John Conyers

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], a distinguished lawyer, to close the arguments and discussion for our side.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Lofgren], a former law professor that distinguishes the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee], a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds to express my gratitude to the gentlewoman from Colorado for reminding the House of the antecedents that have led up to this important measure.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the distinguished gentlewoman from Colorado, I yield myself 30 seconds. Just so we get the history of Megan's Law down in the record here, the State of New Jersey, as a result of the horrible crime that has been repeated and recharacterized on the floor, passed a law that required notification, and so did a lot of other States, and so we are not federally mandating that all of the States, including the ones that have it, now observe Megan's Law. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder], a ranking member of the committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer], the former chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this measure, but I am not quite clear that we do not have a constitutional problem here. This is the Committee on the Judiciary that is reporting this measure. I agree with the analysis of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. The only problem is that he left out the part that we may be forced to revisit before this thing is all over with. I suppose it is somebody's job here to bring this to the attention of members of the committee, Members of the House that are not on the Committee on the Judiciary. There have been court cases that find that identifying a person after a conviction is a continuation of punishment and could raise a constitutional problem. It has come up in court cases before, and we will likely hear about it again. The Federal district court has already found a similar provision unconstitutional, finding that notification provisions do constitute a form of punishment more than a regulatory scheme and therefore is violative of the prohibition on the ex post facto clause that appears in the Constitution. In other words, this may be good from this point on, but I think it creates an open case that we may want to remember as we pass this measure, that it could present a problem in the courts in the future. Mr. Speaker, we have come together here to focus in on this matter. We think, though, that in the larger scheme of things, this notification process actually already exists in the law. While we are not making an unfunded mandate, we are creating a penalty for States that receive Federal funds if they do not comply. That is a different kind of animal, but at the same time it is meant to be coercive upon the States. I join in support of this measure. I hope that it will do some good. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. It is a perfect privilege and pleasure to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Chrysler].

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman. Let me ask the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Chrysler], the author of the measure, that were this amendment to prevail, namely, that the Commission shall review our collective works tonight as opposed to us directing the Sentencing Commission to amend the guidelines, would that work an irreparable injury on the objectives that the gentleman has worked so hard to bring to the floor?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I believe this may be the last amendment to this measure. I would like to make a case that what we have done here, although it is outside the Sentencing Commission's responsibilities, it really has not been that bad. Now, having said that, I would like to point out that the Sentencing Commission has not failed. The Sentencing Commission did what we asked it to do. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime agreed with me earlier in the debate, the Sentencing Commission's work came back to this committee and was ratified. I would argue that what we have done tonight is far less worse than many things that have happened on the criminal justice field, but that let us now repair the amendment that is on the floor, that is not a lot different from the controlling language in the Chrysler bill. The Chrysler bill says the U.S. Sentencing Commission shall amend the Federal sentencing guidelines. The Watt amendment says the U.S. Sentencing Commission shall review the Federal sentencing guidelines to determine appropriate sentencing enhancement for crimes of violence committed against vulnerable persons. In other words, all he does is take the work that we are about to report tonight and pass it back through the Sentencing Commission. Is that so bad? What is wrong with that? We now have a work product that can now go back to the Sentencing Commission. Guess what? It has got to come back to us, anyway. Nothing that the Sentencing Commission can do has any viability till it has passed through the House of Representatives. I argue that much of the work tonight, I believe, will pass muster with the Sentencing Commission, and so I fail to see any great harm done in connection with this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], the author of the amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. In what respect, sir? It would not change a line in the bill. It would take the bill, assuming that it is passed, send it to the commission, and guess what? Anything that the commission does that we do not approve of, guess what we can do? Change it. So for that reason I suggest that it would not do any harm at all to the gentleman's work here tonight and the work that others have done to add on to it.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I hope that the gentleman understands that this does not have to do with my disagreeing with his basic contention, but it has to do with the fact that we find ourselves tonight on this slippery slope. If we are on the slippery slope for all its irrationality, I do not want to exclude environmental crimes. I thank my colleague from Michigan for yielding me this opportunity to express my agreement with both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding to me. I want to thank the gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, for agreeing to accept the amendment. I also want to thank the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt] for continuing to object to the entire procedure. Let me first remind the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime that one of the measures that led me to introduce environmental crimes is the fact of the two 9-year-old boys in his State, if not his district in Florida, who were killed from a wreck of hazardous waste illegally disposed of in a dumpster. The two individual defendants, the plant manager and the shop foreman, were convicted of hazardous waste felonies. Each was sentenced to serve 27 months in prison under the terms of a guilty plea that included knowing endangerment. They went to 5 years probation. I think the gentleman would agree that these kinds of crimes are as serious as all the others that we have dealt with. Now, that does not in the least detract from the validity of the arguments offered by the gentleman from North Carolina. I am placed in the precarious position of agreeing with the gentleman from North Carolina, but we are here adding these measures tonight. To leave out crimes of an environmental nature where there is deliberate, reckless endangerment, knowledge and intention, would, to me, be an incredibly wrong thing to do. This is the slippery slope that we are on. I am on it. I am not going to leave out environmental crimes because of the irrationality of what the majority of the Members have willed here today.

Mr. CONYERS. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Should I not be recognized in support of my amendment?

Mr. CONYERS. The arguments against germaneness coming from the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime would carry much more resonance if, through his agreement, and the Committee on Rules, we have already made measures germane that would have clearly been nongermane. The question is: What shall we make germane and what shall we make not germane? And to argue that these kinds of crimes that clearly call out for criminal penalties should not be included merely because they are not violent in the traditional sense of violence, there are many crimes that occur that are not physically violent. There is no physical act of violence when a person is murdered by poisoning. There is none. They are not excluded. They do not fall to the argument of being nongermane. And so, Mr. Chairman, I would say that this amendment relates to the subject matter as the legislation does before us. The subject before us, of the bill before us, is limited to crimes of violence which are committed against the elderly, young people, and other vulnerable persons. My amendment is limited to these same precise categories. The crime involved must be a crime of violence and it must be committed against a child, elderly person or other vulnerable person. On that basis, I urge that the point of order be rejected.

Mr. CONYERS. May I be heard, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I now have an amendment that would make it clear that environmental crimes of violence are included in the definition of crimes of violence to which enhanced penalties will attach. Mr. Chairman, in another previous amendment I would have added environmental crimes as a distinct class of crimes in addition to crimes of violence for which there could be enhanced penalties. But this amendment differs in that it merely specifically provides for the definition of crimes of violence to include crimes of violence that are environmental in nature. Again, let us use the crime of murder by poison. Poisoning is considered and is a crime of violence. Similarly, if a company contaminates a community's water supply, thereby poisoning residents with death resulting to some young and old victims, this amendment would require that enhanced penalties attach. So, Mr. Chairman, I believe without my amendment, even a prosecutor could justifiably argue that the contamination of a water supply resulting in deaths could be a crime of violence qualifying for increased penalties. But this amendment would dispel those doubts and make it clear that environmental crimes resulting in physical harm should have the same penalties as other crimes resulting in physical harm. In fact, there is little or no difference. Let me describe the kind of behavior that would be prosecutable in the event my amendment wins passage. Several years ago two 9-year-old boys were killed by fumes from hazardous waste illegally disposed of in a dumpster, and the jury made an award in a wrongful death lawsuit, but they have never been able to recover. The corporation merely declared bankruptcy. Unless we are able to go to the corporate personal defendants who could be eligible for significant incarceration under this provision, there is no way that they can be reached. And so, I think it is wonderful to say we are tough on crime, but let us make sure that we punish the full range of people who commit criminal acts, who place our children and elderly at risk. A 27-month sentence for hazardous dumping that costs a number of children their life is simply not strong enough, and the sentencing enhancements that have been discussed on this floor in the underlying bill should apply to the circumstances that I have raised as an example in support of this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I urge the Committee to support the amendment and add this very important part of criminal conduct to be subject to enhanced penalties. point of order

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal to the Chair to consider adding environmental crimes to the measure before us as a germane provision. Mr. Chairman, as written, the bill refers to crimes of violence which include, of course, physical force. Now, at first glance, environmental crimes might not appear to be involving physical force. But then one need only recall that murder is a crime of violence and that murder can be accomplished by nonphysical means like poison. Even though the perpetrator may not be even present at the time of the actual ingestion of the poison, poisoning someone is no less murder because there is no physical contact. Likewise, Mr. Chairman, the adding of environmental crimes as an appropriate and germane part of the provisions and the objectives sought in H.R. 2974, would make, I think, quite rational sense. Environmental crimes are similar if not identical to the example of poisoning by murder. A company, for example, deliberately dumps chemicals that it knows are dangerous into a water supply. Is that a physical crime? Inevitably harm results to the people who drink the water, sometimes resulting in death. In Woburn, MA, we saw numerous children develop leukemia and eventually die from the disease contracted as a direct result of the poisoned water they consumed. Would a rule of germaneness take a crime of that nature and that level of violence out of the provisions of enhancing crimes to children in this measure? I would argue that it should not. Is that company any less responsible for these deaths than a murderer is for his? I think not. Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues are concerned about the level of intent, whether the company intended the children to die, well, intent is a question that in every murder investigation or trial will be determined in a court of law. Using my example, Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to make a distinction from the previous measure that I offered, and I argue that the environmental crimes are violent in effect and are too important and serious for it to be ruled out of order because such crimes have not historically been considered in this genre. I urge the Chairman to dismiss the point of order.

Mr. CONYERS. I would like to be heard in opposition to the point of order.

Mr. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I reserve my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Becerra].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, but merely to initiate a discussion around this measure by pointing out that we have a rather large-size problem about drafting. Mr. Chairman, this bill carries with is some incredible possibilities in that those who might interfere with witnesses could be subject to the same underlying penalties of a defendant, for example, the death penalty, but the defendant might be acquitted, and someone who was guilty of jury tampering could face the death penalty. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that if we decide to increase the penalties for witness retaliation, jury tampering, it should be done on a much more rational basis than the one that has been dumped into this measure. I think we really may want to examine this measure much more closely than we have at the committee level. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Becerra].