Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, for the national intelligence director to be truly accountable for the intelligence community, the director must have the authority to have a real say in the selection of the heads of the principal agencies of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission said that the ability to hire the senior managers is one of the key authorities, critical to the success of the national intelligence director. It is critical to the success of any leader, but particularly it is important for the head of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission cited the DCI's current lack of this power as one of the key flaws in the DCI's authorities. Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the NID will recommend to the President nominees to be the directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency--the agencies known better as NSA, NGA, and NRO. The NID is required to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending the nominees to the President, and if the Secretary of Defense does not agree with the recommendations of the NID, the director must make that fact known to the President. The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the managers of this bill each agree that these three critical agencies should remain within the Department of Defense because of the dual role these agencies play. For that reason, we joined forces to oppose the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania that would have severed the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, the reporting link. In our bill, I believe we have taken the right approach. We have left these three agencies within the Department of Defense, but we have made it clear that there is an important reporting responsibility to the national intelligence director and that the national intelligence director will choose the individuals to lead these agencies with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. It is actually the President's nomination, but the recommendations would go from the NID with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. Why did we do that? We struck that balance not only because it was recommended by the 9/11 Commission, and strongly recommended, but because we recognize that these three agencies do not just serve the Department of Defense; they are national intelligence assets. They provide vital intelligence information throughout the intelligence community. In fact, when Senator Lieberman and I met with the head of the NSA, he told us he was on the phone far more often with the Director of the CIA than he is with the Secretary of Defense. These agencies provide critical information to the CIA, to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Energy, to the Secretary of the Treasury--to all those 15 agencies across our Government that vitally need intelligence information. That is why we have the heads of these agencies recommended by the national intelligence director with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. I point out that if we were to adopt the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia, we are essentially making no change in current law. Under current law, the Secretary of Defense recommends the appointment of these individuals to the President, and it is the Director of Central Intelligence who concurs in the choice. So essentially the Senator from Virginia is simply restating current law. Current law is not adequate, and we know that that higher authority is a key authority. If we are going to hold the national intelligence director accountable for the intelligence community, we have to give him the authorities he needs to do his job.

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I note the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee is now on the floor, and I would like him to proceed whenever he wishes.

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, as we have indicated, the legislation before the Senate is the product of a concerted effort by the Governmental Affairs Committee to reflect the testimony of more than two dozen witnesses at eight hearings. It reflects the recommendations of other committees who gave us input into the legislation, and it builds upon the work of the 9/11 Commission. But it is important to know that the 9/11 Commission did not start from scratch, either. Its work takes into account nearly a half century of studies on intelligence reform, dating back to the Eisenhower administration. Indeed, the calls for reform go back 50 years. For nearly 2 years, the 9/11 Commission conducted an investigation of unprecedented depth. They interviewed more than 1,200 witnesses in 10 countries, yet we hear again those who counsel: Not yet; we are going too fast; we should wait; we need more information; under the current threat of terrorism, the time isn't right; the highly charged political atmosphere of a Presidential campaign creates an environment that is not right for such an important decision. I ask, what more information do we need? If you look at the list of witnesses who testified before the 9/11 Commission, before the Governmental Affairs Committee, before the Armed Services and Intelligence Appropriations Committee, I would say, what point of view has not been heard? What area of expertise was not explored? What more compelling evidence do we need? I ask, if the time isn't right to act now, when will the right time ever come? When will there be no threats? When will we be at peace? The war against terrorism is likely to have to continue for many years. I believe we will have failed the American people if we do not act on an issue that is so important to the security of our country. I think the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, said it best when he spoke at our very first committee hearing on July 30 of the urgent need to move forward with these reforms. This is what he said: These people are planning to attack us again, and trying to attack us sooner rather than later. Every delay that we have in changing structures to make that less likely is a delay that the American people can't tolerate. I think he said it well. The stakes are too high. The matter before us is too compelling. Even as we debate this legislation, we know that terrorists are planning to attack our country. We know that we are at an increased risk of terrorist attack. We see it all around this Capitol at the intersections and with the increased security. How can we not act? What more do we need to know? If we do not act, I think we will have failed to respond to an urgent threat, and we will have failed in our responsibility to do everything we can to make our citizens safer. Now is not the time to delay. Now is the time to move forward, and to move forward with a bill that makes a difference, not a bill that tinkers around the edges or makes a few cosmetic changes but, rather, with a bill that makes fundamental reforms to respond to deficiencies, inadequacies, and flaws that have been identified time and time again over 50 years. I thank the Chair.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before I comment on the specifics of the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia, let me join Senator Lieberman in expressing the utmost respect that I have for the Senator from West Virginia. His devotion to the Constitution, to the Senate, to the country, and to his family is truly legendary. I have learned so much just from watching the Senator from West Virginia. In fact, he inspired me to get a copy of the Constitution, and while I don't carry it with me as he does, I have it in my briefcase. It was his example that inspired me to do that. Like Senator Lieberman, I have, nevertheless, many concerns about the pending amendment. In drafting our bill, we made very clear the authority that the new national intelligence director would have. We did not want to simply create another layer of bureaucracy. What we wanted to do is to empower the NID with significant budget personnel, standard-setting authority, so that this individual could make a difference. I remember in the testimony before our committee the consensus among the witnesses was that in order for the NID to be effective, strong authority was absolutely critical. Indeed, the assistant DCI for community management said it very forthrightly. He testified as follows: We must be flexible in shifting people and money to respond to emerging priorities. Today's intelligence budget system does not meet this criteria. Senator Byrd's amendment imposes significant restrictions on the ability of NID to transfer personnel and to transfer funds. That concerns me greatly. Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, with OMB approval, the NID may transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program within the national intelligence budget to another program. The NID is required to consult with the heads of the affected agencies prior to implementing such a reprogramming or transfer, but our bill does not require their approval. We make very clear that the reprogramming and transferring approvals and restrictions as far as congressional authority are included in our bill, as well. If we require the concurrence of the agency heads before personnel or money can be moved around, we essentially have made no improvement in the current system. That is not progress. In fact, it is exactly the problem the 9/11 Commission identified over and over again as a major flaw in the current system. The NID needs to be able to marshal the people, the funds, and the resources necessary to counter the threats we face. That is the bottom line. The current authorities for the DCI are insufficient because they permit agencies to prevent the DCI from transferring funds or people simply by objective. That is what we need to change. I am also concerned about making additional positions created by this bill subject to Senate confirmation. The privacy and civil rights officers at the Department of Homeland Security are not Senate- confirmed positions. I see no reason for treating the privacy and civil rights officers that would be created by this bill any differently. There is another point that I make about the restrictions in the Senator's amendments on reprogramming and transfer authority. That is, if we are going to impose these kinds of restrictions, we are not improving the system in any significant way, and we are allowing the long delays that plague the current system to continue. Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin told me it can take as long as 5 months for him to reprogram funds. In the threat environment we face today, we cannot afford a 5-month delay in transferring urgently needed funds to counter the threat we face. The amendment of the Senator from West Virginia would represent a significant weakening of the authority in this bill, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Colorado for his generous comments. I very much enjoy working with him on the Armed Services Committee. He brings a great deal of expertise to this debate. The amendment he has proposed this morning is one that our staffs are starting to look at. I suggest that it be set aside so that we can do more analysis of it, but I appreciate the spirit in which it was offered.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Colorado for the work that he has done in coordinating the geospatial information needs of the Department of Homeland Security. He first introduced a bill on this issue last year. He has been a leader in pushing for improvements in how this information is handled. This legislation was recently reported as a separate bill by the Governmental Affairs Committee. It is acceptable and cleared on both sides. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would like to propound a unanimous consent request that the Senator from Massachusetts be recognized for 10 minutes, to be followed by the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Smith, to be recognized for 10 minutes.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I note that the Senator from Massachusetts is in the Chamber. I wonder if I could inquire of the Senator from Massachusetts whether he is going to be seeking recognition to speak on the bill or on another issue?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I appreciate the assistance of the assistant Democratic leader. I echo his hope that Members will come to the Chamber tomorrow to offer and debate their amendments. We will delay the votes on those amendments until Monday, but we have an awful lot of work to be done. Senator Lieberman and I will be here tomorrow ready to engage on these amendments. I ask my colleagues to be here as well and help make progress on this very important bill. We are making some progress, but we are not making enough progress and we need to pick up the pace. We need to whittle down that amendment list. We need to have some of those amendments simply go away. I hope that will happen.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I ask the Democratic whip that those amendments be interspersed with Republican amendments.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his contributions. It is always a pleasure to work with him, particularly on an issue that is so important to our Nation's security. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Ms. COLLINS. I say to the distinguished Senator that I think the analogy is very similar. The Secretary of Defense is not required to present the views of the NSA to the President. I think this works in a more collaborative way than we are giving the system credit for. We have to be careful, while we put in all of these safeguards--and I support the chairman's amendment--that we do not create a situation where it is unclear who is the principal adviser to the President. And that, under our bill, is the national intelligence director.

Ms. COLLINS. I am certainly open to working with the distinguished Senator to address his concerns. I believe it would work similarly to how the views of the head of the NSA, the NRO, the NGA, and DIA get to the President now through the Secretary of Defense. Under our bill, the CIA Director clearly reports to the NID, much as the head of the NSA reports to the Secretary of Defense. Nothing prevents the CIA Director or the NSA Director from going to the President, but we have changed the structure. We are making the NID the principal adviser to the President for intelligence, but I cannot conceive of a situation where the NID would not be relying very heavily on the CIA Director for the advice that he is giving to the President. It would be foolhardy for him not to.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would be happy to consult further with the Senator about his concern in this area. I note that the 9/11 Commission and numerous other commissions have determined that the CIA Director has too many roles right now; that he has three roles. He is the principal adviser to the President for intelligence, he is the head of the CIA, and he is the manager of the intelligence community. There is widespread consensus that is too much for the CIA Director to have, so our legislation alters those roles. The CIA Director would run the CIA. The national intelligence director would not run the day-to-day operations of the CIA, but the national intelligence director would become the principal adviser to the President on intelligence. The national intelligence director would also be the manager of the national intelligence programs. So we have defined those roles in that manner, but we have not altered the fact that the CIA Director would still be a Presidential appointee, he would still be confirmed by the Senate, and he would still have lots of access, in my view, just as Cabinet members are always going to be able to get their views to the President. I think the structure the Senator has improved, the joint intelligence community council, strengthens that flow of communication, but that structure is there. I do not believe that is going to be a problem. I also point out to the Senator that the Senator made an excellent point earlier when he was talking about the need for competitive analysis for a variety of viewpoints to be presented to the President and that we did not see that work as well as it should have in recent cases. We have put in extensive language in our bill due to amendments authored by Senator Levin, as well as the work Senator Lieberman and I and others have done, that makes very clear, for example, that when a National Intelligence Estimate is produced, that it has to highlight dissenting views. That does not happen now sufficiently. Often those dissenting views are hidden away in a footnote when they really should be up front for us to be aware that there are dissenting views and who has those dissenting views. Another example: We require these estimates to have a confidence level attached to the prevailing view so we will know how much support that prevailing view has. So throughout our bill there are requirements to make sure that dissenting views are heard. Indeed, the Rockefeller-Hutchinson amendment we just adopted also strengthens that by having the office of alternative analysis. So I think there are numerous safeguards to make sure that all voices are heard; that competitive analysis is strengthened; that dissenting views are highlighted.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin by saying that I very much appreciate the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, working with Senator Lieberman and me to modify his amendment so that it is consistent with the goals of our legislation. The JICC was suggested by the White House when we drafted our bill. I view it as an important component of the Collins-Lieberman bill because it provides a forum for the national intelligence director to solicit the views of and to receive advice from key Cabinet members on a wide variety of issues. It is important for the members of the JICC--the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, and other Departments, Treasury as well--to see the council as a way to communicate their views freely to the NID to help the NID reach the right decisions and to be a forum for a wide variety of issues. It is also important for the NID to remain firmly in control as chairman of the council, and I believe the modification makes clear that it is the NID who is the chairman and who will regularly convene this council. Senator Warner's amendment, as modified, meets both those goals. It strengthens the bill. I can speak on behalf of the ranking member of the committee in urging its adoption. I thank the Senator again for working with us.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison for their amendment to improve the quality of intelligence analysis by creating a red team. Both of them talked to me very early on about the need for this improvement in our bill. Senator Roberts and Senator Mikulski have also been very interested in this issue. I am very pleased they have been able to come together. They have produced an excellent amendment that will improve the quality of intelligence analysis. I also urge adoption of the amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to table the Lautenberg amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to table the Hollings amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina eviscerates the underlying bill. I want to be very clear about that. His amendment takes a radically different approach to intelligence reform. The Hollings amendment creates a national intelligence coordinator and transfers to this individual the responsibility and authority that the Director of Central Intelligence now has as head of the intelligence community. The DCI would remain as head of the CIA and principal adviser to the President. This approach is completely contrary to the recommendations of the 9/ 11 Commission. It is completely contrary to the report of the congressional joint inquiry. It is completely contrary to numerous government and private sector reports over the past five decades. The Hollings amendment gives the national intelligence coordinator the responsibility to manage the intelligence community but does not give that individual any additional authority to allow him to accomplish that task. The Hollings amendment also provides that except as otherwise provided by law, the national intelligence coordinator shall not be accountable to Congress regarding the performance of the responsibility of the coordinator. It is difficult to imagine why we would establish such a position with a list of legally defined responsibilities and authorities currently in the National Security Act of 1947, very important responsibilities and authorities which affected the security and the liberty of the American people, and then specifically provide that this individual is not accountable to Congress. I am strongly opposed to this amendment. It guts the entire Collins- Lieberman bill. I urge my colleagues to defeat it.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from South Carolina be accorded up to 10 minutes more for his debate, and then that Senator Lieberman and I have up to 10 minutes for us to use in opposition to the Hollings amendment. Then it is my intention to move to table.

Ms. COLLINS. How much more time does the Senator from South Carolina believe he would require?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will quote Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin from our September 8 hearing on this very issue. He said: If there is a separate appropriation for the foreign intelligence program, the national intelligence program, as distinct from the current arrangement where that appropriation is buried in the larger Defense Department bill, I think it would make some sense to declassify the overall number for the foreign intelligence program. That was typical of our witnesses. I also note that the top line has been made public on occasion in the past. It was made public in 1997 and 1998 by the DCI. At this point there are numerous Senators who are asking what the plan is for today and who are trying to catch planes. I ask for the regular order with respect to Lautenberg amendment No. 3802, and I ask unanimous consent that there be 2 minutes on each side prior to a motion to table the amendment. I further ask for the yeas and nays.