John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. As a matter of fact, I think particularly with an inclusion for exceptions for undue hardships this amendment is an important one. The Bankruptcy Code prohibits the discharge of federally made guaranteed or insured education loans or education loans made by nonprofit institutions. What the gentleman from South Carolina would do now is extend the prohibition from discharge to all qualified education loans and include exceptions for undue hardships. That is the thrust of the amendment, and we have no objection to that whatsoever. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment that we find absolutely acceptable, and I plan to support it, and we urge the Members to join in support of it. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute. Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the esteemed chairman of the subcommittee that the Bankruptcy Commission was the one that turned down means testing, which has now been put into the bill. So I am glad that he picks and chooses those that he likes. There are some people involved in labor that have a strong opposition to the bill without this amendment. They are called the AFL-CIO. That is the largest collective bargaining organization in the United States of America. They have examined it pretty carefully. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I wish to say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Chairman, that apparently the Congressional Budget Office did not see the savings that the gentleman envisions in this, and the gentleman has been here long enough to remember the Paperwork Reduction Act. Whatever happened to that? Here, if the gentleman were to examine the proceedings in any bankruptcy court, he would quickly know that the court can demand an income tax return, and certainly any party in interest is not about to forget to bring that in to the proceeding if there is any slight notice that he needs it. So what the gentleman from North Carolina is doing is merely making this optional to anybody that wants it, and here the gentleman from Pennsylvania is resisting it. If a Federal agency tried to promulgate this rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania would be leading the Congress in demanding to know why they want such unnecessary authority. So, please, let us improve the bill to at least this minor amount.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today is a historic day for jazz lovers all over the world, because today marks Duke Ellington's 100th birthday. Edward Kennedy Ellington was born right here in the Nation's capital on April 29, 1899. The nickname Duke was given to him by his friends because of his regal air and his love of fancy clothes with elegant style. He retained those traits throughout his life, but he wore his sophistication without a hint of pretentiousness. The Duke was a genius at instrumental combinations, improvisions, and jazz arranging which brought the world the unique ``Ellington'' sound that found consummate expression in works like ``Mood Indigo,'' and ``Sophisticated Lady.'' He said he decided to become a musician when, in his youth, he realized that ``when you were playing piano there was always a pretty girl standing down at the bass clef end of the piano.'' It became obvious that he was truly talented when he played his first musical composition, ``What You Gonna Do When the Bed Breaks Down?'' When he finished the crowd went wild and demanded more, however, since he had not written any other music he changed the arrangement and style right there on the spot. Thus, began the Duke's magnificent career as one of the world's greatest composers. A pioneer, an innovator and an inspiration to generations, Duke Ellington personified elegance and sophistication. Also, he was a creative genius who never stopped exploring new dimensions of his musical world. By the end of his life, he would declare, ``Music is my mistress.'' And so it was. No other lover was ever better kept, or in grander style. Duke Ellington knew how to treat his Muse. And she returned the favor. The power of his presence was as strong off the stage as on. Ellington's nephew, Stephen James, says, ``When you were in his presence, you felt it. If no one knew him and he were in . . . [a] room, everybody would be drawn to him. It was just the nature of his aura, his magnetism.'' Ellington's career as a bandleader lasted more than fifty years; during at least forty-five of which he was a public figure of some prominence. It is often said that there were three high-water marks in that span. The first occurred in the late 1920s, when he attained the security and prestige of a residency at the Cotton Club, where the best black entertainers of the day worked for gangsters and performed at night for all-white audiences. Duke survived those years with his dignity intact--no small achievement--and he learned from his musicians, some of whom were then more skilled than he. By the end of the twenties, he had begun to experiment as a composer and arranger, and had several hits under his belt. In the early thirties, he sharpened his skills, and made his first attempts at composing longer works. By the late thirties, he had assembled the best collection of players he ever had under his command at one time. Duke showed off his musicians in miniature masterpieces, three-minute concertos that displayed a single soloist against the backdrop of a tightly-knit ensemble. Many of these pieces are among his most enduring. Others from this time, equally memorable, explore a dizzyingly shifting labyrinth of textures, as different instruments take the lead and the accompaniment moves from one section of the band to another. Billy Strayhorn, a brilliant young arranger who had joined the band in 1939, became increasingly important as Duke's principle collaborator in composition. By most accounts, Strayhorn was a musical genius of Mozartean proportions for whom composing music was as natural as breathing. Capable of doing almost anything musically, he chose to spend most of his adult life as an adjunct to Ellington, matching his compositional style to the maestro's, but also introducing some new musical concepts that would become part of Duke's palette. Ellington always learned from his musicians, but Strayhorn was his postdoctoral fellowship. Duke Ellington created a body of music that endures and always rewards. His place in the sweep of American music is unique, and his stature is the equal of that of any of the acknowledged European masters. In 1988, Congress appropriated funds for the acquisition and care of Duke Ellington's vast archives. Today I went before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education and requested that $1 million be added to the FY 2000 appropriation for the Department of Education Program and that it be earmarked for the Smithsonian Institution's Jazz Program. We must continue to keep Duke's music alive for all generations.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as with all Americans I am greatly distressed by the brutality and loss of freedom the Kosovars are suffering at the hands of military forces of the Serbian regime in Belgrade. However, NATO military policy, while inflicting heavy penalties on the infrastructure of Yugoslavia, has done nothing to stop the forced removal of the Albanian residents of Kosovo, the original objective announced by President Clinton and our NATO allies. It may, in fact, have aggravated the situation. And the effort of the honorable Congressman from California, Tom Campbell, and his supporters, to move for a congressional declaration of war is fraught with additional danger with regard to both our domestic tranquility and the possibilities of expanding the conflict. On the domestic front the President as Commander in Chief would be empowered to call up the Reserves and federalize the National Guard. All regular enlistments in the armed services would be extended until 6 months after the termination of the conflict. (10 U.S.C. 506, 671a) Private property deemed necessary for military purposes could be seized. (10 U.S.C. 2663-64) Under certain conditions, the President could take over private manufacturing plants, transportation systems, and regulate the transmission of electrical energy. (10 U.S.C. 4501-02, 9501,-02, 4742, 9742, 16 U.S.C. 824) Private vessels could be requisitioned by the government (46 U.S.C. App1242-a), radio and television transmission rules could be suspended (47 U.S.C. 606), and a variety of controls could be established with regard to aliens, particularly those from states considered enemies. While it is not certain, it is highly probable that Congress would agree to pass other legislation deemed necessary to achieve victory, which would curtail other aspects of civil life we take for granted. With regard to United States foreign policy, the negative costs could be equally grave. Such a declaration could be divisive in NATO, with some members (Greece, Italy) determining that the effects of such a war declaration by the U.S. Congress would decrease the support among their own citizens, thus ending their cooperation and producing a rupture in the alliance. It would certainly increase the sense of hostility with Russia, the Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet states. While we are all agreed with the objective of bringing peace and justice to the Balkan region, there needs to be further reflection and discussion regarding the terms we wish to establish with the Yugoslav government and the means by which we achieve this end. It may be desirable to consider establishing an ad hoc group within the UN General Assembly, beyond just the NATO members, to aid in the search for an honorable and sensible end to this increasingly grave crisis.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the decision to go to war is one of the most important decisions that our country can make. As elected representatives, we have to consider our international and domestic obligations, as well as our individual and collective moral beliefs. There is no question that Slobodan Milosevic has committed horrible atrocities in Kosovo and I do not believe the international community should stand by idly. The votes today though, require us to look at the international context of this conflict and some of the consequences of our response thus far. I believe the evidence leads us to the view that Congress should have a say before any kind of ground troops are deployed and that is why I will support H.R. 1569. The political process that gauges the appropriateness of humanitarian intervention needs to catch up with the military's ability and willingness to undertake those operations. In that respect, today's debate serves a useful purpose. Regardless of how you intend to vote on today's measures, an open and fair debate on real, credible options is democratically healthy and Constitutionally necessary. I opposed the rule earlier today because I do not think it rose to this standard. It imposed an absurdly small amount of time for debate and took the unprecedented step of precluding further House consideration of any resolutions under the War Powers Resolution dealing with Yugoslavia during the remainder of this Congress. I also must observe that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have taken an excessively captious approach to the president's strategy in Yugoslavia and the administration's foreign policy generally. Yet I believe this Congress has been derelict in its own duties, happy to sit back and criticize the president. First it avoided action for the first month of the war, limiting itself to a vote on peacekeeping troops after hostilities have ended and a symbolic vote to support the troops. Now the House is voting on a group of four resolutions, none of which present real, credible alternatives to bombing. I think there are some very difficult questions that should inform a thorough debate on war in Yugoslavia, starting with how we define what we are trying to accomplish. Military Objectives and American Interests The military objectives in Kosovo have been variously described as (1) forcing Milosevic to make peace; (2) severely degrading his capacity to carry out military action in the future; (3) deterring an even bloodier offensive against civilians in Kosovo; and (4) allowing the return of refugees and ensuring their self-governance. What I'm wondering, is what thresholds have been established to determine when we have accomplished these goals? What role do we envision for Congress in determining when the mission objectives have been completed and what criteria will be used to make that determination? I am voting for H.R. 1569 because I believe it will preserve those Congressional prerogatives. I also do not think we have adequate assurances from regional states such as Russia that they will refrain from participating in the war; we have boxed Mr. Yeltsin into a very tight corner domestically. I know that the Deputy Secretary of State has been working hard on that issue, but the public statements from Russia are nevertheless alarming. For example, earlier this week a high ranking Russian official noted that the NATO embargo on fuel does not apply to Russia, since it is not a member of NATO. And there is strong nationalist momentum in the Duma to supply the Serbs. I also wonder if the removal of the current regime in Belgrade a prerequisite for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in the Balkans. I've seen what happened with our Iraq policy and I'm afraid we may be headed down the same kind of path, where compliance is unilaterally defined and goals are arbitrarily shifted. vigorous, multilateral diplomacy Regardless of how Congress votes today, I hope we will vigorously pursue diplomatic options. As Admiral Eugene Carroll (ret.) of the Center for Defense Information has suggested, we cannot have a solution to the Yugoslav conflict that is overly reliant on military force. The situation demands a political solution eventually, no matter how you feel about the ongoing bombing. There have been numerous attempts at diplomacy thus far. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's peace proposal on April 9 demanded: ``First, an end immediately to the campaign of intimidation and expulsion of the civilian population; two, to cease all activities of military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo and to withdraw these forces; three, to accept unconditionally the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; four, to accept the deployment of an international military force to ensure a secure environment for the return of refugees and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; and finally, to permit the international community to verify compliance with these undertakings.'' In order to make this proposal work, Annan called for a cessation of hostilities as ``a prelude to a lasting political solution to the crisis, which can only be achieved through diplomacy.'' The European Union made a peace proposal placing Kosovo under international protectorship if Yugoslavian forces agreed to withdraw. And of course Russia has been to the bargaining table a number of times. These efforts have gotten scant attention and minimal diplomatic support. Much of this is a result of the deliberate marginalization of the UN. The role of the united nations It is inappropriate for NATO to be bombing without specific authorization from the United Nations Security Council. When the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1199 on September 23, it called on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop repression against civilians and withdraw forces from Kosovo. The Resolution specifically noted that should progress on this and other stated matter be inadequate that the Security Council would ``consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region'' and remained seized of the matter. Moreover, since Article 53 of the UN Charter specifically states that ``no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'', I think it was inappropriate for NATO to proceed without specific Security Council authorization. Article 39 of the Charter clearly states that ``The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.'' The fact of the matter is that the Security Council should have made any determination regarding the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in Kosovo. It is also not clear that the Security Council ever made any determination under Article 42 as to whether force could be employed by NATO. I am aware of the Secretary General's public statements, but I think these issues remain unresolved. The United States should address these issues before the UN Security Council along with the authority for and composition of a post-war peacekeeping force. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State told the Speaker today in a letter that the Administration is ``willing to consider a U.S. contribution to an international security presence,'' but they insist that it must have ``NATO at its core.'' This kind of inflexibility is not justified. One of the key stumbling blocks from the beginning has not been a restoration of autonomy for Kosovo or the withdrawal of troops, it has been whether the implementation force will be NATO-led or include more of our allies who have an interest in peace. I think the peacekeeping operation must have at its core an international institution broader than NATO, such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The fact of the matter is that NATO has a very limited mandate and limited membership. the future of NATO The North Atlantic Treaty clearly limits NATO to acts of self defense. Article Five states that ``The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack on them all. . . .'' NATO does not have any legal authority to engage in military action that is not self-defense such as humanitarian intervention; I'm saying this independent of whether this intervention is morally correct or not. The escalation of the conflict has had devastating consequences for non-combatants. On April 6, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took the highly unusual step of asking NATO to take over relief coordination due to the extraordinary demands being placed on their resources. I do not think we have fully studied the propriety of a military alliance making decisions that greatly impact the care, maintenance and legal status of refugees--work that is ordinarily carried out by a non-political relief agency. There has also been a great many civilian deaths, partly as a consequence of NATO's decision to target non-military facilities such as TV stations. It is also an unintended consequence of flying at high altitudes in the interest of minimizing the risks to pilots. This happened on April 12, when NATO planes struck a civilian train on a bridge over the Juzna Morava River. The pilot fired his missiles before he even saw the target. The next day, 16 patients in a hospital in Banica were wounded by flying glass during a bombing raid. On April 6, dozens of people were hurt or killed in an attack on Aleksinac when bombs went 1500 yards astray. When the Pentagon admitted that a bomb went astray, the New York Times reported the next day that in fact more than one missile was used. The Washington Post reported on April 13 that NATO had acknowledged bombing residential areas of Kosovo, Pristina and the Southern Serbian town of Aleksinac where at least 20 people were killed. For exactly these reasons, the head of the International Red Cross, Cornelio Sommaruga, called this week for an end to bombing civilian targets by NATO. I know it is extremely difficult to avoid civilian casualties during war. I mention these incidents because I think we need to be cognizant of the fact that the more frequently they occur, the more difficult it is going to be to build a political solution on the ground after the war. exit strategy and war by proxy I do not think that I have adequate assurances that neither the U.S. nor any third party country will arm (or has armed) the KLA as part its war-fighting or exit strategy. We are all already aware of the atrocities that have been committed by Milosevic's forces but I was appalled by some information I received just today about the KLA. According to Human Rights Watch, the KLA began its first major offensive, an attack on the town of Orahovac on July 18, 1998. ``At least forty-two people were killed in the fighting, and on estimate, another forty remain unaccounted for. Reports of mass graves and summary executions surfaced, but remain unconfirmed.'' The press release also notes that on August 27, 1998, ``twenty-two civilians were reportedly executed by KLA members in the village of Kle ka'' and on September 9, 1998, ``the bodies of thirty-five people, including both ethnic Serbs and Albanians, were found in an artificial lake near the village of Glodjane. The evidence strongly suggests that they were killed by the KLA.'' The Associated Press notes that the KLA publicly claimed responsibility for bombing government targets in 1996. Some of my colleagues are in favor of arming the KLA. I think we need to be concerned about the KLA not just because they may be perpetrators of the same kind of violence that NATO is supposedly trying to stop but also because there is such strong potential for mission blowback. humanitarian intervention and international law Let me repeat that I do not think we should have looked the other way. There is an obvious tension in international law between the obligation to respect the sovereignty of nations versus the duty to intervene to stop genocide and crimes against humanity. The UN Charter begins by stating its purpose is to ``save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.'' The Charter condemns violations of sovereignty and states that ``All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . .'' At the same time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the rights of individuals against oppressive states, and the parties of the Genocide Convention are committed to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The answer is that both U.S. and international law need to be a part of determining when atrocities warrant humanitarian intervention. This combination ensures multilateralism, helps to share the costs of operations and takes into consideration the opinions of our allies, which in this case should include countries who are not NATO members and who could contribute to a peaceful resolution of this crisis. When I learned that an F-117 had been shot down and that troops were being held in captivity, it brought home the horrors of war even sooner than I feared. Congressional oversight and involvement must stay in sync with this rapidly unfolding war. I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 1569 and to not abandon the path to peace.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding me the time. My colleagues, the reason we can bring a bill like this, of this complexity, under the suspension rules is because of the good work of our staffs and of our colleagues on the Committee on the Judiciary. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble), the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) the ranking member, and the other committee and its leadership all work together quite well. And I also want to compliment the members of the staff that did this, as well. Obviously, there were many complexities. I am pleased that the way things have worked out. We are revising the satellite compulsory license law to allow companies to retransmit local news, weather, sports, safety announcements. In other words, local-to-local service can now be had and will allow the satellite industry, in addition, to compete with cable to get better services, more choices and lower rates for consumers. We also carry the famous ``must carry'' provision, and that will ensure that satellite companies that choose local-to-local service will give their customers all and not just some of the local channels, thereby broadening the choice consumers have in programming. As we approach the millennium and technology permits satellite and cable companies to deliver high-quality television programming, it is important that we in Congress continue to monitor these industries and make the appropriate reforms to make the playing field level and competitive and to keep the marketplace dynamic. I can assure my colleagues that the Committee on the Judiciary is eager to continue its responsibilities in the area.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson); my colleague, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), the remaining civil rights leader that worked with Dr. King and Rosa Parks for many years, and to all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol. Now, there are several reasons why Rosa Parks' name can be lifted up with such eloquence today. First is that she developed this theory that applies to every human being that struggles for justice: ``I am only one person, but I am one. I cannot do everything, but I can do something.'' For her to sit down on the bus that day was an enormously courageous act that still thrills the world when they realize this seamstress had determined what she would do, not with Dr. King, not with the civil rights movement, not with the NAACP, not with anyone. Secondly, she, by her act, brought Dr. King into the movement, and we will have more on that very shortly. But that an oppressed people could take upon themselves to change the de jure and de facto status of race relations by their own action was thought to be impossible by many at that time. Finally, it was the theory of nonviolence that a woman faced with violent oppressors could say, ``You can do whatever you want.'' Remember, the bus driver begged her to please sit down. And the theory of nonviolence later enunciated by Dr. Martin Luther King makes the Gold Medal a very appropriate response to her today.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to remind the previous speaker that the AFL-CIO has urged a vote against the proposed constitutional amendment that would require a two-thirds majority in the United States House and Senate to increase Federal revenues. Why? Because this amendment would undermine the principle of majority rule in our Federal Government by allowing one-third of either the U.S. House or Senate to hold tax bills hostage. Since many of the terms in this resolution, as previously pointed out, are extremely vague, this proposed constitutional amendment would undoubtedly lead to endless litigation in our courts. It would also hurt our Nation's working families by making it more difficult to extend the lives of the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds. In fact, this proposed constitutional amendment would also make it more difficult to close tax loopholes, including the foreign tax credit and the deferral of the United States taxes on foreign income which encourage U.S. companies to move American jobs overseas. Why, since last April 15, 1998, have not the majority brought forward any of these bills that would close tax loopholes? It seems to me that the income tax was approved by the 16th Amendment to the Constitution in the year 1913. It was passed because huge tycoons were earning hundreds of millions of dollars without paying taxes: the Rockefellers, the Morgans, the Vanderbilts. Without the 16th Amendment, we would have had no way to prosecute a World War I, not to mention a World War II. So it is important that we put these matters in perspective. We have an accounting analysis that shows that the Reagan era tax cuts were for higher income taxpayers. The Clinton era help for the working poor and the targeted tax cuts contained in the 1997 balanced budget agreement have all helped keep the Federal taxes for most Americans lower than they have been in any time since 1979. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes while the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley) is on the floor. First, the 1993 vote was far more than a tax increase. It had tax increases and deductions, and many other changes. Secondly, if one measures State and local revenues, in looking at the States with a supermajority requirement, we find that five of the seven States with supermajority requirements experienced lower than average economic growth as measured by changes in per capita personal incomes. Both of these years were business cycle peaks, 1979 and 1989. If economic growth during this period is measured by changes in gross State product, four of the seven supermajority States had lower than average growth. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. Madam Speaker, could I point out to the distinguished Whip of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), that we have a GAO study that finds the majority of the large international corporations paid no U.S. income taxes? It could not be that he would want to protect these corporations; that as American taxpayers struggle to meet their April 15 income tax deadline, that a majority of the international corporations doing business in the United States could pay no Federal income taxes? I would ask, what, Madam Speaker, do we do about that, if we were to unwisely enact this provision? The international companies paying no U.S. income tax have trillions of dollars of assets and annual sales in this country, and nothing has been done about it, even though we have a three-fifths rule in the House that is always waived. There are no proposals on the Floor. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means. (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin) a senior member of the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, it needs to be pointed out from the very beginning that the Committee on the Judiciary has not ordered reported H.J. Res. 37 proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States with respect to tax limitations. This has not occurred, notwithstanding a communication forwarded by the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), to the chairman of the Committee on Rules saying that this has taken place. In addition, I have never been contacted, or written, or telephoned even, about a constitutional amendment that cannot in due fairness come before the Congress without any, any committee proceedings in the House Committee on the Judiciary. We have never witnessed this before. Madam Speaker, I think it is a disgrace to the process and borders on legislative malpractice. This amendment is an insult to the legislative process and to the principle of democracy itself. The absence, the total absence of any committee hearings, of any markup, without any prior consultation, makes this failure one that ought to send this committee and the vote on this amendment off the floor today on this important day. When the matter involved is a constitutional amendment which would forever limit the voting rights of Members, such lack of process is shocking and unconscionable. Now we all know the real reason the resolution is being rushed to the floor, to provide another symbolic gesture on Income Tax Day and divert attention from the real issues that matter to voters. The fact that the amendment will not pass or has never passed hardly constitutes a valid reason for waiving the Committee on the Judiciary's historic jurisdiction over constitutional amendments. The substantive implications of this amendment are even more problematic. First and foremost, the amendment undercuts the very cornerstone of democracy, the theory that majority rules. By requiring a two-thirds majority to adopt certain legislation, the amendment diminishes the vote of every Member of the House and the Senate. Now the framers of the Constitution wisely rejected the principle of requiring a supermajority for basic government functions. James Madison argued at the time of the Constitutional Convention that under a supermajority requirement the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would no longer be the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority. The fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would no longer be the majority that would rule. The power would be transferred to the minority. In addition, the amendment would permanently enshrine some $450 billion of special corporate tax favors in the Constitution, nearly three times as much as all the means-tested entitlement programs combined. Could that be a motive for bringing this measure forward, by a majority which already violates its own House rules on the requirement of a three-fifths majority for these kinds of votes? It would be next to impossible to change the law to require foreign corporations to pay their fair share of taxes on income earned in this country or to repeal loopholes which encourage United States companies to relocate overseas. In fact, under this amendment, it would take more votes to close a tax loophole engineered by powerful interest groups than to cut Social Security, Medicare and education programs. So the amendment would also make major deficit reduction measures much harder to pass when they are needed. Five of the six major deficit reduction acts that have been enacted since 1982, measures which fully allow us to balance the budget, include a combination of revenue increases and program cuts. It includes both increases and cuts. President Reagan signed three of these measures into law and Presidents Bush and Clinton signed one each. None of these five measures received a two-thirds majority in both Houses. So had the proposed constitutional amendment been in effect during this period, substantial budget deficits would still be with us today. Finally, I remind my colleagues that this amendment is the height of hypocrisy. Four years ago, the majority changed the House rules so that they could not increase tax rates without a three-fifths vote. Does anyone on the other side remember this? On six separate occasions since then the majority has ignored or waived their own House rules. Question. If the supermajority requirement has not worked as a House rule, why in the world would anyone think that it could work any better as a constitutional amendment? I think the answer is obvious. It would not. House Joint Resolution 37 is strongly opposed by the administration. It is opposed by a wide variety of groups that are concerned about sound fiscal policy and good government, including the Concord Coalition, Common Cause, Citizens for Tax Justice and the AFL-CIO. I urge my colleagues to do what we have always done. Give this their careful consideration and vote against this ill-conceived, antidemocratic constitutional amendment that is brought before us again on this day. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds. Since the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton) knows that, he must know that there were some other reasons that there were other exceptions made. That was not the only one for increases in Medicare. For increases in Medicare, we had to again waive that rule. So let us bring this thing to a fuller conclusion than that.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished and able gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire of the Chair the time remaining on both sides?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce the Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1999 along with 21 additional cosponsors. Identical legislation is being introduced today in the other body by Senators Lautenberg, Feingold, and Kennedy. Our bill would require the Justice Department to conduct a study of racial profiling by acquiring data from law enforcement agencies regarding the characteristics of persons stopped for alleged traffic violations and the rationale for subsequent searches. The legislation is similar to legislation I introduced last Congress (H.R. 118) which was approved by the Judiciary Committee on a bipartisan basis and passed the House by voice vote on March 24, 1998. We have all heard stories of African and Hispanic Americans-- including many well known actors, athletes, law enforcement officers, and legislators--who have been stopped for the traffic infraction known as ``Driving While Black'' or ``Driving While Brown.'' Our legislation will allow us to ascertain the extent such profiling is occurring on a nationwide basis, help increase police awareness of the problem, and determine if any broader response is warranted. The limited data available indicates that the problem of racial profiling in traffic stops is serious. For example, a recent study by the Orlando Sentinel found that 70% of the persons stopped on I-95 were African-American, even though they only made up less than 10% of the driver population. A court ordered study in Maryland found that more than 70% of drivers stopped on I-95 were African American though they made up only 17.5% of drivers, while another study conducted in conjunction with a New Jersey civil rights lawsuit found that minorities were nearly five times as likely as non-minorities to be stopped for traffic violations along that state's turnpike. Further evidence of racial profiling by law enforcement was evident in the case of State v. Soto, in which Superior Court judge, Robert E. Francis ruled that troopers were engaging in racial profiling on the southernmost segment of the New Jersey Turnpike. This in turn raises troubling questions regarding the extent to which law enforcement officials may be unfairly targeting Hispanic and Asian Americans under the guise of immigration enforcement. If our citizens are to trust our justice system it is imperative that all forms of discrimination be eliminated from law enforcement. The Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1999 will help give Congress the tools to assess and understand a dangerous form of such discrimination-- racial profiling in traffic stops.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have been urging a solution to the Iraqi crisis which does not depend on the suffering of thousands of vulnerable and innocent people. To this end I support the easing of the economic sanctions on Iraq while simultaneously tightening the military embargo. The cost of our containment policy does not have to be the death of 5000 children a month, and in fact the American role in the embargo that causes such devastation undermines any containment we hope to achieve. I would like to enter into the Record an excellent article from The Nation magazine which provides a fresh look at our Iraq policy. The article by Joy Gordon, ``Sanctions as Siege Warfare,'' presents a critique of the recent escalation in the use of sanctions to solve diplomatic crises. By detailing the latest statistics regarding suffering in Iraq, it contends that the imposition of sanctions conflicts with the United Nation's historic mission to alleviate worldwide suffering. It presents the case that the ``Iraqi experiment'' has in fact failed and that such a comprehensive sanctions regime is both unviable and beyond the administrative capabilities of the UN. The unwieldy, inefficient and inconsistent bureaucracy of the Oil-for-Food program has ensured that the UN can not even fulfill its own acknowledged prerogative to deliver urgent humanitarian aid. The program was intended as a transition, emergency operation, not a sustained effort to feed 23 million people over decades. This program is in addition to restrictions placed on ``dual use goods'' (a label which includes pencils and other items needed for schools), which the nation needs to rebuild its sanitation, health and agricultural infrastructures. Even after some limited reform, Oil-for-Food is still unable to meet the most basic needs of the people of Iraq. Some in Congress disagree with that, but I ask them where is their evidence? The World Health Organization, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, UNICEF, and the Secretary General of the UN have all found otherwise. The horror of this situation was brought to my attention most eloquently by Denis Halliday, who recently quit his job as the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and the director of Humanitarian Affairs in Iraq over this precise issue. The work that Halliday has undertaken along with Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies, has made an important contribution to bringing the indescribable human crisis in Iraq to America's attention. (I single out the United States because much of the world already knew how bad the situation in Iraq was.) Gordon's article describes the centrality of the United States' role in perpetuating sanctions, and most significantly, the misguided justifications which underpin US policy. The US, in its self-declared role as ``world policeman,'' is turning increasingly to sanctions as a ``non-violent'' alternative to bombing campaigns. We should not allow starvation to become an alternative to diplomacy. In the long term, the implications for the general populace can be devastating. In Iraq, the interior had already been destroyed by nine years of conflict (nineteen, if one counts the Iran-Iraq war). The weak and young have suffered the most whilst those in power continue to live comfortably. The supreme aim in Iraq, to remove Saddam Hussein, is itself unviable whilst the dictator remains bolstered by such powerful cadres and the people remain divided, mutually hostile and depoliticized. Gordon's article alludes to the fact that sanctions can only help achieve political objectives when tangible opposition movements and the apparatus for dissent already exist. This is why sanctions against South Africa were an effective tool for ending Apartheid; the African national Congress was an organized, credible, internal, popular democratic opposition. When such institutions do not exist, sanctions can be counter-productive as they have been in Iraq, perpetuating the state of crisis upon which dictatorships depend and fostering a legacy of bitterness towards the west. It has often been said that you cannot achieve democracy by undemocratic means. I would add as a corollary that you also cannot inspire respect for human rights by undermining them. The article below shows how the sanctions on Iraq have been as war-like as war itself, and I hope it helps to establish new criteria that will make our policy both more humane and more effective. [From the Nation, Mar. 22, 1999] Sanctions as Siege Warfare (By Joy Gordon) As the case of Iraq has shown, there's more than one way to destroy a nation. The continuing American bombing of Iraq has drawn attention away from the international debate over economic sanctions against Baghdad and their toll on the Iraqi people. yet the crisis these policies have engendered in Iraq raises crucial questions about the United Nations' growing reliance on sanctions as a device of international governance. Can this modern-day equivalent of siege warfare be justified in ethical or political terms? It is a question that goes to the very heart of the UN's dual commitment to both peacekeeping and humanitarian principles. The role of the UN in the Iraqi sanctions regime has been convoluted and contradictory from the start. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter empower the Security Council to use economic tactics to keep international peace (although before sanctions were imposed on Iraq in 1990, the UN had imposed them only twice, against South Africa and Rhodesia). At the same time, the UN has an explicit commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the many other documents that espouse the right of every person to health, food, drinking water, education, shelter and safety. Indeed, the UN has a decades-long history of humanitarian work by its many agencies--the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, HABITAT and others. Thus the UN has found itself in the awkward position of authorizing a sanctions regime that is causing massive human suffering among those least responsible for Iraqi policy, while at the same time trying to meet humanitarian needs and protect those populations most harmed by sanctions--women, children, the poor, the elderly and the sick. Although there is controversy over the precise extent of human damage, all sources agree that it is severe. Voices in the Wilderness, an antisanctions activist group based in Chicago, has used the figure of 1 million children dead from the sanctions; the Iraqi government claims 4,000-5,000 deaths per month of children under 5. Even US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright does not contest how great the human damage has been, but has said, ``It's worth the price.'' Richard Garfield, an epidemiologist at Columbia University who analyzes the health consequences of economic embargoes, calculates that 225,000 Iraqi children under 5 have died since 1990 because of these policies--a figure based on the best data available from UN agencies and other international sources. The Red Cross World Disasters Report says underweight births have gone from 4 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 1998. While it is harder to calculate the impact of the economic devastation on adults, it is quite acute, particularly for women. In 1997 the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that chronic malnutrition in the general Iraqi population was as high as 27 percent, with 16 percent of adult women under 26 undernourished and 70 percent of women anemic. The Iraqi crisis shows how peculiarly unsuited the UN is to manage a sanctions regime. This is partly because it had imposed sanctions so rarely before and partly because of its longstanding commitment to alleviating poverty rather than causing it. The fact that the sanctions against Iraq are so extensive and so novel has forced the UN to generate from scratch an extraordinarily elaborate set of mechanisms to manage them, through which it attempts to reconcile its conflicting commitments. From the beginning, the UN both predicted an impending humanitarian disaster and made moves to alleviate it. The UN began assessing the human damage immediately after the Persian Gulf War, when it made an initial, ill-fated proposal to allow Iraq to sell oil for food. The Security Council formed the ``661 committee,'' consisting of representatives of each nation in the Security Council, to monitor the sanctions against Iraq established in SC Resolution 661. At the same time, the committee was also responsible for granting humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions. The result was that it put in place procedures that in fact functioned as obstacles to any smooth influx of food and medicine. A cumbersome sanctions bureaucracy scrutinized and approved or denied every contract, the proposed quantity of goods, their price and their intended use. To sell humanitarian goods to Iraq, a company would submit an application to its national mission at the UN, which would then turn it over to the 661 committee. But the 661 committee did not publish any criteria for approval, and its meetings were closed sessions at which neither Iraq nor the vendors were allowed to have representatives present to answer questions or offer information in support of the contract. The application process typically took months, sometimes as long as two years. And the committee's rulings were inconsistent--the same goods sold by the same company might on one occasion be deemed permissible humanitarian goods and on another be flatly denied without explanation. In addition, during this period all fifteen members of the committee had to approve exemptions by consensus; thus any nation could effectively exercise veto power or cause repeated delays of weeks or months simply by asking for more information. As a result, it was expensive and exasperating even to apply to sell food and medicine to Iraq. On small British company that sold medical supplies described the process: First, to talk to an Iraqi buyer, public or private, the seller had to apply for a license to negotiate, which could take three to four weeks. Once buyer and seller came to an agreement, the seller had to apply for a supply license, which could take up to twenty weeks. In the meantime, Iraq's currency would have devalued substantially, so the buyer might not be able to afford quantity of goods or might need more time to raise the additional hard currency. But that would require a change in the terms of the application, and any change in the application meant the whole process began again. Thus the red tape undermined Iraq's ability to import even those urgent humanitarian goods permitted under the sanctions. While food and medicine were theoretically permitted during this time, ``dual use'' goods were flatly prohibited. Under the terms of the sanctions, ``dual use'' items are those that have civilian uses but also may be used by the military or more generally to rebuild the Iraqi economy. Dual-use goods include pesticides and fertilizer, spare part for crop- dusting helicopters, chlorine for water purification, computers, trucks, telecommunications equipment and equipment to rebuild the electrical grid. Anything that might go toward rebuilding the infrastructure, or toward economic poverty generally, is labeled ``dual use.'' Yet Iraq's infrastructure had been devastated by massive bombing during the Gulf War, which destroyed or caused extensive damage to water treatment plants, dams, generators and power plants, pipes and electrical systems for irrigation and desalinization of agricultural land, textile factories, silos, flour mills, bakeries and countless other buildings and resources. While Iraq was in principle allowed to import food and medical supplies, it was prohibited from buying the ``dual use'' equipment needed to grow and distribute food, to treat and distribute potable water, and to generate and distribute electricity for irrigating crops, refrigerating food and operating hospital equipment. The damage to water treatment plants and water distribution networks caused, among other things, a cholera epidemic and increases in waterborne diseases, infant diarrhea, dehydration and infant mortality. Although bureaucratic obstacles effectively prevented much humanitarian material from reaching Iraq, the UN did grant humanitarian exemptions and heeded some criticisms based on humanitarian concerns. At the urging of the UN Secretary General, the 661 committee streamlined many of its procedures. But the basic policies remained intact-- humanitarian goods required prior approval, and the ban on dual-use goods remained in place. And when the UN's interest in security and humanitarian concerns came into conflict, the interest in security still trumped. In 1996 the Security Council and Iraq agreed to an Oil for Food program (OFF), which provides a mechanism for the purchase of goods except where the 661 committee has a specific objection, and then monitors their distribution and use. Under OFF, Iraq was initially authorized to sell $2 billion of oil in any six-month period (the limit was later increased to $5.3 billion). The extensive presence of UN humanitarian agencies in Iraq (as well as UNSCOM) is funded by the oil sales themselves. There are more than 400 international UN staff in Iraq and another 1,300 Iraqis on the UN staff. In the northern sector of the country the UN has taken over an entire range of governmental functions on behalf of (and with the agreement of) the Iraqi government-- including food distribution, agriculture, nutrition programs, distribution of medical supplies, dam repair, renovation of schools, installation of water pumps and the provision of printing equipment for school textbooks. In the central and southern governorates, the mandate of the UN agencies is only to assist and monitor the government in such functions. Even so, UN staff determine whether resources are adequate to meet ``essential needs'' in a given area, and they document and confirm the equitable distribution of food, distribution and storage of medical supplies, and the use of water and sanitation supplies. Iraq submits proposals for every purchase with oil funds--every gear, pipe, chemical, valve, piece of plywood, steel bar and rubber tube, for a country of 22 million people, on which it proposes to spend the $2.9 billion expected to come from the current phase of Oil for Food. For each of these items, Iraq is required to specify not only the exact use but the particular end user--which grain silo will be using each of the conveyor belts Iraq wishes to purchase. Although the UN bureaucracy now processes these contracts quickly, there are still substantial delays when the seller fails to provide enough details in the application or when its nation's UN mission is slow to submit the paperwork. The intricacy of the process for obtaining purchase and contract approval pales in comparison to the thoroughness with which each item is observed and documented once it arrives in Iraq. At the border, inspection agents under contract to the UN document the arrival of every item, verify quantity and quality, and conduct lab tests to confirm that the goods conform to the contract. Once the goods have crossed the borders, UN observers then confirm the transit of all goods, their storage and equitable distribution, and they document the end use. Finally, UN staff review the documentation of the hundreds of UN observers. All this is paid for by 2.2 percent of the Iraqi oil sales--as of November 1998, $207 million. Precisely because the system of verification is so thorough, the Security Council has been willing to grant permission for some dual-use goods to enter the country. The 661 committee has allowed purchases, for example, of chlorine gas for water purification and spare parts for crop-dusting helicopters because UN personnel were in Iraq to verify the location and use of each canister of chlorine and the installation of each helicopter part and the destruction of the old parts. Relative to other UN programs around the world, those in Iraq are highly elaborate and expensive. Yet they do not come close to meeting the country's needs, according to the Secretary General's report of last fall. Although the quantity of chlorinated water is greater now, the water distribution system has deteriorated so much that by the time it arrives in people's homes, the water is not consistently potable. The emergency parts for electrical generators that do arrive merely slow down the deterioration of the electrical system, the power cuts are expected to be worse next year than this year. There are 210 million square meters of minefields, and the UN's three mine-detector dog teams (a total of six dogs) can barely make a dent. It does not seem that the strcture of the UN sanctions on Iraq could be duplicated in other situations. The expense of an elaborate bureaucracy, which closely monitors virtually all the goods Iraq has been permitted to purchase, is possible only because Iraq is paying for it. And that, in turn, is possible only because Iraq's wealth is so vast, and so easily converted to cash. Were it not for Iraq's wealth and the Security Council's success in tapping it, monitoring the sanctions regime and its humanitarian exemptions would cost far more than the UN could ever afford. Since most sanctioned countries--Yugoslavia, for example--don't have resources that can be tapped in the way Iraqi oil has been, it is hard to imagine that there could be many more sanctions-and-exemptions regimes of this scale. While the sanctions against Iraq are in many ways anomalous, they nevertheless provide a graphic demonstration of how such extreme sanctions are implemented and justified. Just as the Gulf War offered a testing ground for new alliances and new weapons in the post-cold war world, the sanctions against Iraq have been an experiment in nonmilitary devices of international governance. Both the United States and the UN are exhibiting a growing reliance on economic sanctions to achieve their aims around the world, even if in areas outside Iraq the sanctions regimes are somewhat less ambitious. Although the UN had imposed sanctions only twice between 1945 and 1990, it has done so eleven times since then. But even this is very little in comparison with the frequency of US sanctions. Between 1945 and 1990 sanctions were imposed worldwide in 104 instances; in two-thirds of these, the United States was either a key player or the sanctions were unilateral actions by the United States with no participation from other countries. Since 1990 the United States' use of sanctions has increased by an order of magnitude. As of 1998, it imposed economic sanctions against more than twenty countries. Even as it has been using sanctions on its own behalf, the United States has spearheaded many of the Security Council's recent sanctions efforts. While it would be incorrect to treat the Security Council as simply a naked tool of US hegemony (as much as Jesse Helms would like that to happen), the United States does have disproportionate influence both because of the veto power it holds as one of the five permanent members and because of its economic influence globally. And its leverage has only increased in recent years as Russia's willingness to exercise its veto power has been tempered by its dependence on the West for massive capital investment. In 1990, sanctions appeared to be a nearly ideal device for international governance. They seemed to entail inconvenience and some political disruption but not casualties. Unlike the situation in Somalia, sanctions in Iraq did not involve troops. Because sanctions seemed to incur less human damage than bombing campaigns, peace and human rights movements found them attractive as well. Indeed, many of those opposing the Gulf War in 1990 urged the use of sanctions instead. But what Iraq shows us is that it is now possible for sanctions to cause far more than inconvenience or international embarrassment. In the absence of a Soviet bloc as an alternative source of trade, it is now possible to construct a comprehensive sanctions regime that can absolutely break the back of any nation with a weak or import-dependent economy. Iraq has also demonstrated, quite graphically, that sanctions can cause fully as much human suffering as even a massive bombing campaign. Iraqi casualties from the Gulf War were in the range of 10,000 to 50,000. Casualties attributed to sanctions are anywhere from ten to thirty times that--and that's only counting the deaths of young children. This ought to raise serious ethical concerns, since sanctions (like their low-tech predecessor, siege warfare) historically have caused the most extreme and direct suffering to those who are the weakest, the most vulnerable and the least political. At the same time, those who are affected last and least are the military and political leadership, who are generally insulated from anything except inconvenience and the discomfort of seeing ``the fearful spectacle of the civilian dead,'' to use Michael Walzer's phrase. However devastating their effects on the economy and the civilian population may be, sanctions are rarely successful in achieving changes in governmental policy or conduct. Sanctions, like siege warfare, have generally been perceived by civilian populations as the hostile and damaging act of a foreign power. Sanctions, like siege warfare, have generally resulted in a renewed sense of national cohesion, not domestic pressure for political change. The most generous scholarship on this issue holds that in the twentieth century, sanctions achieved their stated political goals only about one-third of the time. But even that figure is disputed by those who point out that in most of these cases there were other factors as well; a more critical estimate places the success rate at less than 5 percent. In the other ``success'' cases--such as South Africa, which is often cited to show that ``sanctions can work''--there were major factors other than sanctions. Many have suggested that the end of apartheid was due to internal political movements as much as to international sanctions. South Africa was also atypical in that those most affected by the sanctions also supported them. If not sanctions, then what? Is bombing preferable to sanctions as a device to ``punish rogues'' and enforce international law? Without the sanctions option, it is sometimes argued, the militarists will just say there is no longer an alternative to bombing. But the Iraq situation demonstrates that sanctions are not merely a ``problematic'' or ``less than ideal'' form of political pressure. Rather, they are an indirect form of warfare. Not only are they politically counterproductive, but sanctions directed toward the economy generally (as opposed to, say, seizing personal assets of leaders) are inherently antihumanitarian. Denis Halliday, the former Assistant Secretary General of the UN, resigned in protest last fall, saying that he no longer wished ``to be identified with a United Nations that is . . . maintaining a sanctions programme . . . which kills and maims people through chronic malnutrition . . . and continues this programme knowingly.'' His conclusion seems very like US Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun's position on the death penalty in his 1994 dissent in Callins v. Collins: For the death penalty to be constitutional, it must be applied equally in like cases; but at the same time, the sentencing judge must have the option of granting mercy based upon the circumstances. These two requirements, Blackmum reasoned, are irreconcilable, and no amount of ``tinkering'' will somehow make the contradiction dissolve. Likewise, no amount of tinkering will make sanctions anything other than a violent and inhumane form of international governance. It is hard to articulate any greater good that can justify the deliberate, systematic imposition of measures that are known to increase chronic malnutrition, infant mortality and the many varieties of human damage that impoverishment inflicts.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.