Larry Craig

Mr. CRAIG

Mr. CRAIG. Not at the moment. I want to be quick here so I can yield to one of your colleagues. Of course they would not. Does any manufacturer of a legal firearm make the clear assumption that it is going to be used illegally? Of course they do not. They make them under the guidelines of the law. They abide by the law. And we protect those who do. We do not--we do not--protect those who do not abide by the law. The Senator also went on to say that this would somehow protect trade associations. Go to the bill. You have held it up. I wish you would read it in detail. It is not the intent of our bill to do so. In fact, the Daschle amendment clarifies that we do not necessarily protect trade associations. Well, then you better talk to Senator Daschle. He is the amender of the legislation that is before us to clarify that point. We believe we have effectively clarified it, and the Congressional Research Service says we have done just that. So if a trade association acts negligently, acts outside the letter of the law, then they are every bit as liable as they would be under current law. So we do not reach out to do that. Do we close the courthouse door? Absolutely not. The plaintiff makes it to the courthouse, with his or her attorney. They argue it before the judge. The judge weighs it in light of the law--if this were to become law--and makes the decision as to whether that case can go forward. I think that is clearly an important argument that needs to be established. As to the argument about lawsuits involving, what they describe as, high volume gun sales--I think he spoke to a tragic situation in Illinois--the regulations of the numbers of guns that can be sold in a single transaction, however, are not the job of the courts. They are the job of the legislators. They are that Senator's job and this Senator's job, if you can gain a majority of the votes to establish a certain number of gun sales per day. The job of the dealer is to check the background, to check the legality, and to do so openly and knowingly. Now, having said that, let's talk about the dealer. In S. 1805, we exclude from its protection actions brought against a transferer convicted under section 924(h), title 18 of the United States Code, or a comparable State felony law. 18 U.S.C., section 924(h), provides: whoever knowingly transfers a firearm knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title. S. 1805 does not wipe out this provision of the United States Code. We intentionally narrowed its focus so that would not happen. The Senator from Illinois is rightfully concerned about the trafficking of firearms, as am I. I certainly do not want that to happen. But what I do not want to happen either is for hard-working men and women of this country--many of them union men and women--who are working in firearms production in this country today for civilian use and for military use, to lose their jobs because their company has simply been strangled to death by lawsuit after lawsuit after lawsuit. That is what is happening. We have lost thousands of legitimate jobs in this country because this industry is a very small industry in total. Put it all together, and it is less than a Fortune 500 company. That is why it is extremely cautious about how it operates within the law, and it is why our judges have recognized the frivolous character of these lawsuits and have thrown them all out. The problem is simply this: It costs hundreds of millions of dollars to argue the law and to argue before the courts and to continue this legal dance that certainly those who are now engaged in it put law- abiding manufacturers and dealers through. Well, that is going to be part of the argument we look at here. But I do ask our colleagues to focus on the bill, to understand how narrowly it has been designed. It is a product of a bipartisan effort, not a single-interest effort but a bipartisan effort, to reform our tort process in a way to deny a very particular frivolous kind of lawsuit of the kind that is addressed in S. 1805. I yield the floor.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, again, I remind our colleagues that we are in a postcloture environment. What does that mean? It means we could actually debate the broad issue of the bill for upwards of 30 hours before we actually get to the bill, even though 75 of us have said let's move on, let's get to this legislation, debate it, offer amendments, and bring it to final passage. My colleague from Montana is leaving. I thank him for his statement of the work he has done in behalf of gun owners and manufacturers and law-abiding gun dealers. I thank him for being an original cosponsor and working with me to get S. 1805 to the floor. I thought what I might do for a few moments, while we are waiting for leadership on both sides of the aisle to see if we can't find an agreement on how to proceed to this legislation, is to deal with some finer points that are involved in the legislation. My guess is, over the course of this week and probably the next week, you are going to hear a great deal said about the bill--11 pages, a relatively small bill--and what it does or does not do. S. 1805 has basically two substantive provisions. First, section 3(a) states that: A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in a Federal or State court. A qualified action may not be brought. Second, section 3(b) orders the immediate dismissal of a qualified civil liability action pending on the date of enactment of S. 1805. The key to S. 1805, therefore, is the definition of ``qualified civil liability action.'' That is what most of our colleagues, I hope, would focus on, even though the issue spirals around the use of a gun and that brings about substantial heated debate and political decisions. Key in S. 1805, again, is the definition of a civil liability action which is addressed in the definition section, then, in section 4(5). A qualified civil liability action is defined as a lawsuit: . . . brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party. . . . Subsection (5), the definition, then excludes five categories of lawsuits from coverage under S. 1805: First: (i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted. In other words, we don't exempt that. We exclude these categories from that definition so you can still go to court, you can still gain redress from that. The second one is: (ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se. Negligent entrustment is defined: . . . the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows, or should know, the person to whom the product supplied is likely to, or does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or others. In other words, if the seller knows that this is going to be used for criminal intent or for misuse, then of course that provision is exempt from the protection under 1806. Third: (iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product [knowingly and willfully] violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which the relief is sought. . . . Again, the courthouse door is open to that. (iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product. That is available. (v) an action for physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. Those are really the key points here that we do not in any way exempt. What we are doing in S. 1805 is very simple. We are trying to reinforce centuries of legal precedent, based on individual responsibilities, not responsible for actions of third parties. In other words, once again the trial bar is trying to suggest that a criminal act is the responsibility of the person who manufactured the product that the criminal may use in that act. We have never allowed that to stand in our courts, and now we are trying to assure that a very small industry in this country can be protected from the kinds of frivolous lawsuits filed that are draining them of their very livelihood. Earlier this afternoon I talked about the hundreds of jobs that have been lost. Some scoffed and said, ``This is a jobs bill?'' You bet it is a jobs bill. If you destroy that industry, thousands of high-paying jobs will be lost across the United States in an industry that is legal, that is law abiding, that one might argue is even enshrined in the Constitution under the second amendment. That is why we are here today. Is it important? You bet it is important. Is it a part of what our Senate ought to be debating? Absolutely. If we are able to do this, we establish extremely important precedent that other manufacturers of law-abiding products will look at, and should look at. Why should the trial bar be allowed to suggest that the maker of a Chevrolet, Ford, Dodge, or Toyota pickup used by a drunk driver that ended up killing someone be responsible for it? Because they manufactured it? Since when is this country going to exempt the actions of the individual and say, Oh, no, it really wasn't his fault; it was the fault of the vehicle. It was the fault of an inanimate object known as a gun. That is the issue today and it really is fundamental. You hear a great many arguments. One of them is that we are locking the courthouse door. No, all those principles I talked about are exempt and can be tried and can be argued before the courts. Even in S. 1805, somebody who by definition brings a junk lawsuit gets to argue the case before the judge. They get through the courthouse door. The judge then listens, applies the law, and makes a determination whether this is a legitimate case that should go forward or it was an illegitimate case. Will this bill affect several high profile cases such as the lawsuit against a gun dealer in Tacoma, WA, from whose store the DC snipers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, got their rifle? Does it exempt that dealer if he acted unlawfully? We don't know that yet. We know that BATF has investigated it and jerked his firearm license and the store is now closed. We are told that BATF has asked the Justice Department to file criminal charges against him. But we do know one thing. We do know that Lee Malvo has admitted to stealing the gun from that dealer. Therefore, there is a principle in tort law that says that a manufacturer is not liable if the product used, being his, was stolen before it was used. That we do know. And now we have an admission by the person who pulled the trigger that the Bushman rifle used in those tragic incidents here that kept this city rivetted for a tremendous amount of time and took numerous lives was a stolen weapon. Having said all of that, the case is yet to be investigated. The facts are yet to be truly known. Allegedly, guns went missing. Allegedly, they were not reported. If all of that is true, then the owner of this particular gun shop in Tacoma, WA could well be liable and could well come under the criminal laws of today, and S. 1805 would do nothing about that and shouldn't do anything about that. Once again, as I have already said numerous times today--and I am sure I will repeat it over the course of a good number of days--this is a very narrow approach. It is an important one. Senator Daschle, the minority leader, and I joined in his amendment embodied in S. 1805 to ensure that we refine it even more to make it very clear exactly what and who might be exempt and for what reason. We think we have so effectively narrowed it that it has met the broad acceptance of our colleagues in the Senate. I hope the cloture vote today is reflective of some of that acceptance as we work and debate through this issue. I hope leadership on both sides can get us to an agreement so we might proceed and get on the bill and deal with some of the amendments at hand. I hope we can defeat them. I would like a clean bill. The administration would like a clean bill. There is ample time to debate other issues. There is ample time to debate extension of the assault ban. I strongly oppose that. That was legislation I called a political placebo at a time when everybody wanted to try to do something, even though they knew it was impossible to control the criminal element in this country unless you got tough on crime. So we passed that legislation. History shows the assault weapon ban did little to no good--except it did one thing. It kept law-abiding citizens from buying certain types of firearms even though our second amendment would suggest they have the right to own them. That is why I hope the assault weapon ban as it expires can be left to its expiration. I hope we can defeat that. The other issue, the gun show loophole: Is there a loophole in gun shows? Let me set the stage for that. I would like to compare a gun show and an auto show. If you are a licensed car dealer or a licensed manufacturer of automobiles--I don't know that you have to be licensed to manufacture automobiles--then you can put all kinds of auto shows together, and you can sell from those shows. You can demonstrate your product. You can sell all kinds of things with no prohibition. In Idaho, the only prohibition, if you sell more than five a year, is you have to get a license to be an auto dealer. What we say in gun shows is if you are a licensed gun dealer at a show, then you must comply with all laws during that show in the sale of a firearm. But if you are an individual who sells very few firearms but you might sell one to a friend or someone else on occasion, and you sell at a gun show, or you met a friend at a gun show and you tell him about a gun you have and the transaction occurs, you don't have to comply with a background check; You are not a licensed dealer. Someone would suggest that is a loophole. I don't see that as a loophole because outside of gun shows it is not considered one--only if it is inside. What this is all about is establishing a Federal regulation to control gun shows. This will be a new entity of Federal control over something that is clearly a free market process. Do we want Federal regulations over the control of auto shows? Do we want Federal regulations in control over new-clothing shows? No. That is the marketplace at work. But if there are Federal laws that control these different products and/or sale, then they comply. They comply inside the show or outside the show. That is standard today. What our colleagues are trying to do in suggesting there is a loophole, which I believe I have suggested by demonstration of facts does not exist, is to control the gun show, and to suggest if you are an individual and you make a sale at a gun show, you then must do background checks and all other due diligence you would not do if you were outside the gun show, speaking neighbor to neighbor, friend to friend, and were not viewed as a licensed dealer, or not a gun dealer in any way. That is the reality of what we are talking about. Those are some of the amendments we will have which we will be dealing with on the floor. I hope as we deal with those, we might deal with others such as concealed carry. We might look at the gun ban of Washington, DC, where law-abiding citizens cannot legitimately own firearms, and a variety of other issues. The President asked--and I would like to honor that because I believe strongly in it, too--that we produce a clean bill just exactly like the House did on a better than 2-to-1 margin--285 to 140--that we produce a clean bill and get it to the President's desk; wipe out these frivolous lawsuits but still allow law-abiding citizens who might be injured by illegal action of a gun dealer or illegal action of a gun manufacturer their day in court without the kind of frivolous and/or junk lawsuits-- the kind that are costing the industry millions upon millions of dollars right now and slowly but surely diminishing them. Lastly, if we are not successful and if the trial bar is at some day and at some point successful, my guess is this relatively small industry in our country will not be here. What happens when we no longer produce high-quality firearms in this country for our military or for our police? Do we rely on China or Yugoslavia or Hungary or some other foreign country to produce the firearms our men and women in Iraq use to defend themselves and to enforce the law? Do we put them at risk? Do we say to our good law enforcement officers, You are going to have a foreign firearm on your hip and it will not be produced by a legitimate company in this country as a part of our national protection and our freedoms and rights? That is ultimately what could happen because already we have seen these industries go out of business because of the risk of doing business and the liability involved based on these types of lawsuits we are now trying to shape and limit. That is the essence of S. 1805. I hope we can soon move to the bill and begin debating it in its entirety, and certainly any amendments that would then come forward, debate those, get an up-or-down vote and move toward final passage. With that, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I thank Senator Daschle, our minority leader, the Senator from South Dakota, for the cooperative way in which he has worked with us to, in his own words, improve, narrow, clean up this piece of legislation. As I have already said on the floor today, a good number of times, the Daschle amendment--the effort that S. 1805 seeks to accomplish--is a very narrow way of protecting law-abiding, legitimate firearm manufacturers and dealers, but not to stand in the way of access to the courts as a result of somebody being harmed by somebody who has acted illegally as a licensed dealer or a firearms manufacturer. I truly appreciate the Senator's efforts in behalf of this very small community of folks in the industry of manufacturing quality firearms. It is critical for our Nation, for law-abiding citizens, and for our national security. The Senator has seen that and understood it, and we will work now to hopefully get this bill before us soon this afternoon so amendments can be offered. I think the Senator has been ready to do that. That will move us down the road toward hopefully final debate and a vote on this legislation.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the leadership of both sides of the aisle, at the moment, is working to try to see if we can gain a unanimous consent request that would bring us to the bill hopefully within the hour and possibly deal with one or two amendments, and at least one amendment voted up or down; and then the laying down of another amendment at least this evening and starting debate on that. So I thought for a few moments I would give a little background as to what has brought us to this point in time and S. 1805. Senator Daschle was in the Chamber a few moments ago to visit with the Senate about his amendments and what we effectively incorporated in the bill. He has some fine-tuning he may offer as one of the first amendments this evening. But when Senator Baucus and I introduced S. 695 back in the spring, more than half of the Senate--Republicans and Democrats--became original cosponsors. Today we have 55 cosponsors, including the leadership on both sides. A similar bill, H.R. 1036, was passed in the House of Representatives by a 2-to-1 margin over a year ago. Now we have before us S. 1805, again, very similar to what we did in 1995, but with some adjustments made with the Senator from South Dakota. This is an extraordinary showing of support for a bill. I believe it is a testament to the gravity of the threat addressed by this legislation: The abuse of our courts through lawsuits filed to force law-abiding businesses to pay for criminal acts by individuals beyond their control. The businesses I am talking about are collectively known as the U.S. firearms industry. The lawsuits I am talking about claim that even though these businesses complied with all of the laws and sell a legitimate product, they should be responsible for the misuse or the illegal use of the firearm they produce, misused by a criminal. These actions are pursued with the intent of driving this industry out of business--regardless of the thousands of jobs that would be lost in the process and the impact on citizens across the Nation who would never contemplate committing a crime with a gun. Let's be very clear about this. These lawsuits are not brought by individuals seeking relief for injuries done to them by anyone in the industry. Instead, this is a politically inspired initiative trying to force social goals through an end run around the Congress and the State legislatures. I believe that is worth repeating because it is the essence of the legislation. Instead, I believe these lawsuits are politically inspired initiatives trying to force social goals, or public policy, if you will, through an end run around the Congress and the State legislatures. The theory on which these lawsuits are based would be laughable if it were not so dangerous: To pin the responsibility for a criminal act on an innocent party who was not there and had nothing to do with the act. They argue that merely by virtue of the fact that a gun was present, those who were part of the commercial distribution chain should be held responsible for the gun's misuse. Earlier today, I talked about all kinds of chains in commerce-- automobiles, and other vehicles, and other tools that are used tragically enough sometimes or misused in a way that they take a human life. What about a baseball bat? We hear, every so often, of a baseball bat used in the commission of a crime in which the baseball bat or the use of it struck a person and killed them. Should we make a person who manufactured that baseball bat liable or should we do that which we have always done in this country: made the individual responsible for his or her action? This is not a legal theory. It is just the latest twist in the gun controller's notion that it is the gun, and not the criminal, that causes the crime; it is the car, and not the drunk driver, that kills the child it runs over. The truth is, there are millions of firearms in this country today. Yet only a very tiny fraction of them are ever used in the commission of a crime. The truth is, again and again law-abiding firearms owners are using their guns, often without ever firing a shot, to defend their life or the lives of their family and their property. That is what the second amendment is all about. That is why this right is ingrained within the character and the culture of this country. The truth is, the intent of the user, not the gun, is what determines whether that gun will be used in a crime. A gun can be nothing but a piece of metal until it is used carefully and wisely by an individual in defense of themselves or in hunting by the expertise of the shooter, or it can become a very lethal weapon in the hands of a criminal in the taking of a life. The trend of abusive litigation targeting the firearms industry not only defies common sense and concepts of fundamental fairness, but it would do nothing to curb criminal gun violence. Let me repeat that. Does it stop gun violence in this country? No, it does not. The only way you do that is to sweep our country clean of the millions of firearms that are owned out there, and certainly take them out of the hands of criminals. But we know that is a near impossible task, too. Furthermore, the trend jeopardizes America's constitutionally protected access to firearms for defense and other lawful uses. The bill that more than half of the Senate has already endorsed is a measured response that would put a stop to this abusive trend without endangering legitimate claims of relief. Let me emphasize that it does not insulate the firearms industry from lawsuits or deprive legitimate victims of their day in court, as some critics have already charged. Nowhere in S. 1805 is there a padlock on the courthouse door. Quite the opposite. If this becomes law, this is the law that will be argued in court by some as to why a given lawsuit ought to be thrown out. And we trust the judge, wise and learned, will listen to all of those arguments and make a decision as to whether the lawsuit goes forward because it is legitimate within the law or it is simply just that, frivolous, it is not legitimate within the law, and it ought to be denied or cast aside. Again, let me emphasize, it does not insulate the firearms industry from all lawsuits or deprive legitimate victims of their day in court, as some critics would, in fact, argue, and has been already argued several times on the floor today. In fact, it specifically provides that some actions can be brought against those in the business of manufacturing and selling firearms when they violate the law or act wrongfully themselves. Earlier today, I went through those five areas that we have clearly identified in the law where action can be taken. Senator Daschle has even refined that a little more to make sure all is clear in this given area. Actions based on breaches of contract, defects in firearms, negligent entrustment, criminal behavior--these actions would not be affected by this legislation. The laws there are already clear. People are being tried today in the courts based on those laws, and S. 1805 in no way would wipe them aside or cause a different action. S. 1805 is solely directed at stopping frivolous politically driven legislation against law-abiding individuals for the misbehavior of criminals over whom they have no control. The courts of our Nation are supposed to be forums for resolving controversies between citizens and providing relief where warranted, not a mechanism for achieving political ends that are rejected by the people's representatives--the Congress or the State legislatures. I believe that is the fundamental essence of 1805. It is direct. It is clearly to the point. It ought to be. I am pleased that 75 Members of the Senate earlier today said let's move this legislation to the floor. Let's begin the process. Let's vote up or down. Let's keep the bill clean and deal with this critical issue. Once again, let me talk for a few moments about those exceptions we have carved out or defined within the law in the bill to make sure there is no question. The key to S. 1805 is the definition of qualified civil liability action which is addressed in the definitions section, section 4. I ask all of my colleagues to go there and read it. It is a simple bill, an easy bill to read, of 11 pages. But we made sure that we clearly spelled out a qualified civil liability action, which is defined as a lawsuit brought by any person against a manufacturer or a seller of a qualified product or a trade association for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by a person or a third party. Section 4, subsection 5, the definition then excludes five categories of lawsuits from coverage under 1805. In other words, we make very clear these following areas: No. 1, an action brought against a transfer convicted under section 924(h) of title 18 United States Code, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the transferee's conduct. In other words, illegal movement of the weapon itself. An action brought against a seller--this is the second one--for negligent entrustment of negligence per se. Negligent entrustment is defined in section 4, subsection 5(a), as the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows, or should know, the person to whom the product supplied is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person and others. Misuse of the firearm, knowing that is going to happen. That is what Senator Daschle spoke to so clearly today in his clarifying amendment. The third item, an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly and willfully violated a State and Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought. No. 4, the action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product. No. 5, an action for physical injury or property damage resulting directly from a defect in the design or manufacturing of the product-- in other words, product liability--when used as intended or in a manner that is reasonable and foreseeable. And then, as I mentioned, the Daschle language amends the text to permit suits against manufacturers or dealers engaging in straw purchase transactions. That is, when one individual purchases a firearm on behalf of a third party. Why did we spell these out? We wanted the Senate and the citizens of our country to understand that this was not broad, nor was it sweeping. At the same time we wanted everyone to understand that what we were saying very clearly is something that has been said time and time again as it relates to the value of this legislation; that is, the reenforcement of centuries of legal precedent based on individual responsibility, not responsibility for actions of third parties. In other words, if you manufacture a product legally in our economy and it sells and someone misuses it and a life is taken with the misuse of that product, should we be able to come back through the court to the person who produced it when they abided by the law and in no way knew that the product would be used with the intent of harming someone? That is the basis of individual responsibility in our country and, as I said, of centuries of legal precedent based on individual responsibility and not the responsibility of the actions of third parties. Many judges have already rejected these suits that have been brought. Antigun activists are trying to distort tort law by creating totally new and expansive theories of liability to win restrictions that have been rejected in the legislative process.

Mr. CRAIG. I ask unanimous consent that I be yielded Senator Nickles' hour under rule XXII.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I thank Senator Nickles for generously yielding me his hour. In a postcloture environment, the sponsors of the legislation are allowed 2, individual Senators are allowed 1. I didn't realize I had already spoken that much today. Having said what I have just said, I hope I have laid a clear and unambiguous basis to why we are here today and why this legislation is sponsored and supported by so many groups across the United States: the United States Chamber of Commerce; the United Mine Workers of America; National Association of Wholesaler Distributors--and the list goes on-- the National Association of Manufacturers; the Boone and Crockett Club; the Buckmasters American Deer Foundation; the Campfire Clubs of America; Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation; Council of Wildlife Management and Education; Dallas Safari Club; Foundation for North American Wild Sheep; Hunting and Shooting Sports Heritage Foundation; International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies; International Hunter Education Association; Izaak Walton League of America; Mule Deer Foundation; National Rifle Association; National Shooting Sports Foundation; National Trappers Association; National Wild Turkey Federation; Pheasants Forever; Pope and Young Club; Quail Unlimited, Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation; Ruffed Grouse Society; Safari Club International; Texas Wildlife Association; the Wildlife Society; U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance; White Tail Unlimited; Wildlife Forever; Wildlife Management Institute; the Sports Fishing Association of America; America Tort Reform Association; National Association of Independent Insurers; National Alliance of American Insurers. Here is something I found most interesting. We began to debate it on the floor today. Representatives from the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers of East Alton, IL. Why? Because many of their members are employed in the Savage Arms Company in Westfield, MA, where they have already lost some 340 jobs over the last few years because that arms company has been so weakened by some of these lawsuits. They have had to pay out since 1999 over $425,000 as the cost of being at court with some of these lawsuits. They are obviously concerned about their jobs. Somebody scoffed a bit this afternoon that I am standing here talking about jobs, that this is some kind of a jobs bill. It is just that. These industries are at risk today. They are not huge, deep-pocket industries. If we put every gun manufacturer in this country all together, they would make up, in total assets, less than a Fortune 500 company. So they are extremely concerned. The aerospace workers in Waltham, MA, in Chicopee, MA, along with Westfield, MA, the United Mine Workers, again the United Steelworkers from Gainseville, FL--all of them have spoken to it. The United Auto Workers have employees at the Colt plant in Newington, CT. Today they say, and I read from their letter: We have 383 members from the Colt workforce. By comparison, about 5 years ago, we had over 600 Colt workers who were members of our local. Our members built the finest small arms in the world, including M-4 carbines, M-16 rifles, and M-203 grenade launchers. Obviously, those are not civilian weapons, they are military weapons. Those are the kinds of tools that our men and women use in Iraq today in defense of themselves and in defense of our freedoms. Many of them provide the U.S. military and law enforcement. Our law enforcement people carry, in most instances, American firearms at their side. Do we really want, by forcing these industries out of business, Chinese or Yugoslavian or Hungarian firearms to be packed by our military? Some would say: Senator Craig, you are just exaggerating. No, I am not. If ever one of these frivolous lawsuits would find root and grow, the kinds of millions of dollars in potential settlement for an argument that a criminal act caused by a third party was ultimately the result of an individual manufacturer who operated in a legal way could easily put them out of business because they simply do not have the kind of depth that, for example, the tobacco industry had years ago when these kinds of lawsuits began to be won against that industry. Others have been tried in a variety of industries, but there is a reality, and that is why unions are now stepping forward as strong supporters of this legislation saying: Wait a moment, enough is enough. As long as our companies are legal and responsible and producing quality products, leave us alone, unless we act in a criminal fashion or in violation of Federal law in this country. I cannot blame them for asking it. I believe they should ask it, and I believe we ought to grant that right. That is what S. 1805 does. There are a good many issues we will be discussing over the course of this debate. My guess is there will be a variety of amendments offered. I find it interesting that this debate gets us to where we are today. Let me cite something that is interesting, and I will bring some charts to the Chamber probably within the next day. Here is a question asked by the political studies at Southern Methodist University and the Zogby poll people in examining the differences in thinking between people who lived in the States who voted for George Bush in 2000, the red States, and those who voted for Al Gore, the blue States. Think red and blue here for a moment. We all saw those maps after the election, so we begin to think in reds and blues. Here was the question asked by the Zogby poll people. I don't think you would call Zogby a conservative pollster. He is either center left or is certainly viewed by most as not being conservative. Let me stop there. Here is a question asked by the Zogby pollster: Do you agree or disagree that American firearm manufacturers who sell a legal product that is not defective should be allowed to be sued if a criminal uses their product in a crime? The answer came back showing a phenomenal result. Opposition in the States that voted for President Bush, the red States, was 74 percent. In other words, 74 percent said that gun manufacturers that operate in legal ways ought to be protected. And in Al Gore States, 72 percent, a 2-percent difference. One could almost say that a vast majority of Americans agree with the essence and the principles of S. 1805. I found that very interesting. Interestingly, across the board, those most strongly opposed to these lawsuits against the firearms industry are currently members of the military and their families. There has been a lot of talk about our military these days because we have phenomenally brave men and women standing in harm's way in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world. Our military said: We oppose frivolous lawsuits of our gun manufacturers by 83 percent. That was a Zogby poll taken earlier this year of 1,200 voters nationwide. So I find it interesting that opposition occurs to the very narrow approach we have taken when all of these large numbers begin to appear. Zogby also asked this question: Which of the following two statements regarding gun control comes closer to your opinion? Statement 1: There needs to be new and tougher gun law legislation to help in the fight against gun crime. Statement No. 2: There are enough laws on the books. What is needed is better enforcement of current laws regarding gun control. By a better than 2-to-1 margin, 66 to 31, voters nationwide agreed on statement 2; that is, there are enough laws on the books. What is needed is better enforcement of current laws regarding gun control. Overwhelmingly, Americans are now speaking out very clearly on gun issues. They are also overwhelmingly speaking out against frivolous lawsuits of the kind that we have seen now launched against this industry. Some 30-plus have been filed. Some are still pending. Some are on appeal. Some have already been thrown out by judges. That is why we are here today. It is time that Congress stands up and speaks to clarify and disallow the gaming of the system, if you will, by some who want to line their pockets first and, oh, if there is a little bit left, maybe the victim or at least the person in the name the suit was brought would gain some benefit, but large compensation to those who have a license to argue before the courts of the land. That is the reality of what we are dealing with. I close by saying that we do not block lawsuits that are responsible, that are within the law as we see it today and that we understand have a legitimacy because some manufacturer or some dealer acted beyond and outside the law in a criminal fashion that causes us to suggest that their misaction means they ought to pay the price for that misaction because someone else paid dearly by the use of that firearm. Those are the fundamental issues before us in this debate, and I think it is important we have these votes. I hope within the next few minutes or within the hour we will have an agreement that allows us to move forward and possibly go to an amendment tonight, and then we will be back tomorrow for the balance of at least Thursday dealing with other critical votes on this issue. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, we are hoping in a few moments that we might have a unanimous consent request to allow us to get to this bill. I will respond only briefly to the Senator from New Jersey and his comments because he did suggest that I had implied something that is not fact on the floor of the Senate today. I want to make sure the record is clear because I don't want in any way to mislead any of my colleagues. I said that the Bull's Eye gun store was closed. It, in fact, did close. The license of the dealer at the time the weapon was stolen was jerked. He could no longer conduct the business. He sold the business to a new licensed dealer. What the Senator from New Jersey failed to recognize is that licenses aren't given to locations; they are given to individuals, and those individuals must qualify. A condition of the new license also was all new personnel in the gunshop. The Senator is accurate in suggesting that he might have called today and the gunshop is open under new management and new license and new people. The person who I said this morning had lost his license because BATF had jerked it and he had to close his business is, in fact, a legitimate and valid statement. That did happen. It is also my understanding that the criminal investigation is now underway, and that BATF is recommending to Justice that they file felony charges against this particular dealer. I do not know anything more about the facts. But I do know one thing.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me complete this thought, and I would be happy to yield. I do know one thing. Lee Malvo himself said: I stole the weapon. That is very important. But the Senator suggested--and his words were: Well, maybe an under-the-table deal. I do not know that stealing is under the table, and the man who pulled the trigger admitted he had stolen the weapon. You can imply anything you want. I can't. I have to use factual statements given by, in this case, a man who has been apprehended and we now believe by all evidence committed that tremendously tragic crime and was one of the District of Columbia snipers. That is the reality. I believe those are the facts. I believe them to be honest and straightforward facts. I would be happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. CRAIG. I did yield for the sake of a question and not a comment. I would like to reclaim the floor.

Mr. CRAIG. I didn't inquire about friendships or relationships. I inquired about the legality of the license that operates the store, and whether the store is still in business, and whether the owner who is alleged to have mishandled records owns it today; does he operate it. The answer is no. Let me also add that I appreciate the Senator's logic about the stealing of a weapon. Automobiles are stolen from automobile lots and the thieves are caught on camera. The last I checked, an automobile is substantially larger than a rifle. Is it possible that Lee Malvo picked up a gun and walked out of the store? He says he did. He says he did. He stole the weapon. I am not going to in any way attempt to defend the man who once owned the Bull's Eye gunshop. He may be indefensible. He may have violated the law. If he did--and he is being investigated for it--S. 1805 does not immune him from any of those actions. That is what is important to understand as we debate the bill. His acts were criminal. If he is in violation of the Federal firearm license, if he has mishandled his records, and if he had, in fact, seen a robbery and failed to report it, then this man is in trouble because that is the law. We would not protect him nor does this bill protect him from that law. I yield the floor.

Mr. CRAIG. If the Senator will yield, I think that is a valid analysis and I certainly did not intend to misportray that. Again, let's go back to the law. Are you suing the store if there are lawsuits, or are you suing the individual who had the Federal firearms license? Is it the physical structure that is liable or is it the individual who owned the structure who is liable? We know what the law is. It is the individual and not the store. I cannot, nor do I, know the details of the relationship. What I do know is that he cannot sell firearms today. His license has been pulled. That is what the law requires, and a criminal investigation proceeds at this moment. I believe that is the essence of the argument.

Mr. CRAIG. If the Senator will further yield, I did use the phrase ``store closed.'' I meant the ownership, as it was; he closed. It reopened. Whether it was 24 hours or 48 hours, he could no longer operate it when his license was revoked. We understood he sold it to a new operator who is licensed.

Mr. CRAIG. Hope springs eternal that we might, sometime in the late of the afternoon--I guess it is now described as early evening--see a unanimous consent agreement that would take us into tomorrow and the remainder of the week as to how we are able to move to and deal with S. 1805 and its amendments. I am going to respond only briefly to what my colleague has just said because I am not an attorney and I am not going to attempt to outlawyer the lawyers. Mr. Cutler is a fine lawyer. There are many other fine lawyers who disagree with Mr. Cutler. It is not our job to outlawyer the lawyers, but it is our job to write law as clearly as we can and then allow judges, listening to the arguments of lawyers as they relate to how a given situation might fit in a suit, to make the determination as to the applicability of the law. Now, having said that, I would like to refer to another lawyer. Is he as recognized as is Mr. Cutler? No, probably not. But this does come from the Congressional Research Service, and it is one of those services that we utilize. The Senator has, I think, the same work product I have. We are talking about the Daschle-Craig-Baucus amendment that Senator Daschle came to the floor to speak to a few moments ago. The Daschle-Craig-Baucus Amendment would strike ``knowingly and willfully'' in the preceding sentence-- That we are talking about-- potentially increasing the likelihood that [certain exceptions] to the general immunity afforded under the [law] would be applicable in any given case. They looked at it in relationship to the Bull's Eye case to which the Senator was referring. Now, these are not my words. I am not this good. I am not an attorney. But I do listen to them, and I seek out their advice when it comes to writing law and making sure that it is clear and unambiguous. They cite two examples and they say: Applying these changes to the scenario at issue-- We are talking about Bull's Eye-- it would appear that the Amendment could have the effect of making it more likely that this exception to immunity would be applicable, if certain facts are established. ``If certain facts are established.'' Those facts have not yet been established. They were not established for Attorney Cutler. He is simply looking at the broad presence of the law, or application of it, as are we. If certain facts are established in an investigation and charges are brought against an owner, then we believe our amendment clarifies and does not provide the immunity, if those facts are established. Now, the changes we are talking about are twofold: (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record which he is required to keep pursuant to State or Federal law-- If weapons are stolen and they fail to note it, fail to report it to the police, that fits that area-- or aided, abetted or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness or the sale or other disposition of a qualified product. ``Other disposition''--theft. At least this is my interpretation now. I am not a lawyer. Secondly: [A]ny case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under section 922(g) or (n) of title 18, United States Code. . . . That is what the Congressional Research Service says. Then it draws that conclusion I gave earlier: Applying these changes to the scenario at issue-- That is what the Daschle-Craig-Baucus amendment does. ``The scenario at issue,'' the arguments put forth, the concern about somehow, if the facts are established, this firearms dealer being immune by S. 1805-- it would appear that the Amendment could have the effect-- The amendment is in large part incorporated in S. 1805 now, and Senator Daschle is going to offer another amendment that we know will be accepted and will clarify it even more-- of making it more likely that this exception to immunity would be applicable, [again] if certain facts are established. That is the argument at hand. We can trade arguments of attorneys. We will place all these kinds of things in the Record so our colleagues can understand them and hopefully sort them out, but it is my opinion that we are not exempting this formerly licensed gun dealer who has now had his license revoked. Because if an investigation goes forward, and charges are filed against him, I believe we have clearly not granted him immunity under S. 1805 if it, in fact, becomes law. I do believe that is the strength of our argument, and one that certainly is believed to be what we represent here. It is certainly from the Congressional Research Service, which has very active attorneys who deal constantly with the law as we shape it and form it and look at arguments that are placed out there in the public arena in relation to the legislation that we bring before the Senate. I yield the floor.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, we hope we are narrowing down to a time when we will have a unanimous consent request which then--and I can't judge this yet--might conclude our efforts today. We will be back early tomorrow morning to resume. I thank my colleague for his arguments. We are not going to try this case here on the floor of the Senate because we don't have a judge. I am not a lawyer. He is; I am not. But I would also ask him to look at another provision we have in the bill as he argues the case. That is that a lawsuit could also be allowed under the bill's exception allowing actions for negligence per se or for negligent entrustment, depending on, of course, the condition of the dealer and the dealer's knowledge, if any, of the suspects. Having said that, let's remember to address these issues, the victim would need to get his day in court. The case will be filed. The defendant would file a motion to dismiss based on provisions of 1805. And if the judge--remember there is going to be the impartial judge weighing all the law and the findings--decides this case did not fall under those exceptions, then the litigation would proceed. That is the essence. We are not going to argue the case effectively here because, frankly, we don't know all of the facts. We are not a part of ATF's investigation, and all of those facts are not yet public. They will not be public until charges are filed, a suit is brought, and that day in court I just spoke of is at hand. Obviously, the Senator and I can disagree on what the meanings are, but I do believe the arguments we put forth are extremely valid. Certainly, the minority leader, myself, and others, in a very bipartisan fashion, have worked tremendously hard to craft this bill in a way that is as narrow as I expressed it to be earlier in the day to deal only in the protection of law-abiding dealers, law-abiding manufacturers who make a legitimate product, and to deny the kind of lawsuits we have seen that are more intent on bankrupting the manufacturer than they are in bringing resolution to or, if you will, dealing with the victims and rewarding them in any fashion. I yield the floor.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CRAIG. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank both the leadership on our side of the aisle and certainly the minority leader and the minority whip for the work they have done in trying to bring this together. Is this something that I wholeheartedly support? Well, let me put it this way: It is something I support because it gets us to a final vote, which is very important, in a timely way. But something is absent from this unanimous consent agreement that is very important: to allow the underlying bill, however it is changed, to become law. That is why we are here on the floor. Not that this is how we get to conference, which oftentimes is agreed to. When we craft a bill and arrive at a time of final passage, we almost always include in it the procedure by which we will get to conference. I hope that our minority leader, in good faith, would work to help us get to that point so we can work out the differences between the House and the Senate. There will be differences; that is quite obvious now. Some of these amendments could pass. It is important we work that out. We saw the underlying bill gain a substantial bipartisan majority support in the Senate, and therefore it is incumbent upon all of us, I trust, to get this bill to a conference between the House and the Senate, work out our differences so we can vote on a conference report and allow this underlying bill now changed to get to our President's desk. Having said that, let me thank everyone for the work they have done. This is a very busy schedule. But let me also echo what the minority leader said. It does not stop other Members who feel they must offer amendments from bringing those to the floor. I said early on today we wanted an open process, amendments voted on, but at the end of the day we wanted to vote on final passage. We helped facilitate that by this agreement, and I appreciate the work done by our leaders.

Mr. CRAIG

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The hearing will be held on Wednesday, March 3, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The purpose of the hearing is to receive testimony on S. 1420, a bill to establish terms and conditions for use of certain Federal land by outfitters and to facilitate public opportunities for the recreational use and enjoyment of such land. Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510-6150. For further information, please contact Dick Bouts at (202) 224-7545.

Mr. CRAIG

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that privileges of the floor be granted to Lisa McGrath and Douglas Lucke during consideration of S. 1805, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.

Mr. CRAIG

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I do not object to that. I appreciate the time consideration. The Senator from California is kind enough to allow me to proceed. I ask unanimous consent that she immediately follow me.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, first, I am here to speak on S. 2061 and ask our colleagues to support it. Many of my colleagues have already spoken of the pressing need for this legislation, so I will not repeat their words now. What I will speak about is how the medical liability crisis has played out in my region of the country, the Pacific Northwest. I believe the situation as it exists there provides clear evidence of the need for national reform. My story is the tale of two States, my home State of Idaho and our neighbor to the west, Oregon. Idaho enacted its original tort reform legislation in 1987. This legislation limited the award of noneconomic damages in personal injury cases to $400,000. This limit was indexed to inflation. Oregon also enacted tort reform legislation in 1987. Like the Idaho law, the Oregon law limited the award of noneconomic damages in personal injury cases. Oregon's law placed this limit at $500,000. Unlike Idaho however, where the tort reform measure withstood judicial scrutiny, and has since been strengthened by the Idaho State Legislature in 2003, Oregon's law was struck down by the State supreme court in 1999. Since the cap was removed, there have been 20 settlements and jury awards of more than $1 million. As expected, the costs of these awards have been passed on to medical professionals in the form of higher medical malpractice insurance premiums. The Eugene Oregon Register Guard reported on March 19, 2003, that obstetricians who have base coverage ($1 million per claim, $3 million aggregate per year) through Northwest Physicians Mutual, a doctor-owned insurance company, have seen their premiums increase nearly threefold, from $21,895 in 1999 to $61,203 in 2003. The same article referred to a statewide survey conducted by researchers at Oregon Health and Science University which found that since 1999, 125 doctors have quit delivering babies in Oregon--representing about 25 percent of doctors providing obstetric care. Nearly half of these physicians, 48 percent, cited insurance costs and 41 percent said they feared lawsuits. The article goes on to tell the story of an Oregon physician who is abandoning his practice in Eugene, in order to establish a new practice in Coeur d'Alene, ID. The physician stated that he was attracted to Idaho because the State has safeguards in place for doctors. These safeguards have helped keep malpractice premiums down in Idaho. Indeed, the Idaho Medical association reports that physicians in Idaho for some high-risk specialities, such as obstetrics and gynecology, pay about half of what their counterparts in Oregon pay. While I welcome any healthcare providers who wish to practice in Idaho, I do not wish to see women of a neighboring State, or any State, suffer from lack of available health care because medical providers cannot afford to purchase malpractice insurance in their home State. Now as a firm proponent of our Federal system, I have always believed that it is preferable to solve problems at the level of government closest to the people. And my preference here would have been for State governments to address this issue, as indeed many have. However, many other States have either not enacted reform legislation, or as in the case of Oregon, have found their efforts at reform sidetracked by overzealous judges. And, as the medical liability crisis in the 19 States identified by the AMA now threatens to overwhelm the entire Nation's medical liability system, I feel that now is the time to address this issue at the national level. A Federal law is required to ensure that reforms will be effected in all States. Furthermore, the language of S. 2061 will protect States with existing caps. At the same time it will protect health care providers by establishing a Federal standard for noneconomic damages limits, even if such caps are barred by a State constitution, such as in Oregon. By allowing State autonomy in the setting of liability limits, this bill respects our tradition of federalism. Since this body refused to vote for cloture on a related bill last July, the general accounting Office has issued a report assessing the effects that rising malpractice insurance premiums have had on the public's access to health care. This report, released in August of last year, confirmed instances in the five ``crisis'' States studied where actions taken by physicians in response to malpractice pressures have reduced access to services affecting emergency surgery and newborn deliveries. No instances of reduced access to heath care were identified in the four ``non-crisis'' States studied. The August report follows an earlier GAO report that examined the causes of the dramatic increase in malpractice insurance rates. That earlier report found that ``losses on medical malpractice claims--which make up the largest part of insurer's costs--appear to be the primary driver of rate increased in the long run.'' Together these two studies provide strong evidence that: (1) Rising claims costs are driving up the cost of malpractice insurance; (2) the rising cost of insurance is causing medical service providers to take actions which have limited access to health care; and (3) the imposition of noneconomic damages caps, as well as the other reform measures included in this bill, are effective in constraining the rise of insurance premiums. From the Pacific Northwest to the Florida Keys, the problem is clear and the solution is clear. The only question awaiting clarification is whether this body possesses the resolve to pass this much-needed legislation. Mr. President, to reiterate, I want to tell the story of two States as it relates to this issue and the bill, Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act, addressing that problem. The States are Idaho and Oregon. In 1987, Idaho and Oregon passed identical laws--or relatively identical laws. In the State of Idaho, we capped our personal injury cases at $400,000. Oregon capped them at $500,000. Unlike Idaho, the Oregon Supreme Court, in a period of time immediately following that, struck down the Oregon action. Idaho did not. Idaho not only held its law but then strengthened that law in 2003. Here is the rest of the story. Idaho strengthened its law in 2003. Oregon struck down its law in 1999. But they both started in the same place. Since the cap was removed in Oregon, there have been 20 settlements for injury awards of well over a million dollars. As expected, the cost of these awards has been passed on to the medical professional in the form of higher medical malpractice insurance premiums. The Eugene, Oregon Register Guard reported on March 19, 2003, that obstetricians who have base coverage--that is, $1 million per claim, $3 million per aggregate per year--through Northwest Physician Mutual, a doctor-owned insurance company, have seen their premiums increase nearly threefold, from $21,895 in 1999, to 61,203 in 2003. The same article referred to a statewide survey conducted by researchers at Oregon Health and Science University, which found that since 1999, 125 doctors have quit delivering babies in Oregon-- representing about 25 percent of the doctors providing obstetric care. Nearly half of these physicians, 48 percent, cited insurance costs, and 41 percent said they feared lawsuits. The article went on to talk about one Eugene, OR, physician who moved to Coeur d'Alene, ID. The reason he moved to Idaho is because in our State of Idaho, their insurance premiums are substantially less because the cap we placed in the law has held the test of the courts. The reality is that we are trying to set the stage nationwide. We are all aware--and many colleagues have come to the floor of the Senate to talk about it--of the studies done, the GAO report, the high-cost States, and the OB/GYN doctors fleeing from those States, and as a result making it very difficult in some instances for pregnant women to receive the kind of health services they need and, in fact, upon time of delivery, to know they have a doctor waiting at their side to help them. As medical liability crises in these 19 identified States loom, it is time we speak with uniformity across the Nation. That is exactly what this bill does. I hope that our colleagues can support cloture and we can move to a final vote on this bill. Clearly, the American people are now expecting us to speak out. Last week, I held a health care conference in Boise. One of the primary concerns was the rapidly rising cost of health care. One of the components of that escalation in cost is the very thing we are attempting to address today. So I hope the Senate can stand with reasonable unity. Myself and others understand the politics of the trial bar. When is enough enough? If we don't, by this action, deny access to the courts by those who are truly injured--and we don't--then why are we allowing a certain segment of our society, in the litigious manner they have chosen, to line their pockets. Who is the beneficiary? The patient? In many instances, they are not. Yet costs go up simply because of the risk involved. We ought to be protecting the patient and, in this case, the average citizen of this country on both sides of that equation by making sure they can gain true access to the courts when true injury results and, at the same time, making sure we are wise enough to hold down the increasing costs of health care, assisted by the dramatic increase in premium costs to our physician. This is a step toward that kind of a solution. I yield the floor.

Mr. CRAIG

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The hearing will be held on Wednesday, March 10th, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The purpose of the hearing is to receive testimony on the following bills: S. 1354, to resolve certain conveyances and provide for alternative land selections under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act related to Cape Fox Corporation and Sealaska Corporation, and for other purposes; S. 1575 and H.R. 1092, to direct the Secretary of Agriculture to sell certain parcels of Federal land in Carson City and Douglas County, Nevada; S. 1778, to authorize a land conveyance between the United States and the City of Craig, Alaska, and for other purposes; S. 1819 and H.R. 272, to direct the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain land to Lander County, Nevada, and the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain land to Eureka County, Nevada, for continued use as cemeteries; and H.R. 3249, to extend the term of the Forest Counties Payments Committee. Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510-6150. For further information, please contact Frank Gladics at 202-224- 2878.