C. Cox

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me the time. I rise to applaud the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and the conferees for bringing to this House a measure that is vital to our national security. I am especially pleased that the conference report incorporates a number of the bills that made up our policy for freedom in China. These bills passed the House last fall with overwhelming bipartisan support. One of the ``Policy for Freedom in China'' bills included in the conference report is the legislation written by the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), providing for design of a theater missile defense system for Taiwan. This significant provision was drafted in response to the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 in which the PRC fired nuclear-capable missiles surrounding Taiwan's major ports. However, since the recent North Korean missile launch over Japan, it has become clear that other friends and allies in the region, not just Taiwan, are vulnerable to the threat of missile attacks. I would like to inquire of the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina, whether the conference report will, in fact, require the administration to address the missile defense needs of Taiwan and also our other East Asian allies.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I have listened carefully to the debate and it occurs to me that those who have been speaking against the resolution have not read it. They have been attacking various public policy positions that some people in America might or might not hold, but they have not been mentioning the resolution. The resolution itself is very, very clear, it is very straightforward, and it is indeed entirely consistent with Proposition 215 in California. The resolution says the following. First, it declares that Congress continues to support the existing Federal legal process for determining the safety and efficacy of drugs. That is the law, it is the existing Federal law, and a vote against this resolution, then, is to take the position that Congress no longer supports the existing Federal legal process for determining the safety and efficacy of drugs. The second thing that the resolution says is that the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, in other words, shall submit to the Congress a report, a report on the efforts of the Clinton administration to enforce existing laws. Now, perhaps the Congress does not want to know whether or not the administration is enforcing existing laws; perhaps the minority does not wish to know that because the administration has a pretty sorry record on that score. In 1992, President Bush committed $1.5 billion to drug interdiction. In 1993, President Clinton cut $200 million out of that effort and rolled back significant other involvement by the Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs, Border Patrol and the National Guard. He then further cut his own Anti-Drug Policy Office from 146 persons down to 25. In 1993 and 1994, out of 2,600 speeches and interviews, President Clinton did not speak more than 2 dozen times on the topic. Under President Clinton's watch, marijuana use among youths has more than doubled, more than doubled during the Clinton administration. President Clinton and Vice President Gore and their FDA have raised a lot of hell about tobacco smoking, and that is important, but the FDA cares only about whether or not there is tobacco in that cigarette. Go ahead and put marijuana in it, and that is a different score. What we are interested in with this resolution is where is the FDA when we put something besides tobacco in a cigarette? The FDA went out of its way in order to claim jurisdiction which Congress had not explicitly given it over tobacco to determine that a cigarette is a medical device. Now, that strains the lexicon a bit, but nonetheless, they made that determination. A cigarette is a medical device and, therefore, the FDA has jurisdiction under our FDA statutes over tobacco. Well, surely, then, if a cigarette is a medical device, the FDA has jurisdiction over marijuana when put in a cigarette and smoked. But the FDA has done nothing to determine the safety and efficacy of marijuana for medical uses. It is already the law that doctors can prescribe marijuana to sick patients, and that is not what we are talking about here. But what we do wish to do is get the FDA to focus as much as they are focused on tobacco on what happens when we put marijuana in those cigarettes. Mr. Speaker, the last thing that the resolution does is it asks the FDA, the Commissioner of foods and drugs, to submit to the Congress a report on the specific efforts underway to enforce existing law. That is the entirety of what this resolution does, and a vote against this resolution is a vote against either 1 or all 3 of those things, a position which is untenable if one takes as seriously smoking marijuana as one takes smoking a tobacco cigarette.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I missed the vote on rollcall No. 399. I strongly support the Kolbe amendment, and had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I know my colleague from California (Ms. Waters) will be recognized immediately because we are going back and forth, and in fact, having spoken with her about this, I know that we agree on our conclusion on the merits of this legislation. Reform of our justice system, civil and criminal, is a top priority of this Congress. The low reputation of the legal profession is of greatest concern to ethical lawyers. I rise in support of America's prosecutors, the overwhelming percentage of whom already follow the rules written out in this legislation. In fact, I dare say virtually all of them do every day. Citizens need to understand that they have a legal right to have these rules followed, and that is the purpose of this today. Reputable lawyers know better than anyone else that all too often the courts today are too slow; that all too often justice is delayed or, because of delay, denied; all too often the justice system does not ultimately deliver what all of us intend it to deliver. Because I have so much faith in America's prosecutors, because I want to support our criminal justice system, I want the American people to support that justice system as well. I want everybody to understand that when they go to court and they are accused of a crime or their family member is accused of a crime or when they are a victim and the perpetrator of that crime is accused that justice will be done and that it will be fair and on the level. There are 10 commandments in this bill. The 10 commandments are already observed by good prosecutors everywhere and certainly by good prosecutors in our Department of Justice and those who work in the Offices of Independent Counsels appointed pursuant to statute. Let me just read these 10 commandments, because it is so self-evident we must stand in support of them. Commandment number one, just reading from the 10 provisions of the McDade-Murtha bill, says: Thou shalt not indict without probable cause. Who here today says it should be otherwise? Of course, this is a rule that must bind prosecutors throughout the Government. Number two: Prosecutors cannot hide information that would exonerate a person who has been indicted. They cannot hide information that would exonerate someone who might not be guilty of the crime with which they have been charged. That is a rule that good prosecutors already live by. A prosecutor must not intentionally mislead a court as to the guilt of the accused. Of course he or she must not do that. A prosecutor must not intentionally or knowingly alter evidence or intentionally or knowingly misstate evidence. Number six: A prosecutor must not try to color a witness' testimony. Number seven: A prosecutor must not prevent a defendant from obtaining evidence that he or she is entitled to. Number eight: A prosecutor must not offer or provide sex as an inducement to any government witness or potential witness. Number nine: The prosecutor should not leak information improperly during the course of an investigation. We all know about the importance of grand jury secrecy to the ultimate successful prosecution, because if witnesses are tipped off in advance they cannot convict the guilty. And number 10: Prosecutors should not engage in conduct that discredits the Department of Justice. These 10 commandments in this legislation are not controversial. They are not controversial if applied to any prosecutor within the Department of Justice or within the office of any independent counsel. Every lawyer, certainly every Government lawyer should follow these rules. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on McDade-Murtha and yes on the perfecting amendment offered by the former chairman the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, when he talked about Medal of Honor recipients like Kenneth A. Walsh, President Reagan asked ``Where did we find such men?'' He answered: ``We found them where we always did--in our villages and towns, on our city streets, in our shops and on our farms.'' We found Kenneth A. Walsh in Brooklyn, and, more recently, I am proud to say, in Orange County, California. His presence alone--for he never boasted, or bragged, or even talked much about his service--reminded us of the cost of freedom, and the bravery inspired by the American ideal. The nation lost another hero last week. I submit to the Record an article from Friday's Orange County Register, so that we will always remember him: [From the Orange County Register, July 31, 1998] One Enemy He Could Not Defeat (Military: Kenneth A. Walsh, a Medal of Honor recipient, dies at 81) (By Tom Berg) SANTA ANA--His bags were packed by the front door when he died. His ride to the airport was idling outside. Another air show and another honor were awaiting Kenneth A. Walsh, American hero. He died Thursday doing what he'd done for decades-- promoting patriotism as a recipient of the Medal of Honor. Here was a Marine who shot down 21 Japanese planes in World War II. A pilot who crashed or was shot down five times. A man who earned the highest military distinction given in this nation. His death, at age 81, leaves just two other living Medal of Honor recipients in Orange County. ``He was a natural-born fighter pilot, with guts you wouldn't believe,'' recalled historian, friend and veteran George Grupe, 76, of Newport Beach. ``To fly in when he's outnumbered 50 to one :. :. :. :he was a real tiger.'' A pilot must shoot down five enemy planes before he is called an ace. Walsh had earned that title twice--downing 10 Japanese planes--before fate would usher him into the thick of two firefights in 1943 that would result in his meeting the president of the United States. On August 15, Walsh led a squadron of five Corsairs into 30 Japanese Val bombers and Zero fighters massing to attack U.S. troops. Walsh shot down two Vals and a Zero before 20mm cannon fire blew holes in the wing and fuel tank of his Corsair. He landed, but his plane never flew again. Two weeks later, he spotted 50 Japanese planes while he was flying alone, away from his squadron. He dived into the fray against incredible odds and shot down two Zeros before rejoining his squadron. He then shot down two more Zeros before his Corsair took enemy fire and crashed. ``Everyone knew about Ken Walsh,'' said Medal of Honor recipient William Barber 78, of Irvine. ``He was one of those few Marines who gained the day in competition with the Japanese air forces in the Solomon Islands in 1943.'' After the war, Walsh and his wife, Beulah, walked timidly into the Oval Office, where Franklin Roosevelt handed him the Medal of Honor for gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. Walsh uttered few words. ``Scared, young man?'' FDR asked. ``Yessir!'' ``Lieutenant Walsh, will you shake my hand?'' Roosevelt asked. ``Yessir!'' Walsh said again. Quite a moment for a young man from Brooklyn who joined the Marines as a skinny teen-ager. He retired as a lieutenant colonel and settled in Santa Ana in 1962. The Medal of Honor has hung on the chests of only 3,412 soldiers since the days of the Civil War. Only 163 survive today--11 in California and two in Orange County: Barber and Walter Ehlers, 76, of Buena Park. All three men appeared often at patriotic events. They were among eight Medal of Honor recipients from Orange County who were honored with monuments last Memorial Day at the War Memorial Plaza in Santa Ana's Civic Center. ``He was very proud of that,'' said Sid Goldstein, 78, of Westminster, past national Commander of the Legion of Valor. ``He took pictures. He wanted to make sure all his family back in Brooklyn got a picture of that concrete. He used to say, `Here I was a poor Irish kid from Brooklyn when I got the Medal of Honor. I never could foresee being so honored and respected in society.' '' For all his bravery, Walsh rarely talked abut his heroics. ``He was always asked by different people about what he did, and he would tell them,'' said Beulah, his wife of 57 years, ``but he never talked to me much about it.'' Walsh, who died of a possible heart attack, was on his way to Oshkosh, Wis., for an air show where he was to be among four Medal of Honor recipients honored (one for each branch of service). ``All I can say is he'll be buried in Arlington National Cemetery, I hope,'' Beulah Walsh said. ``That was his wish.'' Besides his wife, Walsh is survived by a son, Thomas. Funeral arrangements are pending.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, I will just ask the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), if that is her understanding as well?

Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from California, the coauthor of the bill, for yielding. Mr. Speaker, earlier on the floor we had discussed our understanding, our clear understanding, that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter standards of liability under the Exchange Act. I would add, and I believe the gentlewoman is in agreement, that in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether conduct that was not intentional was sufficient for liability under the Federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has never answered that question. The court expressly reserved the question of whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a subsequent case, Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, where it stated, ``We have explicitly left open the question of whether recklessness satisfies of the scienter requirement.'' The Reform Act did not alter the standard for liability under the Exchange Act. The question was expressly left open by the Reform Act for resolution by the Supreme Court on the basis of the statutory language of the Exchange Act.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. The gentlewoman is correct. It is my clear understanding that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter standards of liability under the Exchange Act.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise for a colloquy with the gentlewoman from California, the principal Democratic sponsor of H.R. 1689. I note that some question was raised during consideration of her legislation about the 1995 Reform Act's effect on standards of liability under the Exchange Act. Is it the gentlewoman's understanding that, in adopting her legislation today, Congress does not intend to alter standards of liability under the Exchange Act? Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate, too, my colleague's remarks. I have not heard that poem for a while, even though I have little kids age 5 and 4. But I do think of Little Red Riding Hood. Do you remember when the wolf is licking his chops and so on? Here, it is not the investors that the wolf is worried about. The wolf wants to eat the investors. The stockholders here are being taken advantage of by lawyers who bring lawsuits for their own benefit, and that is what the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was all about. There are a lot of these suits. There have been a lot of these suits. Over half of the top 150 companies in Silicon Valley alone were hit by such suits that were regulated by the 1995 Private Securities Regulation Reform Act. The enormous price that investors had to pay in these suits, according to one study, amounted on average to $9 million for each settlement. That comes out of the company, out of the investors' hides. But it goes to the lawyers. The plaintiffs, the supposed beneficiaries of this system, on average, received from these $9 million, on average, settlements between 6 cents and 14 cents on the dollar. That is why such a strong bipartisan majority of the House and the Senate have acted first to bring us the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and now to bring us this very, very worthy legislation, the White-Eshoo Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. I want to join in congratulating my colleagues, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. White) and the gentleman from California (Ms. Eshoo) for their tireless efforts on behalf of this legislation as well as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley) for their leadership in bringing to us this point. In addition, finally, I want to highlight a provision added in the committee by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley) that gets directly to the point raised by my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), and that is giving States the opportunity themselves to handle the implementation of their own laws. The continued viability of the section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 is unwritten in this legislation, as well as it should be, and I thank my colleagues for doing such good and worthy work. A strong bipartisan majority of the House and Senate acted in 1995 to reorient federal securities litigation to encourage investors to bring meritorious claims while protecting innocent employers from meritless extortion suits. We acted to protect the millions of innocent investors who were bearing the cost of meritless lawsuits while gaining little or no recompense for genuine fraud. In 1996, strong bipartisan majorities of the House and Senate again turned to the issue of securities law, this time addressing the appropriate division of labor between state and federal securities regulators. In that historic bill we determined that ``covered securities''--basically, those traded on national exchanges--would be subject to federal regulation, while non-covered securities would be regulated by the states. Today we are going to continue our work in this field of law by protecting the gains we made in the 1995 Reform Act from circumvention by entrepreneurial trial lawyers, and by harmonizing the 1995 Reform Act and the 1996 National Markets legislation. Trial lawyers have sought to get around our 1995 reforms by bringing their suits in state courts, where those reforms do not apply. Yet as our capital markets are national, and thus investors may live in any of the 50 states, bringing a suit in one state unfairly imposes a financial burden on residents of another state. To address this inequity and assert that national markets require nationally applied rules, this legislation will make federal courts the exclusive venue for large-scale securities fraud lawsuits involving securities subject to federal regulation under the 1996 National Markets Act. Because questions have been raised about the 1995 Reform Act both in Committee and in the other body, I would like to take this opportunity--as a principal proponent of the Act--to discuss what Congress did, and did not, do in 1995. First, with respect to scienter under the 1934 Act: In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court made clear that, as a necessary element of a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with ``scienter,'' which the Court described as ``a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.'' [425 U.S. 185 (1976)] The Court in Hochfelder expressly left open the question whether extreme recklessness could ever supply this necessary intent element, although subsequent judicial decisions have noted that the language and structure of the Act ``evidenced a purpose to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.'' [Aaron v. SEC, 680, 691 (1980)] Many Members of Congress and of the Conference Committee that considered the Reform Act believed then, and believe today, that recklessness--the oxymoronic ``unintentional fraud''--is not an appropriate or workable basis for Rule 10b-5 liability. In practice, it has proven difficult to distinguish from certain forms of negligence, and has resulted in little uniformity of treatment among even courts that purport to follow the same standard of scienter. However, other House and Senate Members felt differently, and the Act as enacted left to the courts the determination of the scienter standard on the basis of the pre-existing, unamended 1934 Act. I, for one, believe that the Supreme Court will ultimately determine that the text, structure, and legislative history of the 1934 Act clearly require intentional conduct to impose liability. With respect to the pleading standard in the 1995 Act, here again the legislative intent is quite clear that we intended to codify a pleading standard higher than that of the Second Circuit, and that we did not intend to codify or incorporate by reference the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting that caselaw. As explained in the Statement of Managers, ``The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit . . . Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend the codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading standard.'' And we went on to specifically explain that this was the reason why we dropped the so-called Specter Amendment on motive, opportunity, and recklessness--because we wanted a standard higher than the Second Circuit's, not because the Specter language was implicit in our own Act's language. The President was certainly quite clear about our Conference Report language: In his December 20, 1995 veto message, he wrote, and I am quoting: I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit--the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that. The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically indicated that they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead intended to ``strengthen'' the existing pleading requirements of the Second Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than any now existing . . . The President correctly described the 1995 Reform Act's intent though not its effect. It's ironic that he and other Members of his party, having failed to kill reform openly in 1995, now seek to rewrite the history of the battle they lost. In addition, I want to again highlight a provision added in the Committee by Chairman Bliley that makes a technical correction to the 1996 Fields bill. This correction restores the viability of Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides a voluntary state-law alternative to federal securities registration. This provision--which has been an unamended part of the 1933 Act since the enactment of that legislation, exempts from federal registration securities issued in exchange for other securities, claims, or property interests, if the terms and conditions of the issuance and exchange have been approved as fair by state authorities. It is purely voluntary; issuers may still seek federal registration if they wish. Although the 1996 Act does not amend Section 3(a)(10), it inadvertently impeded its operation. I appreciate the Chairman's consideration in including a curative technical amendment endorsed by the California securities regulatory authority in the manager's amendment. I look forward to the House's passage of this legislation, and I thank the Chairman and my colleagues for their tireless efforts on behalf of this legislation. Together we have protected investors from frivolous lawsuits in the past, and today we shall ensure that this stands in the future.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, there are a few occasions more joyous and historic in a family's life than a 50th wedding anniversary. On August 18, 1948, my parents, Marilyn Ann Miller and Charles Christopher Cox, were wed in Mahtomedi, Minnesota. They received a papal blessing, and it was propitious: a half century later, their bonds of matrimony are stronger than ever. Fifty years of marriage have produced five Cox children: myself, identical twins Kathy and Anita, Terry, and Molly. And the Cox children have given our parents nearly 9 grandchildren (I say nearly, because my wife Rebecca is due in just over a month with our third child). They are Nick Hammer, Sean Hedgecock, Christina Ziton, Trevina Joseph, Charles Cox, Katie Cox, Alex Ziton, and Christopher Joseph. Along with the rest of our extended family, we will all join with our parents and grandparents on this memorable occasion to celebrate their golden anniversary. As each of us in Congress knows, leadership in all walks of life means, more than anything else, setting an example. For us, their children and grandchildren, my parents have been a marvelous example. We owe our values, our education, our caring and commitment for others, and our sense of honor, duty, patriotism, and social justice to the leadership in all of these things that they showed us. Their most fundamental lesson to us was the way they have, and continue to, lead their lives. At the close of the 20th century, men and women in their 70's, like my parents, can expect to live much longer than those of their parents' generation. What's more important, they can expect to be productive and to enjoy life far beyond what was possible even 20 years ago. This is what social scientists now call the ``second adulthood''--post- retirement years that extend for decades or more. As a result, we ``children'' are still counting on them to show us the way, even though their own parents' lives were necessarily very different. Well into adulthood, we're still learning, and still depending upon, our parents to help us lead our lives. Mark Twain once remarked that he spent $25 to research his family tree, and then he had to spend $50 to cover it up. Not so for the Cox family. We're proud to celebrate our parents' 50th wedding anniversary on the floor of the House of Representatives, and in the pages of the Congressional Record. After all, our parents are a national treasure-- and what better way to help them celebrate than to share the festivities with 250 million of their fellow taxpayers? I know every one of my colleagues--particularly those from Minnesota, where our family was raised, and where my parents still live; from California, where my father was raised, and those citizens I am proud to represent; and from Virginia, Colorado, and Indiana, where the rest of the Cox grandchildren live--join me in wishing Marilyn and Charles Cox a splendid 50th wedding anniversary, and many more to come.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I introduced the bill we are considering today, H.R. 4105, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, yesterday. It has not been reported to the House by either the Commerce Committee or the Judiciary Committee, or by any committee of Congress. It does, however, represent a synthesis of two bills approved by the Commerce Committee (H.R. 3849) and by the Judiciary Committee (H.R. 3529). Thus, while normally there be one or more committee reports filed in connection with H.R. 4105, there is none. As the author of the consensus bill, as well as of the original Internet Tax Freedom Act (H.R. 1054), upon which both H.R. 3849 and H.R. 3529 were based, I am pleased to set forth for the Record the author's intent concerning certain key provisions of the bill, notably Section 2 (``Moratorium on Certain Taxes'') and Section 7 (``No Expansion of Tax Authority''), since this important information will not be fully reflected in the committee reports accompanying the two previous bills. Report Concerning Provisions of H.R. 4105, the Internet Tax Freedom Act A. Moratorium on Certain Taxes Section 2 of H.R. 4105 amends Title 4 of the U.S. Code to add a new Chapter 6 (Sections 151-155). New Section 151 of Title 4 prohibits, for a period of 3 years, State and local governments from imposing, assessing, collecting, or attempting to collect ``taxes on Internet access,'' ``bit taxes,'' ``multiple'' taxes on electronic commerce, and ``discriminatory'' taxes on electronic commerce. 1. No taxes on Internet access New Section 151(a) prohibits, for a period of 3 years, State and local governments from imposing, assessing, collecting, or attempting to collect ``taxes on Internet access.'' It is intended that this temporary ban will be made permanent in the future, as it is envisioned that the legislation submitted to Congress by the Advisory Commission pursuant to new Section 153(b)(5) will include provisions making the 3-year ban on such taxes permanent. The National Governors' Association has already publicly declared its support for such a permanent ban. The term ``Internet access'' is defined in new Section 155(7). It means any service that enables users to access content, information, and other services offered over the Internet. It includes access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers. It does not, however, mean a telecommunications service. Providers of Internet access often provide their subscribers with the ability to run a variety of applications, including World Wide Web browsers, File Transfer Protocol clients, Usenet newsreaders, electronic mail clients, and Telnet applications. Providers of Internet access may also provide access to proprietary content as well as access to the Internet. American Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, and Microsoft Network are examples of providers of Internet access. New Section 151(b) provides a limited exception to the moratorium on taxes on Internet access for eight States that presently tax Internet access--Connecticut, Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Ohio. Any one of these States' taxes on Internet access would be ``grandfathered'' if the State enacts a law within one year expressly affirming that the State intends to tax Internet access. The intent of this provision is to ``grandfather'' only those States that have already come to rely on Internet access taxes as an important source of revenue, and that have expressly described in statute that Internet access is subject to taxation. The reason a further legislative act is required in order to quality for the exception is that none of the eight potentially ``grandfathered'' State statutes makes express reference to the Internet. (The Governors of two States that presently tax Internet access--Texas and South Carolina--opted not to have their States' laws included in the ``grandfather'' provision, because they oppose the taxation of Internet access.) Because none of the States presently taxing Internet access has a law on the books that expressly authorizes the taxation of Internet access, such taxes are being imposed as the result of decisions made by tax administrators rather than by legislators. For example, a tax administrator may decide that Internet access falls within the definition of existing telecommunications or other taxes, even though the Internet is nowhere referred to or described in the State's law. New Section 151(b)(2), which requires the express codification of such Internet access taxes, is intended to ensure that the significant decision of a State to override national policy against the taxation of Internet access will be made by the State's duly elected representatives. In form, this provision is similar to other instances in which Congress has chosen to make applicability of a Federal law contingent upon the actions of others, including State officials. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983); and Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997). It is important to note that the ``grandfather'' exception provided in new Section 151(b) only applies to ``taxes on Internet access.'' It does not apply to the other taxes included within the moratorium--bit taxes, multiple taxes, or discriminatory taxes. As a result of this clear language, even if a State tax on Internet access meets the conditions of the exception set forth in Section 151(b), the tax may nevertheless be barred if it is imposed in a manner that would cause it to fall within the definition of a ``multiple'' tax or a `` discriminatory'' tax. Moreover, a tax on Internet access that comes within the ``grandfather'' provision is not thereby rendered valid for all purposes. Coming within the ``grandfather'' means only that the tax is only excepted from the moratorium imposed by this Act, not that is is excepted from any other limitations on a State's ability to tax--such as, for example, limitations imposed by the Constitution. New Section 15(c) provides a further exception to the moratorium to ensure that telecommunications carriers will not avoid liability for taxes on telecommunications services as such. This provision requires that, in order to be covered by the moratorium, a telephone company that bundles telephone service along with Internet access must separately state on the customer's bill the portion of the billing that applies to telephone services. 2. No. bit taxes New Section 151(a)(2) prohibits, for a period of 3 years, State and local governments from imposing, assessing, collecting, or attempting to collect so-called ``bit'' taxes. A ``bit'' is an abbreviation for ``binary digit,'' which denotes either a zero or one. The term ``bit tax'' is defined in new Section 155(1) as any tax on electronic commerce expressly imposed on or measured by the volume of digital information transmitted electronically, or the volume of digital information per unit of time transmitted electronically. It does not include taxes imposed on the provision of telecommunications services. Because bit taxes target digital communications, they would be extremely detrimental to the future of the Internet and extremely costly for consumers. It is for these reasons that State and local governments are barred from imposing any such tax. 3. No multiple taxes on electronic commerce New Section 151(a)(3) prohibits, for a period of 3 years, State and local governments from imposing, assessing, collecting, or attempting to collect ``multiple'' taxes on electric commerce. The term ``multiple tax'' is defined in new Section 155(8). In general, this definition covers two distinct ways that taxes may become layered in an unfair manner. The first concerns instances where two or more taxing jurisdictions all tax the same sercice. The second covers instances where one taxing jurisdiction applies a telecommunications tax in a manner that results in the consumer paying the same tax twice: once on the underlying phone service used to connect to the Internet, and again on the Internet service itself. New Section 155(8)(A) states that a tax is a ``multiple tax'' if it is imposed by one State or locality on the same or essentially the same electronic commerce that is also taxed by another State or locality. Whether two or more taxes are ``multiple'' is independent of whether they are levied at the same rate, or on the same basis. A credit for taxes paid in other jurisdictions, or some other similar mechanism for avoiding double taxation, will prevent a tax from falling within this definition. This section is intended to strengthen the protections already afforded by the U.S. Supreme Court against multiple jurisdictional taxation. For instance, in Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989), the Court limited the ability of two States to double-tax the same service by requiring that an interstate telephone call must originate or terminate in the State and must be billed to an in-State address in order for that State to tax the telephone call. In the case of electronic commerce, it is even more important to provide clear protections against multiple taxation. The Internet's decentralized packet- switched architecture means that Internet transmissions almost always cross several jurisdictions. Moreover, the variety of technologies employed to deliver Internet services means that each aspect of a transaction could be subjected to separate taxation--for example, transmission of data and also the data itself--on the grounds that these are not ``the same.'' (For this reason, the definition in new Section 155(8)(A) expressly adds the alternative ``or essentially the same.'') These factors, combined with the Internet's increasingly portable nature, makes it especially vulnerable to the threat of multiple taxation. New Section 155(8)(B) states that if a State or local government classifies Internet access as telecommunications or communications services, then any State or local government tax on the underlying telecommunications services used to provide Internet access will constitute a ``multiple tax.'' The definition provides an exception to this rule if the State or local government allows a credit for other taxes paid, a sale for resale exemption, or similar mechanism for eliminating double taxation of the service and the means for delivering the service. 4. No discriminatory taxes On electronic commerce New Section 151(a)(3) prohibits, for a period of 3 years, State and local governments from imposing, assessing, collecting, or attempting to collect discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. The term ``discriminatory tax'' is defined in new Section 155(3). In the world of multi-state tax law, the term ``discriminatory'' commonly carries distinct meanings. It is most often used to describe taxes that favor local commerce over interstate commerce. For the purposes of this Act and only this Act, however, new Section 155(3) defines the term ``discriminatory'' in a manner that is meant to capture instances where State or local tax policies intentionally or unintentionally place electronic commerce at a disadvantage compared to similar commerce conducted through more traditional means, such as over the telephone or via mail- order. Adopting such a definition of ``discriminatory tax'' is not intended to disturb Commerce Clause protections against State or local tax laws that burden interstate commerce. Rather, the Act is meant to complement these existing protections. New Section 155(3)(A)(i) defines ``discriminatory tax'' as any tax on electronic commerce that is not generally imposed and legally collectable by a State or local government on transactions involving similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished through other means. For example, if a State requires the seller of books at a retail outlet to collect and remit sales tax, but does not impose the same tax collection and remittance obligations on the seller if the same sale is made over the telephone from a mail-order catalog, then the State would be prohibited from imposing collection and remittance obligations on the seller when the transaction occurs in whole or in part over the Internet. A tax is discriminatory if it is imposed on an Internet transaction but not imposed on any other similar transaction off the Internet, or if it is imposed only in some but not all other cases. The property, goods, services, or information need not be identical, but only ``similar.'' This is intended to cover the common phenomenon of ``interactive'' Internet versions of non-interactive products sold off the Internet. Likewise, any taxation of property, goods, services, or information that is inherently unique to the Internet would be discriminatory, because there is no non- Internet property, goods, services, or information that is similar and that the State generally taxes. New Section 155(3)(A)(ii) extends the definition of ``discriminatory tax'' to include any levy by a State or local government that taxes electronic commerce in a manner that results in a different tax rate being imposed on electronic commerce when compared to a transaction that occurred through another means. (a) No taxes on Internet-unique property, goods, services, or information Taken together, new Section 155(3)(A)(i) and (ii) mean that property, goods, services, or information that is exchanged or used exclusively over the Internet--with no comparable off-line equivalent--will always be protected from taxation for the duration of the moratorium. Examples of Internet- unique property, goods, services, or information include, but are not limited to, electronic mail over the Internet, Internet site selections, Internet bulletin boards, and Internet search services. (b) No new collection obligations New Section 155(3)(A)(iii) states that a tax on electronic commerce is discriminatory if it imposes an obligation to collect or pay a tax on a different person or entity that would be the case if the transaction were accomplished without using the Internet, such as over the telephone or via mail-order. For instance, a tax is not discriminatory if the obligation to collect and remit it falls on the vendor whether the sale is made off-line or online. This definition also includes taxes that impose tax collection obligations on persons other than the buyer or seller in an Internet transaction. For example, a tax is discriminatory if it imposes tax collection or tax reporting duties on Internet access providers, telephone companies, banks, credit card companies, financial intermediaries, or other entities that might have access to a customer's billing address, since these collection and reporting obligations are not imposed in the case of telephone, mail-order, or retail outlet sales. (c) No classification of an ISP as a phone company New Section 155(3)(A)(iv) states that a tax on electronic commerce is discriminatory if it establishes a classification of Internet access provider, and imposes a higher tax rate on this classification than on similar information services delivered through means other than the Internet. The term ``information services'' is expressly defined in new Section 155(5) and in Section 3(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 to exclude ``telecommunications service.'' As a result, neither telephone companies nor similar public utilities, as such, may be ``providers of information services delivered through other means'' within the meaning of new Section 155(3)(A)(iv). For this reason, the fact that a telephone company or similar public utility service pays tax at the same or a higher tax rate than an Internet access provider will not prevent the tax on the Internet access provider from being discriminatory. In this way, new Section 155(3)(A)(iv) effectively serves to prohibit States and localities from classifying a provider of Internet access as a telephone company or similar public utility service-- for example, for the purpose of applying a business license tax--if such classifications are subject to higher tax rates than other non-Internet information services. (d) No New ``Nexus'' The definition of ``Discriminatory tax'' in new Section 155(3)(B) is intended to prohibit States and localities from using Internet-based contacts as factor in determining whether an out-of-State business has ``substantial nexus'' with a taxing jurisdiction. This is intended to is provide added assurance and certainty that the protections of Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)--including its requirement that substantial nexus be determined through a ``bright-line'' physical- presence test--will continue to apply to electronic commerce just as they apply to mail-order commerce, unless and until a future Congress decides to alter the current nexus requirements. In this way, the Act intends to encourage the continued commercial and non-commercial development of the Internet. New Section 155(3)(B) is a direct response to testimony from a State tax administrator, who offered his view to Congress at a July 1997 hearing that the Quill protections provided to remote sellers without a substantial in-State physical presence should not apply to businesses engaged in electronic commerce. During the hearing, the tax administrator acknowledged that if a resident of his State were to use the telephone to purchase a good from an out-of-State vendor, his State would not be permitted to impose its tax collection obligations on that vendor unless the vendor otherwise had a substantial in-State physical presence. The tax administrator further testified, however, that if instead the Internet were used to place the order, his State would attempt to require the out-of-State vendor to collect taxes. His rationale was that the flow of data over the Internet into his State, the ``presence'' of a web page on a computer server located in- State, of the supposed ``agency'' relationship between the remote seller and an in-State Internet access provider should be enough to give the remote seller a substantial physical presence in his State. The Act rejects this approach. The promotion of electronic commerce requires faithful adherence to the U.S. Supreme Court's clear statement in Quill that a ``bright-line'' physical presence--not some malleable theory of electronic or economic presence--is required for a State to claim substantial nexus. Even without the Act, the courts, in light of Quill, are likely to view such arguments by State tax administrators with great skepticism. But the Act provides clarity and far greater certainty by specifically outlawing State or local efforts to pursue aggressive theories of nexus. This should result in decreased litigation which will benefit States, localities, taxpayers, and an often overworked court system. New Section 155(3)(B)(i) defines ``Discriminatory tax'' so as to make it clear that Congress considers the creation or maintaining of a site on the Internet to be so insignificant a physical presence that the use of an in-State computer server in this way by a remote seller shall never be considered in determining nexus. New Section 155(3)(B)(ii) defines ``discriminatory tax'' so as to prohibit a State or political subdivision from deeming a provider of Internet access to be an ``agent'' of a remote seller. Internet access providers commonly display information on the Internet for remote sellers, and often maintain or update the remote seller's web page. Even if the Internet access provider provides these and other ancillary services (such as web page design or account processing) on an in-State computer server, the provider should not be considered an agent for purposes of taxation. B. No expansion of tax authority The Act is meant to prevent Internet taxes, not proliferate, encourage, or authorize them. Section 7 of H.R. 4105 expressly states, therefore, that nothing in the Act shall be construed to expand the duty of any person to collect or pay taxes beyond that which existed on the date of enactment of the Act. Section 7 is specifically intended to make it clear that the Act does not, directly or indirectly, expand the definition of ``substantial nexus'' beyond existing judicial precedent and interpretations of the Commerce Clause of the Untied States Constitution. It is intended to negate any possible inference that the Act might subvert existing requirements that interstate activity have a ``substantial nexus'' (determined through a ``bright-line'' physical- presence test) with the taxing jurisdiction, and that taxes on such activities be fairly apportioned, be fairly related to the services provided by the jurisdiction, and not discriminate against interstate commerce. It is fully intended that a State or local tax not barred by the provisions of this Act shall not be valid if such tax would otherwise constitute an undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, even prior to recent changes which enabled the Internet Tax Freedom Act to be endorsed by the National Associated of Governors, National Conference of State Legislatures, and other state and local government groups, the bill had already been endorsed by a number of prominent individual Governors, State lawmakers, State Treasurers and tax collectors. I'd particularly like to single out for thanks the support of California Gov. Pete Wilson, New York Gov. George Pataki, Massachusetts Gov. Paul Cellucci, Virginia Gov. Jim Gilmore, former Massachusetts Gov. Bill Weld, former Virginia Gov. George Allen, California Board of Equalization Chairman Dean Andal, former Federation of Tax Administrators president Ernie Dronenburg, Ohio Treasurer Ken Blackwell, Utah Senate Democrat Leader Scott Howell, and Maryland House Republican Leader Martha Klima. (Attachment # 1). The Internet Tax Freedom Act is strongly supported by President Clinton, who endorsed the legislation in February 1998 in a speech to high-tech executives. The legislation is also supported by the U.S. Treasury Department, which endorsed the legislation in May 1997 in testimony before Congress. I'd like to insert into the Record the following letter of support form the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable Lawrence H. Summers. (Attachment # 2). In addition to significant support from prominent stated officials and President Clinton, the Internet Tax Freedom Act has also garnered support from a broad and diverse coalition of individuals and organizations, consumer and taxpayer advocates, and service and trade associations representing businesses involved in the Internet community. I'd like to ask that several letters of support from these individuals and organizations be placed in the Record. (Attachment # 3).

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, I asked for about 45 minutes so I could read the names of all the people that it is important to thank. Because I have a limited period of time, I want to thank certainly those that are here that were the leaders in the effort to bring it to the floor, in particular my chairman, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley), my ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), as well as the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), who has shown so much leadership on this, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), for their diligent efforts. We have the subcommittee chairmen, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) and the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), to thank for this as well, and governors, both early on, and, eventually, almost all of them later. But early on, Governor Wilson of California, my Governor, Pete Wilson, was a leader, as were many of our statewide elected officials in this effort to prevent the Internet from being taxed; the Governor of New York, Governor Pataki; Governor Cellucci in Massachusetts, and Governor Weld before him; Governor Gilmore in Virginia, Governor Allen before him; Governor Bush in Texas; and my partner in all of these negotiations, the Governor of Utah, who also negotiated on behalf of the National Governors Association, Mike Leavitt. This is now a consensus bill. It is a balanced approach between our national interest in preventing parochial taxation of the Internet and Federal regulation of the Internet, and the concern of State and local governments who want to make sure that they retain their prerogatives. As we enter the Information Age, the digital age, we are establishing in law a very important principle; that information should be made available as freely and widely as possible throughout the world; it should not be taxed and it should not be regulated. This bill addresses itself to both problems. It says not only that we will not have new special discriminatory and multiple taxes on the Internet, but also that the FCC, now the Federal Communications Commission, shall not become the ``Federal Computer Commission.'' We will not give the FCC, and we expressly state this in the legislation, the power to regulate the Internet. Some long time ago, Michael Faraday, the very, very famous inventor, a century-and-a-half ago, had become sufficiently well-known in his own day that he won an audience with the king, King William IV. He had invented the dynamo, the first electric motor, by rotating a current- bearing wire around a magnet, and the king wanted to see him. The king was fascinated with his invention, the dynamo, but he addressed himself to Michael Faraday and said, ``But, after all, of what use is it?'' Faraday replied, ``Sir, I do not know, but of this I am certain: One day you will tax it.'' We are a long way further down the road in the revolution wrought by that wonderful revolution of electricity that Faraday helped to perfect, but, without question, the 30,000 State and local tax jurisdictions that could tax the Internet are just as anxious to, so as was the tax collector back in the days of King William IV. We are preventing that today. We might just say tonight, ``Read our e-mail; no new taxes.'' Mr. Speaker, may I just say that there is one other person that deserves thanks, who is an alumnus of this body. He is now a Senator, Ron Wyden. This is my legislation in the House, but he and I teamed up together to do this, and it is as much his idea as it is my own. I am anxious that the other body move this bill after we give it strong bipartisan if not overwhelming support here tonight and tomorrow, and I think he should be recognized for his efforts as well; an alumnus not only of the House, but of our Committee on Commerce.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me. The gentlewoman is exactly correct, that is the way the commission is set up. There will be 14 representatives from State, local, and county governments, including representatives from the National League of Cities, also the National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the United States Conference of Mayors, the International City/County Management Association, and the American Legislative Exchange Council.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I certainly thank the chairman of the Committee on Rules for those generous comments and, obviously, all of us being in politics here know that at this point I should sit down, because never will people say nice things like this about me again and I am enjoying the opportunity. But I want to begin by saying exactly the same kinds of things about my colleagues who have brought us to this point, the threshold of investigating in exactly the right way a very serious matter. In particular, the ranking member on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), with whom it has been my pleasure to work for the last several days in a very serious and urgent way; and, as well, the minority leader of the House, who made this his priority, exactly as did the Speaker of the House. As a consequence, I can thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), who has conducted the debate on the minority side today, for his recommendation of an ``aye'' vote. And I can thank my colleagues for what I believe is the collective and considered wisdom of the House in proceeding in this way. Much of what we will undertake, much of what we will look at in this Select Committee will be secret information, and we will keep it to ourselves. Much of the reason that we are here, frankly, rests upon classified information. But the reason that we are here is also largely a matter of public record, and so what I would like to do now is begin with what is publicly known about why it is important for us to proceed in this way with this Select Committee. In 1996, the People's Republic of China's Long March rocket, carrying a Loral satellite, exploded shortly after lift-off. It was at least the fifth Long March rocket to fail in the last 7 years. On April 4th, 1998, the New York Times, in a story by Jeff Gerth, first reported that a Federal grand jury was investigating whether, during the investigation of that 1996 launch failure, Loral and Hughes provided any information to the Chinese People's Liberation Army without the necessary State Department approval, and whether such illegal actions may have advanced the Chinese People's Liberation Army nuclear missile capabilities. According to the April 4 New York Times article, since this proposed export could involve the transfer of the same kind of expertise that prompted the Justice Department to investigate in the first place, some Clinton administration officials claimed that the February waiver undermined the investigation. The Justice Department made these very concerns known to the White House prior to the February 1998 waiver. On April 5, 1998, Ronald Ostrow and Jim Mann reported in the Los Angeles Times that missile guidance technology transferred to the People's Liberation Army may have gone beyond China's own nuclear arsenal. They quoted a Defense Department official, who stated, ``Guidance for missiles seems to be a critical factor for Iran and North Korea. And they are getting it from China.'' On April 13, the New York Times reported further that in May 1997, the Pentagon issued a classified report which concluded that Loral and Hughes provided information that ``significantly improved China's nuclear missile capabilities.'' The New York Times reported on May 15, 1998, that a Chinese military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Liu Chao-Ying, funneled nearly $300,000 to Democratic fund-raiser Johnny Chung. Lieutenant Colonel Liu is an officer of China Aerospace, a state-owned company directly involved in China's satellite launching program. Lieutenant Colonel Liu was previously an officer of China Great Wall Industries, the manufacturers and sellers of M-11 missiles components to Pakistan. On May 23, the New York Times reported that on February 18, 1998, while the Justice Department investigation of Loral was ongoing, President Clinton issued another waiver for Loral to export a satellite to China. On June 1, 1998, the New York Times reported that the State Department also advised the White House prior to the February 1998 waiver that Loral's actions in 1996 appeared to be ``criminal'' and ``knowing'' and that U.S. law might prohibit satellite exports to the People's Republic of China in any event due to the PRC's transfer of missile technology to Iran. The June 1 article also reported that the administration was aware of the Defense Department's concerns over possibly aiding the People's Liberation Army's nuclear missile program, citing a February 12 memorandum to the President from National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. Also, according to the June 1 article, and again citing internal White House and State Department memoranda, National Security Adviser Berger and the President were made aware of the fact that Loral stood to lose the contract and to incur a financial penalty if the waiver were not granted soon. The waiver was issued shortly after the supposed deadline. The launch project was kept on schedule for November 1998, and Loral did not incur any penalties from the Communist Chinese Government. The press has also reported that the CEO of Loral, Bernard Schwartz, has become a close personal friend of the President and was the largest single donor to the Democratic Party in 1996. On June 10, the General Accounting Office testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that President Clinton's March 14, 1996, decision to transfer ultimate control of satellite exports from the State Department to the Commerce Department diminished the ability of the Defense Department to block satellite exports for national security reasons. Until that 1996 decision by the President, the Department of Defense was routinely deferred to by the Department of State and national security was paramount when waivers were sought. Now, however, the Commerce Department, whose mission it is to promote exports, is the agency in control. In testimony before the House Committee on National Security in November of 1997, Commerce Department official William Reinsch acknowledged that while some 47 supercomputers have been sold to the People's Republic of China, the United States Government was unaware of their whereabouts. These supercomputers may be used for, among other purposes, simulating testing of nuclear weapons. 60 minutes, on CBS, reported on June 7, 1998, that the People's Liberation Army illegally diverted enormous McDonnell Douglas aeronautics machine tools, approaching the length of a football field, for use in People's Liberation Army military aircraft production. McDonnell Douglas is now the subject of a grand jury investigation of the diversion. All of these media reports give rise to a number of unanswered questions that will be the object of the Select Committee's focus. There is no more important question before the Select Committee than the one with which we will begin. ``Has the reliability or accuracy of nuclear missiles in the arsenal of the People's Liberation Army been enhanced; and, if so, how did this happen?'' I agree with all those who have spoken that this Select Committee is the most effective means to inquire into these matters. There are some 8 committees of the House of Representatives, with nearly 300 members, that properly have jurisdiction over these committees. Consolidating this investigation into a Select Committee whose members have been chosen by the Speaker of the House and by the minority leader, who are expert in the matter, who can consult collegially with one another, and who can maintain discretion and confidentiality, will reflect credit upon this House. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution, to support the creation of the Select Committee, and to answer this serious question in the serious manner that it deserves.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. That interpretation is the correct interpretation. As the gentleman knows, that section of this resolution, section 7, is taken essentially verbatim from the rules of the House concerning the procedures for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of which the gentleman is the ranking member. Our procedure on the Select Committee will be the same as it is on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, that is, again, the correct interpretation. As the gentleman and I have discussed privately, this is a very important power that the Select Committee will possess. It should be used sparingly, not only after a vote, but after consultation and I would hope deliberation not only of the chairman and ranking member but all of our members.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time. Mr. Speaker, our relations with the People's Republic of China are multidimensional. We have trade relations, we have security relations, and yes, we care about human rights in China. Yes, we should talk about these things always together. But there are people of good will on both sides who believe that keeping tariff rates low is a way for us to engage China. That is the view of the President of the United States. While I am one who has voted against MFN, and so probably do not fall into the category that my colleague just described of being inconsistent, I do not see it as hypocrisy when people wish to stand up for human rights and also wish to stand up for low tariff rates. It seems to me that when we have a vote on this in just a little while, we are likely to have about 90 percent of the Congress voting together, because on either side of the MFN issue, we ought to agree that human rights in China are important. Because our relations, our bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China are complex, it is, to state the obvious, that human rights is not all there is. But if the President of the United States were to appear in Tiananmen Square, with all of the symbolism that that carries, were to appear in this very public killing field, that visit, that event, would be all about human rights and nothing else. That is why the President ought not to do it. It is not just that over 2,000 people were killed by PLA troops and tanks on that day, as estimated by the Chinese Red Cross and other reliable sources, including eyewitness accounts. It is that the survivors of those democracy demonstrations are still in jail today, in 1998. It is awfully difficult to imagine an America that stands for freedom sending its President to the very site of this notorious event, which all the world saw and still concerns itself with, and not send the kind of signal that all of us hope is not sent, that America no longer cares about freedom. We do care about freedom. I believe President Clinton cares about freedom. That is why he should not go there. Last year I went with the leadership of this Congress to meet with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing. We were not received in Tiananmen Square. It was not necessary for us to be received there. The Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, last year went to the People's Republic of China. He was not received in Tiananmen Square. President Clinton should not become the first American President, the only American President, to be received in Tiananmen Square since that horrible occurrence in 1989. That is what this resolution is all about. I am very confident that it will receive broad and bipartisan support. I am very confident that the advice that we will be giving I think will be received as it is intended, for the good of the United States of America, for the good of human rights around the world.

Mr. COX of California

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield my time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner) and that he may be able to yield time as he sees fit.