John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I now to yield to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Tonko).

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Sarbanes), whose father honored us by serving on the Judiciary Committee when he was here.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to recognize Stephanie Baez for her dedicated service to the House of Representatives. Over the past six years, she worked for several Members representing her home state of New York and most recently the House Judiciary Committee, where she has served as the Communications Director for the Democratic staff. A 2008 graduate of Stony Brook University, Stephanie majored in political science with a concentration in journalism. She began her career on Capitol Hill in 2010 as a staff assistant for Congressman Anthony Weiner of New York, where she was promoted to press assistant and legislative correspondent. She then served as a press assistant and legislative correspondent for the office of Congressman Charles B. Rangel, and later served as the communications director for Congressman Hakeem Jeffries. In 2014, she was hired as the communications director for the House Judiciary Committee Democratic staff. As the spokesperson for the Committee, Stephanie worked tirelessly to disseminate the messages of the Democratic Members, create and maintain relationships with the press, manage the Committee social media accounts, and overhaul the Democratic website. She organized many high profile press briefings and coordinated with other Committees and their Members to ensure the press received timely and accurate information. Stephanie excelled at all of these tasks. She earned a well-deserved reputation for being dependable, and her expertise and energy were appreciated by staff and Members alike. We thank Stephanie for her many outstanding contributions to the House Judiciary Committee and the U.S. House of Representatives, and wish her well as she returns to New York to work for the New York Economic Development Corporation. She will surely be missed.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, during the congressional debates on arbitration more than 90 years ago, witnesses testified about the benefit of resolving disputes without judicial intervention. They noted, for example, that when arbitration is properly used, it can help parties avoid the uncertainty, delay, and costs of protracted litigation. Their testimony ultimately led Congress to pass the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, which empowered courts to enforce arbitration agreements. As the use of pre-dispute forced arbitration agreements--especially with respect to consumer transactions and employment agreements--has proliferated in recent years, however, it is clear that arbitration is not always beneficial to all parties and it may, in fact, eviscerate the protection of critical federal consumer and civil rights statutes. It is also apparent that the secrecy of arbitration awards can be used to hide awareness of wrongdoing by businesses. And, there are serious concerns about whether some arbitrators are indeed neutral. The New York Times, in an excellent three-part series of investigative articles on the use of forced arbitration agreements published last year, reported that ``clauses buried in tens of millions of contracts have deprived Americans of one of their most fundamental constitutional rights: their day in court.'' Based on its exhaustive investigation of court records and hundreds of interviews with lawyers, judges, arbitrators, corporate executives, and plaintiffs, the Times found that arbitration practices are often closed, fail to adhere to rules of evidence or even substantive law, and are nearly impossible to appeal. The arbitration provisions that prohibit class actions, as the Times reports, are viewd by state judges as virtual `get out of jail free' cards ``because it is nearly impossible for one individual to take on a corporation with vast resources.'' By privatizing the justice system, arbitration ``bears little resemblance to court'' and has become an ``alternate system of justice'' for businesses precisely because it tends to favor them, according to the Times. Nothwithstanding these concerns, the use of pre-dispute forced arbitration clauses has become virtually ubiquitous. They appear in credit card agreements, car rental agreements, and employee handbooks. They even appear in nursing home agreements when they are signed ``at the time of admission only because the resident or family member does not even notice or understand the arbitration clause, or sign[ed] . . . out of fear that otherwise the admission will be jeopardized,'' according to the National Senior Citizens Law Center. Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements do not offer any option to reject. Once signed, these agreements force consumers and employees to irretrievably waive their right to judicial redress for harms they have suffered, prevent them from availing themselves of any class action remedy, and deny them the right to otherwise obtain justice under applicable state and federal law. As a result, millions of consumers and employees across our Nation are legally bound by forced arbitration clauses in contracts with little or no ability to negotiate them. Accordingly, it is time for Congress to reconsider the value of pre- dispute mandatory arbitration agreements. We must restore integrity to the arbitration process and limit the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses that provide no opportunity for consumers and employees to opt-out. Congress should not restrict the rights and options of consumers and employees to resolve disputes Rather, arbitration should be one option among many to resolve disputes. Legislation that protects consumers and employees is a common-sense solution for all Americans. For example, H.R. 2087, the ``Arbitration Fairness Act,'' is an excellent measure that was introduced by my colleague, Representative Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. This bill would make pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in employee, consumer, civil rights, and antitrust disputes. Importantly, H.R. 2087 would leave arbitration in effect when it is truly voluntary: after a dispute arises. Similarly, H.R. 4899, the ``Restore Statutory Rights Act,'' which was also introduced by Mr. Johnson earlier this week, would ensure that the rights and protections established by Congress or the states are enforceable in court. These bills would help restore balance and fairness to contractual agreements by allowing consumers, employees, franchisees, residents of long-term care facilities, and others to opt for arbitration, rather than have arbitration imposed on them as a pre-condition. Such measures would help ensure a fairer arbitration process because the terms of arbitration. Congress must do more to protect the right of consumers and employees to have access to the courts. Americans should not be forced to lose this precious right as a result of one-sided, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2947, the ``Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2016.'' for several reasons. To begin with, the bill addresses a real need--recognized by regulatory agencies, bankruptcy experts, and the private sector--that the bankruptcy law must be amended so that it can expeditiously restore trust in the financial marketplace as soon as possible after the collapse of a major financial institution. As many of you may recall, the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 caused a worldwide freeze on the availability of credit, which not only affected Wall Street, but Main Street as well. Even after Lehman sought bankruptcy relief, the filing did not prevent the near collapse of our Nation's economy. The Lehman case revealed that current bankruptcy law is ill-equipped to deal with complex financial institutions in economic distress. H.R. 2947 addresses these shortcomings by establishing a specialized form of bankruptcy relief whereby the holding company of a large financial institution could expeditiously obtain such relief, while allowing its operating subsidiaries to function outside of bankruptcy. Through this mechanism, the debtor's principal assets, such as its secured property, financial contracts, and the stock of its subsidiaries, would be transferred to a temporary ``bridge company,'' that, in turn, would liquidate these assets for the benefit of creditors under the supervision of a trustee. This process should reduce the likelihood of disruption to the financial marketplace and avoid any worldwide freeze on the availability of credit. Another reason why I support this bill is that it appropriately recognizes the important role the Dodd-Frank Act has in the regulation of large financial institutions. Without doubt, the Great Recession was a direct result of the regulatory equivalent of the Wild West. In the absence of any meaningful regulation of the mortgage industry, lenders developed high risk subprime mortgages and used predatory marketing tactics targeting the most vulnerable. These doomed-to-fail mortgages were then securitized and sold to unsuspecting investors, including pension funds and school districts. Millions of Americans were trapped in mortgages they could no longer afford. This resulted in causing vast waves of foreclosures, massive unemployment, and international economic upheaval. The Dodd-Frank Act goes a long way toward reinvigorating a regulatory system that makes the financial marketplace more accountable, more transparent, and more resilient. And, H.R. 2947 will make the Dodd-Frank Act even more effective by ensuring the bankruptcy law is better equipped to resolve these companies. Finally, I am pleased that H.R. 2947 is the product of a very collaborative, inclusive, and deliberative process. A collaborative process--particularly with respect to complex legislation with wide-ranging consequences--is essential. It should be the norm, not the exception. Accordingly, I commend Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte for his leadership in ensuring this collaborative process for H.R. 2947. Nevertheless, while the bill is an excellent measure, it unfortunately does not include any provision allowing the federal government to be a lender of last resort, a critical element that nearly every expert recognizes is necessary to ensure financial stability. This is a matter that at some point must be addressed. Again, I want to acknowledge the excellent level of cooperation on both sides of the aisle in producing the legislation that is pending before us today. In closing, I appreciate that my Judiciary Committee colleagues on both sides of the aisle have come together to support H.R. 2947. Nevertheless, I strongly encourage Chairman Goodlatte to consider other bankruptcy-related measures that my colleagues and I have introduced this Congress dealing with equally important matters. These measures include H.R. 97, the ``Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act,'' which I introduced to help level the playing field for employees and pensioners in corporate bankruptcy cases. I also would urge consideration of legislation, such as H.R. 1674, the ``Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act,'' a bill sponsored by my colleague, the gentleman from Tennessee Steve Cohen, that would help relieve those who--through no fault of their own--become entrapped in unaffordable, predatory student loan obligations. These measures also deserve to be considered prior to the close of this Congress.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing, together with my Democratic colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, a resolution calling on the Senate to observe regular order and to give President Barack Obama's nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court full and fair consideration and an up-or-down vote. Judge Garland is an eminently seasoned jurist who has the qualities to make him an upstanding nominee for the Supreme Court. His unquestioned intellect, long judicial experience, and even temperament are widely admired and respected, even by Republicans like Senator Orrin Hatch, who called him a ``consensus nominee'' for the Supreme Court who would be ``very well supported by all sides.'' Moreover, his deep respect for and fidelity to the Constitution and the law and his sensitivity to the impact of the law on ordinary people make him a good choice to fill the vacancy. Unfortunately, with the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, we have seen partisan politics regarding Supreme Court nominations reach a new low. For instance, within hours of Justice Scalia's passing, Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell said that the Senate would refuse to consider any nomination made by President Obama to fill the vacancy. In addition to being an astounding failure to carry out its constitutional duty, Senate Republicans' flat-out refusal to consider President Obama's nominee, regardless of the nominee's qualifications, is part of a longstanding pattern of disrespect shown to this President in particular. The Senate must provide the same consideration and respect for this President and his Supreme Court nominee that every other President has been given. The President, of course, has the Constitutional authority and obligation to appoint Justices to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article II, Section 2, and he has fulfilled his duty with his nomination of Judge Garland. And the Senate has both the authority and the obligation to provide advice and consent on the President's nominee pursuant to that same provision. Yet, the Senate has flatly refused to do its job, which is simply unacceptable. It is clear that the Constitution requires that both the President and the Senate fulfill their respective roles in the Supreme Court nomination process in order for the Supreme Court to be able to fully perform its constitutional role. Otherwise, what is to stop the Senate from simply grinding the Court--a co-equal branch of government--to a halt by simply refusing to consider any nominees to fill any vacancies on the Court. There is no merit to the argument that we have to wait until we elect a new President. After all, the American people twice elected President Obama to fulfill the duties of President, including the duty to appoint Supreme Court justices. And there is ample precedent for Presidents nominating, and the Senate confirming, Supreme Court nominees in the last year of a presidency. For example, in 1988, during the last full year of Republican Ronald Reagan's presidency, the Democratic-controlled Senate confirmed the nomination of Justice Anthony Kennedy by President Reagan by a 97-0 vote. Today, there are 10 months left in President Obama's term. This is more than sufficient time for the President to nominate, and for the Senate to consider and vote on his nominee. It is vital that the Supreme Court have a full complement of justices so that the critical constitutional and legal questions before the Court can be given the full attention that they need. While the House of Representatives does not have a formal say in the nomination process, it is important that its voice be heard on this important constitutional matter, and I urge the House to pass my resolution. The Senate should do its job, comply with regular order, hold fair hearings on Judge Garland's nomination, and then hold an up-or-down vote on the nomination.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2745, the ``Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015'' or SMARTER Act, would require the Federal Trade Commission to use the same merger enforcement procedures as the Justice Department's Antitrust Division for proposed mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and other similar transactions. I oppose this flawed bill for several reasons. Most importantly, H.R. 2745--by weakening the Commission's independence--undermines Congress's original intent in creating the Federal Trade Commission in the first place. For good reasons that are still relevant today, Congress established the Commission to be an independent administrative agency. Although the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 empowered the Justice Department to enforce antitrust laws, Congress determined that more needed to be done to address the wave of mergers and anti-competitive corporate abuses that continued notwithstanding the enactment of that Act. Accordingly, Congress created the Commission in 1914 as an independent body of experts charged with developing antitrust law and policy free from political influence, and particularly executive branch interference. To this end, Congress specifically gave the Commission broad administrative powers to investigate and enforce laws to stop unfair methods of competition as well as the authority to use an administrative adjudication process to develop policy expertise, rather than requiring the Commission to try cases before a generalist federal judge. Yet, rather than strengthening the Commission's independence and enforcement authority, the SMARTER Act does the opposite. Of greatest concern is the bill's elimination of the administrative adjudication process for merger cases under section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. By doing so, the SMARTER Act would effectively transform the Commission from an independent administrative agency into just another competition enforcement agency indistinguishable from the Justice Department and, thereby, arguable redundant. The Commission's administrative authority is key to its distinctive role as an independent administrative agency. But the SMARTER Act--by eliminating the Commission's administrative authority--opens the door for the ultimate elimination of the Commission. And, you do not just have to take my word for it. Former Republican Commission Chairman William Kovacic, while expressing support for the bill's harmonization of preliminary injunction standards, says that the ``rest of the SMARTER Act is rubbish.'' He continued, ``Let me put it this way: behind the rest of [the SMARTER Act] is the fundamental question of whether you want the Federal Trade Commission involved in competition law.'' Similarly, current Commission Chairwoman Edith Ramirez observes that the bill would have ``far-reaching immediate effects'' and ``fundamentally alter the nature and function of the Commission, as well as the potential for significant unintended consequences.'' Consumers Union also opposes the SMARTER Act not only because it is completely unnecessary, but also because the bill could ``create unintended hurdles to effective and sound enforcement'' and ``set the stage for further tinkering--both of which risk undermining what is now a coherent, consistent, well-established, familiar enforcement procedure within the'' Commission. Finally, the SMARTER Act is problematic because it may apply to conduct well-beyond large mergers, which could further hinder the Commission's effectiveness. In particular, the SMARTER Act would eliminate the Commission's authority to use administrative adjudications not just for the largest mergers, but for non-merger activity, like a ``joint venture'' or ``similar transaction.'' I recognize that the bill's authors have tried in good faith to respond to some of the concerns expressed by me and by the Commission during the last Congress and I appreciate those efforts. Moreover, I recognize that the Commission itself last year changed its procedural rules to make it easier to end the use of administrative litigation where it loses a preliminary injunction proceeding in court. I continue to have concerns, however, about the bill's prohibition against the Commission's administrative litigation authority with respect to all merger cases. Accordingly, I must oppose the SMARTER Act, even in its rewritten form, and I urge my colleagues to join me in opposition to H.R. 2745.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to House Resolution 639, which would allow the Speaker to file an amicus brief on behalf of the entire House of Representatives in United States v. Texas. This case deals with critical executive actions implementing immigration initiatives that will strengthen our communities, protect the dignity of families, enhance public safety and national security, raise average wages for U.S.-born workers, and grow our economy by tens of billions of dollars. Unfortunately, the majority opposes these initiatives and now seeks to influence this pending appeal before the Supreme Court. I oppose this resolution for several reasons. First, it is entirely unnecessary. Earlier this month, 185 of my colleagues and I filed an amicus brief in this case with the Supreme Court. And other individual Members of this body are already free to file their own amicus briefs as well. The Speaker, however, has chosen to expend legislative time on this measure instead of focusing on what Americans truly care about. Americans are worried about jobs, about overwhelming student loan debt, and in my State, the safety of the drinking water. Another problem with this resolution is that it authorizes the filing of an amicus brief on behalf of the entire House of Representatives in United States v. Texas when in fact it would not reflect the views of the entire legislative body. The amicus brief authorized pursuant to House Resolution 639 would represent the views of only the Republican majority. The majority should not be able to bind the minority to this ill- conceived and misleading undertaking. Finally, we have already thoroughly debated the constitutionality of the President's executive actions and it is clear that the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals immigration programs are lawful exercises of executive discretion. Presidents from both parties, including George H.W. Bush and Ronald Regan, have routinely used similar deferred deportation policies to promote family unity in our immigration system. These programs are commonsense solutions to our broken immigration system that has divided families for decades. The Supreme Court is the proper venue to resolve this issue, and I am confident the Court will find these actions consistent with the law and the Constitution. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill conceived and wasteful resolution.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the Emergency Financial Manager Reform Act of 2016 is intended to ensure that state-appointed emergency financial managers for municipalities in fiscal distress do not violate Constitutional protections, ensure public health and safety, and are accountable stewards of taxpayer funds. The bill responds to problems presented when unaccountable emergency financial managers usurp local elected officials and unilaterally make decisions that jeopardize public health and safety. Across our Nation, there are many cities in financial distress still struggling to recover from the Great Recession and other factors undermining their economic recovery. While most states work cooperatively with their cities to foster economic stability and growth, others such as my home state of Michigan, use draconian, autocratic laws that usurp local elected officials and replace them with unaccountable political appointees--typically known as emergency financial managers--who, through their vast powers, can jeopardize the health and safety of those who live and work in these struggling cities. In Michigan, for example, the root cause of the hazardous condition of Flint's lead-contaminated drinking water and the Detroit Public School System's buildings is the unaccountable emergency financial managers appointed by our Governor, Rick Snyder. This law and its implementation threaten not only our citizens' health and safety, but our fundamental Constitutional values and principles. In addition, extreme emergency financial manager laws frequently facilitate conflicts of interest and mismanagement and can be used to contravene important federal and state constitutional protections for collective bargaining agreements. They can authorize emergency financial managers to unilaterally reject collective bargaining agreements and other contractual obligations and thereby negate years of hard earned worker pension benefits. These are not just problems in Michigan, as it has been suggested that Atlantic City, which is also in financial distress, be taken over by an unaccountable emergency financial manager with broad powers similar to those available in Michigan. The Emergency Financial Manager Reform Act responds to these serious concerns by authorizing the Attorney General to reallocate five percent of the law enforcement funds that would otherwise be allocated to a state under the Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne- JAG), which provides funding to states for law enforcement purposes, if it is determined that the state appointed emergency financial manager violates any one of seven common sense safeguards: Protection Against Discriminatory Impact on Voting--This provision requires the state that has appointed an emergency financial manager to submit a certification to the Attorney General (and every 18 months after such appointment if the tenure of the emergency financial manager continues beyond such period) that the appointment: (A) has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying, abridging, or diluting the right to vote on account of race or color; and (B) the community for which the emergency financial manager is sought to be appointed has had an opportunity to comment, on the impact of such appointment may have on voting rights. Protection Against States Ignoring Adverse Impacts on Voting Rights-- This provision requires the Attorney General to receive copies of all public comments submitted in response to the notice required above and to interpose an objection to the certification. Protection Against Harm to Public Health and Safety--This provision requires the emergency financial manager before making decisions affecting public health or safety, including the disbursement of any emergency funds provided by any federal or state entity for the purpose of addressing lead or other contamination of drinking water in a public water system, to receive prior approval from the governor and local elected officials. Protection Against Conflicts of Interest, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Discretion--This provision requires the emergency financial manager to have adequate oversight to ensure against conflicts of interest, mismanagement, and abuse of discretion. Protection Against Unilateral Rejection of Other Contracts--This provision provides that the emergency financial manager may not reject, modify, or terminate an existing contract without mutual consent or unless such rejection, modification, or termination is approved by a federal bankruptcy court. Protection Against Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements-- This provision provides that the emergency financial manager may not reject, modify, or terminate a collective bargaining agreement without mutual consent of the parties. Protection Against the Failure to Provide Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment--This provision ensures that the public--before an emergency financial manager is appointed--is provided notice and the opportunity to comment on whether the appointee has any conflicts of interest, whether he or she has the requisite experience and financial acumen, and whether the appointee is empowered to propose sources of financial assistance, such as loans, grants and revenue sharing. The public must also be given the name of a state official designated to received complaints from the public about the appointee's conflicts of interest, mismanagement, or dereliction of duty. The objective of the legislation is not to deny Byrne-JAG grant funds, but rather to incentivize the states to protect their citizens against these risks and abuses when emergency financial managers are appointed. However, if in the event the finds are withheld, they are directly reallocated to the local government for which an emergency financial manager is appointed. We can and must stand together to make sure that the unaccountable emergency financial managers responsible for these man-made disasters-- and the legal system that empowered them--are not permitted to inflict further harm on our citizens.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), a veteran member of the House Judiciary Committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson), another distinguished member of the House Judiciary Committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Members of the House, H.R. 3624, the so-called Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, is not really about fraud. Rather, this measure is just the latest attempt to tilt the civil justice system in favor of corporate defendants by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue State law claims in State courts. Here is why I say that. To begin with, H.R. 3624 addresses a nonexistent problem. Under current law, a defendant may remove a case alleging solely State law claims to a Federal court only if there is complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants, with an exception. If the plaintiff adds an instate defendant to the case to defeat diversity jurisdiction, this constitutes fraudulent joinder and, in such circumstance, the case may be removed to Federal court. In determining whether a joinder was fraudulent, the court must consider only whether there was any basis for a claim against the nondiverse defendant. For the case to remain in Federal Court, the defendant must show that there was no possibility of recovery or no reasonable basis for adding the nondiverse defendant. This very high standard has ignited our Federal Courts for more than a century, and it has functioned well. H.R. 3624 would replace this time-honored standard with a thoroughly ambiguous one. The measure would require a remand motion to be denied unless the court finds, among other things, that it is ``plausible to conclude that the applicable State law would impose liability'' on an instate defendant; that the plaintiff had a ``good faith intention to prosecute the action against each'' instate defendant or to seek a joint judgment; and that there was no ``actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts.'' Additionally, H.R. 3624 would effectively overturn the local defendant exception, which prohibits removal to Federal Court even if complete diversity of citizenship exists when the defendant is a citizen of the State where the suit was filed. The bill's radical changes to longstanding jurisdictional practice reveal the true purpose of this measure. It is simply intended to stifle the ability of plaintiffs to have their choice of forum and, possibly, even their day in court. In addition, H.R. 3624 would sharply increase the cost of litigation for plaintiffs and further burden the Federal court system. For example, terms like ``plausible'' and ``good faith intention'' are not defined in the bill. This ambiguity will lead to greater uncertainty for both courts and litigants and will spawn substantial litigation over their meaning and application, further delaying many decisions in many cases. Additionally, these standards require a court to engage in a minitrial during an early procedural stage of a case, without an opportunity for the full development of evidence. Thus, the bill would sharply increase the burdens and costs of litigation for plaintiffs and make it more likely that they would be prevented from choosing the forum for their claims. Finally, the amendments made by this bill raise fundamental federalism concerns. Subject to certain exceptions as set forth in our Constitution, matters of State law should be decided by State courts. The removal of a State court case to Federal court always implicates federalism concerns, which is why the Federal courts generally disfavor Federal jurisdiction and read removal statutes narrowly. H.R. 3624, however, ignores these federalism concerns. By applying sweeping and vaguely worded new standards to the determination of when a State case must be remanded to a State court, the bill denies State courts the ability to decide and ultimately to shape State law. H.R. 3624 not only violates State sovereignty, but it also violates our fundamental constitutional structure. Accordingly, I sincerely urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this problematic legislation. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Somehow the gentleman from Virginia has misunderstood what I said or has mischaracterized what I said. This bill makes it too difficult to remand cases back to State courts to the point at which federalism concerns are raised and plaintiffs are frequently harmed. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cohen), a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. CONYERS. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute. I thought you might be interested in knowing that 21 different organizations strongly oppose H.R. 3624, the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, including: the American Association for Justice, the Center for Effective Government, the Center for Justice and Democracy, the Consumer Federation of America, the D.C. Consumer Rights Coalition, Main Street Alliance, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Disability Rights Network's lawyers, the National Employment Lawyers Association. I include in the Record the letter containing the list of groups that strongly oppose H.R. 3624. February 23, 2016. Re Groups Strongly Oppose H.R. 3624, ``The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act''. Hon. Paul Ryan, Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi: The House will soon be voting on H.R. 3624, the ``Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act.'' This bill would upend long established law in the area of federal court jurisdiction, place unreasonable burdens on the federal judiciary, and make it more difficult for Americans to enforce their rights in state courts. The undersigned organizations strongly oppose the bill as harmful and unnecessary. Under our system of government, federal court jurisdiction is supposed to be very limited. State courts should not be deprived of jurisdiction over a claim they should properly hear, so the burden is always on the party trying to get into federal court to show why it should be there. When a case is properly in state court, only complete ``diversity'' can support removing it to federal court, meaning that no plaintiff in a case may come from the same state as any defendant. H.R. 3624 would undermine this fundamental precept and force state cases into federal court when they don't belong there. The bill would do this by transforming the centuries- old concept called ``fraudulent joinder,'' which is a way to defeat complete diversity; i.e., when non-diverse defendants are in case. Despite its name, joining such defendants is rarely ``fraudulent'' and has been accepted practice for over a century. As Lonny Hoffman, Law Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center, explained in testimony to this committee, under current, ``well-settled law, fraudulent joinder will only be found if the defendant establishes that the joinder of the diversity-destroying party in the state court action was made without a reasonable basis of proving any liability against that party.'' Current law ``strikes an appropriate balance among competing policies in how it evaluates the joinder of non-diverse defendants.'' However, H.R. 3624 would dramatically change this longstanding, efficient and well-functioning law. The bill alters the fundamental precept that a party seeking removal has a very heavy burden to establish federal court jurisdiction. At a preliminary stage, the court is required to engage in exhaustive fact finding on the merits even before summary judgment. The bill instructs the court to use subjective and vague criteria, like ``objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no good faith intention'' or ``based on the complaint . . . it is not plausible to conclude,'' creating uncertainty as courts struggle with how to interpret and apply this new standard. The bill provides no evidentiary standards to help courts make such a complex decision. And requiring the court to engage in extensive factual adjudication at this early stage raises significant 7th Amendment ``right to jury trial'' constitutional concerns. As Professor Hoffman put it in testimony to this committee, although the bill is short in length, its provisions are ``anything but modest; if enacted, they would dramatically alter existing jurisdictional law.'' The process contemplated by this bill would be not only unfair to and incredibly expensive for the plaintiff, but also an enormous waste of judicial resources. There is no reason for these state based claims to be heard in federal court other than corporations' desire to engage in forum shopping. Yet, there is no evidence whatsoever that national corporations, who choose to avail themselves of the marketplaces in states across the country, complying with multiple state laws in the process, should then have a problem appearing in state court. H.R. 3624 will have a destructive impact on our state and federal judiciary. Professor Hoffman said in his testimony, ``Finally, by divesting state courts of jurisdiction and deciding merits questions that state courts now routinely resolve, proponents appear deaf to the serious federalism concerns that the bill raises.'' We urge you to oppose this legislation. Thank you. Very sincerely, Alliance for Justice, American Association of Justice, Americans for Financial Reform, Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization, Center for Effective Government, Center for Justice & Democracy, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Action, Consumer Watchdog, Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety, D.C. Consumer Rights Coalition, Essential Information, Homeowners Against Deficient Dwellings. Main Street Alliance, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low income clients), National Consumer Voice for Quality Long- Term Care, National Consumers League, National Disability Rights Network, National Employment Lawyers Association, Protect All Children's Environment, SC Appleseed Legal Justice Center, Texas Watch, The Impact Fund, Woodstock Institute, Workplace Fairness.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Members of the House, I oppose the manager's amendment, something I rarely ever do. While I don't take issue with the changes to the bill that the manager's amendment makes, this amendment fails to address any of the concerns that I raised about the underlying bill because the bill is flawed in its very conception. There is no real problem that this bill addresses. Existing fraudulent joinder law adequately addresses the improper joinder of instate defendants, and the bill's proponents have offered no evidence to the contrary. This unnecessary bill instead creates great uncertainty and delay in the consideration of State law claims with its ambiguous new requirements. It will also spawn much litigation, leading to increased costs that will be borne disproportionately by plaintiffs. This bill, in addition, violates State sovereignty by significantly diminishing the ability of State courts to decide and shape State law matters. Those are my objections to the manager's amendment. I hope it will be voted down. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to the Honorable Paul Mannes, an outstanding public servant who, over the course of his 34 years of service as a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Maryland, exemplified the finest qualities of a jurist. Unfortunately, Judge Mannes passed away on January 20, 2016 at the age of 82. He is very much missed by his wife of 58 years, Karen Klein Mannes, and their three sons and daughters-in-law as well as his colleagues on the bench and in the bar. Born in the District of Columbia on December 25, 1933, Judge Mannes grew up in Chevy Chase, Maryland and went on to Dartmouth, where he majored in philosophy and graduated with honors in 1955. Thereafter, he attended Georgetown University School of Law, where he earned a juris doctor degree in 1958 and a Masters in Law in 1961. After serving as a law clerk to the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia, and as an Assistant Corporate Counsel to the District of Columbia, he entered private practice with various law firms. On December 10, 1981, he was sworn in as United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Maryland. During his time on the bench, Judge Mannes published 155 opinions that span more than 500 volumes of the Bankruptcy Reporter. He enjoyed a national reputation in the bankruptcy community as one of America's foremost judges. The Washington Post, for example, praised him in 1991 as the court's ``workhorse.'' In addition to his demanding workload on the bench, Judge Mannes devoted his time to improving the law. In 1987, he was appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to the Judicial Conference of the United States Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and later served as Chairman of the Committee, the first bankruptcy judge to be so honored. He was also active in the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, where he served as President from 1992 to 1993, and was a member of the American Bankruptcy Institute, among other professional organizations. Judge Mannes was also a valuable resource to the Committee on the Judiciary. For example, he testified before the Committee in 1995 and in 2003 on the need for additional bankruptcy judgeships respectively on behalf of the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. He helpfully provided his assistance to Committee staff on both sides of the aisle. He also served on a special advisory group to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, an independent body created by Congress to study and make recommendations to improve our Nation's bankruptcy laws. Judge Mannes thoroughly embraced his role as a jurist and served as a mentor to those who were beginning their careers as bankruptcy judges. He and his wife hosted dinners for every new class of newly-appointed bankruptcy judges who attended the judges' orientation seminar at the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, DC. This home-style welcome, which he paid for at his own expense, became a virtual institution that endeared Judge Mannes and his wife to judges from all over the country and enhanced the collegiality of our Nation's bankruptcy bench. Mr. Speaker, I ask that my colleagues join me in honoring the life of the Honorable Paul Mannes. He will truly be missed, but his legacy will not soon be forgotten.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 4470, the Safe Drinking Water Act Improved Compliance Awareness Act. This bill is a good first step to helping ensure the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) never again allows an intransigent state government endanger the public welfare. Let there be no mistake. The blame for what happened in Flint lies directly at the feet of Governor Snyder who ignored Flint's democratic rights, his appointed Emergency Managers who wanted to save a buck, and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) that was too timid to protect the public from haphazard changes to the Flint water system. But the EPA needs to take some blame for not dismissing out of hands the efforts of the Governor, his Emergency Managers, and MDEQ to delay addressing the crisis in Flint. The EPA let the endless echo of ``EPA overreach'' prevent them from doing their job--which is telling anti-regulatory special interests that the public's health comes first. This bill is a start to fixing that problem, but we have a long way to go. My colleagues across the aisle need to stop fighting EPA on behalf of special interests, and start fighting alongside EPA in the public interest. Because if they don't, there will be more Flints, there will be more mothers who can't sleep because their children are sick, and there will be more ``bi-partisan'' bills expressing hindsight support for EPA action.