Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield 30 more seconds to the Senator.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska, who has played a very important role in crafting this legislation.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, would the Chair inform me how much time is left on the Collins-Lieberman amendment?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, at this time I would like to yield up to 10 minutes to the Senator from Michigan. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his many contributions to this bill.

Ms. COLLINS. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, who is the chief cosponsor of the Collins-Lieberman amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, we all want more funding to be distributed on risk. The Collins-Lieberman amendment which was just adopted more than doubles the amount of money allocated based on risk. Risk is not a science. We are giving unprecedented authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security, that there is no precedent for in any grant program of this size. The fact is, under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment, every State would lose at least $8 million in guaranteed funding. Some States would lose tens of millions of dollars. Even taking into account how funds have historically been distributed based on risk, 43 States lose money under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment verses the Collins-Lieberman amendment. We have to recognize that every State has vulnerabilities and needs to be brought up to a baseline ability to prepare and prevent for terrorist attacks. The Collins-Lieberman amendment was endorsed by many law enforcement groups that do not support this approach. I urge opposition to the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, during the past 3 years, we have appropriated more than $8 billion in homeland security grants, despite the fact that this program has never been properly authorized. The Homeland Security Committee has spent the last 3 years working on an authorization bill. We have produced a carefully crafted, balanced bill that is incorporated in the Collins-Lieberman amendment. This debate is about establishing a formula that provides a predictable level of funding scaled to reflect the different needs of large and small States that will allow all States to achieve essential preparedness and prevention capabilities. We break the mold that provides a set baseline amount to each State regardless of size and needs. This debate is also about distributing more funds based on risk. Let's put this important issue in perspective. Compared to last year, our amendment would double the amount of funds distributed based on risk. Last year only 37 percent of funds appropriated for homeland security grants were allocated based on risk. Under our amendment, more than 70 percent of the funds would be distributed based on risk or factors used now by the Department of Homeland Security to determine risk. That is a lot of discretion that we are giving to the Secretary. I want to address the CRS memo solicited by Senator Lautenberg that was discussed this morning. It has been used by our opponents to suggest that only 60 percent is distributed based on risk. In fact, it is more than 70 percent, as is the underlying bill. Tellingly, in a memorandum issued just today, CRS categorizes the sliding scale allocation as risk based. This is a balanced approach. I urge my colleagues to vote for the Collins-Lieberman amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, there are other issues as well that are very important to comment on. Another one is that the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment does not include adequate accountability measures. We know that we need tough accountability measures, such as what is included in the Collins-Lieberman amendment. Such measures, for example, include a requirement for a GAO audit. We would also require in our amendment--in contrast to the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment--that all spending be tied to achieving essential prevention and preparedness goals. This is an important point. We cannot afford to have scarce homeland security dollars wasted on leather jackets in the District of Columbia or be used to buy air-conditioned garbage trucks for a New Jersey city. We need to make sure the expenditures are wise and appropriate, and the tough accountability measures included in the Collins-Lieberman amendment will do that. I note that the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment is silent on an authorization level, and it doesn't attempt to restore the $900 million in cuts since fiscal year 2004. Only our amendment seeks to stop the reduction of funding for first responders by authorizing a significant level of funding. We didn't go overboard. It is a level of funding that was provided in fiscal year 2004; it is $2.9 billion. While we are making progress every year on becoming better prepared to prevent or respond to attacks, we are a long way from completing the task. I note that the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment excludes from risk- based funding substantially all the cities that have not received funds in the past. This is an important point. While the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment purports to authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to distribute funds as he sees fit based on risk, in reality it effectively restricts the universe of cities that could apply for risk- based funding to those that have received risk-based funding in the past. In this sense, it perpetuates the status quo. If a city or region has not received risk-based funding in the past and then is faced with a potential threat, for example, due to the construction of a new chemical facility or another piece of critical infrastructure or because it is hosting a large event, it is out of luck; it is ineligible to apply for risk-based funding under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment. Finally, let me show you the impact--on this chart in green and white--of the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment. The States in green are better off under the Collins-Lieberman approach--the approach supported by the occupant of the chair. It is virtually every State. I also point out that those seven states in white don't do badly. They do very well because we are doubling the amount of money that is risk-based, and we are also providing for a reasonable minimum allocation. There it is. I hope my colleagues will consider this. A lot of work went into crafting this amendment. It is a comprehensive approach for a grant program for which we have appropriated billions of dollars, but never authorized. Let's do this right. Let's adopt the bipartisan Collins-Lieberman amendment. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Connecticut.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield myself 9 minutes. Let me make some concluding remarks about the impact of the amendment offered by our colleagues, Senator Feinstein and Senator Cornyn. The fact is that the amendment would decimate the predictable funding levels for States. The minimum in the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment is only .25. It is simply too low to support the efforts by States to have a predictable base level of funding each year to fund multiyear projects, such as creating interoperable communications networks, first responder training programs, or the agriterrorism project that the Midwestern Governors are eager to establish. I will give you a couple of examples of what the differences would mean. Assuming the Senate bill's appropriation level under our amendment, the State of Georgia could plan on receiving a base amount of $15.3 million. Under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment, Georgia would be assured of getting only $2.4 million as a minimum allocation. Under our amendment, North Carolina would receive a base of a little over $15 million. But under Feinstein-Cornyn, the State could only count on $2.4 million. Under our amendment, Florida would receive a base amount of more than $30 million because of the sliding scale minimum. But under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment, Florida would only get $2.4 million. Furthermore, the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment's lack of predictable funding inhibits the ability of States to plan. Both our colleagues' amendment and the Collins-Lieberman amendment would require States to submit 3-year State homeland security plans. Yet, the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment does not provide a predictable base, so such plans would not be a fruitful exercise. For example, the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment requires that the State plan include ``a prioritization of needs based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment, and a description of how the State intends to address such needs at the city, county, regional, tribal, and interstate level.'' I simply fail to see how a State could satisfy these ambitious requirements without any assurances that it would receive a significant base amount of funding. Because our amendment provides States with that predictable, substantial base allocation, the 3-year plans would actually become useful roadmaps and would allow for more efficient expenditure of homeland security funds. That is why our amendment is strongly supported over the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment by the National Governors Association. Mr. President, the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment shortchanges funding dedicated to the prevention of terrorism attacks. It simply does not provide the kind of assured funding needed for law enforcement to help detect and prevent attacks before they occur. Indeed, it takes significant steps backward from what Senators Gregg and Byrd have included in the underlying bill. The underlying bill appropriates $400 million for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, which provides funds for police, sheriffs, and other law enforcement personnel to stop terrorist activity before it occurs. By contrast, the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment actually swallows up the existing law enforcement terrorism prevention program, without ensuring any funds whatsoever--any funds whatsoever-- for our police, sheriffs, and other law enforcement personnel. In other words, all of the funding under the Feinstein-Cornyn amendment could be used to prepare to respond to terrorist attacks, leaving efforts to prevent such attacks entirely up to our States and communities. In sharp contrast, the Collins-Lieberman amendment would formally authorize the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program and ensure that prevention efforts are adequately protected by treating them as a separate program with different allowable uses than response efforts. That is why the law enforcement community has overwhelmingly endorsed our amendment. The Collins-Lieberman amendment enjoys the support of the National Troopers Coalition, the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Association of Police Organizations, the International Union of Police Associations, the Association of Chiefs of Police, and the list goes on and on, including the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and the National Emergency Management Association. I ask unanimous consent that the letters from these and other organizations be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. One reason our amendment bridges the small State-big State divide is that unlike the alternative amendment, the underlying bill, or current law, our amendment breaks away from a one-size-fits- all approach by establishing this sliding scale minimum allocation. Does a more populous State require more funds to achieve adequate levels of preparedness and prevention? The answer is yes, which is why the 19 most populous and densely populated States would get a higher baseline allocation than the .55 percent that other States would achieve. That includes the State of New Jersey, I would note, which receives considerably more. Second, the underlying bill is not a middle point between the amendment that Senator Lieberman and I have offered and the Feinstein- Cornyn amendment. In fact, the underlying bill in our amendment includes substantially the same type of baseline allocation for most States. The difference is that under our amendment, the 19 most populous and densely populated States would receive a greater baseline allocation. If you take into account the sliding scale minimum, which neither of my friends on the other side of the aisle have taken into account when they look at our bill, our amendment and the underlying bill allocates substantially the same amount of funds based on risk. When we talk about the significance of preventing the next terrorist attack, it is important to note that terrorists have been proven to use staging areas away from the most obvious targets. So while New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, are clearly targets, let us not forget that opportunities to catch terrorists, to stop them, exist in places such as Portland, ME; Norman, OK; and Norcross, GA. As a recent publication of the International Association of Chiefs of Police notes: Several of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks had routine encounters with State and local law enforcement officials in the weeks and months prior to the attack. If State, tribal and local law enforcement officers are adequately equipped and trained, they can be invaluable assets in efforts to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists before they strike. Let's again look at some of the facts. As the 9/11 Commission report notes, terrorists trained and operated in different parts of the country to prepare for and carry out the September 11 attacks. For example, two of the terrorists were pilots and visited the flight school in Norman, OK. Norman is also where Moussaoui and another terrorist resided while attending school. Two of the terrorists stayed in Georgia, visiting such small communities as Norcross and Decatur before living in Stone Mountain, GA. Although the 9/11 Commission found no explanation for these travels, the terrorists' mobility reveals an unpredictable pattern that shows that their presence was not confined to large cities. Over and over again, if you look at the list from the 9/11 Commission, you will see that the terrorists trained and lived in rural America, in small communities. As I have said earlier, this issue is very real to us from the Northeast, from the State of Maine in particular, because two of the terrorists started their day on 9/11 from the Portland, ME, airport. Over and over again, we have seen, from law enforcement, warnings that we need to pay attention to prevention, and that is exactly what this bill does. Local police departments and sheriff's offices provide the bulk of law enforcement services to rural communities, and they are severely constrained by a lack of resources. That is why so many law enforcement groups have endorsed the Collins-Lieberman proposal. There are other challenges; for example, to our food supply. But I see the Senator from Connecticut is now on the floor, so I yield to him the remaining time before we return to the Reid amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me clear up a couple of misperceptions surrounding this debate. First of all, this debate is not about big States versus small States, although it certainly sounds that way. Our amendment, for example, is cosponsored by both Senators from Ohio and, in fact, was heavily influenced by and contributed to by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin. I ask unanimous consent he be added as a cosponsor.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before the Senator from California leaves the floor, let me say I admire the Senator from California, who is one of the most careful, thorough Members of this body. The point that I was trying to make, and perhaps not as artfully as I should have, is that the Homeland Security Committee has held extensive hearings on the Homeland Security Grant Program. I am not aware of other committees in the Senate having done that. We have held extensive hearings over 3 years. We drafted a bipartisan bill. We received input from a number of groups. We have had two different markups, and the bill was reported unanimously last year, with only Senator Lautenberg in dissent this year. So our bill has had a great deal of consideration. That was the only point I was trying to make. As the Senator knows, I have a great deal of admiration for what a careful legislator she is.

Ms. COLLINS. I will be happy to yield once I conclude my explanation. The Senator from New Jersey again ignores the amount of money in this bill that would go to the law enforcement terrorism prevention program, which would be authorized for the first time in this legislation. Prevention takes a back seat to responding to a terrorist attack, and that is why virtually every police association in this country has endorsed the Collins-Lieberman bill, virtually every one, because of our emphasis on prevention as well. The National Association of Police Organizations wrote: Unlike other homeland security grant proposals, S. 21 ensures that the prevention of terrorist attacks, not just response efforts, receives a significant share of homeland security funds. I would be happy to yield to the Senator from New Jersey on his time or on the time of Senator Feinstein. I yield the floor but reserve the remainder of my time.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the Senator from New Jersey is mistaken in saying this bill provides less risk-based assistance than the legislation reported from the committee in April. It does not. The Senator is in error. It is exactly the same as the committee-reported bill, which was reported without dissent on a voice vote. The fact is, the Collins-Lieberman amendment doubles the funds that would be distributed based on threat, risk, and consequences while maintaining a predictable and meaningful level of funding for each State. For the Nation to be prepared, all States must achieve a baseline level of essential capabilities. The Federal Government is a partner with our State and local governments and with our 9 million first responders in this regard. Unfortunately, what we are seeing today is a regrettable and corrosive argument that is pitting urban centers against rural States. Our bill does not do that. We have carefully crafted a compromise that ensures that every State receives a baseline level in order to recognize that every State has homeland security needs and vulnerabilities and that first responders throughout the country need to be properly equipped, trained, and supported. We know the terrorists traveled through, trained in, and stayed in rural States. Two of them left from my home State of Portland, ME, to begin their journey of devastation and death on September 11. A predictable stream of funding is essential to achieving the goals, but the fact is, S. 21 doubles the amount of money for risk-based funding compared to the current law. If one looks at this chart, the Senator from New Jersey repeatedly ignores the 10.7-percent distribution, which was Senator Levin's proposal, which means that risk-based factors account for more than 70 percent of the funding. That is more than double what is involved in current law. So we have doubled the amount of money that would be allocated based on risk factors while maintaining a steady, predictable base line funding so that all States can achieve a level of preparedness. Again, the Senator from New Jersey----

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, as I understand it, the latest CRS analysis--as I understand it from press accounts since, again, the Senator has not been willing to share it with my office--is once again flawed. It does not take into account the sliding scale minimum allocation that is included in the Collins-Lieberman amendment. This sliding scale minimum distributes 10.7 percent of the funds in our bill based on population and population density. Those are two risk factors that are used by the Department of Homeland Security to distribute risk-based funds. I note, because I want to give credit where credit is due, that the proposal for this sliding scale minimum came from our colleague, a senior member of the committee, Senator Levin of Michigan. Let's look at the real numbers. The fact is there is a doubling in the amount of money that is based on risk under our amendment. The legislation before us emphasizes risk-based funding and doubles the amount of money compared to current law that would be allocated based on risk. The Committee on Homeland Security has done a great deal of work on this formula. I think we see today the problems that occur when we try to write a formula not in committee, not based on careful hearings, input from all interested parties, two markups, 3 years of deliberations by the committee, but instead try to cobble together an amendment on the Senate floor. I have heard again today the comparison that Wyoming gets more money on a per capita basis. The Senator from California, my friend and colleague, made that argument. Over and over again we hear the argument that homeland security dollars are unfairly allocated because less populous States generally get more per capita than more populous States. But the truth is, that argument does not hold water. What is the point of that argument? That homeland security dollars should be distributed on a per capita basis rather than risk and a minimum free each State? The fact is, risk-based allocations lead to per capita disparities as well. Let's take the District of Columbia as an example. I think every single Member of this distinguished body would agree that the District of Columbia, despite its relatively small population, is an extremely high-risk area. In fact, the District of Columbia gets by far the most on a per capita basis, nearly $217 per resident, because it is a small population, high-risk area. Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument of these advocates is fewer dollars to the national capital region. The fact is, distributing funds based on risk does not necessarily lessen the per capita disparities among recipients. We took a look at the distribution of fiscal year 2005 urban area security initiative funds which are allocated based on risk. What we found were the same or even greater levels of per capita disparities compared to an analysis of the urban areas and State grant funds combined. For example, Boston received nearly $48 per capita, where Houston, with over three times the population, received under $10 per person. Los Angeles received about $18 per capita; Pittsburgh, $29. The point is, moving from a formula to a risk-based distribution does not necessarily bridge those per capita divides. Second, let's look at what this is really all about. Under S. 21, the amount the small States would be guaranteed beyond their per capita shares amounts to less than 3 percent of the funds that are allocated-- 3 percent. Let's use the real example. S. 21 would authorize $2.9 billion for homeland security grants. The total that small States are guaranteed in excess of their per capita share is just $85.4 million out of that $2.9 billion. Here is the chart that demonstrates what this allocation is all about. In contrast, the 19 most populous States receive some $619 million in guaranteed funds under the bill, seven times more than the less populous States are guaranteed beyond their per capita share. In short, we are not talking about a major redistribution of homeland security dollars. The fact is also that the potential of terrorist attacks against rural targets is increasingly recognized as a national security threat. I quoted yesterday the Harvard study that talked about rural areas facing unique and profound homeland security challenges. Bioterrorism, an attack on our food supply, where would those most likely occur? The food supply is outside our urban areas. A great many power grids, water supplies, nuclear plants--all of those are outside of urban areas. Likewise, a report from the RAND Corporation, prepared for the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, assessed how prepared State and local law enforcement is. It noted that homeland security experts and first responders have cautioned against an overemphasis on improving the preparedness of large cities to the exclusion of small communities or rural areas. The report recognized that much of our Nation's infrastructure and potential high-value targets is located in rural areas. The Department of Homeland Security said that it is well known that terrorists choose to live and train in small and rural communities. Communities that my friends from California and New Jersey would say are at no risk, they are low risk, they should not receive risk money. These small and rural communities are where the terrorists live, train, and hide. That is why law enforcement has overwhelmingly endorsed the Collins- Lieberman amendment. We have letters from the National Troopers Coalition, the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, the National Association of Police Organizations, the International Union of Police Associations, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the United Federation of Police Officers, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the International Association of Fire Chiefs. All of these groups representing law enforcement and representing our firefighters are endorsing the approach taken in the Collins-Lieberman amendment. One reason they do is for the first time we are going to have standards, we are going to tie spending to standards, and we recognize that the first responders in each and every State deserve our support. We need to bring every State up to a minimum level of preparedness, and we are not there now. That is why the National Governors Association and the National Emergency Management Association strongly endorse our approach. Over and over again we hear from these organizations that the funding formula proposed in the Collins-Lieberman amendment ``promotes a better level of preparedness and brings some predictability to States for planning purposes.'' That is from the National Troopers Coalition. The Fraternal Order of Police says our legislation--this is the Collins-Lieberman legislation--recognizes the fact that the majority of Federal funds have been previously directed toward recovery response operations, too often at the expense of the efforts to prevent future attacks. Ensuring that all communities achieve and maintain the appropriate response-and-recover capacity for terrorist incidents is a critical component. However, it is the goal of law enforcement to ensure that we never have a terrorist incident to respond or recover from. We want to stop the attack before it even occurs. Those are important advantages of the Collins-Lieberman approach. The accountability measures in our bill are absolutely critical and are missing from the Feinstein-Cornyn-Lautenberg approach. We know there has been wasteful funding. We cannot tolerate inappropriate and wasteful spending of critical homeland security funds. That is why we have strong accountability measures in the Collins-Lieberman proposal, measures that are lacking completely from the alternative put before us today. These accountability measures will ensure that no longer will homeland security funds be spent to purchase air-conditioned garbage trucks in the State of New Jersey--that is the kind of wasteful spending that we want to guard against--or leather jackets for the District of Columbia. Instead, spending would be tied to achieving essential capabilities for our first responders to meet national preparedness goals. This is a carefully thought out bill. It is a comprehensive bill. It reflects many hearings and input from the first responder community. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, my friend from California, as well as the Senator from New Jersey, have both referred to a memo the Congressional Research Service put together for Senator Lautenberg. First, let me say I have not seen this memo despite my staff repeatedly requesting a copy from Senator Lautenberg's office. The memo appears to have been widely distributed to the press but, unfortunately, the Senator has chosen not to share it with the two sponsors of the amendment. Why would that be? Perhaps it is because the last time my colleague from New Jersey asked CRS to put together a memo attacking S. 21, we quickly discovered it was based on fatally flawed assumptions. The memo purported to show that S. 21 would lead to less risk-based funding than under current law, but that was just plain wrong. And CRS, once the analysts talked with my staff, agreed they had made a mistake. In fact, CRS issued the memo I hold in my hand correcting the flawed conclusions of the Lautenberg memo. I ask unanimous consent that the CRS analysis be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from California for that clarification. Mr. President, the Collins-Lieberman amendment has picked up a number of cosponsors, so I want to bring my colleagues up to date by reading the full list of the cosponsors of the Collins- Lieberman amendment. They are as follows: Senators Voinovich, DeWine, Coburn, Akaka, Carper, Salazar, Coleman, Ben Nelson, Pryor, Snowe, and Dayton. I ask unanimous consent that all of those cosponsors be added to the Collins-Lieberman amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Cornyn, who is the prime cosponsor of the amendment of the Senator from California, wishes to go next. If he is not going to go next, I will be happy to speak on my time. But it was my understanding he wanted to speak first.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeffrey Highley, a civil engineering congressional fellow in Senator Pryor's office, be granted the privilege of the floor for the remaining duration of the debate on the Homeland Security appropriations bill.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Connecticut for his excellent statement. We have worked very hard on this issue for the past 3 years. It is my hope that our colleagues will recognize the work that has gone into this measure, whether it is coming up with a fair and balanced--I guess that phrase maybe has weight toward it--carefully crafted formula or whether it is the accountability measures that are in the bill that I also believe are so important. Another member of our committee who has been a stalwart supporter of the bill and has worked very hard in shaping many of its provisions from his perspective as a former mayor of a major city is our colleague from Minnesota, Senator Coleman. I am very pleased he is here to speak on behalf of the bill.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today with my good friend, Senator Lieberman, to offer an amendment to the Homeland Security appropriations bill. Let me note at the outset my appreciation for the work that Senator Lieberman has done on this issue. He and I have worked together with members of the Homeland Security Subcommittee for the past 3 years on this authorization to develop an improved homeland security funding approach based on extensive hearings we have held, much consultation, and hard work by our committee. We are pleased to be joined by several cosponsors, including Senators Carper, Coleman, Akaka, Voinovich, DeWine, Bingaman, and Salazar. The amendment we offer would for the first time authorize a framework for the billions of dollars the Department of Homeland Security allocates each year to assist first responders and State and local officials in helping to prevent terrorism and to prepare for an attack. That important point bears repeating. The more than $8 billion that Congress has appropriated for grants to States and localities for terrorism prevention and response since 9/11 has never been definitively authorized. This is not a matter of an authorization having expired, which happens quite frequently around here, but rather of a multibillion- dollar program that has never been authorized. This is highly unusual. In fact, my staff checked with CRS, which went back a decade and could not find a single other grant program over $1 billion that has never been authorized. Sure the appropriators have borrowed a funding formula from the PATRIOT Act, although the bill before us does not use that formula, but in truth the appropriators have had to legislate the details of the Homeland Security Grant Program year after year. So, for example, the House-passed version of this year's Homeland Security appropriations bill determines the minimum allocation that each State is to receive, establishes a strict timeframe for applications to be submitted and for the Department to act on them, requires 80 percent of the grants to be passed on by States to local governments within 60 days, determines for what funds can and cannot be used, and requires grantees to submit reports on their use of funds. That is a lot of legislative language on the House-passed appropriations bills, and indeed the Senate version before us contains similar legislative provisions. These are the kinds of programmatic decisions that Congress is supposed to determine through authorization bills, not each year anew on an appropriations bill. What Senator Lieberman and I are offering today is the specific, detailed authorization bill that this program has never had. Frankly, we would prefer not to do this, not to offer it to the appropriations bill. We believe our legislation, S. 21, which is the product of numerous legislative hearings, two markups, and input from countless interested parties and many homeland security experts, should be considered by the full Senate on its own. The House recently passed a companion measure. S. 21 is on the Senate calendar, having been reported by the Homeland Security Subcommittee without dissent on April 13. But there are no assurances that it will be brought to the Senate floor. So we are offering our authorization bill as an amendment to this appropriations measure. Although Senate rule XVI generally prohibits authorizing on an appropriations bill, ironically there is an exception when the House has, in essence, opened the door by legislating on the matter in its own bill. That is what has happened here, so we believe that rule XVI is not implicated. Mr. President, you may be saying, Why does this really matter? What is important about this bill that it should be brought up rather than allowing the situation to continue with slight tweaks and variations and new legislative language on the appropriations bill, year after year? Let me talk about the amendment, which is the text of S. 21 as reported, with a few changes. The amendment establishes a new formula for distributing homeland security grant dollars. It determines how funds are to be allocated, sets criteria to ensure that the funds are spent in ways that help States and communities develop essential capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorism, and it holds grantees responsible for achieving results. Perhaps the amendment's most important provisions are those that inject needed accountability measures into the grants process. We have all heard the horror stories about inappropriate spending of homeland security funds. This waste is intolerable, but particularly so when there are so many unmet needs that are scrambling for funds--needs where the funding simply is not available. Our amendment will put into place tough new standards to ensure that homeland security funds are spent wisely and in ways that will help us better prepare for, or respond to, or prevent a terrorist attack. Let me refer to this chart which summarizes the accountability measures that are included in the Collins-Lieberman provisions. The first is tying spending to standards. This amendment requires that States distribute and spend homeland security funds only in ways that measurably help them meet preparedness standards and achieve essential capabilities to be determined by the Department of Homeland Security. In other words, no more spending homeland security dollars on leather jackets in the District of Columbia or air-conditioned garbage trucks in New Jersey. For that matter, even purchases of perfectly appropriate items such as hazmat suits must be tied to achieving essential capabilities set by the Department. This safeguard is designed to prevent a community from purchasing equipment that it has no reasonable expectation of needing. I know this is an issue with which the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Gregg, has been particularly concerned. The second accountability measure is a thorough annual audit by the General Accounting Office to ensure that funds are not being wasted and that the program is working as intended. Third is greater coordination among the many grant programs that fund prevention and response efforts. Our amendment would create a Federal interagency committee to promote coordination of homeland security grants throughout the Federal Government. In particular, this committee would focus on eliminating redundant application, planning, and reporting requirements faced by States, local governments, and first responders in applying for and executing different Federal homeland security-related grants. Fourth are robust reporting requirements. These are the means by which accountability can be enforced. The amendment requires grant recipients to submit annual reports on their specific uses of grant funds and their progress in achieving essential capabilities. These reports would be submitted to the Secretary. The Secretary, in turn, would be required to submit an annual report to Congress, providing an accounting of how grants to States and communities are spent and an evaluation of their progress. Fifth are the remedies for noncompliance, what I call the enforcement mechanisms. The amendment empowers the Secretary to terminate or reduce grant payments if a State or locality fails to comply with all the requirements of the grant. In addition to these tough new accountability measures, our amendment authorizes a funding amount that is adequate and a distribution formula that is fair. This legislation dramatically increases the funds that would be distributed based on threat, risk, and consequences. It also maintains a meaningful level of funding for each State. Much of the frontline responsibility for homeland security has fallen squarely on the shoulders of our State and local officials and our Nation's more than 9 million first responders. Communities across America have risen to this challenge and developed scores of innovative homeland security strategies. For these strategies to be implemented, however, all States must achieve a baseline level of essential capabilities. At the same time, we must direct resources toward locations and facilities that are at higher levels of risk and vulnerability. Both of these goals--helping each and every State come up to a minimum level of preparedness and targeting funds to those areas and facilities at greatest risk--require an adequate, steady, and predictable stream of Federal funding. Absent that stream, we find ourselves in an escalating argument over whether these resources are being allocated and spent properly. Unfortunately, this argument increasingly pits our urban centers against our rural regions. We believe the bill that we have carefully crafted strikes the right balance. Let me acknowledge the hard work of Senators Gregg and Byrd in putting together this appropriations bill. We share with them the goal of a fair formula for allocating funds to States while increasing the proportion of funds that would be distributed based on risk, but the problem is unpredictability. We ask States to prepare multiyear plans for improving their homeland security capabilities and yet each year we threaten to develop a new formula for distributing Homeland Security grant dollars. That is why in supporting our legislation, S 21, the National Governors Association underscored the need for the predictability that our amendment would provide. On the chart behind me is a quotation from the Governor's letter. It reads as follows: To effectively protect our states and territories from potential terrorists events, all sectors of government must be part of an integrated plan to prevent, deter, respond to and recover from a terrorist act. For the plan to work, it is essential that it be funded through a predictable and sustainable mechanism both during its development, and in its implementation. A minimum allocation to each state and multiyear authorization levels of funding will provide the predictability necessary to implement statewide plans that will assist governors in securing our nation. This is, after all, a partnership with first responders, with local governments, and with State governments. Our amendment would provide the predictability States need to protect our Nation. First, our amendment authorized a sufficient level to reverse the trend of declining Homeland Security funding by authorizing the program at the fiscal year 2004 level of $2.9 billion. As the chart behind me demonstrates, funding for first responders is on the decline by $900 million from 2004 to the level proposed in the President's budget. We were reminded just last week that the war against terrorism has not been won. The battle continues. It is our first responders who are on the front lines. Do we truly believe that now, during a period of heightened alert, is the time to scale back our efforts in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks? I think not. Our amendment also incorporates a balanced formula. Each State would be guaranteed a minimum allocation of .55 percent of the total funds appropriated for State and urban area grants. The minimum, however, is scaled so that States with larger populations and higher population densities would receive additional funds. We call this a sliding scale baseline. It will promote a level of preparedness and provide predictability. The remainder of the total funds would be distributed to States and regions based on the Secretary's determination of risk and threat. As this chart shows, the amendment makes a grant investment in threat-based funding. It increases the proportion of risk-based funding by more than 60 percent. Moreover, under our sliding scale distribution using factors the Department of Homeland Security employs now in its risk-based approach, another 10.7 percent of appropriated funds would be allocated only to the most populous and most densely populated States. These are important steps toward bridging that urban-rural divide, and they balance the need for predictability for bringing each State up to a minimum level of preparedness with a heightened emphasis on allocating funds based on threat, risk, and consequences. As the ranking member on our committee well knows, since he has joined with me in all of these investigations, the choice must not be between protecting skyscrapers or farms and feedlots that provide our food supply, or chemical plants and industrial zones versus the rural communities that trucks and trains carrying those hazardous chemicals pass through. All funds beyond those necessary to cover the baseline allocations, more than 60 percent of the total, would be distributed based on the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences faced by an area from a terrorist attack. From this funding pool, the Secretary would make threat-based grants to both States and metropolitan regions. My colleague from Connecticut feels strongly about taking a regional approach to homeland security. In allocating the risk-based formula, the Secretary would prioritize grants with consideration given to such factors as population, population density, critical infrastructure, coastlines, international borders, previous terrorist attacks, elevated threat levels higher than the rest of the Nation, as well as other factors he deems appropriate. While allowing judgment on the part of the Secretary, we specifically delineated some of the critical factors--the ones I just read--that the Department must take into account. In doing so, we take some of the mystery out of the black box from which DHS now seems to generate some of its funding decisions, decisions that result, for example, in Minneapolis receiving funding but not St. Paul. One of the most disturbing aspects of the urban-rural argument is the assertion often made that locations outside of our largest cities have no significant homeland security needs. This is demonstrably untrue. It ignores a great deal of expertise. It ignores our history. A recent study conducted by the Harvard School for Public Health, with coleadership by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services and participation by 26 States, shows that rural areas face unique and profound homeland security challenges. A great many power and water supplies as well as virtually our entire food supply are located outside of urban areas. Work our committee has done on agro-terrorism shows the potential threat to our food supply. In addition, rural areas have far less capacity to deal with a terrorist attack or a public health crisis. In a letter describing its commercial equipment direct assistance program, the Department of Homeland Security itself wrote: When they face the common threat of terrorism, the needs of smaller jurisdictions are very different from the needs of larger metropolitan areas. Smaller agencies confront threats to the transportation infrastructure, agriculture, water supplies, power grids and other critical items spread out over a wide geographic area. I will highlight the next statement because the events preceding September 11 show it is so true: Terrorists may live and train in rural communities. Targets such as pipelines and nuclear power plants are typically located in smaller jurisdictions. Indeed, among the most striking aspects of the report of the 9/11 Commission is the extent to which the terrorists did live, organize, and train in America's smaller communities. The contacts they had with smaller law enforcement agencies before the September 11 attacks are striking, as well. As the committee reconstituted the movements of the terrorists after they arrived in the United States, the trail led to such places as Venice and Coral Springs, FL, Norman, OK, Falls Church, VA, Lawrenceville and Stone Mountain, GA and, of course, most personal to me, Portland, ME. It was Portland, ME from which two of the hijackers, including the ringleader, began their journey of death and destruction on September 11. It is not just the large cities that attract those who would do us harm. Indeed, often they feel more secure in hiding in our smaller cities and communities. As we seek to ensure that our communities, large and small, are prepared to respond to a terrorist attack, we must not lose sight of the need for prevention. Our amendment ensures that the prevention of terrorist attacks, not just response efforts, receives a significant share of Homeland Security funds. This is an area that law enforcement groups tell us over and over again has been neglected. Our amendment ensures that the prevention of terrorist attacks receives significant funds. It would for the first time authorize the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program which funds prevention activities by State and local law enforcement. Under the amendment, 25 percent of Homeland Security grant funding would be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention, including information sharing, target hardening, threat recognition, terrorist intervention activities, interoperable communication, and overtime expenses incurred in support of Federal homeland security efforts. The International Association of Chiefs of Police recently released a report that put it very well. They warned: In our national efforts to develop the capacity to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack we have failed to focus on the importance of building our capacity to prevent a terrorist attack in the first place. We are never going to be able to protect every single target in this country. That is why we have to pay attention to the prevention, the detection, the law enforcement side, as well as the response side. Because of our bill's emphasis on terrorism prevention, it has been endorsed by the National Association of Police Organizations, the International Association of Chiefs Of Police, the International Union of Police Associations, the National Troopers Coalition, the United Federation of Police Officers, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the Fraternal Order of Police, and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives among others. NAPO is the strongest voice supporting law enforcement officers in the United States, representing more than 236,000 sworn law enforcement officers as well as retired officers, and 100,000 citizens who share a common dedication to fair and effective crime control and law enforcement. They, too, have pointed out in a letter to Senator Lieberman and me that we need to be sure State and local law enforcement are properly supported, trained, and equipped to prevent terrorism before it occurs. I do not believe we can allocate Homeland Security dollars effectively and efficiently unless we listen to and learn from the advice of our law enforcement officers and other first responders. Guided by a task force of first responders, the Secretary would establish the essential capabilities I referred to earlier to ensure that first responders have the support they need. Preventing and responding to terrorism is a national challenge, but preventing and responding to specific acts of terrorism in the urgency of the moment is a regional challenge. We saw this after the September 11 attack on the Pentagon and in New York City when first responders from outlying communities rushed in to make invaluable and heroic contributions to the rescue operation. We saw it again in simulation at the TOPOFF 3 exercise I observed earlier this year with Senator Lieberman. This incident was a simulated explosion and chemical attack at a waterfront festival in New London, CT. The contributions by first responders from the outlying smaller communities were enormous, but their efforts were hampered by a lack of interoperable communications equipment. Senator Lieberman and I saw some first responders who were carrying as many as three emergency radios, which slowed the evacuation of those who were playing the injured parties to hospitals throughout the region. In a real attack, these delays--that incompatibility of equipment--would have had devastating consequences. Regional planning and coordination are essential, and our amendment would shift the focus of local funding from individual cities to metropolitan regions. Unlike the current Urban Area Security Initiative under which DHS simply announces a list of cities it has selected to fund, our amendment would establish an application process for metropolitan region funding. In applying for funding, communities would be given considerable flexibility in forming regions that would make the most sense locally. Our amendment provides that the regions within the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas would automatically be eligible to apply, with additional regions eligible under certain circumstances. Our amendment would also allow for regional coalitions--even those spanning multiple States--to apply for grant funding together to address common needs. I think this would lead to real breakthroughs in strategy. Let me give you a concrete example. Several Midwestern States are joining together to take steps to prevent and, if necessary, respond to acts of agroterrorism. That is exactly the kind of project that our amendment would provide for and fund. Under current law, these States could not seek funds as a group despite the common threats they face and the common solutions they seek. Our amendment breaks out of this rigid mold to allow States, counties, cities, tribes, and other governmental units to think regionally and creatively as they seek to prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks. Our amendment would also put the State and local homeland security planning process where it belongs, on the front end. This legislation requires State and local jurisdictions to plan for how funds will be spent before the funds arrive. Currently, much of the deliberative planning on how funds will be spent is done on the back end, only after DHS has allocated grants to States and urban areas. Moreover--and this actually is another safeguard--our bill would require States to spend money according to State plans approved by the Department of Homeland Security. More advanced funding means funds will be spent more quickly and according to a coherent strategy. Whenever I meet with first responders, whether it is in my home State of Maine or elsewhere, I am always struck by the fact that very few of these brave, dedicated men and women first went into law enforcement, firefighting, or emergency medical services ever thinking they would end up on the front lines of a war against terrorism. They have been handed an unprecedented and unimaginable challenge, and they have accepted it bravely and willingly. They deserve the equipment, training, planning, input, accountability, and stability that our amendment would provide. They deserve to have this critical program that is so essential to the security of our Nation properly authorized, funded, and designed. Thank you, Mr. President.

Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk. I call up the amendment No. 1142.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Reid amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose of offering an amendment.