John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Just answer me.

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, could I ask the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), if he does not like partial-birth, what will he be willing to accept to save the life of the mother if he does not like this measure?

Mr. CONYERS. Then why are you opposing this?

Mr. CONYERS. We are talking about serious physical health. Yes or no.

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, you do accept it?

Mr. CONYERS. What do you think about serious health risk, namely, fertility? What is the answer? I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. CONYERS. It was a pleasure.

Mr. CONYERS. Just a moment. No lectures. Just answer the question. What about serious health risk, like sterility?

Mr. CONYERS. Just answer me.

Mr. CONYERS. You are against protective procedure and all these other procedures. We will talk later about this.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, pursuant to general leave I request the following remarks be inserted in the Congressional Record during consideration of the bill H.R. 1122. Imagine that you--or your wife--or your daughter, learned when she is seven months pregnant that the fetus had a lethal neurological disorder and all of its vital organs were atrophying. After consulting with specialists and being told that the pregnancy is seriously jeopardizing the mother's health, and possibly her life, you are told that an intact D&E procedure has the best chance of preserving the mother's health and her ability to become pregnant again. Or imagine that the mother is 32 weeks pregnant when she learns that the baby has no brain. The fetus has no chance of survival. The mother is diabetic, so a Cesarian section and induced labor are more dangerous to her health and reproductive capacity than an intact D&E procedure. Would you want 435 politicians to tell you--or your wife--or your daughter, the type of medical procedure she could use in this painful situation? Should Congress be able to determine whether a woman will lose her capacity to reproduce and bear children? Well that is precisely the situation that Coreen Costello and Vicki Stella were in. And if we adopt this bill, we will be telling many, many other women that Washington knows best when it comes to terminating pregnancies that have resulted in tragic circumstances. Women's lives and health must be protected. This bill is unconstitutional, because it contains no exception providing for the physical health of the mother. And that is why we should vote against it. Roe v. Wade, and its progeny, clearly hold that a woman's right to protect her life and health, in the context of reproductive choice, trumps the government, as big brother, in its desire to regulate. Courts across the country have continued to reaffirm Roe's holding that, ``subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'' Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65, 93 S. Ct. At 732. Without such an exception, this legislation could jeopardize women's health. Of course, the Republican leadership has little interest in developing a credible and serious constitutional proposal that could be signed into law. Instead, they prefer a ``wedge'' issue that can divide the American people. That's why they wouldn't make a single amendment concerning health in order. But H.R. 1122 has no health exception, and we are led to believe that the reason is because its authors have determined that under no possible condition is a mother's health--no matter how serious--to be equated with the potential life of a fetus. To them, the partial birth abortion ban is merely a means of preventing any and all abortions, even where the mother's health is in jeopardy. We must make abortion less necessary, not more difficult. But the reality is, this bill will do absolutely nothing to reduce the number of abortions performed in this country. Zero. It will only criminalize physicians for pursuing the safest alternative in dealing with a very painful, difficult, and terrifying circumstance when a pregnancy has gone bad, and the mother's physical health is in jeopardy. And it will encourage states to attempt to outlaw abortion at any and every stage. It is this effort that is becoming a trend among anti-choice proponents across the country. One need only look to the case of Wisconsin, where for a few days no woman was able to obtain an abortion, in order to see the true breadth of this ban. In mid-May, an anti-choice judge refused to grant a temporary injunction against the state's ``Partial Birth Abortion Ban.'' Upon learning of this decision, abortion providers in Wisconsin refused to provide any abortion for fear of prosecution under this broad ban. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit Court overruled the judge and the health of Wisconsin women is once again protected. It is clear that H.R. 1122 is unconstitutional. State versions of partial birth abortion bans, have been blocked or limited by eighteen federal and state courts. Many of these cases involve laws modeled after H.R. 1122. Based on these decisions, it is clear that H.R. 1122 is unconstitutional. As of July 9, 1998, 28 states have enacted legislation banning so- called ``partial birth abortion'' or other abortion procedures. Court challenges regarding these laws have been initiated thus far in 20 states. In 18 of those, courts have partially or fully enjoined the laws. In 7 of those 18, courts have permanently enjoined the laws. Only three courts have not enjoined state ``partial birth abortion bans'' when they have looked at the statutes. However, in Alabama, which is one of the three states, the court has not ruled on the merits, but the Alabama Attorney General has directed the state's district attorneys to enforce the statute only after viability. The Alabama court did not rule on the merits of the case at this time, because the court was very unclear about the meaning of various terms in the statute, such as the meaning of a ``partial birth abortion.'' As a result, the court will not issue a final ruling, pending further explanation about the meaning of the statute from the Alabama Supreme Court Summit Medical Associates v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998). This decision is further evidence that courts are having a hard time interpreting the unconstitutionally vague language of so called ``partial birth abortion bans.'' And in Virginia, a single Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a stay of a preliminary injunction issued by the district court, allowing the law to go into effect. (Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, No. 98-1930 (4th Cir. June 30, 1998) (Luttig, Cir. Judge). This makes Virginia the only state where a Court has gone against the grain and overturned a preliminary injunction against a ban. But in the majority of cases, there is no question that courts have overwhelmingly come to the conclusion that so called ``partial-birth abortion'' statutes are patently unconstitutional. Some of the language from these cases is especially illustrative. For instance, a federal district judge in Arizona held that Arizona's statute, which was modeled on H.R. 1122, ``unconstitutionally burdens a woman's right to terminate a nonviable fetus, and that the Act is void for vagueness in that it does not sufficiently define the conduct which is attempts to proscribe.'' Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Woods, 982. F. Supp. 1396 (D. Ariz. 1997). In Iowa, a court held that the statute that was modeled after H.R. 1122 was unconstitutional because it ``likely infringes on the constitutional rights of women . . . the protection of constitutional rights clearly outweighs any interest the state may have in promoting the interests of the fetus with a statute that is unconstitutional.'' Planned Parenthood v. Miller and Niebyl v. Miller, Civ. No. 4-98-CV- 90149, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9851 (D.S.D. Iowa, June 26, 1998). In addition, most of the medical and legal experts who have reviewed the legislation note that it is extremely vague and broad and as a result, may outlaw abortion procedures at ANY stage of pregnancy. In fact, in my home state of Michigan, on July 31, 1997, federal District Court Judge Gerald Rosen struck down Michigan's ``partial-birth'' abortion ban, finding that the definition of ``partial-birth'' was so vague that doctors lacked notice as to what abortion procedures were banned. Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997). Moreover, the court found that the state law unduly burdened women's ability to obtain an abortion, in violation of the undue burden analysis established in the Supreme Court's landmark case of Casey v. Planned Parenthood, where the Court held that at least pre-viability, states may not place an undue burden on the right of women to choose to end a pregnancy. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 50 U.S. 833 (1992). The judge noted that ``the Michigan Legislature rejected every attempt to narrow and more specifically define the sweep of its statute, and as a result, produced a law clearly violative of Supreme Court precedent.'' It is clear that this bill violates that well established constitutional law long-settled by Roe. An Arizona court also found the same thing. This purposeful vagueness can only be interpreted as an effort to outlaw other abortion and obstetric techniques as well. As recently as February 12, 1998, a District Court in Illinois found, ``The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to give fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited.'' Hope Clinic et al. v. Ryan, No. 97C8702 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Let's take the politicians out of this intensely personal issue. When it comes to a women's life or health, Washington doesn't always know best.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the reported resistance by Independent Counsel Starr to Chief District Court Judge Johnson's decision to begin an investigation of whether Mr. Starr leaked grand jury materials to the press in violation of federal law. Rather than obey that judge's order, Mr. Starr apparently has filed an unusual motion to prevent her order from going into effect until such time as he can be heard before the D.C. Court of Appeals. The central issue appears to be whether Mr. Starr will be forced to comply with Judge Johnson's order that President Clinton's lawyers be allowed to participate in the questioning of members of the Independent Counsel's office concerning the alleged leaks. We have not yet been informed of exactly why Mr. Starr is so concerned about direct questioning of his staff by the President's lawyers concerning alleged violations of federal law. Judge Johnson's decision to permit such questioning is, however, fully justified by Mr. Starr's prior misleading statements on the issue of whether his office was the source of leaks. Mr. Starr has previously stated that leaks were ``prohibited'' in his office and that he had ``no reason to suspect'' that anyone in his office may have been the source of reports about his investigation. Later, of course, as we all now know, Mr. Starr admitted that his office speaks frequently with reporters, but that these contacts do not fall within his narrow definition of a ``leak.'' Mr. Starr's resistance to standard truth-seeking measures such as adversarial questioning is blatantly hypocritical in light of his numerous public statements suggesting that the White House and others are improperly obstructing his investigation simply because they ask courts to balance important private and governmental interests against Mr. Starr's apparently boundless interest in new investigative leads. Now that Mr. Starr has apparently found some interests of his own that he believes justify limiting an important part of a proposed criminal investigation, will Mr. Starr now concede that asking a court to evaluate a privilege is an appropriate response to a criminal investigation? Assuming that Mr. Starr is unwilling to make this concession, will he then ask himself the same question he asked during his recent speech to the bar association in North Carolina? In that memorably inappropriate attack on the President by the Independent Counsel, Mr. Starr self- righteously posed the following question: At what point does a lawyer's manipulation of the legal system become an obstruction of the truth? Witnessing Mr. Starr's own legal manipulations this week, I am forced to ask my own question: What does Mr. Starr have to hide? Mr. Starr should live up to his own rhetoric, stop resisting Judge Johnson's order and allow a credible investigation to proceed into these significant allegations of serious wrongdoing.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, according to media reports, a hearing was held this morning on the issue of leaks by the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. The issue of leaks by the Independent Counsel and his staff is not new. Last month, Mr. Starr acknowledged in an interview that he has talked to reporters on an ``off the record basis,'' and that his chief deputy, Mr. Jackie Bennet, Jr., spends much of this time talking to the media. The Independent Counsel argues that there is nothing improper about his contacts with the media because he did not disclose any information coming directly from the grand jury. According to him, there is nothing wrong with talking to the press about his investigation so long as the information he reveals has not yet come before the grand jury. I find that overly technical distinction to be unpersuasive. In the past, Mr. Starr has flatly denied leaking to the press. In fact, his earlier public statements took a hard line on the issue. He has said the following about the release of confidential information by his office: ``The release of any investigative information by a member of this office or any other law enforcement agency would constitute a serious breach of confidentiality.'' Ken Starr, Washington Times, April 30, 1996. ``Consistent with its historical practice, the Department of Justice does not ordinarily disclose the evidence gathered during an investigation except through the mechanism of indictment and trial. See 28 CFR Sec. 50.2.'' Annual Status Report to Congress By The Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, p. 13 (Aug. 9, 1997). ``[A]n independent counsel `shall, except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws.' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(f)(1).'' Annual Status Report to Congress By The Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, p. 13 (Aug. 9, 1997). ``As much as I understand the questions that you have, I am operating under constraints of confidentiality. It is simply inappropriate, it's simply improper for me to be addressing questions in the course of an investigation.'' Ken Starr Press Conference, Jan. 22, 1998. ``I'm not going to comment on the status of our negotiations [with Ms. Lewinsky's lawyers]. That again, if you ask specific facts, Linda, which you're entitled to do, I just hope you understand, especially when you ask a kind of question about the status of someone who might be a witness, that goes to the heart of the grand jury process.'' Ken Starr Press Conference, Feb. 5, 1998. The obligation of laws, I cannot answer some of the questions that you understandably have. I'm sympathetic with that. But I am under a legal obligation not to talk about facts going before the grand jury. Ken Starr Press Conference, Feb. 5, 1998. I believe in having testimony and evidence put before 23 men and women drawn at random. That's our system. That is government by the people. It's not government by prosecutors. It's putting evidence before a grand jury. That is our system. It's a sound system. It's centuries old. It was ordained at the founding of the American republic. Part of that is, guard the confidentiality of that. Ken Starr Press Conference, Feb. 5, 1998. ``In my service as Independent Counsel, particularly with regard to the secrecy of the grand jury, I have insisted on a high commitment to professional conduct. I have expressed this commitment to you repeatedly. From the beginning, I have made the prohibition of leaks a principal priority of the Office. It is a firing offense, as well as one that leads to criminal prosecution. In the case of each allegation of improper disclosure, we have thoroughly investigated the facts and reminded the staff that leaks are utterly intolerable.'' Letter from Ken Starr to David Kendall, February 6, 1998, at p.1. ``In light of the unclear press attributions in some examples cited in your letter, I have undertaken an investigation to determine whether, despite my persistent admonitions, someone in this Office may be culpable. I have no factual basis--as you likewise of not have--even to suspect anyone at this juncture.'' Letter from Ken Starr to David Kendall, February 6, 1998, at p.1. Mr. Starr's earlier statements to the public appear inconsistent with his more recent admission that he and his deputy routinely talk to the press. The changing positions he has taken raise questions about whether he has been fully candid about the extent of his dealings with the media.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the following editorial that appeared today in the Washington Post. This article quite rightly criticizes D.C. Court of Appeals Judge Laurence Silberman's opinion issued last week in response to the Justice Department's request for a stay of the lower court order requiring several Secret Service agents to testify before the grand jury. As this editorial makes clear, Judge Silberman's broad view of the powers of the independent counsel is completely insupportable. The editorial also helpfully reminds us that Judge Silberman once struck down the Independent Counsel Act as unconstitutional, but was later reversed by the Supreme Court. Judge Silberman's insistence on construing the Independent Counsel Act as broadly as possible, therefore, appears to be another chapter in an old argument that has long since been lost. This editorial provides some important context to Judge Silberman's intemperate attacks on the Justice Department's good- faith representation of the Secret Service. [From the Washington Post, July 20, 1998] A Power Not Vested in the Constitution (By Benjamin Wittes) Judge Laurence Silberman's extraordinary concurrence in last week's Court of Appeals decision concerning grand jury testimony by Secret Service agents grabbed headlines for its vituperative rhetoric. The judge cast aspersions on Attorney General Janet Reno, saying she was ``acting as the President's counsel under the false guise of representing the United States.'' And Silberman also accused ``the President's agents [of] literally and figuratively `declar[ing] war' on the Independnce Counsel.'' Silberman's overheated rhetoric, however, was not the most remarkable aspect of his opinion--which, as a mere concurrence, fortunately does not have the force of law. As a prominent conservative jurist, Silberman is an advocate of judicial restraint, yet his opinion Thursday was almost a prototype of activist judging. Indeed, the judge opined on a matter the parties had not squarely presented him. And, having reached its merits unnecessarily, he issued an opinion with constitutional implications for the independent counsel statute, a law that was upheld unequivocally by the Supreme Court in the 1988 case known as Morrison v. Olson. Silberman's opinion is more dramatic still, because the high court's holding in Morrison reversed an appeals court decision written by none other than Laurence Silberman himself. Silberman's opinion does not directly attack the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. Though he gripes about it, the judge is, after all, bound by the Morrison precedent. But by asserting that the attorney general legally cannot litigate against Kenneth Starr on behalf of the Secret Service, he attacks the statute through a back door. Silberman's opinion, were it actually law, would grant Starr such immense power that his role could no longer be constitutional under the vision of the independent cunsel the Supreme Court upheld in Morrison. Silberman's decision 10 years ago held that the independent law unconstitutionally breached the separation of powers. The theory of his lengthy and elegant decision was that the Constitution vests the power of the executive branch in the president and that an executive branch officer independent of the president is a derogation of the president's exclusive sphere. The independent counsel, as a prosceutor named by a panel of judges, he reasoned, cannot constitutionally wield the prosecutorial powers of the executive branch. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. In Morrison, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that an independent counsel is a constitutional beast known as an ``inferior officer'' of the executive branch. Inferior officers, under the Constitution, can be appointed by courts. And the high court deemed Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison to have this subordinate status because of her limited jurisdiction, her being subject to removal by the attorney general under certain circumstances, and her obligation to follow the policies of the Department of Justice. Starr, in other words, can exist constitutionally only as long as he remains such an ``inferior officer.'' The moment he becomes anything grander, his independence from the president would render him constitutionally defective. Silberman understands the requirements of Morrison as well as anyone. Yet his latest opinion would inflate the balloon of Starr's authority well past the point where his constitutionality would burst. The law gives the independent counsel ``full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the Attorney General.'' And Silberman reasons that if Starr is acting as the attorney general in the areas within his mandate, Reno cannot also be the attorney general for those areas. She must, therefore, bow out: ``It seems clear to me then that no one in the United States Government, speaking for the government, has standing to oppose the Independent Counsel in [the Secret Service] proceeding. . . . That, as should be apparent, means that it is up to the Independent Counsel--the surrogate Attorney General in this matter--to decide whether the `privilege' asserted by the Secret Service as a government entity should be recognized.'' This description of Starr's power hardly sounds like an inferior officer. Quite the contrary. In Silberman's vision, Starr is an officer of titanic executive power, who can operate not only entirely as he pleases with respect to Justice Department policies (for no one can oppose him) but can also decide the behavior of other parts of the executive branch. If Starr really can arbitrate his own dispute with the Secret Service--and, by extension, with any other federal agency--he would usurp enormous executive authority. But were this the true scope of his power, the constitutionality under Morrison of his office would evaporate. Silberman's history on this issue makes his recent opinion all the more astonishing. By describing Starr's power in such a way as to make it inconsistent with the limited independence on which the Supreme Court predicated the constitutionality of the law, Silberman subtly would rehabilitate his own earlier opinion striking down the law. So even while Silberman bashes the integrity of the administration, his logic would make its greatest adversary impossible. The writer is a member of the editorial page staff.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, leaks of confidential information regarding Ken Starr's investigation of the President have become intolerable. Yesterday, the media was filled with reports that were attributed to congressional sources close to Mr. Starr's investigation. According to those sources, Mr. Starr subpoenaed Larry Cockell, the head of the President's Secret Service protection team, in order to learn whether the Secret Service ``facilitated'' meetings between the President and unnamed women. The suggestion that the Secret Service would do that kind of thing is an outrage. And to share those sinister and unfounded suspicions with unnamed congressional sources is even worse. Why should the Secret Service have to endure this slander from people who claim to represent the United States of America? Secret Service agents put their lives on the line day-in and day-out. Whenever, the President is in public, they are in the line of fire. Who can forget the searing image of John Hinckley's cowardly attack on President Reagan. And who can forget the fact that Tim McCarthy, the President's Secret Service agent, took a bullet to save the President's life. The agents who protect the President are the best of the best. It is an insult to the integrity and professionalism of these dedicated men and women to think that they would participate in these kinds of activities. In fact, Lewis Merletti, the Director of the Secret Service, and the former head of the President security team, said last night that he would have resigned before he would have tolerated improper activity by a person he as assigned to protect. Mr. Starr denies that he leaked information about the Secret Service matter to Congress. Unfortunately, he has little credibility on that issue. In the past, Mr. Starr said that he made ``the prohibition of leaks a principal priority'' of his Office. He also said that he considered leaks ``a firing offense.'' Only later did we learn that Mr. Starr and his chief deputy routinely talk to reporters off-the-record. When that fact was exposed, Mr. Starr tried to argue that as long as he did not reveal what a witness said in the grand jury room, there was no law or ethical rule that prevented him from talking to reporters. Of course, Mr. Starr's position is contrary to a recent decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that makes it illegal to reveal ``not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but also what is likely to occur. Encompassed within the rule of secrecy are the identities of witnesses of jurors, the substance of testimony as well as actual transcripts, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of the jurors, and the like.'' Over and over again, Mr. Starr either pushes or exceeds the limits of propriety. His dealings with the Secret Service are a good example. Although Mr. Staff won the right in the district court and court of appeals to serve his subpoenas, the matter is still under litigation. With the issue heading for a showdown in the Supreme Court, why did Mr. Starr try to get the agents into the grand jury today? One explanation, and one that I hope is not true, is that he wanted to get the testimony before the Supreme Court could rule on the issue. Mr. Starr's insistence that the agents testify today has thrown the legal process into disarray. Our legal system is built on the orderly movement of a case from the trial court, to appeal, to the Supreme Court. This process ensures that judges have enough time to consider the arguments for and against each side of a dispute. Here, where the safety and health of the President of the United States are at issue, it is particularly disturbing that Mr. Starr has engaged in legal strong-arm tactics.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today we have learned that the Independent Counsel Ken Starr has issued a new subpoena for the testimony of Special Agent Larry Cockell, a plainclothes Secret Service officer who is in charge of the President's personal security detail. This new turn in Mr. Starr's endless investigation raises an important question: why didn't he subpoena this plainclothes agent earlier this year before he went to court over whether the Secret Service should give confidential information to the grand jury. Perhaps Mr. Starr was concerned that the court might take a different view of his arguments against the Secret Service's privilege if it knew the full scope of his intentions with respect to questioning the Secret Service. It is disturbing that two courts have had to examine the issue of a secret service privilege without being informed that Mr. Starr also intended to question plainclothes Secret Service agents in addition to the uniformed Secret Service agents. Plainclothes Secret Service agents are unique in that they enjoy intimate access to the President and are responsible for his physical safety in public crowds and other places where the risk of harm is the greatest. In the event of an assassination attempt, they are truly in the line of fire. Seeking to question those agents raises a different set of issues which the courts have not yet been confronted with. Mr. Starr's latest subpoenas frustrate the orderly judicial resolution of the important issues raised by his unprecedented requests for the testimony of uniformed Secret Service agents. The Secret Service argument in support of a privilege against testifying seems more reasonable than Starr's argument that the attorney-client privilege did not survive the death of the client. In both cases, there was little available precedent and the arguments were based on policy considerations. If Starr's attorney-client privilege argument was not frivolous and deserved Supreme Court review, it must be said that the Secret Service's sincere arguments in support of their protective function is just as legitimate. It seems Mr. Starr is determined to deny the Secret Service the same opportunity for Supreme Court review that he has sought for himself. He has already forced the Secret Service to seek a stay of his subpoena in court while it pursues its request for judicial review. It has been reported that Starr may ask Secret Service personnel to testify about conversations between President Clinton and his attorney Robert Bennett concerning the Paula Jones case. This would create a potentially tragic Catch-22 situation in which the Secret Service has an obligation to guard the President, but Mr. Starr argues that their presence eliminates the President's attorney-client privilege. It is unreasonable, unfair and unprecedented for Mr. Starr to force the President to compromise his Secret Service protection in order to receive confidential advice from his private attorney. To its credit, the Secret Service strongly believes that their duty to protect the President is far more important than Mr. Starr's inquiry into what any of them may or may not have witnessed in the course of carrying out their responsibilities. It is unseemly and inappropriate for Mr. Starr to continue to force the Secret Service to forego the judicial review that it believes is absolutely appropriate in order to carry out its mission of protecting the President. Mr. Starr got to go to the Supreme Court on his privilege issue and he lost. Why doesn't the Secret Service, which is trying to protect the life of this and future Presidents, get to go to the Supreme Court? What Mr. Starr is trying to do with this latest subpoena is to get the testimony he wants before the arguments about privilege can reach the Supreme Court. This new subpoena is a tactical maneuver to avoid the full judicial review of these issues of enormous national importance. They are legal maneuvers that violate a fundamental sense of fairness and are really unnecessary to the execution of his statutory responsibilities. It is obvious to everyone that any further review will be handled in an expeditious manner, just as the courts have already done. A fair- minded prosecutor would welcome a complete Supreme Court review of the privilege asserted by the Secret Service and efforts to thwart such review only serves to increase the doubts that many have about the legitimacy of this investigation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am told that the Majority Whip, Mr. DeLay, will soon offer an extraordinary and unprecedented amendment to the Treasury-Postal appropriations bill which seeks to involve Congress in pending litigation between the Secret Service and the Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr. That litigation, which is before the federal appeals court in the District of Columbia, concerns whether Secret Service agents can be required to testify about private activities of the President. Under this Republican amendment, Congress would direct the Attorney General to withdraw the Secret Service's appeal from an order that affects them, and every future President, profoundly. What the gentleman from Texas and the Republican leadership want is for Congress to weigh in on an important and difficult legal issue and give free and unsolicited legal advice to the Attorney General. The amendment is bad policy and, I am quite sure, unprecedented. Never, in my memory, has the Congress tried to involve itself in such sensitive litigation, and certainly not in the context of an Independent Counsel's investigation of the President. Former President George Bush, in a recent letter to Secret Service Director Lewis Merletti, wrote, based on his experience, that he hoped that Secret Service agents ``will be exempted from testifying before the Grand Jury.'' President Bush went on to say that ``[w]hat's at stake here is the protection of the life of the President and his family, and the confidence and trust that a President must have'' in the Secret Service. Even the three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that originally heard the case itself said that ``ensuring the physical safety of the President is a public good of the utmost importance.'' Just this past Sunday, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Orrin Hatch, said that his committee would hold hearings to consider legislation in this area, a proposal that I think is quite reasonable. But until Congress considers this complex area, I don't believe that we have any business trying to dictate to the Attorney General what position she should take in this litigation. The Secret Service has a unique relationship with every President of the United States. Secret Service agents necessarily are within earshot of every confidential communication that a President has. Are we ready to require these agents to repeat everything that they overhear the President or the head of a foreign country say? The gentleman's amendment threatens the open and close relationship between the Secret Service and the President, a relationship that must provide the President with maximum security and protection. As a matter of principle, the Secret Service has independently decided that the issue is important enough to seek rehearing before the entire District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Given the Secret Service's strongly held views, isn't it a bit presumptuous of us to consider the invitation of the gentleman from Texas to take a position on this issue?

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. has been intimately connected to events in Panama for one hundred years. If anything, this relationship has intensified in recent years, as the time approaches for the reversion of the Canal Zone back to the people of Panama on the last day of this century. But rather than it being a happy occasion, considerable apprehension seems to exist among the average Panamanian whether local authorities will be able to effectively administer the Canal. Anna M. Busch, a researcher with the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs has authored an article scheduled to soon appear in COHA's biweekly publication. The Washington Report on the Hemisphere. In her article, Busch cites the disturbing case of Dr. Miguel Antonio Bernal, a highly regarded Panamanian professor of international law, who has had an exemplary history of being a gadfly in defense of democracy against a long line of authoritarian figures, including General Manual Noriega, for which he had to flee the country. Because of the transcending importance to the U.S. of the well being of the Panamanian people, and the desire of all Americans to see an effective transition in the return of the Canal Zone to Panama as stipulated under the terms of the Carter-Torrijo Treaty of 1977, I urge my colleagues to closely examine the Council on Hemispheric Affairs article authored by Anna M. Busch for its important insights into a series of issues, including the multinational drug facility, which is now being negotiated with Panamanian authorities. Disturbing Panamanian Realities (By Anna Marie Busch) As a result of the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Canal treaties, the U.S. is in the middle of the process of handling over the last vestiges of control over its Canal Zone facility, which must be transferred to local authorities by December 31, 1999. As it readies to do so, thousands of U.S. military personnel have left the country and the Southern Command already has moved its headquarters to Miami. But, the questions being raised by many Panamanians are whether Panamanian President Ernesto Perez Balladares, whose government has been plagued by charges of nepotism, drug cartel links, and human rights violations, is capable of taking charge of canal operations, or, for that matter, deserves to remain in office for another term. Apparently, many Panamanians have grave doubts, at least on the first point, with recent polls indicating that 70% of the population favors the facility to remain under some form of U.S. supervision. Petty Panamanian Politics Former Vice-President Richardo Arias Calderon observed in the New York Times last September, ``whoever is in power for the next term will have the opportunity to take some big decisions and grant some important contracts. That generates economic power, and if not done transparently, offers ways to favor certain economic interests and law firms.'' Arias' prophesy and the poll regarding the future status of the canal, reflect genuine misapprehensions by Panama's citizens over the country's lack of civic rectitude and the grave doubt which many of them entertain regarding the personality and performance of President Perez Balladares. Although the Panamanian constitution bars any incumbent from serving two consecutive terms and mandates a ten year interval before a candidate could qualify for reelection, Perez Balladares, following the disquieting trend among Latin American presidents like Peru's Fujimori, Brazil's Cardoso, and Argentina's Menem, is moving a proposed referendum through the legislature, which is controlled by his party. The supplemental bill, expected to pass in August, would allow him to run for reelection when the canal's transfer takes place. Not leaving matters to chance, four of the eleven board of directors chosen by the ruling Democratic Revolutionary (PRD) leader to oversee the control of the canal, are relatives of either Perez Balladares or his wife. The referendum, which many Panamanians consider unconstitutional, has caused a vocal outcry among many scholars and other critics of the Perez Balladares government. One prominent analyst, Dr. Miguel Antonio Bernal, a distinguished university professor and popular radio commentator, who repeatedly has voiced his negative opinions on the referendum, and has made allegations concerning government excesses and wrong-doings, has now been indicted by the state attorney after he had suggested that the National Police had bungled an ongoing case in which four prisoners had been decapitated. Though Dr. Bernal has long been viewed as a perpetual irritant by the authorities (just as he had been under the Noriega regime when he was forced to flee into exile) for his outspoken criticism of corrupt government practices, official Panamanian sources predict that the new charge against him may again result in enforced exile. Dr. Bernal's case was suspended by the judge at the end of its June 19 preliminary hearing due to a motion presented by defense attorneys requesting that legal basis of charges against the defendant be declared as unconstitutional. The trial will be postponed indefinitely until a higher court rules. Although the defendant's highly visible profile and fame drew wide support for him, the average Panamanian dissident could never hope for such a crowd and such widespread attention. This is why the final disposition of the Bernal case is so important to the future of Panamanian democracy. Despite the fact that the Panamanian constitution guarantees freedom of expression, that same document also contains clauses which the authorities intentionally entered into it in order to silence its would-be critics. For example, article 33 allows for the State to ``fine or arrest any person who offends or shows disrespect to them [government officials] when they are in performance of their duties or because of their performance of the same.'' In the country's Penal Code, a charge of ``slander and offense'' can bring about fines or imprisonment. Long controversial Law 67 of 1978 forbids the practice of journalism by people who do not have ``professional competence.'' Removing the Checks and Balances On February 5 of last year, Perez Balladares signed a bill creating a new office, ``Defender of the People'' (Human Rights Ombudsman). This official, even though working on a pathetically meager budget, was initially given broad powers to investigate accusations of human rights abuses and to disseminate his findings. The terms of the position also allowed the ombudsman to step in and negotiate complaints having to do with the Attorney General's office, and the proper functioning of the Electoral Tribunal. But, in a troubling ruling by the Court last February, his latter powers were revoked. The Perez Balladares government originally had set up the Human Rights Ombudsman office as a way to placate international human rights groups, but as time passed, more and more of its powers have been yanked away. The ombudsman, (constitutional law scholar Italo Antinori), now must learn to cope with hundreds of complaints, a low budget, and an office whose powers largely have been retrenched. Perez Balladares' Eye on the Prize Though the transfer of the canal is certainly on the minds of U.S. government and Panamanian officials, this issue does not exhaust their bilateral agenda. Slow negotiations over a multinational anti-drug center still must be successfully concluded, the legality of the proposed referendum allowing for Perez Balladares to seek reelection confirmed, and the accusation that basic civil rights are being trampled on must be resolved. A long list of brutality charges against the National Police remain to be investigated; a Supreme Court, which according to the State Department is ``subject to corruption and political manipulation,'' must be reformed and governmental links to drug cartels and money laundering schemes investigated. Perez Balladares' current mildly anti- U.S. stance is being seen as a form of self-serving demagoguery, in which he artfully wraps himself in the nation's flag to gain support for his August referendum from the nationalist core of his party's rank-and-file. Thus far, he has turned down U.S. transitional assistant funds for the canal, preferring to accept aid from Asian or EU sources, in order to lessen Washington's presence and influence. Regardless, if current practices remain, any ongoing mismanagement of the canal could result in a huge disappointment for the country, both in terms of shortfalls in shipping revenue, and also due to impediments to the Canal's tourist and industrial development potential. Any slowdown in growth could also present a springboard for his many political adversaries to savage any dreams he might have had of reelection.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, next week I will be leading a bipartisan delegation to the nation of Haiti. I have been there many times in the last five years, and never before have I seen obstacles of nation- building so substantial and the determination of a people so focused. In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in the first democratic elections Haiti ever held. He overwhelmingly defeated all the other candidates, including the U.S.-backed candidate. Less than one year later, in September 1991, he was overthrown by a military coup d'etat. The international community responded with a massive embargo to try to squeeze power from the grip of the junta. During the years of the military regime, Haiti suffered under horrible human rights conditions. The terror that people thought they had put behind them in 1986 and 1987 when the Duvalier dictatorship ended and a new constitution was formed returned with a new vengeance. Supporters of democracy were harassed by attaches and the FAHD, as the Haitian army was called. Worst of all, as many as 5000 people were killed by a paramilitary organization called FRAPH, led by a U.S. intelligence contact named Emmanuel ``Toto'' Constant. By 1994, President Clinton decided that this was too much and it was time to act. On September 19, U.S. troops led a multi-national force in Operation Uphold Democracy that restored Haiti's legitimately elected government to power. It soon became obvious, though, that Haiti's challenges had just begun. For one, Haiti had to figure out what to do with a military that was 7,000 soldiers strong. It managed to abolish that corrupt institution and build an interim public safety force with the help of the international community. Since then Haiti has been working with the United States and the international community to build a civilian police force that respects the rule of law and human rights while gaining the confidence of the population. Now the police force is 6,500 officers strong, and the U.S. is largely responsible for training 5,200 of them. Haiti also had to revitalize an economy that had been ravaged by a massive drug trade, a constant flow of contraband, and the flight of private investment in the face of the embargo. Today real GDP growth is hovering around 3 to 5 percent, inflation is down to a remarkable 7 percent, and exports are up 44 percent. Many economic reforms have taken place, and the government is ebbing toward dialogue with those popular organizations, unions, and people who have an interest in seeing that they occur in the least harmful way, and with the greatest democratic input. Economic reforms need to happen, but they will only be successful with the full consent and participation of those most profoundly affected by them. Haiti also discovered that political interests that had united around Aristide before and during the coup began fragmenting, creating a diversity of views but also a new kind of political confusion. This confusion has culminated in a political paralysis that has left Haiti without a prime minister for over a year now. I am going to Haiti with my good colleagues, Mr. Delahunt from Massachusetts and Mr. Christensen from Nebraska in the hopes that we can gain some insight into the crisis, offer our thoughts, and describe to them what I think is happening here in Washington with regard to Haiti. Mr. Speaker, I think Haiti has slipped from the radar screen of many in Congress, which I think is very problematic. I also think it is clear that those in Congress who do follow Haiti closely are terribly frustrated with this enduring political crisis that has dragged on for so long. This delegation is going to Haiti because we believe a political solution is necessary and possible. I hope the American people and the Congress are prepared to give this fragile democracy the attention it deserves. We need to do everything we can to make sure this nation succeeds and that the hard fought gains of the democratic movements of the 1980's are not turned back. Let's keep hope alive in Haiti.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, this is an important 150th anniversary. It is significant. I cannot remember in my career that we have ever celebrated the emancipation of slavery in the Virgin Islands. I commend the gentlewoman for her conviction, ability, intelligence and beauty. Mr. Speaker, I applaud Congresswoman Donna Christian-Green for introducing this legislation that recognizes the 150th anniversary of the emancipation of African slaves in what is now the United States Virgin Islands. On July 3rd 1848 thousands of slaves on the island of St. Croix marched into the town of Frederiksted under the leadership of Moses Gottlieb and staged a demonstration demanding their freedom and threatened to destroy the island by fire unless their freedom was granted by 4 p.m. that afternoon. When reports of the insurrection reached the Danish Governor of the VI Peter von Scholten, 15 miles away in the town of Christiansted, he journeyed to Frederiksted where he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. It is important for us to commemorate the historic significance of this 150th anniversary and the significant contributions that the descendants of those who were freed have made to the United States as citizens since 1917. More importantly, however, we as a nation must recognize the emancipation of African slaves as part of the process of extending civil rights to all individuals in the United States. Unfortunatley, the struggle for equality for all Americans still continues. Discrimination is still rampant in housing, education, employment, the environment and in many other areas in society. Despite the uphill battle that we appear to be facing at times, we must maintain our unwavering commitment to preserve, protect, and defend human rights and freedom.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I enter into the Record the following article from the National Law Journal concerning legal issues that have been raised by Mr. Starr's previous denials of allegations of improper disclosures by his office to the press. [From the National Law Journal, June 29, 1998] Lies, Not Leaks, Real Starr Issue? Critics Say His Leak Denials May Have Violated U.S. Law (By David E. Rovella) Kenneth W. Starr's critics say the Whitewater independent counsel should be investigated for leaking grand jury information. But if he's found to have done anything wrong, it may not be for leaking, but for lying--the very offense Mr. Starr is trying to pin on the president. Such thinking has gained some currency among lawyers connected to the investigation, but not because of Mr. Starr's recently published admission that he gave information to reporters--information some say may be protected by grand jury secrecy laws. Instead, defense lawyers are focusing on statements Mr. Starr made in the past six months, statements that gave the impression that he never commented about such matters. For example, a defense lawyer involved in the investigation says confidential memos sent by the Office of the Independent Counsel to him and to the Justice Department deny such leaks. As a result, he argues, Mr. Starr's recent statements could make him vulnerable under 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), which punishes false statements made to executive branch officials, such as U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno. In short, Mr. Starr and Bill Clinton are accused of unseemly acts most people don't care much about. For Mr. Clinton, the allegation is sex with a White House intern. For Mr. Starr, it is allegedly illegal leaking. But if either man is brought down, it would not be because he committed an illicit act, but conceivably because he lied about it. Just as Mr. Starr has been allowed to chase evidence of Mr. Clinton's lying or suborning perjury to cover up alleged sexual peccadilloes, lawyers representing possible targets of the Whitewater investigation say Ms. Reno should appoint a special prosecutor to investigate alleged leaks and any possible false statements made by Mr. Starr. Justice officials would only say that the Office of Professional Responsibility is reviewing the article in Brill's Content magazine, published June 15, in which Mr. Starr made his so- called leak confession. The independent counsel has said in at least three separate public statements that information he provided to reporters did not violate Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires grand jury secrecy. But observers say even the possibility that he lied increases pressure on the Justice Department to launch an unprecedented probe of the independent counsel. ``It's very parallel to Clinton and Lewinsky,'' says former Iran-Contra associate independent counsel Gerard E. Lynch. ``The question of leaks, like the question of consensual oral sex, is something only two people know about, and neither one wants to tell.'' The Defense of Starr In a June 16 letter to Mr. Starr, Clinton lawyer David E. Kendall listed various points during the six-month Lewinsky investigation when Mr. Starr had publicly declined to comment on grand jury matters, citing secrecy concerns. One lawyer close to the investigation, who requested not to be identified, says that when complaints about alleged leaking by Mr. Starr were filed with Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder Jr., Mr. Starr responded with scathing denials. ``He had made statements to Justice that he had not done these things,'' the lawyer says. Neither Mr. Starr nor the Justice Department would comment on whether such memos were sent or what they may have contained. But Mr. Starr's carefully worded statement tracks his defense against such charges. In the magazine article, he stated that his talks with reporters did not violate grand jury secrecy because the information provided stemmed from interviews with grand jury witnesses before they testified. If there ever is an investigation, there remains some question of how Justice would probe the OIC without compromising its independence. ``Most 6(e) cases tend to be [Freedom of Information Act] cases, media requests to open the court--not dealing with the behavior of the prosecutor,'' says former Iran-Contra associate independent counsel John Q. Barrett. Experts say Ms. Reno could use her general powers to appoint a ``Regulatory Special Prosecutor,'' similar to those appointed prior to the independent counsel law. This, they say, is preferable to seeking another independent counsel-- which would likely be denied by the Special Division of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia-- or to asking Mr. Starr to expand the mandate of former DOJ official Michael Shaheen, who is probing alleged payoffs of Whitewater witness David Hale by right-wing groups. The ``Dow Jones'' Case Both the leaking and lying charges hinge on a May 8 ruling by the D.C. Circuit that dealt with media access to hearings spawned by the Whitwater grand jury. A passage in the ruling, which may be a nonbinding dictum because it doesn't directly involve media access, contradicts Mr. Starr's initial assertions that he did not breach 6(e). In Re: Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 98-3033. Circuit Judge A. Raymond Randolph addressed 6(e)(2), which requires secrecy for ``matters occurring before the grand jury.'' ``This phrase . . . includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but also what is likely to occur,'' he wrote. ``Encompassed within the rule[is] . . . the substance of testimony [and the] strategy or direction of the investigation.'' Some experts who say that using 18 U.S.C. 1001's prohibitions of lying against Mr. Starr would be a stretch also say they doubt the potency of Dow Jones on 6(e). ``If I were a special prosecutor assigned to pursue this theory, it wouldn't be a slam-dunk,'' says Mr. Lynch. Another facet of Mr. Starr's defense deals with charges that his alleged leaking violates Justice Department policies. Under 28 U.S.C. 594(f)(1) of the independent counsel act, Mr. Starr must obey the ``established policies'' of the Justice Department, ``except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent'' with the act. One of those policies is Rule 1-7.530 of the U.S. Attorney's Manual. While barring medial contact concerning ongoing investigations, the rule makes an exception for ``matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about which the community needs to be reassured.'' Mr. Starr says he was obligated to correct misinformation in the press, and therefore his press comments fell under that exception. (Mr. Lynch says that this argument is ``a little lame.'') However, the independent counsel law may relieve Mr. Starr of having to follow 1-7.530 at all, if he feels that doing so would be ``inconsistent'' with the act. But Mr. Lynch says this provision of the law isn't a free ride. Mr. Starr ``is not a total free agent; he's a substitute for a regular prosecutor,'' he says. ``You're not supposed to make up your own rules along the way.''

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I have agreed to cosponsor H.R. 3905, the ``Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998,'' legislation originally introduced by Chairman Hyde. I have done so because litigation over asbestos claims may have reached a crisis point. Hundreds of thousands of American workers who were exposed to asbestos, and who have suffered or are suffering from serious diseases as a result, have to wait for years to have their legitimate claims paid. In some cases, innocent victims are in danger of not receiving any compensation at all, because the liable corporations have protected themselves, or will protest themselves, under the bankruptcy laws. In 1994, negotiators between labor unions representing the bulk of the asbestos worker victims, on one side, and asbestos manufacturers, on the other side, resulted in a settlement agreement that was designed to alleviate the crisis. This agreement, know as the ``Georgine Settlement' after Robert Georgine, President of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and the lead negotiator for labor in the settlement talks, would have established an administrative procedure for resolving asbestos claims. The U.S. District Court that oversees much of the federal class-action asbestos litigation approved the settlement as fair and reasonable. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa 1994). Last year, however, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), the Supreme Court invalidated the Georgine Settlement, not on grounds of unfairness, but because the settlement agreement did not fit within the technical requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs class-action lawsuits. The Court held that the federal courts lacked statutory authority to order so sweeping a settlement. Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated: ``The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.' Given the Supreme Court's decision, I believe that the relevant parties should again come to the table to work out a legislative solution if at all possible. That is why I have agreed to cosponsor H.R. 3905. I do want to note, however, that I have some specific concerns about the language of the bill as it is currently drafted. I am concerned the bill would eliminate the availability of punitive damages in those cases in which asbestos victims choose to pursue ordinary tort remedies instead of the administrative claims procedure. I have always believed, and I continue to believe strongly, that punitive damages must be available to sanction outrageous wrongdoing by corporate defendants. Otherwise, some unscrupulous businesspeople will simply choose to treat the damage caused by unsafe products as a cost of doing business. This in no way means that I believe those defendants in the Georgine Settlement engaged in such conduct, but I do believe that such judgments should be left to the judicial process. In addition, it is my position that any legislation we enact in the asbestos area should hew as closely as possible to the terms of the Georgine Settlement. To the extent H.R. 3905 may depart from those terms, I believe we should examine such departures very closely. I look forward to working with Chairman Hyde on a bipartisan basis on this important legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, in the continuing saga of the legal education of Kenneth W. Starr, the Supreme Court upholds the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. In a vote of six to three today, they upheld this relationship by ruling that communications between a client and his or her lawyer remain privileged, even after the client's death. Today's decision rejected efforts by the Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr, to obtain three pages of handwritten notes taken by the attorney for former deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster. The notes were taken during a meeting between Mr. Foster and his lawyer just 9 days before Mr. Foster tragically took his own life. Mr. Starr had asked the court to rule that anything a client says to his or her lawyer should be available to a prosecutor after the client dies. He also asked the court to believe that only clients who intended to perjure themselves would be stopped from talking to their lawyers if they knew that their conversations might become public after their death. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications. It is intended to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients, and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice. He added that ``It has been generally, if not universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client in a case such as this.'' In light of this settled law, the Chief Justice said that ``The burden is on the Independent Counsel to show that `reason and experience' require a departure from this rule,'' and the court concluded that Mr. Starr could not meet that standard. Rejecting Mr. Starr's view that only guilty people will invoke the privilege, the Chief Justice made the commonsense observation that people go to see attorneys about a wide range of matters that might prove embarrassing if made public after they die. For example, people routinely meet with lawyers to talk about family or money problems, and who would ever want these kinds of things made public? Think of the possible embarrassment to a person's family or the potential damage to that person's reputation, even after his or her death. The Chief Justice wrote that, There are weighty reasons that counsel in favor of posthumous application. Knowing that communications will remain confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether. Clients may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family. Posthumous disclosure of such communications may be as feared as disclosure during the client's lifetime. During his 4-year, $40 million investigation, Mr. Starr made it seem that anyone who asserts a privilege when he demands information is somehow trying to obstruct justice. Without question, it is important for a prosecutor to uncover facts necessary to decide whether a crime has been committed, but we expect the basic principles of law and civility will be followed during criminal investigations. The decision today by the United States Supreme Court reaffirms what most of us already knew, which is that the relationship between a lawyer and a client is sacred, and that prosecutors themselves are sometimes guilty of excesses.