John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson), for his effort. If he thinks that the president is not going to continue his veto over this legislation because of this amendment, then I am afraid he has another thought coming, because this is too little and too late. This amendment falls well short and offers far too much protection for drug dealers, polluters, copyright infringers, and other types of misconduct. I am going to explain how and why that is. First of all, the carve- out is purely discretionary with the court. The court does not have to do this, I say to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan), it is up to them, so the damage cap may apply or the damage cap may not apply. A judge that may be considered pro-defendant in legal circles would have total discretion to render the Rogan-Hutchinson amendment to be a nullity. Second, the amendment fails to safeguard the wide variety of civil statutes on the books which authorize punitive damages and which are based on far less stringent evidentiary requirements than set forth in the amendment. State laws frequently permit award of punitive damages against businesses based on more lenient evidence standards. So in some areas we may be of marginal help, but in other areas we are not helping at all. For example, in Illinois, the Drug Dealer Liability Act authorizes punitive damages against corporations participating in illegal drug markets, which would be overturned by the legislation. Florida has an environmental liability law which provides for treble damages in private actions against unlawful pollution or discharge, which would also be overturned by this bill. The last thing we would want to be doing is creating further legal obstruction to bring drug dealers and corporate polluters to justice. I do not think that this is intentionally set about as an objective, but still, this is the result. It is another example of intent to do well versus the results of what happens when this measure is put into practice. The copyright law, let us look at this. Plaintiffs are entitled to receive up to $150,000 in penalties where the defendant acted willfully, which is a much lower standard than is put forth in the Hutchinson amendment. The standard for Hutchinson is ``specific intent,'' so the gentleman is making it harder to get those people that may be acting in violation of copyright law. This is a current major issue in litigation over the I Crave TV web site, a foreign firm which is accused of stealing copyrighted television signals and airing them on the Internet. Unfortunately, the legislation continues to severely minimize liability for copyright theft and harm of all our Nation's intellectual property owners. Finally, even in the ordinary tort context there are numerous examples of misconduct which should be subject to punitive damages, but which will never meet the ``specific intent'' standard set forth in the amendment. Example: What about the trucking companies? Three hundred thousand trucking companies, most of which have less than 25 employees, would be shielded for punitive damages for flagrant highway accidents, even if they violate State regulations and injure or kill drivers or passengers. This is of particular concern to all of us who are concerned about highway safety. So I sympathize, I say to the gentleman from Arkansas, with what the gentleman is trying to do with the amendment, but it falls short. It does not go far enough. It will not protect us from a presidential veto, which has happened before in this kind of case, and it is not the kind of thing that we would want to have happen in terms of giving protection to drug dealers, polluters, copyright infringers, and other types of misconduct.

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS. Of course they would. Criminal sales of guns to felons would be caught by the protective provisions supposedly going to protect small businesses, mom and pop stores. We have heard mom and pop all day. These gun manufacturers are not mom and pop stores. Our definition would not put them out of business. All it would do is it would apply to all of those that have revenues in excess of $5 million a year. If they have revenues smaller than $5 million a year, they would enjoy the protections. So this is not an antigun, all-guns-are- evil argument in which I have to refer to a constitutional provision. I am merely trying to take these gun manufacturers out of the protections that the gentleman from California is inadvertently giving them in trying to protect so-called small business. Mr. Chairman, I include the following letter for the Record: Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, February 16, 2000. Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. Dear Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Conyers: On behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council's over 400,000 members, I am writing to you to ask you to oppose passage of H.R. 2366, the ``Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2000,'' because of the adverse effects that it would have on enforcement of environmental protection statutes and private causes of action against those who violate the law. The bill is objectionable in its current form and would remain objectionable even if the two proposed Rogan amendments are approved. While the purpose of the bill appears to be to limit the liability of small businesses for ``punitive damages'' in personal injury and other tort lawsuits, the language is sufficiently broad to impact federal, state, and citizen environmental enforcement actions. For example, the definition of ``noneconomic loss'' in Section 102 is broad enough to include environmental degradation or even environmental catastrophes. There is no definition of ``punitive damages'' in the bill, and that term could be interpreted to apply to civil penalties or fines, and even treble damages--all of which are punitive in nature. Thus, this bill could allow companies and individuals to violate environmental laws with impunity, encouraging recalcitrant behavior. It could be interpreted to supersede specifically-enacted provisions designed to ensure adequate punishment and deterrence for serious environmental violations, including long-term noncompliance with statutes protecting public health and the environment resulting in serious environmental harm. Moreover, it could prohibit federal and state trustees from recovering natural resource damages under a number of environmental statutes. The bill also could prevent whistle- blowers from recovering damages under certain federal environmental laws, including those that ensure safe drinking water. In addition, victims of lead paint poisoning will be less able to protect themselves. It would also restrict punitive damage recovery for violations of clean up orders under Section 107(c)(3) of CERCLA, which specifically provides for a punitive damage recovery against those who fail to comply with such orders. Removing the possibility of treble damages for failure to comply with such orders would encourage companies to delay compliance and instead hire attorneys to challenge those orders. Delay and wasteful litigation would result. This bill would not only interfere with citizen's right to bring enforcement actions to clean up their local waters and air and prevent future violations, but could also stop families from obtaining adequate compensation from severe pollution that makes them sick. The bill does not even contain an exemption for conduct that results in death. Families should be able to obtain all the damages to which they are entitled under current law when their health is destroyed by the negligence of a small business as well as by a large one. This bill could end up protecting small businesses at the expense of injured families. For these reasons, the proposed amendments cannot repair the harm that would result from this bill, and I respectfully urge you to oppose this bill. Sincerely, Nancy Stoner, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council.

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to tell the gentleman from California how shocked I am to hear the last statements that he has uttered. He has been very calm and polite and generous in his discussion. But to say that we are naming gun manufacturers as evil and giving me instructions to go to a constitutional amendment to stop them is, of course, deliberately missing the point. We are not trying to hurt gun manufacturers. The Saturday night special is a faulty weapon. The gentleman is on the Committee on the Judiciary. He is a former member of the court. He is an attorney who has practiced law. The Saturday night special is not a protected weapon. It frequently is found to be a malfunctioning, dangerous weapon. We are not trying to put the gun dealers out of business. But for him to stand here and tell me that he is not going to help them by limiting their liability where they may be negligent is an incredible statement on his part. He imposes the cap on punitive recovery. He imposes the elimination of joint and several liability for everybody that comes under the definition of this bill. Davis Industries may not be evil, but they are the ones manufacturing the Saturday night specials. Intratec, I am not sure they are not evil people, there may be some nice ones there, but they are the ones who manufacture the TEC-DC9 used at Columbine. It is his State and cities and counties in California suing Davis Industries. We are not trying to put them out of business. We are trying to make them vulnerable to legal action, and he is protecting them. He is protecting them. Why does he disagree, I might ask, to the lawsuits that are being brought in California at this present moment?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to point out that there are some companies that we may or may not want to be included in the provisions of the bill, and that is why this amendment exists. Take the famous American Derringer Company that has less than 25 employees but manufactures as many as 10,000 cheap pistols a year, which will now be protected as a small business under the Rogan bill. Is that a small business? Is this a mom and pop? What about Davis Industries? It has 15 employees. It is in the home State of the author of this bill, of California, and is known for manufacturing the majority of Saturday night specials in this country. As many as 180,000 pistols a year. Is this a small business that we want to protect? And may I point out that the Conyers-Scott amendment limitation would stop this ridiculous assumption that businesses that are bringing in hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars, are, in effect, small businesses, that we are concerned about the mom and pop effect. Again, it is a matter of Rogan intent versus the bill's effect. The effect is, you are giving an umbrella to those that do not deserve it. Intratec, the manufacturer of the infamous TEC-DC9 used at Columbine High School, has less than 25 employees but sells as many as 100,000 of these awful weapons a year. Is this a small business that we want to protect, or do we want the Conyers-Scott amendment to make sure that it will not reside under the protection of the Rogan bill? I say we should exclude all of these gun manufacturers from the provisions of the bill, not because of the death-dealing weapons they manufacture, but because they are not small businesses in the true sense of the definition. We need a revenue cap on the definition of small business. Thanks to the gentleman from California, American Derringer, Davis Industries, and Intratec all will be very grateful to know that you are refusing a cap that would catch them. The Rogan bill says that all of these are small businesses. Do we really want to protect them? I think not. I urge all of the Members in this body to support the Conyers-Scott amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would point out a couple of items here made in the statement of the author of this bill against the amendment that I think we might want to review more carefully. First, the most commonsense response to whether this is a small business bill or not would be to put some limit on the revenues in each of the last 2 years of less than $5 million each year. That would solve all of the discussion about whether or not this is a bill in which a lot of large businesses in terms of their annual revenue are crowding under the umbrella of mom-and-pop stores. Here is an example of a wonderful intent demonstrated by the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan) with no conception of the effect of what he is doing here. This would allow businesses with hundreds of millions of dollars of annual revenue to come under the umbrella. We do not want that, I say to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan), let me help. Let me help by amending his definition of ``small business'' not just to 25 employers or less. He knows that the high- tech industries have people working in lofts in their own homes with only a few other people that are commanding much more than millions of dollars' worth of revenue every year. Why does my colleague not accept the limitation of small business, if that is what he is really concerned about, to those businesses that have revenues of less than $5 million a year? Most mom-and-pops do not come anywhere near $5 million a year. Most mom-and-pops are happy to get $100,000 or $200,000 or $300,000 worth of business a year. The gentleman told me himself, and I know it already. But why not a $5 million, $4 million, $6 million limitation? Those cannot be called mom-and-pop businesses. I think it is because the gentleman knows the effect of that unusual distorted definition that he is going to let in trucking companies, big businesses, people who certainly do not fit into the mom-and-pop category. Now, the gentleman says that this bill of his tracks the Y2K bill in terms of limiting punitive damages. Sorry. The Y2K bill limits punitive damages to the greater of three times compensatory damages. His bill limits the damages to the lesser of three times the compensatory damages, or $250,000, whichever is less. I know the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan) just inadvertently thought that he was moving along the lines that the other bill supported by the administration was doing. So the argument that I present here in terms of the amendment that I and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) offer is about truth in labeling. We are not limited to small businesses. There is no reason this Congress should shield from liability large businesses, and our amendment fixes it by a $5 million revenue limitation, rather high. In addition, Title II of the bill limits the liability of product sellers and contains no size limitation at all, whether based on employees or revenues. This means that Wal-Mart, Hertz Rent-A-Car, and other huge corporations could achieve multi-million-dollar windfalls, not to mention all the reckless gun sellers that have been referenced earlier whose carelessness and extended negligence lead to thousands of deaths or injury. Now, I am afraid that that, I say to the author of the bill, cannot be considered a harmless error or a mistake. I think that that is what he meant it to do. That is what the effect is, and that is the result that will occur if this measure is passed in the form, even with all the amendments that have been added to it so far today. Now, there is a misperception about the measure that this is somehow limited to product liability. It is not. Title 1 is truly breathtaking in its scope to any civil action, to any civil action, whether it relates to a contract claim, a copyright claim, environmental claim, a securities claim, civil RICO, a bankruptcy action, even a reckless driving claim or a malpractice claim. Now, I think this is changing the direction that we are going in in this legislation when we incorporate something of this magnitude in this bill. Why do we not limit it to product liability, as the discussion began, rather than protecting businesses against frivolous product liability suits. They have now taken the huge step forward to say that they would serve to protect businesses involved in criminal misconduct, foreign companies stealing U.S. copyrights, as well as careless corporate polluters. I do not buy that wide provision of insulating liability under the rubric of protecting small businesses in product liabilities cases. They have gone a bit too far this time. They have gone too far. And so, I am well aware that the body has tried to deal with the Rogan and Moran amendments to improve the situation, but the problems still remain. We are still protecting gun manufacturers, drug dealers, and polluters. Our amendment responds to this. This is the most important amendment that my colleagues may ever see on this bill. And I am stunned that, in their generous conduct on the floor today, they have accepted or supported every amendment but this one, the one that might take care of the problems and make it reasonable in the eyes of many people and organizations and the administration, as well. We are trying only to clarify the misleading provisions of the bill. My colleagues purport to have a hate crimes carve-out. But did they accidentally leave out gender-based hate crimes or did they deliberately leave out gender-based hate crimes? Nobody knows. But let us put it in. They are not, apparently, willing to do that. They want to claim that they are two-way preemptive, but they only preempt State laws in which punitive damages are more favorable to the victims. The bill appears to allow State opt-outs but limits it to legislative statutes. Might I ask why a referendum might not be acceptable and that they require just to pass through the House, as well? There are other ways for citizens to indicate their support. What about a referendum? Our amendment fixes these problems, providing for a real hate crimes carve-out, providing for a real two-way preemption, providing for a hate crimes provision that includes gender. And so, if we are going to vote on a bill to protect small businesses, we ought to be clear and honest enough to limit the bill to actual small businesses. And so, for that reason, I hope this bill may be made viable and whole by supporting our amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), my cosponsor.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, we are now confronted with a measure that ought to begin with the observation of the necessity for truth in labeling. The sponsors of this bill have had the courage to put small business liability, to put ``small'' in the title. They have been bold enough to include this phrase in the title. The problem, of course, is on any reading of this, this measure is in no way limited to small business. Title II, which limits the liability of product sellers, contains no size limitation whatsoever. The fact that we talk about 25 employees or less ignores the simple fact that there is no constraint on the amount the business is doing in terms of revenues. Hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars, could be included, as we know, in financial organizations that frequently have far less than 25 employees. So this is not a small business bill. Of course, to fundamentally limit victims' rights when it comes to dangerous products, negligence and other misconduct is, to me, going in the wrong direction, because it follows the form of other liability legislation we passed that is already going in the wrong direction. This bill has to stand next to the class action bill that federalized most class actions; the statute of repose bill that created an 18-year limit on durable goods and machinery and equipment. And now we come up with a bill misnamed a small business bill, which puts a cap on punitive damages, limits joint and several liability and exempts a number of corporations from the doctrines of strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of an implied contract. This is a serious move in the wrong direction. It is not just an unnecessary bill; it is moving way, way in a direction that I do not think most of the Members here, once they recognize what is in this bill, will support. First, the bill imposes severe evidentiary restrictions and an overall cap of $250,000 in punitive damages in every civil case against businesses with fewer than 25 employees. Collectively, these restrictions are likely to eliminate not only the incentive for seeking punitive damages but it also eliminates any realistic possibility of obtaining them. It sends exactly the wrong message to people with deliberate intent to do wrong, people who are not concerned with the considerations of safety in the workplace. They are being told it does not matter how harmful or malicious their action or behavior is, they will never be realistically subject to significant punitive damages, which erodes the whole concept of punitive damages. When we eliminate joint and several liability for noneconomic damages, we are eliminating in those few cases the right to pain and suffering recovery and loss of life and limb that so frequently is important in the cases where those theories would apply. This has the effect of making innocent victims bear the risk of loss when a co-defendant is judgment-proof and would severely discriminate against seniors and women who bear the greatest portion of noneconomic damages in our society. To take one class of defendants and relieve them of responsibility from the doctrines of strict liability, the failure to warn or breach of implied warranty, is unbelievable, leaving only a plaintiff with negligence as a cause of action. So, in my view, the legislation is not just unnecessary, it is misleading and it is reckless and it should be turned aside. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, we all know that monopolies do not serve the public interest; they keep prices high, limit consumer choice, and fail to innovate. In 1996, in an effort to break up the entrenched local phone monopolies, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Telecommunications Act. I am happy to commemorate the 4-year anniversary of that Act. The theory of the 1996 law is simple: in order to encourage local phone monopolies to open their local networks to competition, the Bells would be permitted to enter the long-distance market, but only when their local markets were open and competitive. Four years after its passage, there is substantial evidence that the 1996 act is working. But the local phone market is still not as competitive as we would like. There are competitive local carriers growing rapidly, both in terms of revenue and market capitalization; but they still compromise only 5 percent of the market. And worse still, the Bells even refuse to provide competitors with the necessary network access.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I, Representative Hastings and Representative Wexler are introducing a resolution condemning the conduct of U.S. District Judge Alan McDonald for bringing the appearance of improper racial, ethnic and religious bias upon the Federal Judiciary, urging the Federal Judiciary to protect against the perception of bias within their ranks and calling for the nomination and confirmation of candidates for the Federal Judiciary that reflect the diversity of American society. News agencies in Spokane, WA have confirmed accounts from staff members and attorneys stating that, during official proceeding of his court dating back to 1990, Judge McDonald made or participated in numerous communications that referred to racial, ethic and religious minorities in demeaning, stereotypical and racist language, including references to Latino defendants and lawyers as ``greasers,'' an African-Americans plaintiff as ``impo-tent'' and maligning Mormons, Jew and Chinese for corrupt financial practices. Rather than apologizing for any indiscretion, Judge McDonald has attempted to explain away his offensive notes as private and misinterpreted attempts at humor. Similarly, the Chief District Court Judge William F. Nielsen has dismissed the impact of the offensive notes on the minority community and failed to sanction Judge McDonald for his conduct. There should be no toleration of statements by officials of the United States that evidence prejudice or bias towards individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, gender or sexual orientation. The actions of Judge McDonald undermine the promise of integrity and impartiality upon which our Federal Judiciary is built and expressly violate the Judicial Code of Conduct. Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges cautions a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, specifically noting that a judge's duty ``includes the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior that can reasonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or bias towards another on the basis of personal characteristics like race, sex, religion, or national origin.'' At a time when minority candidates for federal judgeships are twice as likely not to be confirmed as their white counterparts, this display of bigotry raises issue with regard to the fairness and impartiality of the judicial system. The 4th and the 7th Circuit Courts have historically been all white courts and remain so today. Further, there are no African-Americans on the 1st, 9th, (which includes California), 10th and Federal Circuit Courts and no Hispanics on the 3rd, 6th, 8th, and D.C. Circuit Courts. The federal judiciary should reflect the diversity of American society to protect against the perception of bias raised by the conduct of Judge McDonald. This Congress should stand together and condemn the conduct of U.S. District Judge Alan McDonald for bringing the appearance bias upon the Federal Judiciary and call upon President Clinton to renew his efforts to nominate and confirm candidates for the Federal Bench that reflect the diversity of American society.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I would like to advise the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot) that this amendment, as reported and modified, is one that I have no objection to. But I would like to point out to him that it does not in any way change the objection that American workers are relegated to a second-class legal status with rules that apply to no one else. That is not corrected by this perfecting amendment. I would like to have him reflect on the fact that only American workers will be barred from recovery of many types of damages for death and disfigurement that occurs from injuries that involve older equipment. That has not changed by this amendment. Neither does it change the fact that this bill, H.R. 2005, does not apply to the rest of the public who could be injured by older equipment. Nor does the perfecting amendment change the fact that Worker's Compensation laws do not cover noneconomic damages that would otherwise be available to workers for injuries that result in death and disfigurement. The perfecting amendment shifts the considerable cost to small business who will have to, as a result of this measure, pay higher premiums and who will be unable to recover for many property damages caused by defective machinery. Finally, this amendment does not change the fact that the opposition by workers and unions and the administration and consumer groups remains, notwithstanding this amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stupak).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would like to observe that the danger of the legislation before us is that it would cut off the right of workers to hold wrongdoers accountable when they are injured by a defective product that is more than 18 years old, regardless of how long the product was built to last and regardless of whether or not the potential plaintiff has suffered an injury yet. So while this bill is a dangerous piece of tort reform, the most egregious aspect of this measure is that it singles out American workers injured or killed on the job and prevents them from recovering damages from manufacturers of the defective workplace machinery. How can we start off the 21st century in the United States of America under such prosperous circumstances by the first thing we handle out of the Committee on the Judiciary in the year 2000 is a measure to further limit the right of recovery of workers injured by defective products that may be more than 18 years old? I suggest this is a return to the middle ages. We are turning the clock back rather than moving into the new century. The measure that we are discussing today is inherently unfair to American workers, because under this measure they would only have access to their State workers' compensation system which typically only allows for lost wages and medical expenses. But if an innocent bystander, who happens to be nearby and is injured by the same piece of machinery under the same circumstance as the worker, the bystander can sue for lost damages for medical expenses, for future lost wages and for pain and suffering, loss of limb and permanent disfigurement. What we are creating is a measure that the bystander can receive full compensation while the worker's recovery can be drastically limited. Are we seriously about to do that here today in the House of Representatives? This is why the working families are currently permitted under State law to sue the responsible third party, the manufacturer, and under the measure before us this bill cuts off that right. And so the bill is unfair to workers, but it is also unfair to employers. Here we get both the employees and the employers. The employers will suffer how? First, they will not be able to recover for any property damage they suffer when older equipment fails and damages the workplace. Secondly, the employers would no longer be able to recover the funds paid to an injured employee through workers' compensation. Currently, employers can recover these workers' compensation payments for many damages awarded employees in court. Now, the bill also raises concerns that deal with the issue of Federalism. This measure may run afoul of the commerce clause limiting congressional authority to the regulation of interstate commerce and the 10th Amendment, which reserves all of the enumerated powers to the States. So here we have before us a measure, the first out of the Committee on the Judiciary in the year 2000, a measure that takes away the rights of working families, the rights of their employers, and the rights of States all at once. Is there any surprise that the labor movement in the United States opposes the measure? The AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers, the Communication Workers, the Machinists, the Teamsters all oppose this measure, and it is very significant that the White House has issued an advisory that suggests that the President will veto this measure. Now, the measure before us is not about growth or competitiveness; it is about limiting in a mean-spirited way the rights of American workers and their employers in a very important area. So I hope that as the Members of the House listen to this debate, that they will join with those of us who have vowed to oppose it and to vote against it. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), a senior member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute. Mr. Chairman, I have been very touched by the notion of my friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), that we need the time to cut off litigation is very important. But should we cut off the litigation of an injured employee who is the victim of a defective product that was supposed to last far longer than 18 years, because today we have a bill on the floor that says 18 years will be the limit and after that one is on their own? I say no. I say that we do not cut off the right of a person to sue under those circumstances. In many other cases, I would be inclined to agree with my colleague from the Committee on the Judiciary about the time that we need to cut off and limit litigation, but not here. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hooley).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Jones).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).