John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to honor the life of Rose Nader, who at age 99 died on Tuesday, January 24, 2006, of congestive heart failure. As you can see, Mrs. Nader indeed lived an honorable life. Below is a reprint of her obituary that appeared in the Washington Post on January 26, 2006: Mrs. Nader, who jousted with politicians and complacency as a small-town activist and was the mother of consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Mrs. Nader developed a certain civic renown in 1955 when she confronted Sen. Prescott Bush (R-Conn.), the father and grandfather of presidents. When Senator Bush visited Winsted, following a catastrophic flood, he was approached by Mrs. Nader at a public gathering. When he offered his hand in an obligatory fashion, Mrs. Nader latched on and refused to free him until he promised to help a dry-dam proposal move forward. This was fulfilled. Later, she advocated building a community center for children, forming a speakers club that would bring worldly lecturers to the town, and expanding and preserving a local hospital. At home, she could be implacable, particularly about food. She emphasized homemade items over packaged goods whose contents she found bewildering. She prohibited hot dogs and later beef because of the presence of a growth-stimulating hormone linked to cancer. She sweetened food with honey, not sugar, and pushed her children to eat chickpeas instead of candy bars on their way to school. When news of this was publicized during Ralph Nader's rise to prominence, the Wall Street Journal editorial page likened his mother to a Puritan. This characterization was laughed at by her children, even as they promoted the story involving her distrustful relationship with chocolate. Mrs. Nader later said: ``When the children convinced me that chocolate-frosted birthday cakes were what all the other children wanted, I frosted the cake, but after the candles were blown out and before they cut into the cake, I removed the frosting. Some people might say I was severe, but it became a family joke.'' She later wrote a cookbook. Rose Bouziane was born in Zahle, Lebanon, on Feb. 7, 1906, to a sheep broker and a teacher. She taught high school French and Arabic before her marriage in 1925 to businessman Nathra Nader. After immigrating to the United States, they settled in Connecticut, where his Main Street bakery-restaurant-general store in Winsted, in the northwestern corner of the state, became a redoubt for residents bemoaning actions or inactions at the town hall. On occasion, Mrs. Nader used newspaper opinion pages to express her views. Writing in the New York Times in 1982, she denounced the use of ``credibility phrases,'' such as ``frankly,'' ``to tell you the truth'' and ``in all honesty,'' that sometimes preceded a political statement or sales pitch. They gave her ``the pervasive feeling that distrust is so widespread that people need to use such language to be believed.'' In another editorial, she embraced mass mailings from issue groups that are commonly dismissed as ``junk mail.'' She wrote that they often come from people ``who care about their times.'' Her husband died in 1991. A son, Shafeek Nader, died in 1986. Besides Ralph Nader of Washington, survivors include two daughters, Claire Nader of Washington and Winsted and Laura Nader of Berkeley, Calif.; a sister; three grandchildren; and three great-grandchildren. Ralph Nader once said his mother ``took us out in the yard one day and asked us if we knew the price of eggs, of apples, of bananas. Then she asked us to put a price on clean air, the sunshine, the song of birds--and we were stunned.''

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), a dear friend of the honoree in this resolution, who had worked with Mrs. King for many years. (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee. And I would like to thank the chairman of the Judiciary Committee (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for accommodating us with the extra time that we have here this evening for the Coretta Scott King resolution. (Mr. SCHIFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), who has worked in the King venue even before she became a Member of Congress when she was a staffer and when she was a State senator in California.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Capps), who has worked tirelessly in the field of health care since she came to Congress.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Scott), who has shown his interest in the ideals of Dr. King by joining the Committee on the Judiciary in connection with the Voter Rights Act extension which is currently under debate.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega), who has worked with us on civil rights issues both in this country and in other places in the world. (Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis), a dear friend who was in the civil rights movement.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Butterfield) to close our discussion this evening.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege now to yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the honorable Democratic whip of the House, who I happen to know worked with Rosa Parks. And I am delighted that he came to several of her farewell memorial tributes and that he is with us on the floor today for the resolution for the late Coretta Scott King.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, it is our understanding that there will be continuation of the debate on this resolution tomorrow.

Mr. CONYERS. Until then, Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield such time as she may consume to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), a member of the Judiciary Committee and a civil rights leader when she was in State government and a civil rights leader today, to close on our side.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to another Member person to testify in terms of this House Resolution tonight, Congresswoman Diane Watson, a member of the Congressional delegation, but, more than that, she was a distinguished State senator from California and she was one of the few in this body who have been named an ambassador.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), a civil rights leader, one who has been in the struggle since the beginning. I remember him from 1963 and he had been in it long before.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. Today we mourn the loss of a dignified and peaceful woman who showed us by example how to pursue change in the world, despite the costs of that struggle. My friends in the Congress, I have known Coretta King since I went south during the civil rights movement as a lawyer. She was a vibrant, consistent, totally dedicated partner with her husband. She helped him stay strong, especially in the beginning when there were so many threats and challenges to the revolutionary idea that we would start a civil rights movement in the South itself. Many people tried to dissuade Martin from that course. As a child of the segregated South, she agreed that the movement should begin at the seat of Jim Crow. When faced with the loss of her husband, Coretta remained able to advance their vision of a free and equal America. She continued her husband's legacy by devoting her life to advancing racial and economic justice and for the rights of women, children, the poor, and the homeless. She also fought for employment, education and health care opportunities for all. Most notably, this woman stood for equality and peace, the very virtues to which her husband had dedicated his life. It was with Coretta's approval that 4 days after Martin's assassination on April 4, 1968, that I introduced a bill to name a holiday in his honor. Coretta was at the heart of this effort, as well as were many others to continue the life and work of King. In 1969, I joined Coretta at the King Center in Atlanta to kick off the campaign for a national holiday. She orchestrated a national grassroots movement that urged passage of this legislation and would come to Congress in 1979 and 1980 and 1981 and 1982 and 1983 to testify before the Congress and urge support of the King holiday. It was with her diligence and perseverance that that holiday bill was passed in 1983 and first observed in 1986. Today, upon the passing of Mrs. King, we will pledge to continue the King legacy as she has for the past 37 years. As the life and work of the Kings touched millions during their lifetime in this country and around the world, we here in Congress must ensure that their lives continue to impact millions more in the coming years, and that is why I am so proud to join the rest of us in supporting and urging passage of the King resolution. Mr. Speaker, I would now yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), the distinguished chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the minority leader of the House.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman. I am pleased to yield 3\1/3\ minutes to a member of the Committee on the Judiciary from Houston, Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/3\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Jones), an attorney, a prosecutor, a member of the Committee on the Judiciary and a staunch advocate for civil rights. (Mrs. JONES of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton), who has distinguished herself in the field of law, in the executive branch of our government, and has also appeared in the Supreme Court on a number of occasions on behalf of civil rights issues.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from Montgomery, Alabama (Mr. Davis) who in closing will perhaps yield as much of his time as he can to the gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. McKinney) where Mrs. Coretta Scott King resided for so many years.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, while I am a strong supporter of the brave men and women who serve in our armed forces, I am deeply opposed to the unnecessary and pernicious last-minute amendment added to this bill by Senators Graham, Levin, and Kyl. I am also disappointed that the conferees have made further changes to the provision that will only further damage our rule of law and compromise the efforts of our soldiers around the world. Their amendment, which is now Section 1405 of this bill, may severely curtail the federal court's review of detainees operations in ways that do irreparable damage to our rule of law. The provision also fails unequivocally to condemn torture and abuse, or the erratic and unreliable information that practice yields. These flaws are contrary to the fundamental principles of our legal traditions. Let me first focus on the torture issue. Never before in America's proud history have we countenanced a system in which there is even a possibility that human liberty might be taken away based on evidence extracted by torture. And it is this refusal to debase ourselves, by resorting to immoral and illegal techniques, that lies at the core of our best and most noble traditions. We should have made clear beyond doubt in this provision that we do not approve of and we are not willing to tolerate a system that rests on torture today. Even if it were true that there may be some extreme case--say, the infamous ``ticking time-bomb'' scenario--that could vindicate the use of abhorrent physical coercion, that exceptional case would not warrant the use of that evidence--evidence that our intelligence services have told us is very often unreliable--in subsequent judicial proceedings. There is simply no excuse or justification for this omission. As we try to establish new democracies and the rule of law for Iraq and Afghanistan in place of sanctuaries for terrorists, Congress's failure to condemn and bar abuse is shameful, intolerable, and deeply hypocritical: How can we refuse to practice what we preach to other countries? Congress must return to this issue as soon as possible and make good the promise of Senator McCain's wise anti-abuse provision; after all standards are important but, as we have learned time and time again, we also need accountability and enforcement. Time is of the essence because continued torture and abuse hurts our efforts in Iraq and beyond against al Qaeda. The persistent wave of stories about prisoners detained for the wrong reasons, or subjected to inappropriate treatment or abuse while in U.S. custody has inflicted terrible harm on our reputation, and on the efforts by our brave men and women in Iraq to win the hearts and minds campaign. Establishing a meaningful system of accountability for detainee operations is not only a matter of restoring America's honor in the eyes in the world, it is a vital part of our counterterrorism strategy. Accountability, moreover, cannot be achieved without independent monitoring mechanisms. The rule of law, as events of the past four years have made clear, dies behind closed doors and barbed-wire. Cutting off meaningful judicial supervision of the Guantanamo Naval Base will not restore the military's honor. And turning the federal courts into rubber stamps for decisions generated through the rack and the screw would stain our legal traditions. As Senator Specter powerfully urged, these difficult issues must be assigned to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees for their careful and expert consideration. Senator Specter's wise counsel has been repeated in letters from senior members of our armed forces, who have already retired; a bipartisan group of respected former federal judges; the American Bar Association; and a broad cross-section of professors from the legal academy. This wide-ranging opposition indicates how thorny these issues are, and how unwise it is to move so quickly on them. I am heartened, however, that we have been able to preserve much that is not harmful in this provision. There are some sound ideas embedded in these provisions that we should use when we reconsider these issues. Central to Congress's aim in this provision is a distinction between those detainees who have already been subject to a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and new detainees who will be subject to a future CSRT procedure that Congress will certify more than six months from now. For those who have already been subject to a CSRT and now challenge either that procedure or the lawfulness of the military commission system, the provision does not affect access to the federal courts. Through section(h)(2), Congress has crafted a new system of judicial review for cases that will be brought under a new system of CSRTs, to be designed by the Secretary of Defense and reviewed with care by Congress. These appeals from new CSRTs will be heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. And even in these new cases, the provision does not alter the now-established ability of attorneys to visit clients at Guantanamo. Attorneys litigating their cases in a circuit court need access to and communication with their client, as recent filings in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case show. But section (h)(2) also circumscribes the new system of review to new cases, which will of necessity arise more than six months from now, when the new CSRT procedures have been promulgated. We have preserved the existing, expansive review role of the federal courts for the habeas petitions filed by those who have already been through a CSRT. So detainees who have already had a CSRT hearing, including those who have pending habeas petitions, will continue to have traditional habeas review. We also chose in paragraph 3 of subsection (e) not to legislate an abstention rule. For those who have filed challenges to their military commissions, we did not take the extraordinary step of requiring convictions or other exhaustion before they come into federal court. As in Ex Parte Quirin, we have permitted pre-conviction challenge to be brought up to the U.S. Supreme Court. Paragraph 3 simply governs challenges to ``final decisions'' of commissions, and does not impact challenges when they are not brought ``under [that] paragraph.'' See Section 1405 (e)(3)(c),(d). To be sure, a few provisions are singled out to apply to pending cases, but these are provisions that give those who have filed cases additional rights, instead of taking any rights away. One such provision was added in conference with respect to coerced testimony, Section 1405(b)(2). But that provision does not in any way alter the clear intent of the Congress, which was to grandfather the jurisdiction of existing Guantanamo habeas and mandamus lawsuits under Lindh v. Murphy. As such, nothing in the legislation alters or impacts the jurisdiction or merits of Hamdan. And, quite obviously, nothing in the legislation constitutes affirmative authorization, or even toleration, for the military commissions at issue in that case. That is the question that the Supreme Court will decide in the coming months. Our mention of commissions simply reflects, but does not endorse, the fact that the lower court in Hamdan held them legal. This provision attempts to address problems that have occurred in the determinations of the status of people detained by the military at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. It recognizes that the CSRT procedures applied in the past were inadequate and must be changed going forward. As the former Chief Judge of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found, in In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the past CSRT procedures ``deprive[d] the detainees of sufficient notice of the factual bases for their detention and den[ied] them a fair opportunity to challenge their incarceration,'' and allowed ``reliance on statements possibly obtained through torture or other coercion.'' Her review ``call[ed] into serious question the nature and thoroughness'' of the past CSRT process. The former CSRT procedures were not issued by the Secretary of Defense, were not reported to or approved by Congress, did not provide for final determinations by a civilian official answerable to Congress, did not provide for the consideration of new evidence, and did not address the use of statements possibly obtained through coercion. To address these problems, this provision requires the Secretary of Defense to issue new CSRT procedures and report those procedures to the appropriate committees of Congress; it requires that going forward the determinations be made by a Designated Civilian Official who is answerable to Congress; it provides for the periodic review of new evidence; it provides for future CSRTs to assess whether statements were derived from coercion and their probative value; and it provides for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for these future CSRT determinations. At the same time, in accordance with our traditions, this amendment does not apply retroactively to revoke the jurisdiction of the courts to consider pending claims invoking the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging past enemy combatant determinations reached without the safeguards this amendment requires for future determinations. The amendment alters the original language introduced by Senator Graham so that those pending cases are not affected by this provision. Accordingly, subsection (h)(1) establishes that generally the provisions of this section, including subsection (e)(1), which affects the substantive rights of parties, apply only as of the date of enactment of this provision in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Lindh v. Murphy. Recognizing the Supreme Court's concerns about judicial independence in cases such as City of Boerne v. Flores and United States v. Morrison, we have underscored that Congress is not attempting to settle any constitutional question that is the proper province of the federal courts. Thus in sections (e)(2)(C)(ii), (e)(3)(D)(ii), and (f), we have made clear, out of an abundance of caution, that we not purport to decide any constitutional question that remains within the proper bailiwick of the federal courts pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. Thus, this provision does not speak to the constitutionality of the military commissions or the old CSRTs. We leave it to the courts to decide these questions.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a Resolution of Inquiry H. Res. 643 requesting the Attorney General to transmit to Congress documents reflecting the legal justification for spying on American soil without judicial approval. I introduce this Resolution on behalf of myself and Mr. Berman, Mr. Boucher, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Ms. Lofgren, Ms. Jackson-Lee, Ms. Waters, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Wexler, Mr. Weiner, Mr. Schiff, Ms. Linda Sanchez, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island, Mr. Doggett, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Filner, Mr. Markey, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Tauscher, Ms. Lee, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Udall of New Mexico and Mr. Holt. It is my hope that the Administration will voluntarily comply with this straightforward request. However, if they do not, this Resolution will require a vote in the Committee, and possibly the House floor so that the Members can go on record concerning whether this is an important enough issue to warrant Congressional oversight. I believe we simply cannot tolerate a situation where the Administration is both laying down and interpreting the law on its own accord, and not even sharing with the Members of Congress what the legal justification for such a program is. Last week we learned that the President has been using the National Security Agency to conduct surveillance involving U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, in apparent contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This week we learned that contrary to the President's assertions that the wiretapping included only foreign calls, some of the intercepted communications were conducted entirely within the United States. As a result of these disclosures, one member of the FISA Court, Judge James Robertson, resigned, and the presiding judge of the court has sought a classified briefing to address their concerns that the NSA program was illegal and may have been improperly used to gain further wiretaps from their court. These revelations raise some of the most serious legal and constitutional questions conceivable in our democracy--whether our own government is able to intercept our most private conversations without establishing to any independent party that such eavesdropping is in any way necessary or related to a possible crime. For 25 years under FISA we have created special procedures for obtaining intelligence information on U.S. soil. The standard for getting a wiretap warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is so low that only 5 out of the 19,000 applications have been denied since 1978. We even allow FISA orders to be obtained on a retroactive basis for the first 72 hours, in case the government needs to move with great speed. However, for some reason the Bush Administration has opted not to use the FISA laws to obtain surveillance orders involving a number of people located on U.S. soil. As one official told the Washington Post, ``the FISA process demanded too much: to name a target and give a reason to spy on it.'' The purpose of this Resolution of Inquiry is to allow Congress to obtain the necessary information so we can learn precisely what the legal basis was for this great expansion of executive power. We are not asking to learn about the names or identities of the individuals who have been surveilled, at this point we simply want to learn on what legal basis the surveillance orders were issued. The Administration has proposed a number of legal theories to the press to justify the NSA wiretaps, ranging from the President's authority as Commander In Chief to general authority included in the post 9/11 Afghanistan Resolution.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the legislation. Specifically, I oppose the avian flu liability provision which provides sweeping blanket immunity for the drug companies while again leaving American citizens unprotected. This legislation, which appears both unconstitutional and contrary to federalism, has not been reviewed by any committee of jurisdiction. In fact, this language was added to the Department of Defense Appropriations Conference Report in the middle of the night, long after the conferees approved the bill. Under the current provision, punitive damages for any claims are barred, allowing for no corporate liability. Drug companies that engaged in the worst kinds of abuses could not be penalized by juries. In addition, the legislation limits the total liability of any manufacturer or distributor. The result is no out of pocket payments by reckless corporations and no real recovery for injured citizens. Consider this example: The Secretary of Health and Human Services declares a potential public health emergency and designates a vaccine as a countermeasure. Later production of the vaccine demonstrates that the vaccine has vast problems with its potency and may render the vaccine harmful. With this knowledge, the company still sends the vaccine to thousands of distributors and when it is administered, the result is numerous deaths. Under this provision, families who are trying to gain compensation for their losses are left without recourse. This provision requires that before an injured person can pursue a claim, the Secretary of HHS must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was willful misconduct on the part of the manufacturer, distributor, or administrator of a covered product. First, this would insure that no injured person, including first responders and medical personnel, would have coverage. Second, it is doubtful that ``willful misconduct,'' which is defined as actual knowledge that a covered product would cause harm, could actually be proven. Third, even if an injured victim proved willful misconduct by clear and convincing evidence, the massive tort reform such as no punitive damages and capped non-economic damages would severely limit any compensation. In addition, this portion of the conference report applies to a wide range of drugs, vaccines, and other products. The provision does not limit its application to only new drugs or vaccines used in a pandemic context. Instead, it applies to any ``drug, biological product or device'' that is used to treat or cure a pandemic, epidemic or limit the harm that a pandemic or epidemic might cause. As drafted, this legislation would include drugs such as Tylenol or AdviI. Finally, the conference report falsely claims to establish a compensation process. This ``compensation process'', under the sole direction of the Secretary of HHS, is governed by regulations created by the Secretary alone and includes caps on compensation awards. Further, no monies have been appropriated for the fund and consequently, the ``compensation process'' is whole inoperable. The provision has no true compensation program. Attached to my statement is a letter from Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor at the Duke University School of Law which further outlines the problems and issues concerning this preparedness provision. Instead of putting the burden on the victim by cutting compensation and protecting the drug manufacturers, we must ensure corporate accountability and protection for our citizens. I strongly urge a ``no'' vote. Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University School of Law, December 20, 2005. Dear Senator: I understand that the Congress is considering legislation that has been denominated as the ``Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act.'' This legislation would give the Secretary of Health and Human Services extraordinary authority to designate a threat or potential threat to health as constituting a public health emergency and authorizing the design, development, and implementation of countermeasures, while providing total immunity for liability to all those involved in its development and administration. In addition to according unfettered discretion to the Secretary to grant complete immunity from liability, the bill also deprives all courts of jurisdiction to review those decisions. Sec. (a)(7). I write to alert the Congress to the serious constitutional issues that the legislation raises. First, the bill is of questionable constitutionality because of its broad, unfettered delegation of legislative power by Congress to the executive branch of government. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may provide another branch of government with authority over a subject matter, but ``cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a prescribed standard.'' United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). Recently, the Supreme Court endorsed Chief Justice Taft's description of the doctrine: ``the Constitution permits only those delegations where Congress `shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.' '' Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998)(emphasis in original), quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The breadth of authority granted the Secretary without workable guidelines from Congress appears to be the type of ``delegation running riot'' that grants the Secretary a ``roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them'' of the type condemned by Justice Cardozo in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935)(Cardozo, J., concurring). Second, the bill raises important federalism issues because it sets up an odd form of federal preemption of state law. All relevant state laws are preempted. Sec. (a)(8). However, for the exttemely narrow instance of willful (knowing) misconduct by someone in the stream of commerce for a countermeasure the bill establishes that the substantive law is the law of the state where the injury occurred, unless preempted. Sec. (e)(2). The sponsors appear to be trying to have it both ways, which may not be constitutionally possible. The bill anticipates what is called express preemption, because the scope of any pennissible lawsuits is changed from a state-based to a federally based cause of action. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). Usually, that type of ``unusually 'powerful' '' preemptive statute provides a remedy for any plaintiff's claim to the exclusion of state remedies. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Here, rather than displace state law in such instances, the bill adopts the different individual laws of the various states, but amends them to include a willful misconduct standard that can only be invoked if the Secretary or Attorney General initiates an enforcement action against those involved in the countermeasure and that action is either pending at the time a claim is filed or concluded with some form of punishment ordered. Such a provision raises two important constitutional concerns. One problem is that this hybrid form of preemption looks less like an attempt to create a federal cause of action than an direct attempt by Congress to amend state law in violation of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and basic principles of federalism. Although Congress may preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause by creating a different and separate federal rule, see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Counc., 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000), it may not directly alter, amend, or negate the content of state law as state law. That power, the Erie Court declared, ``reserved by the Constitution to the several States.'' 304 U.S. at 80. It becomes clear that the bill attempts to amend state law, rather than preempt it with a federal alternative, when one realizes that States will retain the power to enact new applicable laws or amend existing ones with a federal overlay that such an action may only be commenced in light of a federal enforcement action and can only succeed when willful misconduct exists. The type of back and forth authority between the federal and state governments authorized by the bill fails to constitute a form of constitutionally authorized preemption. The other problem with this provision is that the unfettered and unreviewable discretion accorded the Secretary or Attorney General to prosecute an enforcement action as a prerequisite for any action for willful misconduct violates the constitutional guarantee of access to justice, secured under both the First Amendment's Petition Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12 (2002). In fact, the Court has repeatedly recognized that that ``the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.'' Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731. 741 (1983), citing California Motor Transport Co . v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has said in a long line of precedent, cannot be dependent on the ``unbridled discretion'' of government officials or agencies. See, e.g., City of Lake wood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988). At the same time, the Due Process Clause guarantees a claimant an opportunity to be heard ``at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The obstacles placed before a claimant, including the insuperable one of inaction by the Secretary or Attorney General, raise significant due process issues. The Supreme Court has recognized that official inaction cannot prevent a claimant from being able to go forth with a legitimate lawsuit. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The proposed bill seems to reverse that constitutional imperative. Third, the complete preclusion of judicial review raises serious constitutional issues. The Act, through Sec. 319F- 3(b)(7), expressly abolishes judicial review of the Secretary's actions, ordaining that ``[n]o court of the United States, or of any State, shall have subject matter jurisdiction,'' i.e., the power, ``to review . . . any action of the Secretary regarding'' the declaration of emergencies, as well as the determination of which diseases or threats to health are covered, which individual citizens are protected, which geographic areas are covered, when an emergency begins, how long it lasts, which state laws shall be preempted, and when or if he shall report to Congress. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the preclusion of all judicial review raises ``serious questions'' concerning separation of powers and due process of law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); see also, Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 14, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993). Judicial review of government actions has long regarded as ``an important part of our constitutional traditional'' and an indispensable feature of that system,'' Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and a co-author of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, I take this opportunity to reemphasize the importance of certain parts of the legislative history of the provisions involving protections for battered immigrants. Additionally, I want to highlight and provide guidance on the reasoning behind and expectations about some of the provisions that are part of the final bill, the engrossed amendment agreed to by the Senate, which passed the Senate on December 16, 2005 and passed the House on December 17, 2005. Since the section numbers changed between the version of VAWA 2005's Protection of Battered and Trafficked Immigrants provisions that passed the House September 28, 2005, and the version that we are considering today, I will provide a list at the end of my statement that cross references the section numbers in the final bill. Section 801 enhances protection for immigrant victims of trafficking and certain immigrant crime victims by reuniting them with their children and family members living abroad. In the context of trafficking cases and other immigration functions I wanted to clarify for the record that VAWA 2005 contains language in Sections 801, 803, 804, 813 and 832 that are designed to amend sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to reflect the current delegation of authority and reassignment of immigration functions from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). When DOJ and DHS are cited as having shared authority under this Act, that shared authority should be limited to instances in which DHS is making an immigration determination in a case in which DOJ has an active federal investigation or prosecution. In cases where the investigation or prosecution is being conducted by a state or local prosecutor, or by another federal government agency, DOJ involvement may not be appropriate or required. Section 802 creates an exception to unlawful presence for victims of severe forms of trafficking who demonstrate that their trafficking experience was at least one central reason for their unlawful presence in the United States. For the purposes of this section (and similarly for sections 801, 805 and 812 of this Act), I understand that the term ``at least one central reason'' is intended to mean that the unlawful presence was caused by, or related to, the trafficking experience and its concurrent process of victimization. Just as this section provides a waiver of unlawful presence inadmissibility for T visa victims, I would hope that DHS will exercise its discretion determining good moral character so that T visa recipients are not barred from attaining adjustment of status from a T visa. Section 804 provides that aliens can qualify for T status if they respond to and cooperate with requests for evidence and information from law enforcement officials. I also want to emphasize that state and local law enforcement officials investigating or prosecuting trafficking-related crimes are permitted to file a request (and certification) asking DHS to grant continued presence to trafficking victims. This section changes references in the INA to conform to the transfer of immigration functions from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security by replacing references to the Attorney General with references to the Secretary of Homeland Security. I believe the expansions in protections for children contained in this Act are particularly important. Section 805 ensures that immigrant children who are victims of incest and child abuse get full access to VAWA protections. The application for adjustment of status to permanent residence of an alien who self-petitioned for permanent residence shall also serve as an adjustment application for any derivative children. Derivative children of self-petitioners will receive lawful permanent residency along with their self-petitioning parents. This section removes the requirement that abused adopted children must live with the abusive parent for two years and assures that child VAWA self- petitioners and derivative children have access to VAWA's aging out protections and can additionally access any Child Status Protection Act relief for which they qualify. It allows assures victims of child abuse and incest who were under 21 when abused have additional time until they turn 25 to file VAWA self-petitions. In this context, I understand that the term ``at least one central reason'' is intended to mean that the they delay in filing was caused by, or related to, the child abuse or incest and its concurrent process or victimization. Section 811 defines a ``VAWA petitioner'' as an alien who has applied for classification or relief under a number of provisions of the INA. I want to emphasize the importance of the fact that the law assures that adjudication of all forms of immigration relief related to domestic violence, sexual assault, trafficking or victims of violent crime continue to be adjudicated by the specially trained VAWA unit. In 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service consolidated adjudication of VAWA self-petitions and VAWA-related cases in one specially trained unit that adjudicates all VAWA immigration cases nationally. The unit was created ``to ensure sensitive and expeditious processing of the petitions filed by this class of at-risk applicants . . .'', to ``[engender] uniformity in the adjudication of all applications of this type'' and to ``[enhance] the Service's ability to be more responsive to inquiries from applicants, their representatives, and benefit granting agencies.'' See 62 Fed. Reg. 16607-16608 (1997). T visa and U visa adjudications were also consolidated in the specially trained VAWA unit. (See, USCIS Interoffice Memorandum HQINV 50/1, August 30, 2001, from Michael D. Cronin to Michael A. Pearson, 67 Fed. Reg. 4784 (Jan. 31, 2002)). This specially trained VAWA unit assures consistency of VAWA adjudications, and can effectively identify eligible cases and deny fraudulent cases. Maintaining a specially trained unit with consistent and stable staffing and management is critically important to the effective adjudication of these applications. Consistent with these procedures, I recommend that the same specially trained unit that adjudicates VAWA self-petitions, T and U visa applications, process the full range of adjudications, adjustments, and employment authorizations related to VAWA cases (including derivative beneficiaries) filed with DHS: VAWA petitions T and U visas, VAWA Cuban, VAWA NACARA (Sec. Sec. 202 or 203), and VAWA HRIFA petitions, 106 work authorization under section 814(c) of this Act), battered spouse waiver adjudications under 216(c)(4)(C), applications for parole of VAWA petitioners and their children and applications for children of victims who have received VAWA cancellation. I also encourage DHS to promote consistency in VAWA adjudications by defining references to ``domestic violence'' in the INA as ``battery or extreme cruelty,'' the domestic abuse definition codified in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (``VAWA 1994''), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (``IIRIRA'') and regulations implementing the battered spouse waiver. The Secretary of Homeland Security can remove the conditional status of an alien who became a permanent resident, as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident without joint filing of a petition with the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, upon the showing of hardship, battery, or certain other factors. Applications for such relief may be amended to change the ground or grounds for such relief without having to be resubmitted. VAWA 2000 allowed victims of domestic violence abused by U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident spouses to file VAWA self-petitions from outside of the U.S. if they had been abused in the U.S. or if their abuser was a member of the uniformed services or a government employee. Modeled after the VAWA 2000 protection offered to children on VAWA cancellation of removal grantees, existing parole provisions should be used to ensure that approved VAWA petitioners, their derivative children and children of traffic-king victims, can enter the U.S. Section 812 provides that an alien who is a VAWA petitioner or is seeking cancellation of removal or VAWA suspension as a battered alien is not subject to the penalties for failing to depart after agreeing to a voluntary departure order, if the battery or extreme cruelty, trafficking, or criminal activity provided at least one central reason related to the alien's failure to depart. In this context it is my understanding that the term ``at least one central reason'' is intended to mean that the failure to depart was caused by, or related to, the battering or extreme cruelty experience and its concurrent process of victimization. Section 813 is designed to address a number of problems for immigrant victims in removal proceedings. The definition of exceptional circumstances will now include battering or extreme cruelty. Important clarifications are made to assure that immigration judges can grant victims the domestic violence victim waivers we created in VAWA 2000. I particularly want to emphasize the importance of the protections from reinstatement of removal we create in this Act for immigrant victims. Under current law DHS has the discretionary authority to consent to the readmission of a previously removed alien (using the existing I-212 process). DHS should make use of its discretion in granting readmission to appropriately assist aliens with humanitarian cases including but not limited to, victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, victims of trafficking and crime victims who are cooperating in criminal investigations. Under current law, victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking who have been ordered removed, including expedited removal, are subject to reinstatement of removal if they depart the U.S. and attempt to reenter the U.S. Once they are reinstated in removal proceedings, they cannot obtain VAWA, T, and U relief, even if they have a pending application for such relief. Recognizing these harsh consequences, Congress encourages DHS to make use of its discretionary authority to consent to the admission of such previously removed aliens (using the existing I-212 process). Section 814 provides that an alien whose petition as a VAWA petitioner has been approved may be granted work authorization. U visa applicants are provided work authorization under existing law. I want to emphasize that this section gives DHS statutory authority to grant work authorization to approved VAWA self-petitioners without having to rely upon deferred action. I believe that one of the most important protections offered by this section toward prevention of domestic violence is that Section 814 of this bill provides that an alien spouse admitted under the A (foreign diplomats), E-3 (Australian investor), G (international organizations), or H (temporary worker) visa non- immigrant programs accompanying or following to join a principal alien shall be granted work authorization if the spouse demonstrates that during the marriage he or she (or a child) has been battered or has been subjected to extreme cruelty perpetrated by the principal alien. This section is intended to reduce domestic violence by giving victims tools to protect themselves and hold abusers accountable. Research has found the financial dependence on an abuser is a primary reason that battered women are reluctant to cooperate in their abuser's prosecution. With employment authorization, many abused spouses protected by this section will be able to attain work providing them the resources that will make them more able to safely act to stop the domestic violence. The specially trained CIS unit shall adjudicate these requests. I believe that Section 817 of this Act contains same of the most important protections for immigrant victims. This section is enhances VAWA's confidentiality protections for immigrant victims and directs immigration enforcement officials not to rely on information provided by an abuser, his family members or agents to arrest or remove an immigrant victim from the United States. Threats of deportation are the most potent tool abusers of immigrant victims use to maintain control over and silence their victims and to avoid criminal prosecution. In 1996, Congress created special protections for victims of domestic violence against disclosure of information to their abusers and the use of information provided by abusers in removal proceedings. In 2000, and in this Act, Congress extended these protections to cover victims of trafficking, certain crimes and others who qualify for VAWA immigration relief. These provisions are designed to ensure that abusers and criminals cannot use the immigration system against their victims. Examples include abusers using DHS to obtain information about their victims, including the existence of a VAWA immigration petition, interfering with or undermining their victims' immigration cases, and encouraging immigration enforcement offices to pursue removal actions against their victims. Immigration enforcement agents and government officials covered by this section must not initiate contact with abusers, call abusers as witnesses or rely on information furnished by or derived from abusers to apprehend, detain and attempt to remove victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and trafficking, as prohibited by section 384 of IIRIRA. In determining whether a person furnishing information is a prohibited source, primary evidence should include, but not be limited to, court records, government databases, affidavits from law enforcement officials, and previous decisions by DHS or Department of Justice personnel. Other credible evidence must also be considered. Government officials are encouraged to consult with the specially trained VAWA unit in making determinations under the special ``any credible evidence'' standard. I believe that all investigation and enforcement of these provisions should be done by the Office of Professional Responsibility of the Justice Department. For consistency, these cases need to be centralized in one division and I believe that this office is best equipped to address these cases. The current practice of granting deferred action to approved VAWA self-petitioners should continue. Aliens with deferred action status should not be removed or deported. Prima facie determinations and deferred action grants should not be revoked by immigration enforcement agents. The specially trained Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) unit should review such cases to determine whether or not to revoke a deferred action grant. Immigration enforcement officials at the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement do not have authority to overrule a CIS grant of deferred action to an alien victim. Immigration enforcement officers should refer aliens they encounter who may qualify for relief under this Act to immigration benefits adjudicators handling VAWA cases at CIS. VAWA confidentiality protections in IIRAIRA are amended to conform with current practice extending these protections to the Department of Homeland Security in addition to the ``Department of Justice and to expand confidentiality protections to the Department of State. These protective provisions were designed to assure that the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State may not use information furnished by, or derived from information provided solely by, an abuser, crime perpetrator or trafficker to make an adverse determination of admissibility or. removal of an alien. However, information in the public record and government data-bases can be relied upon, even if government officials first became aware of it through an abuser. This section provides that this provision shall not apply to prevent information from being disclosed (in a manner that protects victim confidentiality and safety) to the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, including the Immigration Subcommittees, in the exercise of their oversight authority. This section also gives the specially trained VAWA unit the discretion to refer victims to non-profit, non-governmental organizations to obtain a range of needed assistance and victim services. Referrals should be made to programs with expertise in providing assistance to immigrant victims of violence and can only be made after obtaining written consent from the immigrant victim. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the ability of an applicant to designate a safe organization through which governmental agencies may communicate with the applicant. This section requires that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice provide guidance to their officers and employees who have access to information protected by Section 384 of IIRAIRA, including protecting victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, trafficking and other crimes from the harm that could result from inappropriate disclosure of information. Congress encourages the DHS's specially trained VAWA unit and CIS VAWA policy personnel: (1) to develop a training program that can be used to train DHS staff, trial attorneys, immigration judges, and other DOJ and DOS staff who regularly encounter alien victims of crimes, and (2) to craft and implement policies and protocols on appropriate handling by DHS, DOJ and DOS officers of cases under VAWA 1994, the Acts subsequently reauthorizing VAWA, and IIRIRA. Section 825 contains a number of amendments particularly important to me. Protecting victims of domestic violence from deportation and assuring that they can have their day in court before an immigration judge to file for VAWA related immigration relief is a central focus of all VAWA immigration protection I have been involved in developing since 1994. This section contains amendments that clarify the VAWA 2000 motions to reopen for abused aliens, enabling otherwise eligible VAWA applicants to pursue VAWA relief from removal, deportation or exclusion. This section provides that the limitation of one motion to reopen a removal proceeding shall not prevent the filing of one special VAWA motion to reopen. In addition, a VAWA petitioner can file a motion to reopen removal proceedings after the normal 90-day cutoff period, measured from the time of the final administrative order of removal. The filing of a special VAWA motion to reopen shall stay the removal of the alien pending final disposition of the motion, including exhaustion of all appeals, if the motion establishes a prima facie case for the relief. One VAWA 2005 post-enactment motion to reopen may be filed by a VAWA applicant. Aliens who filed and were denied special VAWA motions under VAWA 2000 may file one new motion under this Act. Additionally, I feel it is very important that the system of services we provide to domestic violence victims, rape victims and trafficking victims and our protection order courtrooms and family courts are places to which victims can safely turn for help without worrying that their abuser may have sent immigration enforcement officers after them when they are seeking service and protection. Section 825(c) establishes a system to verify that removal proceedings are not based on information prohibited by section 384 of IIRIRA. When any part of an enforcement action was taken leading to such proceedings against an alien at certain places, DHS must disclose these facts in the Notice to Appear issued against the alien. DHS must certify that such an enforcement action was taken but that DHS did not violate the requirements of Section 384 of IIRIRA. The list of locations includes: a domestic violence shelter, a rape crisis center, and a courthouse if the alien is appearing in connection with a protection order or child custody case. Persons who knowingly make a false certification shall be subject to penalties. Removal proceedings filed in violation of section 384 of IIRIRA shall be dismissed by immigration judges. However, further proceedings can be brought if not in violation of section 384. I also want to highlight the important protections for all battered women and stalking victims contained in Section 827 of this bill. With respect to laws and regulations governing identification cards and drivers' licenses, DHS and the Social Security Administration shall give special consideration to victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking who are entitled to enroll in state address confidentiality programs, and whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed under State or Federal law (including VAWA confidentiality provisions), or suppressed by a court order. The REAL ID Act of 2005 imposed a new national requirement that all applicants for driver's licenses or state identification cards must furnish their physical residential address in order to obtain a federally valid license or identification card. This requirement jeopardizes those victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking who may be living in confidential battered women's shelters or fleeing their abuser, stalker, or trafficker. In recognition of the dangers of this requirement, this provision instructs DHS and the Social Security Administration to give special consideration to victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking by allowing certain victims to use an alternate safe address in lieu of their physical residential address. I understand that a driver's license or identification card is necessary for victims to board an airplane or train to flee danger. Many confidentiality programs are currently in place on both federal and state levels to ensure that the dual goals of economic security and victim safety are reached by allowing an individual to choose an alternate address on her driver's license. This will provide an exception for those victims who are entitled to enroll in state address confidentiality programs, whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed under State or Federal law or suppressed by a court order, or who are protected from disclosure of information pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1367, ensuring the continued protection and necessary mobility for these women and their families. As Ranking Member' of the House Judiciary Committee, I have been particularly concerned about the significant delays that have occurred between the effective dates of VAWA 1994 and VAWA 2000 laws and the issuance of implementing regulations that are needed so that immigrant victims can receive the protections Congress has created for them. Section 828 requires that regulations implementing both this Act (including materials and dissemination under section 834) and the Act reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act in 2000, (``VAWA 2000''), be issued within 180 days of this Act's enactment. In applying such regulations, in the case of petitions or applications affected by the changes made by the Acts, there shall be no requirement to submit an additional petition, application, or certification from a law enforcement agency with the date of the application for interim relief establishing the priority date of counting time towards adjustment of status. However, the Department of Homeland Security may request additional evidence be submitted when the documentation supporting an outstanding VAWA self-petition or justifying interim reliefs now insufficient. The Department of Homeland Security shall also craft and implement policies and protocols implementing VAWA confidentiality protections under Section 384 of IIRAIRA as amended by this Act. Lastly, I want to provide important background information about the reasoning behind The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA) that is included in this VAWA 2000 legislation. The final IMRBA legislation combines provisions that created a significant role for the government in information collection and distribution to foreign fiancees and spouses with regulation of the International Marriage Broker Industry. IMBRA has been designed to address concerns about U.S. citizen abusers who use the K visa process to petition for aliens outside the United States and abuse them. This Act, establishes the first meaningful federal regulations on international marriage broker agencies (IMBs), companies jn the business of matching mostly American male clients to foreign women who will join them in the United States as fiances or spouses. There have been numerous cases of foreign women who were matched with American men, came to the U.S. live with their new spouses and were subjected to domestic violence, sexual assault or other forms of extreme cruelty. In some cases, the perpetrators have successfully used IMBs and the immigration system to bring in a series of fiances or spouses who have all suffered from domestic violence from the American sponsor and client. This bill is designed to inform foreign spouses and fiancees entering the United States of the laws relating to such abusive crimes, and the availability of help. In addition, it seeks to prevent abusers from using the immigration system to find new victims. Sections 832, 833 and 834 are designed to prevent further abuse by instituting measures to distribute information that can help the K visa recipients learn about domestic violence protections available to them in the United States. These sections also provide them with specific information about their U.S. citizen petitioners' criminal conviction history. Additionally, this section limits the ability of abusive U.S. citizens to repeatedly petition for K visas for aliens outside the U.S. A consular officer may not approve a fiancee visa petition without verifying that the petitioner has not previously petitioned for two or more aliens applying for spousal or fiancee K visas. If the petitioner has had such a petition previously approved, the consular officer must verify that two years have elapsed since the filing of the previous petition. The Secretary of Homeland Security may grant waivers of the two-year waiting period or the limit on filing more. than two petitions. The waivers included here were designed to give DHS the discretion to waive both the time and number limitations when K fiance visa applications are filed by nonabusive U.S. citizens. Such waivers may be appropriate, for example, for non-abusive U.S. citizens who live abroad or were raised abroad and may be more likely to marry foreign spouses, or in cases of unusual circumstances, such as the sudden death of an alien approved for a prior K visa. Section 832(a) includes a domestic violence victim waiver modeled after the waiver created for immigrant victims of domestic violence by VAWA 2000 (INA Section 237(a)(7)). Waivers shall be granted when tbe U.S. citizen petitioner demonstrates that they have been' subjected to battering or extreme cruelty, that there was a connection between the criminal conviction and the abuse. including efforts to escape the abuse and that they were not the primary perpetrator of abuse in the relationship. Section 832(a)(2) of VAWA 2005 requires that U.S. citizen petitioners filing K visa applications for spouses they married abroad provide under oath the same criminal information required for K fiance visa petitioners. This section also creates a database to track serial K applications. Upon approval of a second K visa for a spouse or fiance the U.S. citizen petitioner will be entered into the multiple visa tracking database and will be notified that this petition and all future petitions will be entered into the database maintained by the Department of Homeland Security. Once two espousal or fiance K visas have been approved, for each subsequent petition filed, DHS will notify both tbe citizen petitioner and foreign-born spouse about the number of previously filed petitions in the database for a 10-year period. All future K applications will trigger similar notice. The domestic violence pamphlet developed under Section 833 of this Act will be sent to the K beneficiary inunigrant spouse along with the multiple filing data base information. Under this Act, IMBs are required to comply with mandatory collection of criminal background information on each U.S. client, including arrest and conviction information, information on any temporary or permanent protection order issued against the U.S. client, and information on where the person has lived, prior marriages and children they have under the age of 21. The IMB must also conduct a sex offender registry search on the U.S. client. Conclusion I am once again honored to have played a role in reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act and the protections it affords to immigrant women who suffer from battery and extreme cruelty in our Nation. We have made important changes and adjustments to current law that will ensure that the broad range of domestic violence victims have access to the immigration relief they need to escape from abuse and begin to rebuild their lives, and those of their children. I am particularly pleased that Congress was able to agree upon passage of the first legislation to provide fiancees and spouses applying for K visas from abroad the ability arm themselves with what can be life saving information and to truly regulate the international marriage broker industry. I offer my sincere appreciation to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, F. James Sensenbrenner, who worked with me for the better part of this year on this bill in shared commitment to protect victims of domestic violence. In addition, I must thank Congressman Rick Larsen of Washington for his leadership on protecting unsuspecting foreign women who become victims of abuse by sponsoring IMBRA and working with Chairman Sensenbrenner and me on bringing IMBRA into this bill. I also offer special thanks to my Senate colleagues, Senator Arlen Specter, Senator Patrick Leahy, Senator Joseph Biden and Senator Ted Kennedy for their hard cooperative work to ensure that the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 could be passed into law this year. I worked closely with Chairman Sensenbrenner to develop legislative history for the protections offered to immigrant victims contained in Protection of Battered and Trafficked Immigrants Title of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005. The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives Report to accompany H.R. 3402 that was published on September 22, 2005, provides important legislative history on this Title. Since section numbers have changed in the final bill, I include here cross reference list that will facilitate relating the sections of the final VAWA 2005 provisions we are voting on today with the legislative history sections that describe and support these provisions. Final VAWA 2005 Section Number and House Committee Report Section Number 801 (Treatment of Spouse and Children of Victims)--901(a). 802 (Presence of Trafficking Victims)--903(b). 803 (Adjustment of Status for Trafficking Victims--903 & 903(a). 804 (Protection and Assistance to Trafficking Victims)-- 901(d). 805 (Protecting Victims of Child Abuse) 805 (a) and (b)--912(b) and (c). 805 (c)--912(d). 805(d)--931. 811 (VAWA Petitioner Definition and VAWA Unit)--911, 902, 914, 918. 812 (Exception to Voluntary Departure)--919. 813(a) (Exceptional Circumstances)--937. 813(b) (Discretion to Readmission Instead of Reinstatement of Removal)--915. 813(c) (Domestic Violence Victim Waiver Clarification)-- 935. 814(a) (VAWA HIRIFA and VAWA Cuban Adjustment Improvements)--936, 917. 814(b) (Work Authorization for VAWA Petitioners)--915(a). 814 (c) and (d) (Work Authorization for Abused A, E-3, G, H Spouses)--933. 814(e) (Limitation on Petitioning for Abuser)--917(g). 815, 823, 824 (Clarification and Corrections Regarding VAWA NACARA VAWA HRIFA, VAWA Cuban Adjustment Applicants--917. 816 (VAWA Protection for Elder Abuse Victims)--913. 817 (VAWA Confidentiality Protections)--921, 915. 821 (a) and (b) (Duration of T and U Visa Status)--901(b). 821(c) (Change of Status to T or U Visa Status)--901(c). 822 (Technical Corrections)--941. 823 (VAWA Cuban Adjustment Improvements)--917(d). 824 (VAWA HRlFA Improvements)--917(e). 825 (Deportation and Deportation Proceedings)--936, 921(f). 826 (Protection of Abused Juveniles)--921(d). 827 (Identification Documents for Domestic Violence and Crime Victims)--None. 828 (Rulemaking)--900. 831, 832, 833, 834, Subtitle D, International Marriage Broker Regulation--916, 922.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I began on a note of congratulating the chairman of this committee who has been the first chairman to have began to get reauthorizations on the Department of Justice. I have been working on that for many years prior to him succeeding, but this is the first time that we have had them. This is the second time that we have had the authorization. What makes this bill even more important to me is that we have a reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 in it as well. I congratulate a great number of our colleagues in the Senate, Senators Biden, Leahy, Specter, for working on this on their side; and we have all come together with what I think is a very important measure. Now, let me quickly get to three parts of this that are particularly important to me. For many years, I have been urging that in this program of Violence Against Women Act, we create specifically tailored programs to address the needs of communities of color. It draws on several Violence Against Women Act programs and finally ensures that we help people who either never receive the services or receive very few of them, and inserting this language into the bill is a monumental victory for communities of color fighting violence against women across this country. Secondly, the bill provides funding for various offices within the department. In particular, we build up the Office of Inspector General, putting in over $70 million a year. This office has been diligent in overseeing the department's war on terrorism, issuing reports on 9/11 detainees and pushing the department to change its procedures in many of the ways they handle terrorism matters. The third point that I consider extremely important is that our colleague from California, Adam Schiff, on the Judiciary Committee, was able to get language in that requires the Attorney General to report to Congress on the number of persons detained on suspicion of terrorism. If Members do not think that is an important subject, then we need to hold a special briefing for anybody that wants more information on it. It has been a highly controversial issue in the Judiciary Committee, notwithstanding the fact that everybody from the Attorney General on down has been dancing around these subjects. We also reauthorize the COPS office that the Clinton administration created, and the law enforcement people have been very proud of that fact. So for all of those reasons and more, I urge the House to, as close to unanimity as we may be able to come on this, pass this measure. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.