John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. My colleague, the gentleman from Michigan, [Mr. John Dingell], has properly decried the process that excluded us. I can suggest to you that the work product does not deserve much consideration here. But also I would like to point out to my friends, just as we lay to rest who is getting the money here, we cannot deny that the political action committees of corporations and organizations favoring tort reform contributed nearly $62 million between 1989 and 1994, as part of a multimillion dollar lobbying effort to overturn America's system of civil justice. The trial lawyers, trial lawyers, contributed that $5.8 million, one- tenth of the total of legal reform proponents who came together in a massive coalition. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott], a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey], one of the unsung members of the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee], a member of the committee. (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 10 seconds to respond to a question asked earlier by the chairman. Mr. Speaker, he wanted to know the name of somebody who could get their victims rights cut off and could not even sue. I give him the name of Carla Miller because, under the statute of repose, we would cut off any ability to recover in cases of clear misconduct or negligence. Mr. Speaker, I yield 20 seconds to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Lofgren], a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of the time on this side to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to suggest to you that the President of the United States was correct to veto the bill before us, the product liability bill, as being harmful to working Americans and particularly discriminating against women, so I urge a ``no'' vote to sustain the veto. This proposal to override is a continuation of the majority Republicans' war on public safety, on workers, on women, and on seniors. They continue their war for the special interests who have spent over $26 million in campaign contributions in an effort to tilt the legal system further in their favor. So let us not kid ourselves, no matter what is said here today, about where the special interests concern lies. So far, amazingly, I have not heard the lawyers get beat up yet, but this is only the beginning of the debate. I always enjoy that part, where the lawyers are singled out as special interest people, when the hugest special interests in our political system are in there solid working on the other side. That is the simple truth of the matter, and that is what this is all about. I was pleased that the President would veto this measure. I warned the committees in the process that this would likely happen, please include a few provisions that would have made this product liability bill make more sense. But, no. We had a conference committee, you may remember, in December. We had one opening meeting, and that was it. So much for any bipartisan attempts at working anything out. I have been in more than one conference in this Congress that proceeded much along those lines. We were shut out. Fortunately, the President stepped in, and now, having had this veto, we are here now to determine whether we will override it or sustain the President in his veto. Now, this bill has some problems. It has a lot of little problems, but it has some very big problems. The product liability bill would not only cap and limit the amount of damages an injured victim can recover, but would in many instances completely cut off the victim's right to seek compensation. Completely cut off the victim's right to seek compensation. This is coming out of the Committee on the Judiciary, the committee that is supposed to be the watchdog over the freedoms of people.

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, we could cut off their rights to seek compensation even in clear, uncontested cases of negligence.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Just a moment, sir. May I remind the gentleman of the date when the Sentencing Commission returned their reply to our directive? It was November.

Mr. CONYERS. I would like to find out if the gentleman understood the question. Is the gentleman aware of the fact that we accepted the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission?

Mr. CONYERS. Is the gentleman aware of the fact that the Sentencing Commission's recommendations cannot go into effect without the Congress acquiescing in them? And when they came back to the Subcommittee on Crime, unfortunately of which the gentleman is not a member, but is probably always welcome, and when they came to the full Committee on the Judiciary, the committee members, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], myself, and even our chairman, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], all acquiesced in the Sentencing Commission's response to the directive that we issued. Is the gentleman aware of that?

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman is familiar with the process. I am glad to know that. Did the gentleman know that Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to address the problem of which he complains?

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Chrysler] for his attention for a moment, please. Mr. Chairman, I would like the gentleman to indicate to us if he is familiar with the Sentencing Commission's process in terms of enhancing or adding penalties to the crimes that he complains of.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I need my colleague to respond to my questions on my time. Is he aware of the fact that we directed the Sentencing Commission to deal with the problem of which he complains today?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, this measure before us, there seems to be a little amnesia in the committee. This bill before us is operating as if the Sentencing Commission never acted upon our directives. If my colleagues will examine the records of the Committee on the Judiciary, the action that the Sentencing Commission took pursuant to our directives was submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, it went to the full Committee on the Judiciary, it was accepted by everybody on both committees, and now we come to the floor criticizing the Sentencing Commission as if they had never acted. So I want to point out that we ought to at least show that there was no one that objected, at least during the time that I was present in both the subcommittee and the full committee, on the inadequacy of the way that they, the Sentencing Commission, dealt with the directives that we gave them. They acted, they sent them back, we accepted them, it became part of the law, and now today we meet under the anxious gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Chrysler], who has determined that there must be more done and that somehow the Sentencing Commission, not the Committee on the Judiciary, has failed in its responsibility. Mr. Chairman, I think that that is an inaccuracy, and no matter what we do here today, the least we can do is acknowledge the correct chronology of what has taken place that has led us to this point in the creation of criminal law at the Federal level. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Manton] in support of the bill.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, we are considering the Crimes Against Children and Elderly Persons Prevention and Protection Act. There have been comments and criticisms raised that this legislation was necessary because the Commission on Sentencing did not implement adequately the congressional directive found in the violent crime bill of 1994. I wish to review this for the edification of the Members because the legislative language that we instructed the Sentencing Commission was thought to not require specific amendment action on the part of the Sentencing Commission but, rather, required an analysis, a thorough analysis, of certain areas of the guidelines to ensure that those identified objectives were going to be obtained. The Sentencing Commission conducted that analysis as instructed and, contrary to assertions that have been made here on the floor, it also additionally amended the guidelines to better address the desired objectives. I am suggesting that the Sentencing Commission has not been sleeping on the job but as a matter of fact has been doing precisely what the committee, through the Congress, has instructed them to do. The crime bill, at a particular section, 240002, of the 1994 crime bill, specifically directed the commission to ensure the guidelines provided sufficient and stringent punishment for those convicted of the crime of violence against an elderly victim. The directive established that the following objectives that the guidelines should achieve are as follows: One, increasingly severe punishment commensurate with the degree of physical harm caused to the elderly victim; two, an enhanced punishment based upon the vulnerability of the victim; and, three, enhanced punishment for a subsequent conviction for a crime of violence against an elderly victim. In response to the directive, the Sentencing Commission then analyzed the available sentencing data, the relevant statutory and guideline provisions. They also solicited the views of all interested parties on other amendments that might be relevant to the guidelines. All of the commentators asserted that, in their view, the existing guidelines sufficiently account for the congressional concerns that were embodied in the directive. Nevertheless, the Commission, in addition, identified two ways in which it believed the guidelines could be amended more fully and effectively and addressed those concerns about the harm to children and elderly victims to see that they are appropriately punished. Here is what the commission did: It clarified the commentary of the vulnerable-victim guideline to broaden it applicability. Then they added an application note specifying that a sentence above the guideline ranges may be warranted if the defendant's criminal history includes a prior sentence for an offense that involves the selection of a vulnerable victim. These amendments became effective November 1, 1995, following congressional review. Thus, while it may be that some of us now believe that the commission should have done more, I think the record should reflect that the directive, while it required most specific amendment action, nevertheless in two significant respects the commission, in fact, did amend the relevant guidelines. And so the Congress presumably reviewed these changes, and I think we did, and raised no issues as to their inadequacy at the time. So we now are operating under the false assumption that the Sentencing Commission has not been cooperating or working with us in terms of the directives that we gave them, and I think that the opposite is the case. Under these circumstances, Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Lofgren], a distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Tell me the answer, sir.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would bring to the attention of my colleagues that in addition to adding stalking to domestic violence and attaching penalties to it, this measure, in addition, makes interstate violation of a protection order subject to the following penalties: A person who violates an interstate protection order shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for life or any term of years, if death of the victim results. Although this is current law, it is important to understand that it is in fact related to violence and stalking, because frequently a violation of a protection order might be involved. So in addition to a life term if death results, there is also a 20- year penalty if permanent disfigurement or life threatening bodily injury results. There is a penalty of 10 years incarceration if serious bodily injury to the victim results or if the offender uses a dangerous weapon during the offense. And, as provided for the conduct under chapter 109A if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A, then it would be punishable for not more than 5 years, in any other case, or both fine and imprisonment. So we now have a complete criminal statutory provision that deals with domestic violence, stalking, and violation of a protection order. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to recount for the Members in the body the criminal penalties that attach to this crime: A person who violates this section, or section 2261A shall be fined under this title, imprisoned-- (1) for life or any term of years, if the death of the offender's spouse or other intimate partner results; (2) for not more than 20 years if permanent disfigurement or life threatening bodily injury to the offender's spouse or intimate partner results; (3) for not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the offender's spouse or intimate partner results or if the offender uses a dangerous weapon during the offense; (4) as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A, without regard to whether the offense was committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison; and, (5) for not more than 5 years, in any other case, or both fined and imprisoned. These are very appropriate, they are stiff penalties, and I think that they are appropriate for the kind of violence and stalking that has plagued the country as exemplified by the examples that have been recited here on the floor this afternoon. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I support this measure, which creates a new Federal offense for interstate stalking. The provision is modeled after a provision in the 1994 crime bill that created a Federal offense of interstate travel to commit domestic violence. The bill here before us covers travel across State lines or from or to Indian country with the intent to injure or harass another person, where the defendant places the subject in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, or death or bodily injury to a member of the subject's immediate family. Mr. Speaker, some may argue that creating a new Federal law for stalking is an overfederalization of crimes, but I disagree. The problems of stalking, because of their interstate nature, transcend the ability of State law enforcement agencies, obviously, to continue working together without such a provision as H.R. 2980. Moreover, under title 18 of the United States Code, there are provisions that make it a crime to cross the State line with falsely made dentures, or with a cow. Keeping that in mind, this is clearly not a radical expansion of the law to make it a crime to cross State lines to harass or abuse another person. Mr. Speaker, this stalking offense is modeled on an existing interstate domestic violence offense. It specifically covers traveling across State lines, entering or leaving Indian country, with the intent to injure or harass another person. I urge the support of the entire membership of the House in passing H.R. 2980. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.