Larry Combest

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. COMBEST. Reclaiming my time, I want to say to the gentlewoman that I understand the frustration, I truly do understand it, and it makes it seem so ridiculous for this to have happened, that we can allow a bad accounting program like this to go unpunished. but I do not know how we go back and punish. The only way to do that is to cut out what I think are some very significant programs, and, hopefully, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to try to deal with this problem are what are bringing this all to fruition and to a head.

Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. COMBEST. I do understand.

Mr. COMBEST. Those funds in the carryforward account are obligated and were authorized and appropriated for specific purposes of which the new authorizations that we are looking at now would not include. Those are still going to have to be expended. They would have had to have been expended at some point in time. And that is the point I was making earlier, was that if the Congress wants to go back and cancel some of those programs that have already been approved that this money was there for, that is a totally different subject. But as long as those are still to be moving forward in the new satellite architecture, all those funds in the carryforward account at some point have to be expended on those programs. And the moneys we are looking at now are not going in the carryforward, they are going into additional expenditures for those programs above what the carryforward accounts accounted for.

Mr. COMBEST. I guess we might, but I am not for sure. I would have to check to see what that is.

Mr. COMBEST. Yes; that is correct, on the NRO portion.

Mr. COMBEST. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct, this authorization bill is 5 percent below what the administration requested.

Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. COMBEST. That was to be brought under scrutiny and they were to begin to manage that account. We then have, in this year's authorization, as I have mentioned, and I would encourage the gentlewoman to look, brought every program that organization runs under scrutiny. Every one. I wish the gentlewoman would look at what we are recommending on some of those. I cannot go beyond that on the floor of the House.

Mr. COMBEST. Part of that is in the continuing carryforward account. What we required last year in the authorization was that they lower their carryforward account to no more than 1 month. They could not run programs in a carryforward account, they could not keep those moneys for more than 1 month. But they have to manage that, Mrs. Schroeder. They have to move that. They cannot take that amount of money and all of a sudden just throw it away. We do not want them to do that, and they are managing that now. So what we are requiring that they do is to take that money that was originally authorized and appropriated for certain programs and expend it on those programs and work that carryforward account down. They are in that process now to where they have no more than 1 month's carryforward at any time. We have only become aware, as the gentlewoman mentioned, of the amount of the money just in the past week to 10 days, because they have continually, over this period of time, tried to do a very accurate accounting in which they were going to tell us how much that was there for. And it was not wasted or thrown away or squandered. It is not being spent on programs that are not authorized. It is that they were trying to work that out. But last year, recognizing even at the time we were only talking in the neighborhood of a billion to a billion and a half, we agreed that that was not acceptable and that we were going to bring that under scrutiny.

Mr. COMBEST. No. First of all, there is not an entire $4 billion. Virtually half of that amount was taken out last year.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman from Colorado had asked me to yield, and I am happy to yield to her.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, this is one of those interesting situations that one finds themselves, I guess constrained. I and the members of the committee were outraged at about this time last year when it was discovered that there was a carryforward account that we were not aware of; that the Director of Central Intelligence was not aware of. We demanded that there be something done. As has been mentioned, the two top officials at the NRO were relieved of their duty. A chief financial officer was put into place, and he was tasked with coming up with what was the amount. Originally, it was purported to be a billion, a billion and a half. It was uncertain, because as the gentlewoman from Colorado has pointed out, when the chief financial officer, Mr. Nelson, publicly made his report last week, he talked about how egregious, and I do not remember his exact words, but they were not kind in terms of some of the financial management of the NRO. We have tried to follow on the committee throughout the past several months, as we have had constant updates on the investigation by the chief financial officer of the NRO carryforward account. There were substantial monies taken out in the appropriations process last year, after it was discovered, from the carryforward account. The Director of Central Intelligence as well took out an additional amount of that money, all inclusive totaling in excess of billions of dollars, to use in other functions that the administration wished to pursue. We have continually asked and we have continually been updated on the carryforward account. Mr. Nelson, rather than keeping it secret and not discussing it, has a public interview in which he mentioned the $4 billion amount. Now the accounting process stunk, but I think it is very important to note that this was money that had been authorized and appropriated for programs that were authorized by the Congress, for future program as that are managed and run by the National Reconnaissance Office. They were moneys that had not been expended because some of the programs had been working better than had been anticipated. These are programs that if the Congress wants to cancel, the Congress should cancel, but it does not take away from the fact that these are programs that at one time the Congress has approved to move forward with. Now, I also find it a little difficult in defending this because of how outraged I was when I first became aware of the carryfoward account. I also find it somewhat ironic that in the mark, and I would invite Members to come up and look at what we have done in the section for the NRO, we are 5 percent below what the administration requested for the NRO. And some of us have been accused of micromanaging the NRO accounts. My comment to that was if someone had been micromanaging for several years we would not be in the problem we are in. So on one side some of us are being criticized for micromanaging, trying to straighten out the problem, and on the other side we are being criticized for not doing enough. So I would encourage Members to come up and look, and I wish I could tell Members what we are doing with all of the programs. There has been no program left unscathed. We have brought every program program that that organization runs, put it on to the table, and we have been looking at delaying some of those programs, we are looking at potentially canceling some of those programs, and we are being strongly criticized by the agency, by the administration, and by other Members of Congress. But the purpose of doing that is to bring into bearing what it is the gentlewoman is complaining about, and very rightly so. But I would urge her to come up and look and talk to some of the Members on the other side that have been complaining so hard about the fact that we are putting them under a microscope. They are going to have to come up with and defend and satisfy the committee that every one of the requests that they have made in the President's request, which is above what we have authorized is, in fact, justifiable.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's amendment. Those who follow the floor debate on intelligence from year to year are aware, in general terms, that the intelligence budget has been on a steady decline, that capabilities are being shut down, and that managing intelligence nowadays means making Russian roulette decisions on which cuts are least likely to endanger lives. Being on the committee has allowed me to see the specifics behind these generalized facts. More importantly, it has allowed me to delve in person into the intelligence processes and products and see with my own eyes their strengths and weaknesses. Some of those weaknesses can be sifted out of the mass of largely ludicrous public attacks which intelligence is sometimes subject. The strengths, though, tend to be largely unknown in the country at large and unheralded in the press. Without being too specific, let me mention a few I have personally run across. Example one: Cooperative clandestine activities undertaken by the CIA and other U.S. Government agencies resulted this last year in the detection and foiling of planned attacks on U.S. public and private citizens. Lives were saved. Example two: The CIA worked with cooperative foreign governments to, effectively speaking, shut down a terrorist organization that has had a long history of successful attacks on U.S. citizens. Example three: Young intelligence community scientists constructed state-of-the-art computer hardware and custom software capabilities that are allowing the Intelligence Community to do what outside experts--and our country's enemies--believe to be impossible. I should point out that these same scientists work in this specific intelligence agency at a salary a fourth or fifth of what they have been offered in the private sector--they refuse to leave the work they consider so personally satisfying and important to national security. Example four: Intelligence Community scientists and clandestine operators cooperated to detect, penetrate, and neutralize the activities of a pariah regime to develop weapons of mass destruction. Example five: The Intelligence Community, working closely with law enforcement agencies and foreign governments, provided the essential intelligence that led to the crippling of international narcotics trafficking organizations. Mr. Chairman, I am in strong opposition to this proposed cut. The committee recognizes the fact that each year from year to year that there is a very small amount of the actual intelligence budget in its operations programs that have become familiar to Members of Congress, much less to the American people. We take this responsibility very seriously. There are a number of areas within the intelligence budget that have been substantially reduced this year. We have tried to make priorities in some areas that we feel are extremely important to move this Nation in the future of its role for intelligence. This is not something that can be done year by year. This is something that needs to be done on a long-term basis to make for certain that the future provides the continual need for intelligence capabilities that this country has for so many years done very, very well. We are diligent in terms of our oversight. We are serious about the fact that we want to make for certain that each of these dollars is expended wisely. These are dollars, however, that we feel that we can justify to our fellow colleagues and to the American people that are critical and crucial for the American intelligence capabilities which are at the heart of our national security and national defense. I think the committee has done a good job of coming up with a proposed budget in the authorization bill that we have this year. I would strongly support the committee's position on that bill, and I would again reiterate my opposition to the proposed cut amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly concur and say yes, we would intend for this to still be in effect. As the gentlewoman so adequately pointed out, and has been very effective, I think, in leading on this issue, we would certainly expect that this provision would be narrowly construed and only used in the most serious of circumstances. That is certainly the intent of the committee to carry forward in this year's authorization.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this is also a technical amendment that would correct an oversight in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996. The law requires specific authorization for expenditure of funds for intelligence. The act in question obligated funds for intelligence, but contains no provisions for authorization. This amendment would correct that oversight. It is my understanding that the amendment is acceptable to the Committee on Appropriations, and I would yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, again this is basically a technical amendment. The section provides the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to transfer funds authorized for automatic declassification within the national foreign intelligence community to execute section 3.4 of Executive Order 12958. This provision would allow that money which is basically in one pool to be dispensed within the NFIP agencies, depending upon the need of that agency to comply with the declassification order of Executive Order 12958. It is my understanding that there are no objections to this amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this section corrects existing law which currently requires the CIA to make two payments, one of 9 percent, one of 15 percent, for employees who take incentivized retirement from the CIA during fiscal years 1998, 1999. The CIA is required to make the Government retirement trust fund whole for those individuals who take these incentivized retirements. In order to do so, it must reimburse the Federal Government 15 percent of the final base pay of each individual who retires. Requiring the CIA to make an additional 9 percent payment becomes a penalty. Section 403 eliminates the double surcharge. This amendment is identical to one offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica], chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service. It is my understanding that Mr. Dicks has no objections.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply provides the opportunity for the Central Intelligence Agency to execute multiyear leasing authority. The CIA has routinely signed multiyear leases since 1949, relying on section 8 authority to expend appropriated funds of the CIA Act. The CIA inspector general now has concerns about the propriety of using that authority for overt leases. CIA needs are such that it often requires space on a very short notice. If it can do so only for short-term leases, 1 year, landlords demand higher rental payments. GSA has difficulty meeting CIA's very specific needs: readily available space, special security and communications needs resulting in added cost for CIA and thus for the Government as a whole. The CBO raises concerns about the availability of appropriations for multiyear leases. My amendment would require that multiyear leases be subject to the availability of funds. CBO is also concerned that this provision could cost several million dollars per year. We have to remember that without this authority, the CIA will continue to use 1- year leases that will inevitably cost more money. Our best estimate is that this provision will save more than a million dollars per year. Mr. Chairman, it is technical. It is my understanding that my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], has no objection to this amendment.