Larry Combest

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and, again, I respect the persistence of the gentleman from Massachusetts in this effort. I appreciate the fact that the gentleman from Massachusetts does make himself available, goes to the committee and takes the time to look through the classified annex to look at the expenditure levels that we do make available to Members of Congress in H-405. I think that shows a seriousness and the fact that he is a very responsible Member in this effort. I cannot argue with a number of the things the gentleman has said and the fact that there have been a lot of reports done publicly by media and by others approximating or at least in their wording assuming that, or it is stated that the intelligence budget is ``X.'' That is always a second line of the story. If there is, in fact, a specific release of the amount of moneys expended on intelligence, that will become the story, and then the next obvious step is to begin to look at, well, how does that break down in expense. I think the American people understand and recognize the fact that there are secrets. Whether or not every one of them are going to agree with what those classified secrets should be, of course, is going to be variable depending upon the outlook the individual may have. I do not hear a clamor or cry to divulge the budget. I think it is the beginning of a movement down a road that, in fact, would prove to be burdensome later at some point. I would, as I have indicated, rise in opposition to the amendment and urge my colleagues to defeat the amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. COMBEST. If the gentleman will continue to yield, it is not an inconsistency, it is just the fact that in the budget obviously the programs we are looking at, we looked at in terms of priority. It has been estimated that the declassification would require $70 million. That is a substantial amount of money for declassification. That is why we limited. It is not the objection that the chairman had to the declassification idea. It was the fact that there are many, many programs that would be detrimentally affected. I just wanted to make for certain that the gentleman, while he was supporting a further reduction, was asking for an increase in some other areas that could amount to several tens of millions of dollars.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to clarify for certain that I had understood the gentleman earlier. He did rise earlier in support of increasing the amount relative to the environmental intelligence program and increasing the amount available for the declassification of documents?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, it comers as no surprise to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], I am sure, that I am opposed to the amendment. I would say to the gentleman that he has been very tenacious in his efforts. I know that the gentleman comes at this purely from a belief that he is doing the right thing. I have always respected that, among all Members. Mr. Chairman, I want to make certain that there is not a misunderstanding. This is no intent to indicate that the gentleman intentionally misspoke. First, we will probably have a strong disagreement on the fact that there has been actually a diminishing of the need for intelligence. That is an arguable point, of which probably neither of us would be swayed. I do not see that threat diminishing. Second, as he had made reference to an earlier comment by the ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], that expenditures now would give us an opportunity to reduce in the future and that he has not seen any of that reduction, I wanted to just share with the Members the chart that we had. This is the actual expenditure line, and it is somewhat difficult to read. On the far left is 1989, and it runs through the 1996 mark, or the direction the intelligence budget has been going. So there has been a decrease on overall expenditures of intelligence through 1995 fiscal year, and it is difficult to see on this chart, because it is a slight increase, as mentioned, 1.3. The gentleman is totally correct, I mentioned in my opening comments the amount of percentage, but there has been a decrease. Candidate Clinton proposed a decrease over a period of 7 years, which actually, in reality, was reached last year. It is an argument and a discussion that I presume quite seriously will go on for some time. The cut would take us below the levels of last year, if, in fact, it were implemented. Again, I am sure it comes as no surprise, but I would rise in strong opposition to the amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. I think I could assure the gentleman that the gentleman from Washington would love for there to be plenty of purchases of stealth, but I would just like to state that the Chair has seen the amendment, we certainly concur with it, and we would accept the amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COMBEST. I totally concur with the gentlewoman. She is absolutely correct, and I appreciate her interest in this.

Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, yes, that is exactly correct. I would take that one step further and would tell the gentlewoman I would be very glad to work with her to make certain that it has to be very black and white, one of those areas of exemption that there cannot be a gray area under which there was a claim of exemption for one of those purposes, if, in fact, it was not emphatically one of those very specified purposes.

Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, I totally would concur with the gentlewoman, and I am glad the gentlewoman asked for this time to make sure the Record reflects the intent, and I assure the gentlewoman that I would stand by her, behind her or wherever she would wish, in trying to nail this down much more specifically, if we detected at all this happens to be a problem and it appears that there is any abuse of the latitude which this amendment has provided.

Mr. COMBEST. I appreciate the gentleman's cooperative nature in working this out.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the amendment with the language which I have read.

Mr. COMBEST. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I certainly concur with the gentleman. I appreciate his further explanation of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, is it in order at this time for the author of the amendment to request unanimous consent to add ``prompt and'' in the section, ``in a prompt and timely fashion'' in line 10, page 2 of the amendment?

Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from California. (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, my amendment reflects the results of discussions between the Members and staffs of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on International Relations on issues pertaining to the application of sanction laws to intelligence activities. Since the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had reported out legislation on sanctions deferrals, the committee has been working with the Committee on International Relations to incorporate the concerns of that committee and, therefore, modify section 303 as reported by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. [[Page H 8824]] Mr. Chairman, that is what this amendment does. I would urge the adoption of this amendment. Before I turn to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], I would like to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for the gentleman's interest, contribution, and his cooperation, as well as that of the gentleman's staff; the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi], of our committee, who was a strong proponent of any U.S. sanction laws and has paid close attention to this legislation; and certainly to the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] and his staff, all of who made very constructive contributions and have worked closely to working this out in a bipartisan and satisfactory manner.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] and enjoy working with him. The gentleman is a dedicated Member and I assure him that any time the gentleman wants to leave this country, I will be happy to assist him. The gentleman knows that I say that only in jest. We are all very proud of the activities that the gentleman from New Mexico, my neighbor in Texas, has accomplished, and we are glad the gentleman is a part of our team. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis]. (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for his comments and, as I have already mentioned, I appreciate his participation, his advice, and his dedication to the intelligence community and to our national security. I would like to respond to his comments regarding the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I, too, am not pleased with the NRO's performance regarding expenditure rates and funding needs. The need to adjust some of the managerial philosophies at the NRO was even brought out in our unclassified committee report. However, I believe that many of our adjustments are not just in response to managerial shortcomings, but are a recognition of the fact that rapid advances in technology, similar to those the gentleman addressed in his statement, also have value in the areas of satellite development. The problem is that these types of technologies, which go beyond historical incremental improvements, are not readily being addressed by the NRO, who have grown comfortable philosophically with staying the course. I take note of my colleague's concern regarding stability and predictability in intelligence funding. That has been and remains a major concern of mine in terms of how the House handles intelligence oversight. Technological developments combined with the diversity of intelligence requirements, however, dictate that we not be lulled into complacency at a time when innovation may mean the difference between whether or not we can meet the policymaker's needs in the 21st century. Our bill does not attempt to push the NRO into untested areas, but simply assures that they will be open to the possibilities inherent in new technologies. Again, I thank Mr. Dicks for his comments and his concerns, and greatly look forward to exploring this area further as the committee continues its work on 1C21. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster]. (Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I would like to compliment the Committee's ranking Democrat, Norm Dicks, for his highly constructive role in the formulation of this legislation. He is a bona fide expert in many aspects of national security and intelligence, particularly in advanced technologies, and his influence is evident in many of our Committee's positions. I also would like to thank the other Democratic members of the Committee who have also joined in a spirit of nonpartisanship to craft this legislation. I also thank my fellow Republican Members who have worked hard in putting this bill together. In particular, I appreciate the fine work of Jerry Lewis and Bob Dornan, our subcommittee chairmen. Finally, the staff on both sides of the aisle deserve our thanks. They are a dedicated, talented group. This legislation is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, and cooperation. The Committee held 11 full committee budget hearings, over 20 Member briefings, and over 200 staff briefings related to the budget. As a result, it is an act that our Committee reported out unanimously and in which we can all take no small measure of pride. H.R. 1655 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1996 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for intelligence be specifically authorized. The intelligence budget has three major components--the national foreign intelligence program, known as the NFIP, the tactical intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA, and--for the first time this year--a third program, the joint military intelligence program, known as JMIP. NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. TARA, or tactical intelligence activities, reside exclusively in the Department of Defense. They consist, in large part, of numerous reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information in support of military operations. Additionally, this year we have for the first time categorized some activities under the newly created joint military intelligence program, which provides military intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers. This categorization of the intelligence budget into national, defense and tactical military intelligence programs facilitates our understanding of the diverse uses of intelligence. Additionally, it should increase the accountability and managerial control of intelligence programs. From even the above thumbnail sketch of intelligence activities, it is obvious that, although our committee [[Page H 8817]] has jurisdiction over all three intelligence programs, we must work closely with the National Security Committee, particularly in the oversight and authorization of the TIARA program. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of chairman Floyd Spence, the members of the National Security Committee, and Committee Staff. Due to the classified nature of much of the Intelligence Committee's work, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the House except in the broadest terms. This can handicap Members' understanding of the issues at hand, particularly when we reach the amendments phase of these proceedings. Accordingly, I strongly urge those Members who have not yet had a chance, to read the classified annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in the capitol--a 2-minute walk from the floor to H-405. Now let me do what I can--in an unclassified manner--to discuss several major elements of the bill. First, I will put the bill in the historic context of the last few years' authorizations. Then I will explain the philosophy we followed in considering this year's bill. Finally, I will touch on several of the bill's most important initiatives and emphases. First some recent history: Those who have been tracking the intelligence budget over this decade have seen a rather remarkable-- some would say reckless--decline in intelligence spending. This is not news and I have discussed this at length on this floor for several years. But let me review and update a few facts that speak volumes and correct several common misconceptions. Fact one: In real terms, the intelligence budget has been cut in all but one of the last 7 years. Fact two: The intelligence community is being reduced at twice the rate recommended by the President's national performance review program. Fact three: President Clinton proposed a few years ago to cut $7 billion from intelligence by 1997. That was accomplished over a year ago--2 years early. We will probably come very close to doubling those cuts by 1997. Fact four: We have, until this year, been on a glide slope of intelligence cuts that would by the end of this decade put intelligence spending in constant dollars at about 65 percent of the 1989 level. Fact five: The intelligence community continues to reduce its personnel at a rate that will, by 1999, cut more than one of every five positions. It was with the knowledge of this recent history that we began consideration of the fiscal year 1996 authorization. The cumulative effects of these developments over the last several years are troubling to many of us on both sides of the aisle who believe that we cannot indefinitely continue to cut critically important intelligence support to U.S. policymakers and military commanders. Nonetheless, our committee decided on a nonpartisan basis that it would not rush headlong into efforts to reverse these trends of the recent past. Responsible oversight requires an objective approach. We decided that the 104th Congress offered us an excellent opportunity to take a fresh, open-eyed look at intelligence. We resolved to work together in a nonpartisan manner to make the most objective assessment possible of each item in the intelligence budget. To do that we broke with some recent practices, three of which I will mention here. First, we reorganized the committee to merge the previously separate budget and oversight/evaluation functions. Wise budgetary decisions must be guided by evaluations of effectiveness. Second, we broke with the past practice of concentrating on the short-term effect of our budgetary decisions. Instead, we have taken a longer view and designed this year's authorization with an eye toward future needs and requirements for intelligence. This emphasis in our authorization has coincided with our committee's major activity of this Congress--an exhaustive and authoritative study of this country's long- term requirements for intelligence. This study, called ``IC21: The Intelligence Community for the 21st Century,'' will be completed in time for its results to be considered in the preparation of what may become semiannual legislation in next year's session. Third, we opted for the most intellectually honest process we could devise to judge each program on its merits and its contributions to national security. We explicitly rejected the idea of working toward an arbitrarily set higher or lower budget objective. We also rejected the idea of making offsets to otherwise deserving programs so as to fund an increase in other programs. We were confident that the Congress would accept an intelligence authorization consisting of properly funded programs--even if that amounted to a significant increase in the aggregate over the President's request. As it turned out, despite some 80 budget actions taken by the committee, this bill authorizes intelligence expenditures only 1.3 percent above the President's request. To understand many of the specific actions taken in H.R. 1655, the Members will have to refer to the classified annex available to them in our committee office. But let me give you an unclassified sketch of several of the themes that emerge: We have moved to centralize authorities and improve cross-program management of intelligence activities. This reduces needless redundancies, facilitates the identification of under- performing programs, and increases accountability. We have, across the board, emphasized the need for countering the challenges of foreign denial and deception practices. We have directed the intelligence community to do better at countering the increasingly sophisticated capabilities of hostile foreign powers to hide their activities from our intelligence capabilities. I note, for example, the reported success the Iraqi regime had in hiding its massive biological weapons program. Foreign denial and deception practices have revealed an extraordinarily dangerous intelligence vulnerability that has not been sufficiently addressed. Our actions will do much to reverse this trend. I should add that this is also an issue of great interest to the Speaker. We have focused the intelligence community's attention more on the downstream activities of processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence. Without careful planning there is a serious danger of painting ourselves into a corner where we devote all of the very thin intelligence budgets we can now afford toward the development and maintenance of expensive technical collection systems, but have insufficient ability to make use of the intelligence we collect. We believe this is already a problem and we have taken action to address it. We have urged the intelligence community to accelerate its move toward concentrating intelligence collection and analysis on issues of the highest national importance. We no longer have the resources or capabilities to spare on anything but the most important intelligence targets. We have acted to improve counterintelligence, security, counter- terrorism, and counterproliferation capabilities. We have taken action to improve the capability of the CIA to better manage and oversee its agent operations and the intelligence emerging from them. As you all know, it is a matter of deep importance to this committee that there be a better process of keeping this committee informed of intelligence developments. In addition to placing this requirement on the CIA--and we have done so in no uncertain terms--we must give the CIA the capability to meet our expectations. This action will enhance this capability as well as increase the productivity of the CIA. We made our biggest change to the administration's request in the satellite area. Although the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] received 99 percent of the amount requested, the funds were significantly redistributed within the NRO account that builds and manages our Nation's satellites. The significance is most apparent regarding long-term policy. The committee believes the NRO needs to reduce program costs. We believe that with creativity and cost consciousness significant savings may be possible. The committee has also directed that the NRO assess the long-term threats that we face to ensure that we are building systems that will address potential collection gaps. Finally, we concentrated on the imagery program, where developments in the commercial arena point [[Page H 8818]] toward large potential cost savings in national security programs. Without getting into the highly classified and very technical areas of the satellite collection process, technology advances over the last 10 years, coupled with alternative launch options offer the possibility of substantial savings while maintaining and even enhancing necessary intelligence capabilities. Finally, in drafting this bill, we resisted the calls of those who advocated an unconsidered, massive infusion of funds to remedy the cuts of the past, and we rejected the urging of those who rely on anecdotes and headlines, many of them wrong, to dismantle intelligence. Our hard work and pragmatic approach has paid off in producing a hard-nosed, lean authorization at 1.3 percent above the President's request. It focuses intelligence, increases accountability, and corrects several of the dangerous trends in recent intelligence authorizations. This is a responsible bill that any Member of this body can readily support. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the petroleum museum in Midland, TX. This nonprofit educational and technical museum highlighting the exciting story of the oil and gas industry was opened by President Gerald Ford on September 13, 1975. It has grown to be one of the top tourist attractions for the Permian Basin and the entire State of Texas. As one who has toured the museum myself, I was greatly impressed and I would highly recommend a tour for anyone who will be visiting the Permian Basin of Texas and would like to uncover the history of this oil-rich region. The idea for a petroleum museum began in the 1950's and it became a reality through the hard work, dedication, and generosity of the Permian Basin's business and petroleum leaders. Through the past 20 years, many changes have taken place at the museum including an additional wing, educational programs, exhibits, acquisitions of artifacts, archival material, and books. Countless numbers of schoolchildren and adults have toured the museum learning more about the gasoline that fuels your car to the energy that runs your home. Its fascinating exhibits range from the life-size murals of the hearty men and women who tamed the [[Page H 8815]] Permian Basin oil patch to the outdoor exhibit which consists of the world's largest collection of the antique drilling and production equipment. I congratulate the petroleum museum staff and volunteers on 20 wonderful years and look forward to their second 20 so our children and our children's children may continue to discover and explore the inspiring story of the domestic oil and gas industry. In my 10 years in Congress, I have worked consistently to make sure that evidence of the domestic oil and gas industry should not be found only in museums.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I rise to thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], my friend and very able colleague on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], the continuing very able and former member and chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for their support of the rule. Mr. Speaker, we think it is a good rule. We think it is one which will give us the opportunity to have full and open debate, and yet protect any classified material problems that we might have in open debate on the floor of the House. I would certainly commend it to my colleagues and urge its passage and thank the committee very much for its assistance in crafting a rule that was so strongly supported by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more strongly with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young], the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations. I might also mention the gentleman from Florida is a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I could not any more eloquently outline why we should not accept this amendment. Rather than repeat a number of the things that the gentleman from Florida said, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is to quote from a speech which the President, Mr. Clinton, made to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency recently on a visit that he made there. Today, because the Cold War is over, some say that we should and can step back from the world and that we don't need intelligence as much as we used to; that we ought to severely cut the intelligence budget. A few have even urged us to scrap the central intelligence service. I think these views are profoundly wrong. I believe making deep cuts in intelligence during peacetime is comparable to canceling your health insurance when you're feeling fine. We are living in a moment of hope. Our Nation is at peace. Our economy is growing all right. All around the world, democracy and free markets are on the march. But none of these developments are inevitable or irreversible. Now, instead of a single enemy, we face a host of scattered and dangerous challenges. They are quite profound and difficult to understand. There are ethnic and regional tensions that threaten to flare into full-scale war in more than 30 nations. Two dozen countries are trying to get their hands on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As these terrible tools of destruction spread, so too spreads the potential for terrorism and for criminals to acquire them. And drug [[Page H 8650]] trafficking, organized crime, and environmental decay threaten the stability of new and emerging democracies and threaten our well-being here at home. In the struggle against these forces, you, the men and women of our intelligence community, serve on the front lines. By necessity, a lot of your work is hidden from the headlines. But in recent months alone, you warned us when Iraq massed its troops against the Kuwaiti border. You provided vital support to our peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Haiti and Rwanda. You helped to strike a blow at a Columbian drug cartel. You uncovered bribes that would have cheated American companies out of billions of dollars. Your work has saved lives and promoted America's prosperity. Mr. Chairman, those are words from a speech that the President made to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. I do not normally quote the President. However, I do not think it could be better summed up. I rise in strong opposition to this amendment and would urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''