John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge this body to stop over-spending on defense and start spending on the needs of our children. We need to put children first. Our military spending is still at Cold War levels. Each year, we allocate more than half of federal discretionary spending to military efforts. In contrast, for education, that figure is less than 9 percent. As a nation, we rank 1st in military spending but only 10th globally in spending for education. It should then come as no surprise, that in a recent international study of 21 industrialized nations the students of the United States ranked 19th in math and science performance. This Congress voted to increase the Pentagon's budget by 112 billion dollars over the next six years. Incredibly, that is nearly the same amount of money needed to repair the nation's schools according to a report by the General Accounting Office. Our schools are in dire need of assistance. many are crumbling, cracking, and splitting at the seams. That same GAO report informed us that 14 million pupils nationwide are being educated in unsatisfactory environments. These children are attending school in facilities that either need extensive structural repair or the replacement of one or more buildings. In my home state of Michigan, for example, more than 1 in 5 schools have at least one building in need of serious repair, and more than half of Michigan's schools have at least one serious environmental health problem. We all accept the fact that learning environment affects the quality of the education our children receive. I ask you: ``How do we expect our children to learn, when we do not give them the clean and safe places to do so?'' We need to get the asbestos out of the classrooms. We need to get children out of trailers and portable classrooms. We need to fix leaking roofs, repair plumbing facilities and ensure each student is studying under adequate light. Ms. Lenora Starks, a constituent of mine, recently wrote to me. She was concerned that we weren't doing enough to help our public schools. ``We must ensure,'' she wrote, ``that our students have a proper learning environment. In too many schools, efforts to improve student achievement are hampered by inadequate and deteriorating facilities.'' Ms. Starks can see our priorities. She sees that this Congress has not been putting children first and is worried about what that means for our nation's future. We need to put children first by increasing spending on Head Start. Rather than giving an excess of 17 billion unrequested dollars to the bloated Pentagon budget, we could fully fund Head Start for the next five years. And this funding is critical. Because of inadequate federal funding, Head Start is only able to serve 30 percent of eligible children. Lack of federal fund also causes most children to wait until the age of four to enter the program, when evidence supports earlier intervention is more effective. Children are also adversely affected by a lack of financial commitment to low-income families and to impoverished neighborhoods. One example is the malignant neglect of the childcare crisis in this country. The 105th Congress only provided 182 million dollars this year to improve the quality of children care in this country. This fell far short of the estimated 7.5 billion dollars needed to provide safe and affordable child care for working families. Full-day child care costs up to 10,000 per year, yet half of America's families with young children earn less than 35,000 per year. Child care in low-income communities must be a priority if parents are going to be able to seize opportunities to provide for their children. Regarding neighborhoods, support for Community Development Block Grants, which have a long history of providing economic aid to underserved areas, is declining. In the city of Detroit, CDBG funding has declined from 130.1 million to 51.3 million over the past 19 years. For fiscal year 2000, current proposals by this Congress would continue the downward trend. With one in five American children living in poverty, cuts to CDBGs undoubtedly affect their futures. Studies show that poor children are less likely to finish school, are at heightened risk of stunted growth and other health problems and contribute less to our economy as adults. We must restore the CDBGs to their original vitality and reverse the years of cutbacks if we really want to help the youngest victims of poverty. Congress also misdirects spending by failing to support youth employment initiatives. While increasing the Pentagon's budget over the past two years, Congress has concurrently cut youth job training by 80 percent and federal support for summer jobs for young people. Young people must have avenues to pursue their dreams. We need to reprioritize our allocation of funds in this nation. We need to put children first. This is not a choice, this is a must.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to a man whose outstanding dedication to our children, the future of our nation, does us all proud. Dr. Thomas Lloyd, General Superintendent of Schools in the Highland Park School District, passed away on June 28, 1999, at the age of 61. The community will miss him dearly. Dr. Lloyd, who had served since 1996 as the District's 16th superintendent, was born in Miami and graduated from George Washington Carver High School there is 1956. After attending Morehouse College in Atlanta, Dr. Lloyd enrolled at Wayne State University, where he earned a B.A. in Psychology in 1963. In addition, he minored in Sociology and English. He continued on at Wayne State, where he earned a M.A. in Vocational Rehabilitation Counseling, with a minor in Education. Subsequently, Dr. Lloyd earned is Ph. D in Administration and Supervision at the University of Michigan. From 1962-63, Dr. Lloyd served as research technician at Henry Ford Hospital and Lafayette Clinic in Detroit. He also served as a clinical psychologist at W.J. Maxey Training School in Whitmore Lake (1963-65), an assistant at Wayne State's Traffic Research Center, and as School Psychological Diagnostician for the Southern Wayne County Economic Group, Inc. (1996-68). Additionally, Dr. Lloyd served as dropout counselor and guidance department supervisor in the Detroit Public Schools; and as team leader, special instructor and acting supervisor of trainee affairs at the DPS Skills Training Center from 1965-66. In his 32 years of service to the Highland Park School District, Dr. Lloyd held a variety of posts. A state-certified Psychological Examiner, he also served as School Diagnostician (1967-68), counselor at Highland Park Community College (1968-1971), Assistant Dean at HPCC (1971), and School District Special Education Programs Supervisor (1987). Dr. Lloyd also had an earlier stint as Superintendent of Schools (1978-87) and two periods as President of Highland Park Community College (1971-78 and 1993-96). Dr. Lloyd was renowned and respected for his leadership ability in the field of education, always placing a strong emphasis on planning, efficiency and fiscal responsibility. His most recent accomplishment was a richly detailed blueprint for improved educational quality and student achievement, the 1997-2000 Districtwide School Improvement Plan. Dr. Lloyd realized early on the impact that new technology would have on learning, becoming a strong advocate for high-tech teaching, learning and information services. He led the District into a new age of technology, accomplishing a swift transition into an exciting era. Dr. Lloyd was also an impassioned defender of Highland Park Community College. He voraciously fought to keep the only convenient metro-area community college open, to serve thousands of ````education-seeking students'' who could not easily attend other institutions of higher learning. He fought to ensure that education was available to all, not just a privileged few. Other initiatives fostered under Dr. Lloyd's stewardship were the creation of a new public information program, and in concert with the Mother's Club of Highland Park, reactivation of the Harvey C. Jackson, Jr. Memorial Scholarship Fund. Combined with local fundraising and outside providers, the Scholarship Fund has issued $173,400 in college scholarships to 127 Highland Park students in 18 years. Dr. Lloyd successfully grasped the importance of advanced education in the modern world and ensured that his gifted students were in no way restrained from reaching their full potential. In addition, Dr. Lloyd, at various points in his career, served as chairman of national and local planning committees. He planned the first annual National Association of Black School Educators Summer Leadership Academy (Ann Arbor, 1983). He also chaired the Southeastern Michigan League of Community Colleges (1977-78), and served on the Executive Board of the Michigan Community College Association. Also, Dr. Lloyd was also a member of the Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity, the Phi Delta Kappa educational honorary society, and various state and national professional organizations in the fields of psychology and education. Dr. Lloyd has served as a member of executive boards of the Highland Park Boys' Club, Rotary Club, Caucus Club, Metropolitan Detroit Bureau of School Studies, and Detroit Black United Fund. In addition, he was a member of the Highland Park Lions' Club, Highland Park City Planning Commission, and the advisory board of the Reggie McKenzie Foundation, and has served as Trustee of Mayflower Congregational Church in Detroit. In 1997, Dr. Lloyd received the honored Golden Apple Award, from the Trailblazer's Division (Scouting for the Handicapped) of the Detroit Area Council, Boy Scouts of America. Dr. Lloyd is survived by his wife Karen, son Thomas (Melissa), daughters Lisa (Mark) and Charlene, stepdaughter Dawnielle, brothers Samuel and James, grandsons Kennie Hobbs, Jr., and Mark Jones, Jr., and granddaughters Danielle Mike; Jessica, Amber and Mallory Lloyd.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor my good friend and distinguished colleague, Congressman George Brown of California's 42nd Congressional District. I worked alongside of Representative Brown for 33 years and will remember his service to Congress as one dedicated to improving the quality of life not only for his constituents but for all of us. George Brown started off his illustrious career not as the public servant we remember him by, but as a young student in the 1930's. It was on the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles where he began his crusade for a better nation by organizing the first integrated campus housing. Being the great leader he was, George was the first to integrate UCLA's housing by taking on an African-American roommate. Later in his life Representative Brown was proud to continue his push for civil rights when he voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A picture of George, President Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. hung on his wall as a constant reminder to the signing of that act into law. Upon graduating from UCLA with a degree in Industrial Physics, Brown put his degree to good use with the City of Los Angeles. It was there that he helped organize the city's workers and its veteran's housing projects. Then in 1954 George Brown won his first election as a member of the city council in Monterey Park, CA. One year later in 1955 he became mayor of the same city. The dedication he held for the issues dearest to him kept Brown moving as he was elected to the California State Assembly in 1958. As a member of the state assembly Brown introduced an environmentally friendly piece of legislation that called for a ban on lead in gasoline, the first ever of its kind. What we later learned is that this was only the beginning of George's fight for a cleaner, safer environment. In 1962 George Brown ran for the 29th district in California. He won the House seat easily that year beating his opponent by an 11 percentage point margin. Serving on the House Committee on Science and Aeronautics, Brown was a staunch supporter of the advancement of the space program and the pursuit of technology that would improve all of our lives. George believed that technology should be included in the education of our children and worked hard to accomplish this goal throughout his career. In more recent years Congressman Brown was found supporting international scientific cooperation and attempting to establish joint research programs between the United States, Russia and Mexico. During the 1960's and into the 1970's, Congressman Brown was a strong voice in protest to the Vietnam War. He argued that the no matter how long we fought and how many troops we sent over to Vietnam, we could not find world peace from a war that was slaughtering peasants. Throughout the war, he tried time and again to get the attention of the nation. One such time found Representative Brown outside on the steps of the Capitol Building demanding that if the police were going to arrest 13 peaceful war protesters for disturbing the peace, then they should arrest him too. When I think back to this time I'm reminded of the group that Bob Kastenmeier from Wisconsin, Don Edwards from California, George, myself and several others formed to stop the war effort. After the release of the Pentagon Papers our efforts in the group intensified to bring an end to the war, perhaps the hardest worker of all of us being George. As hard as he fought the Vietnam War, perhaps the issue closest to the Honorable Congressman's heart was the environment. It was Representative Brown who first spoke out against the dangers of burning fossil fuel. It was George Brown teaching the nation about the harmful effects of freon in the ozone layer. It was Brown again telling us that we had better keep an eye on the global climate change for our sake and the sake of our children. And then it was Congress, following his lead, enacting provisions in the Clean Air Act that would help the nation monitor the levels of these pollutants in our air and keep a watchful eye on the ever-changing world climate. One of Representative Brown's most notable achievements was the work he put into the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. Through this agency we can rest assured, knowing the policies of the fine Congressman from California will be followed through as he would want them. In looking back at George Brown's life, we look back at a life dedicated to promoting the beliefs of a man that was committed to making the world a better, cleaner, more peaceful place for us to live. His hard work on the tough issues will be missed, but most of all we will simply miss the strong-willed, intelligent, caring man that George Brown was.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Gilman-Campbell- Maloney/Crowley, et al. Amendment to H.R. 2514, the American Embassy Security Act. Passage of this secondary amendment to the Smith amendment would allow up to $25 million to be appropriated for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in FY2000 for vital family planning and maternal and child health care programs. Some of my colleagues have suggested that funding the UNFPA would support the Chinese government's coercive abortion activities. Last year, they eliminated all U.S. fuding for UNFPA in the omnibus appropriations bill due to concerns about China. This amendment would allow us to fund UNFPA, while actively discouraging the organization from any activity in China; indeed, one dollar of appropriated U.S. funds would be deducted for each dollar UNFPA spends of other donors' funds in China. Any U.S. contribution that would be made to the UNFPA in FY2000 would have to be maintained in a separate account, none of the funds could be spent in China, and UNFPA would have to certify that it does not fund abortions. The U.N. Population Fund does not support abortion. In fact, UNFPA works to reduce the need for abortion by enhancing access to family planning. In addition to addressing the reproductive health needs of women, UNFPA devotes significant resources to preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Cutting of funds to the U.N. Population fund for even one year will lead to disastrous results; it is estimated that the result of the elimination of U.S. funding for UNFPA in FY1999 appropriations will have led to 500,000 more unintended pregnancies and 200,000 more abortions throughout the developing world, along with 1,200 more maternal deaths and 22,000 more infant deaths. We cannot risk results like this for another year. The U.S. government should not, as a matter of principle, hold family planning and UNFPA hostage to a legitimate concern about the conduct of the Chinese government. There is a well-founded concern about China's family planning program--not UNFPA's. the concerns of the U.S. government should be placed on the U.S.-Chinese bi-lateral agenda, along with other human rights issues, and linked as appropriate to trade and other negotiations. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join with me in support the Gilman-Campbell/Maloney-Crowley amendment to fund the United Nations Population Fund.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I am pleased to offer for the record a memorandum on the Second Amendment and Gun Control Legislation that was written by Professor Robert A. Sedler, an outstanding constitutional law professor who has taught at the University of Kentucky Law School and now teaches at Wayne State University School of Law. Professor Sedler previously worked with my Judicial Committee staff on constitutional matters during the recent impeachment proceedings. Given the current national debate on gun control and gun control legislation, his memorandum is particularly enlightening. The Second Amendment and Gun Control Legislation (By Robert A. Sedler, Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University School of Law) Opponents of gun control legislation, such as the NRA, frequently invoke the Second Amendment to argue that gun control legislation is unconstitutional. Such an argument is completely misplaced for two reasons. First, under current constitutional doctrine, as propounded by the United States Supreme Court, the Second Amendment does not establish an individual right to bear arms. The Second Amendment is a state's rights provision, guaranteeing a collective rather than an individual right. Second, even if the Supreme Court were to hold in the future that the Second Amendment does create an individual right to bear arms, that right, like other constitutional rights, would not be absolute, and would be subject to reasonable regulation that did not impose an ``undue burden'' on that right. The Second Amendment starts out by referring to state militias, which were the forerunner of the present National Guard: ``A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State,'' and goes on with the more familiar. ``The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.'' At the time of the Constitution every state had a militia, consisting of all able-bodied men. When there was a call to arms to defend the state, each able- bodied man was supposed to show up with his own rifle. Every man had a rifle, which he used for hunting and for the legitimate self-defense of his family and his home. The Constitution gave the federal government a lot of power over the state militias. Congress could call them into federal service (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 15), as units of the Michigan National Guard have been called up for service in Bosnia and Kosovo. When the militias were called into federal service, they were subject to the control of the President as Commander-in-Chief (Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1). Congress was also given the power to govern the organization and training of the state militias (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16), just as today Congress regulates the state National Guard. After the Constitution was ratified, there was concern in the states that Congress would use its power over the state militias simply to abolish them. This concern was addressed by the Second Amendment. The language and historical context of the Second Amendment indicates that it was to be a states rights provision, it was intended to prevent Congress from abolishing the state militias. Under this view of the Second Amendment, it would not be the source of an individual right to bear arms, and federal gun control laws could not be challenged as violative of the Second Amendment. \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Supreme Court long ago held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The contrary view focuses on the fact that the time of the Second Amendment, all the able-bodied men that made up the state militia were expected to have their own rifles to bring with them whenever there was a call to arms. Under this view, the Second Amendment would be the source of an individual right to bear arms, just as the First Amendment is the source of an individual right to free speech, and federal gun control laws could be challenged as violative of the Second Amendment. Many state constitutions do expressly establish an individual right to bear arms. The Michigan Constitution, Art. I, sec 6, for example, provides that: ``Every person has a right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.'' There is much debate today among law professors and others over whether or not the Second Amendment should be seen as establishing an individual right to bear arms. Of course, only the United States Supreme Court can say authoritatively what the Second Amendment means. The only Supreme Court case to expressly deal with that subject is the older case of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). In that case, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal law banning a number of weapons such as sawed- off shotguns and machine guns. The Court seemed to say that the Second Amendment was a state's rights provision intended to prevent Congress from abolishing the state militias, and was not intended to establish an individual right to bear arms. The Court stated: ``With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view,'' and concluded that, ``[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a `shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.'' 307 U.S. at 178. The Supreme Court has not had a case dealing with the meaning of the Second Amendment since Miller, except to cite Miller for the proposition that federal restrictions on the use of firearms by individuals do not ``trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.'' Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65, n.8 (1980). Because lower federal courts are bound by United States Supreme Court decisions unless and until they are overruled by the Supreme Court itself, the federal courts of appeal have unanimously held, as the Sixth Circuit has put it, that, ``[i]t is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right.'' United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, l106 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding ban on possession of submachine guns). Recent cases holding that the Second Amendment does not establish an individual right to bear arms include Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996) (person denied a concealed weapon permit has no standing to claim that denial violates his Second Amendment rights); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F. 3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995) (denial of application to purchase handgun cannot be challenged as violative of Second Amendment).\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ In view of this unbroken line of federal appellate decisions, the very recent decision of a federal judge in Texas holding that the Second Amendment establishes an individual right to bear arms and renders unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm while under a court restraining order, United States v. Emerson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4700, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Tex., 4/7/99, is puzzling and is likely to be reversed on appeal. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Supreme Court's decision in Miller sets forth the current state of the law, which is why the lower federal courts must reject any claim that the Second Amendment establishes a constitutionally-protected individual right to bear arms. The Supreme Court may change its mind, but unless and until it does, the federal courts cannot properly use the Second Amendment to declare any gun control law unconstitutional. Let us assume, however, that the Supreme Court does change its mind and holds that the Second Amendment does protect the individual right to bear arms. This would not have any effect at all on existing and proposed federal gun control laws, such as the ban on assault weapons, the ban on possession of a gun by a convicted felon, a requirement that guns contain safety locks and be kept out of the reach of children, or a background check waiting period. Constitutional rights are not absolute, and are subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest. Guidance on this point can be obtained from the decisions of state courts upholding gun control laws as a reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms. In upholding a ban on dangerous weapons over 60 years ago, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court stated as follows: ``Some weapons are adapted and recognized by the common opinion of good citizens as proper for the private defense of person and property. Other are the peculiar tools of the criminal. The police power of the state to preserve public safety and peace and to regulate the bearing of arms may take account of the character and ordinary use of weapons and interdict those whose customary employment of individuals is to violate the law.'' People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 539, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (1931). Moreover, since constitutional rights are not absolute, any regulation of a right--even a fundamental one, such as a woman's right to abortion--is not subject to constitutional challenge unless it imposes an undue burden on the exercise of that right. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Thus, a 24 hour waiting period before a woman can have an abortion was held in Casey to be constitutional because it does not prevent the women from having an abortion. By the same token, a three day waiting period for the sale of a gun at a gun show so that a background check can be run on the purchaser does not impose an undue burden on the right to bear arms, since it does not prevent a qualified purchaser from obtaining the gun. Nor does a requirement that guns be equipped with safety locks impose any burden at all on a person's ability to obtain and use guns. Nor could it possibly be suggested that the Constitution stands as an obstacle to denying a gun to a convicted felon or a mentally unstable person. Likewise, a ban on carrying a concealed weapon would be constitutionally permissible because of the clear danger to public safety that can result from people pulling out guns and engaging in a shootout in the public streets. A constitutionally protected right to bear arms would include the right to have a rifle for hunting and for defense of the home. It might also include the right to have a handgun for defense of the home, although this is debatable. A ban on private ownership of handguns would serve the public interest in crime prevention, since so many crimes are committed by the use of handguns. This aside, most assuredly, the right to bear arms would not include the right to have a sub-machine gun or a sawed-off shotgun or an assault weapon, or to carry concealed weapons, or to brandish a gun in the public streets. And again, any right to gun ownership would be subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest. In summary, under the current state of the law, the Second Amendment does not establish an individual right to bear arms. But even if the Supreme Court were to subsequently hold that it did, all the present and proposed federal gun control laws would be upheld as constitutional, because they are reasonable and do not impose an undue burden on the right to bear arms.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I merely wanted to commend the gentleman on his statement. It is a very courageous statement, and it is also a very well thought out statement from a constitutional point of view. I thank him very much for his contribution.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes. Mr. Speaker, we are confronted with a very unusual situation here that, unless we put the legislation that we handled in 1993, which was passed by a voice vote, and of course many Members now present were not in the Congress nor on the Committee on the Judiciary at that time, into perspective, we may miss what is attempted to be done here. The court rendered part of that law invalid. They rendered the part that deals with State and local civil rights laws invalid, that it did not apply to them. What this measure is doing is coming back and getting the other part of it. And so, this is part of a one-two punch in which we are now doing something incredible if we look at it in the broader context. We have already put restrictions on Federal civil rights laws as a result of the 1993 case, and now we are coming back to get the part that escaped the court's criticism. That is why the leading civil rights litigation organization in the United States, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, has, as of yesterday, sent me a strong letter explaining why they cannot support this measure. In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union, probably the second- most active litigating organization, has also indicated their strong reservations about this measure in its present form. I would just give my colleagues a part of the reasoning of Director Counsel General Elaine Jones of LDF's letter to me that indicates why they urged Members not to succumb to this bill, as enticing as it may be, without some correction. Defendants in discrimination cases brought under State or local fair housing, employment laws may seek to avoid liability by claiming protection under the Religious Liberty Protection Act. This would require individuals proceeding under such State and local antidiscrimination laws to prove that the law they wish to utilize is a least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. This requirement would significantly increase the litigation time and expense of pursuing even ordinary antidiscrimination actions and as a result could even preclude some plaintiffs from pursuing their claims. And so, we are now being asked to submit to part two of the original law that limits the Federal civil rights jurisdiction and now we have come back in this rather clever and innocent-sounding defense of religious liberties to now put the hindrance, the binders, on local and State civil rights laws. Although I am committed to preserving religious freedom in this nation, I cannot support the Religious Liberty Protection Act as it is presently drafted. My principal concern is that the legislation creates a brand new right for so-called ``religious practitioners'' and no other group or government enjoys--the right to discriminate. The right is so sweeping it will apply not only to religious institutions, but to large corporations. I know that the bill's supporters say we should not worry about race and gender discrimination, because those interests have previously been found by the courts to be protected under the so-called ``compelling interest test set forth in the bill. Forgive me for being a little bit skeptical of this claim, particularly given the current conservative makeup of so many courts. Even if the supporters' predictions prove true, civil rights plaintiffs will be subject to vastly enhanced litigation costs. We have enough barriers to civil rights suits without adding these new obstacles. This is why the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund is so strongly opposed to the bill. Buyt it is beyond race and gender that the most significant civil rights concerns exist. This is because anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation, marital status, and disability have not been found by the courts to be based on a ``compelling'' government interest. This means that under the bill, businesses will be free to discriminate against gay and lesbian employees, and large landlords will be able to justify their refusal to rent to single parents or gays and lesbians. In my view, we have fought too hard in the civil rights arena over the years to give back these gains. I am also concerned that the bill raises serious constitutional problems. Among the many problems are the bill's tenuous relationship to Congress' interstate commerce and spending power authority, and its micro management of the federal judiciary and the state and local authorities. Given the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions on commerce, federalism and separation of powers, it is difficult to see this bill passing constitutional muster. Unfortunately, when the bill was struck down, it will serve as yet another precedent blocking Congress' path to protecting other civil rights which have a far stronger tie to our commerce and spending powers. In other words, we are sending the Court the weakest possible bill from a constitutional perspective and are inviting an adverse precedent. I seriously question whether another federal law which is so antagonistic towards civil rights holds the key to protecting religious liberty in this country. This country has more religion and a greater variety of religious expression than any nation on earth. We have done so by maintaining the delicate balance between the First Amendment's religious liberty clause and its establishment clause, as interpreted by an independent judiciary. It is doubtful the ``Religious Liberty Protection Act'' can improve on the scheme for protecting religious liberty designed by our founding fathers. I urge a ``no'' vote. NAACP Legal Defense, and Education Fund, Inc, Washington, DC, July 14, 1999. Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Rayburn Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Congressman Conyers: The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (``LDF''), urges you to oppose final passage of H.R. 1691, The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (``RLPA''). LDF litigates civil rights cases throughout the country on behalf of African Americans and other minorities in an effort to preserve equity, fairness and justice in educaiton, employment, housing, health care, environment, criminal justice, and voting rights. RLPA poses a potential threat to this type of litigation as RLPA may be used in a manner to limit African Americans and other minorities' rights to seek protection from discrimination under state and local antidiscrimination laws. Defendants in discrimination cases brought under state or local fair housing, employment, etc., laws may seek to avoid liability by claiming protection udner RLPA. This would require individuals and groups proceeding under such state and local antidiscrimination laws to prove that the law they wish to utilize is a least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. This requirement would significantly increase the litigation time and expense of pursuing even workday antidiscrimination actions and as a result could hinder or preclude some plaintiffs from pursuing their claims. Even if the courts ultimately rule, as they should, that the various state and local antidiscrimination statutes are least restrictive means to further compelling governmental interests, the uncertainty of whether statutes will withstand a RLPA defense may dissuade plaintiffs from seeking redress under antidiscrimination statutes. Of course, if any court were to determine that a particular antidiscrimination statute were not a least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, a successful RLPA defense would completely bar a plaintiff from proceeding under that statute. In either event, RLPA will create an additional burden for plaintiffs attempting to vindicate their civil rights. For these reasons, LDF asks that you oppose RLPA, which may be used as a mechanism to limit African Americans and other minorities from proceeding under the state and local laws that prohibit discrimination in a wide range of areas. Sincerely, Elaine R. Jones, Director-Counsel. Reed Colfax, Assistant Counsel. Examples of Unintended and Adverse Consequences from Enactment of H.R. 1691, the ``Religious Liberty Protection Act'' 1. Knives in schools. Pursuant to its policy prohibiting the possession of knives on school property, the school district forbade Sikh elementary school children to wear kirpans--seven-inch, ceremonial knives that are required by their religion. Relying on the ``Religious Freedom Restoration Act,'' the Sikhs filed suit and moved for a preliminary injunction barring the district from applying its no-knives policy to ban the possession of kirpans at school. The court required the school district to permit the children to wear the knives if the knives were basted in their scabbards. See Cheema v. Thompson, 36F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1994). 2. Sexual abuse. In Arizona, a Warlock recently defended his alleged sexual abuse of a 13-year-old girl as part of the Wiccan religion. The open question is what is the least restrictive means of dealing with religious conduct that results in sexual abuse or statutory rape. Although the state may have a compelling interest in preventing sexual abuse or statutory rape, conviction and incarceration may not be the least restrictive means of dealing with such individuals. 3. Refusal to pay child support. A member of the Northeast Kingdom Community Church--which requires members to eschew all their personal possessions and work for the benefit of the Community and forbids members to support estranged spouses or children who live outside the community--was found in contempt of court for failure to comply with an order to pay child support. He alleged that both the finding of contempt and the underlying support order violated his religious rights. The court vacated the judgment of contempt and remanded the case for a hearing as to the least restrictive means to enforce the defendant's support obligation. See Hunt v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 423 (1994). 4. Faith healing resulting in the death of a child. The son of a believer in the Christian Science Religion died at age 11 from juvenile-onset diabetes following three days of Christian Science care. A medical professional could have easily diagnosed the child's diabetes from the various symptoms he displayed in the weeks and days leading up to his death (particularly breath with a fruity aroma). Although juvenile-onset diabetes is usually responsive to insulin, even up to within two hours of death, the Christian Science individuals who cared for the child during his last days failed to seek medical care for him--pursuant to a central tenet of the Christian Science religion. The mother argued that a wrongful death suit brought by the child's father was not the least restrictive means of serving the state's interest in the health of the child. Rather, the state could have required the mother to report the child's illness to the authorities when death seemed imminent. The court held that the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion does not extend to conduct that threatens a child's life. See Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. App. 1995). 5. Refusal to cooperate with discovery request. A wrongful death suit alleged that the Church of Scientology is responsible for the death of an individual who died of a blood clot in her left lung after spending 17 days in the care of church staffers. The church is attempting to block discovery by contending that releasing the decedent's files would violate the church's ``sacred religious belief'' that the files remain confidential and that they be retained by the church for use in a parishioner's future lives. The court ruled that the decedent's estate had the right to see her files. Upon the passage of the Florida religious freedom restoration act, the court is now reconsidering its previous ruling. See Thomas C. Tobin, Scientologists Fight to Keep Files Secret, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 6, 1998, at 4B. 6. Conjugal visits in prison. A Roman Catholic argued that a prison regulation prohibiting condemned inmates from receiving conjugal visits violates his first amendment right to free exercise of religion. The court rejected this argument because the prisoner failed to show that the prison regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for condemned inmates is not rationally related to a valid penological interest. See Noguera v. Rowland, 940 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1991). Under RFRA and RLRA, the prison would have to show that its policy regulating conjugal visits was the least restrictive means of achieving compelling penological interests. 7. Jewelry in prison. Wisconsin severely restricted the wearing of jewelry by jail and prison inmates. The prison regulation forbade the possession of ``items which because of shape or configuration are apt to cause a laceration if applied to the skin with force,'' and the state refuses to make an exception for religious jewelry, such as crucifixes, which (unless made of cloth) fall within the ban. Inmates brought a suit against the relevant officials to enjoin, as a violation of RFRA, the defendant's refusal to make such an exception. The court held that, because prison security is a compelling state interest, if particular types of religious jewelry (or religious jewelry of any type in the hands of prisoners reasonably believed prone to use it for purposes of weaponry, barter, or gang insignia), pose a genuine threat to prison security, the state can ban them. Second-guessing the prison authorities, the court ruled that the jewelry in that case could not be banned. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996). 8. Class action against prison's grooming policy. Inmates confined by the State of South Carolina, including Muslims, Rastafarians, and Native Americans, filed a class action challenging a South Carolina grooming policy that required all male inmates to keep their hair short and their faces shaven. The inmates claimed that the Grooming Policy forced them to compromise their religious beliefs and practices, and therefore violated their rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Following invalidation of RFRA, the court held that the Grooming Policy is an eminently rational means of achieving the compelling governmental and prenological interests of maintaining order, discipline, and safety in prison and did not violate the inmates' free exercise rights. See Hines v. Taylor, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13362 (4th Cir. 1998). 9. Landmaking. St. Bartholomew's Church owned a Community House in which the church conducted many of its religious and community outreach activities. New York's Landmarks Preservation Commission denied the Church's requested to level the historic Community House and replace it with an office tower, which would both house the Church's religious activities and significantly enhance the Church's revenues through commercial rents. The Second Circuit found that whether the Church's religious activity was `'substantially burdened'' by New York's action turned on whether the Church ``had been denied the ability to practice [its] religion or coerced in the nature of those practices.'' the court found that New York's action did not punish any religious activity. See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990). Interestingly many of the cases file under RFRA turned on whether there was a ``substantial burden'' and determined that there was no such burden. In other words, RFRA (and RLPA) open the doors to the courthouse in many cases where the religion cannot meet the threshold inquiry. 10. Polygamy and abuse. A battered and bruised teenager fled from an isolated ranch that is used by a Utah polygamist sect as a reeducation camp for recalcitrant women and children. The husband of the girl was charged with incest and unlawful sexual conduct stemming from the sexual relations he allegedly had with her, his fifteenth wife. See Tom Kenwoorthy, Spotlight on Utah Polygamy; Teenager's Escape from Sect Revives Scrutiny of Practice. The Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1998, at A3. RLPA would offer the father a defense against statutory rape and polygamy. 11. Refusal to provide social security numbers to DMV. California residents contended that social security numbers are the ``mark of the beast'' in the biblical Book of Revelation and refused to give the DMV their numbers for applications of their driver's licensees. The court held that, because sincere religious convictions were involved, the DMV must use an alternate identification for those individuals. See John Dart, Judge Upholds Objections to Identifications, L.A. Times. October 25, 1997, at B1. In 1986, the Supreme Court rejected a similar request in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). RLPA would require a result much more in line with the California ruling than the Supreme Court's ruling. 12. Historic preservation. A Roman Church holds one service per week asked permission to demolish the entirety of the church,. which is located in the historic preservation district, for the purpose of expanding. When the City Council refused permission to demolish the church in its entirety, the church filed suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, claiming that the city's historic preservation law could not be applied to a church. The Supreme Court held that RFRA is unconstitutional. Boerne v. Flores, 117 Ct. 2157 (1997). RLPA invites churches and religious individuals to thwart and ignore all land use laws, including historic and cultural preservation laws. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time. My colleagues, as the bill presently stands, whenever a parties brings suit claiming discrimination, the defendant will be able to claim that this is inconsistent with their religious beliefs. We are creating a huge disparity here. The Nadler amendment responds to the problem, thank goodness, by specifying that the bill's protections only apply to individuals, religious institutions, and small businesses. So the amendment will be particularly helpful with regard to laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital status, disability, sexual orientation, where there has not been found by the court a compelling interest test. That is why the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union have recently broken from this loose coalition because they realize what we would be doing if we allowed this bill to go through without this very important amendment. We do not want to turn a shield into a sword. At our hearings, the Christian Legal Society acknowledged that they planned a widespread campaign to use the Religion Freedom Protection Act to undermine State laws protecting people with different orientations. Please support the Nadler substitute.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt). I believe he is the ranking member on the subcommittee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), the ranking member of Committee on Rules, for granting me the time. Religious freedom has been one of the cornerstones of American democracy, of course, since our founding. Like the Members of this body, I believe all of them, I am committed to preserving religious freedom. So we have before us soon today, first of all, we have a rule which I am in support of, but the bill, well-intentioned as it is, may cause far more harm than good. Because, instead of limiting religious discrimination, it will allow for an increase in other forms of discrimination. Instead of enhancing constitutional protections, it may very well run afoul of the Constitution itself. I would like to take a moment or two to explain this. A letter came to me from the American Civil Liberties Union that started out working with a coalition supporting this bill. It was multiracial, multireligious. But now the Religious Liberty Protection Act is being opposed by the Civil Liberties organization because it does not include explicit language ensuring that the language will not undermine the enforcement of civil rights laws. The Congress should not break from its long-standing practice, they say, of refraining from undermining or preempting State civil rights laws that are more protective of civil rights sometimes than even Federal law. So the opposition by the Civil Liberties organization is, unless this bill is corrected and amended to protect civil rights laws, and I think the substitute of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) would accomplish this, we would have a very serious problem. The Civil Liberties Union goes on to say that, We are no longer a part of the coalition supporting the Religious Liberty Protection Act because we could not ignore the potentially severe consequences that it may have on State and local civil rights laws. And although we believe that courts should find civil rights laws compelling and uniform enforcement of these laws the least restrictive means, we know that at least several courts have already rejected that position. We have found that landlords across the country have been using State religious liberty claims to challenge the application of State and local civil rights laws protecting persons against marital status discrimination. Now, none of these claims involve owner-occupied housing. All of the landlords owned many investment properties that were outside of the State laws exemptions for small landlords. These landlords are companies. And they all sought to turn the shield of religious exercise protection into a sword against civil rights prospective tenants. So, Mr. Speaker, we want to consider an alternative, an improvement, if possible, to this measure. Without this improvement, I think this is a serious regression in both religious liberty and in civil rights protections as well. Remember, if you will, that a measure that will lead to an increase in discrimination, because whenever a party is sued for discrimination, this bill will allow in effect, the religious liberty defense, it will in effect allow a defendant to say, I have discriminated because my religion allowed me to do it. My religion made me do it. This is a right no other citizen or government can assert. So the bill is so sweeping that this new defense will not only apply to religious institutions themselves but to companies and corporations as well.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), who has worked very diligently on this measure.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to underscore a point made by the gentleman from North Carolina with reference to the commerce clause, because that has not been brought up and discussed in the fullness that he has done it. The bill is using now the commerce clause to seek to have a cover of constitutionality to protect religious liberty. In order to invoke that clause, it seems to me that we will now have to equate religion with interstate commercial activity, something I am not prepared to do this afternoon. And if we equate religion with interstate commerce, does it not open the door to further regulation of religion through the commerce power? And there I think these problems that the gentleman from North Carolina does not want to take a chance on finding out what a conservative court is going to do kicks in here and it makes this reference between a bill that was held partially unconstitutional and an attempt to remedy the other half of it through this measure that is before us now. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to stand here today to congratulate the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) on the committee; the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Davis), who has put this bill before us and brought it to our attention; and all of those in this House and in the other body who have helped make this a day that a conference report can be brought to the floor for support. It represents a marked improvement over the House-passed version of the bill of which I was not able to support in the House form. The bill was improved first in the Senate at the insistence of many Democrats and again in conference at the insistence of the administration. As has been suggested, a lot of work went into this, including members of the staff, and I think we now have a bill, though far from perfect and despite some last-minute drafting glitches, I believe it will achieve the purpose of allowing high-tech companies to focus on the fixing of the Y2K problem without trampling on consumer rights. I am glad the administration met with the conferees over the past weekend to achieve this compromise. Had we taken up the Senate-passed bill as some in this body were proposing, we would be facing a drastically worse bill which would surely have faced a presidential veto. More importantly, I can support this legislation because it represents a one-time Federal response to a unique nationwide problem relating to possible year 2000 computer failures and does not serve in any way as precedent for broader-ranging changes in our tort laws. In addition, the bill will have no force or effect with respect to actions stemming from any harm occurring after January 1, 2003. In my judgment, the final conference report is far closer in text and in spirit to the Democratic substitute offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) and myself, which received 190 votes here in the House, than it is to the more extreme bill that was originally passed by the House. The conference report improves upon the House-passed bill in a number of respects. First, it deletes the so-called reasonable defense effort. Under this defense, of course, a defendant who was grossly negligent could completely avoid liability as long as he took minimal steps to fix the problem, even if these efforts did not result in a cure and caused substantial damages. It also deletes the ``loser pays'' defense requiring a litigant to pay the other side's attorneys fees if they rejected a pretrial settlement and ultimately obtained a less favorable verdict. The provision would operate as a tremendous disincentive to small businesses and poor and middle-class victims of Y2K failures because they have far less financial resources and cannot afford the risk of paying a large corporation's legal fees based on the outcome of a trial. The conference report also significantly narrows the doctrine of joint and several liability limitation. The House bill, my colleagues will recall, would have wiped out the doctrine of joint and several liability. Fortunately, the conference report excludes individual consumers from this limitation and incorporates several changes designed to protect innocent plaintiffs and help ensure that ``bad actors'' are not rewarded. Finally, the conference report significantly narrows the bill's punitive damages limitations. The Committee on the Judiciary reported a bill that would have prevented any plaintiff from ever receiving punitive damages in a Y2K action. The conference report is far fairer and caps punitive damages at the lesser of three times the compensatory damages or $250,000 and only applies caps to small business defendants. So although the legislation is not perfect, on balance I believe it will help protect the Nation's high-tech community against frivolous lawsuits and encourage businesses to remedy their Y2K problems without unduly infringing on the rights of small business and individual plaintiffs. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a letter from John Podesta to myself dated June 30, 1999, as well as a section-by-section description of the Y2K conference report, as follows: The White House, Washington, June 30, 1999. Re H.R. 775--the Year 2000 Readiness and Responsibility Act. Hon. John Conyers, Jr., House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Representative Conyers: The nation faces the possibility that widespread frivolous litigation will distract high technology companies and firms throughout the economy from the important work of preventing--and if necessary--repairing damage caused by the inability of systems to process dates in the new millennium. Special, time-limited legislation to deter unwarranted Y2K lawsuits is important to our economy. Over the last few months, the Administration sought to ensure that, while we deterred frivolous claims, we also preserved important protections for litigants who suffer bona fide harm. We believed that the Senate-passed bill failed this test. The Conference Committee agreed to make a list of changes that were important to provide necessary protections. The agreed-upon changes were translated into legislative language extremely narrowly, threatening the effectiveness of the negotiated protections. Nonetheless, we have concluded that, with these changes, the legislation is significantly improved. Specifically, as modified, the Conference Report: ensures that individual consumers can be made whole for harm suffered, even if a partially responsible party is judgment- proof; excludes actions brought by investors from most provisions of the bill and preserves the ability of the SEC to bring actions to protect investors and the integrity of the national securities markets; ensures that public health, safety and the environment are fully protected, even if some firms are temporarily unable to fully comply with all regulatory requirements due to Y2K failures; encourages companies to act responsibly and remediate because those defendants who act recklessly are liable for a greater share of a plaintiff's uncollectible damages; and ensures that unconscionable contracts cannot be enforced against unwary consumers or small businesses. As a result, I will recommend to the President that he sign the bill when it comes to his desk. In the normal course of business, the Administration would oppose many of the extraordinary steps taken in this legislation to alter liability and procedural rules. The Y2K problem is unique and unprecedented. The Administration's support for this legislation in no way reflects support for its provisions in any other context. Sincerely, John Podesta.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, Dr. Maurice Waters, recently a Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University in Detroit, and his wife, Dr. Elinor Waters, former Director of Oakland University's Continuum Center in Rochester, MI, are a most extraordinary couple. This past Saturday, they celebrated their 50th Wedding Anniversary and given their activities and vigor, it is conceivable that they are just now hitting their stride. They may epitomize the adage of a rolling stone gathering no moss. I have known Maury Waters and his family for a number of years. He presently has Professor Emeritus status at Wayne State and has moved from the Detroit area to Chevy Chase. During his nearly 40 years at Wayne State, he not only taught political science as an assistant and then as a tenured Professor--specializing in International Relations-- but he managed to author five books, eleven major articles and book chapters and dozens of conference papers. While in Detroit, he was a board member and chairman of the Center for Peace and Conflict, which is affiliated with Wayne. He also taught at the University of Wisconsin, at Antioch College in Ohio and at the University of the West Indies, in Kingston, Jamaica. Dr. Waters was also a Foreign Policy Associate under the Rockefeller Foundation as a Research Scholar at the United Nations. Beyond teaching at Oakland University and directing its Continuum Center, Elly Waters has also authored numerous books and professional articles and is a nationally acclaimed expert in the field of counseling older people and adult career development. She worked at the Merrill-Palmer Institute in Detroit, at the Fels Institute in Yellow Springs, OH, and the Industrial Relations Center of the University of Chicago and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Dr. Waters has also served on numerous national boards including the American Counseling Association and the National Board for Certified Counselors and was President of the Association for Adult Development and Aging. After ``retiring'' for a few years and moving to the Washington, DC area, they could have rested on their laurels and taken it easy, but that is not their style. Elly continues as a training consultant, serving on national boards and accepting speaking assignments. Maury pursued his interest in the United Nations and is now a member of the board of the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area. Then, as the Clinton Impeachment proceedings began to take place, Maury approached me to express serious concerns about certain constitutional and precedential implications of where the House was going. He then said he would assist me on Capitol Hill with this historical matter. His advice proved so valuable that I coaxed him out of his ostensive retirement and hired him as a parttime Senior Advisor. In addition to their full and active professional careers, Maury and Elly had three children, George, Rob, and Judy. They are also blessed with two grandchildren: Caitlin, who lives here in the D.C. area, and Joshua, in California. Maury and Elly have become bi-coastal grandparents, traveling frequently. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the lesson to be learned from the Doctors Waters is that intellectual and professional activity, supported by a loving family, can keep two people young and contribute to a long and fruitful marriage such as this one that has succeeded for half a century. My congratulations to them both.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, to the Members of the House of Representatives, I would like Members to understand that there is wide, wide support not only in the committee but among organizations for reforming civil asset forfeiture. When we bring together the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman of Committee on Judiciary, myself, the ranking member, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr), then we have a combination that covers, I think, the entire political philosophical spectrum of the Congress. When we bring also the American Civil Liberties Union, the Criminal Defense Lawyers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Cato Institute, and the National Rifle Association, we have a combination of organizations that I think they come together every 10 years on a legislative agreement. But it is wide, it is deserved, it is merited only because we have now found a process that is so abominable that it must be corrected, and we are very proud to have this wide array of philosophical views joining behind the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act, H.R. 1658. Would my colleagues believe that, under current law, the government can confiscate an individual's private property on a mere showing of probable cause and then, even though the person may never have been convicted of a crime, require the person to file an action in Federal court to prove that the property is not subject to forfeiture in order to get the property back. Well, that is the state of the law. There is no question that forfeiture laws, as Congress has intended to serve legitimate law enforcement purposes, and in the greater instances, they do, but they are currently susceptible to abuse and abuse that this measure proposes to correct. There is also a problem for racial minorities. For example, a 10- month Pittsburgh Press investigation of drug law seizure and forfeiture included an examination of court records on 121 sole suspected drug courier stops, where money was seized and no drugs were discovered. The Pittsburgh Press found that African-American, Latino, and Asian persons accounted for 77 percent of these arrests. So this bill before us today, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act, seeks to change this and to make Federal civil forfeiture laws more equitable in a number of ways. First of all, we change the burden of proof. Very few places in our law other than this, if any, require that the person coming in carry the burden of proof. Well, not so in forfeiture law. So if a property owner challenges a seizure, we want the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. There cannot be any problems with that. Now it is just the reverse. The government comes in, and the person seized has to prove that the property should not have been seized. This provision that we correct places the burden of proof where it historically belongs under United States jurisprudence within the government agency that performed the seizure. It protects individuals from the difficult task of proving a negative, in other words, that their property was not subject to forfeiture, which may be pretty hard to prove. Secondly, I think it is important that the bill provide for the appointment of legal counsel if the person challenging the forfeiture is indigent or cannot otherwise afford proper legal counsel. What this provision does is simply recognize that legal representation is appropriate, indeed necessary, to defend against this type of deprivation of property. Now, in determining whether or not to appoint counsel, the court must consider whether the claim appears to be made in good faith. Because if it is, they should get counsel. If it is not, they should not be provided counsel. Third, the bill permits a court to provisionally return the seized property to the owner before the final adjudication is complete if the claimant can prove and demonstrate substantial hardship. Now this could occur, for example, if the forfeiture crippled the functioning of a business, which oftentimes is the case, prevented an individual from working, or left an individual homeless in the case of where homes are seized. Individuals lives and livelihoods should not be in peril during the course of a legal challenge to a seizure. The next thing we do that I think commends the bill to the Members of the House of Representatives is that we create a uniform innocent owner defense against forfeiture to prevent people from losing their property because of the wrongdoing of others. The presumption of innocence is fundamental to the American criminal justice system and should be in the case of civil asset forfeiture. This basic tenet, however, is seriously compromised whenever assets are confiscated, as they are now often seized under these forfeiture statutes without proof of wrongdoing by the owner. The next thing that we do that I think should attract the attention and support of the Members is that we permit individuals who prevail in their forfeiture challenges to be able to sue the government if their property was destroyed or damaged, what could be more fair than that, while it was in government custody. It makes little sense to grant the right to reclaim the property only to find that it has lost all or half of its value. The next item that is in this bill that I commend to the Members' attention is the requirement that the government pay successful claimant post-judgment interest as well as prejudgment interest on currency. This provision prevents the government from gaining a windfall on improperly seized property and puts the property owner in the position he or she would have been if the property had not been seized in the first instance. The next thing that we do is eliminate the current requirement that a claimant must file a bond before challenging a forfeiture. This lifts a financial hurdle to filing a forfeiture challenge. Finally, we expand the time to file a forfeiture challenge by 10 days from 20 to 30 days, giving additional persons time to learn about their rights and file a claim. We believe that this measure is long overdue in coming. We have had a very thorough and fair hearing in the Committee on the Judiciary. Everybody is pleased about it. But I should warn my colleagues that a substitute may be offered that would expand the categories of crime, that would worsen the measure that is before us, expanding categories of crime subject to a civil forfeit, and includes a seize now, fish for evidence later provision that allows the government to hold the property with no evidence, and then use their powerful Federal civil discovery tools to seek more evidence to try to build their case. So I would like to put our colleagues on notice that there is a substitute that would completely reverse the benefits of this bill. I urge Members, both Democratic and Republican, to join us in the bill that has the widest support both in and out of the House. Mr. Chairman, I include the following document, entitled ``The Need for H.R. 1658: Recent Cases of Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuses of Innocent, Legitimate Businesspeople and Entities'' as follows: The Need for H.R. 1658 Recent Cases of Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuses of Innocent, Legitimate Businesspeople and Entities Houston, Texas: Red Carpet Motel--Raise Your Prices or Else! February 17, 1998, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Houston seized a Red Carpet Motel in a high-crime area of the city. The government's action was based on a negligence theory-- that the motel owners, GWJ Enterprises Inc. and Hop Enterprises Inc., had somehow ``tacitly approved'' alleged drug activity in the motel's rooms by some of its overnight guests. There were no allegations that the hotel owners participated in any crimes. Indeed, motel personnel called the police to the establishment dozens of times to report suspected drug-related activity. U.S. Attorney James DeAtley readily bragged to the press that he envisioned using current civil asset forfeiture laws in the same fashion against similar types of legitimate commercial enterprises, such as apartment complexes. The government claimed the hotel deserved to be seized and forfeited because it had ``failed'' to implement all of the ``security measures'' dictated by law enforcement officials. This failure to agree with law enforcement about what security measures were affordable and wise from a legitimate business-operating standpoint was deemed to be the ``tacit approval'' of illegality cited by the prosecutors, subjecting the motel to forfeiture action. One of the government's ``recommendations'' refused by the motel owners was to raise room rates. A Houston Chronicle editorial pointed to the absurdity and danger of this government forfeiture theory against legitimate business: ``Perhaps another time, the advice will be to close up shop altogether.'' The editorial went on to make these additional, excellent points: ``The prosecution's action in this case is contrary not only to the reasonable exercise of government, but it contradicts government-supported enticements to businesses that locate in areas where high crime rates have thwarted development. Good people should not have to fear property seizure because they operate business in high-crime areas. Nor should they forfeit their property because they have failed to do the work of law enforcement. . . . This case demonstrates clearly the need for lawmakers to make a close- re-examination of federal drug forfeiture laws.'' . . . (emphasis added) After more bad publicity all over Texas, in July 1998, the government finally released the motel back to the owners and dropped its forfeiture proceedings. It exacted a face-saving, written ``agreement'' with the motel owners. The agreement, however, in fact only put into words the security measures and goals the owners had already undertaken and those which it had always strived to meet. The motel owners had lost their business establishment to the government's seizure for several months, suffered a significant loss of good business reputation, and were forced to spend substantial amounts of time and money on hiring an attorney and defending against the government's forfeiture action, which should never have been undertaken in the first place. [Source: Houston Chronicle, Mar. 12, 1998 editorial and 1998 articles Dallas Morning News, 1998 articles (unreported case)] San Jose, California: Aquarius Systems, Inc--Your Buyer, Your Assets! October 28, 1998, a federal judge in San Jose, California finally granted summary judgment against the government in a civil forfeiture action, ruling that the government must return to Los Angeles-based Aquarius Systems, Inc. (aka CAF Technologies Inc.) the $296,000 it had seized from it 6 years ago. Aquarius and 4 other computer chip dealer companies had been accused of marketing stolen chips. Federal agents, who participated in this ``sting'' operation, then seized $1.6 million of the companies' chip-buying, operating money. Unknown to Aquarius Systems, Inc., the buyer used by the company had been operating for his own profit, by purchasing chips for $50.00 each while reporting to his supervisors at the company a unit cost of $296.00 (which at the time was a reasonable price). (The buyer ultimately served a short sentence of conspiracy to buy stolen property.) In his ruling ordering the government to return to Aquarius $296,000 of its seized operating money, U.S. District Court Judge Jeremy Fogel blamed the government for dragging its feet on due process, by tying up the company's operating assets for so many years. Ruled the Court: ``It is incumbent upon the government to institute civil forfeiture proceedings expeditiously.'' The judge then denied the government's motion for summary judgment against the company, and granted the company's motion for summary judgment against the government. The Court held that Aquarius Systems knew nothing about what its buyer was doing. As the judge noted, the company was unusual in its ability to stave off ruin from the government's seizure and forfeiture action, and in its ability ``to fight [it] for six years.'' [Source: The (California) Recorder, Nov. 17, 1998 article (unreported case)] Chicago, Illinois: Family-Owned and Operated Congress Pizzeria--Restaurant+Money+3 Handguns=Forfeiture? September 3, 1997, Anthony Lombardo, owner and proprietor of the family business, Congress Pizeria of Chicago, was finally returned over $500,000 in currency improperly seized from his restaurant in early 1993. It took him over four years, and much expensive litigation, all the way to the federal court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit, before former U.S. Attorney and Chief Judge Bauer and his colleagues on the Court ordered the government to return Mr. Lombardo's money. Based on the ``confidential informant'' testimony of Josue Torres, the Chicago Police Department conducted a search of Congress Pizzeria. Torres, a crack addict, had been employed as a truck driver for the restaurant up until a few months before he told his story to the police. He told the police that he regularly fenced stolen property at various places in Chicago in order to feed his crack cocaine habit, and that Congress Pizzeria was one of the places in which he did so. On this, a warrant was issued to authorize police to search the pizzeria and to seize a camera, a snowblower, a television, and three VCRs, which are items the informant said he had sold to the sons at the restaurant. None of these items were found. During the search, however, the police did ``find'' and seize three unregistered guns, and $506,076 in U.S. currency. The money was in a make-shift safe in the family-owned restaurant--a forty-four gallon barrel located inside either a boarded-up elevator or a dumb-water shaft (the record was somewhat unclear). It was wrapped in plastic bags and consisted of mostly small bills--such as might be expected from transactions by a pizzeria. The owner's son, Frank Lombardo, was present at the time of the search. He was arrested and charged with possessing unregistered firearms (the guns at the restaurant). At the state court proceeding, the guns case thrown out, because ``it was not apparent that the guns were contraband per se'' and ``the guns were seized prior to the establishment of probable cause to seize them.'' No other state or federal criminal case was every investigated or charged against the Lombardos or their pizzeria. The federal government nonetheless moved to seize and forfeit the $500,000 ``found'' in the pizzeria, under current civil asset forfeiture drug laws. The government's theory of why this money was forfeitable as ``drug money'' was this: The owner's son, Frank Lombardo, was said to have been ``extremely distraught'' and ``visibly shaken when he was told that the money was being seized'' from his family's restaurant; and, said the government, he had ``offered no explanation for the cash horde.'' (Later, Frank went to the police station to explain that the money belonged to his father, the owner of the pizzeria, who was then in Florida.) Drug-sniffing dogs were also brought to the police station (not in the pizzeria), to check out the money for the presence of drugs. A narcotics canine named Rambo was instructed to ``fetch dope'' and he grabbed on bundle of money from the table and ripped the packaging apart. To the amazement of the court of appeals, this behavior apparently indicated to the officers the presence of drugs on the money. At best, as the Court noted, the dog only identified narcotics on one bundle of the seized currency even though the officers seized 31,392 separate bills in multiple bundles. And, even the government admitted that no one can place much stock in the results of dog sniffs because at least \1/3\ of all the currency circulating in the United States, and perhaps as much as 90-96%, is known to be contaminated with cocaine. (Indeed, as the court of appeals noted, even Attorney General Reno's purse was found by a dog sniff to contain such contaminated currency.) On this non-evidence of any nexus between the money and drugs, the government kept the money of Mr. Lombardo and his family Pizzeria for 4 years--until the 7th Circuit finally ruled that it must be returned, in late 1998. The Court held that the government had in fact failed to establish even the cursory burden that it is supposed to shoulder under current law--the establishment of ``probable cause'' to seize property in the first place. None of the supposed ``suspicious factors'' cited by the government had ``any bearing on the probable cause determination. The existence of any sum of money, standing alone, is not enough to establish probable cause to believe the money is forfeitable.'' Nor, for the reasons discussed above, was the police-station, drug-sniffing dog episode enough for probable cause. And, ``putting to one side the fact that the state court suppressed the guns as evidence against Frank Lombardo, [there is] no reason to believe that the presence of handguns should necessarily implicate narcotics activity or that their presence need be seen as anything other than protection in a small business setting.'' In conclusion, the Court wrote: ``We believe the government's conduct in forfeiture cases leaves much to be desired. We are certainly not the first court to be `enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes.' '' (Quoting US v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992)) [Source: U.S. v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F. 3d 442 (7th Cir. 1997) (Bauer, J.).] North Dakota and Daytona Beach, Florida: Customs versus Bob's Space Racers--Who's Amusement? In 1997, on a routine business trip, a large number of circus employees of the Bob's Space Racers Company, of Daytona Beach, Florida, were traveling to Canada. Bob's Space Racers, a privately held company, is one of the leading providers of amusement park games. The company also provides entertainment at traveling circuses. As normal, the employees had been provided with their salary and traveling expenses for the project in cash. Thus, each of the 14 employees had several hundred dollars in his or her pockets when the group attempted to cross the border into Canada from North Dakota. Customs agents at the North Dakota border seized all their money on the theory that, when the Customs agents aggregated all the money carried by each of the 14 employees, the total came to just over $10,000--the amount of money triggering the regulations about ``declaring'' and filing Customs' ``cash reporting'' forms (Form 4790). Customs had no basis for ``aggregating'' the money of the employees. And there was no reason to believe the employees were part of any conspiracy to smuggle money out of the country without filing the appropriate Customs forms. Indeed, the company informed Customs that the money was legitimate traveling expenses. Into 1998, at least, the company was still trying to get Customs to remit the employee travel expenses seized. [Source: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force Co-Chair David B. Smith, Alexandria, Virginia (unreported case)] Haleyville, Alabama: Doctor, Beware Your Banker? In 1996, after many years and much costly litigation, Dr. Richard Lowe of the small northwest Alabama town of Haleyville, was finally returned his wrongfully seized life savings of almost $3 million, when the 11th Circuit Court of Federal Appeals ordered the government to return it. Dr. Lowe, MD, is something of a throwback. He's a country doctor in small-town America, who still charged $5.00 for an office visit in 1997. He drives a used car and lives in a very modest home. When he was a small child in the Depression, he lost $4.52 in savings when the local bank failed in his home town in rural Alabama. His parents lost all of their savings when that bank collapsed. Because of that experience, he has always hoarded cash. He'd empty his pockets at night into shoe boxes in a closet at home. Over the years, he had accumulated several boxes of cash in the back of a closet in his home. In 1988, he consolidated his savings in the First Bank of Roanoke, Alabama--in order to set up a charitable account for a small private K-12 school in his hometown that was about to fail. He transferred all of his life savings into the consolidated account. At the time the government first wrongfully seized his account, in June 1991, Dr. Lowe had given the school over $900,000, had saved it from collapse, and was still contributing to it. In the fall of 1990, his wife was urging him to do something about the boxes of money in the closet. The Doctor said OK, you count it and we'll put it in the school's account. It came to $316,911 in denominations of ones, fives, tens and twenties. Some of the bills were as much as 20 years old. Dr. Lowe took the money to the bank and gave it to the bank president, who was a longtime friend and former neighbor of Dr. Lowe's. This is the first cash that had ever been placed in the bank account. All the other money had been transferred by check from other banks when CD's matured. The bank president knew the Doctor was obsessive about anonymity; he did not want to be known as a ``rich doctor.'' So, instead of depositing the money to the account, the bank president just put the money in the bank vault. He gave the Doctor a receipt for the deposit, but he chose to simply put the money in the bank's vault. Then, with some of the money over the next 6 weeks, the bank president went to neighboring banks in the vicinity of Roanoke, and bought $6,000, $7,000, and $8,000 cashier's checks, and then credited it to Dr. Lowe's account. When some of the other banks thought it was peculiar that the Roanoke bank president was doing this, they made a report to authorities. When FBI agents came to interview the bank president, he told them exactly what he had done and why. He told them that it was his idea and not Dr. Lowe's. And he told them that as he understood the reporting laws, he had done nothing wrong. Still, the FBI and U.S. Attorney decided to seize Dr. Lowe's account. They did not just seize the $316,000 in cash deposits. They seized his entire account--his entire life savings of some $2.5 million, at the time. The bank president and his son, who was vice president, were both indicted. The bank president later made a deal with the government to plead guilt to structuring/reporting violations, in exchange for the government's dismissal of charges against his son. And, a full two years after the seizure and attempted forfeiture of the Doctor's accounts, during which time all of his money was held by the government, the government decided to indict Dr. Lowe as well, for the alleged reporting transgressions of his banker. It is, however, not violation of law, and certainly no crime, for a bank to send cash to another domestic financial institution. That is not within the definition of illegal ``structuring.'' In short, there was no offense here, by even the banker, let alone the totally innocent, ignorant bank customer, Dr. Lowe. Prosecutors kept pursuing their case against the Doctor anyway. With just one more week to go before his trial was to start, the prosecutors balked at taking their shoddy case to a jury. The government, to save face, offer the Doctor a ``pretrial diversion'' rather than simply dismissing the case, as they should have done. Under the diversion, the Doctor had to agree to stay out of trouble for one year and the case would be dismissed. Of course, the Doctor had no trouble staying out of trouble, as he had never done anything wrong to begin with, or in his entire life. Still, even then, the U.S. Attorney General's office in Birmingham refused to drop its civil asset forfeiture action against Dr. Lowe's life savings account--clinging to the fact that, under current law, the burden remained on the Doctor to prove his money innocent! While prosecutors now understood there was no ``structuring'' violation by anyone, as they had initially asserted they changed their theory to this Alice in Wonderland claim: Dr. Lowe's account was forfeitable under civil asset forfeiture laws because the bank had failed to file with the government the required regulatory reporting form, a Cash Transaction Report (CRT), upon receipt of Dr. Lowe's $300,000 in currency. At best, this was a violation by the bank, not the customer. Yet, the government deemed this enough to proceed in a civil forfeiture action against the Doctor's life savings--to force him to meet his burden of proof under current law, or else lose his property permanently. The federal district court judge did rule that there was nothing wrong with the underlying account until the $300,000 cash deposit. And thus, he held that these monies should be returned to the Doctor. This was 3 years after the government's initial seizure--for 3 years, Dr. Lowe was denied access to any of his life savings. The federal district court judge erred in ruling for the government on the $300,000 in currency, ``finding'' without any evidence that the Doctor ``must have exhorted'' the bank president (his words) not to file the technical CTR with the government, even though the government itself had never even noticed that a CRT had not been filed when it started its action against Dr. Lowe, the bank president and his son. Dr. Lowe somehow had the wherewithal to continue his long fight against the government's wrongful taking of his money, and appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Finally, in late 1996, the court of appeals vindicated Dr. Lowe. It reversed the lower court's erroneous ruling, holding that, even under current, distorted civil asset forfeiture law, the Doctor had shown by evidence clear beyond a preponderance that he knew nothing of the banker's actions. Meanwhile, though, he was without access to any of his seized life savings for 3 years, and without access to $300,000 of his accounts (which he had donated to the private school) for 6 years. He faced a wrongful indictment and threat of criminal trial. And he endured the financial, physical and emotional devastation of lengthy, costly litigation against a U.S. Attorneys Office blindly pursuing his assets, no matter the shoddy nature of its case. Perhaps the government thought it could simply sear ``the old man'' out? The impact of this experience on him was so severe that Dr. Lowe had to hospitalized at least once for stress and high blood pressure. Very few victims of such governmental abuse would have been able to keep fighting to win, as did the extraordinary Dr. Lowe. [Source: Hearing before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, on H.R. 1835 (105th Congress), June 11, 1997 (Testimony of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force Co-Chair E.E. Edwards III, Nashville, Tennessee) (unpublished case)] Kent, Washington: Maya's Restaurant--The Sins of the Brother? In 1993, in the Seattle suburb of Kent, Washington, police officers stormed Maya's Mexican food restaurant in the middle of business hours, ordering customers out of the establishment, and telling the patrons that the restaurant was being forfeited because ``the owners were drug dealers.'' Local newspapers prominently publicized that Maya's restaurant had been closed and seized by the government for ``drug dealing.'' Exequiel Soltero is the president and sole stockholder in Soltero Corp., the small business owner of the restaurant. The actual allegation was that his brother had sold a few grams of cocaine in the men's restroom of the restaurant at some point. Exequiel Soltero and the Soltero Corporation Inc. were completely innocent of any wrongdoing and had no knowledge whatsover of the brother's suspected drug sale inside the restaurant. According to the informant relied upon by the law enforcement officers, the brother had told him that he was part owner of the restaurant. This was not true. It was nothing but puffery from the brother. The officers never made any attempt to check it out. If they had, they would have easily learned that Exequiel Soltero was the sole owner of the Soltero Corp., Inc., and Maya's. There was no notice or any opportunity for Mr. Soltero to be heard before the well-publicized, business-ruining raid and seizure of his restaurant. Fortunately, Mr. Soltero was able to hire a lawyer to contest the government's seizure and forfeiture action, but not until his restaurant had already been raided and his business had suffered an onslaught of negative media attention about being seized for ``drug dealing.'' Further his restaurant was shut down for 5 days before his lawyer was able to get it re-opened. Finally, when Mr. Soltero volunteered to take, and passed, a polygraph test conducted by a police polygraph examiner, the case was dismissed. However the reckless raid, seizure and forfeiture quest by the authorities cost him thousands of dollars in lost profits for the several days his restaurant was shut down, as well as significant, lingering damages to his good business reputation. And he suffered the loss of substantial legal fees fighting the seizure of his business. [Source: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force Co-Chair Richard Troberman, Seattle, Washington (unreported case)] Notes on Recent Cases and Hyde/Conyers Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. I tell the gentleman that that is absolutely not in contention now. I am just hoping that he can support the Conyers- Lofgren motion to instruct which is about the compromise around three major issues that are still out.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren).

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on each side?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for New York for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, I rise to indicate that on our side we support the rule, a modified open rule, and urge its support by all the Members. We want to try to proceed to general debate and the amendments, and hope that this measure may terminate and be concluded in final passage by this evening.