John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, could we not tailor this document a little more narrowly than bringing China into this? The gentleman did not do it. All right. Let me go to the next part. I asked my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), about the hearings. I was told that there were no hearings, no witnesses; but there was a markup last Wednesday. Is that right? I have to get something right down here in the well before I return my time. Okay. That much is right. Mr. Speaker, is there some reason that we did not have witnesses? Silence. All right. Then the only other thing that I could add, Mr. Speaker, is that there has been a change. There was original language that considered that Iraq's refusal to admit U.N. weapons inspectors pursuant to Security Resolution 687 should be considered an act of aggression against the United States and its allies, and that language has been struck.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for his comment. Mr. Speaker, my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), who is more an expert on foreign affairs matters than I, said ``Now is the time to finish the job.'' I guess that is not very ambiguous, is it? And then he went on to explain something that could be troublesome: we are not at war with Iraq, but we are at war with Saddam Hussein. Well, that introduces a new concept. I am only on the Committee on the Judiciary. Our impressions have always been that nations declare war on another, we do not declare war on terrorists or a head of a country, or anything else. I see the gentleman from California in the aisle there.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), my old friend, for his generosity. I can assure him I will not abuse it. I am also happy to join the former chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), in this discussion. I want to just throw this out because I may not be correct; but is this measure, H.J. Resolution 75, a way of us expanding the war to Iraq? I assume the answer is yes.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to be an original cosponsor of the Spectrum License Policy Act of 2001, and I am hopeful we, can pass this bill into law this year before we adjourn. After months of negotiation in this matter, I am glad we have a deal that represents a win for everyone. It benefits the government by providing ten billion dollars in revenues to our Treasury. It benefits the original license holder by preserving the benefit of the bargain it had originally negotiated. It benefits our bankruptcy code, by preserving the doctrine of the stay and the power of the courts to enforce it, even against the government. And it benefits consumers by permitting the spectrum to come on the market as soon as possible, fostering much needed competition. In a very real sense we have reached this point because of the interest and involvement of the Judiciary Committee. When the Federal Communications Commission was seeking to unilaterally take away NextWave's spectrum assets, in violation of the automatic stay, this Committee weighed in to preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy code. The FCC was unable to ram their legislation through and the parties, to their credit, continued negotiating. I am hopeful that this bill will serve as a precedent for achieving settlements for other similarly impacted parties. For example, I would note that Urban Communicators PCS LP, a minority owned enterprise, has also filed for bankruptcy and been engaged in a dispute with the FCC over spectrum rights. I would urge the FCC and the Congress to take up their case on an expedited schedule as well.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have no idea what Department of Justice wants; and I can tell the gentleman, I do not care what Customs wants. Whether they asked for it or not, they should not get it. There are no documents to prove that they asked for it; Members can be the jury. The question that the gentleman from New York raises is whether we are going to sanctioning in this quickie here, a racial profiling exemption that goes back, the qualified exemption that Customs already enjoys. What are we doing here? We already have a dozen cases that have come out of court that have said that Customs is protected and has a qualified exemption from even the wrongdoing of the agents of Customs. Now, and I guess this is in the quiet of the daytime, we are now saying let us exempt the whole agency, not just the individual agents that conduct these violations. Then I am hearing people talk about we need more money. And it is terrible what is happening to kids and ladies and girls, but the chairman is the one that blocked us adding the money. He is sitting here quietly reserving his time. This is a wonderful practice, but what has it got to do with the Customs Border Security Act? Here is a bill that is going to bite the dust because we will not level about what we are doing here. So I cannot authorize sanctioning agencies to have exclusive remedy exemption, when they already have partial exemption.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would like the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson) to know that the Committee on the Judiciary made a great pitch to increase the funding for Customs. It was blocked by the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means sitting there. That is why we could not do it.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, since the April 3, 2001 introduction of H.R. 1343, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, more than 200 members (202) from both sides of the aisle have added their voices to the call for comprehensive legislation that will provide assistance to state and local law enforcement and amend federal law to streamline the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. This legislation is a constructive and measured response to a problem that continues to plague our nation--violence motivated by prejudice. The legislation is designed to address two significant deficiencies in the existing bias crime law enforcement framework. First, the legislation loosens the overly restrictive federally protected activity requirement under existing hate crimes law. Second, the legislation expands the jurisdiction of the federal government to reach violent conduct aimed at victims on the basis of their gender, sexual orientation or disability status. Title 18, United States Code, Section 245, is one of the primary statutes used to combat racial and religious violence. At the time of its passage in 1968, a number of members of Congress wanted to limit the reach of the statute. They accomplished their goal by including a dual intent requirement. To establish a violation under Section 245, a federal prosecutor must prove that a defendant acted, for example, because of the victim's race and because the victim was exercising one of a limited category of federally protected rights (e.g., serving on a jury, voting or attending public school). The original version of the statute contained a less restrictive, but still substantial, intent requirement that the government prove the defendant acted while the victim engaged in a federally protected activity. This dual intent requirement has substantially hampered the hate crimes enforcement by the Department of Justice. There are numerous examples of heinous acts of violence that DOJ has either been unable to prosecute, or has been unsuccessful in prosecuting, due to the limitations of Section 245. One of the most egregious examples of the problems under current federal law occurred in a 1994 Texas hate crimes prosecution. A federal jury acquitted three white supremists of civil rights violations arising out of an incident where they stalked the street of Fort Worth hunting for African-American victims. Although the jury agreed that the defendants' actions were racially motivated, they acquitted the assailants because they could not conclude that they intended to deprive the victims of a federally protected right. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act would correct this deficiency by expanding the reach of federal jurisdiction to cover serious, violent bias crimes. Under the bill, hate crimes that cause death or bodily injury because of prejudice can be investigated federally, regardless of whether the victim was exercising a federally protected right. This legislation will also address inconsistencies in the coverage of current federal, state and local bias crime provisions. Current law does not permit federal involvement in a range of cases involving crimes motivated by bias against the victim's sexual orientation, gender or disability. This loophole is particularly significant given the fact that five states have no hate crime laws on the books, and another 21 states have extremely weak hate crimes laws. Our bill will expand the jurisdiction of federal law to cover sexual orientation, gender or disability, so the federal government will no longer be handicapped in its efforts to assist in the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. In addition, through an Intergovernmental Assistance Program, federal authorities will be able to provide technical, forensic or prosecutorial assistance to state and local law enforcement officials. In addition, the legislation authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to state and local law enforcement agencies that have incurred extraordinary expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act is endorsed by notable individuals and over 175 law enforcement, civil rights, civic and religious organizations, including: President Bush's Attorney General Dick Thornburgh; 22 State Attorney Generals; National Sheriffs' Association; International Association of Chiefs of Police; U.S. Conference of Mayors; Presbyterian Church; Episcopal Church; and the Parent's Network on Disabilities. Poll after poll continues to show that the American public supports hate crimes legislation, including legislation inclusive of sexual orientation. A new Kaiser Family Foundation poll released last month shows that 73 percent of Americans support hate crime legislation that includes sexual orientation. Passage of a comprehensive law banning hate violence is long overdue. It is a federal crime to hijack an automobile or to possess cocaine, and it ought to be a federal crime to drag a man to death because of his race or to hang a man because of his sexual orientation. These are crimes that shock and shame our national conscience and they should be subject to federal law enforcement assistance and prosecution.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. must change its current policy towards Haiti. We, as the standard bearers cannot allow Haiti to further sink into a financial and social mire. It has always been America's role to feed those who are hungry and clothe those who cannot clothe themselves. As we loosen our belts from our Thanksgiving feast, compare the fate of millions of Haitians to ourselves: According to the United Nations, sixty percent of Haiti's 8.2 million people are undernourished. The average number of calories available to Haitians per day is 1977, nearly half of the 3754 calories a U.S. resident gets, according to the World Health Organization. The Associated press recently published the following account of life in Haiti: I'll eat anything I can get,'' said Jean, 25, as he pulls an empty crab trap out of the polluted Port-Au-Prince Bay. On a good day, Jean can earn about $12 but often goes home empty handed. Pigs are raised on garbage and human waste, but their meat is too precious to be eaten by the impoverished residents. The pork is sold at the market for cheaper staples like cornmeal and rice that provides more days of nourishment. The current policy of the U.S. is contributing to the continued attrition of the quality of life of Haiti's people, which if left unchanged, could lead to horrendous outcomes for the western hemisphere's poorest people. We must address the current state of economic devastation. We must remove our blockade of essentially all aid to Haiti. The U.S. must stop using its veto power at the Inter-American Development Bank. This veto-prerogative is blocking development and humanitarian loans which covers a broad spectrum of critical social and economic priorities, such as health sector improvement, education reform, potable water enhancement and road rehabilitation. Presently, the U.S. is precluding the issuance of the following loans from being dispersed by the Inter-American Development Bank: 21.5 million--Education, 22.5 million--Health, 55 million--Roads, and 60.9 million--Water. The hold up of these loans is exasperating Haiti's current negative cash flow status with the Inter-American Development Bank. Although the Inter-American Development Bank is precluded from moving ahead with critical social and humanitarian loans, Haiti is still required to pay arrears payments and credit commissions on loans that it has not received. By the end of 2001, if nothing changes, Haiti will be in a negative cash flow position with the Inter-American Bank--paying more into the Bank than Haiti is receiving by approximately $10 million. Humanitarian and social indicators continue to drop dramatically. As well as, quality of life indicators, such as health and infant mortality, which continues to erode, devastating the humanitarian crisis creating a potentially devastating humanitarian crisis. The national rate of persons infected with HIV/AIDS is now 4 percent or 300,000 persons, creating 163,000 orphans; and 30,000 new cases per year. The infant mortality rate is 74 deaths out of every 1000 births; the doctor to patient ratio is 1.2 persons to 10,000 physicians; only 40 percent of the population has access to potable water; and 85 percent of adults are illiterate. On November 8, 2001 the Congressional Black Caucus, in its entirety, sent a letter to the President requesting to speak with him regarding this vital issue. We have not yet heard any response. Mr. President, we need to hear from you. We need to end the suffering of millions of innocent individuals, we need to continue to be the standard bearer in foreign policy. We must not waiver in our ability to look beyond our political differences and move forthrightly to help those in need. Mr. President, we must ask, ``Is the U.S. comfortable withholding these much needed Inter-American Bank loans from the millions of suffering Haitians in order to punish the Government of Haiti, especially at a time when the U.S. continues to aid other countries who have shown themselves to be much more villainous than Haiti?'' I think not, at least, I hope not.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the substitute and in opposition to the base bill. I do so because the legislation was hijacked by the Rules Committee, which turned a bipartisan insurance relief bill into yet another vehicle to enact a one-sided ``tort reform'' agenda. First and foremost, the base text totally eliminates punitive damages. If this passes, Congress would be saying to the future victims of terrorism that the most outrageous acts of gross negligence or intentional misconduct that lead to an act of terrorism are totally immune from punitive damages. Thus, if a baggage screening firm hires a known terrorist who allows a weapon to slip on board a plane, this bill would protect that company from liability. The base bill also federalizes each and every action involving terrorism, throwing more than 200 years of respect for federalism out the window. Even worse, the liability provisions bear little relationship to the issue of insurance. As a matter of fact, they would apply to cases where the negligent party may have no insurance coverage whatsoever. The bill even takes away all judicial review relating to the bureaucratic decision as to whether terrorism caused the injury, an unprecedented and very likely unconstitutional limitation on victims' rights. The underlying bill also would limit the ability of the victims of terrorism to collect non-economic damages. This says to innocent victims that damages from loss of consortium can be ignored and damages for victims who lose a limb or are forced to bear excruciating pain for the remainder of their lives are not as important as lost wages. Why Congress would want to prevent a grieving wife from obtaining monetary relief is beyond me, but that is exactly what this bill does. The bill goes on and on--comprising a veritable wish list of liability limitations. It mandates collateral source offsets, forcing victims to choose between seeking money from charities and pursuing a grossly negligent party in court. It caps attorneys' fees without providing any comparable limitation on defendant's fees. Amazingly, the legislation would criminalize the fee cap, subjecting lawyers to jail time. The bill also eliminates pre-judgment interest, which takes away any incentive for negligent parties to reach pre-trial settlements. All of these harmful provisions are being proposed in the complete absence of hearings or any committee consideration. If enacted, the tort provisions would constitute the most radical and one-sided liability limitations ever. I urge the Members to vote ``yes'' on the substitute, and ``no'' on final passage. Liability Limitation Provisions in H.R. 3210, the ``Terrorism Risk Protection Act'' (Prepared by the Democratic Staff of the House Judiciary Committee) Section 15 of H.R. 3210, the ``Terrorism Risk Protection Act,'' proposes new and unnecessary tort reforms that would be harmful to victims of terrorism. Specifically, the bill federalizes all terrorism liability cases, prohibits judicial review of decisions to federalize such cases, eliminates punitive damages, limits the amount of non-economic damages for which defendants (not just insurers or reinsurers) are liable, mandates collateral source offsets, and imposes caps on attorneys' fees. The following is a section-by-section of H.R. 3210, Section 15. Section 15. Litigation Management. Subsection (a). Federal Cause of Action for Claims Relating to Terrorist Acts. Section 15(a)(1)--In General: provides that, if the Secretary of the Treasury decides there has been one or more acts of terrorism, ``there shall exist a Federal cause of action, which, except as provided in subsection (b), shall be the exclusive remedy for claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from such acts of terrorism.'' This is a broadly-written provision that would limit victims' rights in every conceivable civil action--state or Federal--involving terrorism, even if the insurer is not a party to the action. In addition, the critical term ``act of terrorism'' is undefined within the text of the legislation and thus grants too much latitude to the Secretary to deem an event an ``act of terrorism'' and allow wrongdoers to benefit from this section. Section 15(a)(2)--Effect of Determination: provides that the Secretary's determinations under section 15(a)(1) shall not be subject to judicial review and shall take effect upon publication in the Federal Register. This provision raises two significant concerns. First, it is likely unconstitutional because the Constitution has been held to provide for judicial review of actions by the Executive. Second, denying judicial review of the Secretary's decisions would grant the Secretary wide latitude to make determinations about what events would constitute ``acts of terrorism,'' such that--as before--a hoax or practical joke could be designated an ``act of terrorism.'' Section 15(a)(3)--Substantive Law: states that an action under this section is governed by the law and choice of law principles of the state in which the terrorism occurred. Section 15(a)(4)--Jurisdiction: provides that the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation will designate one court and that court will have exclusive jurisdiction on all cases arising out of a particular terrorist event. Section 15(a)(5)--Limits on Damages: provides a number of limits on damages in actions brought for damages in connection with any type of civil action related to terrorism, not just those pertaining to commercial property and casualty insurance. These limitations on their face apply in every conceivable action--state or Federal--involving terrorism. In fact, the current version of the bill is worse than that reported by the Financial Services Committee because the earlier bill limited damages only in cases involving commercial property or casualty insurance; the current bill applies to any action related to terrorism, regardless of whether an insurance claim is involved. Section 15(a)(5)(A): would prohibit punitive damages and pre-judgment interest. Punitive damages are monetary damages awarded to plaintiffs in civil actions when a defendant's conduct has been found to flagrantly violate a plaintiff's rights. The standard for awarding punitive damages is set at the state level, but they are generally allowed only in cases of wanton, willful, reckless or malicious conduct. These damages are used to deter and punish particularly egregious conduct. Eliminating punitive damages totally undermines the deterrent and punishment function of the tort law. The threat of meaningful punitive damages is a major deterrent to wrongdoing, and eliminating punitive damages would severely undercut their deterrent value since reckless or malicious defendants could find it more cost effective to continue their callous behavior and risk paying small punitive damage awards. This means baggage screening firms would be protected from liability if they hired incompetent employees or deliberately failed to check for weapons and a terrorist act resulted. Pre-judgment interest liability is an added incentive to move the judicial process along because a delay would result in a penalty of added interest to the judgment. Without the threat of added interest payments, attorneys for defendants may be prone to delay proceedings because the real dollar value of a judgment amount would be reduced, making the judgment the same no matter how long the process. Limiting interest would unfairly affect the judgment award collected by the victims and leave them vulnerable to a delayed judicial process. Section 15(a)(5)(B): provides that a defendant will only be liable for non-economic damages in direct proportion to the percentage of the defendant's responsibility for the victim's harm and prohibits plaintiffs from recovering such non- economic damages unless the plaintiff suffered physical harm. This would alter common law rule of joint and several liability between defendants. Under the traditional rule, where more than one defendant is found liable, each defendant is held liable for the full amount of the damages. The justification for this is that it is better that a wrongdoer who can afford to do so pay more than its share, rather than an innocent victim obtain less than full recovery. Also, a defendant who pays more than its share of damages can seek contribution from the other defendants. By holding each defendant responsible only for its percentage of responsibility, this section would supersede state law by eliminating joint and several liability for non-economic damages in these actions. Also, the prohibition on non- economic damages unless physical harm is suffered raises significant concerns. Essentially, a spouse who suffers loss of consortium could not recover any non-economic damages. This is an unprecedented limitation on victims' rights. In addition, this provision would shift non-economic costs from wrongdoers to victims and discriminate against groups less likely to establish significant economic damages, such as women, children, minorities, seniors, and the poor. It is unconscionable to put more value on the loss of a job than on the loss of a limb, loss of the ability to have children, disfigurement, or other forms of non-economic harms. Also, eliminating joint and several liability for non-economic harms would discourage settlements and thus increase case loads and litigation costs. Section 15(a)(6)--Collateral Sources: requires that, for compensation of loss related to terrorism, a plaintiff's recovery must be offset by any funds received pursuant to any emergency or disaster relief program or any other collateral source. There are two problems with this provision. First, a reduction of a victim's award due to collateral source compensation would result in wrongdoers escaping their responsibility. This legislation subtracts any other potential sources of recovery the victim may have from any damages the wrongdoer should pay. Losses caused by negligence or wrongdoing would be shifted from liable defendants to the government, private insurers, or disaster relief organizations who made the ``collateral source'' payment. Second, the provision is too overreaching. The effect would be to require any funding given to the plaintiff, whether it be from health insurance payment or funds from a voluntary organization, be used to offset relief payments made by culpable defendants. Under this provision, funds received by a victim from the Red Cross must be used to offset relief payments and reduce a wrongdoer's liability. Section 15(a)(7)--Attorney Fees: provides that attorneys' fees shall be limited to twenty percent of either the damages ordered by a court or any court-approved settlement under this section. Any attorney who charges or receives fees in excess of twenty percent shall be fined not more than $2,000, imprisoned not more than on year, or both. Fee caps, which apply only to victims, result in less access to justice for lower-income populations. A payment ceiling or fee cap limits the economic incentive for attorneys to take on complex or difficult-to-prove claims under the contingency fee system; in turn, this would make it much more difficult for lower- income populations to secure good representation. Moreover, the threat of imprisonment is without precedent and could deter attorneys from providing assistance. Section 15(b)--Exclusion: provides that nothing in section 15 shall limit the liability of a person who attempts to commit, commits, participates, or is engaged in a conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism. Section 15(c)--Right of Subrogation: provides that the United States has the right of subrogation with respect to any claim it paid under this section. Section 15(d)--Relationship to Other Laws: states that nothing in section 15 shall affect either any party's contractual right to arbitrate a dispute, or any provision of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107-42). Section 15(e)--Satisfaction of Judgments from Frozen Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, and State Sponsors of Terrorism Section 15(e)(1)--In General: provides that, in any case in which a person obtains a judgment against a terrorist party, the frozen assets of that terrorist party or of any agency or instrumentality of that party shall be available for satisfaction of the judgment. This provision removes foreign sovereign immunity and is designed to ensure that victims of terrorism receive the compensation they are owed, even if the defendant is a foreign state. Section 15(e)(2)--Presidential Waiver: states that the President, on an asset-by-asset basis, can waive the requirements of subsection 15(e)(1) for any property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This waiver authority vitiates the protections for victims of state- sponsored terrorism provided for in subsection 15(e)(1). If the President can waive unilaterally any judgment for a victim, then victims could easily receive no compensation for their claims.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, since the April 3, 2001 introduction of H.R. 1343, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 199 members from both sides of the aisle have added their voices to the call for comprehensive legislation that will provide assistance to state and local law enforcement and amend federal law to streamline the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. The events of September 11th have demonstrated the destructive power of hate to rend the fabric of a community and a nation. Domestically, hate crimes statistics are a disturbing barometer of the state of the nation. In spite of national success in lowering overall crime rates, hate crimes have proven resistant to that trend. Data collected for 2000, pursuant to the 1990 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, documented 8,152 hate crimes, an increase of 3.5 percent from 1999 figures. Overall, racial bias accounted for 54.3 percent of incidents, with religious bias accounting for 16.5 percent, sexual orientation 16 percent and ethnicity 12.4 percent of incidents. Notably, anti-black bias accounted for 35.6 percent of all racial bias and anti-Semitism accounted for 75.5 percent of all religious bias incidents. In the wake of terrorist attacks, the Arab-American Anti- Discrimination Committee has investigated, documented and referred to federal authorities over 450 incidents. These incidents include the murders of a Muslim Pakistani store owner in Dallas, TX, and an Indian- American gas station owner in Mesa, AZ, where a suspect was arrested shouting, ``I stand for America all the way.'' The Department of Justice, however, has initiated only approximately 40 investigations of hate crimes directed against institutions or people of Arab or Middle-Eastern decent. As the James Byrd and Matthew Shepard tragedies suggest, the investigation and prosecution of this flood of hate crimes will strain the resources of state and local law enforcement agencies. Current law limits federal jurisdiction to federally protected activities, such as voting for even covered classes of persons, so all these incidents will not be subject to federal jurisdiction. Moreover, current law does not permit federal involvement in a range of cases involving crimes motivated by bias against the victim's sexual orientation, gender or disability. This loophole is particularly significant given the fact that ten states have no hate crime laws on the books, and another 21 states have extremely weak hate crimes laws. Our bill will remove these hurdles, so the federal government will no longer be handicapped in its efforts to assist in the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. Through an Intergovernmental Assistance Program, federal authorities will be able to provide technical, forensic or prosecutorial assistance to state and local law enforcement officials. In addition, the legislation authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to state and local law enforcement agencies that have incurred extraordinary expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001 is a constructive and measured response to a problem that continues to plague our nation--violence motivated by prejudice. It is vital that both government and individuals distinguish the beliefs of the Arab-American and Muslim communities from the perpetrators of September 11th's violence, and recognize that these Americans share our values and contribute significantly to our communities. All Americans should stand to condemn any acts of bigotry, violence or discrimination against Arab-Americans, South Asians and American Muslims and call upon Americans of every faith and heritage to stand together in this time of national crisis. Our sense of community with fellow Americans of Arab and South Asian decent and those of the Islamic faith should not be counted as another casualty of September 11th's senseless violence.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleague, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey), today to resurrect a bill that is almost ready to leave this body with 199 cosponsors. I want to thank the gentlewoman from California and also my colleagues that are joining her in this effort, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), and many others. Now, we have a hate crimes bill, my colleagues. What we need is some improvements that get through some old Federal jurisdictional hang-ups that have been around since about 1994. So join us in this last push. It is not too late.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am growing increasingly concerned about a series of recent actions taken by the Bush Administration which raise important constitutional and civil liberties issues. Many of these concerns are set forth in the attached letter I forwarded yesterday to Chairman Sensenbrenner requesting that the Judiciary Committee hold hearings on these matters, as well as an excellent editorial written today by William Safire of the New York Times. I am also attaching a copy of a letter I wrote last January detailing my opposition to the nomination of John Ashcroft as Attorney General. The Attorney General's recent actions threatening our civil liberties only reinforces the concerns mentioned in this letter. I also question the timing and need for the Attorney General's recent actions undermining Oregon's assisted suicide law and California's medical marijuana laws. Both of these actions raise very serious federalism issues (since they seek to overturn state enacted referendum) and separation of powers issues (since the authorities were each the subject of failed legislation in recent congresses). Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, Jan. 31, 2001. Dear Democratic Senator: I am writing to inform you that as the Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee and the Senior Member of the Congressional Black Caucus, I am unalterably opposed to John Ashcroft's nomination to be Attorney General of the United States. I have reached this decision with much regret and great consternation. In my 36 years in Congress, I have never before publicly opposed a nominee for Attorney General. However, in the present case, my reservations about Senator Ashcroft's ability and inclination to support and uphold the law in such critical areas as civil rights, reproductive choice, and gun safety are so grave, and his pattern of misleading and disingenuous responses at his confirmation hearing so serious, that I believe it is in the national interest that his nomination be withdrawn, or be rejected by the Senate. I am also concerned that Senator Ashcroft's personal lack of responsiveness to me foreshadows a pattern of conscious avoidance or, at best, benign neglect, of me and my Democratic colleagues in the House. I have several specific concerns in the area of civil rights. First, I am troubled by the fact that notwithstanding Senator Ashcroft's general statements about support for civil rights enforcement, he declined to state specific agreement with the Department's positions in a host of civil rights cases, including its support of the University of Michigan's affirmative action program, a position that was recently ratified by a federal court. Also, with regard to equal rights in the area of education, I am dismayed that Senator Ashcroft has taken public positions opposing voluntary school desegregation. Unfortunately, Senator Ashcroft's testimony at his confirmation hearing with regard to this matter only served to compound my reservations. For example, he asserted, in response to written questions from Senator Kennedy, that the state had ``done nothing wrong'' and was ``found guilty of no wrong'' in the Missouri desegregation cases. However, there were two separate federal courts of appeal decisions and numerous district court decisions holding the state expressly responsible for the unconstitutional discrimination that occurred. Similarly, I remain profoundly disappointed in the manner by which Senator Ashcroft thwarted Judge Ronnie White's nomination to be a federal district court judge, the first African American justice ever to serve on the Missouri Supreme Court. As I have previously written to him, I believe Senator Ashcroft grossly mischaracterized and distorted a good man's record in this case. Senator Ashcroft's unwillingness at his confirmation hearing to acknowledge or express a scintilla of regret for the manner in which he orchestrated Judge White's defeat can hardly be seen as a promising omen to those of us in the African American community who have worked so hard to integrate the federal judiciary. I also believe Senator Ashcroft has not been forthright in describing the reasons for his opposition to the nomination of James Hormel to become the ambassador to Luxembourg. When Senator Leahy asked the nominee to explain the reasons for his opposition to Hormel, he referred, without elaboration, to the ``totality of [Hormel's] record.'' When Senator Leahy again asked Senator Ashcroft in a written question to ``specify the factors that led you to oppose [Hormel],'' he failed to do so, stating merely that his opposition was based ``on the totality of Mr. Hormel's record of public positions and advocacy.'' To this day, Senator Ashcroft has failed to provide a single specific reason for opposing Hormel other than his sexual orientation. The cause of civil rights for all Americans also has not been well-served by Senator Ashcroft's granting an interview with Southern Partisan and then implying that slavery was something other than a ``perverted agenda.'' I also cannot accept his explanation at his hearing that he was unaware of the magazine's extreme and racist positions when he granted the interview. (It is especially implausible given Senator Ashcroft's explicit endorsement of the Journal's agenda when he said that it ``helps set the record straight''--this from a journal that has published articles arguing that slavery was beneficial for black families.) Second, given Senator Ashcroft's past record and statements at the hearings, I do not find his apparent acknowledgment of a woman's constitutional right to an abortion as settled law under Roe and Casey as being at all credible. I say this because in 42 out of 43 Senate votes concerning reproductive rights, he cast a vote aimed at overturning Roe v. Wade. In addition, in his written answers to a question from Senator Kennedy, the nominee replied that he would defend federal legislation outlawing so-called partial-birth abortion, even though the Supreme Court has already declared unconstitutional virtually identical legislation under those very cases. Also, when Senator Leahy asked Senator Ashcroft to justify his sponsorship of the Human Life Act of 1998, he responded that ``[a]s introduced, [the legislation] is not constitutional under Roe and Casey.'' If Senator Ashcroft is willing to introduce admittedly unconstitutional legislation in Congress, notwithstanding his oath, his assurances provide little comfort that he will not defend blatantly unconstitutional policies or legislation designed to undermine this settled law as Attorney General. Thirdly, with regard to Senator Aschcroft's record of opposition to gun control legislation, I remain unconvinced that he is the appropriate person to uphold and enforce our nation's firearms laws. I find little solace in the fact that in response to Senator Schumer's question as to whether he supports the Brady law, Senator Aschcroft merely stated that ``[t]he President has indicated that he supports this law, and I support his position on this matter.'' Such a weak answer is particularly troubling in light of Senator Ashcroft's written response to Senator Leahy, in which he acknowledged his disagreement with ``some of the policy prescriptions that Mr. [Jim] Brady has advocated''; Senator Ashcroft's past wholehearted embrace of an extreme view of the Second Amendment; his active support for legislation in Missouri that would allow individuals to carry concealed weapons; and his unwillingness to commit to relinquish his membership in the NRA, which has sought to undermine almost every federal gun safety law that is on the books, in advance of his confirmation. Finally, I am severely disappointed by the fact that Senator Ashcroft failed to meet with me or respond to any of my written questions to him, despite his personal request to me that I refrain from taking a position on his nomination until we met. This is problematic to me because in addition to delaying my taking a position on the very important matter of Senator Ascroft's nomination, I do not believe he has been forthright in explaining why he has failed to respond to my questions. (For example, in Senator Ashcroft's written response to a question from Senator Carl Levin asking whether the nominee had answered my letter, Senator Ashcroft wrote that my letter, ``though written on January 12, was only received by me on January 17.'' I do not understand how this could be. To ensure that he would receive my letter immediately, my staff contacted the Bush-Cheney Transition Office, informed a transition official there that my letter to Senator Ashcroft was forthcoming, and was instructed to fax the letter to a telephone number reserved for facsimile communications from Members of Congress. We have confirmation that the fax was received at 4:02 p.m. on January 12, one week before the conclusion of Senator Ashcroft's confirmation hearing and before he received any written questions from the Senate. Even though his responses to the questions from the Senate were filed last Friday, January 26, I still have yet to receive any response from Senator Ashcroft, notwithstanding the fact that he wrote to Senator Levin that it was his intent to turn to the questions posed by me following the submission of his written answers tot he Senators.) In sum, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that Senator Ashcroft is the wrong man for the job at the wrong time. When our nation urgently needs an Attorney General who can bring us all together, we have been offered a person known for extreme right wing positions and divisiveness. I have spent my entire career fighting for the cause of civil rights, reproductive choice, and common sense crime and gun safety laws. In my view, Senator Ashcroft's record is simply too inconsistent with these goals to justify my support for him. Sincerely, John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Member.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce today the ``Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports Act''--better known as the ``FANS Act''. After one of the greatest World Series of all time that gave a much needed boost to the entire Country, I was shocked by Major League Baseball's decision just two days later to eliminate two teams as early as December 15th of this year. This is why it is imperative that Congress move quickly on the FANS Act to insure that anti-competitive decisions by Major League Baseball concerning the elimination or relocation of teams are subject to the antitrust laws like all other professional sports and businesses. I want to make clear that the particular modifications to the antitrust laws made by the FANS Act is not intended to imply that baseball's antitrust exemption currently exists beyond the scope of the court's decision in Piazza v. Major League Baseball. Any time 30 of the wealthiest and most influential individuals get together behind closed doors and agree to reduce output, that cannot be a good thing for anyone but the monopolists. If GM and Ford got together and jointly agreed to cut production, people would be outraged. That is exactly what baseball has done. In 1922 the Supreme court erroneously held that baseball was a ``game'' that did not involve ``interstate commerce'' and was therefore beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court upheld the exemption in a case brought in 1972 by Curt Flood, one of the greatest players of his time. But now that professional baseball is a $3 Billion annual business and the time has long since passed when it can be contended that baseball does not constitute ``interstate commerce.'' This is why in 1998, I led the way in repealing the exemption as it applies to labor disputes, in the well named ``Curt Flood Act''--now it is time to finish the job. The elimination of baseball teams from a particular city, be it Minnesota, Montreal or Florida, will result in the loss of millions of dollars in revenue to the local economy and the loss of thousands of jobs. Not just the jobs of baseball players, but the jobs of ticket takers, food vendors, security personnel, and numerous others. A little competition is good for everyone. If the antitrust laws can apply to major league football, basketball, and hockey, there is not a reason in the world they cannot apply to major league baseball. Let's level the playing field once and for all.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, since the April 3, 2001 introduction of H.R. 1343, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 199 members from both sides of the aisle have added their voices to the call for comprehensive legislation that will provide assistance to state and local law enforcement and amend federal law to streamline the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. The events of September 11th have demonstrated the destructive power of hate to rend the fabric of a community and a nation. Domestically, hate crimes statistics are a disturbing barometer of the state of the nation. In spite of national success in lowering overall crime rates, hate crimes have proven resistant to that trend. Data collected for 2000, pursuant to the 1990 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, documented 8152 hates crimes, an increase of 3.5 percent from 1999 figures. Overall, racial bias accounted for 54.3 percent of incidents, with religious bias accounting for 16.5 percent, sexual orientation 16 percent and ethnicity 12.4 percent of incidents. Notably, anti-black bias accounted for 35.6 percent of all racial bias and anti-Semitism accounted for 75.5 percent of all religious bias incidents. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the Arab-American Anti- Discrimination Committee has investigated, document and referred to federal authorities over 450 incidents. These incidents include the murders of an a Muslim Pakistani store owner in Dallas, TX, and an Indian-American gas station owner in Mesa, AZ, where a suspect was arrested shouting, ``I stand for America all the way.'' The Department of Justice, however, has initiated only approximately 40 investigations of hate crimes directed against institutions or people of Arab or Middle-Eastern decent. As the James Byrd and Matthew Shepard tragedies suggest, the investigation and prosecution of this flood of hate crimes will strain the resources of state and local law enforcement agencies. Current law limits federal jurisdiction to federally protected activities, such as voting for even covered classes of persons, so all these incidents will not be subject to federal jurisdiction. Moreover, current law does not permit federal involvement in a range of cases involving crimes motivated by bias against the victim's sexual orientation, gender or disability. This loophole is particularly significant given the fact that ten states have no hate crime laws on the books, and another 21 states have extremely weak hate crimes laws. Our bill will remove these hurdles, so the federal government will no longer be handicapped in its efforts to assist in the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. Through an Intergovernmental Assistance Program, federal authorities will be able to provide technical, forensic or prosecutorial assistance to state and local law enforcement officials. In addition, the legislation authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to state and local law enforcement agencies that have incurred extraordinary expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001 is a constructive and measured response to a problem that continues to plague or nation--violence motivated by prejudice. It is vital that both government and individuals distinguish the beliefs of the Arab-American and Muslim communities from the perpetrators of September 11th's violence, and recognize that these Americans share our values and contribute significantly to our communities. All Americans should stand to condemn any acts of bigotry, violence or discrimination against Arab-Americans, South Asians and American Muslims and call upon Americans of every faith and heritage to stand together in this time of national crisis. Our sense of community with fellow Americans of Arab and South Asian decent and those of the Islamic faith should not be counted as another casualty of September 11th's senseless violence.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, we all know that the Patent and Trademark Office is crucial to America's economy, reviewing technologies and granting patents on thousands of new inventions every year. And this year along has seen a thirteen percent rise in patent applications. We also know the PTO is losing resources and cannot handle the increased workload. The PTO takes no money from taxpayers; instead, it is fully funded by user fees, generating $1 billion per year. Unfortunately, appropriators and the administration treat the PTO like a savings and loan and divert its money every year for other government programs. To date, over $600 million in fees has been diverted since 1992. This coming year alone, the appropriators are taking $200 million. Not surprisingly, this diversion is taking its toll. The PTO cannot hire or retain qualified patent examiners with advanced scientific degrees; they prefer the more lucrative salaries in the private sector. The PTO also cannot update its computer systems to thoroughly search databases of information and determine whether patent applications really disclose new and nonobvious inventions; this makes it that more likely for the PTO to issue a bad patent. Finally, just a few years ago it took the PTO 19.5 months to rule on a patent application; it now takes 26 months, and is expected to be 38.6 months by 2006. At that rate, inventions will be obsolete before they're patented. We cannot let the PTO and American inventors continue to suffer this way. H.R. 2047--introduced by Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Berman, and myself--resolves the problem by letting the PTO keep all of its fiscal year 2002 fees. It also lets the PTO use some of its money to modernize its electronic filing systems. The bill finally requires the PTO to develop a five-year strategic plan explaining what resources it needs to better serve its customers. This plan will make it easier for Congress to make future oversight decisions. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the manager's amendment and in support of the Democratic Substitute. Airport security is a legitimate federal responsibility. Just as we protect our borders, guard against smuggling, and protect against illegal drugs, we must also protect our citizens against terrorists who board our planes and travel our skies with guns, knives, and bombs. However, the Manager's amendment does not accomplish this. Instead, this amendment expands the provision that we already passed, limiting liability for airlines that were used by terrorists on September 11, 2001 and applies that provision to ``any person liable for any damages arising out of the hijacking.'' This would limit the liability of everyone, including an airport security company that allowed terrorists to get on a plane with box cutters. Even worse, the liability provisions go far beyond the protections included in the airline bailout bill we passed in September. This is because the amendment totally bans punitive damages, eliminates prejudgment interest, mandates collateral source, and limits victims' attorneys' fees. All of this was done without the benefit of a single hearing or any consideration by the Judiciary Committee. And all of this harms the victims. Members should know that these provisions are far more extreme than the liability relief requested by the supposed beneficiaries of the provisions--the owners of the World Trade Center and the airplane manufacturers. This amendment is too broad, benefits the wrongdoers, and would have a number of harmful and unintended consequences for victims of terrorism. Please vote no on the manager's amendment and support the Democratic Substitute. Passing this manager's amendment constitutes special interest legislating at its worst. It is wrong and I urge the Members to reject it.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Manager's amendment and in support of the Democratic substitute. Airport security is a legitimate federal responsibility. Just as we protect our borders, guard against smuggling, and protect against illegal drugs, we must also protect our citizens against terrorists who board our planes and travel our skies with guns, knives, and bombs. However, the Manager's amendment does not accomplish this. Instead, this amendment expands the provision that we already passed, limiting liability for airlines that were used by terrorists on September 11, 2001 and applies that provision to ``any person liable for any damages arising out of the hijacking.'' This would limit the liability of everyone, including an airport security company that allowed terrorists to get on a plane with box cutters. Even worse, the liability provisions go far beyond the protections included in the airline bailout bill we passed in September. This is because the amendment totally bans punitive damages, eliminates prejudgment interest, mandates collateral source, and limits victims' attorneys' fees. All of this was done without the benefit of a single hearing or any consideration by the Judiciary Committee. And all of this harms the victims. Members should know that these provisions are far more extreme that the liability relief requested by the supposed beneficiaries of the provisions--the owners of the World Trade Center and the airplane manufacturers. This amendment is too broad, benefits the wrongdoers, and would have a number of harmful and unintended consequences for victims of terrorism. Please vote no on the manager's amendment and support the Democratic Substitute. Passing this manager's amendment constitutes special interest legislating at its worst. It is wrong and I urge the Members to reject it. Attached is a section-by-section description of the liability limitation provision in Managers amendment: On September 22, 2001, the ``Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act'' was signed into law by the President. In addition to providing federal assistance to the airline industry, it provided for a two track liability system. The first track creates a victim compensation fund, which provides victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist- related aircraft crashes at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or site of the aircraft crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, with compensation. Specifically, the legislation authorizes a Special Master, appointed by the Attorney General, to review claims, within 120 days, submitted by claimants. Negligence is not required to be established to obtain compensation under this track. Funds for this victim compensation fund are taken derived from authorized funds from the federal government. The second track is available to persons who elect not to pursue the victim compensation fund. These individuals can pursue a more traditional tort claim based on negligence. But if the claim is against American or United Airlines, it must be brought in the District Court of the Southern District of New York, where all the cases are to be consolidated. In these cases, liability is limited to the amount of available insurance. The Manager's amendment does not disturb the Victim's Compensation Fund. However, it does amend the second track to expand the number of companies eligible to benefit from the liability limitations available described above and to add new limitations, namely eliminating punitive damages, eliminating prejudgment interest, mandating collateral source and capping victims attorneys fees. The following is a more detailed summary of the Section 201 of the Manager's Amendment. Limiting liability for unnamed and unknowable parties (section 408 (a)) The amendment would expand current law from limiting the liability of air carriers to limiting the liability of ``any person'' liable for any damages arising out of the September 11, 2001 hijacking and crashes. Under this new provision, the Federal government is asked to go far beyond the two named defendants that it currently protects in the Air System Stabilization Act (United Airlines and American Airlines). In fact, this provision requires the government to assume liability for ``unnamed parties'' including possible bad actors. Although this new amendment would provide coverage for those who have asked for and may well warrant relief (such as the owner of the World Trade Center and the Boeing Corporation), it would also limit the liability of the screening companies whose negligence may have allowed the hijackers to enter the aircrafts with weapons. This expansion of the legislation would allow hundreds of unknown parties to have protection against liability whether the protection is warranted or not. At a minimum, those eligible for limited liability should be identified, their insurance coverage ascertained, and the need for this protection substantiated. As a result, this bill shifts untold amounts of liability to the federal government with no substantiation. limits on damages (section 4088 (b)(4)) The amendment would impose a new limitation on damages injured victims can recover by stating that a party of the action is not liable beyond the amount of its insurance. The bill also specifically provides that any responsible defendant shall not be held responsible for (1) punitive damages or (2) interest prior to the judgment. It also limits the amount of recovery an injured plaintiff can receive by subtracting from the award any amounts the plaintiff may have received from other wrongdoers (collateral source). (1) Punitive damages are monetary damages awarded to plaintiffs in civil actions when a defendant's conduct has been found to flagrantly violate a plaintiff's rights. The standard for awarding punitive damages is set at the state level, but is generally allowed only in cases of wanton, willful, reckless or malicious conduct. These damages are used to deter and punish particularly egregious conduct. Eliminating punitive damages totally undermines the deterrent and punishment function of the tort law. The threat of meaningful punitive damages is a major deterrent to wrongdoing, and eliminating punitive damages would severely undercut their deterrent value since reckless or malicious defendants could find it more cost effective to continue their callous behavior and risk paying small punitive damage awards. If a baggage screening company hired a felon, the company could normally be held liable for punitive damages. However, this proposed provision could remove the ability of a victim to make such a claim. (2) Interest payments are an added incentive to move the judicial process along because a delay would result in a penalty of added interest to the judgment. Without the threat of added interest payments defendant attorneys may be prone to delay proceedings because the real dollar value of a judgment amount would be reduced, making the judgment the same no matter how long the process. Both Virginia and New York law allow for pre-judgment interest in certain cases. Limiting interest would unfairly affect the judgment award collected by the victims and leave them vulnerable to a delayed judicial process. (3) Collateral source reduction would mandate the reduction of the amount of the victims' award by collateral source compensation received by the claimant or that the claimant may be entitled to, such as health or disability insurance. Neither New York nor Virginia require the court to reduce an award by collateral source compensation. There are two problems with this change: First, a reduction of a victims award due to collateral source compensation would result in wrongdoers escaping their responsibility. This amendment subtracts any other potential sources of recovery the victim may have from any damages the wrongdoer should pay. Losses caused by negligence or wrongdoing would be shifted from liable defendants to the government or private insurers who made the ``collateral source'' payment. Second, the amendment does not require that the victim is actually able to collect from the insurance policy or other collateral source for the wrongdoer to escape responsibility. The amendment only requires that the victim be entitled to recovery from some other source. Caps on attorneys' fees (section 408(b)(5)) This provision limits victims attorneys' fees by making them subject to court discretion and by limiting the amount charged to 20 percent of the damages ordered by the court or the settlement. An attorney who violates this limitation will be fined up to $2000, imprisoned for a year, or both. Neither New York nor Virginia allow attorneys' fee caps. Instead, those states require a lawyer's fee to be reasonable. Fee caps result in less access to justice for lower income populations. A payment ceiling or fee cap limits the economic incentive for attorneys to take on complex or difficult-to- prove claims under the contingency fee system. In turn, this would make it much more difficult for lower income populations to secure good representation. Further, this proposal is one-sided because it only applies to plaintiffs' attorneys. It is blatantly unfair to allow defendants to spend unlimited amounts of money on representation while plaintiffs, even when dealing with the same legal issues, are severely limited in how much they can spend. One way disclaimer (section 408(d)) This amendment provides a disclaimer which states that nothing in the section implies that a person is liable for damages arising out of the hijacking and crashes of September 11, 2001. The language in the amendment as written is one- sided. If it was neutral, it would provide that nothing in the section implies that a person is liable or not liable for damages arising out of the September 11, 2001 hijacking and crashes. This is illustrative of the overall problem with the amendment--it is written from a totally one-sided perspective to benefit defendants with little regard for victims.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my brother and friend on the Committee on Rules for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, the manager's amendment should be opposed and we should support the Democratic substitute, because the limits on legal liability here are a little bit amazing. Legislation designed to enhance airport security would end up harming victims and rewarding the very firms whose negligence has contributed to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Mr. Speaker, the amendment does this by providing liability relief to any person liable for any damages arising out of the September 11 hijacking. What does that mean? The baggage screening firms would be protected from liability if they hired incompetent employees or deliberately failed to check for weapons. Where is the justice in that? I urge Members to consider liability provisions that go far beyond the protections included in the airline bailout bill we passed.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I am inserting into the Record a letter to me from Mr. Lamont Dozier, a fellow Detroiter who rose to the top of his profession as an award-winning songwriter, artist, and producer. In fact, Mr. Dozier has been so successful that his career has lasted for more than four decades, including a stint as a songwriter for Motown Records with the team of Holland-Dozier-Holland. That success, however, did not come easily. Most people usually think of the singer or group who performed the song, not the songwriter or composer who wrote it. We easily remember the Supremes and Phil Collins when we hear ``Baby Love,'' ``Stop in the Name of Love,'' or ``Two Hearts.'' But if we look closely at the liner notes on the albums for those songs, we see songwriting credits for none other than Lamont Dozier. The Supremes and Phil Collins could never have had those hits had it not been for Mr. Dozier and his creativity. In fact, through his artistic genius, we can understand the notion (to use the words of Frances W. Preston, President and CEO of Broadcast Music, Inc.) that ``it all starts with a song.'' In his letter, Mr. Dozier explains the importance of copyrights, royalties, and performance rights organizations. The Copyright Act gives to songwriters the exclusive rights over the public performance and distribution of their copyrighted works--their songs--whether by traditional or more modern forms of transmission. That means that a songwriter gets paid every time a song is played publicly over the radio, television, or by some other means or sells via record or CD. Once an album no longer sells like it used to, the payments for public performances are the only money that a songwriter, like Mr. Dozier, can rely on. Because individual songwriters cannot possibly patrol all the communications media--radio, television, Internet, etc.--for performances of their work, they join performing rights organizations (i.e., BMI, SESAC, and ASCAP) to administer their rights. These organizations provide a ``blanket'' license for the performance of musical works for all types of transmissions and subsequently provide payments to songwriters. I am certain that Mr. Dozier speaks for many songwriters when he notes that he ``wouldn't be able to survive'' or support his family without the performance royalties. Mr. Dozier so eloquently describes the importance of intellectual property and royalties, that I felt compelled to make public his words so that, like his songs, everyone could benefit from them. September 28, 2001. Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515 Dear Congressman Conyers: I am writing this letter to you on behalf of myself, along with millions of other songwriters who have asked me to be their voice for certain judicial matters regarding songwriters and performance royalties. As I am certain you are aware, I am a member of the Detroit songwriting trio, Holland-Dozier-Holland, whose hit songs were written in the 1960's, and those songs today, still remain the tapestry of our country's music, as they are referred to by millions of listeners, as ``feel good music'', and right now more than ever, we all need ``feel good music''. Along with the accolades, many awards have been given to me for writing these songs that have in the past sold millions of records, but the most important compensation I have received, is the performance royalties, which through my performing rights society, BMI, have been the life's blood of me and my extended family. For over forty-five years, I have been a practicing songwriter who has had some hit songs, and then who has not had some hit songs. When record sales have dried up because age plays a factor in product that sells, or incorrect accountings from Record Companies prevent any payments, the only money that I have been able to count on is from my still current performance royalties which my family lives on from check to check. Because I still write everyday, I still hope to have more songs that will create sales and air plays, but in the last several years I have not been lucky enough to make the charts again. However, my older songs are still popular with listeners around the world who choose to listen to certain radio stations that still play these songs. If it were not for those listeners, and BMI sending me those checks, I would not be able to support my mother, brother and sisters in Detroit, my wife and our three children, and to continue to exist in this world with any dignity even though I am not as in demand as a songwriter-producer today at age 60 as I was back in the 1960's. If our performance royalties were taken away, it would be in my mind and in the minds of my millions of colleagues, an injustice in our legal system. For we have all worked for years and years and years to provide our country and other countries in the world with positive music to help enhance their lives. Yes, we have been paid for our services, and just like a pension, which a man receives for 40 years of work on an assembly line at a factory, we, too, are due our royalties . . . especially since the record sales, or as referred to in the music industry, ``the mechanicals'' have all but fallen through to nothing with new artist record albums, with internet activity and the downloading of songs, and just the fact that my songs appeal to a certain age bracket of baby-boomers who may not buy the old time record albums anymore, but who still like and enjoy listening to the many radio stations that still play these songs. I am forever grateful to these radio stations, their listeners, and to BMI, and to you Congressman Conyers, for helping over the many years to see that songwriters like me are still able to rely upon the earnings from our works to support our families, for without these earnings, I wouldn't even know what kind of job I could do, because all of my life I have worked at being a songwriter, and ever since I was able to get my family and myself out of the Jeffrey Projects in Detroit, Michigan, at the age of 16 years old, I have been writing songs and making a living writing songs. Performance income is now the only living that I do earn, although I keep trying to write new songs and try to place them on the likes of Britney Spears and Nsync and Whitney Houston, but perhaps my time has been and gone, and younger songwriters, with their mastery of song and productions, and with their ears more to the streets, have captured these younger artists and modern record companies run by young executives, who don't even know my name hardly recall my contribution in music. Still, if it weren't for BMI and performance income, my family would be destitute. We are not receiving any income from mechanicals or sales, as one would call it, only air play. It's not that I am lazy and just sit back and wait for the checks. I try to earn money singing the songs I have made famous for others, but the work is hardly there for a sixty year old man who was never known as a singer, still I try. I still spend money as a self-employed songwriter, in the writing and recording of song demos for new songs and send them out in the hope that someone will like the new ones enough to record them in order to be able to be on the charts again, have current hit songs, breathe new life into my waning career, and have record ``mechanical'' sales and more air play, as I still have three children to put through school who live under my roof, and the usual lifestyle responsibilities that every citizen of the United States has. Perhaps my way of receiving my income seems ``glamorous'' to those that don't understand the business that I am in, as a still practicing songwriter. It is not glamorous to send out several songs a month, and face rejection of those songs, to hear back that you are ``old school'', and to still get up every morning and sit down at the piano and come up with pretty melodies and nice lyrics, and try try again! I am thick-skinned, but still it gets to me. If our performance royalties were to be discontinued, I wouldn't be able to survive, neither would all of the people I support, and millions of families just like mine, who rely on their life's works to provide income to them while providing enjoyment to others. Without performance income and BMI, I would be a man with no dignity, who would be homeless and forgotten for my contributions to our country and my contributions world-wide for the songs I wrote that broke down racial barriers and touched people all over the world who know how to sing the songs, even though English is not their first language. This is what makes me exist, and it is with this, that I am able to get up every morning, raise my children to be people with integrity and to urge them to contribute wisely to our country, It is going to take a lot for each and every one of us to keep the faith, and to teach the young ones to be strong and positive. I feel that my music has done that for all of these years, and I feel that I deserve to be compensated for my contributions to millions of lives, even if they are not buying my old records, just listening to my old songs on radio stations that play my music. Again, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for taking the time to read my letter, and I hope that it will help you in your crusade to enlighten those who need to know ``what it is like to be a sixty year old songwriter'' who needs to live on BMI performance income. Very sincerely yours, Lamont Herbert Dozier, Holland-Dozier-Holland.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. I would like to make it clear, Members of the House, that I am very proud of the results that have come out with reference to money laundering because we dropped the administration proposal that would have eliminated due process safeguards that would have prevented RICO liability for tobacco companies, and I am very proud of that. My reservations that continue as we end tonight's debate is on the bill and the issues that came out of the House Committee on the Judiciary. And I thank my colleague for yielding.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman from Wisconsin in any position to assure Members of the House that there will be a conference on this measure?