Susan Collins

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, in introducing the Positive Aging Act, which will help to increase older Americans' access to quality mental health screening and treatment services in community-based care settings. The legislation we are introducing today is particularly important for states like Maine that have a disproportionate number of older persons. Fifteen percent of Maine's population is 65 or older, and, with the highest median age, Maine is the ``oldest'' State in the nation. Moreover, our percentage of older adults is increasing, and, by 2036 more than 1 in 5 Mainers will be over the age of 65. One of the most daunting public health challenges facing our nation today is how to increase access to quality mental health services for the more than 44 million Americans with severe, disabling mental disorders that can devastate their lives and the lives of the people around them. What is often overlooked, however, is the prevalence of mental illness among our Nation's elderly. Studies have shown that more than 1 in 5 Americans aged 65 and older experience mental illness, and that as many as 80 percent of elderly persons in nursing homes suffer from some kind of mental impairment. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the mental health needs of older Americans are often overlooked or not recognized because of the mistaken belief that they are a normal part of aging and therefore cannot be treated. While older Americans experience the full range of mental disorders, the most prevalent mental illness afflicting older people is depression. Ironically, while recent advances have made depression an eminently treatable disorder, only a minority of elderly depressed persons are receiving adequate treatment. Unfortunately, the vast majority of depressed elderly don't seek help. Many simply accept their feelings of profound sadness and do not realize that they are clinically depressed. Moreover those who do seek help are often underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed, leading the National Institute of Mental Health to estimate that 60 percent of older Americans with depression are not receiving the mental health care that they need. Failure to treat this kind of disorder leads to poorer health outcomes for other medical conditions, higher rates of institutionalization, and increased health care costs. Fortunately, important research is being done that is developing innovative approaches to improve the delivery of mental health care for older adults by integrating it into primary care settings. This research demonstrates that older adults are more likely to receive appropriate mental health care if there is a mental health professional on the primary care team, rather than simply referring them to a mental health specialist outside the primary care setting. Multiple appointments with multiple providers in multiple settings simply don't work for older patients who must also cope with concurrent chronic illnesses, mobility problems, and limited transportation options. The research also shows that there is less stigma associated with psychiatric services when they are integrated into general medical care. The Positive Aging Act builds upon this research and authorizes funding for projects that integrate mental health screening and treatment services into community sites and primary care settings. Specifically, the Positive Aging Act of 2010 would authorize the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to fund demonstration projects to support integration of mental health services in primary care settings. It would also support grants for community- based mental health treatment outreach teams to improve older Americans' access to mental health services. To ensure that these geriatric mental health programs have proper attention and oversight, it would mandate the designation of a Deputy Director for Older Adult Mental Health Services in the Center for Mental Health Services, and it would also include representatives of older Americans or their families and geriatric mental health professionals on the Advisory Council for the Center for Mental Health Services. Finally, it would require state plans under Community Mental Health Services Block Grants to include descriptions of the states' outreach to and services for older individuals. We are fortunate today to have a variety of effective treatments to address the mental health needs of American seniors. The Positive Aging Act will help to ensure that older Americans have access to these important services. I therefore urge my colleagues to sign on as cosponsors of the legislation, which has been endorsed by a number of mental health and senior organizations, including the Alzheimer's Association, the American Geriatrics Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010. This bill extends important programs that protect our nation's critical shipping lanes and seaports from attack and sabotage. The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010 is co-sponsored by my colleague, Senator Murray. Senator Murray and I drafted the original SAFE Port Act in 2005, leading to its enactment in 2006. I am pleased that she has again joined me to extend and strengthen this important law. Several stakeholders have expressed their support for our efforts, including the American Association of Port Authorities, the National Retail Federation, and the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators. The scope of what we need to protect is broad. America has 361 seaports--each vital links in our Nation's transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of overseas trade. In 2009, U.S. ports logged 68,000 ports-of-call by foreign-flagged vessels, bringing 9.8 million shipping containers to our shores. The largest 21 ports handle 98 percent of the shipping container traffic. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of all container-ship calls are made in just three States--California, New York, and Georgia--but this container traffic arrives at many points across the United States, from Maine to Hawaii. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports--including Portland, the largest port by tonnage in New England--I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. Because seaports are flourishing, our harbors operate as vital centers of economic activity; they also represent vulnerable targets. Shipping containers are a special source of concern. A single obscure container, hidden among a ship's cargo of several hundred containers, could be used to hide a squad of terrorists or a dirty bomb. In other words, a container could be turned into a 21st- Century Trojan horse. The shipping container's security vulnerabilities are so well known that it has also been called ``the poor man's missile,'' because for only a few thousand dollars, a terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the Pacific to a U.S. port. The contents of such a container don't have to be something as complex as a nuclear or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner told The New York Times, a single container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and a detonation system could produce ten times the blast that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on one or more U.S. ports could cause great loss of life and large numbers of injuries; it could damage our energy supplies and infrastructure; it could cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on incoming inventory; and it could hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces fighting against the forces of terrorism. I have had the opportunity to visit seaports across the country and, as one looks at some of the nation's busiest harbors, one sees what a terrorist might call ``high-value targets.'' Ferries move thousands of people daily. Large and sprawling urban populations are situated around the ports. At some locations, there are large sports stadiums nearby as well. Add up those factors and one realizes immediately the death and destruction that a ship carrying a container hiding a weapon of mass destruction could inflict at a single port. Of course, a port can be a conduit for an attack as well as a target. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded on a truck or rail car, or have its contents unpacked at the port and distributed to support attacks elsewhere. In 2008, we saw that the port in Mumbai, India, offered the means for a gang of terrorists to launch an attack on a section of the city's downtown. That attack killed more than 170 people and wounded hundreds more. To address these security threats, our bill would reauthorize the SAFE Port Act cargo security programs that have proven to be successful: the Automated Targeting System that identifies high-risk cargo; the Container Security Initiative that ensures high-risk cargo containers are inspected at ports overseas before they travel to the United States; and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, that provides incentives to importers to enhance the security of their cargo from point of origin to destination. The bill would also strengthen the C-TPAT program by providing new benefits, including voluntary security training to industry participants and providing participants an information sharing mechanism on maritime and port security threats, and by authorizing Customs and Border Protection to conduct unannounced inspections to ensure that security practices are robust. The cooperation of private industry is vital to protecting supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active cooperation in supply chain security efforts. The bill also would extend the competitive, risk-based, port security grants that have provided $1.5 billion to improve the security of our ports. An authorization for the next 5 years at $400 million per year is a continued major commitment of resources, but it is fully proportional to what is at stake, and a priority that we cannot ignore. In addition to continuing and strengthening critical programs, the bill also would expand the America's Waterway Watch Program to promote voluntary reporting of suspected terrorist activity or suspicious behavior against a vessel, facility, port, or waterway. While the program has proven valuable in ports throughout the country, the legislation would broaden its scope and increase public awareness through boating education and industry stakeholder meetings coordinated by the Coast Guard and its Reserve and Auxiliary components. The America's Waterway Watch Program has received strong endorsements from numerous professional boating associations for the enhanced situational awareness it will bring to our nation's ports and waterways. Our bill would protect citizens from frivolous lawsuits when they report, in good faith, suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist activity against the United States. It builds on a provision from the 2007 homeland security law that encourages people to report potential terrorist threats directed against transportation systems by protecting people from those who would misuse our legal system in an attempt to chill the willingness of citizens to come forward and report possible dangers. In addition, this legislation enhances the research and development efforts to improve maritime cargo security. The demonstration project authorized by this law would study the feasibility of using composite materials in cargo containers to improve container integrity and deploy next generation sensors. This legislation also addresses the difficulties in administering the mandate of x-raying and scanning for radiation all cargo containers overseas that are destined for the United States by July 2012. Until x- ray scanning technology is proven effective at detecting radiological material and not disruptive of trade, requiring the x-raying of all U.S. bound cargo, regardless of its risk, at every foreign port, is misguided and provides a false sense of security. It would also impose onerous restrictions on the flow of commerce, costing billions with little additional security benefit. Under the original provisions of the SAFE Port Act, all cargo designated as high-risk at foreign ports is already scanned for radiation and x-rayed. In addition, cargo entering the U.S. at all major seaports is scanned for radiation. These security measures currently in place are part of a layered, risk-based method to ensure cargo entering the U.S. is safe. This legislation would eliminate the deadline for 100 percent x- raying of containers if the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies the effectiveness of individual security measures of that layered security approach. This is a more reasonable method to secure our cargo until a new method of x-raying containers is proven effective. The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010 will help us to continue an effective, layered, coordinated security system that extends from point of origin to point of destination, and that covers the people, the vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime commerce. It will continue to address a major vulnerability in our homeland security critical infrastructure while preserving the flow of goods on which our economy depends.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010. This bill extends important programs that protect our nation's critical shipping lanes and seaports from attack and sabotage. The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010 is co-sponsored by my colleague, Senator Murray. Senator Murray and I drafted the original SAFE Port Act in 2005, leading to its enactment in 2006. I am pleased that she has again joined me to extend and strengthen this important law. Several stakeholders have expressed their support for our efforts, including the American Association of Port Authorities, the National Retail Federation, and the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators. The scope of what we need to protect is broad. America has 361 seaports--each vital links in our Nation's transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of overseas trade. In 2009, U.S. ports logged 68,000 ports-of-call by foreign-flagged vessels, bringing 9.8 million shipping containers to our shores. The largest 21 ports handle 98 percent of the shipping container traffic. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of all container-ship calls are made in just three States--California, New York, and Georgia--but this container traffic arrives at many points across the United States, from Maine to Hawaii. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports--including Portland, the largest port by tonnage in New England--I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy and to the communities in which they are located. Because seaports are flourishing, our harbors operate as vital centers of economic activity; they also represent vulnerable targets. Shipping containers are a special source of concern. A single obscure container, hidden among a ship's cargo of several hundred containers, could be used to hide a squad of terrorists or a dirty bomb. In other words, a container could be turned into a 21st- Century Trojan horse. The shipping container's security vulnerabilities are so well known that it has also been called ``the poor man's missile,'' because for only a few thousand dollars, a terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the Pacific to a U.S. port. The contents of such a container don't have to be something as complex as a nuclear or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner told The New York Times, a single container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and a detonation system could produce ten times the blast that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on one or more U.S. ports could cause great loss of life and large numbers of injuries; it could damage our energy supplies and infrastructure; it could cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on incoming inventory; and it could hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces fighting against the forces of terrorism. I have had the opportunity to visit seaports across the country and, as one looks at some of the nation's busiest harbors, one sees what a terrorist might call ``high-value targets.'' Ferries move thousands of people daily. Large and sprawling urban populations are situated around the ports. At some locations, there are large sports stadiums nearby as well. Add up those factors and one realizes immediately the death and destruction that a ship carrying a container hiding a weapon of mass destruction could inflict at a single port. Of course, a port can be a conduit for an attack as well as a target. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded on a truck or rail car, or have its contents unpacked at the port and distributed to support attacks elsewhere. In 2008, we saw that the port in Mumbai, India, offered the means for a gang of terrorists to launch an attack on a section of the city's downtown. That attack killed more than 170 people and wounded hundreds more. To address these security threats, our bill would reauthorize the SAFE Port Act cargo security programs that have proven to be successful: the Automated Targeting System that identifies high-risk cargo; the Container Security Initiative that ensures high-risk cargo containers are inspected at ports overseas before they travel to the United States; and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, that provides incentives to importers to enhance the security of their cargo from point of origin to destination. The bill would also strengthen the C-TPAT program by providing new benefits, including voluntary security training to industry participants and providing participants an information sharing mechanism on maritime and port security threats, and by authorizing Customs and Border Protection to conduct unannounced inspections to ensure that security practices are robust. The cooperation of private industry is vital to protecting supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active cooperation in supply chain security efforts. The bill also would extend the competitive, risk-based, port security grants that have provided $1.5 billion to improve the security of our ports. An authorization for the next 5 years at $400 million per year is a continued major commitment of resources, but it is fully proportional to what is at stake, and a priority that we cannot ignore. In addition to continuing and strengthening critical programs, the bill also would expand the America's Waterway Watch Program to promote voluntary reporting of suspected terrorist activity or suspicious behavior against a vessel, facility, port, or waterway. While the program has proven valuable in ports throughout the country, the legislation would broaden its scope and increase public awareness through boating education and industry stakeholder meetings coordinated by the Coast Guard and its Reserve and Auxiliary components. The America's Waterway Watch Program has received strong endorsements from numerous professional boating associations for the enhanced situational awareness it will bring to our nation's ports and waterways. Our bill would protect citizens from frivolous lawsuits when they report, in good faith, suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist activity against the United States. It builds on a provision from the 2007 homeland security law that encourages people to report potential terrorist threats directed against transportation systems by protecting people from those who would misuse our legal system in an attempt to chill the willingness of citizens to come forward and report possible dangers. In addition, this legislation enhances the research and development efforts to improve maritime cargo security. The demonstration project authorized by this law would study the feasibility of using composite materials in cargo containers to improve container integrity and deploy next generation sensors. This legislation also addresses the difficulties in administering the mandate of x-raying and scanning for radiation all cargo containers overseas that are destined for the United States by July 2012. Until x- ray scanning technology is proven effective at detecting radiological material and not disruptive of trade, requiring the x-raying of all U.S. bound cargo, regardless of its risk, at every foreign port, is misguided and provides a false sense of security. It would also impose onerous restrictions on the flow of commerce, costing billions with little additional security benefit. Under the original provisions of the SAFE Port Act, all cargo designated as high-risk at foreign ports is already scanned for radiation and x-rayed. In addition, cargo entering the U.S. at all major seaports is scanned for radiation. These security measures currently in place are part of a layered, risk-based method to ensure cargo entering the U.S. is safe. This legislation would eliminate the deadline for 100 percent x- raying of containers if the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies the effectiveness of individual security measures of that layered security approach. This is a more reasonable method to secure our cargo until a new method of x-raying containers is proven effective. The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2010 will help us to continue an effective, layered, coordinated security system that extends from point of origin to point of destination, and that covers the people, the vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime commerce. It will continue to address a major vulnerability in our homeland security critical infrastructure while preserving the flow of goods on which our economy depends.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, as we move to final passage of this historic legislation, I would like to thank Senator Dodd again for his leadership and strong support for my amendment to ensure that all insured depository institutions and depository institution holding companies regardless of size, as well as nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve, meet statutory minimum capital standards and thus have adequate capital throughout the economic cycle. Those standards required under section 171 serve as the starting point for the development of more stringent standards as required under section 165 of the bill. I did, however, have questions about the designation of certain nonbank financial companies under section 113 for Federal Reserve supervision and the significance of such a designation in light of the minimum capital standards established by section 171. While I can envision circumstances where a company engaged in the business of insurance could be designated under section 113, I would not ordinarily expect insurance companies engaged in traditional insurance company activities to be designated by the council based on those activities alone. Rather, in considering a designation, I would expect the council to specifically take into account, among other risk factors, how the nature of insurance differs from that of other financial products, including how traditional insurance products differ from various off- balance-sheet and derivative contract exposures and how that different nature is reflected in the structure of traditional insurance companies. I would also expect the council to consider whether the designation of an insurance company is appropriate given the existence of State-based guaranty funds to pay claims and protect policyholders. Am I correct in that understanding?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, my colleague from Connecticut, Senator Dodd, to clarify the types of trust companies that fall within the scope of section 603(a), a provision that prohibits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from approving an application for deposit insurance for certain companies, including certain trust companies, until 3 years after the date of enactment of this act.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank my colleague for his clarification. Nonbank Financial Companies

Ms. COLLINS. Would the Senator agree that the council should not base designations simply on the size of the financial companies?

Ms. COLLINS. As the Senator knows, insurance companies are already heavily regulated by State regulators who impose their own, very different regulatory and capital requirements. The fact that those capital requirements are not the same as those imposed by section 171 should not increase the likelihood that the council will designate an insurer. Does the Senator agree?

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today as a supporter of the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act, but also as one who has concerns over how the derivatives title of the bill will be implemented. I applaud the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee for his work on the underlying bill. At the same time, I am concerned that some of the provisions in the derivatives title will harm U.S. businesses unnecessarily. I would like to engage the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee in a colloquy that addresses an important issue. The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act will regulate ``swap dealers'' for the first time by subjecting them to new clearing, capital and margin requirements. ``Swap dealers'' are banks and other financial institutions that hold themselves out to the derivatives market and are known as dealers or market makers in swaps. The definition of a swap dealer in the bill includes an entity that ``regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account.'' It is possible the definition could be read broadly and include end users that execute swaps through an affiliate. I want to make clear that it is not Congress' intention to capture as swap dealers end users that primarily enter into swaps to manage their business risks, including risks among affiliates. I would ask the distinguished chairman whether he agrees that end users that execute swaps through an affiliate should not be deemed to be ``swap dealers'' under the bill just because they hedge their risks through affiliates.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I understand that it is the intent of paragraph 7 of section 171(b) of this legislation to require the Federal banking agencies, subject to the recommendations of the council, to develop capital requirements applicable to insured depository institutions, depository institution holding companies, and nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors that are engaged in activities that are subject to heightened standards under section 120. It is well understood that minimum capital requirements can help to shield various public and private stakeholders from risks posed by material distress that could arise at these entities from engaging in these activities. It is also understood and recognized that minimum capital requirements may not be an appropriate tool to apply under all circumstances and that by prescribing section 171 capital requirements as the correct tool with respect to companies covered by paragraph 7, it should not be inferred that capital requirements should be required for any other companies not covered by paragraph 7.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise to speak in support of the resolution offered by the Senator from Alaska disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Our country must develop reasonable policies to spur the creation of green energy jobs, lessen our dangerous dependence on foreign oil, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We face an international race to lead the world in alternative energy technologies, and we can win that race if Congress enacts legislation to put a price on carbon and thus encourage investment here in the United States. I have, however, serious concerns about unelected government officials at the EPA taking on this complicated issue instead of Congress. It is Congress that should establish the framework for regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. And it surely is significant that the House-passed climate bill, as well as the Kerry-Lieberman bill, recognized that fact by preempting some of the EPA's rules in this area. The Agency's early rules on this topic give me cause for concern. They could affect some 34 businesses in my State that employ nearly 8,800 people. Incredibly, the EPA proposes to ignore the carbon neutrality of biomass and would place onerous permitting requirements on businesses, such as Maine's biomass plants and paper mills, which use biomass to provide energy for their operations. This reverses years of EPA considering biomass as carbon-neutral. EPA's decisions could well result in the loss of jobs, leading to mill and plant closures and discouraging employers from investing. We simply cannot afford that result, particularly not in this tough economic climate. The EPA's apparent stunning reversal in its view of biomass potentially would affect 14 biomass facilities in Maine in small rural towns such as Ashland, Fort Fairfield, and Livermore Falls. A better way forward is for Congress to finally tackle this issue and pass comprehensive clean energy legislation. In December, I joined with my colleague, Senator Maria Cantwell, in introducing the bipartisan Carbon Limits and Energy for American Renewal Act, what we call the CLEAR Act. Our legislation would set up a mechanism for selling ``carbon shares'' to the few thousand fossil fuel producers and importers through monthly auctions. Under our bill, 75 percent of the auction's revenues would be returned directly to every citizen of the United States through rebate checks. The average family of four in Maine would stand to gain almost $400 each year. Our bill represents the right approach, a much more thoughtful approach than EPA's, and it would spur the development of green energy and the creation of green energy jobs. I look forward to working with my colleagues to advance the practical concepts that are embodied in the CLEAR Act. Let me be clear because there are diverse views on this issue in this Chamber. I believe global climate change and the development of alternatives to fossil fuels are significant and urgent priorities for our country. We must meet these economic and environmental challenges. The scientific evidence demonstrates the human contribution to climate change, and we must act to mitigate that impact. But we must proceed with care, and we should not allow the Federal EPA to charge ahead on a problem that affects every aspect of our already fragile economy. The preliminary steps the EPA has taken, including its decision to revisit the carbon neutrality of biomass, undermine my confidence in having the EPA proceed. It is Congress's job, not the EPA's, to decide how best to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. So for this reason, I will vote for the Murkowski resolution. Thank you, Madam President.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to join Senators Lieberman and Carper in introducing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack. It would build a public/private partnership to promote national cyber security priorities. It would strengthen the government's ability to set, monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they contain. The marriage of increasingly robust computer technology to expanding and nearly instantaneous global telecommunications networks is a truly seismic event in human history. This information revolution touches everything, from personal relationships and entertainment to commerce, scientific research, and the most sensitive national security information. Cyberspace is a place of great, even unparalleled, power. But, to tweak the familiar saying, with great power comes great vulnerability. Cyberspace is under increasing assault on all fronts: cyber vandalism, cyber crime, cyber sabotage, and cyber espionage. Across the world at this moment, computer networks are being hacked, probed, and infiltrated relentlessly. The purpose of these cyber exploits ranges from simple mischief and massive theft to societal mayhem and geopolitical advantage. In February, Dennis Blair, the former Director of National Intelligence, gave this chilling assessment before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: ``Malicious cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary sophistication. While both the threats and technologies associated with cyberspace are dynamic, the existing balance in network technology favors malicious actors, and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.'' Consider these sobering facts: Cyber crime costs our national economy nearly $8 billion annually. Hackers can operate in relative safety and anonymity from a laptop or desktop anywhere in the world. The expanding capabilities of wireless hand-held devices strengthen this cloak of cyber invisibility. As our national and global economies become ever more intertwined, cyber terrorists have greater potential to attack high-value targets. From anywhere in the world, they could disrupt telecommunications systems, shut down electric power grids, or freeze financial markets. With sufficient know-how and a few keystrokes, they could cause billions of dollars in damage and put thousands of lives in jeopardy. As the hackers' techniques advance, the number of hacking attempts is exploding. Just this March, the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that the computer systems of Congress and Executive Branch agencies now are under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month. Recent examples of cyber attacks are myriad and disturbing: Press reports a year ago stated that China and Russia had penetrated the computer systems of America's electrical grid. The hackers allegedly left behind malicious hidden software that could be activated later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis. At about the same time, we learned that, beginning in 2007 and continuing well into 2008, hackers repeatedly broke into the computer systems of the Pentagon's $300-billion Joint Strike Fighter project. They stole crucial information about the Defense Department's costliest weapons program ever. In 2007, the country of Estonia was attacked in cyberspace. A 3-week onslaught of botnets overwhelmed the computer systems of the nation's parliament, government ministries, banks, telecommunications networks, and news organizations. This attack on Estonia is a wake-up call that has yet to be sufficiently heeded. The private sector is also under attack. In January, Google announced that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google sought to access the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists. For the other companies, lucrative information, such as critical corporate data and software source codes, were targeted. Last year, cyber thieves secretly implanted circuitry into keypads sold to British supermarkets, which were then used to steal account information and PIN numbers. This same tactic was used against a large supermarket chain in Maine, compromising more than 4 million credit cards. Nor are small businesses immune. Last summer, a small Maine construction firm found that cyber crooks had stolen nearly $600,000 through an elaborate scheme involving dozens of coconspirators throughout the United States. These attacks, and the hundreds like them that are occurring at any given time whether on our government or private sector systems, have ushered us into a new age of cyber crime and, indeed, cyber warfare. They underscore the high priority we must give to the security of our information technology systems. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed the vulnerability of our nation to catastrophic attacks. Since that terrible day, we have done much to protect potential targets such as ports, chemical facilities, transportation systems, water supplies, government buildings, and other vital assets. We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations of our networks. Chairman Lieberman and I have held a number of hearings on cyber security in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Carper has been similarly active, particularly on exploring modifications to the Federal Information Security Management Act that are designed to enhance protections of Federal networks and information. From our examinations of this issue, we know that there are threats to and vulnerabilities in our cyber networks. We also know that the tactics used to exploit these vulnerabilities are constantly evolving and growing increasingly dangerous. Now, it is time to take action. A strong and sustained Federal effort to promote cyber security is a key component of effective deterrence. For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by aggressive implementation of effective security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private owners and operators of critical infrastructure. This bill would establish the essential point of coordination. The Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a national strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security policy, including military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomacy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to the national strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and oversight. To be clear, the White House official would not be another unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed position and thus would testify before Congress. The important responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy related to cybersecurity are similar to the responsibilities of the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts across the Executive Branch to protect and improve our cybersecurity posture and communications networks. By working with a strong operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and private sector networks. This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director. The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, with a strong and empowered leader, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations, the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On interagency matters related to the security of federal networks, the Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and respecting disparate agency missions. The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies. The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President. When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to- day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this successful model for cyber security. As we have seen repeatedly, from the financial crisis to the environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, what happens in the private sector does not always affect just the private sector. The ramifications for government and for the taxpayers often are enormous. This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with the private sector, other Federal agencies, international partners, and state and local governments. By developing and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector would be protected. With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based performance requirements to close security gaps. These requirements would apply to vital components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber vulnerabilities, and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would develop a plan for protecting those vulnerabilities and mitigating the consequences of an attack. These owners and operators would be able to choose which security measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance requirements. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks. This model would allow for continued innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT sector. The bill would provide limited liability protections to the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure that comply with the new risk-based performance requirements. Covered critical infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant breaches affecting vital system functions to the center. These reports would help ensure that the Federal Government has comprehensive awareness of the security risks facing these critical networks. If a cyber attack is imminent or occurring, the bill would provide a responsible framework, developed in coordination with the private sector, for the President to authorize emergency measures to protect the Nation's most critical infrastructure. The President would be required to notify Congress in advance of the declaration of a national cyber emergency, or as soon thereafter as possible. This notice would include the nature of the threat, the reason existing protective measures are insufficient to respond to the threat, and the emergency actions necessary to mitigate the threat. The emergency measures would be limited in duration and scope. Any emergency actions directed by the President during the 30-day period covered by the declaration must be the least disruptive means feasible to respond to the threat. Liability protections would apply to owners and operators required to implement these measures, and if other mitigation options were available, owners and operators could propose those alternative measures to the Director and, once approved, implement those in lieu of the mandatory emergency measures. The center also would share information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks affecting the security of their sectors. The center would work with sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in the most efficient and effective manner. With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures. In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly implements its own security measures. The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper-based to real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks. The legislation also would take advantage of the Federal Government's massive purchasing power to help bring heightened cyber security standards to the marketplace. Specifically, the Director of the Center would be charged with developing a supply chain risk management strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would emphasize the security of information systems from development to acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle. While the Director should not be responsible for micromanaging individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security. Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government agencies. These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products. With the Government's vast purchasing power, these innovations can establish new security baselines for services and products offered to the private sector and the general public. Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment of the center. Some have suggested that this effort can be led from the White House alone--why create a new center at DHS and two Senate-confirmed Director positions? One of the great lessons of 9/11 is that true security demands aggressive oversight, expert evaluation, and thorough testing of systems. There must be constant, real-time monitoring of security and analysis of threats. This task requires much more than a cyber czar. It requires strong civilian counterparts to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. These Directors, at the White House and at DHS, would serve as those counterparts. The National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies possess enormous skills and resources, but privacy and civil liberties demands preclude these agencies from shouldering a leadership role in the security of our civilian information technology systems. The intelligence community must play a critical part in providing threat information, but it cannot lead the cyber security effort. We are all acutely aware that there are those who seek to do harm to this country and to our people. If hackers can nearly bring Estonia to its knees through cyber attacks, infiltrate our military's most closely-guarded project, and, in the case of Google, hack the computers owned and operated by some of the world's most successful computer experts, we must assume even more spectacular and potentially devastating attacks lie ahead. We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge my colleagues to support this crucial legislation.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to join Senators Lieberman and Carper in introducing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack. It would build a public/private partnership to promote national cyber security priorities. It would strengthen the government's ability to set, monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they contain. The marriage of increasingly robust computer technology to expanding and nearly instantaneous global telecommunications networks is a truly seismic event in human history. This information revolution touches everything, from personal relationships and entertainment to commerce, scientific research, and the most sensitive national security information. Cyberspace is a place of great, even unparalleled, power. But, to tweak the familiar saying, with great power comes great vulnerability. Cyberspace is under increasing assault on all fronts: cyber vandalism, cyber crime, cyber sabotage, and cyber espionage. Across the world at this moment, computer networks are being hacked, probed, and infiltrated relentlessly. The purpose of these cyber exploits ranges from simple mischief and massive theft to societal mayhem and geopolitical advantage. In February, Dennis Blair, the former Director of National Intelligence, gave this chilling assessment before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: ``Malicious cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary sophistication. While both the threats and technologies associated with cyberspace are dynamic, the existing balance in network technology favors malicious actors, and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.'' Consider these sobering facts: Cyber crime costs our national economy nearly $8 billion annually. Hackers can operate in relative safety and anonymity from a laptop or desktop anywhere in the world. The expanding capabilities of wireless hand-held devices strengthen this cloak of cyber invisibility. As our national and global economies become ever more intertwined, cyber terrorists have greater potential to attack high-value targets. From anywhere in the world, they could disrupt telecommunications systems, shut down electric power grids, or freeze financial markets. With sufficient know-how and a few keystrokes, they could cause billions of dollars in damage and put thousands of lives in jeopardy. As the hackers' techniques advance, the number of hacking attempts is exploding. Just this March, the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that the computer systems of Congress and Executive Branch agencies now are under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month. Recent examples of cyber attacks are myriad and disturbing: Press reports a year ago stated that China and Russia had penetrated the computer systems of America's electrical grid. The hackers allegedly left behind malicious hidden software that could be activated later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis. At about the same time, we learned that, beginning in 2007 and continuing well into 2008, hackers repeatedly broke into the computer systems of the Pentagon's $300-billion Joint Strike Fighter project. They stole crucial information about the Defense Department's costliest weapons program ever. In 2007, the country of Estonia was attacked in cyberspace. A 3-week onslaught of botnets overwhelmed the computer systems of the nation's parliament, government ministries, banks, telecommunications networks, and news organizations. This attack on Estonia is a wake-up call that has yet to be sufficiently heeded. The private sector is also under attack. In January, Google announced that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google sought to access the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists. For the other companies, lucrative information, such as critical corporate data and software source codes, were targeted. Last year, cyber thieves secretly implanted circuitry into keypads sold to British supermarkets, which were then used to steal account information and PIN numbers. This same tactic was used against a large supermarket chain in Maine, compromising more than 4 million credit cards. Nor are small businesses immune. Last summer, a small Maine construction firm found that cyber crooks had stolen nearly $600,000 through an elaborate scheme involving dozens of coconspirators throughout the United States. These attacks, and the hundreds like them that are occurring at any given time whether on our government or private sector systems, have ushered us into a new age of cyber crime and, indeed, cyber warfare. They underscore the high priority we must give to the security of our information technology systems. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed the vulnerability of our nation to catastrophic attacks. Since that terrible day, we have done much to protect potential targets such as ports, chemical facilities, transportation systems, water supplies, government buildings, and other vital assets. We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations of our networks. Chairman Lieberman and I have held a number of hearings on cyber security in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Carper has been similarly active, particularly on exploring modifications to the Federal Information Security Management Act that are designed to enhance protections of Federal networks and information. From our examinations of this issue, we know that there are threats to and vulnerabilities in our cyber networks. We also know that the tactics used to exploit these vulnerabilities are constantly evolving and growing increasingly dangerous. Now, it is time to take action. A strong and sustained Federal effort to promote cyber security is a key component of effective deterrence. For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by aggressive implementation of effective security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private owners and operators of critical infrastructure. This bill would establish the essential point of coordination. The Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a national strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security policy, including military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomacy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to the national strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and oversight. To be clear, the White House official would not be another unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed position and thus would testify before Congress. The important responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy related to cybersecurity are similar to the responsibilities of the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts across the Executive Branch to protect and improve our cybersecurity posture and communications networks. By working with a strong operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and private sector networks. This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director. The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, with a strong and empowered leader, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations, the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On interagency matters related to the security of federal networks, the Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and respecting disparate agency missions. The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies. The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President. When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to- day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this successful model for cyber security. As we have seen repeatedly, from the financial crisis to the environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, what happens in the private sector does not always affect just the private sector. The ramifications for government and for the taxpayers often are enormous. This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with the private sector, other Federal agencies, international partners, and state and local governments. By developing and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector would be protected. With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based performance requirements to close security gaps. These requirements would apply to vital components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber vulnerabilities, and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would develop a plan for protecting those vulnerabilities and mitigating the consequences of an attack. These owners and operators would be able to choose which security measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance requirements. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks. This model would allow for continued innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT sector. The bill would provide limited liability protections to the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure that comply with the new risk-based performance requirements. Covered critical infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant breaches affecting vital system functions to the center. These reports would help ensure that the Federal Government has comprehensive awareness of the security risks facing these critical networks. If a cyber attack is imminent or occurring, the bill would provide a responsible framework, developed in coordination with the private sector, for the President to authorize emergency measures to protect the Nation's most critical infrastructure. The President would be required to notify Congress in advance of the declaration of a national cyber emergency, or as soon thereafter as possible. This notice would include the nature of the threat, the reason existing protective measures are insufficient to respond to the threat, and the emergency actions necessary to mitigate the threat. The emergency measures would be limited in duration and scope. Any emergency actions directed by the President during the 30-day period covered by the declaration must be the least disruptive means feasible to respond to the threat. Liability protections would apply to owners and operators required to implement these measures, and if other mitigation options were available, owners and operators could propose those alternative measures to the Director and, once approved, implement those in lieu of the mandatory emergency measures. The center also would share information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks affecting the security of their sectors. The center would work with sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in the most efficient and effective manner. With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures. In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly implements its own security measures. The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper-based to real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks. The legislation also would take advantage of the Federal Government's massive purchasing power to help bring heightened cyber security standards to the marketplace. Specifically, the Director of the Center would be charged with developing a supply chain risk management strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would emphasize the security of information systems from development to acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle. While the Director should not be responsible for micromanaging individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security. Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government agencies. These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products. With the Government's vast purchasing power, these innovations can establish new security baselines for services and products offered to the private sector and the general public. Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment of the center. Some have suggested that this effort can be led from the White House alone--why create a new center at DHS and two Senate-confirmed Director positions? One of the great lessons of 9/11 is that true security demands aggressive oversight, expert evaluation, and thorough testing of systems. There must be constant, real-time monitoring of security and analysis of threats. This task requires much more than a cyber czar. It requires strong civilian counterparts to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. These Directors, at the White House and at DHS, would serve as those counterparts. The National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies possess enormous skills and resources, but privacy and civil liberties demands preclude these agencies from shouldering a leadership role in the security of our civilian information technology systems. The intelligence community must play a critical part in providing threat information, but it cannot lead the cyber security effort. We are all acutely aware that there are those who seek to do harm to this country and to our people. If hackers can nearly bring Estonia to its knees through cyber attacks, infiltrate our military's most closely-guarded project, and, in the case of Google, hack the computers owned and operated by some of the world's most successful computer experts, we must assume even more spectacular and potentially devastating attacks lie ahead. We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge my colleagues to support this crucial legislation.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I left an important markup of the Senate Armed Services Committee because it was my understanding the Senator from California, Mrs. Boxer, wished to debate an amendment I have pending before this body and she wanted to do so at either 3:30 or 3:45. It is now almost a quarter after 4, and I am told the schedule of the Senator from California has changed. I am very eager, having spent considerable time waiting for her on the Senate floor, to return to the markup. So I am going to give my comments now and try to anticipate the arguments my colleague from California, Senator Boxer, will be making in opposition to the amendment I have offered. It is a little difficult to do it that way, but having waited for some time now, I do need to return to the committee's markup. My bipartisan amendment is a common sense approach to protecting both jobs and children's health, and it has to do with the new regulation the EPA has put into effect as of April 22 that requires mandatory training for anyone who is involved in disturbing or removing lead- based paint. Let me say I support the intention of this rule. In fact, along with my colleague from Rhode Island, Senator Reed, I have done a great deal of work to try to reduce the exposure of our children to lead-based paint. He and I held joint hearings in Rhode Island and Maine because both of our States have housing stocks that are older than the national average and, thus, have considerable lead-based paints. So I understand how important this issue is, and I support the rule. Unfortunately, the EPA has completely botched the implementation of this rule because of its inexcusably poor planning, and it did not ensure there was an adequate number of trainers to provide the required classes to ensure that contractors understand the requirements of the new rule. That is why it is probably not surprising that there is a long list of cosponsors of my amendment. They include Senators Alexander, Inhofe, Bond, Voinovich, Snowe, Begich, Gregg, Murkowski, Coburn, Thune, Corker, Brown of Massachusetts, Hutchison, Enzi and Barrasso, and I appreciate them joining me as cosponsors of this amendment. What my amendment would do is prohibit the EPA from using funds in this bill to levy fines against contractors under its new lead paint rule through September 30. Based on what I have seen in Maine, I believe the lion's share of contractors are awaiting EPA's training classes. Unfortunately, while they wait for EPA to deliver this training, they are at risk of being fined up to $37,500 per day, per violation. While I support EPA's rule because we must continue our efforts to safely rid toxic, lead-based paint from our homes, it is simply not fair to put these contractors at risk of these enormous fines when it is EPA's fault that these contractors have not been able to get the training that is required under the new rule. The fact is there are not enough trainers in place to certify the contractors. Let me give my colleagues an example. In three States-- Louisiana, South Dakota, and Wyoming--there are no trainers available. How is that fair? In my State, as of last week, there were only three EPA trainers for the entire State to certify contractors, and as a result just a little more than 10 percent of the State's contractors have been certified. Well, what does that mean? That means individuals will be affected, not just big contractors. It is your neighborhood painters; plumbers are affected; window replacement and door replacement specialists. It affects a wide variety of individuals involved in home renovations. They are all affected. They can't get the courses. So that means they can't do these jobs. Here is the ironic result. The ironic and tragic result is that lead-based paint remains in these homes. It can't be removed because the contractors aren't certified to remove it. So that is the irony--the delay of the removal of lead-based paint. In a State such as Tennessee that has just undergone enormous flooding and is going to require extensive renovation and reconstruction, it is going to bring a lot of that work to a halt because for all of Tennessee there are only three EPA-certified trainers. In a State such as Alaska--think how vast Alaska is--there are only three certified trainers as well. In Hawaii, there are two. In Iowa, there is only one for the whole State. In the Presiding Officer's State of New Hampshire, there are only three--again, not nearly enough. The rule carries a big penalty for contractors who do not get trained. If contractors who perform work in homes built before 1978 are not EPA certified, they face fines of up to $37,500 per violation, per day. Well, in your State and my State, that is more than many of these painters make in a year--in a year. And how unfair it is that it is the EPA's fault that in many cases these contractors are not certified. They are not certified because they simply cannot get the courses. Let me give my colleagues another example of the EPA's total mishandling of the planning for this rule. The EPA estimated that it only needed to train 1,400 people in my State--1,400 people. In fact, there are more than 20,000 individuals in the State of Maine who require training. The EPA assumes they are part of large firms and that only one person at each firm needs to be certified. That is just not how it works. In my State--indeed, I bet in most rural States-- contractors are often one or two people in a shop. They aren't these big firms. The person who did work on my home replacing the windows just a couple of years ago--and I am glad he did it then before this new rule went into effect--works either alone or with one or two other people to assist him. That is very typical. There is an assumption by the EPA that contractors specialize, that they only do renovations in old homes or they do new home construction. That isn't true at all, particularly not in this economic environment where the housing industry has been so hurt and depressed. The contractors in my State are hustling to do whatever they can in order to get work and to put food on their table. They work in mixed communities with both older and newer homes. It is simply not fair to require them to give up working in older homes, particularly in a State such as mine which has some of the oldest housing in the Nation. Here is another assertion by the EPA. The EPA asserts that they did plenty of outreach and that contractors should have known they needed to get training before April 22. Clearly, the EPA did not adequately target its outreach campaign. Writing to Home Depot doesn't do it. That is not sufficient outreach. In fact, the classes were all offered in the southern part of my State, very far from people in Aroostook County in northern Maine, for example, where it could be a 5 or 6-hour drive in order to get the necessary training. When we begged the EPA for more trainers and more help, it took them 7 weeks to even respond with some ideas for getting more trainers in Maine, and even then their proposal showed a complete lack of understanding of the geography of the State and the number of people who would need to be trained. It also was frustrating because they offered some very expensive classes. EPA, for example, offered a class for $200 in Waterville for people living in Aroostook County. That is almost 5 hours away. So not only were they going to be required to pay $200 for the course, but also they would miss 2 days of work traveling back and forth. That is inexcusable, and that is the kind of insensitivity out of Washington that makes people so alienated from government right now. It is exactly why people are so frustrated. The EPA will point out the dangers of lead poisoning, and I could not agree more that lead poisoning is a terrible problem and that we have to do all we can to protect our children. But poor implementation of this rule serves no one well, and in fact, as I pointed out, it means lead paint is going to remain in homes that otherwise would have been remediated or mitigated. This rule is very strict. If you disturb just 6 square feet of paint, then you have to comply with the new rule. So it doesn't just apply to a large contractor doing an extensive renovation; it is going to apply if you are a carpenter replacing one window in a home or if you are a plumber who is helping to put in a new bathroom where there is lead paint or if you are a painter who is painting a new room or an old room in a house. So it has very wide application. How the EPA so misjudged the number of people who would require training is beyond me. This is so frustrating because it did not need to happen this way and cause such hardship for our small business men and women who are struggling if they are in the construction business right now. That is why my amendment--a bipartisan amendment with considerable support--has been endorsed by the National Federation of Independent Business, our Nation's largest small business advocacy organization. In fact, the NFIB will consider a vote in favor of my amendment as an NFIB key vote for this Congress. I want to make sure my colleagues recognize that. I wish to read a portion of the letter from NFIB. Again, as NFIB points out: The new EPA lead rule applies to virtually any industry affecting home renovation including: Painters, plumbers, window and door installers, carpenters, electricians, and similar specialists . . . NFIB appreciates the intent of the law . . . However, we continue to be concerned that the tight enforcement deadline unfairly punishes contractors who have not been able to become accredited through no fault of their own. That is the point. In my State, there are literally hundreds of contractors who are on waiting lists to get convenient classes, and some of them have been on these class waiting lists for as long as 2 months. So this is a real problem, and the high penalty for noncompliance is simply unfair. I would point out that this is the peak construction season, particularly in Northern States such as ours, I say to the Presiding Officer. We can't bring everything to a grinding halt because the EPA did such poor planning in rolling out this new rule. I also wish to point out that the amendment has been endorsed by the Retail Lumber Dealers Association and by the Window and Door Manufacturers Association. It is endorsed by the National Home Builders Association. It is endorsed by a number of groups representing small businesses involved in the renovation of homes. Again--because I can just imagine what is going to come about later when my colleague from California, Senator Boxer, comes to the floor-- this is not about repealing this rule. This is about giving more time for the training, the mandatory classes to take place before the EPA steps in and wallops these small businesses, these self-employed painters and carpenters and window installers and plumbers, with huge fines that could put them out of business simply because they have not been able to get the mandatory training due to the EPA's poor implementation of this new rule. I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It is a modest, commonsense solution to a problem created here in Washington by officials who are simply out of touch with what is going on in home renovation businesses. I hope my colleagues will support it. All it is doing is giving us a few more months to get people trained. I think that it is reasonable. I ask for my colleagues' support. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask that I be notified when I have 30 seconds remaining, which I am going to yield to the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. President, the Senator from California has misrepresented what my amendment would do. It does not repeal or change the requirement that EPA has for people to be trained before they remove lead-based paint. But the fact is, the EPA rolled out this new proposal, this new requirement, without having the training courses available. It is not fair to slap huge fines on contractors when it is the EPA's fault the classes have not been available. So this amendment just delays those fines until September 30 to allow more time.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I feel honored that I was on the floor and able to hear the chairman of the Appropriations Committee reflect on his own service and also compare the differences between World War II and the experience of our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and marines in the current conflicts. My own father is a World War II veteran who was wounded twice in the Battle of the Bulge. The second time he was wounded was when he was waiting to be evacuated. I can relate slightly, from the experience of my own father, to what we just heard from the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee. I cannot imagine being so badly wounded and waiting for 9 hours to be evacuated. It is a good reminder to all of us, as we engage in the day-to-day debates and arguments and, at times, contentiousness, that we have true heroes in our midst. Certainly, the Senator from Hawaii is one of those. I thank him for his service--his lifelong service. It was an honor to be on the floor and to hear him talk about it because, like many of our World War II veterans, he does not talk about it very often. I wanted to say that before beginning my remarks. Amendment No. 4253 Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment and to call up amendment No. 4253, which is at the desk.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I understand that the chairman has temporarily stepped off the Senate floor, so I will withhold that request. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, this is a modified version of an amendment I offered yesterday. I am joined by Senators Alexander, Inhofe, Bond, Voinovich, Snowe, Begich, Gregg, Brown of Massachusetts, Murkowski, Coburn, Thune, and Corker in supporting this amendment. On April 22, the EPA's new lead paint rule went into effect. As I explained to my colleagues yesterday, unfortunately the EPA completely botched the implementation of this important rule. This rule is intended to make sure that lead-based paint is removed safely from our homes and, thus, it requires those involved in house renovations to participate in a training course in the proper removal of lead-based paint, and then be certified. Unfortunately, the EPA did not plan well for the implementation of this new rule. Across our country, it did not have in place the necessary trainers and classes so that individuals could be trained to comply with this new rule. What our amendment would do is to delay the fines that would apply in cases of violations of this new rule until September 30. Indeed, it would prohibit the EPA from imposing these fines, which are as high as $37,500 per day per violation for violating this rule. I want to make clear that I support efforts to rid our homes of toxic lead-based paint in a safe manner. But it is simply not fair to impose these burdensome, onerous fines on contractors who have been unable to get the EPA-provided training because the EPA did such a lousy job in planning for implementation of this new rule. In my State, for example, as of last week, we have only three EPA trainers to certify contractors for the entire State. As a result, only about 10 percent of the State's contractors have been certified. Hundreds of home renovators have had their names on waiting lists, some for as long as 2 months, but they simply cannot get the necessary training, and that is through no fault of their own. I note that my amendment has been endorsed by the National Federation of Independent Business, our Nation's leading small business advocacy organization. It has been endorsed by the Window & Door Manufacturers Association and the National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association. These groups have endorsed it because they are hearing from their members of the tremendous burden and the tremendous fines that their members are potentially at risk of receiving through no fault of their own. As the NFIB pointed out in its letter, the new EPA lead rule applies to virtually anyone who is involved in home renovations involving lead- based paint. That includes painters, plumbers, window and door installers, carpenters, electricians, and other specialists. Its reach is very broad. What we found throughout the country is the EPA completely underestimated the number of people who would have to be trained. They also seem to be operating under the false assumption that contractors either do new construction or renovation. Madam President, I don't know about your State, but that is not true in my State. In my State, the home renovators do all sorts of work, particularly in this economy. This imposes a tremendous burden on those of us who represent large rural States. In my State, most of the courses were held in the southern part of the State, requiring painters and other contractors to travel hundreds of miles to get the training they need. There are three States where EPA does not have any certified trainers available. This is a commonsense amendment attempting to put some sense in the decisionmaking at the EPA by extending, until the end of this fiscal year, the time for compliance. I want to make clear that I believe we should try to proceed with the removal of lead-based paint and that we need strict safety standards. But it does not make sense to impose huge fines on contractors who are unable to get the required training, the mandatory classes because the EPA did not have the trainers in place before putting the rule into effect. In my State, the building industry is still struggling, and for a lot of individuals who are involved in the building industry, their only work is to do home renovations. My State also has an old housing stock, one of the oldest in the Nation. Ironically, this new rule may result in not having anyone who is qualified to remove lead-based paint from homes because of the way this rule has been implemented. I talked at some length about this issue yesterday. I am not going to repeat what I said yesterday. But let me point out that a lot of the contractors in my State who are struggling already financially do not earn in a whole year the $37,500 they can be fined for one violation by the EPA. It is simply unfair that these heavy fines can be imposed when it is the EPA's fault that the classes have not been made more readily available. All I am attempting to do is to provide the EPA with more time to increase the number of certified trainers. This is a matter of fairness. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the endorsement letters from the NFIB, from the National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association, and from the Window & Door Manufacturers Association.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague and friend from Tennessee for his comments and his support. We have been working on this since we first began discussing it during the appropriations markup, and he has illustrated what truly can be a devastating impact of this rule. It could prevent the renovations, the cleanup, the reconstruction work from going forward in his State. In his State even more than most States, the impact could truly be devastating. It is serious everywhere but truly devastating in Tennessee. I have also commented to my colleague from Tennessee how proud he must be of the residents of his State. You hardly have heard of any complaints from Tennessee even though this has truly been a devastating flood. I sometimes worry that perhaps because they are trying to help one another, they are not getting enough attention in the press or from Congress. Fortunately, they have a very fine advocate in Senator Alexander and Senator Corker, and they are continuing to look out for them by cosponsoring this amendment. I thank the Senator for his support.

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Ms. COLLINS

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am not going to call up my amendment at this time because I understand there is an objection on the other side. But I am going to take advantage of this opportunity to discuss my amendment, which is No. 4218. This is an amendment I have offered on behalf of myself and Senators Inhofe, Alexander, Brown, Brownback, Gregg, Snowe, Coburn, Bond, Murkowski, Voinovich, Burr, Begich, and Corker. On April 22, a new Environmental Protection Agency regulation regarding lead paint abatement went into effect. Lead paint has been of great concern to me for a number of years. I actually joined with the Senator from Rhode Island, Senator Reed, in holding field hearings on the dangers of lead paint in older houses several years ago. It has long been a concern of mine. I support the purpose of this rule because we want to continue our efforts to rid toxic lead-based paint from our homes. I am deeply concerned, however, as are many of my colleagues, that the EPA has completely botched the implementation of this rule. The rule requires that contractors who were hired to do work in homes that have lead paint must first be certified to perform this work. We put the cart before the horse with this rule and the result is that the EPA has not ensured that there is a sufficient number of trainers to provide the training and the certification for these contractors. That means many contractors simply cannot get the necessary certification in most States. The result is that small business men and women are losing out on jobs at a time when many of them are in desperate need of work. Ironically, it also means that lead paint that homeowners want removed or mitigated will not be. In my State of Maine, for example, as of last week we have only three EPA trainers in the entire State to certify contractors. Just over 10 percent of the State's contractors have been certified. Hundreds of Maine's contractors have signed up for the training but they have been forced to wait. Their names are languishing on waiting lists, some for as long as 2 months. It is hard to envision how much worse a job EPA could have done in rolling out this regulation and it is not as if EPA did not know this was coming. EPA has had years to plan for the proper implementation of this regulation. Unfortunately, the EPA's rule carries a big penalty for contractors who do not get the required training. If contractors who perform work in homes built before 1978 are not EPA certified, they face fines of up to $37,500 per violation per day. Many of the painters in my State doing this work don't earn $37,000 in an entire year. How unfair it is when it is the EPA's fault in many cases that they are not certified. The lack of training and the EPA fines are creating a no-win situation. If contractors who have not received the EPA training work in these older homes, they face the possibility of literally losing their businesses, of being fined out of existence, due to the severity of the EPA fines. Meanwhile, the lead paint remains, raising the threat of lead poisoning and its significant health impacts. I have been trying to work with EPA officials since this problem first became evident to me in early March, but they have offered absolutely no reasonable accommodations, no reasonable solutions. In fact, it took the EPA 7 weeks to even offer any ideas for getting more trainers to the State of Maine--and even then the EPA's proposals were unworkable. I come to the floor to offer a common sense solution to a problem created by Washington's poor planning. My bipartisan amendment, which is cosponsored by so many of my colleagues--and let me give the list again. Senators Alexander, Inhofe, Brown, Brownback, Gregg, Snowe, Coburn, Bond, Murkowski, Voinovich, Burr, Begich, and Corker--would prohibit the EPA from imposing fines against contractors who have signed up for the required training classes by September 30 of this year. This delay will allow, I hope, adequate time for contractors to comply with the law and to get the required training without fear of a fine that could well put them out of business. To be clear, our amendment does not stop the EPA from punishing those who willingly break the law and endanger a child's well-being. It simply gives the EPA more time to ensure that there is a sufficient number of trainers in each State, and it simply protects that small painter, that small businessman, that small contractor, from unfairly being fined when it is the EPA's fault he or she cannot get the required training. Inconceivably, I have heard the EPA say it has trained an adequate number of people in Maine, so let me give you the statistics for my State, because they are typical of many States. First, EPA estimates that there are only 1,400 contractors in Maine. In fact, however, there are more than 20,000 contractors in our State; not 1,400, but 20,000 people who need to be trained. EPA makes another erroneous assumption. It assumes that all of these people are part of large businesses and that only one person at each business needs to be certified. EPA also assumes that contractors specialize in doing just old homes or new homes. Completely false. That makes no sense at all in a rural State such as Maine, which has some of the oldest housing stock in the country and most painters are small shops, usually just an individual who is self-employed. At most, he might be part of a small business where there are two or three people who are doing the work. In addition, these individuals work in mixed communities which have older homes and newer homes. This is typical of every community in my State. We cannot ask them to give up working in older homes simply because an economist at the EPA does not understand what our housing stock looks like in Maine. Furthermore, most of the EPA's classes have been held in the southern part of the State. It is not feasible for people to have to travel hundreds of miles in order to obtain this training. I have heard that criticism and that problem from my colleagues in other States as well, that the EPA is offering the classes only in cities and has completely neglected the rural parts of their states. My home State of Maine is not the only State trapped in this bureaucratic dilemma. An EPA evaluation from early May shows, for example, that Hawaii only has two trainers. I cannot imagine how that can work in Hawaii given the islands. That is not feasible. Mississippi has only one trainer in the entire State. Three States--Louisiana, Wyoming, and South Dakota--do not have a single EPA-certified trainer. This is just not fair. It is not fair that these small contractors live under the threat of these onerous fines that would put many of them out of business, when it is not their fault they cannot obtain the training--it is EPA's fault. All of us understand that lead is a dangerous toxin and we must work to do whatever we can to keep our homes and our children safe. But the burden should not fall upon the shoulders of small contractors and construction professionals, painters and others, who are trying their best to comply with EPA's rule. Spring is home renovation season in most States. The small business men and women of Maine are just gearing up for the spring and summer months, and they are trying to recover from the great recession which has been so hard on their businesses. The onerous and unfair fines of more than $37,000 per day could put many of them out of business even as they wait for an EPA training class to become available. As they are waiting, if they choose not to do this work, they are losing income as well, and that is unfair. All I am attempting to do with this amendment is provide the EPA with more time in order to increase the number of certified trainers and the offering of these classes. With enough trainers, we can eventually ensure the success of this program. But without enough trainers, we are guaranteeing its failure and penalizing innocent contractors who are simply trying to make a living and who have been unable to secure the training required by the EPA. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.