Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, as well as the Senate resolution to create an expedited confirmation process for some part-time boards and commissions. I want to commend Senators Schumer and Alexander for their work on this issue and to express my appreciation for all the members of the nomination reform working group--Senators Reid, McConnell, and Lieberman. I was pleased to be a part of what has truly been a bipartisan effort. The Constitution, in the Appointments Clause, makes the appointment of senior Federal executive officers a joint responsibility of the President and the Senate. The President determines who, in his view, is the best qualified to serve in the most senior and critical positions across the executive branch of our Government. It also requires that we, the Senate, exercise our independent judgment and experience to determine if nominees have the necessary qualifications and character to serve our Nation in these important positions of public trust. The confirmation process must be thorough enough for the Senate to fulfill its Constitutional duty, but it should not be so onerous as to deter qualified people from public service. National security reasons also compel attention to this problem. The National Journal has noted that ``[p]eriods of political transition are, by their very nature, chaotic'' and that ``terrorists strike when they believe governments will be caught off guard.'' Both the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the attacks on September 11th, 2001, occurred within eight months of a change in presidential administrations. And in March 2004, just three days before Spain's national elections, al Qaeda-linked terrorists bombed Madrid commuter trains. The 9/11 Commission found that ``[a]t the sub-cabinet level, there were significant delays in the confirmation of key officials, particularly at the Department of Defense,'' in 2001. It was not until six months after President Bush took office that he had his national security team in place. Countless studies have been written and many experts have opined on how to improve the nomination and confirmation process--from the Brownlow Commission in 1937 to the 9/11 Commission in 2004. This is also an issue that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has been working to address for a long time. For example, in 2001, when Senator Fred Thompson chaired the Committee, we held two hearings focusing on the state of the Presidential appointment process. As a result of these hearings, the Committee reported out legislation to address concerns that were raised. A few of the provisions of this bill would later be included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. But more work remains to be done. On March 2nd of this year, the Committee held another hearing to review the nomination process. The witnesses echoed the concerns that have been raised over the years by the many commissions and that still remain unaddressed. Based upon our review, there are a few areas in particular where improvements should be made. The first is to reduce the sheer number of positions subject to Senate confirmation. In this regard, the National Commission on the Public Service, commonly known as the Volcker Commission, gathered some very illuminating statistics. When President Kennedy came to office, he had 286 positions to fill with the titles of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and Administrator. By the end of the Clinton Administration, there were 914 positions with these titles. Today, according to the Congressional Research Service, CRS, there are more than 1,200 positions appointed by the President that require the advice and consent of the Senate. The large number of positions requiring confirmation leads to long delays in selecting, vetting, and nominating these appointees. Consequently, administrations can go for months without key officials in many agencies. And when political appointees are finally in place, their median tenure is only about two and a half years. A second area ripe for reform is to develop a consistent, common form for the nominees to complete in order to streamline the process, save time, and increase accuracy. This also would reduce the cost and burden on nominees. The White House, Office of Government Ethics, and the Senate need to work together to reconcile the various questions that are asked of nominees. Currently, nominees will often find themselves repeating variations of, or even the exact same, response over and over. In this regard, I believe Clay Johnson, the former head of Presidential Personnel from 2001 to 2003, made an excellent point. He noted that there is a thick file in the White House ``with every possible piece of relevant information on that person and yet none of that is made available to the Senate.'' A consistent, common form, which a nominee can respond to online, would help to facilitate the flow of information so the Senate can begin its review of the nomination earlier. Finally, the executive branch also needs to review its own role and responsibilities in the process. Specifically, the White House should review its background investigation requirements. The extent of the investigation should be tailored to the position. A person nominated to a non-national security-related position should not have to undergo the same detailed FBI background investigation as a nominee to a national security- related position, such as the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the process should make some allowance for people who already have undergone the FBI full-field investigation for a different Senate- confirmed position. Reform of this process would help speed up the review of nominees and aid in the task of recruiting talented people for public service. It also is the White House's responsibility to ensure that the Office of Presidential Personnel has the appropriate staffing level to meet the demands of a new administration. As Mr. Johnson noted at our March 2nd hearing, ``[a] new administration has never had the capacity in the first six months to nominate persons for more than 250 cabinet and subcabinet positions, let alone 400 positions, which government reform individuals and groups suggest a new administration should be able to do.'' If these areas can be reformed, substantial time will be saved, and key leadership posts at our federal agencies will not be vacant for nearly as long. Now, during this mid-term period, two years away from a Presidential election, we have the opportunity to streamline the executive branch nominations process. This can help ensure that the next presidential transition will be as smooth as possible, thwarting the terrorists' belief that they will be able to ``catch us off guard.'' The Schumer-Alexander bill and Senate Resolution go a long way to addressing the concerns that I have highlighted. The bill will make more than 200 positions direct Presidential Appointments that would no longer require Senate confirmation. Many of these positions have little or no policy role, such as the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the Department of Commerce, or are internal management or administrative positions, such as chief financial officers or assistant secretaries for public affairs. By not requiring Senate confirmation, it will allow these positions be filled at a much faster pace and free up Senate resources to focus on more significant nominees. The Senate resolution proposes that more than 240 positions on part- time boards or commissions go through a new ``expedited'' confirmation process. These positions will still require the nominee to respond to all committee questionnaires and still provide for the opportunity for closer scrutiny of the nominee, if warranted. This retains the authority of the Senate over these positions, but streamlines the process, lessening the burden on the Senate for routine, non-controversial nominations and providing for a faster road to confirmation as well. While we must deliver on our duty to provide advice and consent, reforms are needed to improve the effective operation of government. We all want the most qualified people to serve the President and the Nation. We should, therefore, ensure that the process is not unnecessarily burdensome and that key leadership posts do not go unfilled for long stretches of time. Most of all, we need to reform the process so that good people, whose talents and energy we need, do not become so discouraged that they give up their goal of serving the public. I am pleased to join Senators Schumer and Alexander as a cosponsor of this legislation and the Senate resolution, both of which will help us attract well-qualified people to public service.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the National Women's History Museum Act of 2011, a bill that would clear the way to locate a long-overdue historical and educational resource in our nation's capital city. I appreciate the co-sponsorship today from 16 of my colleagues: Senators Mikulski, Boxer, Hutchison, Murray, Snowe, Landrieu, Stabenow, Cantwell, Murkowski, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Lieberman, Akaka, Pryor, Merkley, and Begich. American women have made invaluable contributions to our country in such diverse fields as government, business, medicine, law, literature, sports, entertainment, the arts, and the military. A museum recognizing the contributions of American women is long overdue. A Presidential commission on commemorating women in American history concluded that, ``Efforts to implement an appropriate celebration of women's history in the next millennium should include the designation of a focal point for women's history in our Nation's capital.'' That report was issued in 1999. Over a decade later, although Congress has made commendable provisions for the National Museum for African American History and Culture, the National Law Enforcement Museum, and the National Museum of the American Indian, there is still no institution in the capital region dedicated to women's roles in our country's history. It is important to note that taxpayers will not shoulder the funding of this project. The proposed legislation calls for no new federal program and no new claims on the budget. The bill would simply direct the General Services Administration to negotiate and enter into an occupancy agreement with the National Women's History Museum, Inc. to establish a museum on a tract of land near the Smithsonian Museums located at 12th Street, SW., and Independence Avenue, SW. In fact, the Museum would be putting dollars in the federal government's pocket in order to occupy this space because the transaction would be at a fair-market value for the land. This bill would be a win-win for the taxpayers and the Museum. The National Women's History Museum is a non-profit, non-partisan, educational institution based in the District of Columbia. Its mission is to research and present the historic contributions that women have made to all aspects of human endeavor, and to present the contributions that women have made to the nation in their various roles in family, the economy, and society. This museum would help ensure that future generations understand what we owe to the many generations of American women who have helped build, sustain, and advance our society. They deserve a building to present the stories of pioneering women like abolitionist Harriet Tubman, founder of the Girl Scouts Juliette Gordon Low, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and astronaut Sally Ride. That women's roll of honor would also include a legendary predecessor in the Senate seat I now hold: the late Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the first woman nominated for President of the United States by a major political party, and the first woman elected to both houses of Congress. Senator Smith began representing Maine in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1940, won election to the Senate in 1948, and enjoyed bipartisan respect over her long career for her independence, integrity, wisdom, and courage. She remains my role model and, through the example of her public service, an exemplar of the virtues that would be honored in the National Women's History Museum. Again, I thank my colleagues for their past support of this effort, and urge them to renew that support for this bill.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, as well as the Senate resolution to create an expedited confirmation process for some part-time boards and commissions. I want to commend Senators Schumer and Alexander for their work on this issue and to express my appreciation for all the members of the nomination reform working group--Senators Reid, McConnell, and Lieberman. I was pleased to be a part of what has truly been a bipartisan effort. The Constitution, in the Appointments Clause, makes the appointment of senior Federal executive officers a joint responsibility of the President and the Senate. The President determines who, in his view, is the best qualified to serve in the most senior and critical positions across the executive branch of our Government. It also requires that we, the Senate, exercise our independent judgment and experience to determine if nominees have the necessary qualifications and character to serve our Nation in these important positions of public trust. The confirmation process must be thorough enough for the Senate to fulfill its Constitutional duty, but it should not be so onerous as to deter qualified people from public service. National security reasons also compel attention to this problem. The National Journal has noted that ``[p]eriods of political transition are, by their very nature, chaotic'' and that ``terrorists strike when they believe governments will be caught off guard.'' Both the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the attacks on September 11th, 2001, occurred within eight months of a change in presidential administrations. And in March 2004, just three days before Spain's national elections, al Qaeda-linked terrorists bombed Madrid commuter trains. The 9/11 Commission found that ``[a]t the sub-cabinet level, there were significant delays in the confirmation of key officials, particularly at the Department of Defense,'' in 2001. It was not until six months after President Bush took office that he had his national security team in place. Countless studies have been written and many experts have opined on how to improve the nomination and confirmation process--from the Brownlow Commission in 1937 to the 9/11 Commission in 2004. This is also an issue that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has been working to address for a long time. For example, in 2001, when Senator Fred Thompson chaired the Committee, we held two hearings focusing on the state of the Presidential appointment process. As a result of these hearings, the Committee reported out legislation to address concerns that were raised. A few of the provisions of this bill would later be included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. But more work remains to be done. On March 2nd of this year, the Committee held another hearing to review the nomination process. The witnesses echoed the concerns that have been raised over the years by the many commissions and that still remain unaddressed. Based upon our review, there are a few areas in particular where improvements should be made. The first is to reduce the sheer number of positions subject to Senate confirmation. In this regard, the National Commission on the Public Service, commonly known as the Volcker Commission, gathered some very illuminating statistics. When President Kennedy came to office, he had 286 positions to fill with the titles of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and Administrator. By the end of the Clinton Administration, there were 914 positions with these titles. Today, according to the Congressional Research Service, CRS, there are more than 1,200 positions appointed by the President that require the advice and consent of the Senate. The large number of positions requiring confirmation leads to long delays in selecting, vetting, and nominating these appointees. Consequently, administrations can go for months without key officials in many agencies. And when political appointees are finally in place, their median tenure is only about two and a half years. A second area ripe for reform is to develop a consistent, common form for the nominees to complete in order to streamline the process, save time, and increase accuracy. This also would reduce the cost and burden on nominees. The White House, Office of Government Ethics, and the Senate need to work together to reconcile the various questions that are asked of nominees. Currently, nominees will often find themselves repeating variations of, or even the exact same, response over and over. In this regard, I believe Clay Johnson, the former head of Presidential Personnel from 2001 to 2003, made an excellent point. He noted that there is a thick file in the White House ``with every possible piece of relevant information on that person and yet none of that is made available to the Senate.'' A consistent, common form, which a nominee can respond to online, would help to facilitate the flow of information so the Senate can begin its review of the nomination earlier. Finally, the executive branch also needs to review its own role and responsibilities in the process. Specifically, the White House should review its background investigation requirements. The extent of the investigation should be tailored to the position. A person nominated to a non-national security-related position should not have to undergo the same detailed FBI background investigation as a nominee to a national security- related position, such as the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the process should make some allowance for people who already have undergone the FBI full-field investigation for a different Senate- confirmed position. Reform of this process would help speed up the review of nominees and aid in the task of recruiting talented people for public service. It also is the White House's responsibility to ensure that the Office of Presidential Personnel has the appropriate staffing level to meet the demands of a new administration. As Mr. Johnson noted at our March 2nd hearing, ``[a] new administration has never had the capacity in the first six months to nominate persons for more than 250 cabinet and subcabinet positions, let alone 400 positions, which government reform individuals and groups suggest a new administration should be able to do.'' If these areas can be reformed, substantial time will be saved, and key leadership posts at our federal agencies will not be vacant for nearly as long. Now, during this mid-term period, two years away from a Presidential election, we have the opportunity to streamline the executive branch nominations process. This can help ensure that the next presidential transition will be as smooth as possible, thwarting the terrorists' belief that they will be able to ``catch us off guard.'' The Schumer-Alexander bill and Senate Resolution go a long way to addressing the concerns that I have highlighted. The bill will make more than 200 positions direct Presidential Appointments that would no longer require Senate confirmation. Many of these positions have little or no policy role, such as the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the Department of Commerce, or are internal management or administrative positions, such as chief financial officers or assistant secretaries for public affairs. By not requiring Senate confirmation, it will allow these positions be filled at a much faster pace and free up Senate resources to focus on more significant nominees. The Senate resolution proposes that more than 240 positions on part- time boards or commissions go through a new ``expedited'' confirmation process. These positions will still require the nominee to respond to all committee questionnaires and still provide for the opportunity for closer scrutiny of the nominee, if warranted. This retains the authority of the Senate over these positions, but streamlines the process, lessening the burden on the Senate for routine, non-controversial nominations and providing for a faster road to confirmation as well. While we must deliver on our duty to provide advice and consent, reforms are needed to improve the effective operation of government. We all want the most qualified people to serve the President and the Nation. We should, therefore, ensure that the process is not unnecessarily burdensome and that key leadership posts do not go unfilled for long stretches of time. Most of all, we need to reform the process so that good people, whose talents and energy we need, do not become so discouraged that they give up their goal of serving the public. I am pleased to join Senators Schumer and Alexander as a cosponsor of this legislation and the Senate resolution, both of which will help us attract well-qualified people to public service.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join with my colleague from Washington in introducing legislation, the Home Health Care Access Protection Act of 2011, to prevent future unfair administrative cuts in Medicare home health payment rates. Home health has become an increasingly important part of our health care system. The kinds of highly skilled and often technically complex services that our Nation's home health agencies provide have helped to keep families together and enabled millions of our most frail and vulnerable older and disabled persons to avoid hospitals and nursing homes and stay just where they want to be--in the comfort and security of their own homes. Moreover, by helping these individuals to avoid more costly institutional care, they are saving Medicare billions of dollars each year. That is why I find it so ironic--and troubling--that the Medicare home health benefit continually comes under attack. The health care reform bill signed into law by the President last year includes $40 billion in cuts to home care over 10 years. Moreover, these cuts are a ``double-whammy'' because they come on top of $25 billion in additional cuts to home health imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services through regulation in the last several years. These cuts are particularly disproportionate for a program that costs Medicare less than $20 billion a year. This simply is not right, and it certainly is not in the best interest of our nation's seniors who rely on home care to keep them out of hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutions. The payment rate cuts implemented and proposed by CMS are based on the assertion that home health agencies have intentionally ``gamed the system'' by claiming that their patients have conditions of higher clinical severity than they actually have in order to receive higher Medicare payments. This unfounded allegation of ``case mix creep'' is based on what CMS contends to be an increase in the average clinical assessment ``score'' of home health patients over the last few years. In fact, there are very real clinical and policy explanations for why the average clinical severity of home care patients' health conditions may have increased over the years. For example, the incentives built into the hospital diagnosis-related group--or DRG--reimbursement system have led to the faster discharge of sicker patients. Advances in technology and changes in medical practice have also enabled home health agencies to treat more complicated medical conditions that previously could only be treated in hospitals, nursing homes, or inpatient rehabilitation facilities. Moreover, this unfair payment rate cut is being assessed across the board, even for home health agencies that showed a decrease in their clinical assessment scores. If an individual home health agency is truly gaming the system, CMS should target that one agency, not penalize everyone. The research method, data and findings that CMS has used to justify the administrative cuts also raise serious concerns about the validity of the payment rate cuts. For example, while changes in the need for therapy services significantly affect the case mix ``score,'' the CMS research methodology disregards those changes in evaluating whether the patient population has changed. Moreover, the method by which CMS evaluates changes in case mix coding is not transparent, does not allow for true public participation, and is not performed in a manner that ensures accountability to Medicare patients and providers in terms of its validity and accuracy of outcomes. The legislation we are introducing today will establish a reliable and transparent process for determining whether payment rate cuts are needed to account for improper changes in ``case mix scoring'' that are not related to changes in the nature of the patients served in home health care or the nature of the care they received. This process will still enable the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enact rate adjustments provided there is reliable evidence that higher case mix scores are resulting from factors other than changes in patient conditions. The legislation will also prevent the implementation of future Medicare payment rate cuts in home health until the Secretary is able to justify the payment cuts through the improved process set forth in the bill. Home health care has consistently proven to be a compassionate and cost-effective alternative to institutional care. Additional deep cuts will be completely counterproductive to our efforts to control overall health care costs. The Home Health Care Access Protection Act of 2011 will help to ensure that our seniors and disabled Americans continue to have access to the quality home health services they deserve, and I encourage all of my colleagues to sign on as cosponsors.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join with my colleague from Washington in introducing legislation, the Home Health Care Access Protection Act of 2011, to prevent future unfair administrative cuts in Medicare home health payment rates. Home health has become an increasingly important part of our health care system. The kinds of highly skilled and often technically complex services that our Nation's home health agencies provide have helped to keep families together and enabled millions of our most frail and vulnerable older and disabled persons to avoid hospitals and nursing homes and stay just where they want to be--in the comfort and security of their own homes. Moreover, by helping these individuals to avoid more costly institutional care, they are saving Medicare billions of dollars each year. That is why I find it so ironic--and troubling--that the Medicare home health benefit continually comes under attack. The health care reform bill signed into law by the President last year includes $40 billion in cuts to home care over 10 years. Moreover, these cuts are a ``double-whammy'' because they come on top of $25 billion in additional cuts to home health imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services through regulation in the last several years. These cuts are particularly disproportionate for a program that costs Medicare less than $20 billion a year. This simply is not right, and it certainly is not in the best interest of our nation's seniors who rely on home care to keep them out of hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutions. The payment rate cuts implemented and proposed by CMS are based on the assertion that home health agencies have intentionally ``gamed the system'' by claiming that their patients have conditions of higher clinical severity than they actually have in order to receive higher Medicare payments. This unfounded allegation of ``case mix creep'' is based on what CMS contends to be an increase in the average clinical assessment ``score'' of home health patients over the last few years. In fact, there are very real clinical and policy explanations for why the average clinical severity of home care patients' health conditions may have increased over the years. For example, the incentives built into the hospital diagnosis-related group--or DRG--reimbursement system have led to the faster discharge of sicker patients. Advances in technology and changes in medical practice have also enabled home health agencies to treat more complicated medical conditions that previously could only be treated in hospitals, nursing homes, or inpatient rehabilitation facilities. Moreover, this unfair payment rate cut is being assessed across the board, even for home health agencies that showed a decrease in their clinical assessment scores. If an individual home health agency is truly gaming the system, CMS should target that one agency, not penalize everyone. The research method, data and findings that CMS has used to justify the administrative cuts also raise serious concerns about the validity of the payment rate cuts. For example, while changes in the need for therapy services significantly affect the case mix ``score,'' the CMS research methodology disregards those changes in evaluating whether the patient population has changed. Moreover, the method by which CMS evaluates changes in case mix coding is not transparent, does not allow for true public participation, and is not performed in a manner that ensures accountability to Medicare patients and providers in terms of its validity and accuracy of outcomes. The legislation we are introducing today will establish a reliable and transparent process for determining whether payment rate cuts are needed to account for improper changes in ``case mix scoring'' that are not related to changes in the nature of the patients served in home health care or the nature of the care they received. This process will still enable the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enact rate adjustments provided there is reliable evidence that higher case mix scores are resulting from factors other than changes in patient conditions. The legislation will also prevent the implementation of future Medicare payment rate cuts in home health until the Secretary is able to justify the payment cuts through the improved process set forth in the bill. Home health care has consistently proven to be a compassionate and cost-effective alternative to institutional care. Additional deep cuts will be completely counterproductive to our efforts to control overall health care costs. The Home Health Care Access Protection Act of 2011 will help to ensure that our seniors and disabled Americans continue to have access to the quality home health services they deserve, and I encourage all of my colleagues to sign on as cosponsors.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce with Senator Lieberman the Securing Terrorist Intelligence Act. Last Congress, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from the three top U.S. intelligence officials about the errors the Federal Government made in handling the unsuccessful 2009 Christmas Day terrorist plot. We dodged a bullet that day when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian-born terrorist, failed to detonate a bomb on Northwest flight 253 in the skies above Detroit. While critical information was not shared prior to Abdulmatallab boarding that plane, a significant error also was committed by U.S. officials after that foreign terrorist had already been detained in Detroit, an error that may well have prevented the collection of valuable intelligence about future terrorist threats to our country. The error became clear during my questioning of the top intelligence officials at the committee's hearing held in response to this failed attack. I was stunned to learn that the decision had been made to place this captured terrorist into the U.S. civilian criminal court system after just 50 minutes of interrogation--and without any consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Secretary Homeland Security. That decision was critical. The determination to charge Abdulmutallab in civilian court likely foreclosed the collection of additional intelligence information. We know that the interrogation of captured terrorists can provide critical intelligence and save American lives, but our civil justice system, as opposed to the military detention and tribunal system established by Congress and the President, encourages terrorists to ``lawyer up'' and to stop answering questions. Indeed, that was what happened in the case of Abdulmutallab. He had provided some valuable information to law enforcement officials immediately after his capture, and we likely would have obtained more information if we had treated this foreign terrorist as an enemy belligerent and had placed him in the military tribunal system. Unfortunately, once he was read his Miranda rights and given a lawyer at our expense, he was advised to cease answering questions, and that is exactly what he did. That poor decision-making may well have prevented us from finding out more of the plot's organizers, planners, financiers, logistics support, and other key players. In addition, we may have found out more about future plots originating in Yemen targeting American citizens--possibly even the thwarted October 2010 printer cartridge attacks. Good intelligence is critical to our ability to stop terrorist plots before they are executed. We know that lawful interrogations of terrorist suspects can provide valuable intelligence. Deciding to charge Abdulmutallab in the civilian criminal system without even consulting three of our nation's top intelligence officials simply defies common sense. It has been over a year since the arrest, and we are all very thankful that there has not been a successful terrorist attack in America since then. We all know, however, the threat persists. That is why we must redouble our efforts and ensure that when the next terrorist is captured, proper action is taken so we do not miss another opportunity to gain valuable intelligence that could save American lives. To correct this failure and to ensure that our nation's senior intelligence officials are consulted before making the decision to try future foreign terrorists in civilian court, I am reintroducing a bill that would require this crucial consultation. I am very pleased to be joined by the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, who has been such a leader in this area. Specifically, our bill would require the Attorney General to consult with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Defense before initiating a custodial interrogation of foreign terrorists or filing civilian criminal charges against them. These officials are in the best position to know what other threats the United States is facing from terrorists and to assess the need to gather more intelligence on those threats. If there is a disagreement among the Attorney General and these intelligence officials regarding the appropriate approach to the detention and interrogation of foreign terrorists, then the bill would require the President to resolve the disagreement. Only the President would be permitted to direct the initiation of civilian law enforcement actions--balancing his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief and as the nation's chief law enforcement officer. To be clear, this legislation would not deprive the President of any investigative or prosecutorial tool. It would not preclude a decision to charge a foreign terrorist in our military tribunal system or in our civilian criminal justice system. It would simply require that the Attorney General coordinate and consult with our top intelligence officials before making a decision that could foreclose the collection of critical additional intelligence information. This consultation requirement is not unprecedented. Section 811 of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 requires the Director of the FBI and the head of a department or agency with a potential spy in its ranks to consult and periodically reassess any decision to leave the suspected spy in place so that additional intelligence can be gathered on his activities. As the Senate Intelligence Committee noted in its report on the legislation that added the espionage consultation requirement: While prosecutorial discretion ultimately rests with the Department of Justice officials, it stands to reason that in cases designed to protect our national security--such as espionage and terrorism cases--prosecutors should ensure that they do not make decisions that, in fact, end up harming the national security. The committee got it right. The committee went on to explain: [T]he determination of whether to leave a subject in place should be retained by the host agency. The history of the espionage consultation requirement is eerily reminiscent of the lack of consultation that occurred in the case of Abdulmutallab. In espionage cases, Congress has already recognized that when valuable intelligence is at stake, our national security should trump decisions based solely on prosecutorial equities. This requirement must be extended to the most significant security threat facing our Nation--terrorism. I encourage the Senate to act quickly on this important legislation. The changes proposed are modest. They make common sense. But the consequences of a failure to act could be a matter of life and death.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce with Senator Lieberman the Securing Terrorist Intelligence Act. Last Congress, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from the three top U.S. intelligence officials about the errors the Federal Government made in handling the unsuccessful 2009 Christmas Day terrorist plot. We dodged a bullet that day when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian-born terrorist, failed to detonate a bomb on Northwest flight 253 in the skies above Detroit. While critical information was not shared prior to Abdulmatallab boarding that plane, a significant error also was committed by U.S. officials after that foreign terrorist had already been detained in Detroit, an error that may well have prevented the collection of valuable intelligence about future terrorist threats to our country. The error became clear during my questioning of the top intelligence officials at the committee's hearing held in response to this failed attack. I was stunned to learn that the decision had been made to place this captured terrorist into the U.S. civilian criminal court system after just 50 minutes of interrogation--and without any consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Secretary Homeland Security. That decision was critical. The determination to charge Abdulmutallab in civilian court likely foreclosed the collection of additional intelligence information. We know that the interrogation of captured terrorists can provide critical intelligence and save American lives, but our civil justice system, as opposed to the military detention and tribunal system established by Congress and the President, encourages terrorists to ``lawyer up'' and to stop answering questions. Indeed, that was what happened in the case of Abdulmutallab. He had provided some valuable information to law enforcement officials immediately after his capture, and we likely would have obtained more information if we had treated this foreign terrorist as an enemy belligerent and had placed him in the military tribunal system. Unfortunately, once he was read his Miranda rights and given a lawyer at our expense, he was advised to cease answering questions, and that is exactly what he did. That poor decision-making may well have prevented us from finding out more of the plot's organizers, planners, financiers, logistics support, and other key players. In addition, we may have found out more about future plots originating in Yemen targeting American citizens--possibly even the thwarted October 2010 printer cartridge attacks. Good intelligence is critical to our ability to stop terrorist plots before they are executed. We know that lawful interrogations of terrorist suspects can provide valuable intelligence. Deciding to charge Abdulmutallab in the civilian criminal system without even consulting three of our nation's top intelligence officials simply defies common sense. It has been over a year since the arrest, and we are all very thankful that there has not been a successful terrorist attack in America since then. We all know, however, the threat persists. That is why we must redouble our efforts and ensure that when the next terrorist is captured, proper action is taken so we do not miss another opportunity to gain valuable intelligence that could save American lives. To correct this failure and to ensure that our nation's senior intelligence officials are consulted before making the decision to try future foreign terrorists in civilian court, I am reintroducing a bill that would require this crucial consultation. I am very pleased to be joined by the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, who has been such a leader in this area. Specifically, our bill would require the Attorney General to consult with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Defense before initiating a custodial interrogation of foreign terrorists or filing civilian criminal charges against them. These officials are in the best position to know what other threats the United States is facing from terrorists and to assess the need to gather more intelligence on those threats. If there is a disagreement among the Attorney General and these intelligence officials regarding the appropriate approach to the detention and interrogation of foreign terrorists, then the bill would require the President to resolve the disagreement. Only the President would be permitted to direct the initiation of civilian law enforcement actions--balancing his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief and as the nation's chief law enforcement officer. To be clear, this legislation would not deprive the President of any investigative or prosecutorial tool. It would not preclude a decision to charge a foreign terrorist in our military tribunal system or in our civilian criminal justice system. It would simply require that the Attorney General coordinate and consult with our top intelligence officials before making a decision that could foreclose the collection of critical additional intelligence information. This consultation requirement is not unprecedented. Section 811 of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 requires the Director of the FBI and the head of a department or agency with a potential spy in its ranks to consult and periodically reassess any decision to leave the suspected spy in place so that additional intelligence can be gathered on his activities. As the Senate Intelligence Committee noted in its report on the legislation that added the espionage consultation requirement: While prosecutorial discretion ultimately rests with the Department of Justice officials, it stands to reason that in cases designed to protect our national security--such as espionage and terrorism cases--prosecutors should ensure that they do not make decisions that, in fact, end up harming the national security. The committee got it right. The committee went on to explain: [T]he determination of whether to leave a subject in place should be retained by the host agency. The history of the espionage consultation requirement is eerily reminiscent of the lack of consultation that occurred in the case of Abdulmutallab. In espionage cases, Congress has already recognized that when valuable intelligence is at stake, our national security should trump decisions based solely on prosecutorial equities. This requirement must be extended to the most significant security threat facing our Nation--terrorism. I encourage the Senate to act quickly on this important legislation. The changes proposed are modest. They make common sense. But the consequences of a failure to act could be a matter of life and death.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, yesterday I offered three amendments to the SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Bill to make commonsense reforms to our regulatory system. Today, Senators Roberts and Barrasso join me in offering the ``CURB Act''--which stands for ``Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens.'' This legislation combines the provisions of those three amendments to force federal agencies to cut the red tape that impedes job growth. As I explained yesterday, all too often it seems Federal agencies do not take into account the impacts to small businesses and job growth before imposing new rules and regulations. The bill we are introducing today obligates them to do so. The CURB Act does three things: first, it requires Federal agencies to analyze the indirect costs of regulations, such as the impact on job creation, the cost of energy, and consumer prices. Presently, Federal agencies are not required by statute to analyze the indirect cost regulations can have on the public, such as higher energy costs, higher prices, and the impact on job creation. However, Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton in 1993, obligates agencies to provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with an assessment of the indirect costs of proposed regulations. Our bill would essentially codify this provision of President Clinton's Executive Order. Second, the CURB Act obligates Federal agencies to comply with public notice and comment requirements and prohibits them from circumventing these requirements by issuing unofficial rules as ``guidance documents.'' After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, Federal agencies found it easier to issue so-called ``guidance documents,'' rather than formal rules. Although these guidance documents are merely an agency's interpretation of how the public can comply with a particular rule, and are not enforceable in court, as a practical matter they operate as if they are legally binding. Thus, they have been used by agencies to circumvent OIRA regulatory review and public notice and comment requirements. In 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13422, which contained a provision closing this loophole by imposing ``Good Guidance Practices'' on Federal agencies, which requires them to provide public notice and comment for significant guidance documents. Our bill would essentially codify this provision of President Bush's Executive Order. Third, the CURB Act helps out the ``little guy'' trying to navigate our incredibly complex and burdensome regulatory environment. So many small businesses don't have a lot of capital on hand. When a small business inadvertently runs afoul of a Federal regulation for the first time, that first penalty could sink the business and all the jobs it supports. Our bill would provide access to SBA assistance to small businesses in a situation where they face a first-time, non-harmful paperwork violation. It simply doesn't make sense to me to punish small businesses the first time they accidently fail to comply with paperwork requirements, so long as no harm comes from that failure. Each of these provisions has been endorsed by the National Federation of Independent Business, NFIB, and the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council. I urge my colleagues to support the CURB Act, which contains these important reforms to our regulatory system.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in these challenging economic times, it is a pleasure to recognize a business that is growing and creating new jobs as it demonstrates environmental stewardship and community citizenship. The Poland Spring Water Company of Maine is such a business. The pure, natural spring water found in Maine's Western Mountains has been prized by residents and travelers since the earliest days of our Nation. In 1845, Hiram Ricker began bottling this water and a company was born. By 1904, the water had gained international praise earning medals of excellence at the Columbian Exposition and the World's Fair. The Ricker Inn, which opened a decade later, hosted such illustrious guests as Presidents Cleveland and Taft. Today, Poland Spring is one of the best-selling bottled spring water brands in North America. Its bottling plants in three Maine communities provide some 800 good-paying, skilled jobs. Its annual payroll of $40 million and $65 million in purchases of goods and services from other Maine companies make it a mainstay of our State's rural economy. Its generous support for schools, fire and rescue, conservation, and many other causes strengthen our communities. Three years ago, Poland Spring opened its newest plant in the small town of Kingfield with 40 workers. This year, employment stands at 70 and the Kingfield operation was recently named ``The Best Plant in North America'' by Poland Springs' parent company, Nestle Waters. That is an outstanding record of growth and accomplishment in such a short time, but it doesn't surprise me to see a Maine facility achieve this distinction. Poland Spring does not just bottle water--it is a diligent guardian of Maine's precious groundwater resources. The company's extensive monitoring efforts to protect water quality and the local watershed set a standard for the industry worldwide. From its ultra-light plastic bottle and energy-efficient building design to its operation of the largest biodiesel trucking fleet in Maine, Poland Spring's commitment to the environment is seen at every step of the process. I congratulate the Poland Spring Water Company for more than 160 years of contributions to the State of Maine and the Kingfield facility for its recognition as the best in North America.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, yesterday I offered three amendments to the SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Bill to make commonsense reforms to our regulatory system. Today, Senators Roberts and Barrasso join me in offering the ``CURB Act''--which stands for ``Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens.'' This legislation combines the provisions of those three amendments to force federal agencies to cut the red tape that impedes job growth. As I explained yesterday, all too often it seems Federal agencies do not take into account the impacts to small businesses and job growth before imposing new rules and regulations. The bill we are introducing today obligates them to do so. The CURB Act does three things: first, it requires Federal agencies to analyze the indirect costs of regulations, such as the impact on job creation, the cost of energy, and consumer prices. Presently, Federal agencies are not required by statute to analyze the indirect cost regulations can have on the public, such as higher energy costs, higher prices, and the impact on job creation. However, Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton in 1993, obligates agencies to provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with an assessment of the indirect costs of proposed regulations. Our bill would essentially codify this provision of President Clinton's Executive Order. Second, the CURB Act obligates Federal agencies to comply with public notice and comment requirements and prohibits them from circumventing these requirements by issuing unofficial rules as ``guidance documents.'' After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, Federal agencies found it easier to issue so-called ``guidance documents,'' rather than formal rules. Although these guidance documents are merely an agency's interpretation of how the public can comply with a particular rule, and are not enforceable in court, as a practical matter they operate as if they are legally binding. Thus, they have been used by agencies to circumvent OIRA regulatory review and public notice and comment requirements. In 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13422, which contained a provision closing this loophole by imposing ``Good Guidance Practices'' on Federal agencies, which requires them to provide public notice and comment for significant guidance documents. Our bill would essentially codify this provision of President Bush's Executive Order. Third, the CURB Act helps out the ``little guy'' trying to navigate our incredibly complex and burdensome regulatory environment. So many small businesses don't have a lot of capital on hand. When a small business inadvertently runs afoul of a Federal regulation for the first time, that first penalty could sink the business and all the jobs it supports. Our bill would provide access to SBA assistance to small businesses in a situation where they face a first-time, non-harmful paperwork violation. It simply doesn't make sense to me to punish small businesses the first time they accidently fail to comply with paperwork requirements, so long as no harm comes from that failure. Each of these provisions has been endorsed by the National Federation of Independent Business, NFIB, and the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council. I urge my colleagues to support the CURB Act, which contains these important reforms to our regulatory system.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, unfortunately, all too often it seems Federal agencies do not take into account the impacts to small businesses and job growth before imposing new rules and regulations. And so, I am introducing three amendments to the Small Business Reauthorization bill to force Federal agencies to cut the redtape that impedes job growth. The first of my three amendments requires Federal agencies to analyze the indirect costs of regulations, such as the impact on job creation, the cost of energy, and consumer prices. Presently, Federal agencies are not required by statute to analyze the indirect cost regulations can have on the public, such as higher energy costs, higher prices, and the impact on job creation. However, Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton in 1993, obligates agencies to provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with an assessment of the indirect costs of proposed regulations. My amendment would essentially codify this provision of President Clinton's Executive Order. My second amendment obligates Federal agencies to comply with public notice and comment requirements and prohibits them from circumventing these requirements by issuing unofficial rules as guidance documents.'' After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, Federal agencies found it easier to issue so-called guidance documents, rather than formal rules. Although these guidance documents are merely an agency's interpretation of how the public can comply with a particular rule, and are not enforceable in court, as a practical matter they operate as if they are legally binding. Thus, they have been used by agencies to circumvent OIRA regulatory review and public notice and comment requirements. In 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13422, which contained a provision closing this loophole by imposing ``Good Guidance Practices'' on Federal agencies, which requires them to provide public notice and comment for significant guidance documents. My amendment would essentially codify this provision of President Bush's Executive Order. My third amendment helps out the ``little guy'' trying to navigate our incredibly complex and burdensome regulatory environment. So many small businesses don't have a lot of capital on hand. When a small business inadvertently runs afoul of a Federal regulation for the first time, that first penalty could sink the business and all the jobs it supports. My amendment would provide access to SBA assistance to small businesses in a situation where they face a first-time, nonharmful paperwork violation. It simply doesn't make sense to me to punish small businesses the first time they accidently fail to comply with paperwork requirements, so long as no harm comes from that failure. Each of the provisions of these amendments have been endorsed by the National Federation of Independent Business, NFIB, and the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council. I urge my colleagues to support these important amendments to our regulatory system.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about a program designed to address the unique needs of rural schools. The Rural Education Achievement Program, or REAP, is designed to help level the playing field for small and high-poverty rural school systems. It is the only dedicated Federal funding stream to aid rural school districts in overcoming the increased expenses caused by geographic isolation. Nearly one-third of America's public schools are in rural places, and more than 21 percent of our public school students attend these schools. Students in rural America should have the same access to Federal dollars and a good education as those students who attend school in urban and suburban communities. For this reason, I worked with Senator Kent Conrad in 2001 to author the law creating the REAP program. REAP created two grant programs including the Small and Rural Schools Achievement Program, SRSA, which provides additional funding and flexibility to small rural school districts, and the Rural and Low- Income School Program, RLIS, which provides additional funding for poor rural school districts. Prior to enactment of this law, rural school districts received funds calculated on school enrollment. In many of these districts, Federal formula programs, which are based on population, do not produce enough resources to carry out the purposes the grant is intended to fund. One school district in Maine, for example, received only $28 in 2001 to fund a districtwide safe and drug-free school program. In addition, small and rural school districts often forgo Federal education dollars because they lack the personnel and the resources to apply for competitive grants. Having fewer personnel also creates additional challenges in providing professional development opportunities. Small rural districts are often located long distances from other districts, towns, and universities, drastically reducing opportunities to partner or collaborate. By allowing rural school districts to combine funds, as well as providing additional funds, REAP gives these districts the levels of resources required to undertake significant reform. Funds from this program have already helped to support new technology in classrooms, distance learning opportunities, and professional development activities, as well as a vast array of other programs which will help rural districts make progress towards the goals of the No Child Left Behind Act. In 2007 and 2009, along with Senator Conrad, I cosponsored legislation to reauthorize this important program. Unfortunately, no action has been taken. The REAP Reauthorization Act of 2011 would reauthorize and enact a few focused changes to the law. These changes will allow Federal funds to be even more closely targeted to geographically isolated districts. One important change will allow program eligible districts to participate in the Rural and Low-Income School Program if they would not receive financial benefits from the Small and Rural Schools Achievement Program. Education is an essential driver for economic development. This rings true especially in rural America, where schools are the linchpin of rural communities. I am encouraged to see that the Maine School Management Association has spoken in support of the REAP Reauthorization Act of 2011. As cochair of the Senate Rural Education Caucus, I will continue to work towards our goal of advancing the educational interests of rural schools and districts. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from the Maine School Management Association.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about a program designed to address the unique needs of rural schools. The Rural Education Achievement Program, or REAP, is designed to help level the playing field for small and high-poverty rural school systems. It is the only dedicated Federal funding stream to aid rural school districts in overcoming the increased expenses caused by geographic isolation. Nearly one-third of America's public schools are in rural places, and more than 21 percent of our public school students attend these schools. Students in rural America should have the same access to Federal dollars and a good education as those students who attend school in urban and suburban communities. For this reason, I worked with Senator Kent Conrad in 2001 to author the law creating the REAP program. REAP created two grant programs including the Small and Rural Schools Achievement Program, SRSA, which provides additional funding and flexibility to small rural school districts, and the Rural and Low- Income School Program, RLIS, which provides additional funding for poor rural school districts. Prior to enactment of this law, rural school districts received funds calculated on school enrollment. In many of these districts, Federal formula programs, which are based on population, do not produce enough resources to carry out the purposes the grant is intended to fund. One school district in Maine, for example, received only $28 in 2001 to fund a districtwide safe and drug-free school program. In addition, small and rural school districts often forgo Federal education dollars because they lack the personnel and the resources to apply for competitive grants. Having fewer personnel also creates additional challenges in providing professional development opportunities. Small rural districts are often located long distances from other districts, towns, and universities, drastically reducing opportunities to partner or collaborate. By allowing rural school districts to combine funds, as well as providing additional funds, REAP gives these districts the levels of resources required to undertake significant reform. Funds from this program have already helped to support new technology in classrooms, distance learning opportunities, and professional development activities, as well as a vast array of other programs which will help rural districts make progress towards the goals of the No Child Left Behind Act. In 2007 and 2009, along with Senator Conrad, I cosponsored legislation to reauthorize this important program. Unfortunately, no action has been taken. The REAP Reauthorization Act of 2011 would reauthorize and enact a few focused changes to the law. These changes will allow Federal funds to be even more closely targeted to geographically isolated districts. One important change will allow program eligible districts to participate in the Rural and Low-Income School Program if they would not receive financial benefits from the Small and Rural Schools Achievement Program. Education is an essential driver for economic development. This rings true especially in rural America, where schools are the linchpin of rural communities. I am encouraged to see that the Maine School Management Association has spoken in support of the REAP Reauthorization Act of 2011. As cochair of the Senate Rural Education Caucus, I will continue to work towards our goal of advancing the educational interests of rural schools and districts. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from the Maine School Management Association.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am proud to once again cosponsor the Fire Grants Reauthorization Act. I am pleased to join with Senators Lieberman, Brown, and Carper in this effort to reauthorize these vital programs. I have always been an ardent supporter of our Nation's fire services. In addition to serving as a cochair of the Congressional Fire Services Caucus, I was a cosponsor of the original FIRE Act, and an original cosponsor of the FIRE Act reauthorization bills in 2004 and in 2010. Unfortunately, last year's bill did not become law. The FIRE Act grants program provides fire departments with the support they need to purchase equipment and vehicles, and to conduct the training and exercises necessary to perform their jobs well. Indeed, this is one of the most successful programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security. The FIRE Act grants program is an efficient and effective model for delivering grant funding because it has a competitive process for evaluating applications, which are peer-reviewed. It is also successful because monies are provided directly to local fire departments. This bipartisan legislation would retain and build upon these aspects of the FIRE Act program that made it successful in the first place. In visits across the State of Maine, I have seen first-hand how these grants build the critical response capabilities of local fire departments. Maine has received more than $50 million through the FIRE Act grants program--a testament to the needs of our often rural, volunteer fire departments and proof that the program is succeeding in delivering funds to communities that need it most. Independent analyses have confirmed that the FIRE Act grants program has been effective. To quote a 2007 study by the National Academy of Public Administration, ``From the standpoint of administrative efficiency, there is broad agreement among stakeholders and observers that the program has been well run. It is a positive case study in the management of a grant program by a government agency.'' I believe this bill will increase the capabilities of our Nation's fire services, and protect the thousands of firefighters and EMTs who put their lives on the line every day.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, in introducing the Positive Aging Act, which will help to increase older Americans' access to quality mental health screening and treatment services in community-based care settings. The legislation we are introducing today is particularly important for States like Maine that have a disproportionate number of older persons. Fifteen percent of Maine's population is 65 or older, and, with the highest median age, Maine is the ``oldest'' State in the nation. Moreover, our percentage of older adults is increasing, and, by 2030, more than one in five Mainers will be over the age of 65. One of the most daunting public health challenges facing our Nation today is how to increase access to quality mental health services for the more than 44 million Americans with severe, disabling mental disorders that can devastate their lives and the lives of the people around them. What is often overlooked, however, is the prevalence of mental illness among our Nation's elderly. Studies have shown that more than one in five Americans aged 65 and older experience mental illness, and that as many as 80 percent of elderly persons in nursing homes suffer from some kind of mental impairment. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the mental health needs of older Americans are often overlooked or not recognized because of the mistaken belief that they are a normal part of aging and therefore cannot be treated. While older Americans experience the full range of mental disorders, the most prevalent mental illness afflicting older people is depression. Ironically, while recent advances have made depression an eminently treatable disorder, only a minority of elderly depressed persons are receiving adequate treatment. Unfortunately, the vast majority of depressed elderly don't seek help. Many simply accept their feelings of profound sadness and do not realize that they are clinically depressed. Moreover, those who do seek help are often underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed, leading the National Institute of Mental Health to estimate that 60 percent of older Americans with depression are not receiving the mental health care that they need. Failure to treat this kind of disorder leads to poorer health outcomes for other medical conditions, higher rates of institutionalization, and increased health care costs. Fortunately, important research is being done that is developing innovative approaches to improve the delivery of mental health care for older adults by integrating it into primary care settings. This research demonstrates that older adults are more likely to receive appropriate mental health care if there is a mental health professional on the primary care team, rather than simply referring them to a mental health specialist outside the primary care setting. Multiple appointments with multiple providers in multiple settings simply don't work for older patients who must also cope with concurrent chronic illnesses, mobility problems, and limited transportation options. The research also shows that there is less stigma associated with psychiatric services when they are integrated into general medical care. The Positive Aging Act builds upon this research and authorizes funding for projects that integrate mental health screening and treatment services into community sites and primary care settings. Specifically, the Positive Aging Act of 2011 would authorize the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to fund demonstration projects to support integration of mental health services in primary care settings. It would also support grants for community- based mental health treatment outreach teams to improve older Americans' access to mental health services. To ensure that these geriatric mental health programs have proper attention and oversight, it would mandate the designation of a Deputy Director for Older Adult Mental Health Services in the Center for Mental Health Services, and it would also include representatives of older Americans or their families and geriatric mental health professionals on the Advisory Council for the Center for Mental Health Services. Finally, it would require state plans under Community Mental Health Services Block Grants to include descriptions of the states' outreach to and services for older individuals. We are fortunate today to have a variety of effective treatments to address the mental health needs of American seniors. The Positive Aging Act will help to ensure that older Americans have access to these important services. I therefore urge my colleagues to sign on as cosponsors of the legislation, which has been endorsed by a broad coalition of mental health and senior organizations, including the Alzheimer's Association, the American Geriatrics Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, and the National Council on Aging. Mr. President, I ask uanimous consent that a letter of support be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, in introducing the Positive Aging Act, which will help to increase older Americans' access to quality mental health screening and treatment services in community-based care settings. The legislation we are introducing today is particularly important for States like Maine that have a disproportionate number of older persons. Fifteen percent of Maine's population is 65 or older, and, with the highest median age, Maine is the ``oldest'' State in the nation. Moreover, our percentage of older adults is increasing, and, by 2030, more than one in five Mainers will be over the age of 65. One of the most daunting public health challenges facing our Nation today is how to increase access to quality mental health services for the more than 44 million Americans with severe, disabling mental disorders that can devastate their lives and the lives of the people around them. What is often overlooked, however, is the prevalence of mental illness among our Nation's elderly. Studies have shown that more than one in five Americans aged 65 and older experience mental illness, and that as many as 80 percent of elderly persons in nursing homes suffer from some kind of mental impairment. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the mental health needs of older Americans are often overlooked or not recognized because of the mistaken belief that they are a normal part of aging and therefore cannot be treated. While older Americans experience the full range of mental disorders, the most prevalent mental illness afflicting older people is depression. Ironically, while recent advances have made depression an eminently treatable disorder, only a minority of elderly depressed persons are receiving adequate treatment. Unfortunately, the vast majority of depressed elderly don't seek help. Many simply accept their feelings of profound sadness and do not realize that they are clinically depressed. Moreover, those who do seek help are often underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed, leading the National Institute of Mental Health to estimate that 60 percent of older Americans with depression are not receiving the mental health care that they need. Failure to treat this kind of disorder leads to poorer health outcomes for other medical conditions, higher rates of institutionalization, and increased health care costs. Fortunately, important research is being done that is developing innovative approaches to improve the delivery of mental health care for older adults by integrating it into primary care settings. This research demonstrates that older adults are more likely to receive appropriate mental health care if there is a mental health professional on the primary care team, rather than simply referring them to a mental health specialist outside the primary care setting. Multiple appointments with multiple providers in multiple settings simply don't work for older patients who must also cope with concurrent chronic illnesses, mobility problems, and limited transportation options. The research also shows that there is less stigma associated with psychiatric services when they are integrated into general medical care. The Positive Aging Act builds upon this research and authorizes funding for projects that integrate mental health screening and treatment services into community sites and primary care settings. Specifically, the Positive Aging Act of 2011 would authorize the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to fund demonstration projects to support integration of mental health services in primary care settings. It would also support grants for community- based mental health treatment outreach teams to improve older Americans' access to mental health services. To ensure that these geriatric mental health programs have proper attention and oversight, it would mandate the designation of a Deputy Director for Older Adult Mental Health Services in the Center for Mental Health Services, and it would also include representatives of older Americans or their families and geriatric mental health professionals on the Advisory Council for the Center for Mental Health Services. Finally, it would require state plans under Community Mental Health Services Block Grants to include descriptions of the states' outreach to and services for older individuals. We are fortunate today to have a variety of effective treatments to address the mental health needs of American seniors. The Positive Aging Act will help to ensure that older Americans have access to these important services. I therefore urge my colleagues to sign on as cosponsors of the legislation, which has been endorsed by a broad coalition of mental health and senior organizations, including the Alzheimer's Association, the American Geriatrics Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, and the National Council on Aging. Mr. President, I ask uanimous consent that a letter of support be printed in the Record.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleague, Senator Lieberman, in introducing the See Something, Say Something Act of 2011. The number of thwarted and failed attacks in the past few years and the Fort Hood attack, which left 13 people dead and wounded dozens, are sobering reminders that terrorists continue to threaten our nation. We have seen, however, that an alert citizenry can be our first line of defense against terrorist attacks as evidenced by events only a few weeks ago in Texas. Tips from alert citizens led to an investigation and the eventual arrest of Khalid Aldawsari on a federal charge of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, an alert chemical supplier reported Aldawsari's suspicious attempt to purchase a toxic chemical called phenol to the FBI. Shipping company personnel also notified local police officers about related suspicious behavior. Without these calls to law enforcement, it is possible that a person who wrote in his diary ``it is time for Jihad'' would have carried out an attack or attacks on his numerous intended targets, including dams, nuclear power plants, and former President George W. Bush. Individuals must be protected from frivolous lawsuits when they report, in good faith, suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist activity. That is why I am again introducing legislation, along with Senator Lieberman, that will provide these important protections. In the 2007 homeland security law, Senator Lieberman and I authored a provision to encourage people to report potential terrorist threats directed against transportation systems. This legislation would expand those protections to reports of suspicious behavior in sectors other than transportation. For example, reports of suspicious activity could be equally important in detecting terrorist plans to attack ``soft targets'' like hotels, shopping malls, restaurants, and religious institutions. In December 2008, a Federal jury convicted five men from New Jersey of conspiring to murder American soldiers at Fort Dix. According to law enforcement officials, the report of an alert store clerk, who stated that a customer had brought in a video showing men firing weapons and shouting in Arabic, triggered their investigation. If not for the report of this vigilant store clerk, law enforcement may not have disrupted this plot against military personnel at Fort Dix. Real life examples like these highlight the need for this bill. That store clerk's action likely saved hundreds of lives. It reveals a core truth of the dangerous times in which we live. Our safety depends on more than just police officers, intelligence analysts, and soldiers. It also depends on the alertness and civic responsibility of all Americans. So we must encourage citizens to be watchful and to report suspicious activity whenever it occurs. As a result of the devastating 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Senator Lieberman and I convened hearings held by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to examine lessons learned from those attacks. These hearings helped bring to light the reality that terrorists might shift their attention from high-value, high-security targets to less secure commercial facilities, where there remains the potential for mass casualties and widespread panic. Many of the Committee's witnesses during these hearings endorsed the idea of expanding the 2007 law beyond the transportation sector. Indeed, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly said that the 2007 law ``made eminently good sense'' and recommended ``that it be expanded [to other sectors] if at all possible.'' The threat is real, and we must encourage citizens to be watchful and to report suspicious activity whenever it occurs. Our legal system, however, can be misused to chill the willingness of citizens to come forward and report possible dangers. As widely reported by the media in 2006, US Airways removed 6 Islamic clerics from a flight after other passengers expressed concerns that some of the clerics had moved out of the their assigned seats and had requested, but were not using, seat belt extenders that could possibly double as weapons. In response to these concerns, US Airways officials removed these individuals from the plane so that they could further investigate. For voicing their reasonable fears that these passengers could be rehearsing or preparing to execute a hijacking, these concerned citizens found themselves as defendants in a civil rights lawsuit and accused of bigotry. The existence of this lawsuit illustrates how unfair it is to allow private citizens to be intimidated into silence by the threat of litigation. Would the passengers have spoken up if they had anticipated that there would be a lawsuit filed against them? Even if such suits fail, they can expose citizens to heavy costs in time and legal fees. The bill we introduce today would provide civil immunity in American courts for any person acting in good faith who reports any suspicious transaction, activity, or occurrence related to an act of terrorism. Specifically, the bill would encourage people to pass on information to federal officials with responsibility for preventing, protecting against, disrupting, or responding to a terrorist act, or to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials, without fear of being sued for doing their civic duty. Only disclosures made to those responsible officials would be protected by the legislation. Once a report is received, those officials would be responsible for assessing its reasonableness and determining whether further action is required. If they take reasonable action to mitigate the reported threat, they, too, would be protected from lawsuits. Just as we should not discourage reporting suspicious incidents, we also should not discourage reasonable responses to them. Let me be very clear that this bill does not offer any protection whatsoever if an individual makes a statement that he or she knows to be false. No one will be able to use this protection as cover for mischievous, vengeful, or biased falsehoods. Our laws and legal system must not intimidate people into silence or prevent our officials from responding to terrorist threats. Protecting citizens who make good faith reports--and that's an important condition in this bill--of potentially lethal activities is essential to maintaining homeland security. Our bill offers protection in a measured way that discourages abuses. Each of us has an important responsibility in the fight against terrorism. It is not a fight that can be left to law enforcement alone. The police simply can't be everywhere all the time. Whether at a hotel, a mall, or an arena, homeland security and law enforcement officials need all citizens to alert them to unattended packages and behavior that appears out of the ordinary. Along these lines, I applaud DHS Secretary Napolitano for establishing the Department's ``If you see something, say something'' campaign and the recent partnerships with various organizations including the NFL. The Department is taking steps to expand this effort with public education and materials for businesses, communities, and citizens. As the Department's campaign continues to grow, there will be a greater need for this legislation as our citizens become better educated. The National Sheriffs' Association, the National Association of Town Watch, and other national organizations have endorsed this legislation. If someone ``sees something'' suspicious, Congress should encourage him or her to ``say something'' about it. This bill promotes and protects that civic duty. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleague, Senator Lieberman, in introducing the See Something, Say Something Act of 2011. The number of thwarted and failed attacks in the past few years and the Fort Hood attack, which left 13 people dead and wounded dozens, are sobering reminders that terrorists continue to threaten our nation. We have seen, however, that an alert citizenry can be our first line of defense against terrorist attacks as evidenced by events only a few weeks ago in Texas. Tips from alert citizens led to an investigation and the eventual arrest of Khalid Aldawsari on a federal charge of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, an alert chemical supplier reported Aldawsari's suspicious attempt to purchase a toxic chemical called phenol to the FBI. Shipping company personnel also notified local police officers about related suspicious behavior. Without these calls to law enforcement, it is possible that a person who wrote in his diary ``it is time for Jihad'' would have carried out an attack or attacks on his numerous intended targets, including dams, nuclear power plants, and former President George W. Bush. Individuals must be protected from frivolous lawsuits when they report, in good faith, suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist activity. That is why I am again introducing legislation, along with Senator Lieberman, that will provide these important protections. In the 2007 homeland security law, Senator Lieberman and I authored a provision to encourage people to report potential terrorist threats directed against transportation systems. This legislation would expand those protections to reports of suspicious behavior in sectors other than transportation. For example, reports of suspicious activity could be equally important in detecting terrorist plans to attack ``soft targets'' like hotels, shopping malls, restaurants, and religious institutions. In December 2008, a Federal jury convicted five men from New Jersey of conspiring to murder American soldiers at Fort Dix. According to law enforcement officials, the report of an alert store clerk, who stated that a customer had brought in a video showing men firing weapons and shouting in Arabic, triggered their investigation. If not for the report of this vigilant store clerk, law enforcement may not have disrupted this plot against military personnel at Fort Dix. Real life examples like these highlight the need for this bill. That store clerk's action likely saved hundreds of lives. It reveals a core truth of the dangerous times in which we live. Our safety depends on more than just police officers, intelligence analysts, and soldiers. It also depends on the alertness and civic responsibility of all Americans. So we must encourage citizens to be watchful and to report suspicious activity whenever it occurs. As a result of the devastating 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Senator Lieberman and I convened hearings held by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to examine lessons learned from those attacks. These hearings helped bring to light the reality that terrorists might shift their attention from high-value, high-security targets to less secure commercial facilities, where there remains the potential for mass casualties and widespread panic. Many of the Committee's witnesses during these hearings endorsed the idea of expanding the 2007 law beyond the transportation sector. Indeed, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly said that the 2007 law ``made eminently good sense'' and recommended ``that it be expanded [to other sectors] if at all possible.'' The threat is real, and we must encourage citizens to be watchful and to report suspicious activity whenever it occurs. Our legal system, however, can be misused to chill the willingness of citizens to come forward and report possible dangers. As widely reported by the media in 2006, US Airways removed 6 Islamic clerics from a flight after other passengers expressed concerns that some of the clerics had moved out of the their assigned seats and had requested, but were not using, seat belt extenders that could possibly double as weapons. In response to these concerns, US Airways officials removed these individuals from the plane so that they could further investigate. For voicing their reasonable fears that these passengers could be rehearsing or preparing to execute a hijacking, these concerned citizens found themselves as defendants in a civil rights lawsuit and accused of bigotry. The existence of this lawsuit illustrates how unfair it is to allow private citizens to be intimidated into silence by the threat of litigation. Would the passengers have spoken up if they had anticipated that there would be a lawsuit filed against them? Even if such suits fail, they can expose citizens to heavy costs in time and legal fees. The bill we introduce today would provide civil immunity in American courts for any person acting in good faith who reports any suspicious transaction, activity, or occurrence related to an act of terrorism. Specifically, the bill would encourage people to pass on information to federal officials with responsibility for preventing, protecting against, disrupting, or responding to a terrorist act, or to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials, without fear of being sued for doing their civic duty. Only disclosures made to those responsible officials would be protected by the legislation. Once a report is received, those officials would be responsible for assessing its reasonableness and determining whether further action is required. If they take reasonable action to mitigate the reported threat, they, too, would be protected from lawsuits. Just as we should not discourage reporting suspicious incidents, we also should not discourage reasonable responses to them. Let me be very clear that this bill does not offer any protection whatsoever if an individual makes a statement that he or she knows to be false. No one will be able to use this protection as cover for mischievous, vengeful, or biased falsehoods. Our laws and legal system must not intimidate people into silence or prevent our officials from responding to terrorist threats. Protecting citizens who make good faith reports--and that's an important condition in this bill--of potentially lethal activities is essential to maintaining homeland security. Our bill offers protection in a measured way that discourages abuses. Each of us has an important responsibility in the fight against terrorism. It is not a fight that can be left to law enforcement alone. The police simply can't be everywhere all the time. Whether at a hotel, a mall, or an arena, homeland security and law enforcement officials need all citizens to alert them to unattended packages and behavior that appears out of the ordinary. Along these lines, I applaud DHS Secretary Napolitano for establishing the Department's ``If you see something, say something'' campaign and the recent partnerships with various organizations including the NFL. The Department is taking steps to expand this effort with public education and materials for businesses, communities, and citizens. As the Department's campaign continues to grow, there will be a greater need for this legislation as our citizens become better educated. The National Sheriffs' Association, the National Association of Town Watch, and other national organizations have endorsed this legislation. If someone ``sees something'' suspicious, Congress should encourage him or her to ``say something'' about it. This bill promotes and protects that civic duty. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the law granting the Federal Government, for the first time, the authority to regulate the security of the Nation's highest risk chemical facilities is due to expire on March 18. We cannot allow this to occur. Given the success of this law and its vital importance to all Americans, I am introducing legislation today with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu to extend and improve the law. More than 70,000 products are created through the use of chemicals, helping to supply the consumer, industrial, construction, and agricultural sectors of our economy. The United States is home to thousands of facilities that manufacture, use, or store chemicals. This industry is vital to our economy, with annual sales of $725 billion, exports of $171 billion, and more than 780,000 employees. After September 11, 2001, we realized that chemical facilities were vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the hazardous chemicals present at many locations, terrorists could view them as attractive targets, yielding loss of life, significant injuries, and major destruction if successfully attacked. In 2005, as Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I held a series of hearings on chemical security. Following these hearings, Senators Lieberman, Carper, Levin, and I introduced bipartisan legislation authorizing the Department of Homeland Security to set and enforce security standards at high-risk chemical facilities. That bill was incorporated into the homeland security appropriations act that was signed into law in 2006. To implement this new authority, DHS established the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, or CFATS. The program sets 18 risk-based performance standards that high-risk chemical facilities must meet. These security standards cover a range of threats, such as perimeter security, access control, theft, internal sabotage, and cyber security. High-risk chemical facilities covered by the program must conduct mandatory vulnerability assessments, develop site security plans, and invest in protective measures. The Department must approve these assessments and site security plans, using audits and inspections to ensure compliance with the performance standards. The Secretary has strong authority to shut down facilities that are non-compliant. This risk-based approach has made the owners and operators of chemical plants partners with the Federal Government in implementing a successful, collaborative security program. This landmark law has been in place slightly more than four years. Taxpayers have invested nearly $300 million in the program, and chemical plants have invested hundreds of millions more to comply with the law. As a direct result, security at our Nation's chemical facilities is much stronger today. Now we must reauthorize the program. Simply put, the program works and should be extended. Changing this successful law, as was proposed last year by the House of Representatives in partisan legislation, would discard what is working for an unproven and burdensome plan. We must not undermine the substantial investments of time and resources already made in CFATS implementation by both DHS and the private sector. Worse would be requiring additional expenditures with no demonstrable increase to the overall security of our Nation. In the 111th Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives debated a provision that would alter the fundamental nature of CFATS. The provision would have required the Department to completely rework the program. It would have mandated the use of so-called ``inherently safer technology,'' or IST. What is IST? It is an approach to process engineering. It is not, however, a security measure. An IST mandate may actually increase or unacceptably transfer risk to other points in the chemical process or elsewhere in the supply chain. For example, many drinking water utilities have determined that chlorine remains their best and most effective drinking water treatment option. Their decisions were not based solely on financial considerations, but also on many other factors, such as the characteristics of the region's climate, geography, and source water supplies, the size and location of the utility's facilities, and the risks and benefits of chlorine use compared to the use of alternative treatment processes. According to one water utility located in an isolated area of the northwest United States, if Congress were to force it to replace its use of gaseous chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, then the utility would have to use as much as seven times the current quantity of treatment chemicals to achieve comparable water quality results. In turn, the utility would have to arrange for many more bulk chemical deliveries, by trucks, into a watershed area. The greater quantities of chemicals and increased frequency of truck deliveries would heighten the risk of an accident resulting in a chemical spill into the watershed. In fact, the accidental release of sodium hypochlorite into the watershed would likely cause greater harm to soils, vegetation, and streams than a gaseous chlorine release in this remote area. Currently, DHS cannot dictate specific security measures, like IST. Nor should it. The Federal Government should set performance standards, but leave it up to the private sector to decide precisely how to achieve those standards. Forcing chemical facilities to implement IST could cost jobs at some facilities and affect the availability of many vital products. Last year, the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates testified that mandatory IST would restrict the production of pharmaceuticals and microelectronics, hobbling these industries. The increased cost of a mandatory IST program may force chemical companies to simply transfer their operations overseas, costing American workers thousands of jobs. To be clear, some owners and operators of chemical facilities may choose to use IST. But that decision should be theirs--not Washington's. Congress should not dictate specific industrial processes under the guise of security when a facility could choose other alternatives that meet the Nation's security needs. Last July, the Homeland Security Committee unanimously approved bipartisan legislation I authored with Senators Pryor, Voinovich, and Landrieu to extend CFATS for three more years. Additionally, the bill would have established voluntary exercise and training programs to improve collaboration with the private sector and state and local communities under the CFATS program; created a voluntary technical assistance program; and created a chemical facility security best practices clearinghouse and private sector advisory board at DHS to assist in the implementation of CFATS. Today, along with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu, I am reintroducing this bill. The Continuing Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act of 2011 is a straight-forward, common-sense reauthorization of the CFATS program. I am conscious of the risks our Nation faces through an attack on a chemical facility. That is why I authored this law in the first place and battled considerable opposition to get it enacted. We should support the continuation of this successful security program without the addition of costly, unproven Federal mandates. I urge my colleagues to support this important bill.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the law granting the Federal Government, for the first time, the authority to regulate the security of the Nation's highest risk chemical facilities is due to expire on March 18. We cannot allow this to occur. Given the success of this law and its vital importance to all Americans, I am introducing legislation today with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu to extend and improve the law. More than 70,000 products are created through the use of chemicals, helping to supply the consumer, industrial, construction, and agricultural sectors of our economy. The United States is home to thousands of facilities that manufacture, use, or store chemicals. This industry is vital to our economy, with annual sales of $725 billion, exports of $171 billion, and more than 780,000 employees. After September 11, 2001, we realized that chemical facilities were vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the hazardous chemicals present at many locations, terrorists could view them as attractive targets, yielding loss of life, significant injuries, and major destruction if successfully attacked. In 2005, as Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I held a series of hearings on chemical security. Following these hearings, Senators Lieberman, Carper, Levin, and I introduced bipartisan legislation authorizing the Department of Homeland Security to set and enforce security standards at high-risk chemical facilities. That bill was incorporated into the homeland security appropriations act that was signed into law in 2006. To implement this new authority, DHS established the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, or CFATS. The program sets 18 risk-based performance standards that high-risk chemical facilities must meet. These security standards cover a range of threats, such as perimeter security, access control, theft, internal sabotage, and cyber security. High-risk chemical facilities covered by the program must conduct mandatory vulnerability assessments, develop site security plans, and invest in protective measures. The Department must approve these assessments and site security plans, using audits and inspections to ensure compliance with the performance standards. The Secretary has strong authority to shut down facilities that are non-compliant. This risk-based approach has made the owners and operators of chemical plants partners with the Federal Government in implementing a successful, collaborative security program. This landmark law has been in place slightly more than four years. Taxpayers have invested nearly $300 million in the program, and chemical plants have invested hundreds of millions more to comply with the law. As a direct result, security at our Nation's chemical facilities is much stronger today. Now we must reauthorize the program. Simply put, the program works and should be extended. Changing this successful law, as was proposed last year by the House of Representatives in partisan legislation, would discard what is working for an unproven and burdensome plan. We must not undermine the substantial investments of time and resources already made in CFATS implementation by both DHS and the private sector. Worse would be requiring additional expenditures with no demonstrable increase to the overall security of our Nation. In the 111th Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives debated a provision that would alter the fundamental nature of CFATS. The provision would have required the Department to completely rework the program. It would have mandated the use of so-called ``inherently safer technology,'' or IST. What is IST? It is an approach to process engineering. It is not, however, a security measure. An IST mandate may actually increase or unacceptably transfer risk to other points in the chemical process or elsewhere in the supply chain. For example, many drinking water utilities have determined that chlorine remains their best and most effective drinking water treatment option. Their decisions were not based solely on financial considerations, but also on many other factors, such as the characteristics of the region's climate, geography, and source water supplies, the size and location of the utility's facilities, and the risks and benefits of chlorine use compared to the use of alternative treatment processes. According to one water utility located in an isolated area of the northwest United States, if Congress were to force it to replace its use of gaseous chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, then the utility would have to use as much as seven times the current quantity of treatment chemicals to achieve comparable water quality results. In turn, the utility would have to arrange for many more bulk chemical deliveries, by trucks, into a watershed area. The greater quantities of chemicals and increased frequency of truck deliveries would heighten the risk of an accident resulting in a chemical spill into the watershed. In fact, the accidental release of sodium hypochlorite into the watershed would likely cause greater harm to soils, vegetation, and streams than a gaseous chlorine release in this remote area. Currently, DHS cannot dictate specific security measures, like IST. Nor should it. The Federal Government should set performance standards, but leave it up to the private sector to decide precisely how to achieve those standards. Forcing chemical facilities to implement IST could cost jobs at some facilities and affect the availability of many vital products. Last year, the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates testified that mandatory IST would restrict the production of pharmaceuticals and microelectronics, hobbling these industries. The increased cost of a mandatory IST program may force chemical companies to simply transfer their operations overseas, costing American workers thousands of jobs. To be clear, some owners and operators of chemical facilities may choose to use IST. But that decision should be theirs--not Washington's. Congress should not dictate specific industrial processes under the guise of security when a facility could choose other alternatives that meet the Nation's security needs. Last July, the Homeland Security Committee unanimously approved bipartisan legislation I authored with Senators Pryor, Voinovich, and Landrieu to extend CFATS for three more years. Additionally, the bill would have established voluntary exercise and training programs to improve collaboration with the private sector and state and local communities under the CFATS program; created a voluntary technical assistance program; and created a chemical facility security best practices clearinghouse and private sector advisory board at DHS to assist in the implementation of CFATS. Today, along with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu, I am reintroducing this bill. The Continuing Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act of 2011 is a straight-forward, common-sense reauthorization of the CFATS program. I am conscious of the risks our Nation faces through an attack on a chemical facility. That is why I authored this law in the first place and battled considerable opposition to get it enacted. We should support the continuation of this successful security program without the addition of costly, unproven Federal mandates. I urge my colleagues to support this important bill.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise to express my deep concern that the Senate has yet to consider the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011. As the Presiding Officer is well aware, we should have completed work on this bill and every other appropriations bill before October 1 of last year. But with the Department of Defense, this is becoming increasingly problematic. For this reason, along with two members of the Republican leadership, Senator Alexander and Senator Barrasso, I have filed an amendment to the patent reform bill that would fund the Department of Defense for the remainder of this fiscal year. Just think what we have done the last 3 weeks. We took up an FAA reauthorization bill. Then we went on recess for a week. And now we are on a patent reform bill. I don't mean to suggest that FAA and patent reform are not important--certainly we could have gone without having a recess--but both of those bills pale in comparison to the urgency of providing our service men and women with the resources they need to carry out their mission. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and other military leaders have repeatedly and clearly warned us about the dangers of failing to pass a full-year Defense funding bill. It is hurting our national security and harming our readiness. Secretary Gates' put it bluntly, saying: ``The continuing resolution represents a crisis at our doorstep.'' Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn testified that ``a year-long CR will damage national security.'' At no time in recent memory has Congress failed to pass a Defense appropriations bill. Even when there was a year-long continuing resolution for most of the government during fiscal year 2007, the Congress passed a separate bill funding the Department of Defense. With troops in harm's way, now is not the time to break with that precedent. If we do not provide the authority for the Air Force to buy unmanned aerial vehicles to fly combat air patrols over Afghanistan, the fighting there will not be halted until we do so. If we do not act to provide the $150 million that has been requested to meet the very specific and urgent requirements of our special forces, we will be failing those who are truly on the frontlines. Secretary Gates has made it clear, military readiness will suffer because of fewer flying hours for our pilots, fewer steaming days for our ships, and cutbacks in training for home-stationed forces. A full year's CR will also delay much needed modernization of our military equipment. This would come at a time when our Navy is at its smallest size since 1916 and at a time when the aircraft and our Air Force inventory are older than at any time since the Air Force was created. The Navy will not be able to procure a second Virginia class submarine nor a DDG-51 destroyer needed to keep costs down and to achieve the minimum size fleet--313 ships--that the Navy has stated is the absolute minimum. Operating under a full-year's CR also means that the taxpayers are going to end up paying more for less. The Navy would likely have to renegotiate some of its procurements. The Army has already shut down work on the Stryker Mobile Gun System that will likely incur additional costs to restart. It is also important to recognize that at a time when the American public is most concerned about jobs and the economy, the Defense appropriations bill provides funds that are the source of thousands of jobs in the United States--jobs that will be lost or at least deferred. The Secretary of the Navy has said that the combined effects of failing to fund the Defense Department will directly affect the strength of the industrial base and that more than 10,000 private sector jobs at shipyards, factories, and Navy and Marine Corps facilities across the country will be jeopardized. I could go on and on listing the ways our servicemembers and our DOD civilian workforce and the private sector contractors will be affected by our failure to act. There is simply no excuse for this Senate not to have acted last year on a Defense appropriations bill. Surely, we should turn our attention to focusing on the needs of our military immediately, and we should heed the warning of Secretary Gates, who said: That is how you hollow out a military--when your best people, your veterans of multiple combat deployments, become frustrated and demoralized and, as a result, begin leaving military service. Let's do what is most important and let's do it now. Let's pass the Defense appropriations bill. I wish to thank the ranking member of the Budget Committee, Senator Sessions, for yielding me time.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, if the Senator is truly going to wrap it up, I don't object.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Lieberman and Senator Carper in introducing the Cyber Security and Internet Freedom Act of 2011. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack and ensure that access to the Internet is protected and its availability preserved for every American. The Internet is vital to almost every facet of Americans' daily lives--from the water we drink to the power we use to the ways we communicate. It is essential to the free flow of ideas and information. The Internet is a manifestation of the ideals that underlie the First Amendment of our Constitution and the core freedoms that all Americans hold dear. It is essential that the Internet and our access to it be protected to ensure both reliability of the critical services that rely upon it and the availability of the information that travels over it. While the United States must ensure the security of our nation and its critical infrastructure, it must do so in a manner that does not deprive Americans of the ability to lawfully read or express their views. Neither the President nor any other Federal official should have the authority to ``shut down'' the Internet. In June 2010, Senator Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I introduced legislation to strengthen the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack; build a public/private partnership to promote national cyber security priorities; and bolster the government's ability to set, monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they contain. In late June, that bill was unanimously approved by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Today we are introducing for the 112th Congress the bill unanimously approved by our committee, but with explicit provisions preventing the President from shutting down the Internet and providing an opportunity for judicial review of designations of our most sensitive systems and assets as ``covered critical infrastructure.'' President Mubarak's actions in January to shut down Internet communications in Egypt were, and are, totally inappropriate. Freedom of speech is a fundamental right that must be protected, and his ban was clearly designed to limit criticisms of his government. Our cyber security legislation is intended to protect the United States from external cyber attacks. Yet, some have suggested that the legislation the Committee reported during the last Congress would empower the President to deny U.S. citizens access to the Internet. Nothing could be further from the truth. I would never sign on to legislation that authorized the President, or anyone else, to shut down the Internet. Emergency or no, the exercise of such broad authority would be an affront to our Constitution. But our outmoded current laws do give us reason to be concerned. Most important, under current law, in the event of a cyber attack, the President's authorities are broad and ambiguous--a recipe for encroachments on privacy and civil liberties. For example, in the event of a war or threat of war, the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the President to take over or shut down wire and radio communications providers. This law is a crude sledgehammer built for another time and technology. Our bill contains a number of protections to make sure that broad authority cannot be used to shut down the Internet. First, section 2 of the bill states explicitly: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, neither the President, the Director of the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or any officer or employee of the United States Government shall have the authority to shut down the Internet. Second, the emergency measures in our bill apply in a precise and targeted way only to our most critical infrastructure--vital components of the electric power grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This definition would not cover the entire Internet, the Internet backbone, or even entire companies. In defining covered critical infrastructure, our bill directs the Secretary to consider the consequences of a disruption of a particular system or asset. To constitute a ``national or regional catastrophe,'' the disruption would need to cause a mass casualty event which includes an extraordinary number of fatalities; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence; or severe degradation of national security capabilities, including intelligence and defense functions. When the Committee reported this bill last year, the report clarified what these four factors mean, specifically referencing the current DHS interpretation of ``national or severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence; or regional catastrophe.'' Under DHS's interpretation, a ``national or regional catastrophe'' includes a combination of the following factors: more than 2,500 prompt fatalities; greater than $25 billion in first-year economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of greater than one month; or severe degradation of the nation's security capabilities. As our Committee's report noted, we expect the Department to apply this standard in determining which particular systems or assets constitute covered critical infrastructure. Third, our legislation restricts the President's ability to declare a national cyber emergency to those circumstances in which an ``actual or imminent'' cyber attack would disrupt covered critical infrastructure that would cause these catastrophic consequences. Fourth, any measures ordered by the President must be ``the least disruptive means feasible.'' Fifth, the authority our bill would grant is time limited. The President could only declare a cyber emergency for 30-day period and only for up to 120 days. After that, Congress would be required to specifically authorize further measures. Any declaration would be subject to congressional oversight, as our bill requires the President to notify Congress regarding the specific threat to our nation's infrastructure, why existing protections are not sufficient, and what specific emergency measures are required to respond to the specific threat. Sixth, the legislation expressly forbids the designation of any system or asset as covered critical infrastructure ``based solely on activities protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.'' Seventh, the bill provides for a robust administrative process for an owner or operator to challenge the designation of a system or asset as covered critical infrastructure and expressly permits challenges of a final agency determination in federal court. Our bill contains protections to prevent the President from denying Americans access to the Internet--even as it provides clear and unambiguous direction to ensure that those most critical systems and assets that rely on the Internet are protected. And, even though experts question whether anyone can technically ``shut down'' the Internet in the United States, we included explicit language prohibiting the President from doing what President Mubarak did. I would like to stress that the need for Congress to pass a comprehensive cyber security bill is more urgent than ever. Cyber-based threats to U.S. information infrastructure are increasing, constantly evolving, and growing more dangerous. In March 2010 the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that the computer systems of Congress and the Executive Branch agencies are now under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month. The annual cost of cyber crime worldwide has climbed to more than $1 trillion. Coordinated cyber attacks have crippled Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan and compromised critical infrastructure in countries around the world. Devastating cyber attacks could disrupt, damage, or even destroy some of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as the electric power grid, oil and gas pipelines, dams, or communications networks. These cyber threats could cause catastrophic damage in the physical world. Based on media reports, China and Russia already have penetrated the computer systems of America's electric power grid, leaving behind malicious hidden software that could be activated later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis. In June 2010, cyber security experts discovered Stuxnet, one of the most sophisticated viruses ever found. Stuxnet was programmed specifically to infiltrate certain industrial control systems, allowing the virus to potentially overwrite commands and to sabotage infected systems. It had the potential to change instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which, in turn, could damage, disable, or disrupt equipment supporting the most critical infrastructure. The private sector is also under attack. In January 2010, Google announced that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google sought to access the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists. For other companies, lucrative information such as critical corporate data and software source codes were targeted. According to a report released last week, coordinated and covert attacks hit more than five major oil, energy, and petrochemical companies. The focus of the intrusions was oil and gas field production systems, as well as financial documents related to field exploration and bidding for new oil and gas leases. The companies also lost information related to their industrial control systems. In the cyber domain, the advantage lies with our adversaries, for whom success could be achieved by exploiting a single vulnerability that could produce disruptive effects at network speed. Effectively preventing or containing major cyber attacks requires that response plans be in place and roles and authorities of Federal government agencies and entities be clearly delineated in advance. For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by effective implementation of innovative security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. This bill would establish the essential point of coordination across the Executive branch. The Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security policy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to the strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and oversight. To be clear, the White House official would not be another unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed position and thus would testify before Congress. The important responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy related to cyber security are similar to the responsibilities of the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts across the Executive branch to protect and improve our cyber security posture and communications networks. And, by working with a strong operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and private sector networks. This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director. The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations, the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On interagency matters related to the security of Federal networks, the Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and respecting disparate agency missions. The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies. The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President. When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to- day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this successful model for cyber security. This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with the private sector, other Federal agencies, international partners, and state and local governments. By developing and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector would be protected. With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based performance metrics to close security gaps. These metrics would apply to vital components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber risk, and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would develop a plan for protecting against those risks and mitigating the consequences of an attack. These owners and operators would be able to choose which security measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance metrics. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks. This model would allow for continued innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT sector. The bill would protect the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure from punitive damages when they comply with the new risk-based performance measures. Covered critical infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant breaches affecting vital system functions to the Center. Collaboration with the private sector would help develop mitigations for these cyber risks. The Center also would share information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks affecting the security of their sectors. The Center would work with sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in the most efficient and effective manner. With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures. In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly implements its own security measures. The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper based to real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks. The legislation also would ensure that Federal civilian agencies consider cyber risks in IT procurements instead of relying on the ad hoc approach that dominates civilian government cyber efforts. The bill would charge the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the private sector and the heads of other affected departments and agencies, with developing a supply chain risk management strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would emphasize the security of information systems from development to acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle. The strategy would be based, to the maximum extent practicable, on standards developed by the private sector and would direct agencies to use commercial-off-the- shelf solutions to the maximum extent consistent with agency needs. While the Cyber Center should not be responsible for micromanaging individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security. Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government agencies. These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products. These innovations can establish new security baselines for services and products offered to the private sector and the general public without mandating specific market outcomes. Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment of the Center. We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations to our networks. We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge Congress to support this vitally important legislation.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Lieberman and Senator Carper in introducing the Cyber Security and Internet Freedom Act of 2011. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack and ensure that access to the Internet is protected and its availability preserved for every American. The Internet is vital to almost every facet of Americans' daily lives--from the water we drink to the power we use to the ways we communicate. It is essential to the free flow of ideas and information. The Internet is a manifestation of the ideals that underlie the First Amendment of our Constitution and the core freedoms that all Americans hold dear. It is essential that the Internet and our access to it be protected to ensure both reliability of the critical services that rely upon it and the availability of the information that travels over it. While the United States must ensure the security of our nation and its critical infrastructure, it must do so in a manner that does not deprive Americans of the ability to lawfully read or express their views. Neither the President nor any other Federal official should have the authority to ``shut down'' the Internet. In June 2010, Senator Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I introduced legislation to strengthen the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack; build a public/private partnership to promote national cyber security priorities; and bolster the government's ability to set, monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they contain. In late June, that bill was unanimously approved by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Today we are introducing for the 112th Congress the bill unanimously approved by our committee, but with explicit provisions preventing the President from shutting down the Internet and providing an opportunity for judicial review of designations of our most sensitive systems and assets as ``covered critical infrastructure.'' President Mubarak's actions in January to shut down Internet communications in Egypt were, and are, totally inappropriate. Freedom of speech is a fundamental right that must be protected, and his ban was clearly designed to limit criticisms of his government. Our cyber security legislation is intended to protect the United States from external cyber attacks. Yet, some have suggested that the legislation the Committee reported during the last Congress would empower the President to deny U.S. citizens access to the Internet. Nothing could be further from the truth. I would never sign on to legislation that authorized the President, or anyone else, to shut down the Internet. Emergency or no, the exercise of such broad authority would be an affront to our Constitution. But our outmoded current laws do give us reason to be concerned. Most important, under current law, in the event of a cyber attack, the President's authorities are broad and ambiguous--a recipe for encroachments on privacy and civil liberties. For example, in the event of a war or threat of war, the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the President to take over or shut down wire and radio communications providers. This law is a crude sledgehammer built for another time and technology. Our bill contains a number of protections to make sure that broad authority cannot be used to shut down the Internet. First, section 2 of the bill states explicitly: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, neither the President, the Director of the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or any officer or employee of the United States Government shall have the authority to shut down the Internet. Second, the emergency measures in our bill apply in a precise and targeted way only to our most critical infrastructure--vital components of the electric power grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This definition would not cover the entire Internet, the Internet backbone, or even entire companies. In defining covered critical infrastructure, our bill directs the Secretary to consider the consequences of a disruption of a particular system or asset. To constitute a ``national or regional catastrophe,'' the disruption would need to cause a mass casualty event which includes an extraordinary number of fatalities; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence; or severe degradation of national security capabilities, including intelligence and defense functions. When the Committee reported this bill last year, the report clarified what these four factors mean, specifically referencing the current DHS interpretation of ``national or severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence; or regional catastrophe.'' Under DHS's interpretation, a ``national or regional catastrophe'' includes a combination of the following factors: more than 2,500 prompt fatalities; greater than $25 billion in first-year economic consequences; mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of greater than one month; or severe degradation of the nation's security capabilities. As our Committee's report noted, we expect the Department to apply this standard in determining which particular systems or assets constitute covered critical infrastructure. Third, our legislation restricts the President's ability to declare a national cyber emergency to those circumstances in which an ``actual or imminent'' cyber attack would disrupt covered critical infrastructure that would cause these catastrophic consequences. Fourth, any measures ordered by the President must be ``the least disruptive means feasible.'' Fifth, the authority our bill would grant is time limited. The President could only declare a cyber emergency for 30-day period and only for up to 120 days. After that, Congress would be required to specifically authorize further measures. Any declaration would be subject to congressional oversight, as our bill requires the President to notify Congress regarding the specific threat to our nation's infrastructure, why existing protections are not sufficient, and what specific emergency measures are required to respond to the specific threat. Sixth, the legislation expressly forbids the designation of any system or asset as covered critical infrastructure ``based solely on activities protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.'' Seventh, the bill provides for a robust administrative process for an owner or operator to challenge the designation of a system or asset as covered critical infrastructure and expressly permits challenges of a final agency determination in federal court. Our bill contains protections to prevent the President from denying Americans access to the Internet--even as it provides clear and unambiguous direction to ensure that those most critical systems and assets that rely on the Internet are protected. And, even though experts question whether anyone can technically ``shut down'' the Internet in the United States, we included explicit language prohibiting the President from doing what President Mubarak did. I would like to stress that the need for Congress to pass a comprehensive cyber security bill is more urgent than ever. Cyber-based threats to U.S. information infrastructure are increasing, constantly evolving, and growing more dangerous. In March 2010 the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that the computer systems of Congress and the Executive Branch agencies are now under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month. The annual cost of cyber crime worldwide has climbed to more than $1 trillion. Coordinated cyber attacks have crippled Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan and compromised critical infrastructure in countries around the world. Devastating cyber attacks could disrupt, damage, or even destroy some of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as the electric power grid, oil and gas pipelines, dams, or communications networks. These cyber threats could cause catastrophic damage in the physical world. Based on media reports, China and Russia already have penetrated the computer systems of America's electric power grid, leaving behind malicious hidden software that could be activated later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis. In June 2010, cyber security experts discovered Stuxnet, one of the most sophisticated viruses ever found. Stuxnet was programmed specifically to infiltrate certain industrial control systems, allowing the virus to potentially overwrite commands and to sabotage infected systems. It had the potential to change instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which, in turn, could damage, disable, or disrupt equipment supporting the most critical infrastructure. The private sector is also under attack. In January 2010, Google announced that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google sought to access the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists. For other companies, lucrative information such as critical corporate data and software source codes were targeted. According to a report released last week, coordinated and covert attacks hit more than five major oil, energy, and petrochemical companies. The focus of the intrusions was oil and gas field production systems, as well as financial documents related to field exploration and bidding for new oil and gas leases. The companies also lost information related to their industrial control systems. In the cyber domain, the advantage lies with our adversaries, for whom success could be achieved by exploiting a single vulnerability that could produce disruptive effects at network speed. Effectively preventing or containing major cyber attacks requires that response plans be in place and roles and authorities of Federal government agencies and entities be clearly delineated in advance. For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by effective implementation of innovative security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. This bill would establish the essential point of coordination across the Executive branch. The Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security policy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to the strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and oversight. To be clear, the White House official would not be another unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed position and thus would testify before Congress. The important responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy related to cyber security are similar to the responsibilities of the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts across the Executive branch to protect and improve our cyber security posture and communications networks. And, by working with a strong operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and private sector networks. This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director. The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations, the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On interagency matters related to the security of Federal networks, the Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and respecting disparate agency missions. The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies. The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President. When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to- day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this successful model for cyber security. This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with the private sector, other Federal agencies, international partners, and state and local governments. By developing and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector would be protected. With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based performance metrics to close security gaps. These metrics would apply to vital components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber risk, and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would develop a plan for protecting against those risks and mitigating the consequences of an attack. These owners and operators would be able to choose which security measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance metrics. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks. This model would allow for continued innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT sector. The bill would protect the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure from punitive damages when they comply with the new risk-based performance measures. Covered critical infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant breaches affecting vital system functions to the Center. Collaboration with the private sector would help develop mitigations for these cyber risks. The Center also would share information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks affecting the security of their sectors. The Center would work with sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in the most efficient and effective manner. With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures. In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly implements its own security measures. The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper based to real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks. The legislation also would ensure that Federal civilian agencies consider cyber risks in IT procurements instead of relying on the ad hoc approach that dominates civilian government cyber efforts. The bill would charge the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the private sector and the heads of other affected departments and agencies, with developing a supply chain risk management strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would emphasize the security of information systems from development to acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle. The strategy would be based, to the maximum extent practicable, on standards developed by the private sector and would direct agencies to use commercial-off-the- shelf solutions to the maximum extent consistent with agency needs. While the Cyber Center should not be responsible for micromanaging individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security. Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government agencies. These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products. These innovations can establish new security baselines for services and products offered to the private sector and the general public without mandating specific market outcomes. Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment of the Center. We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations to our networks. We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge Congress to support this vitally important legislation.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about a Federal program that creates jobs, improves communities, and ensures air travel throughout the United States. The Essential Air Service Program was created in the wake of the airline deregulation of the 1970s to ensure the continuation of commercial airline service for smaller communities. Four airports in Maine participate in the EAS Program: Augusta, Rockland, Bar Harbor, and Presque Isle. The EAS Program supports these communities and creates direct and indirect jobs. If the EAS Program were discontinued, travelers would lose choices and the economies of these communities would suffer. For residents of northern Maine, the only way to travel by air would be following a 3- to 4-hour car drive. The Maine Department of Transportation calculates that 1,351 direct and indirect jobs rely on aviation activities at the four Maine EAS airports. In rural areas such as Rockland and Presque Isle, these jobs make a huge difference. Without EAS, these jobs would likely disappear. Additionally, without EAS, our rural communities would be less able to attract new businesses and residents. A businessperson may be less likely to locate a new operation in northern Maine if scheduled airline service is more than 3 hours away. It would be simply unfair to pull the rug out from under these rural communities as they try to attract new jobs and businesses. EAS is a small fraction of the total FAA spending, but it has a large impact on our Nation's rural communities and travelers. I strongly support the Essential Air Service Program and will oppose eliminating this program.