John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), my good friend, about the revolution he described. Last April 15th it failed in the House. Does the gentleman have some additional information that will lead us to believe we are going to be overwhelmed today with the passage of this amendment?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), the ranking member.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul) before he goes out, I just wanted to explain one thing. This is not a debate about those ``for'' taxes and those ``against'' taxes, so the gentleman misunderstands our position. Our position is not for enshrining corporate loopholes to the tune of $450 billion in a constitutional amendment. It is not about being for taxes. I am not for taxes. I am trying to keep the gentleman's side of the aisle from enshrining this $450 billion loophole.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would continue to yield, why would people come to the floor crying about that same issue, then? Why would people now come to the floor crying about why they need to impose this two-thirds requirement rule, when the same rule they imposed in the House under Newt Gingrich, the Speaker, is the one they ignore, they honor in the breach, they never do it?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia for his contribution today. Four times they have had, the Republicans have had to waive their own requirement. Does the gentleman have there any explanation from them as to why that occurred?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I was on official travel with the President of the United States last week, and I missed a number of votes. Had I been present, I would have voted no on rollcall numbers 80, 78, 76, 75, 74, 73, and 69. I would have voted yes on rollcall numbers 79, 77, 72, 71, 70, and 68.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to register my strong opposition to the conference report for the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. I urge my colleagues not be fooled by some of the bill's features such as payments to the United Nations because it also contains some incorrigible features. For example, it eliminates the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, thereby denying our foreign policy makers the benefit of an independent voice on arms control matters. H.R. 1757 also resurrects the so-called ``Mexico City'' language that restricts funding for abortions overseas--even if they are paid for with private funds. But the offensive provisions in particular that I want to bring to your attention today deal with Haiti. On September 25, 1997, Congresswoman Waters and I wrote a letter to the chairman and the ranking member of the International Relations Committee, expressing our concern with provisions reflected in this bill in Section 1228. We were joined by Charlie Rangel, Ed Towns, Jim Clyburn, Ronald Dellums, Bill Jefferson, Earl Hilliard, John Lewis, Bobby Rush, and Julian Dixon. I am enclosing this information for the Record. Despite our efforts and those of the gentleman from Indiana, the ranking member, this problematic language stands. Section 1228 creates vague new authority by which the Secretary of State can prevent certain Haitians from entering the Untied States. The fact of the matter is that the Secretary of State already has the authority to deny entry to persons who are suspected of human rights violations or terrorism under Title 8 USC Section 1182(a)(3). This bill has a new, ambiguous standard under which the Secretary of State can deny entry to someone who has been ``credibly alleged to have ordered, carried out, or materially assisted'' in specific killings listed in the conference report. This new language in H.R. 1757 will be inconsistent with the existing law and create a new untested standard that will be open to manipulation by anyone who simply makes an allegation. Rather than promoting justice for all victims of violence, this will be used to politicize the murders of some Haitians, rather than serving as a tool to advance justice for all Haitians. Furthermore, by singling out specific violators the bill fails to send a broad message about human rights violators in general. Perhaps worst of all is that the most egregious enemies of human rights, such as Toto Constant, the head of the paramilitary group FRAPH, are already in the United States. Constant slipped into the U.S. (and is comfortably living in New York) not because the Attorney General or the Secretary of State lacks the power to keep him out, but because like other opponents of democracy from Haiti, he is an old CIA asset. We've got to start dealing with these facts if we really want justice for Haiti. I oppose H.R. 1757 for all these reasons and I thank the gentleman. Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, September 25, 1997. Hon. Ben Gilman, Chairman, House International Relations Committee, Rayburn 2170, Washington, DC. We are writing in reference to amendment 383 of S. 903, the Senate Foreign Affairs Reform Act, offered by Senator DeWine. This provision would seek to deny entry into the United States to those whom the Secretary of State ``has reason to believe is a person who has been credibly alleged to have ordered, carried out, or materially assisted in extrajudicial and political murders'' in Haiti. We strongly support the bill's basic premise that persons involved in political murders be denied entry to the United States. But, we believe this language raises a number of problematic legal issues, may weaken the ability of the U.S. to deal with extrajudicial killers, and may even make it easier to evade prosecution. We also wish to note that the substance of these provisions appear to be covered by existing law. As a result, we urge you to strike this contentious language and avoid the confusion and litigation guaranteed to result if it becomes law. U.S. Code currently grants the Secretary of State the legal authority to deny a visa from individuals that the Secretary believes have engaged in extrajudicial killings. The Secretary of State can deny a visa application based either on anti-terrorist or foreign policy grounds.\1\ A decision to deny a visa based on these grounds is not reviewable by any court. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Sec. 212(a)(3) [8 U.S.C. Sect. 1182(a)(3)] re: terrorism and Sec. 212(a)(3)(C) re: foreign policy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In fact, the Secretary of State in the consular offices in the field already maintains a list of people who fall into one of these two exclusionary categories. This list, commonly known as the ``lookout book'' is kept by every American consulate. If your name is in the lookout book, the consular officer will deny your visa application. The DeWine Amendment lists specific individuals, specific dates, and specific factual allegations. Although this may seem to focus the legislation and get tough on the alleged killers, in fact this language limits the ability of a prosecutor to bring these killers to justice. Any skilled attorney would recognize how any one of these named individuals could escape justice if the fact or dates cited turned out to be incorrect. By writing the legislation so narrowly Mr. DeWine and his cosponsors risk giving human rights abusers a legal escape hatch. Beyond the legal problems with this proposed legislation, we also believe the DeWine amendment fails on moral grounds. In limiting the focus to Haiti this legislation fails to convey a universal condemnation against extrajudicial and political murders. We believe it is imperative to communicate our country's worldwide aversion to political assassinations. It is a matter of principled policy making to deny entry to all persons involved in political assassinations, whether they be from Bosnia, Russia, Guatemala, Haiti or anywhere else in the world. We hope you agree with our analysis of this bill. We urge you to strike this amendment from the proposed legislation. We look forward to working with you on this important issue. Sincerely, John Conyers; C.B. Rangel; James E. Clyburn; William J. Jefferson; Julian C. Dixon; Bobby Rush; Maxine Waters; Edolphus Towns; Ronald V. Dellums; Earl F. Hilliard; John Lewis.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2589, the ``Copyright Term Extension Act''. This bill will allow the United States to keep pace with the copyright terms of European countries that are our main competitors for copyright products such as motion pictures and music. In 1995, the European Union harmonized the copyright term in its member countries at a minimum of life plus 70 years--20 years longer than the term in the United States. By directive, EU countries will not provide copyright protection for U.S. intellectual property in Europe beyond what our own law provides. This approach is known as the ``rule of the shorter term.'' As a result, absent congressional action, U.S. copyright owners will not receive income from uses of their works during the 20 additional years of protection available in European countries and will therefore be at a relative disadvantage to their European competitors. Changes in technology that have increased the commercial value of works created many years ago. In music, for instance, copyright owners are now digitizing musical works and reissuing them to a receptive market. A short copyright term is harmful to works of art and music whose value may not be recognized until many years since they were initially created. The world loves American-made music, movies, computer software and books. Creators of these works should not be placed at a competitive disadvantage in overseas markets. American intellectual property is the most sought after abroad and is one of the few bright spots in our balance of trade. By acting on copyright extension, Congress will be furthering American innovation and protecting American jobs. H.R. 2589 also includes a carefully crafted, balanced library exemption that ensures that the legitimate needs of the libraries are met. In addition the ``fair use doctrine'' is unaffected by the bill. Therefore, users continue to enjoy the full benefits of ``fair use'' under Section 107 of the Copyright Act. I urge all Members to support extending the copyright term which will protect American creators and keep U.S. copyright laws in proper balance domestically and abroad.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment which is a fair and balanced compromise to the current dispute surrounding music licensing. This dispute really revolves around big business seeking an exemption to paying public performance royalties for radio, television and other broadcast in their restaurants. Copyright owners have the exclusive right to authorize others to publicly perform their works. When a commercial establishment turns on the radio or television, that is a public performance of another's intellectual property. Why should all commercial establishments be exempted from licensing fees? Representative Sensenbrenner's amendment is far from a fair approach to music licensing. His amendment would create a carve out for all commercial establishment using music via any transmission, not just standard radio and TV broadcast. Adopting this provision would mean an outrageous give away of music by allowing big restaurants to stop paying a mere $1.58 a day! Meanwhile ninety percent of music writers make less than $10,000 a year! Most songwriters don't perform, so licensing fees are critical to their incomes. This amendment is a direct big business attack on the livelihood of songwriters. My amendment, offered with Representative McCollum, represents provisions of an agreement which the parties came close to at the end of recent negotiations. The McCollum-Conyers substitute expands the current exemption from music licensing to cover all restaurants of less than 3,500 square feet, excluding parking lots, no matter what kind of radio or television devices are being used. It also exempts restaurants of 3,500 square feet or larger if they use only four television sets and six speakers, with no more than four speakers in one room and reasonable television screen sizes. This compromise offers a fair approach by providing a broad exemption to small businesses and protecting royalties of songwriters. Many of you have heard the song, ``I Heard It Through the Grapevine'' which has been recorded by the Temptations, Gladys Knight and the Pips, Marvin Gaye and many others. But I bet you have never heard of Barrett Strong, the songwriter. Music licensing fees collected by performing rights organization (e.g. BMI, ASCAP and SESAC) is the only income Mr. Strong receives from his creative work. Don't let big businesses ``rip off' artists! It is time to end this long dispute--but not by giving away artists' rights to just compensation for their creative works. I urge my colleagues to vote for the McCollum-Conyers substitute.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. No. Not only has that not happened, but I have been assured repeatedly, and I am sorry to have to put this into the Record now, that I would be kept abreast of all developments connected with this, because I have repeatedly been hearing in the media what they were trying to do. As a matter of fact, a January letter requesting this money was brought to me by a member of the press when I told them I had never seen it before. This document I did not see until after the hearing of the full Committee on the Judiciary late this afternoon. So it is with some sadness that I make public that the agreement that I thought that I was entering into has been shattered. Perhaps it can be replaced. But I want the entire Congress to know that these unilateral Republican shenanigans, whether they come from the Speaker or from the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, work an extreme disservice on the processes that are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary in the House.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, here is what the justification submitted to the Committee on House Oversight said: ``The Committee on the Judiciary contemplates an investigation of the Department of Justice's investigation, with an emphasis on the need for an independent counsel.'' They go on to point out that the 17 Republican members have written a letter to the Attorney General and that their plans include the following: The Department of Justice Public Integrity Section and Campaign Fundraising Task Force has been plagued with conflicts of interest, et cetera. In the Chippewa casino matter the Department of Justice is acting as the criminal prosecutor. Further on, the fundraising investigations, the last time the Committee on the Judiciary sought an appointment of an independent counsel was on the Health Care Task Force.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would say to my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts, if anybody in this House thinks that any serious investigation of the White House or this administration can begin on a partisan basis, as this is appearing to be, I think they are dooming it to a total failure. The notion that anything remotely resembling impeachment activity be sent to any committee other than the Committee on the Judiciary is a clear signal that something is wrong.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, the ranking subcommittee chairman.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow the Committee on House Oversight is expected to give $1.3 million to the House Committee on the Judiciary for an enlarged congressional staff to investigate President Clinton. The American people are tired of this waste, and so am I, and this is from a leadership that promised to trim congressional staffs. Now, what is amazing to me is the exchange between the chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Henry Hyde), myself, and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) only 1\1/2\ hours ago in the Committee on the Judiciary, when I explained that I thought we needed no more wasted dollars and harassment of the President. The chairman of this committee, in session, sought to reassure me that the monies would be used for harmless oversight of the Department of Justice and for the noncontroversial reauthorization of the Department. It is on the record in the committee. This is in direct contradiction to the written statement yesterday of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) in a letter that has come to my attention that he has sent to the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), chairman of the Committee of House Oversight, to justify this new windfall by saying that new investigators were needed to recycle and duplicate nearly every independent counsel investigation into the Clinton administration, from fundraising to allegations at the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior. These matters have already been overinvestigated, but they directly contradict the purpose for which these funds are being authorized by the committee. I have never received a letter about this in my career. This is a unilateral Republican action to which I take total exception. There has been stealth in correspondence, there have been internal contradictions. But I must now come to the House and report that the Republican leadership is planning to surreptitiously commence to staff for an impeachment investigation without any notice to the Congress, to the Democrats on the Committee on the Judiciary, or to the American people, without a vote from the House of Representatives. I urge the gentleman from Georgia (Speaker Gingrich), with all respect, to rethink this dangerous, radical political strategy. It is outrageous that we are being told publicly one thing by the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) when his letter to his own leadership is saying something else entirely different: More money to investigate the President. Why can the majority not just admit it, rather than hiding under these cloaks and misstatements. Members of the House will get no opportunity to vote on this massive increase of funds. When I explained that the Speaker agreed with this request in a cover letter, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) asked that he not be saddled with the Speaker's words. So today, Mr. Speaker, I will release to the press the words of the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) justifying this new congressional surplus of money and staff and resources, and let the American people judge for themselves.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to endorse the remarks made by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, about the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act. I am deeply indebted to him for moving this bill from the committee to the full House. This is an offense and an activity that is very familiar to many people. It is something that has happened to more African Americans, particularly males, than I would care to admit today on the floor of the House of Representatives. There are very few of us in this country who have not been stopped at one time for an alleged traffic violation that we constituted really simple racial harassment. Mr. Speaker, I say this as a friend of law enforcement, as one who has always received the support and has worked closely with police organizations across the country for many years. Law enforcement officers may admit to isolated instances of racially targeted police stops, but very few will concede that this harassment is routine, that it happens literally everywhere; and it is to this complaint that this study, this examination of this peculiar kind of incident in law enforcement, is directed. There have been limited studies that have occurred which have found that as many as 72 percent of all routine traffic stops occur with African-American drivers in a population that we all know is not over 15 percent. The coincidence need not to be confirmed. In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, we had a case in which the court itself, in 1993, came to a conclusion that we think will be supported by the study that is proposed in the bill before us. That was the case of a police officer from Santa Monica who was found to have violated the rights of 2 African-American men that he stopped and subsequently arrested at gunpoint. The case is cited here because it was an example of how police routinely violate the constitutional rights of others by stopping them without just cause. There must be a cause to stop someone. It cannot be subjective; it cannot be racially motivated. There has to be a reason. Now, for those who might say, well, why do we not just go to court and let the lawsuits flow, the lawsuits cannot solve this problem. First of all, the individual costs that must be borne by plaintiffs would, in most cases, be more than they could bear; and it would also take considerable amounts of time. Last year, in November, the American Civil Liberties Union sought a fine for contempt of court against the State police near us, the Maryland State police, arguing that police were still conducting a disproportionate number of searches of cars driven by African Americans 2 years after they had agreed to stop that practice as a result of a 1992 lawsuit. In other words, they were violating the agreement. The State police statistics show that 73 percent of the cars stopped and searched on interstate I-95 a few blocks from here, between Baltimore and Delaware, since January of 1995, were conducted on the cars of African Americans, despite the fact that only 14 percent of those driving along that part of the freeway were African Americans. Moreover, there was nothing found in 70 percent of those searches. Mr. Speaker, this and other evidence suggests that African Americans are routinely being stopped by law enforcement simply because of the color of their skin, and it is precisely this sort of unfair treatment that leads many people to distrust the criminal justice system. If we expect everyone to abide by the rules, and we do, we must ensure that those rules are applied equally to everybody, and they are frequently not. In many ways, this sort of harassment is even more serious than police brutality itself. Not to minimize police brutality, but these are insidious ways of antagonizing people, and this treatment must be examined. The measure before us today will not stop or punish the treatment, it will investigate as to whether it in fact goes on in the proportions that our hearings suggest that it does. Unlike police brutality, which frequently comes to light, these punishments are like knife cuts. They are not reported. There is nothing done with them. They are wounds to the psyche that spread, they never heal, and they are painful to those that sustain them. So what we are saying is that this is not an anti-police piece of legislation, it is a piece of legislation to determine whether a practice that we have long suspected is still in fact going on. As we know here in this Chamber, the Supreme Court has expanded police powers by holding that an individual need not be informed that they have a right not to consent to a search of their vehicles. There is a bit of flux in the law on this subject. So this measure, that authorizes the Attorney General to conduct a study regarding the race and alleged infractions of drivers stopped by the police, is designed to provide us with specific information regarding the extent of the problem, and will provide information as to the rationale for any search made subsequent to a traffic stop, and of course, any contraband recovered in that search. Through this study, I hope we will increase police awareness of the problem involved of some few police officers targeting minorities routinely for car searches when there is, indeed, no justification. Perhaps we can discover the extent of the problem, and hopefully reduce the number of discriminatory, inappropriate traffic stops by police officers made based on the color of the skin of the motorist. Because the study proposed by this legislation presents a reasonable way of dealing with an issue I have been hearing complaints about throughout my service in the Congress, I deeply appreciate my colleagues on the Committee on the Judiciary and our chairman for bringing this measure to the floor, and I urge that we support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the United States Commission on Civil Rights, and support this bill to reauthorize the Commission. However, I am concerned that, while the legislation places deadlines for reporting, the Commission remains underfunded and without the resources necessary to complete its many essential functions. Congress has consistently appropriated funds to the Commission below the President's authorization request, leaving the Commission year after year with inadequate resources to carry out its directive of investigating charges of citizens deprived of their civil rights, monitoring the enforcement of Federal civil rights laws, and serving as a national clearinghouse for information related to discrimination. With no specified funding level, the proposed legislation increases the possibility that Congress will continue its pattern of underfunding an important and critical component of this Nation's goal of eliminating discrimination in all its ugly forms. Moreover, there is no indication that the Majority is prepared to support increased funding for the Commission as requested in the FY 1999 Budget. In fact, in its Estimates and Views on the 1999 Budget, the Majority remains noncommittal on the appropriateness of the President's request of $11 million funding request. However, each year, the Congress continues to underfund the Commission. Last year, the Commission requested $11 million, but was only appropriated $8.75 million. While increased congressional oversight over the Commission may be warranted, it is irresponsible for the Committee to place additional burdens on the Commission and yet continue to overlook the need for full funding of the Commission. It is an unnecessary and intrusive requirement to have the Commission constantly under the obligation of responding to the many requests made by the Majority, but without any provision for the funds necessary to perform its duties effectively. The Majority has consistently focused on the problems associated with enforcement of our civil rights laws and insists that discrimination is no longer the problem it was 30 years ago. However, there is no question that the need for the Commission is greater than ever before. Discrimination continues to be a persistent problem in American society, and the role of the Civil Rights Commission plays a crucial part in fighting it. Instead of continually scrutinizing perceived defects in remedies to discrimination, we need to examine the persistent, invidious, intractable and often disguised nature of race and gender discrimination that is an undeniable fact in America today. This is what the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was established to do, and Congress has an obligation to provide it with the necessary resources to do so.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge you to oppose H.R. 992, the so-called ``Tucker Act Shuffle Relief Act of 1997.'' While I support the protection of private property rights and the payment of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, I must oppose H.R. 992 because it is unconstitutional, overrides valuable ``preclusive review'' provisions in Federal statutes, and will lead to duplicative litigation and forum shopping. The bill is strongly opposed by the administration and is likely to be vetoed. H.R. 992 is unconstitutional because it blurs the important distinction between Article III and Article I judges by allowing Article I, Court of Federal Claims judges to invalidate Federal regulations. Only Article III courts have the power of judicial review and the power to enjoin agency actions. The Supreme Court has clearly ruled that Congress cannot grant an Article I court the remedial powers of an Article III court. Second, H.R. 992 overrides the ``preclusive review'' provisions that are an integral part of many Federal statutes. Preclusive review provisions ensure prompt and definitive resolution of legal challenges to agency decisions by providing that challenges to the validity of a particular statute must be brought in a particular court within 60 to 90 days. Businesses and investors rely on ``preclusive review'' provisions in order to make long-term business and investment decisions with certainty. The bill would override these ``preclusive review'' provisions and allow challenges to be brought in a variety of different Federal courts at any time. A number of major Federal statutes would be affected, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. This result would be harmful to the public and the regulated community. Finally, H.R. 992 will lead to duplicative litigation and forum shopping. By repealing 28 U.S.C. 1500, H.R. 992 eliminates provisions in current law that prevent duplicative litigation when a similar claim has been filed or is pending in another court. This will lead to a rash of wasteful litigation and forum shopping which would unnecessarily expend limited judicial resources. I urge a ``no'' vote on H.R. 992.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding. The only two points I wanted to bring up is this is not about whether we are for or against the death penalty. This amendment is to make sure that, if the court has any doubt that the defendant actually committed the offense, the court would be allowed to suspend the sentence of death and provide a sentence of life imprisonment. And with reference to the gentleman's observation that there is no evidence that any person that has been executed was innocent, it is pretty hard after the execution to ask people to continue to look for evidence that the execution was wrong. We know that they were on death row and we have saved them because the effort and the energies persisted while they were alive. So I would not want the gentleman to conclude from the fact that we have not proven that people executed were in fact innocent turns on the fact that they were in fact guilty. That is a pretty long stretch. Those were the two points in his refutation I wanted to bring forth.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.