John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it was.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the dilemma that the gentleman has described. There is perhaps one other solution. Perhaps the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence would determine, and the leadership as well, to accept the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] as a member of the committee, and that way he would be privy to the information that has been pointed out by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] as necessary to effect a specific solution. Because right now there is not only no way that the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] can be specific to those seven excellent questions, but neither can any other Member in the House of Representatives who is not on the committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Farr]. (Mr. FARR of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. The fact of the matter is that for us to say to the American people that they really do not need to know this or that nobody is asking me about it so we will keep it from them is the shallowest kind of presentation to make. We need to know the aggregate amount. I am confident for one that this body will not proceed down a slippery slope. I do not think this body, no matter what we do on this measure today, will further want to break this thing down. I am not certain that I would support any further disclosure than the revelation of the aggregate amount.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the so-called Taxpayer Relief Act. Yet again, the majority has demonstrated that their first priority is to line the pockets of the richest Americans at the expense of working, taxpaying families. I urge you not to be fooled by the majority's effort to pull the wool over the American taxpayers' eyes. Despite claims to the contrary, this tax bill will devastate both middle- and working-class families in order to pay for tax breaks for the rich. The majority has done everything possible to ensure that the wealthiest families will get the bulk of the benefits. A recent study by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities found that the effect of the combined budget and tax bills will give a $27,000 annual boost to the top 1 percent of Americans while raising taxes for the bottom 20 percent of families. Not only does this bill work against families, it is fiscally unsound and irresponsible. Paying for these tax breaks will cost us $85 billion over the next 5 years. In the next 10 years, that amount jumps up to $250 billion. And 10 years after that we will be spending $700 billion on these tax cuts. If you support this bill, you will be giving away $700 billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest Americans. All of America's taxpaying families should share fairly in any tax cuts that we propose, not just the select few who will profit under this bill. With these facts in mind, I hope that you will join me in asking a few questions of the bill's supporters. We should ask why they constructed a bill where the bottom 60 percent of our population shares only 4 percent of the benefits and the top 20 percent of the U.S. population receives 87 percent of the benefits from this tax cut. We should ask why they support a bill that adds to the assault on our already fragile social safety net. We should ask them why they're giving a capital gains break to the 5 percent of Americans who earn $100,000 a year and will reap 75 percent of the benefits. But don't expect an answer to any of these questions. With their underhanded approach, the majority has abandoned millions of hardworking, taxpaying Americans. If the supporters of these tax breaks on both sides of the aisle wanted to be honest about this bill's effects, they should stand up and tell the American people: ``We don't care if you can't afford day care for your children. We don't care if you can't afford to send your sons and daughters to college. We don't care that our tax and budget plans will assure that the rich get richer at your expense.'' But don't expect this kind of honesty from a group that has constructed a child tax credit that is more restrictive than the one proposed in the contract on America. Passing this bill will mean that virtually all families with incomes under $20,000 a year would not be eligible for this child tax credit. If you support this bill, 28 million of our neediest children and their families will receive no tax credit because their incomes are too low to qualify. We cannot allow such an attack on the American family to continue unchecked. I urge my colleagues to oppose this inequitable tax cut. Unlike Mr. Gingrich, who labels any proposal that gives lower and middle class families their proper share of these tax cuts welfare, I believe that hardworking Americans should be treated fairly under any tax cut proposal. I hope that you will demand answers to the questions I have raised and join me in exposing this bill for what it really is--a thinly veiled scheme to provide welfare for the rich.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the Members' attention the provisions in the bill which would for the first time ever federalize the medical malpractice system. The proposals represent the most radical and one-sided liability limitations that have ever been considered by this legislative body. And why shouldn't they be-- they were written by the AMA as part of a back room deal to obtain their support for Republican agenda, including their support for the proposed partial birth abortion ban. The $250,000 cap on pain and is perhaps the most inequitable provision in the entire bill. Although harder to scientifically measure, noneconomic damages compensate real victims for real losses-- including loss of sight, disfigurement, inability to bear children, incontinence, inability to feed or bathe oneself, or loss of a limb-- that are simply not accounted for by lost wages or medical bills. This means that a woman or child facing excruciating pain and suffering for the rest of their life as a result of medical malpractice would have their right to compensation capped, but a CEO who couldn't perform his job because of the same exact injury would face no such cap. The draconian new limitations on punitive damages will also penalize victims and protect wrongdoers. Under the Republican proposal, a doctor who fell asleep in the operating room or operated on the wrong patient could be completely insulated from punitive damages. The language goes so far as to cap the liability of a doctor who rapes his patient. Very often, punitive damages are the only way to truly deter such outrageous conduct, but this bill protects such people. The new statute of limitations provision prohibits all victims from bringing any legal action more than 5 years after the negligence first occurred. It takes absolutely no account of the fact that many injuries caused by medical malpractice or faulty drugs take years or even decades to manifest themselves. Yet under the proposal, a patient who is negligently inflicted with HIV-infected blood and develops AIDS 6 years later would be forever barred from filing a medical malpractice or product liability claim. The so-called periodic payment provisions are also blatantly antivictim. The bill would allow hospitals teetering on the verge of bankruptcy to delay and then completely avoid future financial obligations. And wrongdoers would have no obligation to pay any interest on any amount they owe to their victims. The bill goes on and on, limiting injured victim's State law rights while protecting the most blatant possible malpractice one can imagine. The proponents of these measures couldn't care in the least how they effect the rights of the American people or the quality of medical care in this country--that's why they decided they didn't need to waste any time with committee markup or process. A section-by-section itemization of my concerns regarding the medical malpractice provisions follows: A. Statute of Limitations--Prohibits victims from bringing any state health care liability action more than two years after an injury is discovered or five years after the negligent conduct that caused the injury first occurred. Such a proposed new federal statute of limitations takes no account of the fact that many injuries caused by medical malpractice or faulty drugs often take years to manifest themselves. Thus under the proposal, a patient who is negligently inflicted with HIV-infected blood and develops AIDs six years later would be forever barred from filing a medical malpractice or product liability claim. B. $250,000 Cap on Non-economic Damages--Caps the award of non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions at $250,000. The bulk of data indicates that dollar caps do not provide significant savings. Using information derived from a 1992 GAO study, the ABA's Special Committee on Medical Professional Liability found that state tort reform proposals ``have not had any measurable impact on overall health [care] costs'' and that personal health care spending had doubled between 1982 and 1990, regardless of the type of ``reforms'' adopted. A 1986 GAO study on the impact of specific tort changes on medical malpractice claims revealed that claims and insurance costs continue to rise despite state-adopted limits on victim compensation. Even the total elimination of malpractice costs would provide only negligible savings to the health care system. According to separate reviews by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and CBO, the total amount of all liability premiums paid in the United States represents less than 1% of the Nation's health care costs. And factoring in the costs of so-called ``defensive medicine'' would not result in any significant additional savings to the health care system, according to both the CBO and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. An additional concern with caps on non-economic damages is that they could unfairly penalize those victims who suffer the most severe injury and are most in need of financial security. Although harder to scientifically measure, non- economic damages compensate victims for real losses--such as loss of sight, disfigurement, inability to bear children, incontinence, inability to feed or bathe oneself, or loss of a limb--that are not accounted for in lost wages. And non- economic damage caps have been found to have a disproportionately negative impact on women, minorities, the poor, the young, and the unemployed; since they generally have less wages, a greater proportion of their losses is non- economic. C. Joint and Several Liability--Eliminates the state doctrine of joint and several liability for non-economic damages. This will allow wrongdoers to profit at the expense of innocent victims, rather than forcing tortfeasors to allocate liability among themselves, as has traditionally been the case under state law. And since women, minorities, and the poor generally earn less wages, such limitations on non-economic damages could have a disproportionately negative impact on these groups. D. Limits on Punitive Damages--Caps punitive damage awards at the greater of $250,000 or three times economic damages; limit the state law standard for the award of punitive damages to intentional or ``consciously indifferent'' conduct; allow a bifurcated proceeding to determine issues relating to punitive damages; and completely ban punitive damages in the case of drugs or other devices that have been approved by the FDA or any other drug ``generally recognized as safe and effective'' pursuant to FDA-established conditions. These proposed limitations raise a number of concerns. Arbitrary caps on punitive damages may provide unjustified windfalls to the few tortfeasons responsible for blatant and wanton medical misconduct. (In fact, studies have shown that only 265 medical malpractice punitive awards were awarded in the United States in the 30 years between 1963 and 1993.) By insulating grossly negligent conduct, the proposed new federal standard for establishing punitive damages comes close to criminalizing tort law. Permitting defendants to bifurcate proceedings concerning the award of punitive damages may well lead to far more costly and time-consuming proceedings, again working to the disadvantage of injured victims. And banning punitive damages for FDA-approved products is likely to have a disproportionate impact on women, since they make up the largest class of victims of medical products. E. Periodic Payments--Grants wrongdoers the option of paying damage awards in excess of $50,000 on a periodic basis. This provision would apply not only to future economic damages realized over time, such as lost wages, but to non- economic losses, like the loss of a limb, that are realized all at once. Also, in contrast to many state law periodic payment provisions, the Republican proposal does not seek to protect the victim from the risk of nonpayment resulting from future insolvency by the wrongdoer or to specify that future payments should be increased to account for inflation or to reflect change circumstances. F. Collateral Source and Subrogation--In most states under the collateral source rule, a victim is able to obtain compensation for the full amount of damages incurred, and his or her health insurance provider is able to seek subrogation in respect of its own payments to the victim. This ensures that the true cost of damages lies with the wrongdoer while eliminating the possibility of double recovery by the victim. The Republican proposal would turn this system on its head by allowing tortfeasons to introduce evidence of potential collateral payments owing from the insurer to the victim. This could have the effect of shifting costs from negligent doctors to the health insurance system in general and taxpayers in particular, resulting in increased health premiums paid by workers and businesses. Another problematic feature of Republican malpractice proposals has been their one-sided, anti-victim nature. For example, their proposal allows States to enact more restrictive caps and damage limitations, but not permit the states freedom to grant victims any greater legal rights. Their proposals also ignore a number of complex legal issues. For example, in the state law context, various damage caps have been held to violate state constitutional guarantees relating to equal protection, due process, and rights of trial by jury and access to the courts; and these very same concerns are likely to be present at the federal level. And by layering a system of federal rules on top of a two-century old system of state common law, the Republican proposals will inevitably lead to confusing conflicts, not only within the federal and state courts, but between federal and state courts. Finally, I would like to note several other concerns I have with the legislation relating to judiciary's jurisdiction concerning civil rights and immigration. I am strongly opposed to provisions from the Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee print and the Ways and Means Committee print providing that participants in the workfare program will not be considered employees for purposes of Federal law. As a result, these workers may not be covered under many laws that have helped working people over the years, including title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other laws designed to protect working people from unsafe workplaces, racial and sexual harassment, and unfair wages. It is wrong and patently unfair to require people to go to work and at the same time, deny them legal protections against discrimination. Title VII provides for a broad set of remedies for employees that are discriminated against on thesis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Unless this provision is fixed, it could make former welfare recipients second class citizens and punish people who leave welfare by taking away their basic, fundamental rights. The legislation also continues to restrict Social Security income and Medicaid eligibility to those immigrants who were receiving such benefits as of August 22, 1996. This is a blatant violation of, and retreat from the bipartisan budget agreement which had promised to restore these benefits to legal residents who subsequently become disabled. Legal residents pay taxes and contribute to our society in the same way citizens do, and there is no moral justification for excluding them from our Nation's safety net. I urge the Members to join me in opposing this legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation amending the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. Chairman Hyde introduced this bill after two of the Commissioners, James Dobson, president of Focus on the Family, and Kay James, dean of Regent University, refused to serve on the commission unless they were assured that they cannot be sued for their work on the Commission. Apparently, Mr. Dobson served on a pornography commission in the 1980's at which time he was sued over his work on the commission. Although the Department of Justice eventually did defend him, it was only because the Attorney General had been named in the same suit. Now, because the Department of Justice will not agree that a member of the Gambling Commission is a Federal employee for purposes of liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Chairman Hyde has introduced this legislation specifically providing that the Gambling Commission is a Federal agency under FTCA and that all members and personnel of the Commission are Federal employees under the act. The legislation also includes a rule of construction making it clear that this bill does not imply that other commissions or other members or personnel on other commissions are not covered by the FTCA. Given the fact that two commissioners may resign without assurances that they will not be sued for their work, I understand the desire to quickly pass this legislation. Nonetheless, I do have some concerns. When we have created other commissions in the past, we have been silent as to whether or not the commissioners were covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act. I don't know whether we assumed they were covered or we assumed they weren't covered, but it seems to me that we should consider the consequences of what it means to change the law to clearly cover such individuals. This issue is likely to come up again since I would imagine that other people might also be hesitant to serve on future commissions without assurances that they will be defended in the event of suits, particularly given that at least the Gambling Commissioners now have this protection. I think it would be very useful for the committee to hold hearings considering the definitions of Federal agency and employee of the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. There are questions not only as to whether commissions are covered, but as to whether committees, boards and other quasi-governmental organizations are covered as well. Since the Federal Tort Claims Act is unclear in this regard, perhaps the best course of action would be to amend that act itself to be clear as to which governmental and quasi-governmental entities are covered. The bottom line is that we shouldn't have to guess as to whether or not a certain entity is covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act. If the law is unclear, we should determine what should be covered and then make certain that those entities are covered. I hope the chairman will consider holding hearings and perhaps even moving legislation--should it be appropriate--to clear up this morass. In the meantime, however, I support the passage of this legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as the Members of this House well know I am a strong supporter of vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, and as a general matter I do not favor any exemptions or exclusions from the antitrust laws or legislation which would impact pending cases. However, when it comes to beneficial cooperative activity by charities I believe there is no legitimate role for the antitrust laws. This is why when I learned last year that a group of plaintiffs had brought an unfounded antitrust action against a large number of charities who had agreed to use a common formula in offering gift annuities, I cosponsored with Chairman Hyde H.R. 2525. That legislation granted an antitrust immunity for charities offering gift annuities and eventually passed the Congress unanimously and was signed into law by the President. Unfortunately, subsequent to the law's enaction, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that the charities' accountants and lawyers had also participated in the antitrust conspiracy and charged that the charities' tax exempt status was fraudulent. Despite Congress' clear intent, rather than throw these frivolous allegations out, the courts have continued to allow the case to proceed, allowing the parties to engage in discovery. As a result, the charities continue to face the risk of billions of dollars in damages and millions of dollars in legal fees. This bill would strengthen last year's law to clarify that actions by professionals associated with charitable gift annuities are not subject to the antitrust laws, and create a conclusive presumption of coverage to entities treated as charities by the IRS. This should end the wasteful litigation and allow the charities to focus their resources on better serving our communities. This law is narrowly crafted and specific. It will do no damage to the letter or spirit of our antitrust laws. The language has been carefully reviewed by the Justice Department and they have voiced no objections to the bill. I urge the Members to join me in supporting this important legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend Mr. Smith and Mr. Frank for their diligent work in bringing this bill to our attention. H.R. 1866 simply makes permanent a limited antitrust exemption for educational institutions. Congress acted to provide the exemption after court decisions in 1991 and 1994 found that Ivy League schools who were sharing aid information concerning applicants were violating the antitrust laws. The 1994 law is scheduled to expire on September 30 of this year unless Congress first acts to extend it. Under the terms of the current antitrust exemption, universities are permitted to develop common aid forms and exchange student financial data through a third party so long as they agree to admit students on a need-blind basis. This means that participating schools are able to make maximum use of their available funds and ensure that the largest number of students are able to receive some form of aid. The law specifically prohibits schools from comparing the amount or terms of specific aid offers made to students. The 1994 law has worked well. Because of the law, financial aid officers have been able to develop a common set of principles for awarding aid and a common aid form. This has simplified the financial aid procedures for both students and their families as well as the colleges. In part, as a result, last year colleges and universities provided an estimated $8.6 billion in grants from their own funds, or 30 percent more than the $6.6 billion in aid provided by the Federal Government. This aid is absolutely vital at a time of ever diminishing Federal resources. The exemption is narrowly drafted--allowing antitrust enforcers to pursue anticompetitive conduct while protecting socially beneficial activities by colleges--and deserves to be made permanent. I understand that the Justice Department has expressed no concerns with the bill, and I urge the Members to join me in supporting this well-intended legislation.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 seconds. Mr. Speaker, I would remind the previous speaker that a friend of ours in the Senate from Massachusetts and another friend of ours from the State of Rhode Island have a contrary view.

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, I would point out to the gentleman from Florida about five Supreme Court cases that prove that the statement that the gentleman uttered about action being equated with speech is not correct. Would that impress the gentleman at all?

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. CONYERS. I ask, would it impress the gentleman at all?

Mr. CONYERS. I have my five, and we are going to have general debate for 2\1/2\ hours, so I would ask the gentleman to go get one, OK?

Mr. CONYERS. I will yield the gentleman time to show me a case.

Mr. CONYERS. Just a moment. That is the end of our discussion.

Mr. CONYERS. Of course not.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this is the second annual flag-burning discretion legislative attempt. Last year it was not able to arrive in time for Flag Day, so it was held over for July 4, but this time, although the budget is out of whack and disaster relief is still unresolved, we are able to get this piece of legislation up. I am happy to join with the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary to engage in this discussion for a couple of hours. Now, we are the lawmakers of the land. That presumes that we understand the law. It also assumes that we know something about what the Supreme Court said, Mr. Speaker. What the Supreme Court has said, and I want to correct myself, I said that there were five decisions, there are seven decisions, which I will bring out to my colleagues one at a time, and I will put it in nonlegal discourse so that everybody, no matter what side of the issue they are on, will understand what the current state of the law is at this moment. It is not what some Members have misrepresented it, perhaps accidentally, to be during the debate on the rule. Now, for those who know what Hugo Black would have done if he had voted on flag burning, that is wonderful. Hugo Black never voted on flag burning, so only the chairman of the Committee on Rules would know what a deceased Supreme Court jurist would have done had the issue come before him. Wonderful. I will tell what one conservative jurist named Anthony Scalia has done on the Supreme Court on which he presently sits; that is, he has voted with those of us who realize that flag burning is an expression of speech protected by the first amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman in managing the time on that side.

Mr. CONYERS. N-O. By the way, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman has 1 hour to do all the quoting he wants. May I point out, Mr. Speaker, that speech is protected; that action is protected speech under the first amendment. I do not care what anybody once said. At least as we disagree on this subject matter, let us pretend that we understand what the law is. It is there in the books. We have got it in our offices. It is on the computer. Members can ask a staffer. But do not misrepresent the law while I am managing this bill on the part of the Democrats today. If my colleagues do, if time permits, I will try to correct them as we go along. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. I address my remarks to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution because he quoted former Supreme Court Justice Black. The quote that he made does not come out of any case that Justice Black ever decided. It is in no decision. It refers to the Justice referring to what each State should do. Now, either the gentleman does not understand that or he is trying to fool somebody. I do not know which. Now, ask me to yield.