John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez).

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on both sides?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Members of the House, I strongly oppose H.R. 185, the so-called Regulatory Accountability Act. Under the guise of attempting to improve the regulatory process, H.R. 185 will, in truth, undermine that process. It invites increased industry intervention and imposes more than 60--6-0--new analytical requirements that could add years to the regulatory process. They make no bones about it in this bill. As a result, H.R. 185 would seriously hamper the ability of government agencies to safeguard public health and safety, as well as environmental protections, workplace safety, and consumer financial protections. That is what we are debating at this moment. My greatest concern is that H.R. 185 will undermine the public health, safety, and well-being of Americans. The ways in which it does it are almost too numerous to list here, but I will mention a few. First, H.R. 185 would override critical laws that prohibit agencies from considering costs when public health and safety are at stake. Imagine, we would pass a law that would override critical laws that prohibit agencies from considering costs when public health and safety are at stake, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. This means that agency officials will now be required to balance the costs of an air pollution standard with the costs of anticipated deaths and illnesses that will result in the absence of such regulations. At a hearing on an earlier version of this bill in the 112th Congress, one witness--our witness--testified that if this measure were in effect in the 1970s, the government ``almost certainly would not have required the removal of most lead from gasoline until perhaps decades later.'' This explains why numerous respected agencies, consumer organizations, public interest groups, labor movements, and environmental organizations all strongly oppose this dangerous legislation. For example, the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards--consisting of more than 70 national public interest, labor, consumer, and environmental organizations--say the bill will ``grind to a halt the rulemaking process at the core of implementing the Nation's public health, workplace safety, and environmental standards.'' Another organization, very much respected, the Natural Resources Defense Council, adds that the practical impact of the measure before us now, H.R. 185, ``would be to make it difficult, if not impossible, to put in place any new safeguards for the public, no matter what the issue.'' Now, I am not sure if the authors of this measure understand the deep criticism and reservation that the scientific and academic community have about the practical impact of this measure. Another, the Consumer Federation of America states that H.R. 185 ``would handcuff all Federal agencies in their efforts to protect consumers'' and that it ``would override important bipartisan laws that have been in effect for years, as well as more recently-enacted laws to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive financial services, unsafe food, and unsafe consumer products.'' Do we understand what it is we are dealing with here this day? Further, the AFL-CIO warns that the bill's procedural and analytical requirements add years to the regulatory process--adds years to the regulatory process--delaying the development of major workplace safety rules and will ``cost workers their lives.'' As more than 80 highly-respected administrative law academics and practitioners observe, the bill's many ill-defined new procedural and analytical requirements will engender ``20 or 30 years of litigation before its requirements are clearly understood.'' What do we have in mind? What is trying to be accomplished here? My next concern is that this legislation would give well-funded business interests the opportunity to exert even greater influence over the rulemaking process and agencies. We already know that the ability of corporate and business interests to influence agency rulemaking far exceeds that by groups representing the public. In other words, the groups representing the public already have less influence to influence agency rulemaking, and we are here proposing in broad daylight to make it even worse, much worse. But rather than leveling the playing field, this measure will further tip the balance in favor of business interests by giving them multiple opportunities to intervene in the rulemaking process, including through less differential judicial review. Finally, this measure is based on the faulty premise that regulations result in economically stifling costs, kill jobs, and promote uncertainty. While supporters of H.R. 185 will undoubtedly cite a study claiming the cost of regulation exceed $1.8 trillion, the Congressional Research Service, Center for Progressive Reform, and the Economic Policy Institute all found that a prior iteration of this study was based on incomplete and irrelevant data. In fact, the majority's own witnesses at a hearing on nearly identical legislation clearly debunked this argument. Mr. Christopher DeMuth, who appeared on behalf of the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, testified that the employment effects of regulation ``are indeterminant.'' The other central argument put forth by proponents of this legislation--that regulatory uncertainty hurts businesses--has similarly been debunked. Bruce Bartlett, a senior policy analyst in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations observes: Regulatory uncertainty is a canard invented by Republicans that allows them to use current economic problems to pursue an agenda supported by the business community year in and year out. In other words, it is a simple case of political opportunism, not a serious effort to deal with high unemployment. That is from a Bush administrator, who was a senior policy analyst in the Reagan administration, Bruce Bartlett. Not surprisingly, the administration issued a strong veto threat just yesterday, stating that the bill ``would impose unprecedented and unnecessary procedural requirements on agencies that will prevent them from efficiently performing their statutory responsibilities.'' Rather than heeding these serious concerns, the supporters of H.R. 185 simply want to push forward without any hearings, markups, or deliberative process in this Congress with a bill that has absolutely no political viability. I urge, I plead with my colleagues to oppose this very dangerous legislation, and, Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia, Hank Johnson, a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McKinley amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, the McKinley amendment--as bad as things already are in the bill--adds an additional requirement to the bill's more than 60 analytical new requirements for the rulemaking process by requiring agencies to also consider economic competitiveness and impact on low-income populations in the rulemaking process. Now, the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, and Coalition for Sensible Safeguards all oppose this amendment because it is redundant and inflexible. This amendment is largely redundant of existing requirements. Executive Order 12898 already protects both low-income communities and communities of color. That executive order already requires agencies to take into account distributional impacts on these populations. So I want you to know that this is not the way to go. This amendment makes a totally unacceptable bill even more unacceptable. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chair, I want to say to my colleague on Judiciary, Ms. Jackson Lee, that this amendment is very important. It exempts any rule promulgated by Homeland Security, and as a result of this amendment, current law would apply to the Department of Homeland Security. This is a very perceptive and important part of us moving forward on a really critical consideration because H.R. 185 will stall or prevent rulemaking, and it is essential that the Department of Homeland Security not be encumbered by such burdensome requirements. Summary: This amendment exempts any rule promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from H.R. 185. As a result of this amendment, current law would apply to DHS. This amendment is necessary because H.R. 185 will stall or prevent rulemaking and it is essential that the DHS not be encumbered by such burdensome requirements. Effective rulemaking is a critical tool for DHS to be able to protect the Nation from acts of terrorism and to help communities recover from natural disasters, among many other things. For instance, DHS has already proposed several rules to safeguard maritime security, as well as a rule proposed by the Coast Guard to revise regulations relating to the construction, design, equipment of deep-water ports that are used as terminals for importing and exporting oil and natural gas. This rule would provide for regulatory flexibility, while also preventing another environmental catastrophe like Deepwater Horizon. DHS has also proposed a series of rules to protect against discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex. This rule guarantees the equal treatment of persons in all DHS programs under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These proposed rules clearly demonstrate the need for this amendment, which underscores the importance of rulemaking across a wide spectrum of concerns.

Mr. CONYERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman on his amendment. Mr. Chair, this amendment would exempt from H.R. 185 all rules or guidance that relate to health or public safety, including food safety, workplace safety, consumer product safety, air quality, or water quality. Existing APA procedures would continue to apply to these types of rules. The amendment highlights the real-world consequences of H.R. 185, which would be to stifle agencies' ability to promulgate rules that protect public health and safety. Among other things, H.R. 185 requires agencies to perform cumbersome and lengthy cost-benefit analyses of all rules. Worst of all, it would override substantive provisions of numerous statutes, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, that prohibit or limit agencies from considering cost. For instance, the Food and Drug Administration has begun proposing rules and guidance under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in 2011, representing the most substantial reform to food safety in over 70 years. In November 2014, the FDA proposed rules to implement this Act to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks associated with contaminated produce, among other things. According to the Center for Disease Control, one in six Americans get sick every year from foodborne diseases, affecting about 48 million people yearly. Of these, 3,000 people die every year from these diseases, which are largely preventable. Without this amendment, H.R. 185 would drown the FDA in additional requirements prior to issuing new rules to protect Americans from the contamination of produce and other rules that are critical to keeping the U.S. food supply safe. The cumulative effect of these and the other changes wrought by H.R. 185 would be to substantially undermine agencies' ability to effectively regulate consumer health and product safety, environmental protection, workplace safety, and financial services industry misconduct, among other critical concerns, while doing little to help small businesses shape or comply with federal regulations. Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regularly has reported to Congress that the benefits of regulations far exceed their costs. Effective rulemaking is a critical tool for agencies to protect the public health and safety, from clean air and water to emergency transportation rules designed to keep Americans safe while traveling abroad.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), one of our most effective members of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chair, I am pleased now to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), a man who has served the House Judiciary Committee with great distinction.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Grijalva).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield Mr. Grijalva another minute.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I notice that my friends on the other side have not named one person, academic scholar, or organization that supports this measure. I would now like to identify the letters that we have received on our side that have been very critical--very disturbed--by the gross approach of the authors of this measure. Supporting us and opposing the bill is the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. The AFL-CIO is opposed to this measure. The American Bar Association is opposed. The Americans for Financial Reform is opposed. The Center for Effective Government is opposed. The Center for Progressive Reform is opposed. The Center for Responsible Lending is opposed. The Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, representing more than 70 national consumer, public interest, labor, and environmental organizations and more than 80 State and local organizations and affiliates is opposed. The Consumer Federation of America is opposed. The Consumers Union is opposed to this measure. The Natural Resources Defense Council does not support this measure. Public Citizen is opposed to this. United Steelworkers is opposed. The Union of Concerned Scientists is opposed. The United States PIRG, which is the Public Interest Research Group, is opposed. Ladies and gentlemen, I think that our case against this measure has been well-made. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Ladies and gentlemen of the House, last evening, the President of the United States indicated that he will not sign this bill, that he will veto it if it were to pass, and I am hoping that that doesn't happen. The measure fails in a great way. It would create needless regulatory and legal uncertainty and would further impede the implementation protections for the American public. This bill would make the regulatory process more expensive, less flexible, and more burdensome, dramatically increasing the costs of regulation of the American taxpayer and working class families. This is an incredible situation that we have to debate here. I am hopeful that the logic, the rationale, the threat of the executive branch to veto the bill will all cause us to carefully consider how unnecessary this measure is. I urge that we not support H.R. 185. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a wolf in sheep's clothing. It would not change the bill's overarching regulatory purpose, nor does it address the many concerns expressed by scores of public interest groups that strenuously oppose the bill. I think the President is very sensitive to the working class, the poor, and minorities especially, and I enjoy hearing this commentary coming from the other side of the aisle. If the majority were serious about protecting the low-income population, it would have made in order the amendment offered by our colleague from Illinois, Bobby Rush, to promote environmental justice. The Rush amendment would have safeguarded existing protections while mitigating the devastating consequences of H.R. 185 on both minority and low-income populations. I repeat, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, and the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards all oppose the McKinley amendment. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chair, today the Majority has chosen to hold the Department of Homeland Security hostage with their extreme anti- immigrant policies. Rather than pass a bipartisan bill that would fund the agency tasked with securing our border and protecting our citizens from terrorism and violence--the Majority will consider poison pill amendments to appease an extreme faction of their party. Playing politics with our national security is not responsible governance. First, the Republican party is playing politics with the lives, safety and security of the American people. In the wake of the recent Paris tragedy, it is all too apparent that we need smart enforcement policies that protect the American people and root out any terror threats. The Department of Homeland Security plays a central role in our fight against terror, both in the United States and around the world and we should fully fund their efforts as soon as possible. We should not be debating ``poison pill'' amendments that have no chance of becoming law and will only further delay the funding of DHS. Second, the Republican party is showing the American people that they only immigration policy they believe in is ``mass deportation.'' They have attached several policy riders to this appropriations bill that would further separate families, including the families of military service members and U.S. citizens. Third, the amendments that we will later consider will prevent DHS from implementing smart enforcement policies, including ones that prioritize deporting felons before families. These smart policies allow DHS to focus valuable resources on individuals with criminal convictions and not immigrants with U.S. citizen and legal permanent resident family members. I urge my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to stop playing politics with our national security and start governing.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today, as Ranking Member and former Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I join with my colleague, Rep. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, the former Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, in celebrating the life and recognizing the accomplishments of Karen Wilkinson, who sadly passed away on January 5. Karen was a dedicated public servant, highly valued counsel to the Committee, and beloved colleague. We were fortunate to get to know Karen through her work for the Committee in 2008 and 2009. During that time, Karen, an Assistant Federal Public Defender, was a detailee from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Her detail was the first of a Federal Public Defender to Congress. After her work with the Committee, she returned to Phoenix, Arizona to continue representing indigent clients in federal criminal cases, which she had done for eight years before coming to the Committee. Prior to that, she clerked for the U.S. District Court for Arizona and then joined the law firm of Brown & Bain. Karen graduated magna cum laude from Arizona State University Law School, received a Masters in Business Administration from Nova University and her Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Michigan. Karen's accomplishments during her tenure with the Committee include a number of bills that dealt with issues that are very important to improving our country's criminal justice system. During the 111th Congress, she was responsible for guiding several legislative measures to approval on the floor of the House of Representatives, including: H.R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009; H.R. 632, the National Silver Alert Act 2009; H.R. 748, CAMPUS Safety Act of 2009; H.R. 908, the Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert Program Reauthorization Act of 2009; H.R. 1333, amending chapter 40 of title 18 of the United States Code to exempt the transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation of explosive materials for delivery to a federally recognized Indian tribes; H.R. 1727, the Managing Arson Through Criminal History, MATCH, Act; H.R. 1933, a Child is Missing Alert and Recovery Center Act; S. 1289, the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009, and H.R. 2661, the Court Security Enhancement Act of 2009. In addition, she served as lead counsel on several other very important bills under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee in the 111th Congress, such as: H.R. 503, the Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009; H.R. 2289, the Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009; H.R. 2095, the Restitution for the Exonerated Act; H.R. 1149, the Child Protection Reauthorization Act of 2009 and H.R. 1422, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Reauthorization Act of 2009. Karen also developed proposals subsequently introduced as the Literacy Education and Rehabilitation Act, a bill to require a criminal defense representative to be appointed to the United States Sentencing Commission, the Firearm Recidivist Sentencing Act, and legislation to correct the computation of good time credit in the federal prison system. Her work in developing H.R. 3327, the Ramos- Compean Justice Act of 2009, has led to subsequent bipartisan, bicameral introduction of that bill, now known as the Justice Safety Valve Act. This bill has become one of the critical proposals under consideration as a growing consensus in the country is recognizing the need to reform our sentencing laws in order to achieve greater fairness, save unnecessary costs in the criminal justice system, and reduce recidivism. These bills to reform the criminal justice system, developed through her efforts, are a lasting legacy of her dedication to achieving fairness and justice for all. Karen's dedication to these issues during her time working for the Committee was representative of the professionalism and commitment she showed as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in representing her clients and vindicating their rights to equal and fair treatment under the law. Today, we remember and appreciate Karen Wilkinson's dedication to public service, her commitment to fairness, her wise counsel, and the friendships she developed with us and her Judiciary Committee colleagues. We will honor her by pledging to advance the causes that were her life's calling.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following. Summary When a municipality files for bankruptcy, its employees and retirees who have devoted their lives to public service--such as police officers, firefighters, sanitation workers and office personnel--risk having their hard-earned wages, pensions and health benefits cut or even eliminated. This is why I am introducing the ``Protecting Employees and Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies Act of 2015.'' This legislation strengthens protections for employees and retirees under chapter 9 municipality bankruptcy cases by: (1) clarifying the criteria that a municipality must meet before it can obtain chapter 9 bankruptcy relief; (2) ensuring that the interests of employees and retirees are represented in the chapter 9 case; and (3) imposing heightened standards that a municipality must meet before it may modify any collective bargaining agreement or retiree benefit. While many municipalities often work to limit the impact of budget cuts on their employees and retirees, as demonstrated in the chapter 9 plan of adjustment approved by Detroit's public employees and retirees, other municipalities could try to use current bankruptcy law to set aside collective bargaining agreements and retiree protections. My legislation addresses this risk by requiring the municipality to engage in meaningful good faith negotiations with its employees and retirees before the municipality can apply for chapter 9 bankruptcy relief. This measure would also expedite the appellate review process of whether a municipality has complied with this and other requirements. And, the bill ensures employees and retirees have a say in any plan that would modify their benefits. Section-by-Section Explanation Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 of the bill sets forth the short title of the bill as the ``Protecting Employees and Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies Act of 2015.'' Sec. 2. Determination of Municipality Eligibility To Be a Debtor Under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the United States Code. A municipality can petition to be a debtor under chapter 9, a specialized form of bankruptcy relief, only if a bankruptcy court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the municipality satisfies certain criteria specified in Bankruptcy Code section 109. In the absence of obtaining the consent of a majority of its creditors, section 109 requires the municipality, in pertinent part, to have negotiated in good faith with its creditors or prove that it is unable to negotiate with its creditors because such negotiation is impracticable. Section 2(a) of the bill amends Bankruptcy Code section 109 in three respects. First, it provides clear guidance to the bankruptcy court that the term ``good faith'' is intended to have the same meaning as it has under the National Labor Relations Act at least with respect to creditors who are employees or retirees of the debtor. Second, section 2(a) revises the standard for futility of negotiation from ``impracticable'' to ``impossible.'' This change ensures that before a municipality may avail itself of chapter 9 bankruptcy relief it must prove that there was no possible way it could have engaged in negotiation in lieu of seeking such relief. Third, the amendment clarifies that the standard of proof that the municipality must meet is ``clear and convincing'' rather than a preponderance of the evidence. These revisions to section 109 will provide greater guidance to the bankruptcy court in assessing whether a municipality has satisfied the Bankruptcy Code's eligibility requirements for being granted relief under chapter 9. Bankruptcy Code section 921(e), in relevant part, prohibits a bankruptcy court from ordering a stay of any proceeding arising in a chapter 9 case on account of an appeal from an order granting a municipality's petition to be a debtor under chapter 9. Section 2(b) strikes this prohibition thereby allowing a court to issue a stay of any proceeding during the pendency of such an appeal. This ensures that the status quo can be maintained until there is a final appellate determination of whether a municipality is legally eligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. Typically, an appeal of a bankruptcy court decision is heard by a district or bankruptcy appellate panel court. Under limited circumstances, however, a direct appeal from a bankruptcy court decision may be heard by a court of appeals. Until a final determination is made as to whether a municipality is eligible to be a debtor under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, the rights and responsibilities of numerous stakeholders are unclear. To expedite the appellate process and promote greater certainty to all stakeholders in the case, section 2(c) of the bill allows an appeal of a bankruptcy court order granting a municipality's petition to be a chapter 9 debtor to be filed directly with the court of appeals. In addition, section 2(c) requires the court of appeals to hear such appeal de novo on the merits as well as to determine it on an expedited basis. Finally, section 2(c) specifies that the doctrine of equitable mootness does not apply to such an appeal. Sec. 3. Protecting Employees and Retirees. The chapter 9 debtor must file a plan for the adjustment of the municipality's debts that then must be confirmed by the bankruptcy court if it satisfies certain criteria specified in Bankruptcy Code section 943. Section 3 of the bill makes several amendments to current law intended to ensure that interests of municipal employees and retirees are better protected. With respect to plan confirmation requirements, section 3 amends Bankruptcy Code section 943 to require consent from such employees and retirees to any plan that impairs--in a manner prohibited by nonbankruptcy law--a collective bargaining agreement, a retiree benefit, including an accrued pension, retiree health, or other retirement benefit protected by state or municipal law or as defined in Bankruptcy Code section 1114(a). Such consent would be conveyed to the court by the authorized representative of such individuals. Subject to certain exceptions, section 3 specifies that the authorized representative of individuals receiving any retirement benefits pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is the labor organization that signed such agreement unless such organization no longer represents active employees. Where the organization no longer represents active employees of the municipality, the labor organization that currently represents active employees in that bargaining unit is the authorized representative of such individuals. Section 3 provides that the exceptions apply if: (1) the labor organization chooses not to serve as the authorized representative; or (2) the court determines, after a motion by a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, that different representation is appropriate. Under either circumstance, the court, upon motion by any party in interest and after notice and a hearing, must order the United States Trustee to appoint a committee of retired employees if the debtor seeks to modify or not pay the retiree benefits or if the court otherwise determines that it is appropriate for that committee be comprised of such individuals to serve as the authorized representative. With respect to retired employees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the court, on motion by a party in interest after notice and a hearing, must order the United States Trustee to appoint a committee of retired employees if the debtor seeks to modify or not pay retiree benefits, or if the court otherwise determines that it is appropriate to serve as the authorized representative of such employees. Section 3 provides that the party requesting the appointment of a committee has the burden of proof. Where the court grants a motion for the appointment of a retiree committee, section 3 requires the United States Trustee to choose individuals to serve on the committee on a proportional basis per capita based on organization membership from among members of the organizations that represent the individuals with respect to whom such order is entered. This requirement ensures that the committee, in a case where there are multiple labor organizations, fairly represents the interests of the members of those various organizations on a proportional basis. Finally, section 3 of the bill imposes a significant threshold that must be met before retiree benefits can be reduced or eliminated. Current law has no such requirement. In a case where the municipality proposes in its plan to impair any right to a retiree benefit, section 3 permits the committee to support such impairment only if at least two- thirds of its members vote in favor of doing so.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing two bills to help hold accountable corporations who market dangerous products and who violate the law. We rely on corporations to provide necessary goods and services to consumers and to provide jobs for our citizens. Unfortunately, sometimes corporations engage in acts that may harm us or that otherwise run afoul of the law. That is why I am introducing these measures. The Dangerous Products Warning Act concerns businesses who learn that products they are marketing are dangerous but who do not inform the appropriate federal agency or warn the public. It amends the federal criminal code to impose a fine and/or prison term of up to 5 years on any business entity or product supervisor with respect to a product or business practice who knows of a serious danger associated with such product or business practice and knowingly fails within 15 days after discovering such danger to inform an appropriate federal agency in writing, warn affected employees in writing, and inform other affected individuals. The bill imposes a fine and/or prison term of up to 1 year on any individual who intentionally discriminates against an employee who informs a federal agency or warns employees of a serious danger associated with a product or business practice. The Corporate Crime Database Act deals with the concern that the public has inadequate means of learning about the degree to which companies are engaging in acts in violation of the law, and sets up a mechanism to track such violations and make the information available to the public. The bill directs the Attorney General to: (1) acquire data, for each calendar year, regarding all administrative, civil, and criminal judicial proceedings against any corporation or corporate official involving a felony or misdemeanor or civil charge where potential fines may be $1,000 or more; (2) establish and maintain a publicly available website on improper conduct by all corporations with annual revenues of more than $1 billion; and (3) prepare an annual report to Congress detailing the number of civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement actions brought against any corporation or corporate official and the final dispositions of such actions. With the enactment of these two bills, we would take important steps toward protecting our citizens from harm and empowering them to know which corporations are violating our laws.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing an important bill to respond to the crisis that some jurisdictions are facing with respect to hiring police officers and funding programs to enhance public safety. This bill would establish two public safety grant programs. Section 2 establishes Shield Police Hiring Grants, to be implemented by the Attorney General, to provide grants to law enforcement agencies that operate in Elevated Need Localities. An ``Elevated Need Locality'' is a county (or unit of local government which is not part of a county) which (1) has a crime rate above the national average, and (2) has had budget reductions during the most recent 5-year period. These law enforcement agencies could apply to the Attorney General to receive funds to hire law enforcement officers, or to rehire officers who have been laid off due to budget reductions. Grants would last for three years and may be extended by two years at the discretion of the Attorney General. $100 million for each fiscal year 2016 through 2021 are authorized to be appropriated for this program. Section 3 establishes Shield Public Safety Enhancement Grants, to be implemented by the Attorney General, to provide grants to units of local government that has jurisdiction over all or part of an Elevated Need Locality. Local governments could apply to the Attorney General to receive funds to enhance public safety in a number of ways, such as purchasing public safety equipment, finding public safety programs, making infrastructure improvements for the purpose of enhancing public safety, purchasing and installing street lights to deter crime, funding activities related to crime labs, and funding public defender programs. Non-profit organizations operating in Elevated Need Localities may also apply for grants under this program to fund initiatives designed to reduce crime in these jurisdictions. Grants would be for one year but may be extended at the discretion of the Attorney General. $100 million for each fiscal year 2016 through 2021 are authorized to be appropriated for this program. These programs will help enhance public safety in jurisdictions facing high crime rates and particularly acute budget issues. The programs would be available to fund the hiring of police officers and the operation of initiatives to address public safety and crime. Programs that enhance public safety will prevent crime, which will decrease the victimization of our citizens and reduce the financial costs associated with crime. That is why this legislation is necessary.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following. Summary Throughout our Nation's history, hardworking American men and women have labored to make our businesses become the most productive and dynamic in the world. Unfortunately, when some of these businesses encounter financial difficulties and seek to reorganize their debts under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, these very same workers and retirees are often asked to make major sacrifices through lost job protections, lower wages, and the elimination of hard-won pension and health benefits, while the executives and managers of these business are not required to make comparable sacrifices. We must do more to ensure that America's most important resource--workers and retirees--are treated more fairly when these business seek to reorganize their financial affairs under the protection of our bankruptcy laws. The Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2015 accomplishes this goal by amending the Bankruptcy Code in several respects. First, it improves recoveries for employees and retirees by: (1) increasing the amount of worker claims entitled to priority payment for unpaid wages and contributions to employee benefit plans up to $20,000; (2) eliminating the difficult to prove restriction in current law that wage and benefit claims must be earned within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing in order to be entitled to priority payment; (3) allowing employees to assert claims for losses in certain defined contribution plans when such losses result from employer fraud or breach of fiduciary duty; (4) establishing a new priority administrative expense for workers' severance pay; and (5) clarifying that back pay awards for WARN Act damages are entitled to the same priority as back pay for other legal violations. Second, the legislation reduces employees' and retirees' losses by: (1) restricting the conditions under which collective bargaining agreements and commitments to fund retiree pensions and health benefits may be eliminated or adversely affected; (2) preventing companies from singling out non-management retirees for concessions; (3) requiring a court to consider the impact a bidder's offer to purchase a company's assets would have on maintaining existing jobs and preserving retiree pension and health benefits; and (4) clarifying that the principal purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the preservation of jobs to the maximum extent possible Third, the bill restricts excessive executive compensation programs by: (1) requiring full disclosure and court approval of executive compensation packages; (2) restricting the payment of bonuses and other forms of incentive compensation to senior officers and others; and (3) ensuring that insiders cannot receive retiree benefits if workers have lost their retirement or health benefits. This legislation is identical to H.R. 100, introduced in the 113th Congress, and H.R. 6117, introduced in the 112th Congress. It is supported by the AFL-CIO and many of its largest affiliates, and the United Steelworkers. section-by-section explanation of the bill Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 sets forth the short title of the bill as the ``Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2015.'' It also includes a table of contents for the bill. Sec. 2. Findings. Section 2 sets forth various findings in support of this bill. Title I--Improving Recoveries for Employees and Retirees Sec. 101. Increased Wage Priority. Bankruptcy Code section 507 accords priority in payment status for certain types of claims, i.e., these priority claims must be paid in full in the order of priority before general unsecured claims may be paid. Section 507(a)(4) accords a fourth level priority to an unsecured claim up to $10,000 owed to an individual for wages, salaries, or commissions (including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay) earned within the 180-day period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case or the date on which the debtor's business ceased, whichever occurs first. Section 101 amends section 507(a)(4) to increase the amount of the priority to $20,000 and eliminate the 180-day reachback limitation. Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(5) accords a fifth level priority for unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within the l80-day period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case or the date on which the debtor's business ceased (whichever occurs first). The amount of the claim is based on the number of employees covered by the plan multiplied by $10,000, less the aggregate amount paid to such employees pursuant to section 507(a)(4) and the aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf of such employees to any other employee benefit plan. Section 101 amends Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(5) to: (1) increase the priority amount to $20,000; (2) eliminate the offset requirements; and (3) eliminate the 180-day limitation. Sec. 102. Claim for Stock Value Losses in Defined Contribution Plans. Section 102 amends the Bankruptcy Code's definition of a claim to include a right or interest in equity securities of the debtor (or an affiliate of the debtor) held in a defined contribution plan for the benefit of an individual who is not an insider, senior executive officer or one of the 20 next most highly compensated employees of the debtor (if one or more are not insiders), providing: (1) such securities were attributable to employer contributions by the debtor (or an affiliate of the debtor), or by elective deferrals, together with any earnings thereon; and (2) the employer or plan sponsor who commenced the bankruptcy case either committed fraud with respect to such plan or otherwise breached a duty to the participant that proximately caused the loss of value. Sec. 103. Priority for Severance Pay. Bankruptcy Code section 503(b) establishes an administrative expense payment priority for certain types of unsecured claims. Among all types of unsecured claims, administrative expenses are accorded the highest payment priority, i.e., they must be paid in full before priority and general unsecured claims may be paid. Section 103 amends section 503(b) to accord administrative expense priority for severance pay owed to the debtor's employees (other than an insider, other senior management, or a consultant retained to provide services to the debtor) under a plan, program or policy generally applicable to the debtor's employees (but not under an individual contract of employment) or owed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement for termination or layoff on or after the date the bankruptcy case was filed. Such pay is deemed earned in full upon such termination or layoff. Sec. 104. Financial Returns for Employees and Retirees. Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a) specifies various criteria that must be satisfied before a chapter 11 plan of reorganization may be confirmed. Section 104 amends section 1129(a) to add a further requirement. The plan must provide for the recovery of damages for the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement or for other financial returns as negotiated by the debtor and the authorized representative under section 1113 to the extent such returns are paid under, rather than outside of a plan. Section 104 also replaces Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(13), which pertains to the payment of retiree benefits under section 1114. As revised, section 1129(a)(13) requires a plan to provide for the continuation after the plan's effective date of the payment of all retiree benefits at the level established under either section 1114(e)(1)(B) or (g) at any time prior to confirmation of the plan, for the duration of the period for which the debtor has obligated itself to provide such benefits. If no modifications are made prior to confirmation of the plan, the plan must provide for the continuation of all retiree benefits maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor prior to the petition filing date. In addition, the plan must provide for recovery of claims arising from the modification of retiree benefits and other financial returns as negotiated by the debtor and the authorized representative to the extent such returns are paid under, rather than outside of, a plan. Sec. 105. Priority for WARN Act Damages. Section 105 amends Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) to provide administrative expense status to wages and benefits awarded pursuant to a judicial or National Labor Relations Board proceeding as back pay or damages attributable to any period of time occurring after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. This provision applies where the award was made as a result of the debtor's violation of federal or state law, without regard to the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct on which the award is based or to whether any services were rendered on or after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. It includes an award by a court under section 2901 of title 29 of the United States Code of up to 60 days' pay and benefits following a layoff that occurred or commenced at a time when such award period includes a period on or after the commencement of the case, if the court determines that payment of wages and benefits by reason of the operation of this clause will not substantially increase the probability of layoff or termination of current employees or of nonpayment of domestic support obligations during the case under this title. Title II--Reducing Employees' and Retirees' Losses Sec. 201. Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements. Bankruptcy Code section 1113 sets forth the requirements by which a collective bargaining agreement may be assumed or rejected. Section 201 amends section 1113 in several respects. First, it amends section 1113(a) to clarify that a chapter 11 debtor may reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with section 1113. Second, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(b) to clarify that no provision in title II of the United States Code may be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter the terms of a collective bargaining agreement absent compliance with section 1113. The provision further specifies that the trustee must timely pay all monetary obligations arising under such agreement and that any payment required to be made pre-confirmation has the status of an allowed administrative expense under Code section 503. Third, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(c) to require a trustee, when seeking to modify a collective bargaining agreement, to provide notice of such proposed modification to the labor organization representing the employees covered by the agreement. The trustee must also promptly provide an initial proposal for modification. In addition, the trustee must confer in good faith with the labor organization, at reasonable times and for a reasonable period, given the complexity of the case, in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable modification of the agreement. Each modification proposal must be based on a business plan for the reorganization of the debtor and reflect the most complete and reliable information. As amended, section 1113(c) requires the trustee to provide to the labor organization all information relevant for negotiations. If such disclosure could compromise the debtor's position with respect to its competitors in the industry, the provision authorizes the court to issue a protective order, subject to the needs of the labor organization to evaluate the trustee's proposal and any application to reject the collective bargaining agreement or for interim relief under section 1113. In consideration of federal policy encouraging the practice and process of collective bargaining and in recognition of the bargained-for expectations of the employees covered by the agreement, any modification proposed by the trustee must: (1) only be proposed as part of a program of workforce and nonworkforce cost savings devised for the debtor's reorganization, including savings in management personnel costs; (2) be limited to modifications designed to achieve a specified aggregate financial contribution for employees covered by the agreement, taking into consideration any labor cost savings negotiated within the 12-month period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case; (3) be no more than the minimum savings essential to permit the debtor to exit bankruptcy, such that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor; and (4) not be disproportionate or overly burden the employees covered by the agreement, either in the amount of the cost savings sought from such employees or the nature of the modifications. Fourth, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(d) to provide that if the trustee and the labor organization (after a period of negotiations) do not reach an agreement over mutually satisfactory modifications and further negotiations are not likely to produce mutually satisfactory modifications, the trustee may file a motion seeking rejection of the collective bargaining agreement after notice and a hearing. Absent agreement by the parties, the hearing may not be held earlier than 21 days from when notice of the hearing is provided. Only the debtor and the labor organization may appear and be heard at the hearing. An application for rejection must seek rejection effective upon the entry of an order granting such relief. In consideration of federal policy encouraging the practice and process of collective bargaining and in recognition of the bargained-for expectations of the employees covered by the agreement, section 1113(d) (as amended) provides that the court may grant a motion seeking rejection of such agreement only if the court: (1) finds that the trustee has complied with the requirements of section 1113(c); (2) has considered alternative proposals by the labor organization and concluded that such proposals do not meet the requirements of section 1113(c)(3)(B); (3) finds that further negotiations regarding the trustee's proposal or an alternative proposal by the labor organization are not likely to produce an agreement; (4) finds that implementation of the trustee's proposal will not: (a) cause a material diminution in the purchasing power of the employees covered by the agreement, (b) adversely affect the debtor's ability to retain an experienced and qualified workforce; or (c) impair the debtor's labor relations such that the ability to achieve a feasible reorganization will be compromised; and (5) concludes, based on clear and convincing evidence, that rejection of the agreement and immediate implementation of the trustee's proposal is essential to permit the debtor's exit from bankruptcy such that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor in the short term. If the trustee has implemented a program of incentive pay, bonuses or other financial returns for insiders, senior executive officers, or the 20 next most highly compensated employees or consultants (or such a program was implemented within 180 days before the bankruptcy case was filed), the court must presume that the debtor has failed to satisfy the requirements of section 1113(c)(3)(C). Subsection (d), as amended, prohibits the court from entering an order rejecting a collective bargaining agreement that would result in modifications to a level lower than that proposed by the trustee in the proposal found by the court to have complied with the requirements of section 1113. At any time after an order rejecting a collective bargaining agreement is entered (or mutually satisfactory agreement between the trustee and the labor organization is entered into), the labor organization may apply to the court for an order seeking an increase in the level of wages or benefits or relief from working conditions based on changed circumstances. The court must grant such relief only if the increase or other relief is not inconsistent with the standard set forth in section 1113(d)(2)(E). Fifth, section 201 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(e) to provide that during the period in which a collective bargaining agreement at issue under this section continues in effect and if either essential to the continuation of the debtor's business or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by the collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this provision must be scheduled in accordance of the trustee's needs. The implementation of such interim changes will not render the application for rejection moot. Sixth, section 201 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(f) to provide that the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a breach of such agreement and is effective no earlier than the entry of an order granting such relief. Solely for the purpose of determining and allowing a claim arising from rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, such rejection must be treated as a rejection of an executory contract under Bankruptcy Code section 365(g) and shall be allowed or disallowed in accordance with section 502(g)(1). Subsection (f), as amended, further provides that no claim for rejection damages may be limited by section 502(b)(7). In addition, the provision permits economic self- help by a labor organization upon a court order granting rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under either subsection (d) or (e) of section 1113. It further provides that neither title 11 of the United States Code nor other provisions of State or Federal law may be construed to the contrary. Seventh, section 201 adds new subsection (g) to require the trustee to provide for the reasonable fees and costs incurred by a labor organization under section 1113, upon request and after notice and a hearing. Eighth, section 201 adds new subsection (h) to require the assumption of a collective bargaining agreement to be done in accordance with section 365. Sec. 202. Payment of Insurance Benefits to Retired Employees. Bankruptcy Code section 1114 sets out criteria pursuant to which a debtor may modify retiree benefits, among other matters. Retiree benefits include payments to retired employees, their spouses, and dependents for medical, surgical, and hospital care benefits. It also includes benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan, fund or program. Section 202 amends section 1114 in several respects. First, it amends the provision's definition of ``retiree benefits'' to specify that it applies whether or not the debtor asserts a right to unilaterally modify such benefits under such plan, fund or program. Second, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1114(b)(2), which specifies the rights, powers and duties of a committee of retired employees appointed by the court. As amended, the provision would apply to a labor organization serving as the authorized representative under section 1114(c)(1). Third, section 202 replaces Bankruptcy Code section 1114(f), which requires a trustee to make a proposal to the authorized representative before seeking modification of retiree benefits. As amended, section 1114(f)(1) specifies that if a trustee seeks to modify retiree benefits, the trustee must provide notice of such proposed modification to the authorized representative as well as promptly provide the initial proposal. In addition, the trustee must thereafter confer in good faith with the labor organization, at reasonable times and for a reasonable period, given the complexity of the case, in attempting to reach a mutually satisfactory modification. Each modification must be based on a business plan for the reorganization of the debtor and reflect the most complete and reliable information available. The trustee must provide the authorized representative all information relevant for the negotiations. If such disclosure could compromise the debtor's position with respect to its competitors in the industry, the court may issue a protective order, subject to the needs of the authorized representative to evaluate the trustee's proposal and an application pursuant to subsection (g) or (h). Modifications proposed by the trustee must: (1) only be proposed as part of a program of workforce and nonworkforce cost savings devised for the reorganization of the debtor, including savings in management personnel costs; (2) be limited to modifications designed to achieve a specified aggregate financial contribution for the retiree group represented by the authorized representative (taking into consideration any labor cost savings negotiated within the 12-month period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case with respect to the retiree group); (3) be no more than the minimum savings essential to permit the debtor to exit bankruptcy, such that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor; and (4) not be disproportionate or overly burden the retiree group, either in the amount of the cost savings sought from such group or the nature of the modifications. Fourth, section 202 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(g) to provide that if the trustee and the authorized representative do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement (after a period of negotiations) and further negotiations are not likely to produce mutually satisfactory modifications, the trustee may file a motion seeking to modify the payment of retiree benefits after notice and a hearing. Absent agreement of the parties, the hearing may not be held earlier than 21 days from when notice of the hearing is provided. Only the debtor and the authorized representative may appear and be heard at the hearing. The court may grant a motion to modify the payment of retiree benefits only if the court: (1) finds that the trustee complied with the requirements of section 1114(f); (2) considered any of the authorized representative's alternative proposals and determined that such proposals do not meet the requirements of section 1114(f)(3)(B); (3) finds that further negotiations are not likely to produce a mutually satisfactory agreement; (4) finds that implementation of the trustee's proposal will not cause irreparable harm to the affected retirees; and (5) concludes that, based on clear and convincing evidence, an order granting the trustee's proposal and its immediate implementation is essential to permit the debtor's exit from bankruptcy such that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor in the short term. If the trustee has implemented a program of incentive pay, bonuses, or other financial returns for insiders, senior executive officers, or the 20 next most highly compensated employees or consultants (or such program was implemented within 180 days before the bankruptcy case was filed), the court must presume that the debtor failed to satisfy the requirements of section 1114(f)(3)(C). Fifth, section 202 strikes subsection (k) and makes conforming revisions. Sec. 203 Protection of Employee Benefits in a Sale of Assets. Section 203 amends Bankruptcy Code section 363(b), which authorizes a debtor to sell or use property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business (under certain circumstances), to add a new requirement. New section 365(b)(3) requires the court, in approving a sale, to consider the extent to which a bidder's offer: (1) maintains existing jobs; (2) preserves terms and conditions of employment, and (3) assumes or matches pension and retiree benefit obligations in determining whether such offer constitutes the highest or best offer for the property. Sec. 204. Claim for Pension Losses. Section 204 adds a new subsection to Bankruptcy Code section 502, which pertains to the allowance of claims and interests. New subsection (1) requires the court to allow a claim by an active or retired participant (or by a labor organization representing such participants) in a defined benefit pension plan terminated under section 4041 or 4042 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) for any shortfall in pension benefits accrued as of the effective date of the pension plan's termination as a result of such termination and limitations upon the payment of benefits imposed pursuant to section 4042 of such Act, notwithstanding any claim asserted and collected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation with respect to such termination. In addition, section 204 adds subsection (m) to Bankruptcy Code section 502 to require a court to allow a claim described in Bankruptcy Code section 101(5)(C) (as amended by this legislation) by an active or retired participant (or a labor union representing such participant) in a defined contribution plan (within the meaning of section 3(34) of ERISA). The amount of such claim must be measured by the market value of the stock at the time of contribution to, or purchase by, the plan and the value as of the commencement of the case. Sec. 205. Payments by Secured Lender. Bankruptcy Code section 506(c) authorizes the debtor to recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred to preserve or dispose of such property to the extent the secured creditor benefits from such expenditures. Section 205 amends section 506(c) to add a new provision. As amended, section 506(c) deems unpaid wages, accrued vacation, severance or other benefits owed under the debtor's policies and practices or owed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, for services rendered on and after commencement of the case to be necessary costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of property securing an allowed secured claim. Such obligations must be recovered even if the trustee has otherwise waived the provisions of section 506(c) pursuant to an agreement with the allowed secured claimant or a successor or predecessor in interest. Sec. 206. Preservation of Jobs and Benefits. Section 206 adds a statement of purpose to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code specifying that a chapter 11 debtor must have as its principal purpose the reorganization of its business to preserve going concern value to the maximum extent possible through the productive use of its assets and the preservation of jobs that will sustain productive economic activity. In addition, section 206 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a), which sets out the criteria for confirming a plan, to add a new requirement. New section 1129(a)(17) requires the debtor to demonstrate that the reorganization preserves going concern value to the maximum extent possible through the productive use of the debtor's assets and preserves jobs that sustain productive economic activity. Section 206 also amends Bankruptcy Code section 1129(c), which requires the court to consider the preferences of creditors and equity security holders in determining which plan to confirm. Section 1129(c), as amended, instead requires the court to consider the extent to which each plan would preserve going concern value through the productive use of the debtor's assets and the preservation of jobs that sustain productive economic activity. The court must confirm the plan that better serves such interests. It further provides that a plan that incorporates the terms of a settlement with a labor organization shall presumptively constitute the plan that satisfies this provision. Sec. 207. Termination of Exclusivity. Bankruptcy Code section 1121, in pertinent part, gives a debtor the exclusive authority to file a plan and obtain acceptances of such plan for stated periods of time, under certain circumstances. Section 207 amends section 1121 to specify that cause for shortening these exclusive periods includes: (1) the filing of a motion pursuant to section 1113 seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, if a plan based upon an alternative proposal by the labor organization is reasonably likely to be confirmed within a reasonable time; or (2) the proposed filing of a plan by a proponent other than the debtor, which incorporates the terms of a settlement with a labor organization, if such plan is reasonably likely to be confirmed within a reasonable time. Title III--Restricting Executive Compensation Programs Sec. 301. Executive Compensation Upon Exit From Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code section 1129 specifies the criteria for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. Section 1129(a)(4), for example, requires that certain services, costs and expenses in connection with the case (or in connection with the plan and incident to the case) to have either been approved by the court (or subject to approval by the court) as reasonable. Section 301 amends section 1129(a)(4) to add a requirement that payments or other distributions under the plan to or for the benefit of insiders, senior executive officers, and any of the 20 next most highly compensated employees or consultants providing services to the debtor may not be approved unless: (1) such compensation is subject to review under section 1129(a)(5), or (2) such compensation is included as part of a program of payments or distributions generally applicable to the debtor's employees and only to the extent that the court determines that such payments are not excessive or disproportionate as compared to distributions to the debtor's nonmanagement workforce. In addition, section 301 amends section 1129(a)(5), which requires the plan proponent to disclose the identity and affiliations of the debtor's officers and others, such as the identity of any insider who will be employed or retained by the reorganized debtor and such insider's compensation. Section 301 amends section 1129(a)(5) to add a requirement that such compensation must be approved (or subject to approval) by the court in accordance with the following criteria: (1) the compensation is reasonable when compared to that paid to individuals holding comparable positions at comparable companies in the same industry; and (2) the compensation is not disproportionate in light of economic concessions by the debtor's nonmanagement workforce during the case. Sec. 302. Limitations on Executive Compensation Enhancements. In general, Bankruptcy Code Section 503(c) prohibits a debtor from making certain payments to an insider, absent certain findings by the court. Section 302 amends section 503(c)(1), which prohibits such payments when they are intended to induce the insider to remain with the debtor's business, in several respects. First, it expands the provision so that it applies a debtor's senior executive officer and any of the debtor's 20 next most highly compensated employees or consultants. Second, it clarifies that the provision prohibits the payment of performance or incentive compensation, a bonus of any kind, and other financial returns designed to replace or enhance incentive, stock, or other compensation in effect prior to the commencement of the case. And, third, it specifies that the court's findings must be based on clear and convincing evidence in the record. In addition, section 302 also amends Bankruptcy Code section 503(c)(3), which prohibits other transfers made or obligations incurred outside of the debtor's ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case, including transfers made and obligations incurred for the benefit of the debtor's officers, managers or consultants hired postpetition. Section 302 replaces section 503(c)(3) with a provision prohibiting other transfers or obligations incurred to or for the benefit of insiders, senior executive officers, managers or consultants providing services to the debtor unless they meet certain criteria. First, the court must find, based on clear and convincing evidence (without deference to the debtor's request for authorization to make such payments), that such payments are essential to the survival of the debtor's business or, in the case of a liquidation, essential to the orderly liquidation of the debtor's business and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets. Second, the services for which compensation is sought must be essential in nature. Third, such payments must be reasonable compared to individuals holding comparable positions at comparable companies in the same industry and not disproportionate in light of economic concessions made by the debtor's nonmanagement workforce during the case. Sec. 303. Assumption of Executive Retirement Plans. Section 303 amends Bankruptcy Code section 365, which sets forth the criteria pursuant to which executory contracts and unexpired leases may be assumed and rejected, to add two provisions. New subsection (q) provides that no deferred compensation arrangement for the benefit of a debtor's insiders, senior executive officers, or any of the 20 next most highly compensated employees may be assumed if a defined benefit pension plan for the debtor's employees has been terminated pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of ERISA on or after the commencement of the case or within 180 days prior to the commencement of the case. New subsection (r) provides that no plan, fund, program, or contract to provide retiree benefits for insiders, senior executive officers, or any of the 20 next most highly compensated employees of the debtor may be assumed if the debtor: (1) has obtained relief under subsection (g) or (h) of section 1114 to impose reductions in retiree benefits; (2) has obtained relief under subsection (d) or (e) of section 1113 to impose reductions in the health benefits of the debtor's active employees; or (3) or reduced or eliminated active employee or retiree benefits within 180 days prior to the commencement of the case. Sec. 304. Recovery of Executive Compensation. Section 304 adds a new provision to the Bankruptcy Code. New section 563(a) provides that if a debtor reduces its contractual obligations under a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to section 1113(d), or retiree benefits pursuant to section 1114(g), then the court, as part of the order granting such relief, must make certain determinations. The court must determine the percentage of diminution in the value of the obligations as a result of such relief. In making this determination, the court must include any reduction in benefits as a result of the termination pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of ERISA of a defined benefit plan administered by the debtor, or for which the debtor is a contributing employer, effective at any time within 180 days prior to the commencement of the case. The court may not take into consideration pension benefits paid or payable under title IV of ERISA as a result of such termination. If a defined benefit pension plan administered by the debtor, or for which the debtor is a contributing employer, is terminated pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of ERISA, effective at any time within 180 days prior to the commencement of the case, and the debtor has not obtained relief under section 1113(d), or section 1114(g), new section 563(b) requires the court, on motion of a party in interest, to determine the percentage in diminution in the value of benefit obligations when compared to the total benefit liabilities prior to such termination. The court may not take into account pension benefits paid or payable pursuant to title IV of ERISA as a result of such termination. After such percentage diminution in value is determined, new section 563(c) provides that the estate has a claim for the return of the same percentage of the compensation paid, directly or indirectly (including any transfer to a self- settled trust or similar device, or to a nonqualified deferred compensation plan under section 409A(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) to certain individuals. These individuals include: (1) any officer of the debtor serving as a member of the debtor's board of directors within the year before the filing of the case; and (2) any individual serving as chairman or as lead director of the board of directors at the time when relief under section 1113 or section 1114 is granted, or if no such relief has been granted, then the termination of the defined benefit plan. New section 563(d) provides that a trustee or committee appointed pursuant to section 1102 may commence an action to recover such claims. If neither commences such action by the first date set for the confirmation hearing, any party in interest may apply to the court for authority to recover such claims for the benefit of the estate. The costs of recovery must be borne by the estate. New section 563(e) prohibits the court from awarding postpetition compensation under section 503(c) or otherwise to any person subject to the provisions of section 563(c) if there is a reasonable likelihood that such compensation is intended to reimburse or replace compensation recovered by the estate pursuant to section 563. Sec. 305. Preferential Compensation Transfer. Bankruptcy Code section 547 authorizes preferential transfers to be avoided. Section 305 adds a new subsection to section 547 to permit the avoidance of a transfer to or for the benefit of an insider (including an obligation incurred for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) made in anticipation of bankruptcy. The provision also permits the avoidance of a transfer made in anticipation of a bankruptcy to a consultant who is formerly an insider and who is retained to provide services to an entity that becomes a debtor (including an obligation under a contract to provide services to such entity or to a debtor) made or incurred within one year before the filing of the bankruptcy case. In addition, new section 547(j) provides that no provision of section 547(c) (specifying certain exceptions to section 547) may be utilized as a defense. Further, section 547(j) permits the trustee or a committee to commence such avoidance action. If neither do so as of the date of the commencement of the confirmation hearing, any party in interest may apply to the court for authority to recover the claims for the benefit of the estate. The costs of recovery must be borne by the estate. Title IV--Other Provisions Sec. 401. Union Proof of Claim. Section 401 amends Bankruptcy Code section 501(a) to permit a labor organization (in addition to a creditor or indenture trustee) to file a proof of claim. Sec. 402. Exception from Automatic Stay. Section 402 amends Bankruptcy Code section 362(b) to create an additional exception to the automatic stay with respect to the commencement or continuation of a grievance, arbitration or similar dispute resolution proceeding established by a collective bargaining agreement that was or could have been commenced against the debtor before the filing of the bankruptcy case. The exception also applies to the payment or enforcement of awards or settlements of such proceeding.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the ``Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2015'' targets ruthless collection tactics employed by some student loan creditors against debtors who have sought bankruptcy relief, as documented by the New York Times in its cover story last year. Specifically, my legislation bill would empower a bankruptcy judge to award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a debtor who successfully obtained the discharge of his or her liability for a student loan debt based on undue hardship if: (1) the creditor's position was not substantially justified, and (2) there are no special circumstances that would make such award unjust. The Bankruptcy Code already grants identical authority to a bankruptcy judge to award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to debtor where a creditor requests the determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt based on the allegation that it was fraudulently incurred and the court thereafter finds that the creditor's position was not substantially justified and there are no special circumstances that would make such award unjust. Although parties typically do and should pay their own attorney's fees in litigation, dischargeability determinations concerning student loan debts present compelling factors that warrant the relief provided by this legislation. Under current bankruptcy law, debtors must meet a very high burden of proof, namely, that repayment of the student loan debt will present an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents. The litigation typically requires extensive discovery, trial-like procedures, and legal analysis. Unfortunately, some student loan debt collectors engage in abusive litigation tactics that exponentially drive up the potential cost of legal representation for a debtor. As a result, debtors, who may legally qualify for the Bankruptcy Code's undue hardship dischargeability exception for student loans, may be unable to obtain such relief because of the potential risk of excessive and unaffordable legal fees that the debtor may have to incur not only to meet the high standard of proof, but also to combat an abusive litigation stance taken by a well-funded adversary. The ``Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2015'' will help level the playing field for debtors overwhelmed by student loan debts, the repayment of which would present an undue hardship for themselves and their families. It is my hope that should this measure become law, bankruptcy judges will not hesitate to award debtors attorney's fees in appropriate cases of abusive litigation engaged in by student loan creditors.