Kent Conrad

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on another matter, I want to address the issue of a young man named Ethan Bedrick. Let me put up Ethan's picture so we can see who we are talking about. This is Ethan. Ethan was born on January 28, 1992. His delivery went badly, and as a result of asphyxiation, he has suffered from severe cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegic which impairs motor functions in all of his limbs. You can see him. He is a fighter. Look at that look on his face. He is a happy young fellow, even though he faces severe restrictions. He was put on a regimen of intense physical, occupational and speech therapy to help him overcome some of these obstacles. At the age of 14 months, Ethan's insurance company abruptly cut off coverage for his speech therapy and limited his physical therapy to only 15 sessions per year. Mr. President, can you imagine, this little boy was damaged at birth, and when he is 14 months old, the insurance company cuts off coverage for his speech therapy, limits his physical therapy to 15 sessions a year. At 14 months, when the insurance company made these decisions to cut off this young child from the therapy he needed, the change was recommended by an insurance company representative performing a utilization review of his case. The reviewer cited a 50 percent chance that Ethan could walk by age 5 as a minimal benefit of further therapy. Further, the reviewer never met personally with Ethan, his family, or Ethan's team of regular doctors. Upon review, the insurer affirmed its position with a second company doctor, citing a single New England Journal of Medicine article on physical therapy and child development. That article was published in 1988, 4 years before Ethan was born. I want to go back to the point here that was made by the insurance reviewer. The change was recommended by the insurance company reviewer, citing a 50 percent chance that Ethan could walk by age 5 as a ``minimal benefit.'' Shame on that reviewer; shame on that company. A 50 percent chance of walking is a minimal benefit? How would they feel if it were their child? How would they feel then? A 50 percent chance of walking is a minimal benefit? Further, the doctor declared the prescribed therapeutic equipment, including a bath chair designed for aiding his parents and care providers in his bathing, and an upright walker to allow him upright movement and muscle development, were merely convenience items-- convenience items--and costs not to be covered by his insurance. Can you imagine if you were the parents of this little boy and you were told a walker is a convenience item? You were told that a device to help in the bathing of this multiply handicapped child was a convenience item? The Bedricks, the parents, didn't feel that way. They filed suit. In 1996, the fourth circuit ruled that the insurer's decision to restrict therapy was arbitrary and capricious because the opinions of their medical experts were unfounded and tainted by conflict. Further, the court concluded that neither the insurance plan nor corporate guidelines require ``significant progress'' as a precondition to providing medically necessary treatments. The court noted, ``It is as important not to get worse as it is to get better. The implication that walking by age 5 would not be significant progress for this unfortunate child is simply revolting.'' Those are the words of the court, that the position of this insurance company ``is simply revolting.'' This is a quote from the attorney for young Ethan. ``The implication that walking by age 5 would not be a `significant progress' for this unfortunate child is simply revolting. . . . The delivery of health care services should be based on the promotion of good health and not the margin of profit.'' During the time of review and litigation, Ethan lost 3 years of vital therapy, and ERISA, the Employee Retirement Insurance and Savings Account which governs HMOs, left the Bedricks with no remedy for compensation for Ethan's loss of therapy. The Bedricks' ability to give justice for what the HMO did to Ethan was erased because of ERISA. I raise this issue today because very soon Congress is going to have a chance to act and we, in conscience, must insist that children like Ethan have a fair shot at fair treatment. This little boy, now 6 years old, should not be told that a 50/50 chance of being able to walk is, as described by the insurance company, ``a marginal, minimal benefit.'' That simply cannot be what we do in this country to little boys like Ethan. I yield the floor.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rose yesterday to discuss the farm crisis in my home State of North Dakota. Yesterday, I showed a chart that showed what has happened to farm income in our State between 1996 and 1997, and I start today with that same chart because it shows North Dakota farm income being washed away in 1997. In 1996, we had $764 million of farm income in the State of North Dakota; in 1997, $15 million--a 98 percent reduction in farm income from 1 year to the next. If that is not a crisis, I don't know what would constitute one. The total farm income of the State of North Dakota in 1997 was $15 million. That is divided up among the 30,000 farmers of our State. In other words, the average farmer had a profit, or net income, of only $500 for the entire year. That is a crisis. The problems for agriculture go much further, deep into the pockets of farm producers. In my State and many other States, the economic difficulty in agriculture means trouble on Main Street. If the pockets of farmers are empty, so are the pockets of bankers, grocers, implement dealers, cafe and gas station owners--you name it; any Main Street business is negatively affected, and so are the workers whose businesses are affected. About a week and a half ago, a meeting was held on the border of northeastern North Dakota and northwest Minnesota, where the farm troubles in our region are the worst. At that meeting, which was held by the State Farm Service Agencies, there were agricultural lenders, implement dealers, agricultural suppliers, and other agribusinesses in attendance. Today I thought I would share some of the comments made at that meeting by those people who are dependent on the agricultural economy. These comments illustrate the problems we are facing in agriculture in North Dakota. The first comments were made by agricultural suppliers--the providers of fuel, seed, fertilizer, and other farm inputs. Here is what two of them said at this meeting. The first one said: My daughter sells seed to farmers. Earlier she distributed the seed, now she is going around to pick it up. That is a very bad sign, when those who are selling seed are going around to pick it up after it has been distributed. That means acreage is not going to be planted, and it is not going to be planted because farmers can't cash flow. They didn't cash flow last year; they aren't going to cash flow this year. That is because of this stealth crisis that is occurring out in my State. I am alerting my colleagues, it is in my State today; it may be in your State tomorrow. This is a crisis that has no Federal response. The second ag supplier said: Yesterday, six farmers wanted anhydrous ammonia fertilizer. I turned four of them away. The question this year is not, ``Do you have a loan?'' but ``Is that check any good?'' All across North Dakota, those are the kinds of questions that are being asked. Also at this meeting there were implement dealers. The implement dealers also had some interesting comments. One said: Last year, all the combines I sold went to senior citizens. That should tell you something about the condition of our young farmers. The second implement dealer said: In 1974 it took 5,600 bushels of wheat to buy a 250 horsepower four wheel drive tractor. Today it takes 26,000 bushels to buy the same horsepower, and it doesn't cover any more ground than the old one. There just isn't any buying power left in the bushels they produce. When asked yesterday, Why are we having this crisis in North Dakota? It flows from a number of factors. No. 1 is low prices. No. 2, it flows from widespread disease as a result of 5 years of overly wet conditions. No. 3 is a very weak Federal farm policy. Those are the fundamental causes for the crisis in our State. It is not just the implement dealers at this particular meeting who are talking about it. In addition, I have also heard from other implement dealers in recent news articles about the crisis in agriculture. Jon Sundby, a farm machinery dealer in Hillsboro, ND, said: A year ago at this time, I think we sold 42 tractors. This year we have sold three. Mr. President, that reflects the depth of the crisis that is hitting North Dakota. Bob Lamp, the executive vice president of the North Dakota Implement Dealers Association, said: At this point, there isn't much of a market for machinery because of the economy. Comments from implement dealers and others reflect what is happening all across our State. It is not just implement dealers. Ag lenders are also weighing in. They were at this April 23 meeting. About a week and a half ago that meeting occurred. As anybody in agriculture knows, if you don't have money to operate your farm, you simply can't farm. It is rare in my State for producers to farm without loans to cover their operating expenses. That is why ag lenders are critically important to farmers. Here is what some of them are saying about our current agricultural economy. One ag lender said at this April 23 meeting: Too many are trying to farm this year on credit cards -- On credit cards-- That is a recipe for disaster. I was just with somebody from the State department of agriculture. He had been looking at farm plans. He saw one farmer who had credit card advances of $130,000--$130,000 on credit cards--to farm. That is a recipe for disaster. A second ag lender said: The farmers in trouble are good, honest producers who are suffering in silence. USDA needs to raise loan limits and make interest assistance more widely available on existing loans. A third said: This is, by far, the worst year ever, even considering the 1980s. Mr. President, suffering in silence, I found that. I just took a tour of my State, held farm meetings all across North Dakota during the 2- week break in April, and what I found was that farm producers are shellshocked. They are suffering in silence. They don't know where to turn. One recommended that ``USDA needs to raise loan limits.'' He is exactly right. The Secretary of Agriculture supports lifting the caps on commodity loans, but does not have the authority to do it. The Congress has the authority. We are the ones who have to make a decision to provide some relief. Those loan levels are unusually low. In the 1996 farm bill, caps were set on wheat at $2.58 a bushel. There is no one who can farm and make it on $2.58 a bushel. That doesn't cover your operating expenses. Were we to simply remove the caps, we calculate the loan rate would be 62 cents higher, $3.20 a bushel. That, too, is inadequate, but it would be a help and it is the one thing we could do quickly to put some money in the pockets of these farm producers who are otherwise going to go under. I indicated yesterday that we are going to lose 3,000 farmers in North Dakota this year. We only have 30,000. Ten percent of the people are going to go out of business this year, and the situation next year, unless we act, is going to be far worse. I very much hope that my colleagues are listening, because this is a crisis. Last year, we had a very visual crisis in North Dakota with the floods, the fires and the most powerful winter storm in 50 years. The news media paid attention. As a result, we received a strong response. Well, the disaster continues, but there is virtually no attention being paid to it. That is why I say we have a stealth disaster this year. The conditions are undermining our agricultural producers in a way that is unprecedented. We have never seen such economic hardship on the farm, and yet there is almost no Federal response. If we are going to avert disaster, the Federal Government needs to respond; this Congress needs to respond. Why is it? Because Congress passed a farm bill that forces farmers to face greater risk and succeed or fail based on the whims of the marketplace. It is because Congress has failed to act on the research title of the farm bill and has placed in jeopardy not only the future of agricultural research, but stability in our crop insurance system and rural development in the Fund for Rural America. Those items are funded in the research bill. It is because our crop insurance system is based on a formula which unfairly penalizes producers who experience repeated disaster, and it is especially because when our farmers face a disaster in crop production, there is no program to help. As I indicated yesterday, if you have a disaster in agriculture today, the only help is a low-interest loan. So we are saying to these people at the very time they don't have the money to cash flow, ``Go deeper into debt.'' That is no answer. All of these problems need to be addressed, and they need to be addressed as soon as possible. The livelihood of our farmers, our Main Street businesses, our rural infrastructure and the very health of our Nation depend on it. I have one last comment from an ag lender. This is in North Dakota, and he said: Agriculture needs to be on the top of the agenda for the President, the Secretary and Congress, but, unfortunately, it doesn't seem to be. Mr. President, we have to make it part of the agenda or we are going to have a calamity in North Dakota. I say to my colleagues, we are the first to experience this. Others of my colleagues will probably not be far behind, because if you have a weather disaster, if you have a series of bad years, as we have experienced, you will find there is precious little Federal assistance. That is because of the changes that have been made in the farm bill and other measures taken by Congress. I alert my colleagues, North Dakota may be experiencing this stealth disaster today, but our colleagues are probably not far behind. I urge them to pay attention to this problem. We are an early warning signal, just like they used to send the birds down the mine shaft to see if there was air. North Dakota is the little bird in the mine shaft warning the rest of the Nation that we have a badly flawed farm policy in place. A 98-percent reduction in farm income in 1 year--98 percent. I don't think there is another industry that could survive that kind of fiscal calamity. I know our industry cannot. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. I thank you very much, and my colleague from North Dakota, Senator Dorgan, for this time.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Senator from New York. Mr. President, I might conclude by saying that I was looking at the chart here. While North Dakota suffered a 98 percent reduction in farm income from 1996 to 1997, New York suffered a 44 percent reduction in farm income from 1996 to 1997, one of the worst hit in the country. So North Dakota, unfortunately, leads the pack. We are at the top of the chart in terms of States losing farm income. Unfortunately, the State of New York is also in that top tier. In fact, they ranked fourth in terms of reduction and tied for third, actually, with 44 percent reduction in farm income. So I am certain the producers in your State are suffering as well. We have had the double whammy--not only of low prices, but low prices coupled with this unprecedented outbreak of disease. That is creating a crisis and we simply must respond. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from New York. I am honored to serve with him on the Senate Finance Committee. My wife and I were just telling a colleague the other night that sometimes we have a chance to have dinner with the Senator from New York, and we always feel that it is a privilege because it is like a seminar. There are very few people that have the knowledge bank of the senior Senator from New York. It is an honor to be able to serve with him on the Finance Committee. He has reminded me on more than one occasion that New York is a major agricultural, producing State as well. I just say to my colleague that our experience with the changes that were made, in terms of eliminating a disaster program for agriculture, is a very bitter pill because now we are experiencing the disaster. The only assistance is low-interest loans. When you have persons that aren't cash flowing, to say that the only help we can extend to you is for you to go deeper into debt, that doesn't seem like much in the way of a helping hand. And it is so totally opposite to what we experienced last year with those extraordinary natural disasters that I think it is important to bring it to the attention of my colleagues. This year we are about to lose--in North Dakota alone--10 percent of the farmers. In one year. And next year will be far worse, unless we take action. I thank my colleague from New York.

Mr. CONRAD. I have come to the floor this morning to talk about a disaster that is happening in my home State, but it is receiving very little attention. People who are watching and my colleagues might recall that last year we had a set of disasters in North Dakota that had tremendous national publicity and national attention. We had the worst winter in our history, followed by the most powerful winter storm in 50 years, followed by the worst flood in 500 years; and in the midst of that, fire broke out that destroyed much of downtown Grand Forks, ND. It was really almost apocalyptic. But this year we have another disaster occurring, and it is receiving very little attention. I call it the ``stealth disaster,'' because it is really flying below the radar screen. There are almost no national stories, no national attention. In fact, I believe very few people know this disaster is occurring. But it is occurring and it is an extraordinary disaster that is hurting the farmers of my State. We are in a wet cycle. This wet cycle has bred disease, disease that cost us about a third of our crop last year. That, coupled with very low prices, has meant that our farmers are not cash-flowing. I was just home during a series of farm meetings and in each and every stop was told we will lose perhaps 3,000 farmers this year in North Dakota. We only have 30,000. So losing 3,000 in 1 year would really be quite extraordinary. But these farmers are facing a cash-flow crunch as a result of bad policy, as a result of low prices, as a result of this incredible disease that has broken out. And again, this is a disaster of really staggering proportions in that it gets very little attention, and there is very little the Federal Government is prepared to do. It is very interesting, if you have a disaster like this. Last year when this disaster occurred, or these sets of disasters occurred in North Dakota, and we searched to find if there was Federal help, we found that indeed there was. The SBA rushed to help. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was there. The Housing and Urban Development Program was there with CDBG funds. There was a marvelous, marvelous response that has helped the devastated communities recover. But now we have a different kind of crisis and a different kind of disaster. And when we look for assistance, we find there is virtually none. What you will find is, about the only thing that is available is low-interest loans. Now, additional debt for those who can't cash flow because of a terrible outbreak of disease and because of low prices and because of weak farm policy, saying ``Take on more debt,'' doesn't sound like a very good deal. But that is exactly what we are faced with, because we no longer have a disaster program for farmers; it doesn't exist. The only thing we have is low-interest loans; that is it. When farmers experience a disaster, the Federal response is to help them go further into debt. It doesn't make much sense. We have a circumstance that is, as I described, dramatic. I brought this chart to show what has happened to North Dakota farm income. I say it was washed away in 1997. In 1996, this chart shows the farm income of our State, $764 million; but in 1997, farm income in our State was reduced to $15 million. That is divided among 30,000 farmers. That means the average net income per farm in North Dakota in 1997 was only $500. That is a reduction in income of 98 percent from 1996 to 1997. That is a disaster. Let me go to the next chart that shows farm income from 1996 to 1997, quarter by quarter, so that my colleagues can see the pattern. In 1996, you could see it was about equivalent from quarter to quarter, but, boy, we came to the end of the year, 1996, and look what happened to farm income. It fell off the table. I guess in this case we can say it fell off the chart. That is a 98 percent reduction, a farm income of only $15 million in the entire State for the entire year, divided among 30,000 farmers. As I say, that is only $500 apiece. It is no wonder everywhere I go farmers are saying to me, ``We have a disaster.'' It is not just farmers. In community after community, the bankers are taking me aside and saying, ``Senator, there is something radically wrong with farm policy.'' There is something radically wrong with our disaster programs when farmers can go through these 5 bad years of this incredible wet cycle, and disease develops, and low prices come on to the market, and there is nothing to help these producers. They are going to be washed away every bit as much as the residents of Grand Forks were washed away by the flood waters last year. Some will say North Dakota is a marginal area; when you have bad weather, you will get hurt. I brought this chart to show the Red River Valley. The Red River Valley has the richest farmland in the world. The Red River Valley used to be the bottom of a great lake, Lake Agassiz. Thousands of years ago, when the lake was there, it built up extraordinarily rich soil. When you come to the Red River Valley of North Dakota, you see the richest farmland anywhere in the world. In places it is 8 feet thick, an incredible lode that is so rich. When I was growing up, we were told there had never been a farm failure; there had never been a crop failure in the Red River Valley, ever. These last 5 years have seen extraordinary developments, because even in the Red River Valley, the richest farmland in the world, farm income is down precipitously. You can see from 1996 to 1997 farm income, the richest farming area in the world, down 62 percent. Now the next chart, North Dakota is a place that produces wheat. Indeed we do. We are typically the No. 1 or No. 2 wheat-producing State. Look what happened to the total value of the spring wheat crop. This shows from 1993 to 1997, the crop was about $1 billion in value; in 1993, it declined somewhat; in 1994, came up handsomely; in 1996, it was approaching $1.3 billion. Look what happened last year--a 41 percent decline. It wasn't just the wheat crop. The No. 2 crop in North Dakota is barley. Of course, those who are listening probably know that barley is used to feed animals. It is also used to brew beer. The barley crop, same pattern: You saw a pretty good increase from 1993 to 1996, and then a steep decline in 1997. Some have said this is just a blip, this is just a blip in terms of prices. Yes, you have the disease problem. Hopefully, that will pass at some point. But it is disastrous when you lose a third to 40 percent of the crop in one year because of disease and then, on top of that, you have very low prices. That leaves farmers in an incredibly vulnerable position. Some have said, on the price front that is just a blip. I thought I would bring along this chart that shows prices from 1996 through 1997, month by month, because if you look at that chart, it doesn't look like a blip. In fact, the only blip that occurs is right here, a period of high prices when we were debating the farm bill. At that point, people were told, ``We have reached an era of permanently high farm prices because of export demand; farmers can count on a period going forward of high prices.'' You can see how long that lasted. That lasted about 90 days. Instead, prices started coming down. Both wheat and barley--you can see the wheat prices in blue, the barley prices in red, on the chart, and both of them, from the time we debated the farm bill, have gone down, down, down. This represents a disaster to the thousands of producers in North Dakota who rely on agricultural income to sustain themselves. We have a disaster occurring, and there needs to be a response. I don't think we want to see washed away 10 percent of the farmers in 1 year--and that is this year. I can tell you, Mr. President, next year is going to be far worse unless conditions change, unless prices firm up, unless there is a Federal response, unless the disease problem changes. And, unfortunately, once you get into a wet cycle, these diseases continue as long as the wet cycle does. The result is devastating, absolutely devastating. I fear that we will face a true calamity next year unless there is a Federal response. In closing, Mr. President, a troubled agricultural economy is dangerous for rural communities and for our entire Nation. The importance of a strong agricultural economy and the maintenance of a rural infrastructure was perhaps best summed up by William Jennings Bryan when he said, ``Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic, but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country.'' William Jennings Bryan was right. Agriculture is right at the core of the strength of the American economy. North Dakota is in the first trench. We are the first ones to experience the defects of a national policy that was put in place in 1996. But I alert my colleagues that unless we take action, others will follow. When they have a disease problem, when they face low prices, they will see enormous economic pressure on farm producers, and they, too, will be in a position to lose a significant chunk of their farm families. That is a tragedy for our State. I believe it is a tragedy for our Nation. I hope very much my colleagues are listening and will understand, just as we responded to a more visible disaster last year, we must fashion a Federal response to this stealth disaster that is occurring this year. I alert my colleagues that I will be coming to the floor on a regular basis to bring this matter to their attention in the hopes that we can fashion a stronger national policy. So while North Dakota is suffering this year, we might prevent other States from experiencing what we are facing in 1998. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. Is there anything in the amendment that is before the Senate now that requires a reduction on anybody's part before there is ratification?

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I don't know what amendment the Senator from Arizona is referring to, but it is not my amendment. It is not the amendment that is before us. There is nothing in the Conrad-Bingaman amendment that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe--nothing. The point is, the Russians have an enormous edge on us with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. Let's review the facts. Today, the United States has roughly 400 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; the Russians have between 7,000 and 12,000. How is it not in our interest to push them to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons? It is absolutely in our interest, just as it has been in our interest to get them to reduce conventional forces, as we have done by treaty negotiations, just as it has been in our interest to reduce strategic systems. But it is, I believe, dangerous to allow the Russians to have this kind of edge on us in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Again, I emphasize to my colleagues, there is nothing in my amendment--nothing--that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe.

Mr. CONRAD. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from Arizona, the argument that he advances makes no sense to this Senator. On conventional forces we, by treaty, have gotten them to dramatically reduce their forces as have we. The same is true of strategic systems. The place where there is an enormous disparity is tactical nuclear weapons. They have the advantage. And we are not engaging them in discussions on reduction? I will tell you, if we could have a situation in which we take a 50 percent reduction and they take a 50 percent reduction, I would take that deal right now, because we would lose 200 and they would lose between 3,500 and 6,000. For us not to engage in discussions on ``loose nukes,'' which are the very ones that are most subject to terrorists, to being used in ways that are totally against the U.S. interests, makes no sense.

Mr. CONRAD. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. CONRAD. It would not stop NATO enlargement from going forward. This is not some scheme to stop NATO enlargement. I am opposed to NATO enlargement, but this does not stop enlargement. This does do something about sending a signal we ought to do something about tactical nuclear weapons when they enjoy this incredible edge over us and we seem to not pay much attention.

Mr. CONRAD. Yes. This is a sense--I mean, I do not know----

Mr. CONRAD. This is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. Nobody knows better than the Senator from Delaware a sense-of-the-Senate resolution and its legal standing. What we are trying to do is direct the attention of this administration and our colleagues to the very real threat that ``loose nukes'' present. And we are trying to take the words of General Habiger, who has said to us they have 7,000 to 12,000 of these tactical nuclear weapons and we ought to address that differential.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I want to answer, again, the Senator from Arizona. There is absolutely no intent to require the United States to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons at all. The thrust of this amendment is the concern that a number of us have that Russia has an enormous edge on tactical nuclear weapons, and we ought to engage in discussions with them to get a reduction in those tactical nuclear weapons. That is clearly in the U.S. interest. I hope our colleagues would support this amendment.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President might I ask for the yeas and nays on the Conrad amendment.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, is the pending order the Conrad-Bingaman amendment?

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is designed to address the question of tactical nuclear weapons. Let me just review briefly the circumstance we face, and remind my colleagues that unlike strategic weapons, unlike conventional systems, we have no treaty with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. This chart shows the record on arms control. The red line is Russian forces; the blue line, U.S. or NATO forces. We can see under the Conventional Forces Treaty we have had steep reductions. In terms of strategic systems under the START accords, the same pattern--deep reductions on both sides on strategic systems. But on tactical nuclear weapons we don't know what has happened on the Russian side, although we have an estimate from our strategic commander, General Habiger, that they have 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons; we have about 1,600. Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal--we need to know more. In 1991, Russia had 15,000; the United States, 3,500 in Europe. Today, in Europe we have roughly 400; they have between 7,000 and 12,000. Terrorist use of a tactical nuclear weapons would be devastating. It would make what went off in Oklahoma look like a firecracker. That was a two one-thousandths kiloton equivalent, the bomb that went off in Oklahoma. The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima was 13 kilotons. The smaller tactical weapons of the day run in the 10-kiloton range. The larger tactical nuclear weapons are 300 kilotons plus. There is also a strategic breakout danger. Under the strategic limits of START III, both sides would be at about 2,250 systems. Tactical nuclear weapons today: The United States, roughly 1,500 or 1,600; the Russians, 7,000 to 12,000. That becomes a strategic concern, that great differential between the tactical systems of the two sides. This chart shows the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The distinction between the two is disappearing. During the cold-war period, strategic systems ran 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. The tactical systems currently run 10 kilotons up to 400 kilotons. But today's strategic weapons have been dramatically reduced in yield, down to 300 kilotons to 1 megaton. So the difference between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons is disappearing. Let's listen to America's nuclear commander, the head of strategic forces. General Habiger said, ``The Russians have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons and we need to bring them into the equation.'' That is what the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is about. It is not about reducing United States tactical nuclear weapons. It is not about taking United States tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. It is not about those things. It is about saying that we ought to engage the Russians in a discussion on reduction of tactical nuclear weapons because of the enormous disparity that they enjoy in these forces. It is about asking for a certification from the administration that they are engaged in that course. It is about a report on what we know about these tactical nuclear weapons. I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague and cosponsor, Senator Bingaman of New Mexico.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague from Indiana as well.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on a related matter, I would like to at this point lay down my amendment, as provided for in the unanimous consent agreement. Mr. President, as I have considered NATO enlargement, it seems to me to be clear we need to put the Senate on record during the NATO debate supporting cooperative efforts with the Russians to reduce the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. At the outset, allow me to emphasize that recent years have seen important progress on arms control. Reduced tensions with Moscow have allowed important treaties to be negotiated that have made the world a far safer place. One of the great successes has been the Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That agreement has eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, including the Pershing missiles that this body debated so intensely. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty has markedly reduced tanks and artillery and armored vehicles in Europe. Two START accords have been negotiated, deeply cutting strategic nuclear forces. Unfortunately, there have been no arms control treaties on tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. President, this chart demonstrates the record on arms control. On conventional forces, the red bar shows eastern forces, which during the Cold War were part of the Warsaw Pact. The blue bar shows NATO forces. We can see on conventional forces sharp reductions in the treaty limited equipment of both the old Warsaw Pact and NATO. The same is true under the START accords--dramatic reductions on both sides in strategic systems. But on tactical forces there has been no treaty. We don't know with any precision what has happened in the former Soviet Union. We don't know what their inventory is. In 1991 the United States had more than 3,500 tactical weapons in Europe. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have had around 15,000. In 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev unilaterally pledged to withdraw most tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and begin dismantlement. Since that time, this country has withdrawn all but around 400 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and dismantled all but about 1,600 of our tactical nuclear weapons in total. The story on the Russian side has been very different. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and a 70 percent reduction in military spending, weapon dismantlement has slowed to a crawl. All former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn to Russia and placed in storage, but today we don't know how many of those weapons Russia has. The excellent Nunn-Lugar Program has helped the Russians round up and account for many of these weapons. The fact is, however, we don't know how many they retain. That arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is clearly a threat. Because there is not any arms control regime covering tactical nuclear weapons, we are not allowed to inspect, to assess the security of those tactical warheads, and determine their number. Let's go to the second chart to highlight this point. In 1991, it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. had 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons--15,000. We had in the range of 3,500 deployed in Europe. Today, we have just over 400 in Europe. But the Russians retain, according to the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Habiger, 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. And yet, arms control agreements do not cover this category of weapons. On strategic systems, we have come down on both sides, and have come down sharply. The same is true with regard to conventional forces in Europe. But regarding tactical nuclear weapons, there is an enormous disparity. Russia has in the range of 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. We are down in the range of 400 tactical warheads in Europe, and approximately 1,600 in all. The lack of a treaty means we have no guarantee that Russia's numbers will come down. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads inside Russia present the greatest threat of theft or sale of nuclear warheads in the world today. These constitute the greatest so-called ``loose nuke'' threat. We have reason to believe that the danger with those tactical warheads is greater than with strategic warheads because tactical weapons are not subject to the START accords. They are largely in storage, not deployed on missiles, bombers, and submarines where they are likely to be better protected. A recent story in the Jerusalem Post indicated that Iran may have been able to purchase up to four former Soviet nuclear warheads earlier this decade. This report highlights an important danger. Terrorist use of one of these weapons would be devastating. A nuclear blast would make the Oklahoma City fertilizer bomb look like a firecracker. Today, many tactical nuclear warheads have yields that dwarf the device that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Mr. President, this chart tells us something about terrorist use of a tactical nuclear warhead. It tells us how devastating it would be. The fertilizer bomb detonated in Oklahoma City two years ago had a destructive yield in the range of two one-thousandths of a kiloton. The so-called ``fat man'' atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, 13 kilotons. Smaller tactical weapons of today can be in the range of 10 kilotons. Some tactical nuclear weapons have been reported to be as small as a suitcase. Some larger tactical nuclear weapons can have a yield of more than 300 kilotons. And remember--Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads, devices that are not included in any arms control regime. We don't have an accounting. We don't have the accountability that comes with a formal inspection regime. The threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal is where we ought to be directing our attention. This is what ought to be our top priority. We endanger progress by moving to enlarge NATO at this time. The other threat is one that has been highlighted by the United States Strategic Command. Strategic warhead levels would likely decline to around 2,250 under a START III accord. An 8-to-1 Russian advantage in tactical warheads becomes a major strategic concern in this environment. Let me direct the Senate's attention to this chart. The strategic breakout danger has been referenced by some of our top military leaders. The United States, under a START III accord, would likely have 2,250 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russia would presumably have the same number. But look what happens on the tactical side. With tactical nuclear weapons, our arsenal would stand at around 1,500. Russia could still be at 7,000 to 12,000 tactical warheads, an enormous disparity. And that leads to a concern about strategic instability. This is especially true in light of the fact that the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons has been disappearing. During the early years of the Cold War, large nuclear weapons with yields in the tens of megatons were needed. At that time, our ICBMs and other delivery systems were inaccurate enough that a massive bomb was needed to destroy a target. But as the accuracy of missiles increased, many large multimegaton bombs were replaced with strategic weapons with much smaller yields. Today, for example, the warheads on the MX--or Peacekeeper--have a yield of 350 kilotons. As the next chart notes, this is in the range of many tactical nuclear weapons today. During the cold war, many strategic weapons were in the range of 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. Today, tactical weapons can range from 10 kilotons to around 400 kilotons or more. Many of today's strategic weapons are in the range of 300 kilotons to 1 megaton. So the difference in yield between strategic systems and tactical nuclear systems has been altered dramatically over time. There is much less of a distinction between the yield of strategic warheads and tactical warheads than in the past. The implication is clear and disturbing. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical warheads that General Habiger has said the Russians could have are taking on a strategic relevance. I think my colleagues would agree that a massive Russian superiority could be destabilizing. My amendment would send a clear signal of Senate support for progress on reducing the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. It supports the recommendation of General Habiger, the general charged with America's nuclear security, that future arms control initiatives should include tactical warheads. Let's listen to America's nuclear commander. He says: ``The Russians have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and we need to bring them into the equation.'' This from General Eugene Habiger, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. My amendment is simple and deserves the support of every Senator. Its purpose is to put the Senate on record in the context of the NATO debate as being concerned about the danger of ``loose nukes.'' The strategic implications of Russia's arsenal are also critically important. We should continue to work cooperatively with the Russians to reduce this threat. I believe the dangers in this area require an increased emphasis if we are to be serious about arms control. I am pleased to be joined by Senator Bingaman, the ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, in offering this amendment. Briefly, my amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the Russian Federation to address tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. And second, the administration should work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security and facilitate weapons dismantlement. My amendment contains a simple but important certification. Prior to deposit of the instruments of ratification, the administration shall certify to the Senate that, one, with regard to tactical nuclear weapons it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security and facilitate weapons dismantlement; and that two, discussions toward this end are underway with the Russian Federation. The administration should be able to meet this certification with little difficulty based on current staff level discussions. Nevertheless, this provision puts the Senate on record and the administration on notice that the Senate is interested and concerned. Finally, my amendment requires a report within 180 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification on the status of the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal, the threats associated with it, and plans to continue to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation on increasing transparency, exchanging data, increasing warhead security and facilitating weapons dismantlement. These, Mr. President, ought to be our clear goals. I also believe this amendment is timely and we need this statement now. As Senator Moynihan has discussed, Russian officials have said that in the face of an expanding NATO and dwindling Russian conventional forces, they will have to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons. That is a valid concern. Rushing to enlarge NATO could reduce Russia's willingness to cooperate on tactical nuclear arms. NATO expansion could perpetuate the risk of sale or theft of a ``loose nuke'' and Russia's massive lead over the United States in tactical warheads. Even if the Senate approves NATO enlargement, we need to keep our eye on the ball. That ball is arms control. My amendment sends a clear and compelling signal to Moscow that we want to continue to work with them to reduce the threat in this area. Mr. President, I believe there is nothing in this amendment that is a hazard to NATO enlargement. Although I personally oppose enlargement, I believe it would be a serious mistake for the Senate not to pass this amendment. I believe it should be approved. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the staff for their patience. I thank my colleagues for this opportunity, and I hope they will support this amendment.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of ratification for NATO enlargement. In my view, there are four questions that must be answered in the affirmative in order to support NATO expansion. No. 1, are the risks to relations with Russia and arms control acceptable? No. 2, are we sure what NATO expansion will cost and who will pay for it? No. 3, has a compelling argument been made as to why expansion is necessary? No. 4, are we certain that enlargement will not have perverse consequences, fostering instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal? I am convinced, after thorough review, that the answers to these questions are all no. I start with the observation of Mr. George Kennan, perhaps the foremost observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. Kennan, who was, after all, the architect of the containment policy that proved so effective, said in a Newsday editorial on March 15 that, ``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era.'' Mr. President and colleagues, let me repeat. George Kennan, the architect of containment, said as recently as March 15 that, ``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era.'' That is a pretty serious statement by someone who has great credibility based on his record. He is not alone in that assessment. Former Senator Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect on both sides of the aisle in this Chamber, has discussed a dangerous contradiction at the center of the argument for expansion, saying that while enlargement is intended to protect former Soviet satellites, nothing else is as likely to remilitarize Russia and endanger those very countries as NATO enlargement. Senator Nunn is not alone. We are hearing from leaders in Russia their warnings to us not to proceed. I recently met--with a group of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives--with Alexi Arbatov, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee. He told us, ``If you proceed with NATO enlargement, you are handing a powerful issue to the radicals in Russia. You are energizing the extreme nationalists in Russia, and you are weakening the forces for democracy.'' Mr. President, we should not lightly dismiss the warnings of committed democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov and others who have given us similar warnings. I think it says a great deal that the primary architects of American strategy during the cold war, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, have cautioned the Senate against ratification and NATO expansion. Nearly 50 years ago, as successive heads of the State Department's policy planning staff during the Truman Administration, Kennan and Nitze understood that containment of the Soviet Union was critically important to the free world. Today, they have told us that NATO expansion is a mistake. I believe the stakes are very high. Remilitarization in Russia is a serious threat. Avoiding this outcome should be our priority, not enlarging NATO. The first casualty of our expansion of NATO may very well be progress on arms control. I know that many of my colleagues do not like to be in a position where it seems the Senate's decisions about foreign policy are dependent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of blackmail. The problem with this thinking is that it assumes that something we need is being held hostage. As I have discussed, there simply is no compelling argument for why we must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk relations with Russia and arms control are not acceptable. The Duma's expeditious ratification of START II should be our priority. In pursuing our national interest we are in no way giving in to Russian blackmail. I might add it is not just a question of START II ratification, but it is also clearly in our national interest to make a priority of reducing the threat from the tactical nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal. By rejecting NATO enlargement, we would simply be choosing not to embark on a dangerous and unjustified course of enlarging NATO and would avoid making a terrible mistake in the course of U.S.-Russian relations. The second point I think needs to be made is that NATO enlargement brings unknown costs. The case for enlargement becomes increasingly suspect when we look at questions related to the costs and who will bear them. I direct the attention of my colleagues to a chart on the various estimates that have been issued with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued an estimate of $21 billion to $125 billion. The Rand Corporation said the cost would be $10 billion to $110 billion. The first Clinton administration estimate was $27 billion to $35 billion. NATO itself has put a price tag of $1.5 billion on expansion. And the second Clinton administration estimate was $1.5 billion. You talk about a wide-ranging estimate. We have anywhere from $1.5 billion to $125 billion. I do not know where the truth lies. I am a member of the Budget Committee, as is the distinguished occupant of the Chair. I think it is fair to say that none of us has a truly credible estimate with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement. This takes me to another key question. Who is going to pay this tab? I think all of us know these estimates are probably far off the mark. They probably understate in a very serious way the potential costs of NATO enlargement. The third main point that must be made with regard to NATO enlargement is that no compelling argument for expansion has been made. What is the military threat that we are encountering? After all, NATO is a military alliance. What threat are we defending against by expanding NATO? I see no immediate Russian threat to the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland. We must remember that article V of the North Atlantic Charter states clearly that an attack on any one member nation is to be considered an attack on all. The test for extension of such a guarantee ought to be simple and clear. We must be convinced that the safety of the American people is directly tied to the security of the country in question, and therefore we must defend that country as we would our own. That must be the test. Clearly, Western Europe's freedom from Soviet domination was central to the survival of our country and of the free world. Article V deterred Moscow by sending an unmistakable message that a Soviet move against Bonn, West Germany, would have been resisted as would an attack on Bismarck, North Dakota. But nearly 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Russian army weakened and greatly reduced, and warning times dramatically expanded, I fail to understand why it is immediately imperative that we provide that same guarantee to Budapest, Hungary. Mr. President, what is our national interest? That is the question before this body. I believe the overarching priority is to further reduce nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal. And the question before the Senate is whether NATO enlargement will slow down the progress towards arms control or will speed it up. I don't think there is any question that there exists in expanding NATO a clear risk to this true priority. The overwhelming likelihood is that the U.S. vital interest, which is in reducing the threat from the Russian nuclear arsenal, will be harmed. Expanding NATO is not in our interest. Mr. President, concern about possible instability in Eastern Europe does not justify expansion of NATO. NATO is not the only vehicle for stability in Europe. Other options that deserve review include expansion of the European Union, or reworking the Partnership for Peace or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Expansion of a military alliance is not our only option. In fact, it appears to this Senator that it is the worst option. I think the New York Times put it very well when it stated in a recent editorial: ``There is simply no compelling security justification for NATO enlargement.'' Fourth point: NATO expansion may have perverse consequences, increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. The impact of expansion on Eastern Europe and proliferation are perhaps the least studied of all aspects of this issue. But these are some of the most important concerns. After all, stability in Eastern Europe and the safety of our country is why we are debating NATO enlargement on the Senate floor tonight. I am very concerned that NATO enlargement could actually increase the danger in Eastern Europe. As former Senator Nunn has indicated, expansion could create the very danger from Russia that it is intended to prevent. Expanding NATO to foster stability could have the perverse result of increasing the danger to the former Soviet satellites that we decide not to include. By not including some countries while welcoming others, Russia might well conclude that some countries in Eastern Europe are less important to us than others, and therefore easier to intimidate. Let us not draw new lines in Eastern Europe without serious thought about their consequences. NATO expansion may additionally drive remilitarization and arms buildups. We are asking Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to significantly increase their defense budgets. How can we expect their neighbors to respond? How can we expect Russia to respond? Just as the Russian extreme nationalists are predicting, it would appear that NATO expansion would have the effect of tipping the conventional balance in Europe even further against Russia. This is what the Russian forces for democracy are warning us against. They are saying: ``Don't you understand that if you proceed with NATO enlargement, those who are the most radical elements in Russia, those who are the extreme nationalists, will seize on this and they will look to the capability of this expanded military alliance and they will say the capability of NATO is to put tanks on our border?'' We will answer, in the United States: ``But NATO is not an offensive military alliance; it is defensive in nature.'' And those who are the extreme nationalists and the radicals in Russia will respond: ``NATO says it is a defensive alliance, but why are they putting tanks on our border? We don't know what the long-term intentions of NATO are,'' they will argue, ``but we do know NATO's capability--and that capability is to put tanks on our border.'' How will that be used politically in Russia? How will that be used in a post-Yeltsin era? Will it strengthen the hardliners and those who argue for remilitarization? Or will it strengthen the forces for democracy and a market economy? I do not think it takes any great analysis to figure out the result in Russia or how it will be used politically. Those in Russia who argue for democracy, who argue for arms control and arms reductions, who argue for a market economy, they are warning us that we are weakening them, and that we are strengthening the forces for remilitarization. Mr. President, I also believe NATO enlargement could perpetuate the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. According to General Habiger, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. That bears repeating: Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The United States today has approximately 1,600. What is going to happen with Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile if NATO expansion goes forward? What will Russia's decisionmaking be about their huge advantage in tactical nuclear weapons? I am concerned that NATO expansion will hurt the prospect of an agreement on tactical nuclear arms because it will increase Russia's reliance on those very weapons. Russia already sees itself conventionally outmatched by NATO. It has abandoned its nuclear policy of no first use. NATO enlargement will simply increase their insecurity, making them less willing to part with their tactical nuclear weapons. This will mean it will be harder to reduce the threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of these weapons. I will be addressing this issue with an amendment. But first, let me conclude on the question of NATO enlargement. Mr. President, NATO expansion fails on the four tests that I outlined at the outset of my remarks, leading me to the following conclusions. First, the risks to relations with Russia and arms control are unacceptable. Second, we are not certain what NATO expansion will cost or who will pay for it. Third, there is no compelling argument for why expanding NATO is necessary, especially when there are other alternatives. And, fourth, there is ample reason to conclude that enlargement will have perverse consequences, increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal. Fortunately, it is not too late. Columnist Jim Hoagland in a column in the Washington Post last month said: ``The Senate needs an extended debate, not an immediate vote.'' Jim Hoagland has it right. We do need an extended debate. There should not be a rush to judgment. There are serious questions that should be answered. The Senate, in my judgment, should not give in to the Cold War argument about American credibility being on the line. How many times have we seen that argument called up in this Chamber? When the arguments are weak on behalf of a decision that is already moving forward, we have colleagues who rush to the floor and say, ``Oh, it might not be such a good idea, but America's credibility is on the line. Our President has made this commitment, and therefore we must go along to maintain American credibility.'' I remember that argument being made in the Vietnam era. It wasn't a good argument then, and it is not a good argument now. The better course, rather than moving to expand NATO, is to tell the administration we should, first, investigate alternatives to NATO enlargement, such as expansion of the European Union. Second, we should have a new round of hearings when the results of the studies that are required by this resolution are available. That, after all, was the recommendation of former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker. And third, we ought to pursue arms control as our top priority. As Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has advised us: NATO expansion is at best a distraction from, and at worst a hindrance to, making progress on these issues. Mr. President, I believe we ought to take Professor Mandelbaum's sound advice. Before we rush headlong into expanding NATO, we ought to think carefully about what is truly in our country's interests. Executive Amendment No. 2320 (Purpose: To encourage progress on reducing the threat posed by Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal)

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to discuss briefly a Senate resolution relating to the Pulitzer Prize just won by a major newspaper in my State.

Mr. CONRAD

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, Senator Dorgan and I have prepared a resolution recognizing the remarkable work of the Grand Forks Herald in covering the disasters that beset that city last year. The Chair will recall that we faced a circumstance of the worst winter in our history, followed by the most powerful winter storm in 50 years, followed by the worst flooding in 500 years, then followed by fires that destroyed much of downtown Grand Forks. The Grand Forks Herald, through it all, kept putting out the daily newspaper. It didn't matter that their own building was flooded or burned out. They kept producing that newspaper day after day after day. More than producing a newspaper, they produced a remarkable document that told the story. They have been recognized broadly for their remarkable performance. I can tell you, Mr. President, in the community that newspaper is revered, because they were there at a time of maximum danger and threat to the community and they helped hold that community together. Today I will be offering a resolution on behalf of myself and Senator Dorgan in recognition of the Pulitzer Prize that has now been extended to that newspaper for their remarkable public service. We are incredibly proud that the Grand Forks Herald has been so recognized. They are richly deserving. I hope my colleagues today on both sides will clear this resolution so that we can have the respect extended to that newspaper that they so richly deserve. I thank the Chair. I especially thank my colleague, the leader, from South Dakota for his indulgence in permitting me to discuss this resolution. We, again, are seeking support on both sides so that this resolution can be adopted today and entered into the Record. I also thank my colleague from Georgia, Senator Coverdell, for permitting me to talk about this resolution, albeit briefly.