Larry Combest

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we have any further speakers on this side. I just wanted to make a point that emphasizes something I had said earlier. The White House press statement relative to the intelligence community budget of 1996 said, reflecting the President's determination to promote openness in the intelligence community, he has authorized Congress to make it public. Mr. Chairman, the President can make it public. I would state that the report of the Aspin-Brown commission says that the commission recommends that the President or his designee disclose the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities during the current fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year. That is my suggestion. In compliance with the Aspin-Brown commission, if the President wishes the budget to be disclosed, he or his designee should do it.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 additional minute.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes. I would just like to mention a few points that I have mentioned before and my objections to the concept of the gentleman's amendment. The ranking member of the committee is in support. In fact, I think a cosponsor, chairman of the committee in the previous Congress, our friend the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Glickman, supported the idea. I believe this is starting down a slippery slope. I think this is an inside-the-Beltway issue. I do not believe the American people are clamoring to know the intelligence budget. I believe that they understand the need for there to be national secrets. I believe that, and in fact the staff have begun to put extreme pressure on knowing the individual amounts of various programs, various agencies within the intelligence community. That information, I think, provides information to folks that we would rather not know what our plans and programs are; that, in fact, is harmful. Finally, I would just simply say that in the administration's support of this, of declassification of the topline figure, the President has the authority today, if he wished, to call a news conference and disclose the amount, he could do so. He does not need congressional approval. I think he is looking for congressional cover. I would suggest that, if the administration wishes to take this action, that they would move forward under the authority which they currently have. The President may so desire to do that. That is his decision. I simply do not feel comfortable with it. I have always opposed it, continue to oppose it and would not in fact be supportive, could not lend my support to a provision which in fact would cause him to, given that he has the authority now.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I support the idea of requiring an agreement to be made. That may not be true of every member of the committee, but I certainly do support that.

Mr. COMBEST. My concern would be, for example, we can take the UNPROFOR forces, where the United States is a part of that operation; requiring a prior approval on each case-by-case basis might not be able to be done in a timely fashion. If it is required that there be a waiver or that that be reported to Congress as a theater, the American forces involved with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, that would certainly be something I would support. It is the individual case, in which in a timely manner prior approval could not be given, just simply because there was not enough time that existed prior to the need to share that information for protection of American lives, either be it a single situation, such as Captain O'Grady, or U.S. forces that might be involved in a situation where we became aware of something that was fixing to happen or was going to happen in a very short order but there was not time for the President to actually get engaged and to grant the waiver prior to the time that action had to be taken. Those are the concerns I have. And in those instances, I would try to protect in my substitute that the appropriate committees of Congress would have to be notified that, in fact, that waiver was granted and could then make their own determination about whether or not it, in fact, qualified.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I will only reiterate the substitute that I will be offering to the Brownback amendment would provide those two caveats, one for the allowance of intelligence sharing, broader authority for allowance of intelligence sharing when it goes to supporting U.N. forces in which the United States is a participant, and the second to allow a waiver for emergency situations that involve imminent risk to U.S. lives, in which case the President would have to report to Congress the details of that waiver.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I want to say initially that I am in total agreement with the gentleman's intent, that I share his concerns and voted for provisions in H.R. 7 of last year that would have substantially improved the process by which intelligence could be shared with the United Nations. Unfortunately, those restrictions did not become law, and I still support the idea of requiring that to the appropriate committees of Congress, that any information which is shared with the United Nations commanders must be provided to the Congress for oversight. I am concerned, and our committee spent a good deal of time over the last year following some recognition of some problems in pursuing those to make certain that there was no loss of sources or methods in some of them mishandling of classified information, and we have a very strong concern. Let me mention two areas of concern that I have in regards to the gentleman's amendment that I certainly do not presume in any shape, form or fashion would be intentional. But let me mention two areas of real concern that I have, in which I am concerned that the amendment as offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] in its current form would have. One is in the area of providing and sharing intelligence in which U.S. troops are involved. That would be that we would be prohibited in certain instances by a basic prenotification, that we could not share intelligence with NATO forces in any area in which U.S. troops were involved, and consequently could potentially put them into greater harm. In addition to that, in certain instances that would require prenotification that might not be possible in a timely fashion. I will give you an example in which Captain O'Grady was shot down. That information through the processes of determining the fact that there were surface to air missiles that were in a location that had not previously been determined, literally came down to a matter of minutes, in which we may have been able to be aware of that, but not been able to share that with U.N. forces in the area that they would have been able to get that information to Captain O'Grady. Those concerns in a real timely fashion I believe were legitimate, and I have an amendment to the Brownback amendment that I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that would in fact allow a broader authority for sharing of intelligence when it goes to support U.N. forces in which the United States is a participant, and, secondly, to allow a waiver for emergency situations involving imminent risk to U.S. lives, in which case the President would have to report to Congress as to the specific details of that waiver. amendment offered by mr. combest as a substitute for the amendment offered by mr. brownback

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, as we traditionally have been on this bill, we are very happy to accept the gentleman's amendment, and appreciate his continued work on this for all of these 12 years.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just also mention that in the authorization of last year our committee, and I am sorry in the conference report, which finally became the law, this committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee put a limit of 1-month carryforward money so that those could be substantial so that we can make for certain that it does not grow into the amounts. But it is written into law that there is a 1-month carryforward, no more than an 1-month carryover.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman's concern. Let me say first of all it was not lost. The money is there and accounted for. These were programs that were authorized and appropriated and programs for which commitments have been made, and I would just simply say to the gentleman, in comparing with the State of Vermont's budget, fortunately the State of Vermont does not have to fund national defense for all Americans.

Mr. COMBEST. Let me just finish this, and I will be happy to yield. Mr. Chairman, the committee is extremely concerned about the accountability because of all those good things that are there that do happen. It is this type of problem that arises that obviously makes, stretches the credibility of many of these agencies of Government. I would only want to try to assure the gentleman that we are looking at this very carefully, very closely, and we intend for there to be complete and thorough accountability. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].

Mr. COMBEST. I guess the reward was the fact that there was no punitive action taken. But we have taken $400 million out of the account, more than we had in our authorized bill. We are below some $400 million below the authorization from, $800 million below the authorization for 1996. I do not want to make light of, and I do not make light of, the concerns that are raised. I will assure the gentleman that the committee shares those concerns.

Mr. COMBEST. Well, hopefully not, but it did begin at 1, and, as we know, went to 2. The committee has been kept informed of this, of the additional amounts that continue to be uncovered, but of the amount last year, over $2 billion has been taken. Some of that was taken by other committees. Some of it was taken by the Director of Central Intelligence and expended for----

Mr. COMBEST. The gentleman does make a point, and he is correct in the fact that it was not taken and it was not used toward the deficit. Let me mention to the gentleman from Massachusetts the $4 billion only is recently. We are still looking to find the fact amount.

Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, While I disagree strongly with the amendment of the gentleman from Vermont, I do respect his interest and his position and his tenacity in his annual concern about the spending of intelligence. Unfortunately, it is difficult to discuss all of the aspects of the bill. Let me just make some general comments. The gentleman mentioned that there are tens of millions of people, Americans, dependent upon other programs which are not sufficiently funded. I would agree with that. I would contend that every American depends upon and receives equally the positive results of a strong national defense, which a vital part of that is intelligence and the ability to determine intentions of other countries, particularly as we enter into wartime situations. The reduction of our capabilities abroad in the areas of defense, I think, heighten the magnification of the need for strong intelligence to make for certain we do not send Americans into harm's way. That is on the international front. On the domestic front, concerns of terrorism, concerns of narcotics, concerns of crime are also very important to the American people, and the abilities of intelligence organizations to counter and to be aware of intentions many times go unnoticed, unheralded and, most of the time, unspoken because we simply cannot discuss them. I share the gentleman's concern on the primary subject that he mentioned, and that was the carry-forward account in the NRO, and he is correct in the $4 billion figure that was recently announced by the newly appointed financial manager of the NRO who was brought in after the carry-forward account was discovered. Some have accused the majority in this year's authorization bill of micromanaging the NRO, and the NRP, National Reconnaissance Program. I made a commitment to the members of this committee that the committee that was brought under task in the New York Times editorial of last year when the NRO account, carried-forward account, was first mentioned, and the committees of Congress with oversight were chastised for inadequate oversight that, as long as I had the luxury and the ability to serve as chairman of this committee, I would make every effort that I would not subject the committee to that type of criticism in the future, and it is with great interest and looking at all of the programs of the NRO that the mark that we have brought to the committee in our authorization bill this year is being questioned by so many people. We want to be able to assure, those of us who have been given the ability to serve on this committee and basically have to ask Members of the Congress to trust us, that we are scrutinizing the expenditures of those funds, and while I do not agree that the accounting was done well at all, and in fact I think it was shoddy at best, that those moneys were appropriated and expended for, authorized and appropriated for, programs over the years of which the expenditure did not need to take place because the programs that they were to replace in our architecture had worked so well. There was not a loss of the funds, there was not a squandering of the funds. We are continuing to demand an actual and exact accounting of those funds and the purposes for which they were initially authorized and appropriated, not money which was wasted. It is not money which was wasted, it is money which I will be the first to admit was done very shoddily in reporting to Congress, even to the director of Central Intelligence, that those funds existed. We do not intend to allow that to happen again and are very concerned about that.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me. I rise in strong support of the gentleman from Pennsylvania's amendment. I completely understand the concerns of the gentleman from New Mexico in offering the amendment. I would like to insert in the Record a letter addressed to me as chairman of the committee from the Director of Central Intelligence outlining his concerns but indicating the fact that he would have no intention of using anyone within the media but wanting to protect the right and in dire circumstances or extreme circumstances, particularly as the case may affect the ability to save lives, that they would like the option. The amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania does preserve that right. I do rise in strong support of it. I include for the Record the letter to which I referred: Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 21 May 1996. Hon. Larry Combest, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to express opposition to an amendment to be offered by Mr. Richardson of New Mexico to H.R. 3259, the Intelligence Authorization act for Fiscal Year 1997. Mr. Richardson's amendment seeks to prohibit any use of a U.S. journalist or U.S. journalistic organization for intelligence collection. I empathize with the sentiment behind the amendment. My personal view as well as the official policy of the Central Intelligence Agency is that we should not use American journalists as agents or American news organizations for cover. As Director of Central Intelligence, I have no intention of doing either. As Director of Central Intelligence, however, I am also wary of categorically ruling out means to collect intelligence that might, under extraordinary circumstances, make the difference in saving American lives. That is why CIA policy for the past twenty years has reserved the right to make rare exceptions to that policy. I have not encountered any set of circumstances that would lead me to consider that possibility during my service, but I do not believe that we should forever foreclose my or my successor's future consideration of such a course. I join all Americans in my respect for the independence and credibility of our press. When I recently reviewed CIA's policy on intelligence use of American journalists at the direction of Congress, I put into place very stringent guidelines that prohibit any intelligence use of American journalists except under the most extraordinary circumstances. I found that I was unable to assure the President or the Congress that it would never be essential to ask the assistance of a journalist to discover secret information of supreme importance to the security of this country or its citizens. Unfortunately, I can envision circumstances where such cooperation might mean the difference between life and death, possibly in a terrorist situation involving a threat to many Americans. That is why I am compelled to oppose the Richardson amendment as an unnecessary and overly restrictive limitation on intelligence activity. I urge the Committee to provide me an opportunity to explain in closed session the new guidelines I have adopted and I urge the House to reject the Richardson amendment. An original of this letter is also being sent to Ranking Minority member Dicks. Sincerely, John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?