Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Which portion?

Ms. COLLINS. Not for what is known as TIARA or JMIP.

Ms. COLLINS. The appropriation is received by the NID for the national intelligence program.

Ms. COLLINS. And the law is signed by the President.

Ms. COLLINS. After Congress acts.

Ms. COLLINS. I would be happy to put the provisions in the Record. I question why it is necessary when everybody has the bill available. It is on page 12, for example, lines 20 through 25, in describing what the national intelligence director shall do. It says: Developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments . . . I do not see how it could be clearer.

Ms. COLLINS. Those provisions are extremely clear in the bill. I do not see how they can be ambiguous.

Ms. COLLINS. I would say to the Senator that the Secretary already does have a voice. There is a requirement that as the national intelligence director develops the budget to be recommended to the President, he must do it in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the part of the intelligence community that is under the Secretary of Energy's control, et cetera. In addition, we create a new entity called the joint intelligence community council, which I think already has an acronym, on which the Secretary of Defense will serve, which serves as an advisory board to the national intelligence director. I also point out to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that ultimately it is the President's call on the budget. These are recommendations made by the national intelligence director. It is the President who ultimately decides.

Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct.

Ms. COLLINS. The full budget authority, in my view, applies to the national intelligence assets.

Ms. COLLINS. I do not want to give the impression that our legislation tracks the administration's legislation in all respects, because it does not. What I was saying to the Chair and to the Senator from Virginia is there has never been support for bringing the tactical intelligence assets, bringing the budget for those programs under the national intelligence director's control. Our legislation specifically carves them out and keeps them under the control of the Pentagon. So I am a bit perplexed by this debate because nobody is proposing what the Senator seems to be fearing.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would be helpful.

Ms. COLLINS. That is correct, other than there may be some programs that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes, but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that would be DIA.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am not the author--

Ms. COLLINS. What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion in putting tactical intelligence--

Ms. COLLINS. Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.

Ms. COLLINS. If we look at the administration's legislative language they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets. I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in the Department of Defense.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11 Commission. What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA than he does to the Secretary of Defense.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.

Ms. COLLINS. It has not.

Ms. COLLINS. The Senator's point is well taken.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still wish to be heard.

Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought up another important point. Do we really believe that the national intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11 Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal adviser to the President. Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day- to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the intelligence community. So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that approach was wise. I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered by Senator Specter.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements. We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we recognized that they are national as well. What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment. I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.