would have implications for our Presidential candidate. Let me indicate from the very beginning, I favor the expansion of NATO. I also support the candidacy of Bob Dole. I hope he becomes our next President. I know that he feels very strongly that NATO should be expanded. I intend to lend whatever support I can to his candidacy, as I have indicated. But I believe that before we make a decision on enlargement, which carry some fairly serious consequences, we ought to know a number of things. We ought to know what the implications are in terms of costs. We ought to know, at least get an assessment from our intelligence community, what the likely consequences would be for our allies and what the reaction will be in Russia, to the extent we can calculate it. Notwithstanding what the Russian reaction might be, we are likely to take the steps necessary to enlarge. But we should at least be aware of what our intelligence community can tell us about it so that we can make informed judgments. It seems to me that is not asking too much. And perhaps it comes at a political time, but these are issues that we should raise in advance. We should not find ourselves coming in at the tail end of a decision where a President has made recommendations either to enlarge or not to enlarge, where NATO has gone on record in favor, and suddenly the President turns to the U.S. Senate and says, ``Well, the decision has been made. NATO is in favor of the expansion. Now the Senate must go along.'' Ipso facto, we must approve because NATO has approved. That, I think, would put this Senate in an untenable position--to have a President of the United States make a decision and then simply submit it to us for ratification without us having any prior input into the decision itself or any kind of prior analysis of the evidence that we ought to be considering. There are other questions that can be added to the list of questions contained in this amendment. Indeed, one concerns the benefits of enlargement. That, I think, is a very appropriate question to add. A whole list of questions can be added. It is not locked in concrete. These were not written on Mount Sinai. They can be added to; they can be subtracted from. But it seems to me we ought to start the discussion now. One of my biggest criticisms is that NATO expansion has been bandied about, but the American people have not been asked about it. I hope we can persuade them that it is in our national security interest to expand the coverage and the protection and the benefits of NATO membership to countries that have long been under the heel and boot of tyranny, who are yearning to become part of this wonderful experiment in democracy and capitalism. They are eager to come in under our umbrella, as such. I hope that we can start the dialog now, to start going to the American people and pointing out exactly what is involved, understanding what the risks are, what the calculated risks are, if any. I, frankly, think we have succumbed too often to Soviet, and now Russian, indication. Mr. Lebed once indicated if we were to expand NATO, that is world war III. Since that time, he has modified that suggestion. Now that he is a candidate for vice president, as such, he is taking a more moderate approach. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the statements made. We may take an action in the face of such a threat, but at least it should be an informed decision on our part. And I find nothing wrong with raising these issues now, even though there is a Presidential campaign underway, because President--well, I speak too soon--Senator Dole, candidate for President Dole has been on record for a long time about his favoring expansion. We will support him as best we can in that regard. But I think it is critically important that we start raising these issues now, that we not blind side the American people and say, ``Well, the President of the United States and the Congress have now gone on record that we are all favoring expansion.'' We have never asked them. We do not know if there are tax implications for them or whether we are simply going to borrow the money, or if any money will be necessary at all. We have not asked them whether or not they would be willing to do it for not only Danzig, but Poland or the Czech Republic or any of the other nations that may come in, Hungary and others, Slovenia. We have not asked the American people as to whether or not they would support our sending our troops to those regions should there be an attack upon any one of them. It is important we ask them now to get some sense of what the public opinion is going to be, and if it is negative, to try to overcome that and shape it to follow our leadership on that particular issue. I might say in connection with another subject matter, that of Bosnia, I do not think we have asked enough questions on the subject of Bosnia. Things are going well; apparently they are going quite well now. There is less bloodshed, virtually no bloodshed taking place. The sides appear to have stepped back from this warfare that has been waged for so many years, and there seems to be a positive role that we have played during this interim period, a period of trying to maintain a truce. President Clinton and Secretary Perry each have pledged publicly time and time again this is a 1-year commitment. I think most of us would raise questions initially as to whether you should ever make a time commitment on the deployment of American troops anywhere, but a political decision has been made that 1 year and 1 year only is the amount of time we would deploy our men and women to that region on the ground. President Clinton has stated it publicly many times, Secretary Perry has testified before the Armed Services Committee on a number of occasions that they will start taking troops out, as a matter of fact, beginning in either late September or early October. So there will be no October surprise. It will not be a politically astute movement on the part of the President, ``Aha, we're going to have troops coming home; unbeknownst to the American people, they will come on the eve of the election.'' We know in advance they will be coming home before the election. Yes, I am sure there will be some political benefit from that which President Clinton will seek to reap. We know that is going to take place. We also know, according to Secretary Perry, that all of our troops will be out by the end of December. IFOR will no longer exist, according to the stated plan. But there is something else afoot, I must say, Mr. President. We have not talked about it, but I see it starting to take place. It is somewhat undefined right now. It is like a cloud very distant on the horizon that is coming our way, and we ought to try to identify it, because, Mr. President, there is afoot an attempt and a movement, I should say, in which the IFOR--the so-called IFOR that is there today, the NATO force--will be replaced with a new force. That new force, presumably, will be made up of NATO members, including the United States. The size of that force has yet to be determined, but it will still have to be a sizable force if we are going to deter and discourage any attempt to attack our men and women who are serving there. So now we have a situation in which we have pledged to the American people it is 1 year, and that 1 year came over the strong objection, I might say, of many on this side of the aisle. But, nonetheless, a deployment for 1 year, and at the end of 1 year we are coming home. That is the pledge. What is taking place now, however, is a suggestion that we need a new force, and that new force necessarily will have to include U.S. ground forces. We ought to start discussing that now and not wait until after the fact. Not wait until after November. Not wait until the Congress has dispersed either at the end of September or early October, when we are spread to our constituencies, and suddenly a decision is made that we are now formulating a new policy. The elections will come, and whether it is President Clinton who is reelected or President Dole who is elected, a decision could be made in that interim between November and January to create a new NATO force committing U.S. participation. And then we would be told: ``Well, it's a done deal. Our NATO allies are in favor of it, and now we must go along or we undermine the credibility of the NATO force itself.'' Our NATO allies would no longer trust the United States if we should back away from such a commitment. That is a subject matter that is worth discussing. It may be necessary to do that. I have yet to identify a vital national security interest in Bosnia, which is an artificial state, but nonetheless that is this Senator's judgment. But we ought to be talking about that. We should not wait until after the Bosnia elections in September. We should not wait until after the Congress is dispersed and we adjourn sine die. We should not wait until after the November elections and then suddenly find, my God, the President of the United States has made a commitment to deploy our troops in a new type of IFOR in the region, maybe smaller, but nonetheless still significant in size. So, Mr. President, we ought to get back to the business of having an active, intelligent discussion of these issues. We ought to try to do so on a bipartisan basis if at all possible. It seems to me we ought not to look for hidden agendas. Does the Senator from Georgia have an agenda to try to slow the process down? I do not think so. Others may come to a different conclusion. He is raising these issues because it is important that we prepare the American people for an analysis of exactly what the pros and what the cons are, what the benefits are, what the costs are. Are we placing ourselves in greater jeopardy? Are we reducing the jeopardy to our new friends and allies? All of that is of critical importance, and we ought to discuss it before we take action, rather than bemoan the fact that someone has taken action and we are called to ratify it with no prior role or participation. I hope we can amend the language to make it more positive, to ask about the benefits of expanding NATO, which I support. But I hope we do not simply defer these questions until some time after the decision has been made and then have the American people say, ``We don't want it. We don't want to pay for it. We don't want the benefits of it. We don't want to defend Poland or Hungary or the Czech Republic or Slovenia or the Baltics. We don't want any part of that.'' And suddenly the United States is placed in the position of saying, ``Well, we can't back out of it now. We have made the pledge.'' So I think these are important issues to be discussed. I hope that we can help shape public opinion in favor of expansion, and I continue to lend whatever support I can to Presidential Candidate Dole, Senator Dole, whom I expect and hope will become the new President of the United States. Amendment No. 4369 (Purpose: To authorize additional disposals of material from the National Defense Stockpile)

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, this is an amendment which I am offering, actually, on behalf of the administration. It is something that involves what we call research and development recoupment. The state of affairs is as such: The U.S. companies that sell defense equipment abroad are charged a fee by the Department of Defense for the purpose of recouping the research and development investment that the Department has made in developing the equipment. These fees can run anywhere from 5 percent of the unit cost to as high as 25 percent of the unit cost. These recoupment fees often put our industries at a substantial competitive disadvantage because the fees result in higher sales costs, leading some of the buyers to simply purchase foreign-produced systems, instead. The Bush administration eliminated the R&D recoupment fee for commercial arms sales, but in the case of foreign military sales, so- called FMS, those in which the U.S. Government acts as a middleman, the fee is actually required by law. Last year--let me emphasize this--last year the Defense Authorization Act included a provision to allow the President to waive the fee under two conditions. First, if imposing the fee would cause us to lose the sale, then the President can waive that recoupment fee. Second, if the foreign sale would result in unit cost savings to the Defense Department when it buys the same equipment and those fees would substantially offset the revenue lost from waiving the fee. Here is the problem, Mr. President. Since allowing the fee to be waived would on a net basis lower Government revenues, last year's bill delayed the waiver authority until the enactment of legislation to offset the projected lost revenues through the year 2005. So the administration, as required by last year's bill, has submitted such offset legislation. They have now submitted offset legislation which would cover the lost revenues by selling assets from the strategic stockpile. The Congressional Budget Office has given its stamp of approval to the administration's plan. For several months there was some confusion over whether the administration's bill would work because it significantly overestimated how much lost revenue needed to be offset, calling into question whether the Department of Defense could sell off sufficient stockpile assets without interfering with the market. Earlier this month, however, CBO concluded that waiving the R&D recoupment fee per last year's bill would cost roughly $415 million through the year 2005. That is about half of what the administration originally projected would be the cost. At the time that the Armed Services Committee marked up this bill, CBO had yet to produce its analysis. So the issue simply was not addressed at that time. But after we completed the markup, President Clinton's administration said that unless we included this provision in the offset, they would recommend a veto of the DOD bill. So, in essence, I am acting on behalf of the administration to try to avoid a veto of the measure by now offering that provision in the form of an amendment, the provision that the committee had failed to include. So I am serving here, I think, a bipartisan purpose; namely, the administration said we are going to veto this bill unless you include this amendment, so now I am offering the amendment to help avoid a veto. I know that some Members from States that produce materials that would have to be sold have indicated some concern about the effect that selling these strategic minerals would have on the markets. But I emphasize, the amendment explicitly prohibits any sale that would have an undue disruption on the markets involved. Also, I am aware that some Senators might look at this amendment and ask, ``Aren't we promoting international arms sales?'' I agree that we should always be careful about what arms we sell and to whom we sell them. But this amendment does not pose any problem in terms of unwise arms sales. First of all, the amendment only deals with FMS sales, which the Government has complete control and discretion over. If a proposed sale is unwise or against our interest, this amendment in no way creates any incentive for U.S. officials to approve the sale. In fact, it would create a disincentive because waiving the fee would reduce revenues. I also note a Presidential commission on conventional arms proliferation just last week released its report. That commission was chaired by Janne Nolan, known to many Senators because of her service in the Carter administration and as a Democratic Senate staffer. Another commission member was Paul Warnke, who was President Carter's head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. So we have two very strong individuals who have served in past Democratic administrations who served on this commission. The commission came out with some strong recommendations to limit the sale of conventional arms to other countries. The relevant point for this amendment is that the commission called for the complete repeal of FMS R&D recoupment fees. My amendment does not go that far. Perhaps we ought to eliminate the recoupment fee altogether. But my amendment is not trying to establish new policy. It merely finances the policy decision that Congress made last year when we approved the DOD authorization bill. So, Mr. President, the President's commission on preventing the proliferation of conventional arms sales totally supports this particular approach. They want to eliminate the recoupment fee entirely. This is a much more modest step. It is something that the administration has requested. I hope that my colleagues will see fit to support it. Also, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from the Department of Defense supporting the amendment, an excerpt from the report of the President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy, an article from the Washington Post describing the general findings of the commission calling for greater restraint in arms sales, and, finally, a letter from the Aerospace Industries Association, which endorses the amendment.

Mr. COHEN. I yield the floor. Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

Mr. COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Madam President, just for the record, this amendment was filed yesterday. It is not a last-moment initiative on my part. We do need to move forward if we are going to have any chance of completing action on this bill. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I have a modification of my original amendment, which will add a new subsection that would satisfy the interests of the Senators from Nevada.

Mr. COHEN. I ask unanimous consent Senator Lieberman be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.

Mr. COHEN. If I could just respond very briefly. I know the Senator from Nevada is concerned about the potential consequences of any amendment to his State. But I point out that the amendment provides, specifically on page 2 of the amendment, that ``The President may not dispose''--may not dispose--``of materials under subsection (a) to the extent that the disposal will result in--(1) undue disruption of the usual markets of producers, processors, and consumers of the materials proposed for disposal; or (2) avoidable loss to the United States.'' Second, we have a factsheet submitted by the Department of Defense. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the Record.

Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I will cite it here. Considering the state of the domestic production (U.S. sponge producers have sold out their production, forcing titanium metal producers to go offshore for sponge) this would be an ideal time to enter the market with the Stockpile sponge. Madam President, I am doing this at the request of the administration. They are saying they are going to veto this measure unless we include this provision. So I am trying to act in a bipartisan fashion saying: The administration wants this. I want it. It makes good sense for our producers of military equipment. The Department of Defense wants it. It seems to me that the language is written as such that it would not pose the kind of job loss that the Senator from Nevada has indicated. As a matter of fact, according to DOD, this is the precise time that we ought to enter the market for stockpile sponges. So, Madam President, I hope that we will vote against the elimination of the titanium from my amendment and approve the amendment as I have drafted it. I ask for the yeas and nays on the underlying amendment.

Mr. COHEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.