Larry Combest

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bonilla]. (Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Smith]. (Mr. SMITH of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments and realize she may be in a somewhat peculiar situation and I want to make sure there is not a misunderstanding that we are trying to close out debate here. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo]. (Mr. POMBO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COMBEST. Under the parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman, if I could I want to be certain there is not a misunderstanding that we are trying to close this out. I was wishing, if some Member were here to enter into debate, that we might be able to do that.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Committee held one hearing on title V of the National Security Revitalization Act, partly in open session. The subsequent markup was conducted entirely in open session. During the markup, the committee unanimously approved amendments to sections 502, 504 and 512. Section 512 was the focus of the committee's interest. As introduced, the section required that the United States may provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a written agreement between the President and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The agreement must specify: The types of intelligence to be provided to the U.N.; The circumstances under which intelligence may be provided; and The procedures to be observed by the U.N. concerning persons who shall have access and the procedures to be observed by the U.N. to protect the intelligence against disclosure not authorized by the agreement. As introduced, section 512 required that no agreement would have been effective for a period exceeding 1 year. Mr. Chairman, U.S. policymakers working with the U.N. use intelligence information as part of their broader diplomatic efforts to advance U.S. foreign policy interests with other governments and U.N. agencies. A significant portion of intelligence sharing with the U.N. includes support to peacekeeping activities. However, intelligence sharing also involves humanitarian missions, sanctions enforcement, nonproliferation, opposition to ethnic cleansing, and other issues clearly of importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Procedures have been developed by the intelligence community to provide intelligence information to the United Nations. Specific guidelines have been established for consideration on a case-by-case basis of what can be provided without compromising intelligence sources and methods. The committee recognizes that there are valid concerns about the U.N.'s ability to protect sensitive information, and when intelligence information is provided, these considerations are taken into account. Each request is carefully reviewed to assess the agency or operation involved, and when the United States does provide intelligence information, the least sensitive information is used to satisfy each requirement, and it is provided to a limited number of individuals. Moreover, much of the Intelligence provided has been redacted to include only information that is unclassified. The practical effect of section 512, as introduced, would have been to shut down intelligence sharing with the United Nations. A formal agreement would probably not be achieved as the U.N. leadership could find such an agreement with the United States politically unacceptable for a variety of reasons. Flexibility and discretion are afforded the United States under the current intelligence sharing process. A formal agreement would hamper our ability to share intelligence with the U.N. when we want to and how we want to, and might indeed create an obligation on the part of the United States to provide intelligence to the U.N. upon request. Moreover, every year we would face the possibility that a Secretary General unwilling to sign an agreement acceptable to the United States could, by his refusal, prevent our Government from sharing intelligence when it is in our interests to do so. Finally, the United States would be reluctant to accept the possible public disclosure of the details that such an agreement would require. Given these concerns and others, the committee adopted a substitute to section 512. The amendment sets out two First, before intelligence is provided by the United States to the United Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence to the United Nations that protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Second, the committee has strengthened its oversight of intelligence sharing arrangements with the U.N. The amendment requires periodic and special reports by the President regarding intelligence provided to the United Nations. These reports must be made not less frequently than semiannually to the Intelligence and International Relations Committees of the House and to the Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate. The reports must specify the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which the intelligence was provided. The President must also report to the two Intelligence Committees any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the U.N. within 15 days after the disclosure becomes known to the President. The amendment further requires the Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to work with the United Nations to improve its handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence information provided to it by its members. Mr. Chairman, the committee amendment to section 512 will accommodate the valid need for intelligence sharing with the U.N. where important U.S. national interests are served, while at the same time establishing stronger oversight over these activities. As amended, H.R. 7 is a good, workable approach to the need for intelligence sharing with the United Nations.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, across the country, transplantation surgeries are saving and enhancing many lives. Eye, organ, and tissue donation and transplantation have benefited thousands of people nationwide. Today, I am asking that we take a moment to focus on eye donation and on the importance of preserving and restoring sight through the miracle of corneal transplantation. The benefits of sight restoring transplant surgery extend beyond the individuals who received the transplants; they also extend to the recipients' families, communities, and businesses. In recent years, the efforts of Congress, educators, and the media have had an enormous positive impact on the success of eye donor programs. Every year thousands of corneal transplants are performed across the country, restoring precious sight to young and old. In 1993, over 90,000 eyes were donated to eye banks across the United States. From those eyes, over 40,000 corneas were used in transplantation procedures. The remaining eyes were used for research, training, and other surgical procedures. While the figures for 1994 are still being tallied, even greater totals are projected. Anyone can be an eye donor. Neither cataracts, poor eyesight, nor age prohibit one from being a donor. However, it is important for individuals who want to be donors to inform family members of their wishes. Since 1961, when the Eye Bank Association of America [EBAA] was founded, EBAA member eye banks have made possible one-half million corneal transplants, with a success rate of over 90 percent. The EBAA is the Nation's oldest national transplant association. The EBAA is dedicated to the restoration of sight through the promotion and advancement of eye banking. It has led the transplantation field with the establishment of medical standards for the procurement and distribution of eyes and comprehensive training and certification programs for eye banking personnel. These standards have been used as models for other transplantation organizations. There are over 110 member eye banks operating in over 150 locations in 43 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Canada, Saudi Arabia, England, and Australia. Despite the extraordinary efforts of eye banks, there are still many people who wait in darkness for corneal transplant surgeries due to a lack of donated tissue. At any time in the United States, about 6,000 people are on waiting lists for corneal transplants. Public education is the best way to increase donation, as it enables people to talk to their loved ones and learn of their wishes before times of crisis and grief. We, in Congress, can lead the effort to educate the public about the need for eye donation and encourage more Americans to become donors. We have joined the Eye Bank Association of America every year since 1983, and do so again by proclaiming March 1995 as National Eye Donor Month. In so doing, we call on all Americans to support us in promoting the worthy endeavor of enhancing the lives of fellow citizens through the restoration of sight.

Mr. COMBEST

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the Members' attention the following resolution which was recently passed in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To Commend R. James Woolsey For Exceptionally Distinguished Service to the United States of America Whereas, R. James Woolsey has served the people of the United States of America in government and as a private citizen for over twenty-five years. Whereas, R. James Woolsey began his public service with the United States Army in 1968 where he served as an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and on the National Security Council Staff. Whereas, R. James Woolsey went on the serve with distinction as a General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, as Under Secretary of the Navy, as Delegate at Large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and as Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Convention Armed Forces in Europe, and as a member of several Presidential commissions. Whereas, R. James Woolsey has served with distinction since February 5, 1993 as the Director of Central Intelligence. Whereas, R. James Woolsey has worked diligently to lead the intelligence community to meet the demanding requirements of U.S. national security in an uncertain and unpredictable world. Whereas, under the direction of R. James Woolsey, the intelligence community has provided excellent support to this nation in providing critical insights into the world hot spots--in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere; and followed and, when possible foiled, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist acts, and other activities inimical to U.S. national interests. Whereas, R. James Woolsey has continued and further promoted the consideration and redirection of intelligence roles and missions while simultaneously coping with a dramatic reduction in fiscal resources and of personnel at over twice the rate directed by the President for the government at large. Whereas, R. James Woolsey led the Central Intelligence Agency in the critically sensitive final stages of identifying and apprehending a traitor who had, in previous years, compromised some of its most valuable capabilities. Whereas, R. James Woolsey judiciously and carefully began a complete revamping of personnel security practices and counterintelligence roles in the intelligence community to limit the possibility of a recurrence of such traitorous activity. Whereas, R. James Woolsey used his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence to lay the groundwork for intelligence policies designed to support national security needs for the coming century. Whereas, R. James Woolsey brought to his duties a commitment to improve effective Congressional oversight and to demystify and explain the mission of intelligence to the people of the United States. Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that, on the occasion of his departure as Director of Central Intelligence, the Committee expresses its deep appreciation to R. James Woolsey for his distinguished service to the people to R. James Woolsey for this distinguished service to the people of the United States and, particularly, for his leadership of the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency.