Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the need to more widely invest in education is widely recognized by our Nation's employers. We have seen recent studies by the National Academy of Sciences warning that our country is losing its edge in math and science education. We have seen employer groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers call for greater investment. We have the opportunity to answer those calls by approving this amendment. Prior to my election to the Senate, I worked at a college in Maine, and I saw firsthand how vital these Federal programs were. I hope we will adopt the amendment. It will make a difference to our families, our States, and our Nation.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to reform and strengthen the national security review process for foreign investments in the United States. I am very pleased to be joined by three of my colleagues--Senator Lieberman, Senator Coleman, and Senator Akaka--in introducing this legislation. In a global economy, foreign investment in this country is becoming increasingly common. The national security and homeland security implications of those investments must be scrutinized by the departments with responsibility for those critical matters. The controversy over the Dubai ports transaction has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in the current law and process that is used to review foreign investments in our country. In 1988, Congress passed the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production Act to get the President the authority to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger, or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten our national security. Through an Executive order, the President gave a new committee--known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, often referred to as CFIUS--the responsibility of reviewing transactions pursuant to the Exon-Florio law and to make recommendations to the President. The law is something of an anachronism because of what it doesn't say. It focuses on acquisitions of American companies that are either important to our military industrial base or have technology that could help a terrorist state develop weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, both of those concerns are very important. We do want to preserve our military industrial base, and we do want to safeguard technology that could help terrorists or anyone else develop weapons of mass destruction. But neither of those transactions or those requirements address transactions that could assist terrorists in threatening our security right here at home. Obviously, there are other ways for terrorists to undermine our security that might be completely separate from the military industrial base issues or the technological issues related to weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the law is simply too narrow in its application. The current CFIUS process is not designed to analyze transactions that involve a port terminal or other critical infrastructures within our borders. The Government Accountability Office, in a report issued last September, found that the Exon-Florio law's effectiveness in protecting U.S. national security may be limited--limited because the Department of Treasury, as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, narrowly defines what constitutes a threat to our national security. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, focuses too much on the financial component and not enough on security. I think that is what many of us concluded happened in the review of the Dubai ports transaction. The focus was on investment, needed investment in our ports, rather than being focused on the national security or homeland security implications that could possibly arise from that transaction. The committee is supposed to identify transactions that could affect our national security. It doesn't say ``harm'' our national security; it says ``affect'' our national security. That is supposed to be sufficient to trigger a full 45-day investigation. But, unfortunately, that is not initially what happened with the proposed Dubai ports transaction. I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to a broader issue, and that is the composition of CFIUS. Remember, this is supposed to be a national security review, but who chairs the committee? Not the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, not the Department of Justice. The committee is chaired by the Department of the Treasury, and chairing this committee is meaningful because the chairman's interpretation of the law, including the provision that makes a 45-day investigation mandatory in the case of foreign government control to entities that could affect national security, tends to govern. In other words, what the chairman decides in interpreting whether the 45-day investigation is triggered tends to be what happens. I suggest to you, and to my colleagues that the system is fundamentally flawed if it has the Secretary of Treasury, no matter how capable and well qualified he is--and I believe he is all of those things--chair a committee that is supposed to be looking at national security. Thus, I believe the CFIUS process has been weighed too much toward investment considerations and not sufficiently attentive to the national security and homeland security implications. Indeed, the GAO found that Treasury is ``reluctant to initiate investigations to determine whether national security concerns require a recommendation for possible Presidential action.'' That is what GAO found, and that certainly seems to be an accurate finding. These are concerns which we simply cannot tolerate given today's threat environment, and that is why I am introducing legislation to abolish the CFIUS process and to create a new interagency, interdepartmental mechanism chaired by the Department of Homeland Security to analyze transactions for both their homeland security and national security implications. Our bill is designed to fix the process through the following changes: First, the bill would establish a new committee, the Committee for Secure Commerce, to replace the old CFIUS. The Committee for Secure Commerce would be chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Defense would serve as the vice chairman. The Director of National Intelligence would be specifically designated as a standing member of the committee in order to ensure that important intelligence information is part of the deliberative process. The Department of Treasury will still be represented on the committee, but with respect to the other members, the President shall name the appropriate agencies and departments to sit on the committee. This is an important change because it helps ensure that the focus will, indeed, be national homeland security, and it corrects what I believe to be a major shortcoming in the composition of the current committee, and that is that the intelligence community is not represented. That is extraordinary, given the purpose of this committee. Second, the bill would explicitly include homeland security among the factors the committee would evaluate in deciding whether to review or investigate a transaction. Third, the Secretary of Homeland Security would establish a process by which the committee reviews transactions and would establish the role and responsibility of each member. In addition, each member would establish the process and procedure by which each respective agency would conduct its review, sharing that with the other committee members. It is important that committee members each have a general understanding of the scrutiny being applied to a transaction both within their own agencies and across the government. Such understanding was not apparent in the current CFIUS process. Should a transaction warrant an investigation, the bill would require the Director of National Intelligence to consolidate intelligence assessments. Lastly, this legislation would strengthen the reporting requirements to Congress. The existing process lacks transparency and does not allow sufficient oversight. It may be appropriate for the reviews, which may involve proprietary data and classified information, to be conducted confidentially. However, it is wholly appropriate that Members of Congress be briefed in a timely manner. The bill would also address the so-called Byrd amendment loophole, requiring an investigation where the entity would be controlled by a foreign-government. In looking at the plain language of the existing statute, a 45-day investigation should have taken place in the Dubai Ports World purchase of Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company. However, the Treasury Department interpretation of the statute for nearly 15 years has been contrary to congressional intent, and thus, Treasury found there was no need for the 45-day investigation. That so- called ambiguity has been clarified in our bill. The law requires a 45- day investigation in cases where an acquirer is controlled by a foreign government, as in the case of DP World, and the acquisition could affect the national security of the U.S. It is important that Congress take action to reform the review process for foreign investment in the U.S. This bill provides a new structure, appropriately focused on national security and homeland security. I seek my colleagues support in moving this legislation forward. The Dubai ports controversy may have temporarily or perhaps permanently been set aside, but that does not mean we should abandon the efforts to reform and strengthen the law to ensure a proper review of foreign transactions. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes in morning business.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Ms. COLLINS pertaining to the introduction of S. 2400 are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to reform and strengthen the national security review process for foreign investments in the United States. I am very pleased to be joined by three of my colleagues--Senator Lieberman, Senator Coleman, and Senator Akaka--in introducing this legislation. In a global economy, foreign investment in this country is becoming increasingly common. The national security and homeland security implications of those investments must be scrutinized by the departments with responsibility for those critical matters. The controversy over the Dubai ports transaction has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in the current law and process that is used to review foreign investments in our country. In 1988, Congress passed the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production Act to get the President the authority to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger, or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten our national security. Through an Executive order, the President gave a new committee--known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, often referred to as CFIUS--the responsibility of reviewing transactions pursuant to the Exon-Florio law and to make recommendations to the President. The law is something of an anachronism because of what it doesn't say. It focuses on acquisitions of American companies that are either important to our military industrial base or have technology that could help a terrorist state develop weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, both of those concerns are very important. We do want to preserve our military industrial base, and we do want to safeguard technology that could help terrorists or anyone else develop weapons of mass destruction. But neither of those transactions or those requirements address transactions that could assist terrorists in threatening our security right here at home. Obviously, there are other ways for terrorists to undermine our security that might be completely separate from the military industrial base issues or the technological issues related to weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the law is simply too narrow in its application. The current CFIUS process is not designed to analyze transactions that involve a port terminal or other critical infrastructures within our borders. The Government Accountability Office, in a report issued last September, found that the Exon-Florio law's effectiveness in protecting U.S. national security may be limited--limited because the Department of Treasury, as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, narrowly defines what constitutes a threat to our national security. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, focuses too much on the financial component and not enough on security. I think that is what many of us concluded happened in the review of the Dubai ports transaction. The focus was on investment, needed investment in our ports, rather than being focused on the national security or homeland security implications that could possibly arise from that transaction. The committee is supposed to identify transactions that could affect our national security. It doesn't say ``harm'' our national security; it says ``affect'' our national security. That is supposed to be sufficient to trigger a full 45-day investigation. But, unfortunately, that is not initially what happened with the proposed Dubai ports transaction. I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to a broader issue, and that is the composition of CFIUS. Remember, this is supposed to be a national security review, but who chairs the committee? Not the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, not the Department of Justice. The committee is chaired by the Department of the Treasury, and chairing this committee is meaningful because the chairman's interpretation of the law, including the provision that makes a 45-day investigation mandatory in the case of foreign government control to entities that could affect national security, tends to govern. In other words, what the chairman decides in interpreting whether the 45-day investigation is triggered tends to be what happens. I suggest to you, and to my colleagues that the system is fundamentally flawed if it has the Secretary of Treasury, no matter how capable and well qualified he is--and I believe he is all of those things--chair a committee that is supposed to be looking at national security. Thus, I believe the CFIUS process has been weighed too much toward investment considerations and not sufficiently attentive to the national security and homeland security implications. Indeed, the GAO found that Treasury is ``reluctant to initiate investigations to determine whether national security concerns require a recommendation for possible Presidential action.'' That is what GAO found, and that certainly seems to be an accurate finding. These are concerns which we simply cannot tolerate given today's threat environment, and that is why I am introducing legislation to abolish the CFIUS process and to create a new interagency, interdepartmental mechanism chaired by the Department of Homeland Security to analyze transactions for both their homeland security and national security implications. Our bill is designed to fix the process through the following changes: First, the bill would establish a new committee, the Committee for Secure Commerce, to replace the old CFIUS. The Committee for Secure Commerce would be chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Defense would serve as the vice chairman. The Director of National Intelligence would be specifically designated as a standing member of the committee in order to ensure that important intelligence information is part of the deliberative process. The Department of Treasury will still be represented on the committee, but with respect to the other members, the President shall name the appropriate agencies and departments to sit on the committee. This is an important change because it helps ensure that the focus will, indeed, be national homeland security, and it corrects what I believe to be a major shortcoming in the composition of the current committee, and that is that the intelligence community is not represented. That is extraordinary, given the purpose of this committee. Second, the bill would explicitly include homeland security among the factors the committee would evaluate in deciding whether to review or investigate a transaction. Third, the Secretary of Homeland Security would establish a process by which the committee reviews transactions and would establish the role and responsibility of each member. In addition, each member would establish the process and procedure by which each respective agency would conduct its review, sharing that with the other committee members. It is important that committee members each have a general understanding of the scrutiny being applied to a transaction both within their own agencies and across the government. Such understanding was not apparent in the current CFIUS process. Should a transaction warrant an investigation, the bill would require the Director of National Intelligence to consolidate intelligence assessments. Lastly, this legislation would strengthen the reporting requirements to Congress. The existing process lacks transparency and does not allow sufficient oversight. It may be appropriate for the reviews, which may involve proprietary data and classified information, to be conducted confidentially. However, it is wholly appropriate that Members of Congress be briefed in a timely manner. The bill would also address the so-called Byrd amendment loophole, requiring an investigation where the entity would be controlled by a foreign-government. In looking at the plain language of the existing statute, a 45-day investigation should have taken place in the Dubai Ports World purchase of Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company. However, the Treasury Department interpretation of the statute for nearly 15 years has been contrary to congressional intent, and thus, Treasury found there was no need for the 45-day investigation. That so- called ambiguity has been clarified in our bill. The law requires a 45- day investigation in cases where an acquirer is controlled by a foreign government, as in the case of DP World, and the acquisition could affect the national security of the U.S. It is important that Congress take action to reform the review process for foreign investment in the U.S. This bill provides a new structure, appropriately focused on national security and homeland security. I seek my colleagues support in moving this legislation forward. The Dubai ports controversy may have temporarily or perhaps permanently been set aside, but that does not mean we should abandon the efforts to reform and strengthen the law to ensure a proper review of foreign transactions. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I object.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the majority leader be recognized at the conclusion of morning business.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, last night the majority leader filed cloture on the lobbying reform bill. Under the rule, that vote would occur on Friday although it is hoped that the vote could be expedited and occur sometime today. As a reminder, the majority leader has announced that it is also possible--and indeed we hope--to consider the lobbying reform-related amendments throughout the day today if an agreement can be reached. Also, Senators should be aware that all first-degree amendments to the lobbying reform bill must be filed at the desk by 1 o'clock today as provided for under rule XXII.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this morning the Senate will be in a period of morning business. I ask unanimous consent that the period be extended until 12 noon with the time equally divided in the usual form.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I express my disappointment at the words of the Democratic leader urging our colleagues to vote against cloture on the lobbying reform measure. This is important legislation. This legislation matters. This legislation is bipartisan legislation. It is in response to declining public confidence in the integrity of the decisions made by Government officials. It is extremely unfortunate and unfair for this much needed legislation to be slowed down by an important but completely unrelated issue, regardless of one's views on the Dubai transaction. The Presiding Officer knows I have been outspoken in calling for a full investigation of the national security implications of this transaction, but regardless of one's views on it, this issue should not be tangled up in the debate on whether or not to strengthen our lobbying disclosure laws. We have worked hard to produce a bipartisan bill, two bipartisan bills, that have been married to strengthen our lobbying laws. It is extremely unfortunate to hear the Democrat leader say we should get it done sometime but everyone should vote against cloture. That leads me to question whether there really is a commitment to strengthening our lobbying laws. There is no reason we cannot proceed to the many amendments that have been filed, to debate them fully, let the Senate work its will on each of the amendments, and then clear this legislation so we can go to conference with the House and send the bill to the President's desk. Public confidence in Congress is very low right now, maybe at record low levels. This legislation helps to promote public confidence in the work we do and the decisions we make. This should not be a partisan issue, and it has not been until the Democrat leader came to the Senate to urge his colleagues to oppose cloture. Why can't we proceed with the measure before the Senate? It is a bipartisan measure. My colleague, Senator Lieberman, has worked hand in hand with me on the Committee on Homeland Security to produce this bill. Senator McCain, Senator Santorum, Senator Dodd, Senator Feingold--all have been involved and have worked very hard. Indeed, yesterday we were on the verge of enacting a bipartisan amendment with the lead sponsor being a Democratic Senator. I supported his amendment. It had to do with holds being placed on bills. I thought it was a good amendment that would help increase the transparency and accountability of what we are doing. It is unfortunate the Democratic leader is urging delay, saying we should not proceed to wrap up this bill and, in fact, we should not vote for cloture. I urge our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support cloture. It is imperative we move ahead with this bill. If we do not act today to pass this legislation to strengthen public confidence in the decisions we make, shame on us. I am not saying the issue raised by the Senator from New York is not an important issue. As I said, I have spoken time and again in favor of a full 45-day review, and we have gotten that. We need to find out the results of that investigation, have the Committee on Foreign Investment report not only to the President but to us, and then make our decisions. I am introducing legislation to reform the entire Committee on Foreign Investment to give it a stronger homeland security and national security role and to house it in the Department of Homeland Security. That is an important issue. But it is not the issue before the Senate today. The issue before the Senate today is the lobbying reform measure, two bipartisan bills that have been put together that will help strengthen and promote public confidence in our decisions. Let's get on with the task before the Senate.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Democratic leader for his comments. This is an important piece of legislation. It has been completely bipartisan. The legislation reported by the Homeland Security Committee was reported with only one dissenting vote. The bill that was reported by the Rules and Administration Committee was reported unanimously. We have worked very closely with our ranking members, and I appreciate the assurances of the Democratic leader that his side of the aisle recognizes the importance of enacting this bipartisan legislation. There is no reason why with a good effort we can't complete the bill today. I thank the Democratic leader for his comments. I thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the explanation and clarification of the sponsor of the amendment. I am in complete agreement with the differences that he described. I believe his proposal would inject needed transparency and accountability into the process, not to mention that I would know who puts those holds on my bills. I hope this proposal will be adopted. I intend to support it.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin by commending the two sponsors of this proposal. I know that each of them has worked so hard and so long trying to end the practice of secret, indefinite holds being put on either nominees or placed on legislation. I believe this proposal is consistent with the goal of this legislation which is more accountability and more transparency. I commend both of them for their effort. I would like to engage the sponsor of this amendment in a colloquy in order to clarify that his proposal is not intended to reach a very temporary hold that is placed on a bill in order to allow for review of that legislation. Let me give a specific example. Occasionally, bills will be discharged from their authorizing committees. These are not necessarily on the calendar. They are discharged from the committee, and the bill will be hotlined on both of our sides to see if there is any objection. Obviously, putting a temporary stay on the consideration of a discharged bill in order to allow a few hours for review or even a day for review is completely different from the practice of secretly killing a bill by putting an indefinite anonymous hold. I wonder if, through the Chair, I could inquire of the sponsor if it is his intention to distinguish between those two situations. I would call one a ``consult hold'' perhaps, and one a ``killer hold.''

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their cooperation. I realize I need to talk very rapidly. I understand that the Senator from Oklahoma listed earmarks that the Senator from Maine and I have jointly sponsored. I want to tell my colleagues that I am very proud of those projects, and I will stand here and defend every single one of them. But the fact is, that is irrelevant to the debate before us right now. I think it is so unfortunate to see this breakdown as certain States in certain parts of the country oppose what is a program that is absolutely essential to those of us who live in colder States. I supported all of the aid for Hurricane Katrina's victims in the gulf region. I routinely support programs that benefit other regions of the country. I think it is unfortunate and unfair and very disappointing for colleagues to oppose a program simply because it doesn't benefit their region as much as others. This is a program that is a matter of literally life and death to those of us representing low-income and elderly constituents. I realize my time has expired. I urge my colleagues to support the motion to invoke cloture.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend the ranking member, the Senator from Connecticut, for his excellent statement and for his championship of this bill. He is a longtime champion of good government. It has been a great pleasure to work with him on this legislation. I see that the Senator from Ohio is in the Chamber. I believe he has a unanimous consent request to speak as in morning business. As one of the managers of the bill, I inform the Chair that I have no objection to that request.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin by applauding both Senator Dodd and Senator Lott for their work on the membership part of this bill, and for the outstanding statements explaining the provisions and urging us to act. Senator Lott mentioned that the Rules Committee bill was reported unanimously, and that the bill that came out of our Homeland Security Committee was reported with only one dissenting vote. That is a remarkable show of bipartisanship. But to my colleagues in the Senate, it is probably more remarkable to see two Senate committees working together very carefully, outlining the jurisdiction of each committee and working in concert to produce a comprehensive and well-balanced piece of legislation. Title I of this bill is the Rules Committee bill; title II is the Homeland Security bill. Today the Senate begins consideration of the first significant lobbying reform legislation in a decade. The bills we are debating today and over the course of this week represent the good work of their sponsors, Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman--and Senator Lott and Senator Dodd as well--and the hard work of the two committees I have mentioned. The committee I am privileged to chair, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, marked up the Lieberman bill this past Thursday. The committee reported out the measure, as I mentioned, on a 13-to-1 vote. The issue we take up today is serious, and it is pressing. Recent scandals involving Jack Abramoff and Representative Duke Cunningham have brought to light Congress's need to strengthen the laws and rules governing disclosure, and to ban practices that erode public confidence in the integrity of government decisions. That is what this debate is all about. We know that if we are to tackle the tough issues facing our country, whether it is entitlement reform or other vital issues, the public must have confidence that our decisions are not tainted by special interests and are not subject to undue influence. I want to emphasize that all of us here today recognize that lobbying, whether done on behalf of the business community and environmental organizations or children's advocacy groups or any other cause can provide us with very useful information that aids but does not dictate our decisionmaking process. Indeed, lobbying is a right guaranteed by our Constitution--the right to petition our government. But, unfortunately, today the image of lobbying often conjures up images of expensive paid vacations masquerading as factfinding trips, special access that the average citizen can never have, and undue influence that leads to tainted decisions. The corrosive effect of this image--and in a very few cases the reality on the public's confidence-- in the political process cannot be underestimated. I think it is also important to emphasize, however, that the vast majority of people in Washington, the vast majority of elected officials care deeply about their constituents and this country, and are making decisions which they believe are in the best interests of both. Nevertheless, we in Congress have an obligation to strengthen the crucial bond of trust between those of us in government and those whom government serves. At the committee hearing last month on lobbying reform, we heard from several of our colleagues. We heard from business and labor organizations that engage in lobbying. We heard from a representative of a lobbyist organization, and from public policy experts. I mention this because I want my colleagues to understand that we had a wide- ranging hearing that reached out to people with various views on how we could reform our lobbying disclosure laws. The package before the Senate, the comprehensive package of bills, represents the culmination of what we have learned. Again, I thank Senators McCain and Lott for their leadership in the development of this bill, along with the ranking members of Homeland Security, Senator Lieberman and Senator Dodd. We have crafted a bipartisan package. I also want to thank Senator Rick Santorum for convening a bipartisan working group to help us find some common ground on the principles that underlie both bills. Before describing the details of the bill we reported last Thursday, I want to point out that the committees addressed only those issues within our jurisdiction--the Lobbying Disclosure Act and the Ethics in Government Act, and congressional organization. But here on the floor we have married the two bills to produce a comprehensive package. Let me quickly run through some of the major provisions of what is now title II of the bill we are debating. The first section of this bill, title II, will enhance the lobbying disclosure provision. It will require quarterly filings rather than the present semiannual filing, and it ensures that the information is made available to the public on the Internet. To facilitate this effort, it specifies that lobbyists must submit their filings electronically. This will ensure that the public information is widely available on a more timely basis. So our goal here is to have an easily accessible, transparent, and searchable database available on the Internet so the public is fully aware and able to access these reports. To ensure timely disclosure, the substitute doubles the maximum penalty for noncompliance to $100,000. To increase public confidence and enforcement, the legislation requires disclosure of reports to the Justice Department for enforcement. The enhanced disclosures will make the process of lobbying far more transparent to the public. I note that the committee also adopted an amendment that would require the disclosure of so-called ``grassroots lobbying efforts.'' I did not support this amendment because of my concern that we don't want to chill any effort to encourage citizens to contact their members of Congress, but I nevertheless appreciate the efforts of the sponsors of the amendment--Senators Lieberman and Levin--to address some of the legitimate concerns and to craft it in a way that is far more focused than the original provisions in the underlying bill that was before our committee. Section B of what is now title II focuses on enforcement of congressional ethics. In some cases, there have been concerns about the enforcement effort. We have included provisions that will include auditing and oversight of lobbyists' disclosure filings by the comptroller general who will also provide recommendations on how compliance could be improved and to identify needed resources and authorities. This section of the bill would also provide for mandatory ethics training for Members of Congress and congressional staff. It also includes a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that there should be greater self-regulation within the lobbying community. I am thinking of the kinds of self-regulatory organizations--SROs, as they are often called--such as the securities industry, for example, employs. Subtitle C of our bill, now title II, addresses the revolving-door problem, whereby Members of Congress and high-ranking staff leave Government for jobs focused on the institution they had once served in. We made essentially two changes in this provision of the law. First, we doubled the cooling-off period that applies to Members of Congress who become lobbyists. We require a 2-year cooling-off period rather than the 1-year that is in current law. The second important change we make is we prohibit those high-ranking former congressional staffers from lobbying the entire Senate--not just the office in which they once worked. Those are two significant provisions strengthening the revolving-door provisions of the bill that will help to promote public confidence in the integrity of decisions by ensuring there is not undue special access by people who have inside information. Those are important provisions. I point out in response to a comment made by Senator Dodd that we do extend these provisions to high-ranking members of the executive branch who are covered now by the revolving-door provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The next subtitle of the bill creates a commission to strengthen confidence in Congress. This is a proposal included at the recommendation of my friend and colleague, Senator Norm Coleman. It would establish a commission to review and make some additional recommendations if needed. The commission would report its initial findings and recommendation to Congress by July 1, 2006. This is not a big, longstanding commission. It is a commission that is expected to act quickly, where we take a look at the whole area and report back. I am very proud of the hard work of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on this issue. We have produced a strong bill, a strong bill that significantly increases the disclosure, that toughens the revolving-door provisions, and that will make a real difference in increasing the oversight of ethics and lobbying. However, we need to take another look at a provision that did not get included in the bill that was included in the mark that Senator Lieberman and I put forward but was deleted as a result of an amendment. That is a provision to create an Office of Public Integrity within the congressional branch. I will be talking more about that later, but let me say that proposal by no means is an indication of disrespect for or lack of appreciation of the Senate Ethics Committee. We know the Senate Ethics Committee has a very difficult job and does a good job. The members who serve on it are individuals of great integrity. It address a problem of perception. It is difficult for the public to trust us to set our own rules, investigate violations, act as jury and judge--which is what the current system is now. So we carefully crafted a proposal intended to strike a better balance while still recognizing and maintaining the preeminent role of the Ethics Committee. Regrettably, there was a lot of confusion about this provision in committee because it resembles a provision that has been introduced on the House side. But Senator Lieberman and I modified that provision and came up with our own proposal that ensured that the Ethics Committee was involved in every step of the process. We will have a further debate on that issue, but I raise it now for the benefit of my colleagues. Again, we can make a real difference by passing this bill which marries the two bills that were reported by the Rules Committee and the Homeland Security Committee. The Senate has a very important opportunity to make Government more transparent and more accountable. At the end of the day, the public is going to review this legislation and ask one question: Does it promote more public trust and confidence in the decisions we make? I hope when we have the final vote on this bill, we will see the same kind of strong, bipartisan support the legislation enjoyed in both the rules and the Homeland Security Committee.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend you and Senator Snowe for working so hard on this very vital issue. I want my colleagues to understand exactly what is at stake here. Early Tuesday morning, my State suffered a terrible tragedy--three people, including a woman and her 10-year-old son, died when their house caught fire and burned to the ground. There was the most deadly fire in Maine in 6 years. They lived in Limestone, ME, a town in northern Maine. On the night of the fire, temperatures were below zero. The family had run out of heating oil, and as a result, was using wood stoves to provide the heat. According to the firefighters, the fire started near one of the wood stoves in the kitchen. This is literally a matter of life and death. At Christmastime, when I was home in my hometown of Caribou, ME, two elderly women were hospitalized with hypothermia. This is not theoretical. It is not theoretical when there is ice in the toilet and when our elderly and low-income are at risk of illness, disease, and, yes, even death because they cannot afford the high cost of home heating oil. The least we can do in a country as wealthy as ours is to provide some modest assistance. And those who say that the winter is almost over, come to where I am from in northern Maine. Believe me, there is a lot more winter to come. Maine has run out of its LIHEAP funding. It is time for us to provide this modest help. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Maine.

Ms. COLLINS. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a joint resolution disapproving the conclusion of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, to allow Dubai Ports World, DP World, to take over certain port operations in the United States. My colleague and good friend, Congresswoman Jane Harman, will be introducing this resolution in the House of Representatives. This resolution would do the following: 1. Disapprove the CFIUS review of the transaction; 2. direct the CFIUS to conduct a 45-day investigation in order to ensure that the sale will not have an adverse effect on national security; and 3. direct CFIUS to brief Members of Congress on the findings of its investigation before the transaction is allowed to proceed if the Committee maintains that it should go forth. The pending sale raises potential maritime security concerns. The sale would transfer control of Peninsular & Oriental, P&O, Ports North America to DP World, a foreign government-owned entity. P&O Ports has extensive terminal and stevedoring operations along the eastern seaboard and on the gulf coast. It encompasses not only terminal facility leases in six major U.S. ports, as has been reported widely in the media, but also stevedoring and terminal operations in a total of 21 U.S. ports, including my home State in Portland, ME. We have long acknowledged the vulnerability of our ports--both as a potential target and as a conduit through which terrorists, their weapons or other contraband may enter the U.S. coming from a State with three international cargo ports, I am keenly aware of the importance of our seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. In addition to our ports' economic significance, the link between maritime security and our national security is evident. The attacks of 9/11 have forced us to reassess and rebuild our entire approach to security. Against an enemy determined to cause maximum harm to both the American people and the American economy, we are building a structure that, in great part, relies upon private-public partnerships. Nowhere is this more apparent than in our ports--where terminal operators, longshoremen, port authorities, importers, carriers, and others have worked with the United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and state and local law enforcement to put security plans in place. The foreign government in question, that owns DP World, is the government of Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates, UAE. While UAE is an ally in the war on terrorism, it also has been used as a base of terrorist operations and financing. In fact, the 9/11 Commission reported that UAE was ``both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem.'' The attacks of 9/11 were planned in part in the UAE, and much of the financing for those operations was funneled through the UAE banking system. The facts warrant a thorough 45-day investigation by CFIUS, not a cursory review. This incident has revealed significant shortcomings in the CFIUS process. It is not adequately transparent and does not provide for sufficient oversight reporting to appropriate committees and the leadership of Congress. The Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production Act gives the President the authority to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten the national security of the U.S. Through Executive order, the President established the CFIUS to review transactions pursuant to Exon-Florio and make a recommendation regarding the exercise of his authority. It may be appropriate for the reviews, which may involve proprietary data and classified information, to be held confidential. However, once a decision has been reached by the CFIUS, it is wholly appropriate, and even necessary, that Members of Congress be briefed on the findings of the review and the basis for the decision. I am truly troubled by the review process that was followed with respect to this purchase. The more I learn, the more questions are raised. The law requires a 45-day investigation in cases where an acquirer is controlled by a foreign government, as in the case of DP World, and the acquisition could affect the national security of the U.S. However, the CFIUS did not conduct an investigation, as the plain language of the statute would demand. I am pleased that, in a recent development, the administration has agreed to undertake a 45-day investigation as a result of discussions with DP World and congressional leadership. Perhaps its recommendation, once briefed to Congress, will allay concerns that have been raised. Perhaps the national security implications, apparent on the face of the deal, will be adequately addressed through a more rigorous process. Given the remaining uncertainties, however, I felt it was important to proceed with the introduction of this resolution, in conjunction with my colleague in the House, Congresswoman Harman. The silver lining of recent events is that they have served to highlight the critical importance of port security to our Nation. Last November, Senator Murray and I introduced the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act of 2005. This comprehensive legislation authorizes $835 million annually for programs and initiatives to better secure our Nation's ports. It would help build a coordinated approach to maritime and port security across all levels of government and with our overseas trading partners, improving our Nation's security as it expedites trade with those governments and businesses that join in this goal. The bill addresses the problem of uncoordinated supply-chain security efforts, directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to enhance security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from, or move through seaports of the United States. The strategic plan also must include protocols for the resumption of trade in the case of an incident. This legislation recognizes that America's ports, large and small, are our partners in keeping our Nation safe and our economy strong. I seek my colleagues support both for this resolution and for the GreenLane bill.