John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for legislation in the 106th Congress to compensate the families of the Americans who were killed on April 14, 1994 while serving in Operation Provide Comfort over Iraq. This is an important issue and should be a priority in the next Congress. On April 14, 1994, 15 Americans, 14 military personnel and 1 civilian, and 11 foreign nationals, were killed when their Army Black Hawk helicopters, were shot out of the sky by two Air Force F-15's. According to the General Accounting Office, this horrible tragedy resulted from over 130 separate mistakes by the Air Force and the Army. After this incident, the Department of Defense made $100,000 payments to the families of the foreign nationals in addition to the other death benefits they received from their own countries. Unfortunately, the Pentagon was not willing to give the same treatment to the American families. Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon was wrong not to give our own personnel the same treatment that they gave the survivors of the foreign nationals. The Immigration and Claims Subcommittee held a hearing on this issue on June 18, 1998 and heard from both Government witnesses and the families. At that hearing, the Pentagon was unable to provide a credible answer for why they did not give the Americans the same treatment as the foreign nationals. The Pentagon first could not answer whether they had the authority to make the payments to the Americans. Later, the Pentagon acknowledged that they had the authority to act but simply were unwilling to. At that hearing, the Subcommittee members heard the stories of the American families and the pain they suffered. This hits particularly close to home for me because Anthony Bass, one of the personnel killed, was the son of my cousin and I know the great suffering his family has endured. The Basses and all of the families, put their sons and daughters, and husbands and wives, in the care of our armed forces, but they were let down when the foreign nationals were treated better than their loved ones. Mr. Speaker, I would particularly like to commend the leadership of Mr. Watt, the Ranking Member and Mr. Smith, the Chairman of the Immigration and Claims Subcommittee, who have worked in a bipartisan fashion to make the Pentagon do the right thing. There were a number of bills introduced during the 105th Congress, including Congressman Watt's bill, H.R. 3022, to correct this tragic inequity and fairly compensate the families. Unfortunately, the Subcommittee did not have time this year to consider this important issue because of the many other issues before the Committee. I look forward to the 106th Congress when we will pass legislation if the Pentagon continues to refuse to correct this injustice. Let me say, though, I hope the Pentagon chooses to act so Congress does not have to. Thus far, the Pentagon has sent a message to tell our military personnel and civilian employees that the lies of foreigners are worth more than theirs. That is wrong and must be corrected.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, I want to elucidate on the meaning of an isolated and confusing bankruptcy provision which unfortunately appeared in the omnibus appropriations bill approved by the House yesterday. Section 603 of Division I of the bill, entitled Chemical Weapons Convention should have originally been referred to the Judiciary Committee for action and study. As the Speaker is aware, bankruptcy legislation is quite complex and requires scrutiny of Members who are familiar with the impact of proposed amendments. Most importantly, this legislation should not be read to expand the exceptions to the automatic stay to cases where governmental units are merely seeking to exercise control of a debtor's property to satisfy debt. I believe that the provisions should be read to restrict the exception to the automatic stay to circumstances where a governmental unit is enforcing its police or regulatory power, but not acting to collect a debt or other financial obligations. This interpretation is consistent with Chairman Hyde's reading of the language, which is reflected in a statement inserted in the Congressional Record on his behalf by International Relations Committee Chairman Gilman subsequent to previous Congressional consideration of this legislation. See 143 Cong. Rec. H 10951 (Nov. 13, 1997). I am also concerned that by repealing Sec. 362(b)(4) and Sec. 362(b)(5) of the automatic stay, some may assert that governmental units may now be required to seek relief from stay in order to enforce their pales for regulatory powers in all cases, except in the instance when the governmental units' activities involves action under the Convention in connection with chemical weapons. I do not believe that this new requirement was intended, nor would it be desirable.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I use this excuse to support the bill to commend my subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble) for a year's worth of very good cooperation, a Congress worth of very good cooperation. He is unique, and we have been able to work through many problems that have actually confounded the Committee on the Judiciary for more than a year or two, and this has been a successful relationship between those Members, the subcommittee members and the Members on my side. So, Mr. Speaker, I am happy to support the plant patent bill, commend our colleague, ranking colleague from Vermont on the other side, Senator Pat Leahy, and I urge that we support the provisions here that correct a loophole that has arisen as some people have sought to trade in plants; that is in the environmental sense plant parts taken from illegally produced plants, and we specifically are protecting these additional plants as well, and I commend the members of the Committee on the Judiciary for working so well together on this measure. I rise in strong support of this little noticed, but important change to our patent laws. This legislation protects plant parts to the same extent as plants themselves are protected under the Patent Act. The holders of plant patents, the same as an other American who develops a patent and follows the rules, are entitled to protection. As Mr. Coble has noted, a loophole in the plant patent area has arisen in recent years as some individuals have sought to trade in plant parts taken from illegally produced plants. This legislation closes this loophole by specifically protecting the plant parts. This language is identical to language from the omnibus patent bill which passed the House earlier this session. The legislation before us also includes a provision which authorizes the Patent and Trademark Office to develop and implement statewide computer networks with remote library sites. This will allow small inventors in rural areas to have greater access to patent and trademark information. While I have some time remaining, I would like to congratulate my good friend the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, for the excellent work he has done as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. In recent weeks he has succeeded in passing a number of landmark intellectual property bills, including copyright extension and implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Thanks to Mr. Coble's stewardship, our creators and inventors can rest assured that they will receive fair compensation for their work. Because of the rush of business at the end of the calendar, other important measures relating to data base protection and patent reform were not completed, but we will continue to push these measures on a bipartisan basis next Congress. I would also like to thank Chairman Coble for his hard work on important franchise legislation that he and I introduced 2 days ago. I look forward to working with him on this matter of vital importance to so many small businesses early on in the next Congress.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, so I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, my family and I were saddened to learn of the death of my longtime friend and former colleague, Congressman Charles Diggs Jr., the first African American elected to Congress from Michigan. Congressman Diggs paved the way for an entire generation of African American political leaders, not just in his home state, but throughout the nation. When I first arrived in Washington in 1965, Congressman Diggs had been there 10 years and had earned a well deserved reputation as a fearless fighter for justice for poor and oppressed people. In my early days in Congress, he helped me find my way through the maze of Washington politics. I knew I could rely on him for sound advice. Congressman Diggs was not afraid to speak the truth. During his tenure in Congress, his was a resounding voice for millions of African Americans whose words were muted and whose dreams were bruised by the cruel forces of discrimination and intimidation. In matters of international affairs, he was the first member of Congress to promote Africa as a key part of the U.S. foreign agenda, and he was chair of the House Subcommittee on African Affairs. He was also a founding member of the Congressional Black Caucus, as was I. For Detroiters, the name Diggs has a particular resonance. Congressman Diggs' parents were community activists who operated a funeral home that gave proper funerals to generations of Detroit residents, even when the grieving families were short on funds. On a more personal note, the Diggs family and the Conyers family have known each other for more than half a century. Charlie Diggs and I learned early on that we all have a responsibility to carry the banner for justice and equality. He never forgot that lesson, and he remained convinced of the limitless potential of Detroit and Detroiters. I am proud to have served with him. My entire family extends its deepest sympathies to the Diggs family. Our city and our country have lost another brave warrior in the struggle for freedom. [From the Michigan Chronicle, Sept. 2-8, 1998.] Life and Times of Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. Detroit lost another link to its historic past with the death of Charles C. Diggs, Jr. in West Virginia. He was 75. Federal Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, the congressman's former wife, said, ``I am much saddened by the news. He was a great man with great strengths and weaknesses as well.'' ``I hope he will be remembered for his many gifts and for consistently fighting the good fight on behalf of his people through lonely and dangerous times,'' she continued. Michigan's first Black congressman and the founder of the Congressional Black Caucus, Diggs was the heir to a family political dynasty in local politics and a leading advocate in Washington, D.C. for civil rights and African affairs during his 25 years in Congress. Following in the footsteps of his father, Charles Diggs, Sr., Michigan's first Black Democratic state senator, Diggs, Jr. was the youngest elected member of the Michigan Senate in 1950. He made an unsuccessful run for Detroit City Council in 1953 before successfully running against 14-year incumbent Congressman George O'Brien in 1954. Diggs took office in 1955 as the representative for Detroit's 13th Congressional District. He immediately received national notoriety during the infamous Emmett Till murder trial in Mississippi. After several White defendants were acquitted in the murder of the 14-year-old. Diggs spoke around the country about the case. Diggs made his greatest contributions as a member of Congress and later chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Among his notable crusades were Support of home rule for Washington, D.C. creation of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1969, helping to found TransAfrica, a think-tank on African and Caribbean affairs, founding the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Ind., authoring legislation preserving the Frederick Douglas Home in Anacostia. In 1978, Diggs was charged with padding his congressional staff payroll, but was reelected by Detroit voters. In 1980, he resigned from office after being convicted of crimes related to those charges. He then donated more than 1,000 boxes of his personal papers to the Moorland-Springarn Collection on the Howard University Campus. In the later years of his life, Diggs practiced mortuary science in Virginia, Michigan and Ohio. Following Diggs' departure from Congress, the late Judge George Crockett became the 13th District Representative, followed by Barbara Rose Collins. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick is the current congressperson. Charles C. Diggs Jr. was born Dec. 2, 1922 in Detroit, the only child of his late parents, Charles C. Diggs Sr. and Mayne E. Jones. The Diggs seniors were morticians, pioneers in business, public servants and community activists. Diggs Sr. was elected in 1936 as Michigan's first Black Democratic state senator. The first Black state senator had been Republican Atty. Charles Roxborough, elected for a two-year term in 1932, but he did not seek reelection after serving until 1934. Sen. Diggs headed the Michigan Federated Democratic League in Detroit which was considered the largest organized force of African Americans in the state. He was acknowledged to be the period's most outstanding politician and was particularly noted for authoring Michigan's reverently innovative law prohibiting racial or related discrimination in public- service places; the ``Diggs Law,'' as it was named, was enacted in 1937. His son, Charles C. Diggs Jr. graduated from Miller High School in 1940 as president of his class and third speaker on its champion debating team coached by English professor Alvin Loving. From September 1940 to June 1942, he attended the University of Michigan and won the institution's coveted oratorical championship in 1941. When World War II started in 1942 he sought admission at Detroit's Navy recruiting office, but was rejected, allegedly for ``poor eyesight.'' Of course, his eyesight was sufficient, but he was denied admission because the Navy was segregated, like the rest of the armed services in those days. Opportunities for Blacks were limited to menial tasks, for which he was obviously over-qualified. Moreover, since Diggs, Sr. was a Michigan state senator and a militant activist, the Navy feared public criticism would result. However, Diggs Jr. was drafted in April 1943 after one semester during his third college year which began in September 1942 at historically Black Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn. Following his basic training as a private at Kearns Field. Salt Lake City, Utah, he was sent to the Army administration school, Atlanta University in Georgia. After graduating there, where he and his roommate were top of their class, he was promoted to private first class and reassigned to the third EAUTC Headquarters, Tampa, Fla. Shortly after, he was sent to another military administration school in South Dakota State College, Brookings, South Dakota and was promoted to corporal. Upon graduation, he was returned to the third EAUTIC. He was subsequently elevated to buck-sergeant, and three months later he was appointed to the Army Air Force Officer Candidate School, Miami Beach. Upon graduation there as a second lieutenant, he was reassigned to the famed Black Army Air Force Base at Tuskegee, Ala. When World War II ended, Diggs was honorably released from active duty in June 1945, and he returned to Detroit. He then attended and graduated from Wayne State University's College of Mortuary Science in June 1946 and became general manager of the House of Diggs, Michigan's largest funeral business, founded in 1921. Succeeding his father, Diggs Jr. subsequently became president of the metropolitan Funeral System, Michigan's only burial insurance company. It then became Detroit Metropolitan Mutual Insurance Co., which later combined with Mammoth Life in Louisville, Ky. Mammoth has since merged with Atlanta Life in Georgia and is currently the largest Black-owned insurance company in the United States. In September 1950, Diggs, Jr, enrolled at the Detroit College of Law as a night student, but after only one semester he was elected as the youngest member of the Michigan State Senate, and served two terms. He successfully sponsored Michigan's first Fair Employment Practices Law, establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission to eliminate racial and related discrimination in Michigan public or private. He also sponsored legislation legalizing DNA blood tests to determine a child's rightful paternity/ maternity link, and Michigan became the pioneer state to enact this statute. He then dropped out of law school as driving 85 miles each way to and from Detroit four days a week became too burdensome for his additional legislative and constituency obligations. In 1953, as a second term state senator, he ran for the Detroit City Council, a city-wide, non-partisan election never before won by a Black candidate; he was marginally defeated by a White female. However, his unprecedented showing is widely credited for generating the momentum which four years later contributed substantially to the successful election of Atty. William T. Patrick Jr. as the city's first African American member of the council. Nevertheless, because of the strong voter support Diggs received in the 13th Congressional District in his referenced bid in 1953 for the council, he challenged the 14-year incumbent Congressman George O'Brien the next year in 1954. Diggs overwhelmingly defeated O'Brien three-to-one in that Democratic primary becoming Michigan's first Black member of the U.S. House of Representatives where he served with distinction until his retirement in 1980. The Emmett Till case In 1955 as a freshman congressman he was propelled across the international scene by his attendance at the infamous Emmett Till kidnap/murder trial in Mississippi, next to Issaqueena County where his father was born and his grandfather, Rev. James J. Diggs, founded the Woodland Baptist Church, in the late 1800s. It still stands, a permanent reminder of his many achievements including service as a Baptist minister missionary to Liberia in Africa. The egregious miscarriage of justice which acquitted the White male defendants who committed violent crimes against that 14-year-old teenager who dared not conform with Mississippi's racial standards focused global attention on the worst plight of Black America. After Diggs' attendance at the trial, as always replayed in old films on TV, particularly during Black History Month each year, the NAACP got him to speak throughout the U.S. about the victimization of Emmett Till, to inspire support for corrective federal/state/local civil rights laws and customs. He left his mark on Washington During his first four years in Washington (1955-59), Diggs was assigned to the House Veterans' Affairs Committee. In 1959 President Eisenhower sent Diggs on a mission, in the PAC-AF Command from Hawaii to the Philippines plus other Pacific islands and Japan to report on minority conditions in those areas of the U.S. Armed Forces. He was accompanied by Lt. Colonel ``Chappie'' James, with whom he had been stationed at the Black American Army Air Field Headquarters (Tuskegee, Ala.) and who later became our first Black 4-Star General in the Air Force. Diggs' comprehensive report, supported by extensive interviews and on-site investigations, caused the creation of an Armed Forces Commission to address segregation and discrimination within the command. This commission was continued in 1961 under the next president, John F. Kennedy, whom Congressman Diggs had strongly supported in the 1960 general federal elections. Additionally, during his first four years in the U.S. House of Representatives, Diggs also served on the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee (now House Resources). His ardent advocacy of statehood legislation was one of the prime subjects under its jurisdiction. Focus was on the Hawaii/ Alaska proposals, which in 1959 established Democratic Hawaii and Republican Alaska as the 49/50th states in the union. As chairman of the D.C. committee, Diggs sponsored legislation authorizing preservation of the Frederick Douglas Home in Anacostia, Southeast D.C., by having it designated a national historical site within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Interior Department. This designation replaced its previous benefactor, Dr. Rosa Cragg of Detroit and the National Association of Colored Women's Clubs, under whose aegis the Douglass Home unfortunately had languished, principally because of the latter's limited resources and those of the Frederick Douglass Memorial and Historical Association Inc. In 1959 Diggs also became the first Black member of Congress appointed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He had sought this assignment after his selection in 1957 by President Eisenhower, to be part of the U.S. Delegation to the Independence of Ghana in West Africa. The delegation, headed by vice president Richard Nixon, had been flown there on a ``prop-ship'' through a midway island refuel stop, since this was before the ``jet-propulsion'' age. The prime Foreign Affairs Committee consideration during his first two years was to authorize establishment of the Peace Corps. Given Diggs' enhanced African interest following referenced mission to Ghana, he knew how important the Peace Corps would be in furthering numerous developments on that ancient colonized continent. This prompted him to be one of the committee's strongest and most respected advocates of the Corps. Subsequent positive activities of Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) fully justified his continued, invaluable support. Upon his request he was also appointed, in 1959, to the insignificant subcommittee on Africa, which he immediately stimulated. In 1969, a decade thereafter, he rose to its chairmanship and maintained historic levels of the committee's activation until his retirement in 1980. Based on his extensive travels abroad plus meetings with African leaders and elsewhere regarding African policies, plus his unmatched official hearings, Diggs became one of our nation's leading spokespersons on this subject. TRANSAFRICA, America's premier think-tank on African and Caribbean issues, was founded in Diggs' office where its current executive director, Randall Robinson, was Diggs' administrative assistant. In 1969-70 Diggs founded and became the first chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. William L. Clay, one of the important players in Congress and author of the book, ``Just Permanent Interests,'' is the senior member of the Missouri Congressional Delegation and a founding member of the Congressional Black Caucus. Inside the book, he states, ``Charlie: We would not have made so much progress in the caucus had it not been for your leadership, signed Bill, 9/ 24/92.'' In 1971 Diggs served as a full delegate to the United Nation's general assembly while George Bush, with whom he had served in the House, was the Delegation's ambassador before he became president of the United States. Congressman Ed Derwinski (R-Ill) was another appointed full delegate and he later became the first secretary of the Veterans Administration. In addition to his one semester at Fisk University, Nashville (1942-43) then being drafted into the U.S. Armed Services, there have been only two other Congressmen, Bill Dawson (D-Ill.) and John Lewis (D-Ga.) who have been to that college. Diggs also has a mortuary science degree from Wayne State University, was the sole principal proprietor mortician in the Metropolitan Tri-State area of Maryland, Washington, D.C. and Virginia, and was a Howard University graduate. He also holds honorary doctor of law degrees from Ohio's Wilberforce University and Central State College, North Carolina's Agricultural and Technical State University and the University of the District of Columbia. He is survived by his wife, Darlene Diggs of Mississippi; six children, Charles C. Diggs III, Denise Taylor Diggs, Alexis Robinson Diggs, Douglass Diggs, Carla Mathis Diggs, Cindy Carter Diggs, and 12 granchildren.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be introducing the ``Small Business Franchise Act of 1998'' along with my good friend from North Carolina Mr. Coble. This legislation represents the culmination of many months of work in crafting legislation which creates an appropriate balance between the rights of franchisors and franchisees. There is currently no federal law establishing standards of conduct for parties to a franchise contract. The Federal Trade Commission rule promulgated in 1979 (16 C.F.R. 436), was designed to deter fraud and misrepresentation in the pre-sales process and provides disclosure requirements and prohibitions concerning franchising and business opportunity ventures. However, the FTC has consistently maintained that it has no jurisdiction over problems franchisees face after the franchise agreement is entered into. In the absence of any federal controls or regulation, a number of problems and complaints have been lodged in recent years, principally stemming from the fact that franchisees do not have equal bargaining power with large franchisors. The concerns include the following: Taking of Property without Compensation. The franchise relationship almost always includes a post-termination covenant not-to-compete which prohibits the franchisee from becoming an independent business owner in a similar business upon expiration of the contract. This can have the effect of appropriating to the franchisor all of the equity built up by the franchisee without compensation. Devaluation of Assets. Franchisors often induce a franchisee to invest in creating a business and then establish a competing outlet in such proximity to the existing franchisee that it causes significant damage or destruction to the existing franchised business. Restraint of Trade. Most franchise relationships mandate that franchisees purchase supplies, equipment, furniture, or other items from the franchisor or sources affiliated with or approved by the franchisor. While it may be appropriate for franchisors to exercise some control concerning the characteristics of the products or services offered to franchisees, tying franchisees to certain vendors can cost franchisees millions of dollars, prevents competition among vendors, and can have an adverse impact upon consumers. Inflated Pricing. Many franchise agreements specify that the franchisor has the right to enter into contractual arrangements with vendors who sell goods and services to franchisees that are mandated by the franchise agreement. It has been alleged that these vendors often provide kickbacks, promotional fees, and commissions to the franchisor in return for being allowed to sell their products and services to a captive market. Instead of passing these kickbacks, promotional fees, and commissions on to the franchisee to reduce their cost of goods sold and increase their margin, these payments, it is asserted, benefit the franchisor. While our nation has enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom, it is essential that we in Congress insure that prosperity reaches down to the small businesses that make up the heart and soul of our economy. There is of course little time left in the 105th Congress to allow for consideration and inaction of this legislation. However, I am hopeful that this legislation will be at the top of the Judiciary's committee agenda when we return next year, and I will be seeking hearings on this matter at the earliest occasion. The following is a section-by-section description of the legislation. Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents Sets forth the short title of the Act and the table of contents. Section 2. Findings and Purpose Subsection (a) specifies a series of Congressional findings. Subsection (b) states that the purpose of the Act is to promote fair and equitable franchise agreements, to establish uniform standards of conduct in franchise relationships, and to create uniform private Federal remedies for violations of Federal law. Section 3. Franchise Sales Practices Subsection (a) prohibits any person, in connection with the advertising, offering, or sale of any franchise, from (1) employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) engaging in an act, practice, course of business, or pattern of conduct which operates or is intended to operate as a fraud upon any prospective franchisee; (3) obtaining property, or assisting others in doing so, by making an untrue statement of a material fact or failing to state a material fact; and (4) discriminating among prospective franchisees on the basis of race, color, sexual orientation, sex, religion, disability, national origin, or age in (a) the solicitation, offering or sale of any franchise opportunity, or (b) the selection of any site or location for a franchise business. Subsection (b) prohibits franchisors, sub franchisors, and franchise brokers, in connection with any disclosure document, notice, or report required by any law, from (i) making an untrue statement of material fact, (ii) failing to state a material fact, or (iii) failing to state any fact which would render any required statement or disclosure either untrue or misleading. The subsection also prohibits franchisors, sub franchisors, and franchise brokers from failing to furnish any prospective franchisee with all information required to be disclosed by law and at the time and in the manner required and from making any claim or representation to a prospective franchisee, whether orally or in writing, which is inconsistent with or contradicts such disclosure document. ``Disclosure document'' is defined as the disclosure statement required by the Federal Trade Commission in Trade Regulation Rule 436 (16 CFR 436) or an offering circular prepared in accordance with Uniform Franchise Offering Circular guidelines as adopted and amended by the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. or its successor. Section 4. Unfair Franchise Practices Subsection (a) prohibits any franchisor or subfranchisor, in connection with the performance, enforcement, renewal and termination of any franchise agreement, from (1) engaging in an act, practice, course of business, or pattern of conduct which operates as a fraud upon any person; (2) discriminating among franchisees on the basis of race, color, sexual orientation, sex, religion, disability, national origin, or age; (3) hindering, prohibiting, or penalizing, either directly or indirectly, the free association of franchisees for any lawful purpose, including the formation of or participation in any trade association made up of franchisees or of associations of franchises; and (4) discriminating against a franchisee by imposing requirements not imposed on other similarly situated franchisees or otherwise retaliating, directly, or indirectly, against any franchisee for membership or participation in a franchisee association. Subsection (b) prohibits a franchisor from terminating a franchise agreement prior to its expiration without good cause. Subsection (c) prohibits a franchisor from prohibiting, or enforcing a prohibition against, any franchisee from engaging in any business at any location after expiration of a franchise agreement. This subsection does not prohibit enforcement of a franchise contract obligating a franchisee after expiration or termination of a franchise to (i) cease or refrain from using a trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property owned by the franchisor or its affiliate, except that language in the franchise agreement purporting to determine ownership of a trademark, trade secret, or other intellectual property shall not be binding upon any court or forum for purposes of this paragraph, but may be considered as evidence of such ownership, (ii) alter the appearance of the business premises so that it is substantially similar to the standard design, decor criteria, or motif in use by other franchisees using the same name or trademarks within the proximate trade or market area of the business, or (iii) modify the manner or mode of business operation so as to avoid any substantial confusion with the manner or mode of operations which are unique to the franchisor and commonly in practice by other franchisees using the same name or trademarks within the proximate trade or market area of the business. Section 5. Standards of Conduct Subsection (a) imposes a duty to act in good faith in the performance and enforcement of a franchise contract on each party to the contract. Subsection (b) imposes a nonwaivable duty of due care on the franchisor. Unless the franchisor represents that it has greater skill or knowledge in its undertaking with its franchisees, or conspicuously disclaims that it has skill or knowledge, the franchisor is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by franchisors in good standing in the same or similar types of business. Subsection (c) imposes a fiduciary duty on the franchisor when the franchisor undertakes to perform bookkeeping, collection, payroll, or accounting services on behalf of the franchisee, or when the franchisor requires franchisees to make contributions to any pooled advertising, marketing, or promotional fund which is administered, controlled, or supervised by the franchisor. A franchisor that administers or supervises the administration of a pooled advertising or promotional fund must (i) keep all pooled funds in a segregated account that is not subject to the claims of creditors of the franchisor, (ii) provide an independent certified audit of such pooled funds within sixty days following the close of the franchisor's fiscal year, and (iii) disclose the source and amount of, and deliver to the fund or program, any discount, rebate, compensation, or payment of any kind from any person or entity with whom such fund or program transacts. Section 6. Procedural Fairness Subsection (a) prohibits a franchisor from requiring any term or condition in a franchise agreement, or in any agreement ancillary or collateral to a franchise, which violates the Act. It also prohibits a franchisor from requiring that a franchisee relieve any person from a duty imposed by the Act, except as part of a settlement of a bona fide dispute, or assent to any provision which would protect any person against any liability to which he would otherwise be subject under the Act by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence in the performance of duties, or by reason of reckless disregard of obligations and duties under the franchise agreement. Nor may a franchisor require that a franchisee agree to not make any oral or written statement relating to the franchise business, the operation of the franchise system, or the franchisee's experience with the franchise business. Subsection (b) makes void and unenforceable any provision of a franchise agreement, or of any agreement ancillary or collateral to a franchise, which would purport to waive or restrict any right granted under the Act. Subsection (c) forbids any stipulation or provision of a franchise agreement or of an agreement ancillary or collateral to a franchise from (i) depriving a franchisee of the application and benefits of the act or any Federal law of the State in which the franchisee's principal place of business is located, (ii) depriving a franchisee of the right to commence an action or arbitration against the franchisor for violation of the Act, or for breach of the franchise agreement or of any agreement or stipulation ancillary or collateral to the franchise, in a court of arbitration forum in the State of the franchisee's principal place of business, or (iii) excluding collective action by franchisees to settle like disputes arising from violation of the Act by civil action or arbitration. Subsection (d) states that compliance with the Act or with an applicable State franchise law is not waived, excused or avoided, and evidence of violation of the Act or State law shall not be excluded, by virtue of an integration clause, any provision of a franchise agreement or an agreement ancillary or collateral to a franchise, the parol evidence rule, or any other rule of evidence purporting to exclude consideration of matters outside the franchise agreement. Section 7. Actions by State Attorneys General Subsection (a) permits a State attorney general to bring an action under the Act in an appropriate United States district court using the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of his State. Subsection (b) states that this section does not prohibit a State attorney general from exercising the powers conferred on him by the laws of his State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence. Subsection (c) states that any civil action brought under subsection (a) in a United States district court may be brought in the district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business, or wherever venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391 which establishes general venue rules. Process may be served in any district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he may be found. Subsection (d) states that nothing in this section shall prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged violation of any civil or criminal statute of such State. Section 8. Transfer of a Franchise Subsection (a) permits a franchisee to assign an interest in a franchised business and franchise to a transferee if the transferee satisfies the reasonable qualifications generally applied in determining whether or not a current franchisee is eligible for renewal. If the franchisor does not renew a significant number of its franchisees, then the transferee may be required to satisfy the reasonable conditions generally applied to new franchisees. The qualifications must be based upon legitimate business reasons. If the qualifications are not met, the franchisor may refuse to permit the transfer, provided that the refusal is not arbitrary or capricious and the franchisor states the grounds for its refusal in writing to the franchisee. Subsection (b) requires that a franchisee give the franchisor at least thirty days' written notice of a proposed transfer, and that a franchisee, upon request, will provide in writing to the franchisor a list of the ownership interests of all persons holding or claiming an equitable or beneficial interest in the franchise subsequent to the transfer. Subsection (c) states that a franchisor is deemed to have consented to a transfer thirty days after the request for consent is submitted, unless the franchisor withholds consent in writing during that time period specifying the reasons for doing so. Any such notice is privileged against a claim of defamation. Subsection (d) establishes that a franchisor may require the following four conditions before consenting to a transfer: (1) the transferee successfully complete a reasonable training program, (2) payment of a reasonable transfer fee, (3) the franchisee pay or make reasonable provisions to pay any amount due the franchisor or the franchisor's affiliate, (4) the financial terms of the transfer at the time of the transfer comply with the franchisor's current financial requirements for franchisees. A franchisor may not condition its consent to a transfer on (1) a franchisee forgoing existing rights other than those contained in the franchise agreement, (2) entering into a release of claims broader in scope than a counterpart release of claims offered by the franchisor to the franchisee, or (3) requiring the franchisee or transferee to make, or agree to make, capital improvements, reinvestments, or purchases in an amount greater than the franchisor could have reasonably required under the terms of the franchisee's existing franchise agreement. Subsection (e) permits a franchisee to assign his interest for the unexpired term of the franchise agreement and prohibits the franchisor from requiring the franchisee or transferee to enter an agreement which has different material terms or financial requirements as a condition of the transfer. Subsection (f) prohibits a franchisor from withholding its consent without good cause to a franchisee making a public offering of its securities if the franchisee or owner of the franchisee's interest retains control over more than 25 percent of the voting power as the franchisee. Subsection (g) prohibits a franchisor from withholding its consent to a pooling of interests, to a sale or exchange of assets or securities, or to any other business consolidation among its existing franchisees, provided the constituents are each in material compliance with their respective obligations to the franchisor. Subsection (h) establishes six occurrences which shall not be considered transfers requiring the consent of the franchisor under a franchise agreement and for which the franchisor shall not impose any fees or payments or changes in excess of the franchisor's cost to review the matter. Subsection (i) prohibits a franchisor from enforcing against the transferor any covenant of the franchise purporting to prohibit the transferor from engaging in any lawful occupation or enterprise after the transfer of a transferor's complete interest in a franchise. This subsection does not limit the franchisor from enforcing a contractual covenant against the transferor not to exploit the franchisor's trade secrets or intellectual property rights except by agreement with the franchisor. Section 9. Transfer of Franchise by Franchisor Subsection (1) prohibits a franchisor from transferring interest in a franchise by sale or in any other manner unless he give notice thirty days prior to the effective date of the transfer to every franchisee of his intent to transfer the interest. Subsection (2) requires that the notice given contains a complete description of the business and financial terms of the proposed transfer or transfers. Subsection (3) requires that the entity assuming the franchisor's obligations have the business experience and financial means necessary to perform the fanchisor's obligations. Section 10. Independent Sourcing of Goods and Services Subsection (a) prohibits a franchisor from prohibiting or restricting a franchisee from obtaining equipment, fixtures, supplies, goods or services used in the establishment or operation of the franchised business from sources of the franchisee's choosing, except that such goods or services may be required to meet established uniform system-wide quality standards promulgated or enforced by the franchisor. Subsection (b) requires that if the franchisor approves vendors of equipment, fixtures, supplies, goods, or services used in the establishment or operation of the franchised business, the franchisor will provide and continuously update an inclusive list of approved vendors and will promptly evaluate and respond to reasonable requests by franchisees for approval of competitive sources of supply. The franchisor shall approve not fewer than two vendors for each piece of equipment, each fixture, each supply, good, or service. Subsection (c) requires a franchisor and its affiliates officers and/or its managing agents, must fully disclose whether or not it receives any rebates, commissions, payments, or other benefits from vendors as a result of the purchase of goods or services by franchisees and requires a franchisor to pass all such rebates, commissions, payments, and other benefits directly to the franchisee. Subsection (d) requires a franchisor to report not less frequently than annually, using generally accepted accounting principles, the amount of revenue and profit it earns from the sale of equipment, fixtures, supplies, goods, or services to the franchisee. Subsection (e) excepts reasonable quantities of goods and services that the franchisor requires the franchisee to obtain from the franchisor or its affiliate from the requirements of subsection (a), but only if the goods and services are central to the franchised business and either are actually manufactured or produced by the franchisor or its affiliate, or incorporate a trade secret owned by the franchisor or its affiliate. Section 11. Encroachment Subsection (a) prohibits a franchisor from placing, or licensing another to place, one or more, new outlet(s) in unreasonable proximity to an established outlet, if (i) the intent or probable effect of establishing the new outlet(s) is to cause a diminution of gross sales by the established outlet of more than five percent of the twelve months immediately following establishment of the new outlet(s), and (ii) the established franchisee offers goods or services identified by the same trademark as those offered by the new outlet(s), or has premises that are identified by the same trademark as the new outlet(s). Subsection (b) creates an exception to this section if, before a new outlet(s) opens for business, a franchisor offers in writing to each franchisee of an established outlet concerned to pay to the franchisee an amount equal to fifty percent of the gross sales of the new outlet(s), for the first twenty-four months of operation of the new outlet(s), if the sales of the established outlet decline by more than five percent in the twelve months immediately following establishment of the new outlet(s), as a consequence of the opening of such outlet(s). Subsection (c) places upon the franchisor the burden of proof to show that, or the extent to which, a decline in sales of a established franchised outlet occurred for reasons other than the opening of the new outlet(s), if the franchisor makes a written offer under subsection (b) or in an action or proceeding brought under section 12. Section 12. Private Right of Action Subsection (a) gives a party to a franchise who is injured by a violation or impending violation of this Act a right of action for all damages caused by the violation, including costs of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees, against any person found to be liable for such violation. Subsection (b) makes jointly and severally liable every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under subsection (a), every partner in a firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions and every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction constituting the violation, unless that person who would otherwise be liable hereunder had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to know of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. Subsection (c) states that nothing in the Act shall be construed to limit the right of a franchisor and a franchisee to engage in arbitration, medication, or other nonjudicial dispute resolution, either in advance or after a dispute arises, provided that the standards and protections applied in any binding nonjudicial procedure agreed to the parties are not less than the requirements set forth in the Act. Subsection (d) prohibits an action from being commenced more than five years after the date on which the violation occurs, or three years after the date on which the violation is discovered or should have been discovered through exercise of reasonable diligence. Subsection (e) provides for venue in the jurisdiction where the franchise business is located. Subsection (f) states that the private rights created by the Act are in addition to, and not in lieu of, other rights or remedies created by Federal or State law. Section 13. Scope and Applicability Subsection (a) applies the requirements of the Act to franchise agreements entered into, amended, exchanged, or renewed after the date of enactment of the Act, except as provided in subsection (b). Subsection (b) delays implementation of Section 3 of the act until ninety days after the date or enactment of the Act and applies Section 3's requirements only to actions, practices, disclosures, and statements occurring on or after such date. Section 14. Definitions Defines terms used in the Act.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, might I be informed how much time remains on each side?

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I first wanted to thank my colleague and dean of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), for sharing this legislative product with us, he and the Committee on Commerce and the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. I think everyone has heard that we finally reached a conclusion that I think may satisfy nearly every Member in the House of Representatives. This Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the legislation which was at one time in a doubtful state of passage by many, has now come before the floor. And as the ranking member on the Committee on the Judiciary, I am proud to suggest that this is a bipartisan product, a work that has been thoroughly reviewed by two committees and two subcommittees in this House alone and is certainly worthy of being signed into law by the President. The WIPO implementation and the important explication of the liability for those service providers who knowingly transmit infringing material on-line marks a critical achievement for those of us who support strong copyright protection and the fairness that goes with it. When we started on the journey toward the passage that I think is in front of us, I pledged to work with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble), subcommittee chairman, and the ranking member, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), to make sure that this was done. Although it was thought not to be possible at the time, I think this work exemplifies the kind of bipartisanship that this Congress has and should continue to have as we move forward in other matters. We are strengthening domestic copyright law and providing global leadership so that this great Nation can continue to impress upon other nations the importance of strong copyright protection. Now, not all the provisions have reached a level of perfection. We might have done more to strengthen the role of the Patent and Trademark Office within its own agency. This Member would have preferred to see a database protection bill included in the measure before us. But that was not possible. Which means that we will begin again in the next Congress, all of us who are so honored by our constituents to return. We will have to start all over again in this area, and it is something that I urge my colleagues in both committees to take seriously. I again commend the chairman of the Committee on Commerce, and the ranking member, and all of those in the Judiciary that worked on it. The gentleman from California (Mr. Howard Berman) played an important role in the conference committee. And so, too, of great assistance was the copyright industry, the telecommunications people, the Nation's libraries and librarians, the unions and the guilds who worked cooperatively with us to inform us of the needs that they confront in this digital environment. I am proud of the product, and like all the speakers before me, I urge its favorable confirmation. Madam Speaker, I would like to emphasize that it was my decision to share this time with Mr. Dingell, the Ranking member of the House Commerce Committee. Under the rules, all of the time would have come to the Judiciary Committee, but I am deciding to share the time for two reasons. The first reason is the respect and fondness that I hold for the dean of the House, Mr. Dingell. He asked that I share the time, and out of respect for his leadership in the House, I was happy to oblige. Second the parliamentarian ruled that the House Commerce Committee had some legitimate jurisdictional concerns over discrete aspects of the bill. As such House Commerce Committee members were appointed during the House-Senate conference, albeit in lesser numbers. Mr. Dingell and his Commerce Committee colleagues played a constructive role in bringing this measure to the floor. The sharing of the time should in no way imply that the two committees are, in any way, on equal footing from a jurisdictional perspective on this measure, but does recognize both my great fondness for the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell and the very constructive role that he played in bringing this matter to the floor. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), the ranking member of the subcommittee, whose extraordinary leadership was key to working out the complicated provisions that have been reflected.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, do the provisions in the bill that the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) refers to apply to government offices that do the same thing?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am inserting into the Record two insightful and useful editorials from The Nation magazine. The first one, titled ``Clinton, Starr and the Constitution'' points out that ``this inquiry has been driven by politics from the start.'' The Nation, which has been a strident critic of Bill Clinton almost from the beginning of his Presidency, states that ``Kenneth Starr's impeachment report represents an assault not merely on Bill Clinton but, more significant, on the presidency, the Constitution and our democracy.'' It also rightly points our that ``What the conservatives could not stop by election they have thwarted by investigation. This Congress saw no important legislation passed on tobacco and children, education, childcare, minimum wage or campaign finance reform.'' The second editorial points out that the tactics of this investigation have amounted to ``sexual McCarthyism.'' In drawing a powerful historical analogy, the Nation points suggest that ``the Enemy Other is sexual rather than political deviance.'' Just like during the 1950's, there have been secret grand jury leaks, wiretapping has been used to entrap witnesses and the legal process is being used to punish or defame people for activities that may be ``politically and culturally anathema,'' but not necessarily crimes. Hence the need for the public to hear all the salacious details contained in the Ken Starr report. I bring these fine editorials to the attention of my colleagues and the public. [From The Nation, Oct. 5, 1998] Clinton, Starr and the Constitution Kenneth Starr's impeachment report represents an assault not merely on Bill Clinton but, more significant, on the presidency, the Constitution and our democracy. It is crucial to the future of all three that it be repudiated before its damage becomes irreversible. We have no great affection for the President, who has systematically betrayed almost everyone and everything for which he professed to stand during his six years in office. But those failings should not obscure the great danger posed by the possibility of Starr and his minions forcing Bill Clinton out of office. Whatever the degree of the President's responsibility for bringing this calamitous situation on his own head--and that responsibility is considerable--the nation cannot allow itself to be decapitated by what is, at its core, a politically motivated witch hunt. Clinton's actions ought not to be the subject of an impeachment inquiry. Starr went after possibly more serious allegations against the President related to Whitewater, Filegate and Travelgate, but despite a nearly crazed obsession with nailing his prey, he apparently came up empty- handed. He has therefore been forced to base an impeachment case entirely on Clinton's adulterous affair and attempts to cover it up. A principled man, comfortable with himself and the Constitution, should be able to argue that no citizen may be compelled to testify about intimate details of his sex life unless there is a showing of transcendent public need. Clinton could have invoked provisions of the First, Fourth and Fifth amendments to create a zone of privacy, a so-called intimacy privilege. But instead, Clinton appears to have lied--more than once. Let the lawyers argue whether this technically qualifies as perjury. Clinton would be wise to quit quibbling and rely on the good sense of the American people to see that Congress addresses this transgression (which does not compare with Clinton's more serious failures in addressing the nation's problems of growing corporate power and inequality) with a punishment that fits the crime. One of the most striking aspects of this surreal situation has been the consistency of the public's insistence that what happened between Monica Lewinsky and Bill Clinton is their own business, and that of their families. The punditocracy's obsession with the salacious details of Oval Office sex has been matched by its hypocrisy in playing morality police to an audience that does not care what the pundits think. The Constitution says that Congress shall impeach only for ``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The President's lawyers are on firm ground when they assert, ``The impeachment clause was designed to protect our country against a President who was using his official powers against the nation, against the American people, against our society. It was never designed to allow a political body to force a President from office for a very personal mistake.'' This inquiry has been driven by politics from the start. Kenneth Starr is a partisan conservative Republican who has been the spearhead of an unprincipled, well-funded attack on the Administration almost from the moment it took office. Lest we forget: Starr, former chief of staff to Reagan Attorney General William French Smith, was chosen for his current job in 1994 by a three-judge panel that itself was selected by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who would preside over the Senate in the event of an impeachment trial. Starr considered writing an amicus brief to advance Paula Jones's case against the President. Starr continued, as a million-dollar-a-year lawyer, to represent the tobacco industry while investigating Clinton and planned to accept a Richard Mellon Scaife-funded deanship at Pepperdine University until a national uproar forced him to give it up. And Starr's office is under investigation for the unprofessional and possibly illegal manner in which it leaked information designed to damage the President. Whether it achieves its goal of inspiring Clinton's impeachment, Starr's investigation has succeeded beyond its originators' wildest dreams. It has crippled the Administration and the Democratic Party. What the conservatives could not stop by election they have thwarted by investigation. This Congress saw no important legislation passed on tobacco and children, education, childcare, minimum wage or campaign finance reform. Not much planning for the future appears to be under way in the White House, as Democrats run for cover in hopes of surviving what could be major Republican gains come November. More significant, however, is the damage that Starr and his team have done to time-honored constitutional prerogatives and common decency. President Clinton's right to privacy has been shredded. Starr has used his unlimited powers to threaten White House staff and to intimidate Lewinsky and her family. He has eviscerated the right of attorney-client privilege for public officials, and he has abused the grand jury system. And the hymn-singing, Bible-quoting Starr has produced the best-read piece of Puritan pornography in human history. In his zeal to remove the President, he has transformed the American political process into an exercise in voyeurism. Rather than needlessly drag the country through the degrading process of impeachment hearings based on Starr's document, the House Judiciary Committee might consider conducting a debate that assumes the truth of all the allegations in the Starr report. The question for the committee would then become: Are these charges serious enough to rise to the level of being ``high crimes and misdemeanors''? If not, in what would essentially be the granting of a motion to dismiss, the committee could decide not to present the House with articles of impeachment. The process could stop right there. It would then remain only for Congress to decide whether to drop the matter or to censure the President, in a form to be determined. The President, for his part, could do his party and the country a favor by admitting he lied and making clear that he would accept such a censure. A censure resolution, if it comes to that, should be narrowly focused on the nation's top law-enforcement official lying under oath in his Paula Jones deposition. It should not give credence to Starr's unproven claims of grand jury perjury and obstruction of justice. Going forward, Congress should also insure, by way of changes in statutes governing the independent counsel's office, that no person will ever again be vested with the uncontrolled power that Kenneth Starr has so effectively misused. Inquisitions, sexual or otherwise, are ``inappropriate'' in a constitutional democracy. Starrism Everyone from Alan Dershowitz to a front-page classified advertiser in the New York Times has sounded the alarm about ``sexual McCarthyism'' in connection with Kenneth Starr, his report and all the rest. The word ``McCarthyism,'' as many have pointed out [see Navasky, ``Dialectical McCarthyism(s),'' July 20] is a misnomer since it describes a phenomenon that began before the junior senator from Wisconsin arrived on the scene and persisted after he was retired from it. And each time this umbrella term for the excesses of the anti-Communist crusade is recycled as a metaphor for the latest political mugging, it loses something of its original power and precision as a description of a social pathology. Moreover, in the case of Starr & Co. the metaphor seems inexact because McCarthy was notorious for the sloppiness of his methods, the manipulation of numbers (first there were 205, then fifty-seven, then eighty-one card-carrying Communists in the State Department) and, as often as not, getting the wrong guy. Whereas the sexual allegations against Clinton appear to be well documented, and Starr seems obsessively precise and meticulous (although the closer one looks at his report the less confidence one has in its integrity). Is ``sexual McCarthyism'' a misleading metaphor for what is happening? Not really. Though there are obvious differences, there are at least three significant similarities between then and now. It's important to identify what they are before too many reputations get shredded, too many democratic values violated, too many dangerous precedents established, too much privacy invaded. First and foremost, there is the attempt to demonize a political target as the Enemy Other. Historians like the late Frank Donner have demonstrated how the great Red hunt of the fifties exploited the nativist impulse, which identifies the foreign with the radical and the immoral. In the days of the domestic cold war it meant Hoover, McCarthy, Nixon, HUAC, et al.--cheered on by such as the Rev. Billy Graham and the American Legion--arguing that to be a Communist (or fellow traveler) was to be a ``dirty Red,'' an agent of an international conspiracy, a spy. The reason Arthur Miller's play The Crucible, about the Salem witch trials of the 1600s, spoke so eloquently to the 1950s was that just as there were no witches in Salem, there was no internal Red menace in the United States of the fifties--no Enemy Other that justified the hysteria that resulted in the wholesale invasion of the rights and liberties of citizens. Today we have independent counsel Kenneth Starr, Representatives Henry Hyde and Newt Gingrich, with Chief Justice William Rehnquist waiting in the wings to preside over impeachment proceedings in the Senate--cheered on by such as the Christian Coalition and William Bennett--arguing in effect that to have (dirty) sex in the Oval Office means one should be thrown out of office. The Enemy Other is sexual rather than political deviance, the target of opportunity is the President rather than the CP. Arthur Miller's image of a witch hunt fueled by repressed sexuality leading to a form of cultural hysteria survives from the fifties to link the two episodes. Second, the Red hunters of the fifties succeeded in deploying the legal process to punish people for activities that may have been politically and culturally anathema, but in and of themselves were not crimes. During the fifties, that meant summoning accused members of the Communist Party (a legal organization) before official tribunals and asking them questions the investigators knew would be difficult or impossible for them to answer, thereby forcing them to choose among silence (which landed the Hollywood Ten in prison for contempt of Congress), blacklisting (which was visited on anyone who invoked the Fifth) or betrayal (former comrades who answered the $64 question--``Are you now or have you ever been . . .?''--were next asked to name the names of others). Today Starr uses Clinton's unwillingness to testify about the intimate details of his (perfectly legal) sex life, and his inability--for reasons of Realpolitik--to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself, to try to trap him into the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice and the abuse of power. When is the last time a ``target'' was forced to answer questions, especially intimate ones, before a grand jury? Third, in the fifties, under the rubric of national security, the FBI and other investigative agencies routinely violated the privacy and civil liberties of alleged subversives via legally dubious wiretapping, bugging, the use of informers and intrusive interrogations. Today, Linda Tripp, acting in tandem with the independent counsel and perhaps lawyers for Paula Jones, tries to induce Monica Lewinsky to say things that can be used to entrap the President in contradictory testimony. This may or may not qualify as perjury or grounds for impeachment but is calculated to cause personal and political embarrassment and shame. The parade of analogies marches on. There were secret grand jury leaks then; now the special prosecutor, in league with the Republican majority, arranges for the entire grand jury transcript to be circulated on the World Wide Web. The press then was complicit with the McCarthyites in the sense that it passively reported irresponsible charges on the front page and didn't get around to publishing corrections until days later, usually on page 47. These days the conglomerated and highly technologized media are anything but passive. They are leading the posse, attempting to whip up a political hysteria that thus far the public seems disinclined to indulge. We are lucky in that, for it would be a disastrous precedent--far beyond what McCarthy wrought--to drive a President out of office as a result of a public hubbub over his private conduct. My own study of the McCarthy era led me to conclude that the purpose of the Congressional and other investigations of those years was not to write legislation or to develop new information (HUAC, for example, already had obtained from undercover agents all the names it was insisting witnesses recite in public). Rather, the hearings and trials and investigations of those years were for the most part degradation ceremonies. One shudders at the prospect of Congressional hearings or a Senate trial that recycles the pornographic materials Starr claims it was necessary to assemble. In the long run history has decided that it was not HUAC's or McCarthy's targets that were degraded. It was the country itself. Let us not let it happen again.--Victor Navasky.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2235. In response to the rising tide of violent crime in and around schools across this nation, Congress must step-up our fight against juvenile crime from a prevention perspective. This legislation would amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, encouraging school-based partnerships between local law enforcement agencies and local school systems. School based partnerships would be eligible to receive federal funding to hire ``School Resource Officers'' (SRO's). A SRO would be a career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-based organizations to (1) address crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities, affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school, (2) develop or expand crime prevention efforts for students (3) educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and safety; (4) develop or expand community justice initiatives; (5) train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime awareness; (6) assist in the identification of physical changes in the environment that may reduce the crime problem, and/or (7) assist with the development of anti- crime, school policy and procedural changes. This legislation complements an existing School-based Partnership research grant program administered by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). The existing program funds demonstration efforts on particular, single solutions to youth crime and violence. The proposed legislation would explicitly allow COPS program resources to be used in general (non-research) school based partnerships/SRO efforts. This statutory language is vital to clearly articulating the importance of fighting juvenile crime, and will be essential in establishing the fight against juvenile crime as a national priority. President Clinton recently announced that ``the same community policing techniques that are helping to make our streets safe again are the best way to help keep our schools safe.'' This legislation is an important step in making our schools safe for our children.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, were it not for the gentleman from New York (Mr. Jerry Nadler), this bill, one of the worst anti-people bills I have ever seen in the Judiciary, would be quietly going through this body. The President of the United States, I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), has pledged he will reward the majority with a veto for not listening to the senior ranking member and going off on the deep end. He will veto this bill. And even if it is put in an omnibus bill, he will veto it. So we are talking serious defects. I want to address the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania. He and I have toiled in the Judiciary vineyards together for so long. How could the gentleman put a provision in, first of all, that takes out the few good provisions that we had? The bill was bad enough on its own, but then he gutted the provision, which passed with over 100 of his Republican colleagues, that would have ended the practice of credit card companies cutting off accounts. Why? Why would the gentleman drop the provisions that would prevent the horrible tobacco companies, the bad guys of American industry, from using bankruptcy to get out of their judgments? Why would he endanger youth? I know he is a pro-family man, like me, pro-family values. Why would he endanger child support, alimony payments, in a bill coming out of the committee with his name on it? Why would the gentleman harm small businesses? We represent the little guys. And now he is putting them in very precarious positions. And then the gentleman dropped the consumer protection and fair credit amendments that were in the Senate bill. Now, these were the things the gentleman took out of the bill. But before he did that, the bill was a nightmare anyway. This was the most partisan of anything the Republicans have ever done in the Committee on Judiciary. And without consulting me, the gentleman has been hurried and partisan and, really, the whole process was not the kind that we want. By the way, the gentleman mentioned how many people voted for the bill. How many people voted for the open-ended, no-scope inquiry yesterday? The American people do not want that, and they do not want a bill like this. The House makes mistakes all the time. Our job is to correct them. And so I wanted to just outline some of these things, and I refer the gentleman to the report that we filed of dissenting views that is in this matter. I thank the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Jerry Nadler) for according me so much time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, in my continuing education program for the gentleman from Virginia, who is a dear friend of mine, the fact that more are going into bankruptcy is no proof that the bankruptcy laws are being abused. It is really evidence that the credit card industry is enticing millions into debt that the should not be, I say to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman from Texas is absolutely correct, and our hearing supported that. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), our ranking member, brought in witnesses to point this out without any shadow of a doubt. Anybody that tries to claim that child support payments are enhanced by the provisions in this bill really do not understand it.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of that part of the term extension bill which actually extends the term of copyright. But to object to another, unrelated provision of the bill which I wish were not included today. I do support this overall bill, and I will vote for it, but as I say, regret that I am forced to accept a terrible provision as the price to pay for supporting a bill which this Nation urgently needs. I deeply regret that copyright term extension legislation was hijacked some time ago by interests that have little to do with the extension of copyright's term, but through their persistence, and the support of some in the House of Representatives whose tenacity is to be admired, have succeeded in putting a provision in this legislation which is a terrible blow to songwriters. Copyright term extension is an important and necessary improvement to our copyright laws, and one which I have long supported. After a healthy debate, it passed out of the Judiciary Committee without dissent, and those of us who support it have fought long and hard for it to come to the floor today. It strengthens our domestic copyright industry by extending the life of copyright. In addition, it eliminates the disadvantage that the United States has operated under since the European Union extended the life of its copyrights, but provided that copyrights created in countries that did not do the same, like the United States until now, would not be similarly protected. Although I am wholeheartedly in support of term extension, I am deeply disappointed that the leadership has agreed to use this vehicle to carve out important protections--meaning real money--from songwriters, the overwhelming majority of whom do not make a great deal of money to begin with. The musical licensing exemption provision in today's bill may be a compromise, but it's bad policy. I am concerned that the musical licensing exemption--a wholly inappropriate carveout of performers rights--may also be violative of international treaty obligations. Specifically, the provision may well violate the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works. I am directly talking about Article 11b is of that convention, which provides the exclusive right of the author to authorize the ``public communication by loudspeaker or other analogous instrument transmitting by signs, sounds, or images, the broadcast of the work.'' Based on the Register of Copyrights' analysis of earlier versions of this bill, I am concerned that the carveout in today's bill may violate that provision. The case has also been made to me that the carveout--which will come directly out of the pockets of songwriters--may also be a taking. How ironic that the Republican majority would spend so much time worried about takings in the property context, then turn around and do it to small business people when nobody's looking. I am voting for today's legislation because the extension of copyright term is a critical and necessary policy change for our Nation to make. I am disappointed that the legislation includes this carveout that hurts songwriters. But it was a compromise, and I recognize that. I regret that songwriters were made to compromise on something they should not have had to be dealing with at all, but it is a compromise, and I understand that. I just am not sure that nations that may have a claim against us in the world trade organization because of a violation of the Berne Convention will understand it, and that concerns me.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman). (Mr. ACKERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Houston, Texas (Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee), an able member of our Committee on the Judiciary who was working until midnight on the floor. (Ms. JACKSON-LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the able gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kanjorski). (Mr. KANJORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the able gentleman from New York (Mr. Charles Rangel). (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. With apologies again to my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I yield 20 seconds each to gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Deutsch). Mr. Speaker, I yield 20 seconds to the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS). (Mr. MEEKS of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)