Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the approach offered by the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, and Senator Lott, Senator Carper, and myself, and reject the approach offered by Senator Clinton and Senator Akaka. Senator Clinton said earlier that we are rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic but, in fact, that is what her amendment does. It takes the weak FEMA that we have now and moves it outside of the Department with no new personnel, no new function, no new authorities, no new funding, no infrastructure protection responsibilities, no new communications assets, no new medical assets, no new cyber-security assets. That is exactly contrary to the approach that we have taken. We have built a new FEMA within the Department with strong authorities-- authorities that FEMA has never had--to allow it to respond effectively to a disaster, regardless of its size. We create a new regional structure that will improve the management and the relationship with State and local governments. That is why the first responder groups are all supporting the Collins-Lieberman amendment, and I hope my colleagues will, too.

Ms. COLLINS. Fifteen minutes.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, those who are on the front lines--our police associations, our firefighters associations, the emergency medical personnel organizations--have all endorsed the approach we have suggested. This approach would strengthen FEMA but leave it within the Department of Homeland Security so we can establish a comprehensive all-hazards approach to emergency management. We do not want to take FEMA out of the Department in the way particularly that Senator Clinton's and Senator Akaka's amendment would entail. I refer my colleagues to page 7 of their amendment, section 612, ``Transfer Of Functions.'' This provision says the functions FEMA has as of the date of enactment should be transferred to the new agency. Well, let me tell you what that means. That means that preparedness would still be separate from response despite the fact that the experts agree that one of the reasons for FEMA's weak performance was the separation of preparedness from response--two sides of the same coin that should be together in one agency. Yet the Clinton-Akaka amendment keeps preparedness within the Department of Homeland Security and only has the response functions going to the new independent agency that they would propose. Our bill consolidates the grant-making for preparedness--that is billions of dollars of preparedness grants--we would put in the new FEMA. Infrastructure protection, the national communications system, the chief medical officer, the cybersecurity office all would be in this new agency which we call the U.S. Emergency Management Authority. So we are not simply leaving FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security; we are strengthening, reforming, and upgrading FEMA so it can be effective. I must say, I am at a loss why the proponents of the alternative approach want to take a FEMA that everyone deems is inadequate and has poorly performed, take this shell of an agency that has been stripped of many of its essential functions and cast it adrift by making it an independent agency. That approach makes absolutely no sense at all. If the problem were FEMA's location, then why did the Coast Guard do such a stellar job in performing in response to Hurricane Katrina? By all accounts, the Coast Guard's preparedness and its response were superb. It pre-positioned its assets, it responded quickly, and it rescued some 35,000 people. If the problem, in fact, were the location of the agency, then how did the Coast Guard manage to do such a good job? It is part of the Department of Homeland Security. Obviously, that is not the issue. What we have done in our proposal is give the new emergency management agency the same kinds of protections that the Coast Guard has within DHS. No longer could the agency's mission be altered or its assets stripped away or could it be reorganized. You would have to come to Congress to do that. The issue is how can we best create a strong emergency management agency. That is the question that our proposal answers. It stresses giving FEMA back the authorities that were stripped away. It emphasizes giving it new authority so that it can be a strong, all-hazards agency. It elevates the stature of the appointees. It requires them to have relevant experience for those positions. It gives it the tools to do the job effectively. It protects it from reorganization. It makes the head of the new agency the principal adviser to the President on emergency management, but it allows it to have all the advantages of being part of the Department of Homeland Security, the advantage of a close relationship with the Coast Guard, a close relationship with the law enforcement agencies that are within DHS. Taking the weakened version of FEMA and casting it adrift and thinking that somehow that is going to solve the problem flies in the face of the 23 hearings that we held to get to this solution, the 838,000 pages of evidence, the 325 people we interviewed, and the expertise of the first responder community. It would be a terrible mistake. The Hart-Rudman commission 5 years ago said FEMA is the essential core of DHS, and they are right. If FEMA were pulled out of DHS, DHS would be forced to create a very similar, costly, duplicative agency in order to handle a response to terrorist attacks. It makes no sense to have one agency that deals with natural disasters and another agency within DHS that deals with the response to terrorist attacks. If the levees in New Orleans had been bombed rather than breached, the same challenges of evacuation, sheltering, and caring for individuals would have been present. It makes no sense and will be extremely costly--to the tune of billions of dollars, according to Secretary Chertoff--for us to have to recreate within DHS essential capabilities that DHS will need if FEMA is taken out of the Department. I am reminded during this debate of a saying by H.L. Mencken that for every problem there is a solution that is neat, plausible, and wrong. Taking FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security is wrong. At first blush it may look like the easy solution. But after looking at this issue for more than 8 months, it is not the solution. I hope our colleagues will listen to the true experts, our first responders and their organizations warning that this would be a disaster, that it would force them and State and local emergency managers to have to deal with two agencies, two sets of regulations, depending on whether or not this was the result of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. That is contrary to the all-hazards approach that the experts have encouraged us to take. The Homeland Security Council, a very prestigious group of private sector businesses and experts, conducted its own 6-month review of what went wrong with the preparedness and response to Hurricane Katrina. It, too, concluded that DHS preparedness assets and FEMA need to be more closely aligned, not split apart into two separate agencies. I am going to reserve the remainder of my time. It is my understanding Senator Lautenberg will be speaking on this issue. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, our amendment would strengthen the capability, stature, and effectiveness of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The language in the amendment is largely drawn from S. 3595, the United States Emergency Management Authority Act, which we introduced in this Chamber 2 weeks ago. We believe this is the appropriate time and the right vehicle for improving our Nation's emergency management system. The wounds of Hurricane Katrina are still fresh. A new hurricane season is upon us, and the recent news on the law enforcement and military front reminds us that the terrorist threat to America continues. Bitter lessons have been learned from the experience in responding to Hurricane Katrina, but they have not yet been applied. The time for action is now. The amendment reflects the Senate Committee on Homeland Security's 8- month investigation into the failed preparations for response to Hurricane Katrina. As the Presiding Officer is well aware, the committee conducted an extensive and exhaustive investigation. We held some 23 hearings at which nearly 90 witnesses testified. We formally interviewed 325 individuals, and we reviewed some 838,000 pages of documents. We distilled all of this into a comprehensive report with many recommendations for improving the response at all levels of government. Some of these recommendations have to do with how the Federal Government should be organized to effectively respond to future disasters, whether they are manmade or whether they are natural ones such as Katrina. These recommendations have been distilled in part in USEMA legislation that forms the basis for this amendment. I note that this is the first step in implementing the committee's comprehensive recommendations. We will be introducing a subsequent bill to implement other findings and recommendations. Most significant will be a package of reforms to the Stafford Act, but that is not what we are proposing today. The amendment before us today has four key features. It seeks to restructure, reform, and strengthen the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, which we would rename as the United States Emergency Management Authority. The four key features are as follows: First, it would give this new authority statutory protection against administrative actions that could diminish its capabilities and effectiveness, such as department- wide reorganization that could strip essential functions away from the new agency. Second, it would ensure that the administrator has direct access to the President and serve as his principal adviser on emergency management issues. Third, it would reunite preparedness functions with response capabilities. After all, preparedness and response are really two sides of the same coin. I believe it was a mistake when the Department decided to strip FEMA of its preparedness functions. It would reestablish the agency's comprehensive responsibility and restore a full range of work relationships with State and local government, the essential partners in emergency response. Fourth, the amendment would strengthen the new authority's regional focus. I know that as a former mayor the Presiding Officer has a special appreciation for just how important it is for the Federal Government to work closely with State and local governments. That is an issue that he has brought up throughout this investigation. We would create Federal strike teams that have representatives from all the agencies that are involved on the Federal side of the response. They would be located in regional offices to foster cooperation, coordination, and joint training with State and local emergency managers and with first responders. A crisis, whether it is due to a hurricane, an ice storm, or a terrorist attack is the last time that people should be exchanging business cards. We should make sure the Federal, State, and local governments are training together, planning together, exercising together; that they know one another; that they know the culture, the capabilities, and the essentials. The overarching objective of the amendment is to strengthen FEMA which, as I pledged, we would propose to rename as the United States Emergency Management Authority. The new name signals a fresh start for FEMA with new authority, including some authority that it has never had before over critical infrastructure, for example. It signifies new capabilities and new responsibilities to all-hazards emergency preparedness and response. And, surely, those of us who investigated for some months the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, as well as anyone who followed the issue peripherally, can have no doubt that FEMA urgently needs to be restructured and reformed to be more effective. Part of this help entails giving the new people a special legal status within DHS. Our amendment's prohibition against further departmental reorganization of this agency and mission alterations affecting the authority will give USEMA exactly the same kind of protection that has already been extended to the Coast Guard and to the Secret Service. This is something completely new. We paralleled the kind of protection, the distinct legal status that is given to the Coast Guard and to the Secret Service. I know the Coast Guard was the stellar performer in the response to Katrina. The Coast Guard, by all accounts, did an exceptional job in its preparedness and response, yet as part of the Department of Homeland Security. I think those who think the answer is to sever FEMA or the new agency from the Department should take a hard look at the Coast Guard's experience. But in looking at the Coast Guard, I think we can also learn that it benefited from having this legal protection, and we would extend that to the newly constituted FEMA. This protection will help achieve congressional intent that DHS be the focus for comprehensive, all-hazards Federal preparation and response to disasters. When the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century memorandum recommended just 5 years ago a new approach to homeland security and that America establish a single department to plan, coordinate, and integrate homeland security operations, it called FEMA the necessary core of that new department. To that end, USEMA, like FEMA, needs to be a part of the DHS structure. That analysis has been confirmed by experience. Admiral Allen of the Coast Guard explained at one of our hearings that having FEMA and the Coast Guard in the same department leads to certain synergies that do not otherwise occur, and that led in particular to a 350-percent increase in joint training exercises. That is the kind of integration that we need more of. More generally, keeping key capabilities within a single DHS umbrella permits faster communication and response than a more formal and bureaucratic procedure required for interdepartmental requests from a setting within DHS. However, FEMA needs to have far better lines of communication. I know the Presiding Officer was as shocked as I was to hear the former head of FEMA, Michael Brown, talk about circumventing the chain of command within the Department and his failure to order critical commodities, to order the buses, to communicate just how dire the situation was in Louisiana. We want to make sure that we improve those lines of communication, both within the Department and between the Department and the White House and other agencies. That means giving the administrator more status. We would upgrade the administrator so he is the equivalent of a Deputy Secretary. That gives him more clout and more stature in dealing, for example, with the Department of Defense and other departments that play important roles in responding to a disaster. We designate the administrator of USEMA the principal adviser to the President on matters of emergency management. And we adopt a system that for the Pentagon has worked well in outlining the reporting responsibilities. We parallel the relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President. So there is both a reporting relationship to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and yet the new administrator would be the principal adviser to the President on emergency management. In addition--I think this also responds to a key weakness that our intensive investigation revealed--the administrator would be authorized to give recommendations directly to Congress. The administration would have to make sure he informs the Secretary of what he is going to say, but there is a direct link, a direct line of communication. I know the Presiding Officer recalls that Michael Brown claims he was stifled in reporting to Congress. We don't know for a fact whether that is an accurate statement. But we put in reforms to ensure that the administrator has the ability to communicate his recommendations, his needs, his findings directly to Congress. Our amendment, as I indicated, specifically rejects the notion that FEMA should be cut off of DHS and made a freestanding agency. The DHS needs FEMA's capability. What would happen if FEMA, a weak FEMA, were cast alone is that DHS would have to recreate many of the capabilities that FEMA has at great cost, at great duplication of effort. What we would end up having is one agency that deals with natural disasters and another agency within DHS that deals solely with disasters resulting from terrorist attacks. That makes no sense whatsoever. Many of the challenges in the aftermath of a catastrophe, whether it is manmade or natural, are exactly the same--sheltering people, getting them food and water, an evacuation plan. It also makes no sense from the perspective of State and local governments. We don't want them to just deal with one agency if they are planning for a natural disaster and another agency if they are planning for a terrorist attack since many of the challenges are identical. Just think, if the levees had been blown up by terrorists rather than breached by Hurricane Katrina, many of the challenges would have been exactly the same. There just would have been a stronger law enforcement component. It is a mistake, in that the Coast Guard's stellar performance proves it is a mistake, to think the location of FEMA is the cause of the problems. Even if that duplication were cost free, a virtual impossibility, the Secretary of the Department estimates it would cost billions of dollars to duplicate the necessary capabilities within DHS if FEMA were separated. Even if that were possibly cost free, it would be destructive. Divided preparation and response systems would force State and local officials to have to engage one to prepare for natural disasters and another for terror attacks. As one of our committee's expert witnesses, Professor Donald Kettl of the University of Pennsylvania, said: Separating response to terrorism from response to natural disasters, separating preparedness from response, separating FEMA from DHS, would inevitably bring problems. I agree with the professor. This is consistently what we hear from those who are on the front lines, from those who know what it takes to respond to a catastrophe. In that regard, I note that there is extraordinarily strong support from first responder groups for the Collins-Lieberman-Lott-Carper amendment. It has been endorsed by the National Troopers Coalition, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Association of Police Organizations, the National Sheriffs Association, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Congressional Fire Services Institute, Advocates for EMS, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the International Association of EMT's and Paramedics. This is quite a list of those who truly are on the front lines when it comes to responding to a disaster. I am very proud to have their support for our amendment. They recognize we have worked very hard and consulted fully with them to come up with the right approach. I also note the amendment we are offering has been endorsed by the Homeland Security and Defense Business Council. This is a council that provides advice to the Secretary. It is made up of very distinguished members of the private sector. They, too, have endorsed it. I ask unanimous consent these letters from first responder groups and from the Homeland Security and Defense Business Council be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I also note planning and response capabilities are already too weak in many States, as evidenced by the recent DHS reviews. We don't want to splinter those efforts further by needlessly multiplying their Federal points of contact. For many reasons, therefore, preserving those close working ties with other agencies within the Department, the new FEMA must stay within DHS. Allow me to briefly summarize a few more of the provisions of the bill before yielding to my colleague from Connecticut. First, as I mentioned, it establishes a strong position for the administrator of the new USEMA. This administrator would be nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and have the standing of a Deputy Secretary. Day by day, the administrator would report to the DHS Secretary, but the bill explicitly provides that direct line of communication to the President as well as the authority to make recommendations to Congress on which I have already elaborated. The amendment provides for two directors. There was an issue on which we worked very closely with DHS. The language we have incorporates the feedback we got from the Department. Both of these individuals--which, again, would be high-level individuals within the Department--would be nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and would provide the administrator and the Department with highly qualified professionals in preparedness and mitigation and in response and recovery. Our amendment would give the administrator responsibility for managing preparedness grant programs. The Presiding Officer knows, as the former mayor, that i you control some of the money that goes out to State and local governments, if you are helping to allocate that funding, you will have a good relationship with State and local governments. Inevitably, the authority follows the money. This is going to ensure we have far better coordination. This is an important restoration of authority to this agency. It was a mistake, in my view, that authority was taken away from FEMA. That will help ensure better oversight and coordination of preparedness at all levels of government. I have talked about how important I think these regional structures are for the new agency. It will ensure that Federal officials are familiar with the people, the vulnerabilities, the capabilities, and the resources of the regions they protect, and they won't be introducing themselves to strangers on unfamiliar ground when disaster strikes. I could not help but be struck during our hearings by the fact that so many individuals from FEMA were sent from region 1e--the region that the Senator from Connecticut and I represent, New England--down to New Orleans. I like to believe we New Englanders can handle anything, but the fact is, the response would be far more effective if we had people who are in the area who worked every day with the emergency management officials in the area, who understood the weaknesses and the strengths of particular States rather than sending someone from the Northeast down to the hurricane region or vice versa in times of an ice storm or some other disaster. Further recognizing the importance of multilevel governmental coordination, the bill creates a national advisory council on emergency preparedness and response that would be made up of State and local officials, emergency management professionals from the public, private, and NGO sectors to advise the administrator of USEMA. This is important. We know the critical role nonprofits and the Red Cross play. They, too, should be involved in the training, the planning, the exercising. We learned from our investigation that, too, was flawed. This will help ensure the agency's thinking does not proceed in a stovepipe, but is fortified with comments and expertise from a wide range of vitally concerned partners. Our amendment addresses the glaring and urgent needs highlighted in our investigation of Hurricane Katrina. As I mentioned, I am very pleased we have the support of so many experts. Nothing could speak more eloquently of the need for reform or be more encouraging than to receive the words of support from those who do put their lives on the line every day to protect the American people. We also have the support of the administration for this proposal. Amending the Homeland Security appropriations bill by adding the provisions of our USEMA bill will go far to ensuring in a timely way that we will have a far more effective structure to protect our fellow citizens' lives and livelihoods from disaster. I am very pleased this is a bipartisan effort. I recognize the work of the Senator from Connecticut who has led, with me, the investigation of the committee and the drafting of this legislation. We are also grateful for the input of Senator Lott who knows better than any of us--except his fellow Senators from Mississippi and Louisiana--the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. I am grateful for his input, as well as the input from Senator Carper who also has worked very hard on this issue. Finally, I recognize all of the participation of the Presiding Officer, Senator Coleman. There was no more loyal committee member who came to virtually every single hearing, participated actively, and contributed greatly to our investigation. I thank him for his work, as well Exhibit 1 July 11, 2006. Hon. Susan Collins, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Hon. Joseph Lieberman, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman: On behalf of the Homeland Security and Defense Business Council (the Council), I am writing to support S. 3595, the U.S. Emergency Management Authority Act. On behalf of the private sector, the Council is pleased to endorse this measure to reinvent, protect, and strengthen FEMA. The new FEMA, reconstituted as the U.S. Emergency Management Authority, would ensure that the nation will be better prepared to address, either, natural or man-made disasters. The Council is a non-partisan, non-profit 501 C6 organization that comprises the major companies that serve the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Our focus is to align private sector resources to support the mission of the Department on behalf of the nation's interests. The Council is pleased to see language that elevates the importance of FEMA within DHS and reunites preparedness functions with response capabilities. The Council supports provisions of S. 3595 that would: Give the new U.S. Emergency Management Authority statutory protection against actions that could diminish its capabilities and effectiveness; Ensure that the Administrator of US-EMA has direct access to the President and serves as Principal Emergency Management Advisor, at all times; Reunite preparedness functions with response capabilities to reestablish the agency's comprehensive responsibilities and restore the full range of working relationships with state and local government; and Strengthen the Authority's regional focus with federal strike teams for a faster and more coordinated response and to provide better familiarity with the states in which the strike teams will operate. Thank you for your continued commitment to improving emergency management and response and for engaging the private sector to leverage industry best practices. Should you have additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me anytime. Sincerely, Michael M. Meldon, Executive Director.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, since Senator Lautenberg has not arrived, I am going to continue to expound on why the Collins-Lieberman-Lott- Carper amendment should be agreed to and the Clinton-Akaka amendment should be rejected. As I look at this issue, I realize that people look back at FEMA with rose-colored glasses. There is this myth of the golden age of FEMA. Indeed, FEMA in the past has had some talented leaders which proves my point that this really is about leadership more than anything. Clearly, Michael Brown was an abysmal failure as FEMA's leader. There is unanimity on that as well. But the fact is, when FEMA was an independent agency, it also experienced severe problems dealing with major disasters. If you look at the GAO and other reports, and, indeed, the hearing records before the committee I now chair back after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, you could take out the word ``Andrew'' and substitute ``Katrina,'' and you would get exactly the same indictment. In the hearing after Hurricane Andrew, my colleague, Senator Akaka, noted the difficulties that FEMA has had with response to catastrophic disasters. It is those catastrophic disasters, the fact is, that FEMA has never been able to handle, both when it was independent and when it was in DHS. Our committee's bipartisan recommendation seeks to correct that problem by creating an agency with the capabilities for the first time to manage catastrophic disasters. The Government Accountability Office found that FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 ``raised serious doubts about whether FEMA is capable of responding to catastrophic disasters.'' This is when FEMA was an independent agency. In particular, the GAO said that ``the Federal strategy for response lacked provisions to assess damage, the needs of victims, to provide food, shelter, and other essential services when the needs of victims outstrip State and local resources.'' You could apply exactly the same words to what happened after Katrina. What we need is to build an agency that does have the capacity to respond to not just small- and medium-sized disasters but to true catastrophes. That is what our bill would do. We would have a stronger agency, better led, better organized, with new authorities and powers that FEMA has never had. We would give it the resources to be effective. Another important part of our amendment that, again, the Clinton- Akaka amendment completely lacks is the creation of regional strike teams that would be located in regions of the country and have representatives of all the Federal agencies that are involved in responding to a disaster. These strike teams would plan, train, and exercise with their State and local counterparts and with private sector groups that are involved in responding to a disaster such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. That is the kind of approach we need to be effective. We should have people in the region who already know the local officials, the vulnerabilities, the weaknesses, the strengths, the capabilities of the State and local systems, and can make sure that there are effective plans in place. We don't have that now. When Katrina struck, people were sent from region 1 in New England down to New Orleans and Mississippi to help out. They didn't know the people. They didn't know the geography. They didn't know the culture. They didn't have that much experience in dealing with hurricanes. That doesn't make any sense at all. We should have regionally based teams that can work with their partners at the State and local level and in the private sector. I am talking about working not just with the nonprofits such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army but also with the private sector, such as the local utility companies. That is an important partner as well. Instead, what we found with Katrina were problems in credentialing utility workers and other private sector workers so they couldn't, in some cases, gain access to the disaster area. We have given a lot of thought to how to do this right. This wasn't cobbled together overnight. It avoids the simplistic solution, which is no solution at all, of just saying: Let's take this weak, dysfunctional agency, this discredited agency, cut it loose from DHS, and somehow all will be well. All will not be well. In fact, it would be a disaster to have FEMA, with its very limited current authorities, cast off as a separate agency. Thad Allen said it well when he pointed out that since FEMA and the Coast Guard have been part of the same Department, there has been a 350-percent increase in joint training. That is what we want. We don't want a bureaucratic structure. We want people to plan, train, and exercise together. If they are in different agencies, that is not going to happen. FEMA is not going to have the advantage of working closely with those relevant agencies within the Department. Another problem of the Clinton-Akaka amendment is that it would leave the preparedness functions in the Department of Homeland Security. I suspect I know why they did that. They did that because they realize the Department of Homeland Security has to have those preparedness functions. It needs to be able to prepare to respond to a terrorist attack. So they kept that function there. But how does it make sense for FEMA to be only a response agency? That is what led us to the failed response to Katrina. Preparedness had been stripped off from FEMA. So this makes no sense at all. Another criticism has been that FEMA lacks right now the authority to award preparedness grants. Yet the Clinton-Akaka amendment keeps that problem. It would keep the preparedness grants that go to State and local governments in the Department of Homeland Security, and yet would have this agency, FEMA, which is supposed to be working with State and local governments, with no authority over the funding for preparedness. That doesn't make any sense either. I hope this body will recognize that the Homeland Security Committee has done a great deal of work. I hope they will listen to these first responder groups who say: Keep FEMA within DHS, but make it work. That is exactly what our amendment would do. I see that the Senator from Connecticut has come to the floor. I would like to yield to him, if that is acceptable with the manager of the bill.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Lieberman and I be recognized for 30 minutes equally divided, but that prior to that recognition, my colleague from South Dakota be recognized for not to exceed 10 minutes.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no objection to that request. I would not object.

Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will withhold, I will object to that because the Senator from Connecticut and I had been planning to speak at 11:30. So what I would suggest, if it would be acceptable to the Senator from Illinois, is that the Senator from Connecticut and I would cut our time from 30 minutes to 20 minutes but proceed immediately before the other Members are recognized. Would that be acceptable to the Senator from Illinois, since we were here first?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join my friend and colleague, Senator Lieberman, in introducing a bill that addresses an urgent challenge facing our Nation: the need to ensure a strong and effective capability to deal with natural and manmade disasters, whether they are hurricanes and ice storms or terrorist attacks and pandemic diseases. The U.S. Emergency Management Authority Act is intended to remedy many of the glaring deficiencies that we all saw in the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. The U.S.-EMA bill reflects the evidence that the Senate Homeland Security Committee examined during the course of an exhaustive and bipartisan 7-month investigation. The committee convened 22 hearings, heard testimony from 85 witnesses, conducted more than 325 formal interviews, and examined more than 838,000 pages of documents. The result is a 737-page report that contains 88 recommendations for improving our emergency management system at all levels of government. Our legislation is an important first step toward implementing the committee's major recommendations for reforming FEMA. We will, as my colleague, Senator Lieberman, indicated, be introducing subsequent legislation to implement other recommendations. The four key features of the bill that we introduce today will, first, give the new authority statutory protection against actions that could diminish its capabilities and effectiveness, such as departmental reorganizations; second, ensure that the administrator of U.S.-EMA has direct access to the President; third, reunite preparedness functions with response capabilities while expanding U.S.-EMA's authority over other key functions; and fourth, strengthen the authority's regional focus with Federal strike teams for faster, more coordinated and effective responses. Senator Lieberman and I strongly believe that the best way to achieve the goal of improving the Federal Government's ability to protect American citizens from disaster, to mitigate the impacts, and to promote recovery is to strengthen and expand the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which we have proposed to rename the U.S. Emergency Management Authority. As we saw so starkly and so tragically demonstrated last year, FEMA simply must be made far more effective. We believe FEMA needs special status within the Department of Homeland Security. Our bill would extend to the reconstituted FEMA the same kinds of statutory protections against departmental reorganizations and raids on resources that currently shield the Coast Guard and the Secret Service. I acknowledge the critical role played by the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Lott, in helping us draft this portion of the bill. FEMA would also require more regional focus and closer coordination with local State entities, as well as with our nongovernmental partners. They are the first line of response in a disaster. Our legislation bolsters the role of FEMA's regional centers by authorizing the creation of multiagency strike teams to ensure rapid and effective cooperation with first responders and public officials in disaster areas. These strike teams would comprise representatives from all of the Federal agencies that play a role in responding to the disasters. They would train and exercise with their State and local counterparts. I was struck by the fact that during our investigation, we learned that FEMA sent officials from region I--New England--down to help out in New Orleans. Often they were the lead officials. These were trained and dedicated people, but just think how much more effective they could have been if they had been stationed in the region and working regularly with the public officials in that region and with the first responders. We believe FEMA needs top-level access and visibility. The administrator of the new U.S. Emergency Management Authority would be designated by our bill as the principal adviser to the President on matters of emergency management and would have direct access to the President. This would establish the administrator in a capacity that is analogous to that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the administrator would be authorized to communicate any recommendations, any needs and requirements directly to Congress. Our intention to keep the strengthened FEMA as part of DHS has stirred more debate than perhaps any other of our recommendations emerging from the Katrina investigation. Some Members of this Chamber, as well as proponents of a bill introduced in the House, insist that FEMA must be extracted from the Department of Homeland Security and restored to independent status. We share the view that the actions of both FEMA and DHS officials before and during the Katrina disaster revealed troubling and, at times, shocking lapses in awareness, agility, and judgment. But we also believe that both logic and practical realities point to reform, not amputation, as the best approach to improved protection for our citizens. Please recall that it was only 5 years ago--before the 9/11 terror attacks--that the distinguished panel chaired by two of our former colleagues, Senator Hart and Senator Rudman, recommended that America establish a single agency to plan, coordinate, and integrate homeland security operations. The Commission correctly deduced that FEMA was the ``necessary core'' of that new department, and Congress agreed. The logic of that decision stands intact. The Department of Homeland Security's mission extends to all types of hazards and to preparation and mitigation as well as to response. DHS needs FEMA's capabilities and would have to re-create many of them at great cost and with great duplication of effort if FEMA were to be removed from the Department. Even if that re-creation could somehow be done economically--and the evidence is that it would cost billions of dollars--the result would be new problems for State and local officials who direct first responders. Bifurcated, competing preparedness systems would force State and local officials to engage one system to prepare for natural disasters and another to prepare for terrorist attacks. That does not make sense. Many of the response capabilities are exactly the same whether the catastrophe is caused by a natural disaster such as a hurricane or whether it is the result of a terrorist attack. We know planning and response capabilities are already far too weak in many States. DHS's recent survey of the States proves that. We should not make the problem worse. For those who argue that FEMA simply cannot thrive, cannot be successful within DHS, an obvious and telling question arises: How, then, did the U.S. Coast Guard, also a unit within DHS, emerge as the universally acclaimed hero of the Katrina response? Everyone believes the Coast Guard was the stellar performer, yet the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security. So clearly FEMA's problem does not lie in its placement within DHS. Unlike FEMA, however, the Coast Guard has congressionally mandated protections, and our legislation would extend that exact same protection to FEMA's successor agency. The temptation to think that the answer is simply to remove FEMA is strong, but it is wrong. Just as not all motion is forward, not every change is progress. Emergency management expert Professor Donald Kettl of the University of Pennsylvania put it well when he told our committee: It is tempting to send a strong signal by pulling FEMA out of DHS. But that would only undermine its ability to accomplish its mission. Breaking these pieces apart-- separating response to terrorism from response to natural disasters, separating preparedness from response, separating FEMA from DHS--would inevitably bring problems. I would suggest these are just a few of the serious implications that severing FEMA from DHS would cause. First, coordination and reaction time would suffer. David Paulison, the new Director of FEMA, says that he closely coordinates with the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, and the Secret Service through weekly meetings. In times of disaster, he can simply make a request to these fellow DHS units; he doesn't have to go through a bureaucratic, formal process. They are all parts of the same department. Second, training and preparedness would suffer. ADM Thad Allen of the Coast Guard testified before the committee that having FEMA within DHS has allowed much closer working ties and a 350-percent increase in joint training exercises. Third, DHS's mission capability would suffer. The Homeland Security Act specifies that part of DHS's mission was to act as the focal point for natural and manmade emergencies and for emergency planning. As the Comptroller General has said: Removing FEMA from DHS might impact the ability of the department and its remaining components and FEMA itself in fully addressing the close links between preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery from all hazards. Fourth, State and local governments would suffer. If preparedness functions for natural disasters and terrorist attacks were divided, State and local governments would have to deal with two primary points of contact, two sets of regulations, two sources of funding, and two sets of officials. It greatly complicates their tasks. Fifth, I strongly believe that FEMA would suffer. Removed from DHS, FEMA would lose many of the working relationships I have already described as well as the direct access to the information-gathering and analysis capabilities of other DHS agencies. This would degrade FEMA's ability to plan and train for both natural and manmade disasters and to make efficient use of grant-making authority. To me, it is clear that a strengthened--a much strengthened--FEMA still belongs in DHS, that the necessary reforms can be carried out while it remains in DHS, and that severing FEMA from DHS would create a host of new problems, resulting in considerable extra expense and duplication, without securing any significant benefits. It is worth noting that America's largest group of first responders has come to the same conclusion. The president of the 274,000-member International Association of Firefighters has written us to say: Removing FEMA would hinder--rather than help--efforts to reform our Nation's emergency response system. Having both a DHS and an independent FEMA would create confusion among local response personnel and lead to an unproductive duplication of efforts and turf battles. Having summarized what I see as compelling arguments for strengthening and protecting FEMA as a component of DHS, let me outline some of the key provisions of our U.S.-EMA bill. First, the bill establishes a strong position for the Administrator of the U.S. Emergency Management Authority. Once nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Administrator will have the standing of a Deputy Secretary, and will operate on a reporting and chain of command model like that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Day to day, the Administrator will report to the DHS Secretary, but the bill explicitly provides a direct line of communication between the President and the Administrator during a catastrophe. In addition, the Administrator may make whatever recommendations to Congress that he or she deems appropriate. The bill provides for directors, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to provide the Administrator with highly qualified professionals in Preparedness and Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Apart from bolstering the organization, authorizing these posts would send a clear signal to the Nation's Governors and mayors that they will have people of stature with whom to work and confer. Besides providing the Administrator of U.S.-EMA with an advisory link to the President, the bill specifically tasks the Administrator with providing the federal leadership necessary to prepare for and respond to a disaster, whether man-made or natural. It gives the Administrator responsibility for administering preparedness grant programs, and for monitoring and evaluating the readiness of each of the emergency support functions under the national response plan. These are critical steps for ensuring close cooperation and oversight of preparedness at all levels of government. The bill specifies that U.S.-EMA is a distinct entity and protects it from reorganization without explicit Congressional approval. This gives U.S.-EMA security identical to that of the Coast Guard. Another critical element of the bill authorizes a strong regional structure for U.S.-EMA and creates regionally based federal strike teams for rapid response. This will ensure that U.S.-EMA officials are familiar with the people, the vulnerabilities, and the resources of the regions they protect, and will not be introducing themselves to strangers on unfamiliar ground when disaster strikes. Further recognizing the importance of mult-level government coordination, the bill creates a national advisory council on emergency preparedness and response--made up of State and local officials and emergency management professionals from public, private and NGO sectors--to advise the Administrator of U.S.-EMA. Our bill provides a statutory basis for chief medical officer to advise the DHS Secretary on medical and public-health issues. Other sections promote public and community preparedness; evaluate the effectiveness of equipment for first responders; reauthorize and expand the emergency management assistance compact; and create an office of terrorism prevention at DHS. Mr. President, the U.S. Emergency Management Authority Act is not a symbolic gesture, or a quick fix for our problems. It is a thoroughly researched, carefully drafted collection of reforms that will lay the foundation for years of hard work. The result, we firmly believe, will be a significantly more effective national system of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery against natural disasters and terror attacks. Building on the insights of the Hart-Rudman Commission and on the important advances embodied in the Homeland Security Act, the U.S.-EMA bill will greatly improve the protections that American citizens need, and deserve. Mr. President, my statement has outlined the reforms we are making to this new agency. They are considerable. They are going to make a real difference, and I hope we can pass legislation before the end of this year to greatly strengthen and improve FEMA and our emergency response system and preparedness on all levels of government.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join my friend and colleague, Senator Lieberman, in introducing a bill that addresses an urgent challenge facing our Nation: the need to ensure a strong and effective capability to deal with natural and manmade disasters, whether they are hurricanes and ice storms or terrorist attacks and pandemic diseases. The U.S. Emergency Management Authority Act is intended to remedy many of the glaring deficiencies that we all saw in the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. The U.S.-EMA bill reflects the evidence that the Senate Homeland Security Committee examined during the course of an exhaustive and bipartisan 7-month investigation. The committee convened 22 hearings, heard testimony from 85 witnesses, conducted more than 325 formal interviews, and examined more than 838,000 pages of documents. The result is a 737-page report that contains 88 recommendations for improving our emergency management system at all levels of government. Our legislation is an important first step toward implementing the committee's major recommendations for reforming FEMA. We will, as my colleague, Senator Lieberman, indicated, be introducing subsequent legislation to implement other recommendations. The four key features of the bill that we introduce today will, first, give the new authority statutory protection against actions that could diminish its capabilities and effectiveness, such as departmental reorganizations; second, ensure that the administrator of U.S.-EMA has direct access to the President; third, reunite preparedness functions with response capabilities while expanding U.S.-EMA's authority over other key functions; and fourth, strengthen the authority's regional focus with Federal strike teams for faster, more coordinated and effective responses. Senator Lieberman and I strongly believe that the best way to achieve the goal of improving the Federal Government's ability to protect American citizens from disaster, to mitigate the impacts, and to promote recovery is to strengthen and expand the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which we have proposed to rename the U.S. Emergency Management Authority. As we saw so starkly and so tragically demonstrated last year, FEMA simply must be made far more effective. We believe FEMA needs special status within the Department of Homeland Security. Our bill would extend to the reconstituted FEMA the same kinds of statutory protections against departmental reorganizations and raids on resources that currently shield the Coast Guard and the Secret Service. I acknowledge the critical role played by the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Lott, in helping us draft this portion of the bill. FEMA would also require more regional focus and closer coordination with local State entities, as well as with our nongovernmental partners. They are the first line of response in a disaster. Our legislation bolsters the role of FEMA's regional centers by authorizing the creation of multiagency strike teams to ensure rapid and effective cooperation with first responders and public officials in disaster areas. These strike teams would comprise representatives from all of the Federal agencies that play a role in responding to the disasters. They would train and exercise with their State and local counterparts. I was struck by the fact that during our investigation, we learned that FEMA sent officials from region I--New England--down to help out in New Orleans. Often they were the lead officials. These were trained and dedicated people, but just think how much more effective they could have been if they had been stationed in the region and working regularly with the public officials in that region and with the first responders. We believe FEMA needs top-level access and visibility. The administrator of the new U.S. Emergency Management Authority would be designated by our bill as the principal adviser to the President on matters of emergency management and would have direct access to the President. This would establish the administrator in a capacity that is analogous to that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the administrator would be authorized to communicate any recommendations, any needs and requirements directly to Congress. Our intention to keep the strengthened FEMA as part of DHS has stirred more debate than perhaps any other of our recommendations emerging from the Katrina investigation. Some Members of this Chamber, as well as proponents of a bill introduced in the House, insist that FEMA must be extracted from the Department of Homeland Security and restored to independent status. We share the view that the actions of both FEMA and DHS officials before and during the Katrina disaster revealed troubling and, at times, shocking lapses in awareness, agility, and judgment. But we also believe that both logic and practical realities point to reform, not amputation, as the best approach to improved protection for our citizens. Please recall that it was only 5 years ago--before the 9/11 terror attacks--that the distinguished panel chaired by two of our former colleagues, Senator Hart and Senator Rudman, recommended that America establish a single agency to plan, coordinate, and integrate homeland security operations. The Commission correctly deduced that FEMA was the ``necessary core'' of that new department, and Congress agreed. The logic of that decision stands intact. The Department of Homeland Security's mission extends to all types of hazards and to preparation and mitigation as well as to response. DHS needs FEMA's capabilities and would have to re-create many of them at great cost and with great duplication of effort if FEMA were to be removed from the Department. Even if that re-creation could somehow be done economically--and the evidence is that it would cost billions of dollars--the result would be new problems for State and local officials who direct first responders. Bifurcated, competing preparedness systems would force State and local officials to engage one system to prepare for natural disasters and another to prepare for terrorist attacks. That does not make sense. Many of the response capabilities are exactly the same whether the catastrophe is caused by a natural disaster such as a hurricane or whether it is the result of a terrorist attack. We know planning and response capabilities are already far too weak in many States. DHS's recent survey of the States proves that. We should not make the problem worse. For those who argue that FEMA simply cannot thrive, cannot be successful within DHS, an obvious and telling question arises: How, then, did the U.S. Coast Guard, also a unit within DHS, emerge as the universally acclaimed hero of the Katrina response? Everyone believes the Coast Guard was the stellar performer, yet the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security. So clearly FEMA's problem does not lie in its placement within DHS. Unlike FEMA, however, the Coast Guard has congressionally mandated protections, and our legislation would extend that exact same protection to FEMA's successor agency. The temptation to think that the answer is simply to remove FEMA is strong, but it is wrong. Just as not all motion is forward, not every change is progress. Emergency management expert Professor Donald Kettl of the University of Pennsylvania put it well when he told our committee: It is tempting to send a strong signal by pulling FEMA out of DHS. But that would only undermine its ability to accomplish its mission. Breaking these pieces apart-- separating response to terrorism from response to natural disasters, separating preparedness from response, separating FEMA from DHS--would inevitably bring problems. I would suggest these are just a few of the serious implications that severing FEMA from DHS would cause. First, coordination and reaction time would suffer. David Paulison, the new Director of FEMA, says that he closely coordinates with the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, and the Secret Service through weekly meetings. In times of disaster, he can simply make a request to these fellow DHS units; he doesn't have to go through a bureaucratic, formal process. They are all parts of the same department. Second, training and preparedness would suffer. ADM Thad Allen of the Coast Guard testified before the committee that having FEMA within DHS has allowed much closer working ties and a 350-percent increase in joint training exercises. Third, DHS's mission capability would suffer. The Homeland Security Act specifies that part of DHS's mission was to act as the focal point for natural and manmade emergencies and for emergency planning. As the Comptroller General has said: Removing FEMA from DHS might impact the ability of the department and its remaining components and FEMA itself in fully addressing the close links between preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery from all hazards. Fourth, State and local governments would suffer. If preparedness functions for natural disasters and terrorist attacks were divided, State and local governments would have to deal with two primary points of contact, two sets of regulations, two sources of funding, and two sets of officials. It greatly complicates their tasks. Fifth, I strongly believe that FEMA would suffer. Removed from DHS, FEMA would lose many of the working relationships I have already described as well as the direct access to the information-gathering and analysis capabilities of other DHS agencies. This would degrade FEMA's ability to plan and train for both natural and manmade disasters and to make efficient use of grant-making authority. To me, it is clear that a strengthened--a much strengthened--FEMA still belongs in DHS, that the necessary reforms can be carried out while it remains in DHS, and that severing FEMA from DHS would create a host of new problems, resulting in considerable extra expense and duplication, without securing any significant benefits. It is worth noting that America's largest group of first responders has come to the same conclusion. The president of the 274,000-member International Association of Firefighters has written us to say: Removing FEMA would hinder--rather than help--efforts to reform our Nation's emergency response system. Having both a DHS and an independent FEMA would create confusion among local response personnel and lead to an unproductive duplication of efforts and turf battles. Having summarized what I see as compelling arguments for strengthening and protecting FEMA as a component of DHS, let me outline some of the key provisions of our U.S.-EMA bill. First, the bill establishes a strong position for the Administrator of the U.S. Emergency Management Authority. Once nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Administrator will have the standing of a Deputy Secretary, and will operate on a reporting and chain of command model like that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Day to day, the Administrator will report to the DHS Secretary, but the bill explicitly provides a direct line of communication between the President and the Administrator during a catastrophe. In addition, the Administrator may make whatever recommendations to Congress that he or she deems appropriate. The bill provides for directors, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to provide the Administrator with highly qualified professionals in Preparedness and Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Apart from bolstering the organization, authorizing these posts would send a clear signal to the Nation's Governors and mayors that they will have people of stature with whom to work and confer. Besides providing the Administrator of U.S.-EMA with an advisory link to the President, the bill specifically tasks the Administrator with providing the federal leadership necessary to prepare for and respond to a disaster, whether man-made or natural. It gives the Administrator responsibility for administering preparedness grant programs, and for monitoring and evaluating the readiness of each of the emergency support functions under the national response plan. These are critical steps for ensuring close cooperation and oversight of preparedness at all levels of government. The bill specifies that U.S.-EMA is a distinct entity and protects it from reorganization without explicit Congressional approval. This gives U.S.-EMA security identical to that of the Coast Guard. Another critical element of the bill authorizes a strong regional structure for U.S.-EMA and creates regionally based federal strike teams for rapid response. This will ensure that U.S.-EMA officials are familiar with the people, the vulnerabilities, and the resources of the regions they protect, and will not be introducing themselves to strangers on unfamiliar ground when disaster strikes. Further recognizing the importance of mult-level government coordination, the bill creates a national advisory council on emergency preparedness and response--made up of State and local officials and emergency management professionals from public, private and NGO sectors--to advise the Administrator of U.S.-EMA. Our bill provides a statutory basis for chief medical officer to advise the DHS Secretary on medical and public-health issues. Other sections promote public and community preparedness; evaluate the effectiveness of equipment for first responders; reauthorize and expand the emergency management assistance compact; and create an office of terrorism prevention at DHS. Mr. President, the U.S. Emergency Management Authority Act is not a symbolic gesture, or a quick fix for our problems. It is a thoroughly researched, carefully drafted collection of reforms that will lay the foundation for years of hard work. The result, we firmly believe, will be a significantly more effective national system of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery against natural disasters and terror attacks. Building on the insights of the Hart-Rudman Commission and on the important advances embodied in the Homeland Security Act, the U.S.-EMA bill will greatly improve the protections that American citizens need, and deserve. Mr. President, my statement has outlined the reforms we are making to this new agency. They are considerable. They are going to make a real difference, and I hope we can pass legislation before the end of this year to greatly strengthen and improve FEMA and our emergency response system and preparedness on all levels of government.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am delighted that our opening prayer this morning was so eloquently delivered by the Reverend Ken Dutille of Swans Island Atlantic Baptist Church in my home State of Maine. It is a great pleasure to welcome him to the Senate today. In fact, as he offered the invocation in this Chamber 11 years ago, on October 18, 1995, it is a pleasure to welcome him back to the Senate today. Pastor Dutille's words give direction and purpose to our work. His actions also inspire us; they are a vivid reminder of the commitment and compassion that exists among people of faith throughout our Nation. His ministry is truly unique. His church is joined with churches on three other islands to form the Maine Sea Coast Mission. This nondenominational organization was founded more than a century ago to provide spiritual guidance and educational opportunities to the remote seafaring communities of Downeast Maine. In its early years, the mission's boat, which was called Hope, would deliver a minister to isolated island communities where there were no churches and books where there were no libraries. Today, the Sunbeam V not only continues that vital work, but it also serves as a mobile health clinic bringing medical services--including screenings, inoculations, and telemedicine--to four islands that otherwise would not have access to medical services. Pastor Dutille is the founder of another outstanding mission project, the Bread of Life Food Pantry on Swans Island. The food pantry is often all that stands between the pangs of hunger and a healthy meal for some people in this disadvantaged area of my State. Although the demands upon the food pantry are always considerable, they increased exponentially this last July when the only grocery store on Swans Island was destroyed by fire. The pastor and the rest of the mission community immediately rose to the challenge with a major fundraising campaign. The power of God was evident in their strength of purpose as they responded to this crisis. The pastor is a fisher of people and a person of many accomplishments. He is a graduate of the Baptist Bible College in Springfield, MO, as well as of the University of Maine. He holds a master's degree from the California Graduate School of Theology. He has served in churches throughout Maine and has preached throughout New England. He is a published author, too, and a successful small business owner. He has also had experience that all of us can relate to. In a previous community, he served as a town selectman, so he has a keen understanding of the challenges of public service, as his opening prayer demonstrated today. It is a great pleasure to have such a dedicated spiritual and civic leader with us today and giving the opening prayer. I am sure I speak for all of my colleagues in extending him a warm welcome and in giving thanks for his inspiring prayer. Thank you, Mr. President.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this morning, at 10 a.m., the Senate will vote on the supplemental appropriations conference report. Following the vote, the Senate will resume consideration of the Defense authorization bill. The two managers have made substantial progress, but we will need to work through a number of amendments today in order to complete the bill in a timely fashion. Those Senators who have amendments should be working with Chairman Warner and Senator Levin to get in the queue. The Santorum amendment on Iran is the pending business and we will need to schedule a vote on that today. The majority leader has announced that Members should stay close to the floor so that we can make significant progress during today's session.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the chairman.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair. I rise in strong support of the fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation provides essential resources to our troops, whether they are engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, in training and service at home, or in deployments in other countries around the world. I thank my colleagues, the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senators Warner and Levin, for putting together an excellent bill and also for their strong commitment to our Nation's Armed Forces. Through the leadership of Chairman Warner and Senator Talent, the Seapower Subcommittee chairman, the legislation before us strengthens our Nation's shipbuilding program by authorizing construction of eight new ships and by providing $12.1 billion in shipbuilding moneys, an increase of $1.5 billion above the President's request. This legislation wisely focuses on the declining size of the Navy fleet and takes significant strides toward strengthening the shipbuilding program. It also provides some much needed stability for the industrial base that will be called upon to build and sustain the current force and the future fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mullen, has put forward a 313- ship long-range Navy shipbuilding plan that is a genuine effort to address longstanding congressional concerns that Navy shipbuilding has been inadequately funded and has lacked stability from year to year. Past instability has made it difficult for shipbuilders to plan their businesses. That degree of instability, coupled with less-than-economic production rates, has contributed to significant cost growth in naval shipbuilding programs. The CNO's plan, combined with more robust funding from Congress, will begin to reverse the dangerous decline in Navy shipbuilding. I am pleased that this bill provides full funding for the DD(X) destroyer program, including split funding of the first two ships' detailed design and construction. The DD(X) is so important to our future national security. This ship will have high-tech capabilities that currently do not exist on the Navy's surface combatants. These capabilities include far greater offensive and precision firepower, advanced stealth technologies, numerous engineering and technological innovations that will allow for reduced crew size and thus help to reduce the lifecycle cost of the ship and sophisticated, advanced weapons systems such as the electromagnetic rail gun. Constructing the first two DD(X)s in 2007 and 2008 will contribute to the sustainment of our Nation's highly skilled shipbuilding workforces, including the employees at Bath Iron Works in my home State of Maine. I am very proud of these highly skilled workers and their contributions to our Nation's defense. Split funding between the first two DD(X) ships is a key component of the CNO's 313-ship plan and will make an important contribution to stabilizing a critical naval shipbuilding program, allowing for a more steady plan for the fragile dual-source service combatant shipbuilding industrial base, and achieving long-term program affordability through stability and other ongoing Navy and industry initiatives. Split funding for the DD(X) also supports cost-effective construction activities at both of our shipbuilding yards that concentrate on surface combatants. That will help stabilize and preserve two shipyards in order to meet future Navy requirements. If there were ever any doubt about the need to have two shipyards capable of constructing surface combatants, surely those doubts were put to rest by the extensive damage that Hurricane Katrina caused at the Ingalls Shipyard. We simply cannot afford to have only one shipyard that is capable of responding to the needs of our Navy for capable advanced surface combatants. That is why it is so critical that our procurement strategies recognize that and are developed and designed to sustain both yards. In doing so, we are helping the Navy meet its needs. Our naval fleet has been declining for far too many years. This bill will take a significant step toward stability and meeting the requirements that exist. The high priority placed on the DD(X) program in the Senate version of the Defense authorization bill stands in stark contrast to the House Defense authorization bill that recommends full funding for the procurement of only one DD(X) and does not adopt the critical split funding approach. Failure to support the budget for two DD(X)s would exacerbate the production gap facing BIW in Maine and would pose a significant risk to the DD(X) program that the CNO has so strongly endorsed and that the committee has consistently supported. Navy officials testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that authorizing only one DD(X) in fiscal year 2007 would result in the following negative consequences. First, it would cause significant program delay and disruption. Second, it would increase program costs. Third, it would have a negative impact on the shipbuilder industrial base. Fourth, it would defer the planned competitive contract awards from 2009 until at least 2011. And, finally, it would force the Navy into a lead-follow scenario that would require an additional $450 million in shipbuilding funds. Approval of split funding is, therefore, critical to moving the DD(X) program forward. It strives to keep both DD(X) shipbuilders on an equal footing during this key transitional period. Furthermore, the House version of the DOD authorization bill recommends reducing the overall DD(X) program to only two ships, a significant decrease from the Navy's requirement for a minimum of seven DD(X)s as part of the 313-ship plan. At one point a couple of years ago, the Navy said it actually needs 12 DD(X)s. I still believe the military requirements suggest that that is the accurate number. But for the House committee to slash the number of ships under this program to two would seriously jeopardize our national security. I hope we will proceed with the Senate's much better plan to proceed with a minimum of seven DD(X) ships. I am also pleased that the committee agreed to my request for $25 million in funding to accomplish planning and engineering for the modernization of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer class. This program, which has been in effect in the past few years, is already showing significant promise of significant savings to the Navy by applying some of the technology that is being developed for the destroyer of the 21st century, the DD(X), and backfitting the DDG. This has the potential, for example, to reduce crew size on the retrofitted DDGs by about 30 to 40 sailors. That certainly is significant as well. The Senate's fiscal year 2007 Defense authorization bill also includes funding for other important defense-related projects that benefit Maine and our national security. For example, it includes additional funding for the Mark V fast patrol boat that is being developed at a shipyard in Maine, in conjunction with the University of Maine. It also provides $2 million to the University of Maine's Army Center of Excellence in order to continue the design and testing of lightweight ballistic panel tent inserts made from composite materials. These potentially lifesaving panels protect our troops from insurgent attacks when they are sheltered in temporary dining or sleeping facilities in hostile environments. This is particularly important to the State of Maine because we lost National Guardsmen in Iraq who were eating in an unprotected mess tent. Had we had those composite ballistic inserts for this tent, truly, I believe, lives and injuries would have been saved and avoided. The legislation also authorizes $9.6 million for the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Drydock Waterfront Support Facility in Kittery, ME. This will replace the current submarine support center that is more than 60 years old and poorly designed for current use. This legislation also provides much needed funds for other national priorities. The legislation authorizes incentive payments for civilian health care providers who provide services to TRICARE beneficiaries in rural and medically underserved areas. I know that is a concern of the Presiding Officer as well. Any of us who represent rural States realize how difficult it is to ensure an adequate supply of health care providers. It also follows on the Senate's action earlier this year by repealing provisions of the Survivor Benefit Plan that require the offset of military retirement annuity payments by amounts received for dependency and indemnity compensation. It authorizes acceleration of the effective date of the paid-up provision from October 1, 2008, to October 1, 2006, for retirees who reach age 70 and have paid premiums for 30 years. Finally, let me again, since the distinguished chairman is now in the Chamber, commend him for his extraordinary leadership and dedication to the men and women who are serving in our Armed Forces. We are very fortunate to have such a talented and committed chairman and ranking minority member as we do on this committee. I am very proud to be a member. I offer my full support to the important legislation before us. I yield the floor.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, is the floor open to debate on the underlying bill, or would the Presiding Officer advise me as to the pending business?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privileges of the floor be granted to a fellow in my office, Michelle Aykol, for the duration of the Senate's debate on S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer my strong support and endorsement of the confirmation of Ambassador Susan Schwab as U.S. Trade Representative. During her long career in public service, Ambassador Schwab has dedicated herself to advocating for the best interests of the United States in the global economy. I was delighted when I learned that the President had nominated her for the position of U.S. Trade Representative, a position for which she is ideally suited. Throughout the 1980s, Ambassador Schwab was as a trade policy specialist and then legislative director for Senator John C. Danforth, playing a major role in numerous U.S. trade policy initiatives, including landmark trade legislation that Congress enacted in 1984 and 1988. While serving on the staff of Senator William S. Cohen and as staff director of the Subcommittee on Government Oversight, I worked closely with Ambassador Schwab on a number of trade issues affecting Maine and its industries. In particular, Ambassador Schwab worked with our staff to support Maine's shoe industry and its workers during the industry's massive dislocations in the 1980s. She was instrumental in helping us develop legislation to address the industry's dire situation in those years, including critical improvements to antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard provisions. She also worked closely with our staff to improve market access for Maine agricultural goods in foreign markets. Ambassador Schwab's professional and personal record of service will enable her to effectively represent U.S. interests around the world. She will make an outstanding U.S. Trade Representative.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to speak on S.J. Res. 1, the Marriage Protection Amendment to the Constitution. Let me begin my remarks by stating my position on the issues raised by this amendment. First, it is my strong personal belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. Second, principles of federalism dictate that the responsibility to define marriage belongs to the States. Third, the proper role of the Federal Government is to ensure that each State can exercise that right and responsibility by preventing, as the Defense of Marriage Act does, one State from imposing its view on others. The constitutional amendment under consideration would potentially affect two types of relationships that are fundamental to our society. The first is the union between a man and a woman. The second is the compact between the States and the Federal Government. In our zeal to protect the former, we must not do unnecessary harm to the latter, as it is the bedrock principle of our country's highly successful Federal system. When the Senate considered this amendment in July 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Court had only recently issued its 4-to-3 decision in the Goodridge case. I urged that we should not overreact to the single decision of a State court and rush to amend the Constitution in such a way as to strip away from our States a power they have exercised, wisely for the most part, for more than 200 years. I also opposed efforts to amend the Constitution without evidence suggesting that States could not be trusted to make decisions in this area for themselves. During the period since our last debate, many States have taken steps to define marriage within their borders. Currently, 45 States have enacted laws or constitutional amendments protecting marriage. Nineteen States have State constitutional amendments limiting marriage to a man and a woman, with 15 States passing State constitutional amendments since our last debate. Twenty-six other States, including Maine, have statutes limiting marriage in some manner. Maine law explicitly states that ``[p]ersons of the same sex may not contract marriage,'' and further provides that Maine will not recognize marriages performed in other jurisdictions that would violate the legal requirements in Maine. Thus, even if lawfully performed in another State, a same-sex marriage will not be valid in Maine. Voters in at least seven States will consider State constitutional amendments in 2006 and another four State legislatures are considering sending constitutional amendments to voters in 2006 or 2008. And it is still the case, as it was 2 years ago, that no State law has been enacted to allow same-sex couples to marry. Nor has a popular referendum to that effect passed in any State. I respect the right of the people of Maine and the citizens of other States to define marriage within their boundaries. Were I a member of the Maine Legislature, I would vote in favor of a law limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman. This does not mean that Congress can play no role in this area. To the contrary, Congress has two very important roles. The first is to protect the right of each State to define marriage within its own borders, and the second is to define marriage for Federal purposes. To its credit, Congress did both of these when it enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, in 1996. Signed into law by President Clinton, DOMA enjoyed broad, bipartisan support in both Chambers of Congress, passing by a margin of 85 to 14 in the Senate and 342 to 67 in the House. The statute grants individual States autonomy in deciding how to recognize marriages and other unions within their borders, and ensures that no State can compel another to recognize marriages of same-sex couples. Of equal importance, DOMA defines marriage for Federal purposes as ``the legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.'' I strongly endorse both of the principles codified by DOMA. Even though DOMA has not been successfully challenged during the nearly 10 years since its enactment, many supporters of the marriage amendment point to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas as presaging DOMA's ultimate demise on constitutional grounds. They argue that DOMA's vulnerability necessitates approving the amendment under consideration. I reject that argument. The conclusion that DOMA is inevitably destined to die a constitutional death is inconsistent with language in the Lawrence decision. In striking down a Texas statute criminalizing certain private sexual acts between consenting adult homosexuals, the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy was careful to note that the case before the Court ``does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.'' In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor was even more explicit when she observed that the invalidation of the Texas statute ``does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail. . . . Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations--the asserted State interest in this case--other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.'' These statements persuade me that the Supreme Court is, in fact, unlikely to strike down DOMA. In fact, in August 2004, a Federal bankruptcy court in Washington State ruled to uphold the constitutionality of DOMA, finding that there was no fundamental constitutional right to marry someone of the same sex. Let me end where I began. This amendment is not just about relationships between men and women but also about the relationship between the States and the Federal Government. I would not let a one- vote majority opinion of a single State court lead us to ascribe to Washington a power that rightfully belongs to the States. To the contrary, our role should be to safeguard the ability of each State to exercise that power within its own borders.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join my distinguished colleagues, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, the senior Senator from Maine, Ms. Snowe, and Senator Chafee in introducing this joint resolution, which would affirm the Senate's commitment to recognize the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact, IEMAC. The purpose of IEMAC is to provide mutual assistance among the States of the Northeastern United States and the Provinces of eastern Canada for responding to any type of disaster, whether arising from natural or manmade causes. A number of recent disasters and emergencies have necessitated mutual aid and assistance among the Northeastern States and eastern Canadian Provinces. For example, both the January 1998 ice storm and the August 2003 blackout left millions of people without electrical power, knocked out public water supplies and other essential services, and caused billions of dollars in property damage or business losses. In the past quarter century alone, there have been more than 100 presidentially declared disasters and emergencies in the Northeast, or, on average, about four per year. Many of these events required State and Provincial emergency management organizations to request out-of- jurisdiction mutual assistance to deal with the emergency. The importance of mutual assistance was made clear by Hurricane Katrina, in which 44 States and the District of Columbia received presidential emergency declarations. This was the largest number of declarations ever made for a single disaster in FEMA history. Most of these declarations were not the result of States receiving direct damage from the storm but rather because they reached out to assist the devastated States through the nationwide Emergency Management Assistance Compact, EMAC, sending personnel, equipment and supplies into the stricken areas. In addition, numerous host States opened shelters to assist hurricane evacuees. The genesis of IEMAC was the 1998 ice storm. The worst ice storm in our region's history demolished power lines from Quebec, through upstate New York, across Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. As many as 4 million people were without electricity, some 700,000 people for as long as 3 weeks, and damage topped $6 billion. The following June, the New England Governors Conference and Eastern Canadian Premiers signed Resolution No. 23-5 to adopt an International Emergency Management Assistance Agreement. The resulting memorandum of understanding was adopted by the conference in July 2000. In October of 2004, the memorandum of understanding was the renamed International Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The Governors and Premiers established the International Emergency-Management Group, IEMG, to implement the compact and to work closely developing plans to train and exercise for disasters and emergencies that could affect the Northeastern States and Provinces. The Management Group meets regularly and has recently developed a draft operational manual to fully implement the compact, which is slated to be approved at the IEMG meeting in Quebec this month. The members of the compact are the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and the Provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. Other States and Provinces may join the compact in the future. IEMAC provides form and structure to international mutual aid between the Northeastern States and eastern Canadian Provinces. It addresses such issues as liability, payment, and credentialing before the emergency occurs, which allows for expedited deployment of resources and personnel in time of emergency. Working out the myriad legal and technical details in advance is especially important when resources and personnel must cross international boundaries. The value of the compact already has been demonstrated. When Hurricane Juan slammed into Nova Scotia in late September of 2003, partners in the existing memorandum of understanding provided quick and substantial aid to the stricken province. When Nova Scotia, still recovering from the hurricane, was hit again just a few months later by ``White Juan,'' a powerful blizzard, effective mutual aid again alleviated the suffering. The compact was formed in the aftermath of a powerful ice storm, but the terrorist attacks of 9/11 amplified its importance. The Northeastern United States and eastern Canada are home to major population centers, vast industrial facilities, major cargo ports, and nuclear power plants--all potential terrorist targets. In the event of an attack, tighter border security would be both inevitable and necessary, and the prearrangements made through the compact would be invaluable. The role of the compact is ever expanding. There are a multitude of threats facing the Northeast States and eastern Canadian Provinces today, and the close working relationship of the member jurisdictions fosters a cooperative environment and creates a strong partnership. These strong bonds contribute to the goals of a more secure region and an effective response capability when a disaster or emergency does occur. As has been seen numerous times in the past, disasters know no boundaries--municipal, State, provincial or international. I ask you to join me in adopting the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact so that in a time of disaster the boundaries that separate jurisdictions are not barriers to cooperation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join my distinguished colleagues, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, the senior Senator from Maine, Ms. Snowe, and Senator Chafee in introducing this joint resolution, which would affirm the Senate's commitment to recognize the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact, IEMAC. The purpose of IEMAC is to provide mutual assistance among the States of the Northeastern United States and the Provinces of eastern Canada for responding to any type of disaster, whether arising from natural or manmade causes. A number of recent disasters and emergencies have necessitated mutual aid and assistance among the Northeastern States and eastern Canadian Provinces. For example, both the January 1998 ice storm and the August 2003 blackout left millions of people without electrical power, knocked out public water supplies and other essential services, and caused billions of dollars in property damage or business losses. In the past quarter century alone, there have been more than 100 presidentially declared disasters and emergencies in the Northeast, or, on average, about four per year. Many of these events required State and Provincial emergency management organizations to request out-of- jurisdiction mutual assistance to deal with the emergency. The importance of mutual assistance was made clear by Hurricane Katrina, in which 44 States and the District of Columbia received presidential emergency declarations. This was the largest number of declarations ever made for a single disaster in FEMA history. Most of these declarations were not the result of States receiving direct damage from the storm but rather because they reached out to assist the devastated States through the nationwide Emergency Management Assistance Compact, EMAC, sending personnel, equipment and supplies into the stricken areas. In addition, numerous host States opened shelters to assist hurricane evacuees. The genesis of IEMAC was the 1998 ice storm. The worst ice storm in our region's history demolished power lines from Quebec, through upstate New York, across Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. As many as 4 million people were without electricity, some 700,000 people for as long as 3 weeks, and damage topped $6 billion. The following June, the New England Governors Conference and Eastern Canadian Premiers signed Resolution No. 23-5 to adopt an International Emergency Management Assistance Agreement. The resulting memorandum of understanding was adopted by the conference in July 2000. In October of 2004, the memorandum of understanding was the renamed International Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The Governors and Premiers established the International Emergency-Management Group, IEMG, to implement the compact and to work closely developing plans to train and exercise for disasters and emergencies that could affect the Northeastern States and Provinces. The Management Group meets regularly and has recently developed a draft operational manual to fully implement the compact, which is slated to be approved at the IEMG meeting in Quebec this month. The members of the compact are the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and the Provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. Other States and Provinces may join the compact in the future. IEMAC provides form and structure to international mutual aid between the Northeastern States and eastern Canadian Provinces. It addresses such issues as liability, payment, and credentialing before the emergency occurs, which allows for expedited deployment of resources and personnel in time of emergency. Working out the myriad legal and technical details in advance is especially important when resources and personnel must cross international boundaries. The value of the compact already has been demonstrated. When Hurricane Juan slammed into Nova Scotia in late September of 2003, partners in the existing memorandum of understanding provided quick and substantial aid to the stricken province. When Nova Scotia, still recovering from the hurricane, was hit again just a few months later by ``White Juan,'' a powerful blizzard, effective mutual aid again alleviated the suffering. The compact was formed in the aftermath of a powerful ice storm, but the terrorist attacks of 9/11 amplified its importance. The Northeastern United States and eastern Canada are home to major population centers, vast industrial facilities, major cargo ports, and nuclear power plants--all potential terrorist targets. In the event of an attack, tighter border security would be both inevitable and necessary, and the prearrangements made through the compact would be invaluable. The role of the compact is ever expanding. There are a multitude of threats facing the Northeast States and eastern Canadian Provinces today, and the close working relationship of the member jurisdictions fosters a cooperative environment and creates a strong partnership. These strong bonds contribute to the goals of a more secure region and an effective response capability when a disaster or emergency does occur. As has been seen numerous times in the past, disasters know no boundaries--municipal, State, provincial or international. I ask you to join me in adopting the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact so that in a time of disaster the boundaries that separate jurisdictions are not barriers to cooperation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for a provision in S. 2611 that will level the playing field for minor league sports teams that depend on getting the best athletic talent. Under current law, minor league players who have to use the H-2B visa category face severe visa shortages, while Major League players qualify automatically for plentiful P-1 visas. This unfair discrepancy in the law needs to be remedied, and my amendment, which was accepted by the Judiciary Committee and is now in the underlying bill, provides a commonsense solution. By way of background, H-2B visas are intended for use by industries facing seasonal demands for labor, such as the hospitality and agricultural industries. What many people do not know is that, in addition to loggers, hotel and restaurant employees, and many other types of seasonal workers, the H-2B visa category is also used by many talented, highly competitive foreign athletes who are recruited by U.S. teams. A chronic H-2B visa shortage over the last few years has posed challenges for all industries using the H-2B visa category. In both fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the 66,000 visa cap was met early in the year. While we were successful last year in crafting a temporary 2-year fix for the H-2B shortage, this fix will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. I commend my colleague from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, for offering an amendment to this bill that would extend the current exemption of returning H-2B workers until 2009. However, solving this problem goes beyond fixing the H-2B visa cap. Minor league players simply do not belong in the same visa category as seasonal workers. There is no reason why Major League players can qualify automatically for P-1 visas, which are granted to talented athletes, artists, and entertainers, while minor league players cannot. My amendment would remedy this unfair situation. The problem of requiring minor league athletes to use the H-2B visa category has posed a particular challenge to those of us in Maine who enjoy cheering on our sports teams. The MAINEiacs, a Canadian junior hockey league team that plays its games in Lewiston, ME, has faced tremendous difficulties obtaining the H-2B visas necessary for the majority of its players to come to the United States to play in the team's first home games. Last year, due to uncertainty surrounding the availability of H-2B visas at the end of the fiscal year, the team had to reschedule its season home opener and cancel several early season games. This forced the team to schedule make-up games for those normally played in September. The problems created by the visa situation creates an unnecessary hardship for this team, in addition to threatening the revenue the team generates for the city of Lewiston and businesses in the surrounding area. The Portland Sea Dogs, a Double-A baseball team affiliated with the Boston Red Sox, is another of the many teams that relies on H-2B visas to bring some of its most skilled players to the United States. Thousands of fans come each year to see this team, and others like it across the country, play one of America's favorite sports. Due to the shortage of H-2B visas, however, Major League Baseball reports that, in 2004 and early 2005, more than 350 talented young, foreign baseball players were prevented from coming to the U.S. to play for minor league teams. These teams have been a traditional proving ground for athletes hoping to make it to the major leagues and players often move from these teams to major league rosters. The inclusion of these highly skilled athletes in the H-2B visa category seems particularly unusual when you consider that major league athletes are permitted to use an entirely different non-immigrant visa category--the P-1 visa. This visa is available to athletes who are deemed by the Citizenship and Immigration Services to perform at an ``internationally recognized level of performance.'' Arguably, any foreign athlete whose achievements have earned him a contract with an American team would meet this definition. CIS, however, has interpreted this category to exclude minor and amateur league athletes. Instead, the P-1 visa is typically reserved for only those athletes who have already been promoted to major league sports. Unfortunately, this creates something of a catch-22 for minor league athletes--if an H-2B visa shortage means that promising athletes are unable to hone their skills, and to prove themselves, in the minor leagues, they are far less likely to ever earn the major league contract currently required to obtain a P-1 visa. A simple, commonsense solution would be to expand the P-1 visa category to include minor league and certain amateur-level athletes who have demonstrated a significant likelihood of graduating to the major leagues. Major League Baseball strongly supports the expansion of the P-1 visa category to include professional minor league baseball players. In correspondence to me, the league has pointed out that, by making P-1 visas available to this group of athletes, teams would be able to make player development decisions based on the talent of its players, without being constrained by visa quotas. The P-1 category, the league believes, is appropriate for minor league players because these are the players that Major League clubs have selected as some of the best baseball prospects in the world. There is no question that Americans are passionate about sports. We have high expectations for our teams, and demand only the best from our athletes. By expanding the P-1 visa category, we will make it possible for athletes to be selected based on talent and skill, rather than visa availability. In addition, we would reduce some pressure on the H-2B visa category making more of those visas available to the industries that need them. I am pleased that this important provision is included in S. 2611, and I thank the Judiciary Committee for their willingness to incorporate it into the underlying bill. I ask unanimous consent that letters endorsing my amendment from the Lewiston MAINEiacs Hockey Club and Major League Baseball be printed in the Record. There: being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the Senate has spent much of this week debating S. 1955, the Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act of 2006. I commend my good friend and colleague from Wyoming for all of his hard work on this legislation, which is intended to make health insurance more affordable for small businesses by allowing them to join together to purchase association-based small business health plans. Despite my support for the goal of this bill, I think its approach is fundamentally flawed. Let me explain my concerns. One of my top priorities in the Senate has been to expand access to affordable health care for all Americans. There are still far too many Americans without health insurance or with woefully inadequate coverage. As many as 46 million Americans are uninsured, and millions more are underinsured. Since most Americans get their health insurance through the workplace, it is a common assumption that people without health insurance are unemployed. The fact is, however, that as many as 83 percent of Americans who do not have health insurance are in a family with a worker. Uninsured working Americans are most often employees of small businesses. In fact, some 63 percent of uninsured workers either work for a small firm or are self-employed. Taking a look at the problems faced by small businesses is, therefore, a good place to start as we attempt to reduce the numbers of uninsured. Small businesses want to provide quality health insurance for their employees, but the cost is often just too high. So I am totally in agreement with the underlying goal of this legislation, which is to make health insurance more affordable for small businesses and their employees. To that end, I have introduced bipartisan legislation to help employers cope with rising costs by creating new tax credits for small businesses to make health insurance more affordable and by providing grants to States to assist with the development and operation of small employer purchasing cooperatives to increase the clout of small businesses in their negotiations with insurers. I do, however, have a number of very real concerns about S. 1955, as it was reported out of the Senate HELP Committee. First, the legislation preempts the States' traditional authority to regulate insurance and allows not just small business health plans but all health insurers to exclude important benefits like cancer screenings, mental health coverage, and diabetes care that currently are guaranteed under many State laws. States have had the primary responsibility for the regulation of health insurance since the 1940s, and based on my experience in overseeing the Maine Bureau of Insurance for five years, I believe that States have generally done a good job of responding to the needs and concerns of their citizens. As the founder and cochair of the Senate Diabetes Caucus, I also am all too aware of the tremendous emotional and economic toll that this devastating disease takes on an estimated 21 million Americans and their families. I am particularly concerned that the bill would preempt as many as 46 State laws guaranteeing coverage for the medications, equipment, services, and supplies that people with diabetes need to manage their disease and prevent costly and potentially deadly complications. This simply is penny wise and pound foolish. Diabetes currently costs our Nation more than $132 billion annually. Eighty percent of those costs are due to the complications associated with diabetes-- complications that, absent a cure, can only be prevented through prevention and proper management of the disease. If cloture is invoked, I will be offering an amendment with Senators Bingaman and Domenici to preserve State laws requiring coverage for comprehensive diabetes care. Both the American Diabetes Association and the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation have endorsed our amendment. I am also concerned that the bill would preempt State rating rules and establish a new national standard. Proponents of the legislation contend that the application of this new national standard may not cause much disruption in many states. In Maine, however, which uses modified community rating, it could alter the market substantially. In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, CBO, estimates that one-quarter of all small businesses will actually pay higher premiums if this bill is passed. It is therefore likely that many small employers in Maine--particularly those with an older workforce--will wind up paying more, and in some cases substantially more, under this bill. This bill is no panacea, even for those small employers who will see savings. The CBO estimates that health care premiums will only average about 2 to 3 percent lower if S. 1955 is passed. Many small business owners have been told that the bill will cut their costs by from 12 to 20 percent. Even those employers who do see savings are likely to be disappointed that they are not as great as they had been led to believe. Finally, I am concerned that the bill, as reported by the committee, could allow health plans to exclude a class of health care providers, solely on the basis of their license or certification, restricting patients' access to qualified health professionals. This is a particularly important issue in rural areas like Maine, where there may not be a sufficient supply of physicians to provide the care that the health plan has promised to cover. For example, virtually all health plans cover medically necessary primary care services. Many rural Americans use a physician assistant or nurse practitioner as their primary care provider because there simply isn't an adequate supply of physicians where they live. In these areas, if a plan only covers primary care services offered by a physician, patients will either have to drive great distances to receive the care they need or pay out of pocket for services that are supposed to be covered benefits. If cloture is invoked, I will be offering an amendment to maintain the application of all existing State laws prohibiting health insurers from discriminating against health providers who are acting within their scope of practice under State law, solely on the basis of their license or certification. Mr. President, I do plan to vote for cloture. Congress should be taking action to make health insurance more affordable for small businesses, and I believe that this debate should go forward. I do not, however, believe that we need to preempt the good work that States have done in the area of patient's rights and protections in order to help our small businesses. I would, therefore, oppose the current bill on final passage unless it is substantially changed.