Member of Congress
Norm Coleman
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- MN
- Party
- Republican
Speeches
Introductory Statement on S. 2072007-01-09
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to assist the families of our reservists and National Guard members. With our reservists and National Guard members bravely answering our country's call to service, we must do all we can to meet the calls of help from those families left behind who are struggling financially as a result of their loved ones' wartime service. All too often, the families of reservists and National Guard members must contend not only with the physical absence of a loved one but also with the loss of income that makes paying house, car, medical and other bills too great of a burden to bear without help. According to the latest available statistics, some 55 percent of married Guard members and reservists have experienced a loss in income, with nearly 50 percent experiencing a loss of $1,000 in pay per month and 15 percent experiencing a loss of $30,000 or more in pay a year. With our Guard and reservists putting their lives on the line, they should not also have to put their families' financial lives on the line due to their service. In an effort to provide relief to these families, I am introducing today the Voluntary Support for Reservists and National Guard Members Act that would bolster the financial assistance available to these families. More specifically, the Voluntary Support for Reservists and National Guard Members Act would provide taxpayers the option of contributing part of their tax refund to the Reserve Income Replacement Program which provides financial assistance to those families who have experienced an income loss due to a call-up to active duty. In 2005, the IRS issued 106 million refunds that totaled $227 billion with the average refund coming in at $2,141.36. Even a small percentage of this amount could make a significant difference in the lives of these reservist and National Guard families. While we can do little to ease the emotional burden experienced by families regarding the service of their loved ones, we can at least try to give them some peace of mind when it comes to their day-to-day finances. These families already have made a great sacrifice to the nation, and they should not also have to sacrifice their financial well-being due to their loved ones' service. Beyond our gratitude, care packages and gifts, we can thank our troops for their service by helping to meet the everyday needs of their families who are facing financial hardships. My bill would provide Americans a convenient way to thank our troops by contributing a portion of their tax refunds to give much-needed help to the loved ones of our reservists and National Guard members . I ask unanimous consent that my legislation, the Voluntary Support for Reservists and National Guard Members Act, and the accompanying remarks be printed in the Record.
Introductory Statement on S. 2172007-01-09
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Introductory Statement on S. 282006-12-08
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill I introduce today--the Northern Border Travel Facilitation Act--be printed in the Record.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS2006-12-08
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill I introduce today--the Northern Border Travel Facilitation Act--be printed in the Record.
AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD2006-12-06
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would like to discuss today the gross misconduct of the Australian Wheat Board in its dealings with Saddam Hussein under the U.N. Oil for Food Program and to introduce legislation regarding the potential impact AWB's actions may have had U.S. farmers. Last week, a commission in Australia led by former Supreme Court Justice Terence Cole released a detailed report documenting extensive corruption, fraud, and deceit on the part of the Australian Wheat Board, commonly called AWB. The report showed that AWB paid more than $221 million in under-the-table kickbacks to the Hussein regime to secure exclusive, illegal access to the Iraqi wheat market. I applaud Sir Terence Cole and his commission for the thorough and comprehensive manner in which they have dealt with this issue. As chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I conducted an investigation for almost 3 years into abuses of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. During my investigation, I held numerous hearings and issued several detailed reports that exposed significant graft associated with the program. In particular, my subcommittee exposed corruption involving public officials from the United Kingdom, Russia, France and the United Nations, along with corrupt transactions by companies in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere around the world. However, when my subcommittee considered investigating the AWB, we faced insurmountable legal challenges that prevented us from initiating the kind of exhaustive review that this case required. Unlike other foreign entities that voluntarily cooperated with the subcommittee's efforts, AWB declined to cooperate with the subcommittee by providing documents or witnesses. Given that AWB is a foreign entity, the subcommittee could not compel its cooperation through subpoenas. Moreover, the U.N.'s investigators at the Independent Inquiry Committee issued a report in October 2004, which suggested that it would examine AWB's transactions along with the other deals executed under the program. Unlike the subcommittee's efforts, that inquiry would have complete access to U.N. files and unfettered access to documents from relevant Iraqi ministries and would likely have access to the files and banking records of AWB. Instead of launching a duplicative investigation with no ability to compel the AWB to cooperate, I encouraged the Australian Government and the AWB to cooperate with the IIC and the Cole inquiry whose findings have just been released. The Cole report has left me with a few lingering questions to which I plan to find some answers. My subcommittee is continuing its review of the Cole report to determine whether U.S. affiliates of the AWB should be held accountable here in the United States. But the most important question to ask in the wake of the Cole report's findings is whether American wheat farmers have suffered as a result of the fraud and abuse on the part of the monopolistic AWB. I am introducing legislation today to address that question, and if we find proof of harm, to make our farmers whole. I would like to introduce today the Australian Wheat Board Accountability Act of 2006. The purpose of this legislation is just that: to hold the Australian Wheat Board accountable for their illegal, deceitful, trade-distorting actions. The bill directs the Office of U.S. Trade Representative to use its authority to investigate and combat these practices. This legislation is a simple bill with two distinct elements. First, the bill directs USTR to investigate whether U.S. wheat farmers have suffered economic damage due to the actions of the Australian Wheat Board. Second, if we find harm, we seek compensation. I have spoken many times on this floor about the great experiences I have had meeting with farmers of my State. I just finished traveling to all 87 counties in Minnesota this year, and I will be the first to tell this body that some of the most enriching visits I had took place with farmers. Those who make a living by working the land, Mr. President. Those who produce the food and fiber of our Nation and have done so for generations. Those who contribute so much to the social fabric we hold so dear. And they don't ask for much in return. They didn't ask me to come to the floor today or to introduce this legislation. All they ask is that when it comes to trade, everyone ought to play by the same rules. They want a level playing field because they know they can compete with anyone in a fair global market. The fact is the Australian Wheat Board hasn't been playing by the rules. The Cole report has proven that the AWB unfairly monopolized wheat exports to Iraq under the Oil for Food Program. By paying Saddam and his henchmen millions in illegal kickbacks, they may have distorted the wheat market to the detriment of the honest, hard-working farmers across Minnesota and the United States while they reaped the benefits of a corrupt regime for their own ill-gotten gain. I intend to find out if AWB's criminal actions hurt the bottom lines of our farmers, and that is what part one of this legislation does. Part two of this legislation is about compensation. Under this bill, if it is found that our wheat farmers have suffered economic damage, USTR will seek appropriate compensation to make our farmers whole. If we cannot come to a negotiated settlement, we will impose duties on certain Australian goods until we collect a sum equivalent to the financial loss brought on by the AWB. Either way, I want any possibility of financial loss looked at, and if proven, I want compensation for our farmers. Mr. President, I realize this is the final week of the 109th Congress and that this legislation probably doesn't make the priority list for passage this week. You can bet I will be back here again when we reconvene in January offering this bill in the 110th Congress. We owe it to our farmers to further investigate AWB's actions, and this legislation will make that happen.
AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 20072006-12-05
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.
Mr. COLEMAN. Six minutes, probably less.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota for his leadership on agricultural disaster assistance. I wish to let this body know what assistance means to Minnesota's farmers by reading a few excerpts from letters I have received from producers in my State. I have been on the floor a number of times about this issue. We need to get it done. One man starts out saying, ``I am a struggling young family farmer in Northwest Minnesota,'' and registers his plea: We were counting on some help this summer to cash flow for the year after last year's devastating floods. We are now attempting to work with our banker to increase our operating credit limit, refinance our machinery, or refinance our land, just to make ends meet till we can harvest our crop. Please do not give up on this issue. This urgency is repeated again and again in the letters I receive and conversations I have. Another Minnesota farmer writes there is an ``urgent need for ag disaster assistance for our family farmers devastated by weather disasters in 2005 and 2006. My family has farmed in Minnesota since 1882 and we need ag disaster assistance now. Please, please help us.'' These are heartbreaking stories. These are real emergencies for our farmers. These folks need our help or they will be put out of business, plain and simple. And the need for agricultural disaster assistance is great. Minnesota's farmers have had to fend for themselves in the face of real natural disaster--first, against record flooding in 2005 and now against record drought in 2006. In the sugar sector alone, revenue was reduced by $60 million in Minnesota in 2005, thanks to this natural disaster. In one county, crop loss exceeded $52 million and farmers were prevented from planting over 90,000 acres thanks to saturated fields. Now, thanks to one of the worst droughts ever experienced in the Great Plains, Minnesota farmers have experienced hundreds of millions of dollars of crop loss in 2006. But it is not just about statistics. It is about farmers enduring personal struggles whom I have met all over the State. It is about farmers calling my office, desperate to save the family farm. Farmers are losing their operations, pure and simple. The producers who will not be coming back to the fields next year thanks to catastrophic weather are not just losing a business, many are losing a family tradition. We are losing a way of life. We are losing some of the heart and soul of America and of Minnesota. I am concerned about the comments of some of my colleagues. My colleague and friend, the Senator from New Hampshire, indicated that the separate disaster assistance for sugar beets is akin to earmarks. I want to state that is not the case. It is not about porkbarrel spending. I think what some folks fail to recognize is that due to the nature of the sugar program, they don't get direct payments. It cannot be structured in the same way as other production loss assistance for other crops. If you look at what has been laid out, we have been trying to be very focused and very clear. This is not about excess. This is about keeping families alive. This is about keeping farming alive. Some of the families have farmed for almost 100 years. With all due respect, these faulty characterizations do not do our farmers justice. Another farmer in my State gets at the crux of this amendment when he writes: Maybe the farmers in this area should have applied to FEMA for hurricane relief--it seems that hard working people in my community are looking to their government for help and getting ignored. It is not that this Congress has refused to pass agricultural disaster assistance. We have provided $1.6 billion in emergency agricultural assistance. Of course, none of the farmers in Minnesota will benefit from this assistance because they do not own a farm in one of the Gulf States. Congress has not provided a dime for farmers suffering from natural disasters outside of the gulf region. I have stood on this floor supporting our farmers in the Gulf States. I support us doing what we need to do to lift them up. I think it would shock many Americans to learn that natural devastation must come in the right package to be worthy of Federal aid. The message being sent is that record flooding and drought do not count. That is not a good message. Again, I have traveled to the Gulf States. I have seen the hurricane damage firsthand. And you should see the devastation here. The Senator from North Dakota has done a good job of making it real. Seeing it. And it is real. We cannot put one region against the next. This is about America doing the right thing. That is what we should be doing on the floor of the Senate. The core of this issue is about equity and fairness for all regions that are suffering. And to the thousands of Minnesotans whose very livelihoods have been jeopardized, and those losing their farms due to last year's disastrous weather, withholding assistance is nothing short of cruel. We can do better. We should do better. I urge my colleagues to support this assistance package. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
NATIONAL BIBLE WEEK2006-11-16
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Carper for his leadership. Next week is actually National Bible Week. I think it has been celebrated since 1941. The Senator from Delaware is one of the cochairs of that. Part of what I think is the purpose of it and the importance of it is to reflect a little bit on the value, the importance of the Bible and of faith in our lives. And we do bring different faith perspectives and different historical perspectives. I have a great sense of almost envy a little bit about being from a State that goes back to the very beginning, to the time of the Founders. The Minnesota journey has been a little briefer journey, a challenging journey when the early settlers were coming out and landing. It was pretty cold in the winter and it could be blistering hot in the summer. You kind of reflect on your own mortality. To this day, we stand now in the 21st century, and one of the things faith does--and we heard it from the Chaplain, if you listened to the Chaplain's intonation when the prayer began, calling upon God for wisdom, in a sense humility, that even in this august Chamber it is important for us and our colleagues to have. I think faith gives you that, requires that of you. Alvin Toffler, in ``Future Shock,'' talked about the geometric rate of change--everything is moving so quickly, and reflected in that is the importance of some island of stability. One of the things that faith does for those of us in this body is, in a sea of change, it provides us with stability. It is an island. Everything else is moving very quickly around us, but if you look into the Bible, look into the Hebrew Torah, you find those kinds of rooted values--the social compact, the necessity to help the poor, the necessity to raise your voices on behalf of those who are oppressed, in bondage. All those values are rooted in these books that we still, then, reflect on and study today. I think it is important for us to do that. One of the things, by the way, we have been doing is we have a National Prayer Breakfast. Senator Pryor and I got to chair that this year. I recntly put into the Congressional Record the entire program, the transcript. I urge my colleagues to read it, take a look at it. There are fascinating reflections from King Abdallah from Jordan. The rock star Bono was the chief speaker. He said he is not a man of the cloth, unless your cloth is leather, but then he went on to talk about his own faith journey. He went on to say he used to wake up all the time and pray that God blessed a certain thing that he did. Now what he talks about is looking at and kind of putting his efforts into the things that God wants done, that He has already blessed, trying to figure out what is the right thing to do. At a time when the partisan divide is so great--we see it on C-SPAN-- what I think our faith has done, what it does for my colleagues and for me in fellowship with my colleagues is, for those brief--those moments, I would not say brief moments; actually, they are extended moments--it allows us to get past that and recognize what is in the heart of a colleague. In the end, I hope it is a mitigating factor, something that then lessens the divide that we see so often played out on the screen and played out on TV. The things that bind us are so much more powerful than the things that separate us. We do it, I believe, with a sense of humility. I was the mayor of Saint Paul, MN, the capital city. We say Saint Paul is the city of two cathedral domes. There is the dome of the State capitol and then the dome of the magnificent Cathedral of Saint Paul. The dome of the cathedral is on the highest plane of the city, and I say it is a reflection of who is in charge, and it is not the Governor or State legislature, if we reflect on that in a positive way. There are mad men who use religion and holy books to do terrible things, but those are mad men. That is not what faith is all about. At a time of great change and the world moving so quickly, I know for me, personally, and my colleagues, we find refuge, we find solace, we find a sense of peace in reflecting upon the traditions that brought us to this floor, to this moment, and hopefully that allows us to operate in a way in which we do those good things--those good things that we see ourselves. One of my favorite quotes is from Maimonides, who says each of us must act as if the world were held in balance and any single act of goodness on our part could tip the scale. I believe that every day of my life. That is what faith brings to me and brings to us. I see my colleague from Arkansas is here. Yesterday, we were visiting the new Senators, our new colleagues, and kind of moving them to this family. I will, again, say to my new colleagues that I urge them, on the floor of the Senate, to participate in the National Prayer Breakfast. The President is there, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of the Supreme Court and leaders from 170-something countries. This is not just a Senate thing or a U.S. thing, this is a global thing of great importance, as we saw in our last prayer breakfast, where you have King Abdallah, a direct descendant of Mohammed, Norm Coleman, a Jewish boy from Minnesota, and Mark Pryor, a Christian from Arkansas, coming together on the platform. I hope that has meaning beyond that single day. With that, I see my colleague from Arkansas and yield the floor.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS AFFAIRS AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 20072006-11-14
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I join in thanking my colleague from North Dakota for giving me the opportunity to speak about the trials of Minnesota farmers. I join in this bipartisan plea to deal with an issue that is of great importance to many Minnesota farm families. While my colleagues from North Dakota speak from the other side of the aisle, our call for assistance for our farmers is made with one voice. I particularly thank Senator Conrad for his leadership on this issue. After last week's election, there was a lot of discussion about how the parties can, and should, work together, how we should find common ground on behalf of the American people. Here is one of our first opportunities to display bipartisanship. Supporters of this disaster assistance package hail from all over the country and from both parties. This amendment is just the sort of bipartisan cooperation that this body should embrace to meet the Nation's needs. The need for agricultural disaster assistance is great. Minnesota farmers have had to fend for themselves in the face of real natural disaster; first, against record flooding in 2005 and now record drought in 2006. In the sugar sector alone, revenue was reduced by $60 million in Minnesota in 2005, thanks to this natural disaster. In one county, crop loss exceeded $52 million and farmers were prevented from planting over 60,000 acres, thanks to saturated fields. Now with one of the worst droughts ever experienced in the Great Plains, Minnesota farmers have experienced hundreds of millions of dollars of crop loss in 2006. The pictures that we saw of North Dakota show the same reality that is faced in Minnesota. It isn't just about statistics. It is about farmers enduring personal struggles. This summer, in Lake Bronson, MN, about 100 farmers showed up, out of a town of 180, to talk about the impact on their lives and families. It is about the farmers calling my office, desperate to save the family farm. I have received letters from scores of Minnesota farmers talking about the impact on their lives, on their families, families that go back through generations of farming today could come to an end because we haven't done something that needs to be done. The producers who will not be coming back to the fields next year as a result of catastrophic weather aren't just losing a family business, many are losing a family tradition. In June, I came this floor appalled that the Senate would pass an emergency supplemental appropriations bill that offers a helping hand to some Americans and a cold shoulder to others. Since then, the only thing that has changed is that the burden of natural disaster has grown heavier on American farmers with the addition of last summer's record drought. It isn't that this Congress has refused to pass agricultural disaster assistance. In fact, we provided $1.6 billion in emergency agricultural assistance. Of course, none of my farmers will benefit from this assistance unless they happen to own a farm in one of the Gulf States. Congress still hasn't provided a dime for farmers suffering from natural disasters outside of the gulf region. It would shock many Americans to learn that natural devastation must come in the right package to be worthy of Federal aid. The message being sent is that record flooding and droughts don't count, only hurricanes. I traveled to the gulf to see the hurricane damage firsthand in order to more fully understand what my fellow Americans who live far from my home in Minnesota are suffering. I have wholeheartedly supported their cause in Congress. At its core, this is an issue about equity and fairness for all regions that are suffering. And to the thousands of Minnesotans whose very livelihoods have been jeopardized and those losing farms due to last year's disastrous weather, withholding assistance is nothing short of cruel. Some folks in Washington have cited the overall success of agriculture in 2006, the aggregate numbers, as a justification for withholding assistance. Congress didn't look at the overall economy when determining what sort of assistance to send to the gulf after the hurricanes. We didn't cite the Nation's robust GDP growth and lower unemployment rate as reasons not to assist gulf communities whose local economies were devastated by natural disaster, nor should we propose such a false standard for comprehensive agricultural disaster assistance. Let us seize the opportunity for this body to show Americans that we understand and reflect the character and the heart and soul of America, a big heart that understands that Americans are there with a helping hand for all those deserving of assistance in times of extraordinary need. Let us show America that the Senate will work in a bipartisan spirit to meet their needs. I urge my colleagues to support passage of this critical amendment. I yield the floor.
NATIONAL PRAYER BREAKFAST2006-11-14
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, as the session winds down I have been thinking back over the year. As always, there has been a lot more activity than action, but we are making progress on the people's business. But not everything we do here is legislative in nature. Senator Pryor and I had the opportunity to chair the National Prayer Breakfast in February, a nonofficial, nonpartisan, and nondenominational gathering of people from all over the world who are seeking better ways to connect with each other and find strength beyond ourselves. Many of our colleagues in the House and Senate participated. For their reference and for the benefit of other interested readers of this Record, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a transcript of the event, including a very interesting talk by U2 lead singer and humanitarian Bono, be printed in the Record.
NOTICE OF HEARING2006-11-13
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will hold a hearing entitled ``Failure to Identify Company Owners Impedes Law Enforcement.'' The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' hearing will examine the issue of States routinely incorporating hundreds of thousands of new, non-publicly traded companies in the United States each year without obtaining the identity of the corporate owners, thereby impeding law enforcement investigations into persons misusing U.S. shell corporations for money laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, or other crimes, The hearing will feature the April 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report prepared at the Subcommittee's request, ``Company Formations: Minimal Ownership Information Is Collected and Available.'' Witnesses for the upcoming hearing will include representatives of GAO, the Department of Justice, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Internal Revenue Service, as well as representatives of several states, A final witness list will be available on Thursday, November 9, 2006. The Subcommittee hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, November 14, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. For further information, please contact Raymond V. Shepherd III or Elise J. Bean, of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at 224-3721. Subcommittee on National Parks
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will hold a hearing entitled ``The Defense Travel System: Boon Or Boondoggle (Part 2).'' The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations plans to hold this second hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Travel System (DTS) as part of its ongoing investigation of DOD's travel policies and practices. The DTS was intended to be a seamless integrated computer-based travel system that would facilitate travel for DOD employees and lead to increased efficiency and substantial cost savings. Instead, DTS has cost more than was anticipated, is not fully deployed, does not appear to be widely used and may end up costing more than it has saved. The Subcommittee's first hearing on DTS on September 29, 2005, established that DOD proceeded with the implementation of DTS despite warnings from the DOD Inspector General (IG) and the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation section that DTS might not be the most cost effective solution to DOD's travel needs. Following the hearing, the Chairman asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOD IG to respectively determine if the projected cost savings were justified and to perform a cost benefit analysis of DTS. The upcoming hearing will present the results of those reviews and provide DOD an opportunity to respond. Witnesses for the upcoming hearing will be representatives of GAO and DOD. The Subcommittee hearing is scheduled for Thursday, November 16, 2006, at 10 a.m. in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. For further information, please contact Raymond V. Shepherd, III, Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at 224-3721.
AGRICULTURE DISASTER RELIEF2006-09-29
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota for yielding me time. I stand with my colleague from Minnesota, Senator Dayton, in bipartisan agreement. This is not a partisan issue, and it should not be a partisan issue. I consider this one of the most important pieces of legislation that has been left undone this year, agricultural disaster assistance. While this body has come to the aid of producers in the gulf affected by hurricanes who need agricultural disaster assistance, Minnesota's farmers and families have been left to fend for themselves in the face of natural disasters--the flooding of 2005 and the record drought in 2006. In the sugar sector alone, revenue was reduced by $60 million in Minnesota in 2005 thanks to this natural disaster. In one county, crop loss exceeded $52 million, and farmers were prevented from planting over 90,000 acres thanks to saturated fields. These are not just numbers; these are people's lives. These are their livelihoods. There is a sense of history and connection to the land, and the future is now at risk. I was up at Lake Bronson, MN, in northwest Minnesota, and met with over 100 farmers. It is their lives. The farmers are calling my office desperate to save the family farm. Farmers are losing operations, pure and simple. Some folks in Washington cited the overall success of agriculture in 2006, the aggregate numbers, as justification for withholding assistance. Congress didn't look at the overall economy in determining what sort of assistance to give those affected by the great disaster in the gulf. We didn't cite the Nation's robust GDP growth and low unemployment rate as a reason not to assist gulf communities whose local economies were devastated by natural disaster. Nor should we propose such a false standard for comprehensive agricultural disaster assistance. It is true that the suffering in the gulf is great. I have seen the tremendous damage myself. I have come to this floor time and again to lend my hand to fellow Americans. I can't help but think of the 100- year flood in the Red River Valley. Senator Dayton knows; he was there. We saw neighbors fighting a flood together one sand bag at a time, regardless of whose house was closest to the water. Your State might not be the closest to the flooding that occurred in my State last year or the drought this year, but as a neighbor of mine, a fellow American, I just ask you to help me fight the natural disaster being endured in Minnesota, the Dakotas, and other parts of this country. None in this body can build a dike on our own. Please allow this assistance to go forward. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
RETIRING FROM THE SENATE2006-09-29
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I see my colleague from Minnesota, Senator Dayton. He will not be here in January, and I come to the Senate to associate myself with the praise of my distinguished colleague from West Virginia for Senator Dayton. We live in very partisan times. We live in times where there is great cynicism about politics. We come from opposite sides of the political aisle, and there are moments we are butting heads on issues and press releases, but I have to say my colleague's heart is pure. On issue after issue, when Mark Dayton, the Senator from Minnesota, says something, he says it because he believes it and he is passionate about it. We worked together to try to make sure our troops, when they were on leave from Iraq, came home at no cost. We came together. Earlier today, we were in the Senate talking about agricultural disaster assistance for Minnesota farmers. The public does not see all the times we work together. They do not look into a man's heart. I have been here 4 years, and what I call the pureness of the heart, the commitment to public service, a lifelong commitment to public service, again and again at level after level on the State and now in the U.S. Congress is something to be celebrated. I express to my colleague and my friend--and we use that word rather loosely on occasion here, but he is my colleague and my friend--thanks for your service. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to work with you on behalf of the people of Minnesota and the people of this country.
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT--CONFERENCE REPORT2006-09-29
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I support the SAFE Port Act. Simply put-- this historic legislation will make us safer. The result of inaction will be disastrous. The stakes are just too high. In a recent estimate, a 10-to-20 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to one million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion. FBI Director Robert Mueller, ominously assessed the terrorist threat at the annual Global Intelligence Briefing by stating he is very concerned ``with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy explosives in its attacks against America.'' Many terrorism experts believe that maritime container shipping may serve as an ideal platform to deliver these weapons to the United States. In fact, we recently saw that containers may also serve as ideal platforms to transport potential terrorists into the United States. This was demonstrated on January 15 and again on April 2 of this year when upwards of 30 Chinese immigrants were found emerging from containers arriving at the Port of Los Angeles. The Subcommittee's concern is that smuggled immigrants could include members of terrorist organizations--and/or--that the container could have contained a weapon of mass destruction. As the 9/11 Commission put it so succinctly, ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.'' Since 90 percent of global trade moves in maritime containers, we can not allow these containers to be utilized to transport weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of such an event would be devastating to our way of life and our economy. Instead, we must secure our supply chain before we pay the high price of an attack, and seek the appropriate balance between two often competing priorities: security and speed. This balancing act resulted in the creation of two prominent homeland security programs--the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. CSI effectively pushed our borders out by placing CBP offices in foreign ports to inspect containers before they reach our shores. C-TPAT exemplified a true public-private partnership, in which the private sector took a leading role in securing its supply chain. These programs alone are laudable-- but due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge of securing the global supply chain--we must continue to improve upon these promising initiatives. With that in mind, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I have directed the Subcommittee's 3-year effort to bolster America's port security and supply chain security. We have identified numerous weaknesses in our programs that secure the global supply chain. A brief overview of these problems illustrates the challenges confronting these efforts: In CSI, the Subcommittee found that only a de minimus number of such high-risk containers are actually inspected. In fact, the vast majority of high-risk containers are simply not inspected overseas. To make matters worse, the U.S. Government has not established minimum standards for these inspections. The Subcommittee initially found that an overwhelming proportion of C-TPAT companies enjoy the benefits before DHS conducts a thorough on- site inspection, called a validation. As of July 2006 this proportion has improved considerably to where 49 percent of the participating companies have been subjected to a validation. But this still leaves 51 percent of companies that have not been subjected to any legitimate, on-site review to ensure that their security practices pass muster. The Subcommittee found that DHS uses a flawed system to identify high-risk shipping containers entering U.S. ports. According to CBP officials, the Automated Targeting System or ATS is largely dependent on ``one of the least reliable or useful types of information for targeting purposes,'' including cargo manifest data and bills of lading. Moreover, the Subcommittee found that this targeting system has never been tested or validated, and may not discern actual, realistic risks. Currently, only 70 percent of cargo containers entering U.S. ports are screened for nuclear or radiological materials. One part of the problem is that the deployment of radiation detection equipment is woefully behind schedule. As of August 29, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security has deployed only 43 percent of the necessary radiation monitors at priority seaports. These are just a handful of the significant problems discovered by the Subcommittee. In short, America's supply chain security remains vulnerable. Our enemies could compromise the global supply chain to smuggle a Weapon of Mass Destruction, WMD, or even terrorists, into this country. This legislation tackles these concerns--and many other weaknesses--in a coherent and comprehensive manner. The SAFE Port Act addresses the problem of inadequate nuclear and radiological screening, by requiring the Secretary of DHS to develop a strategy for deployment of radiatioction capabilities and mandating that, by December 2007, all containers entering the United States through the busiest 22 seaports shall be examined for radiation; requires DHS to develop, implement, and update a strategic plan improve the security of the international cargo supply chain. In particular the plan will identify and address gaps, provide improvements and goals, and establish protocols for the resumption of trade after a critical incident; requires DHS to identify and request reliable and essential information about containers moving through the international supply chain; requires DHS to promulgate a rule to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S.; provides Congressional authorization for the CSI program, empowering cap to identify, examine or search maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded in a foreign port as well as establish standards for the use of scanning and radiation detection equipment at CSI ports; and authorizes C-TPAT and establishes certain minimum security and other requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for C-TPAT benefits. Even if we pass this legislation, our job is not completed. We still need to look to the future and develop even more effective and advanced programs and technology. Effectively scanning containers with both an x-ray and a radiation scan is the only definitive answer to the perplexing and most important question of ``what's in the box?'' However, in fiscal year 2005, only 0.38 percent of containers were screened with a nonintrusive imaging device and only 2.8 percent of containers were screened for radiation prior to entering the United States. DHS' efforts have improved somewhat from last year's paltry numbers, but we have more work to do. To date, DHS still uses a risk-based approach that targets only high-risk containers. While this approach is fundamentally sound, the system used to target high-risk containers has yet to be validated or proven to accurately identify high-risk containers. Moreover, the validity of the intelligence used to enhance this system's targeting ability is increasingly in question. Thus, we need to both enhance our targeting capability and use technology to enhance our ability to increase inspections--without impeding the flow of commerce. While the United States currently inspects approximately 5 percent of all maritime containers, the partial pilot test in the Port of Hong Kong demonstrates the potential to scan 100 percent of all shipping containers. Each container in the Hong Kong port flows through an integrated system featuring an imaging machine, a radiation scan, and a system to identify the container. Coupling these technologies together allows for the most complete scan of a container currently available. The Hong Kong concept or similar technology holds great promise and could lead to a dramatic improvement in the efficacy of our supply chain security. I am pleased to say that this legislation develops a pilot program in three foreign seaports, each with unique features and varying levels of trade volume to test integrated scanning systems using non-intrusive inspected radiation detection equipment. It requires full-scale pilot implementation within 1 year after enactment and an evaluation report would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days after full implementation of the pilot. If the pilot programs prove successful, then full-scale implementation would follow. The bottom line is this: we are safer now than we were yesterday, but we are not safe enough. The question then becomes: how do we get there? In the words of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky, ``A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be.'' In other words, we cannot safeguard a post 9/11 America by using pre-9/11 methods. If we think that the terrorists are not plotting their next move, we are mistaken. We must find where the gaps are in our Nation's homeland security and close them before an attack happens. That is the only way to guarantee our security. I agree with what Secretary Chertoff articulated at our full Committee DHS budget hearing, ``the worst thing would be this: to have a program for reliable cargo that was insufficiently robust so that people could sneak in and use it as a Trojan Horse. That would be the worst of all worlds.'' By reforming and strengthening C-TPAT, CSI, ATS, by expediting the, deployment of sophisticated radiation portal monitors and testing the ability to scan 100 percent of cargo before it enters the United States, the SAFE Port Act closes gaps in our homeland security and makes us safer. The conference report was agreed to. (The conference report is printed in the proceedings of the House in the Record of September 29, 2006).
NOMINATION OF FRANCISCO AUGUSTO BESOSA2006-09-27
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the Secure Fence Act of 2006 and the issue of securing our northern border. Without question, securing the border is our most vital need in dealing with illegal immigrants and as it stands, our borders lay vulnerable to not only an influx of illegal immigrants but also transportation of dangerous materials. The facts are clear--each year over 1 million unauthorized aliens are interdicted entering the country mostly on the southwest border. Testimony by the Border Patrol union chief places the estimate of illegal entrants not interdicted by Border Patrol to be two times those actually caught. Simply put, the Border Patrol is overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the traffic and it is time to take action. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to take all appropriate actions to achieve operational control over all U.S. international land and maritime borders within 18 months of its enactment. Additionally, the bill authorizes 700 miles of double-layered fencing at specified locations along the almost 2,000- mile southwest U.S. international border with Mexico. This bill also takes the right approach in terms of northern border security. The legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study on the feasibility of a state of-the-art infrastructure security system along the northern international land and maritime border of the United States. The study shall include the necessity of implementing such a system, the feasibility of implementing such a system and the economic impact implementing such a system will have along the northern border. In my home state of Minnesota, we share 547 miles of border with Canada and 458 of those miles are a water boundary. I want to make it clear to my constituents and our Canadian friends that this legislation should not be used to justify construction of a wall along the northern border but to take an inventory of the systems that are working and not working and ensure that we put in place the most effective approach. We are going to measure twice before building once. The United States and Canada share a long history of working together on issues of mutual concern. Both countries share a common border and common objectives: to ensure that the border is open for business, but closed to crime. The Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan and programs such as the Security and Prosperity Partnership and the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams are great examples of cooperative initiatives that have proven successful. I am fully confident this strong relationship and commitment to border security will continue as it is one of the cornerstones to securing our northern border.
HONORING RANDE YEAGER2006-09-27
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to commend Rande Yeager, a constituent of mine, on completing a year as president of the American Land Title Association, ALTA. He ably represented the land title industry at a time when the value and public policy purposes of title insurance and the maintenance of land records came under challenge. His leadership of ALTA over this past year was a natural extension of his corporate experience. As president of Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, one of the leading title underwriters in this country and my State of Minnesota, Rande has experience being both a leader and a spokesperson for a large company. As ALTA president, Rande made numerous trips to State conventions across the country to get to know his colleagues better, hear their concerns for their businesses and the industry, and came back ready to find out how ALTA could help. He also came to Washington to promote the importance of title insurance and land record maintenance. ALTA has been well served by Rande's leadership. I congratulate him on his year as president and best wishes on his future endeavors.
SECURE FENCE ACT OF 20062006-09-26
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Illinois for submitting this resolution both on the legacy of Paul Wellstone and, in particular, focusing on this issue of mental health parity. Paul Wellstone and I disagreed on a lot of issues. One of the great things about Paul Wellstone is that even if you disagreed with him, you admired his passion--his passion which was reflected when we had our debates. He was always energized. He was real. He was very real. One of the things he was very passionate about was mental health parity and doing the right thing for millions of Americans. His Senate family has been touched by the tragedy of mental illness--touched. Millions of Americans have been touched or impacted by the tragedy of mental illness. The reality is there is treatment available. We can deal with this. We can lift up lives to make people whole and productive. There is a path to do this. There is a path that my predecessor laid out with the help of Senator Domenici in the early 1990s. We made some headway, but we didn't go far enough. We know what the voids are. We know what the gaps are. We have a path to get there. We are close. The problem is ``close'' may be good in bocce ball, but it is not good in legislation. I have been here 4 years. It is one of my hopes that on one of the things that Senator Wellstone and I fully agreed on, which is the importance of providing true mental health parity, is that we can get it done. We are not there yet. We need to get it done. I hope that as we move forward and when we come back and finish this session--we are not going to get it done now, but I hope folks will reflect on what is the right thing. It is the right thing. With this resolution we are honoring the legacy of a great Senator, we honor the legacy of someone who had great passion, and we do the right thing for millions of Americans. Let us get mental health parity through. It is the right thing and I hope we can get it done. Again, I thank my colleague from Illinois for raising this issue. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT2006-09-14
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I share the deep concerns of my friend, high school classmate, colleague from New York, where I grew up, about the danger of a nuclear weapon, the danger of a weapon of mass destruction being smuggled into this country in 1 of 11 million containers. We have, no doubt, the same vision. We want America safe. That is what we have been doing here. That is what the work of the Senator from Maine and the Senator from Washington is about and what we have put forth in the underlying bill that will change. By the way, there were a lot of things in homeland security that I was frustrated with. We spent 3 years, the Permanent Committee on Investigations spent 3 years on this issue, studying it, holding hearings. I encourage my colleague from New York to go to Hong Kong to take a look. My colleague and the Presider Officer went to Hong Kong and took a look at the system that is operating on 2 lanes out of 40 to see what we could do to put in place a system that would scan each and every container that goes through. It is a wonderful system. What we need is action. That is what we did yesterday. We got action. We have in this bill a pilot project that will put in place, in mandates, in directives, not a mandate of what is going to happen in 2008 and 2010, not playing into the sloganeering of ``scan every container,'' but the reality of action today to immediately put in place a pilot project to see if we can make it work in a wider, more systematic way. I am taken aback when I hear my colleague talk about ``we do not need any pilot projects'' and ``we do not need any test study.'' We have a system in place in Hong Kong now that is 2 lanes out of 40. It is a wonderful system. What happens is--I call it kind of a moving CAT scan--trucks come in and they kind of go through this device, ISIS device, and it takes a scan of what is inside the truck. It has a radiation portal monitor, so you end up getting images. I have watched the images. Hong Kong is a CSI--Container Security Initiative--port, so I have worked with our folks there. But when a radiation alarm goes off in Hong Kong, our folks do not have the capacity to inspect it. There is no followup from us. The images that are received are not processed by the folks in Langley or somewhere else. They are not coordinated with what we do on national security. So you have in place a concept where we have to see whether it works. That is what we should be doing: action. That is what this is about. It was fascinating; I was reading an editorial in the New York Times and was somewhat taken aback. I am trying to understand the motivation for moving forward with this amendment. This is what I call a wave-the- magic-wand amendment, that we are going to tell people we are mandating something we have already got on the table in front of us, something to test whether it works. That is what we should be doing. I think, by the way, people in this country are frustrated with Washington when we promise things or sloganeer about something as important as this issue and somehow project the sense we are doing something when we are not doing anything, when there is already action in place--action, action--a pilot project and then a mandate that the Department, in 120 days, tells us: OK, what are the results. Show us how you have integrated this system which is now working in two lanes in Hong Kong--not integrated into anything in our operation--show us that it works, and then requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security, every 6 months, to come back to Congress and report on the status of 100 percent scanning, with specific criteria laid out. That is good government. That is good policy. In the end, I hope it is good politics. I worry that this is about politics. There was an editorial, I have to say, in the New York Times, I believe today, and I was somewhat taken aback. It criticized Secretary Chertoff. That is OK. The Times can do that. I have criticized him on a number of occasions. But then the editorial talks about this issue of 100 percent scanning and then raised this issue of the cost of scanning--it is a small surcharge--and then it goes on to say: When it comes to homeland security, the Bush administration has completely allowed corporate profits to trump safety--as if somehow, because the cost of this is $20 per container, that is why we are not moving forward mandating it today. I want to step back. The way I became aware of the Hong Kong project was because of the private sector that said: Senator, you have to see this. We are willing to pay it. The cost is not an issue. The private sector is willing to pay $20 a container to ensure security. God forbid there is a nuclear device that goes off, we shut down the entire import of goods into this country, and we devastate our economy. So this is not a money issue from the private side. This is maybe the old ex-mayor in me saying: This is kind of the practicality of making sure we have something that works. The Washington Post, in an editorial in June, said it very clearly: ``[I]nspect 100 percent of containers'' is a slogan, not a solution, and we hope lawmakers resist the temptation to use it in the election season to come. The election season is upon us. It is getting very close. This body, yesterday, moved forth with an amendment to put in place a pragmatic, realistic action-oriented way in which we can move to 100 percent screening. We put in place a pilot project to make sure what we are doing works and it makes sense. We will spend, by the way, billions on this, not in the cost of the cargo but in setting these scanning systems up in the, what, over 700 ports throughout the world. And 147 are major ports. We are going to be spending a lot of money on this, but the issue is not money, it is doing it right. Let us step away from the sloganeering. I am going to say this as to the idea of something being half-baked. If you put something in the oven and it is going to be really tasty when it is done, it is going to be really delicious, that is something fully baked. And you make sure it is baked in a way so when you eat it, you do not get sick. Half-baked is when you get something in the end that is the right thing--we believe, in the end, each and every container will be screened. Right now, we have in place the screening of high risk. It is in this bill. Right now, we have the Department saying, before our Homeland Security Committee, by the end of next year, each and every container will be screened for a radiologic or nuclear weapon--by next year. But it will be done in our country. The goal is to have it pushed out, to have that screening done before it gets here. We do not need a half- baked way, a sloganeering way, and to simply say we are going to mandate something in the future, without any path to get there. We have the path. We have done it right. I hope my colleagues reject the Schumer amendment and stick with what we did yesterday because it really makes sense. With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I reiterate the great respect I have for my colleague from New York. He is concerned about this area and he is passionate about safety. I want to make it clear that we are not counseling patience. We are not asking for delay. It is just the opposite. What we are doing and what we have done and what we did yesterday was action. What we are objecting to is an amendment that offers no real increase in security. We are objecting to an amendment that doesn't do anything, doesn't move the ball forward. It gives an opportunity to talk about 100 percent scanning, and it may end up in some commercial somewhere. I hope that is not what this is about. The amendment doesn't do anything. It doesn't push the ball forward. This is not about patience. I am not very patient when it comes to making sure we are doing everything possible to protect against the possibility of a nuclear weapon being smuggled into this country, and that is what this bill does. The amendment is to put in place a pilot project, move quickly; that is what it does. The amendment is to require 100 percent screening of all high-risk containers. That is what it does. We heard in committee the other day from the Secretary of Homeland Security, saying we can have 100 percent screening of all cargo containers for radiological devices by next year. We are not counseling patience. We are supporting action and objecting to an amendment that offers no increase in safety. It doesn't move the ball forward at all. I yield the floor.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. Imagine this scenario: Shortly after 9 a.m. on a beautiful autumn day, an improvised nuclear device explodes on the National Mall in Washington, DC. Within seconds, the U.S. Capitol and the White House are flattened and a plume of radiation spreads to the surrounding suburbs. Intelligence sources quickly determine that this weapon was smuggled through a United States port in a maritime container. Unfortunately, this horrific scenario is not just a plot for the television show ``24''--it is the paramount security challenge facing our Nation and should be our foremost concern. Many experts believe that a maritime container is the ideal platform to transport nuclear or radiological material or a nuclear device into the United States. As the 9/11 Commission put it so succinctly, ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.'' Since 90 percent of global trade moves in maritime containers, we can not allow these containers to be utilized to transport weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of such an event would be devastating to our way of life and our economy. For instance, the Congressional Budget Office at my request studied the economic consequences of an attack upon the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. CBO found our Nation's gross domestic product would decline by about $150 million per day for each day these two ports are closed, and that the annual cost of closing these ports would escalate to nearly $70 billion. While CBO did not analyze the cost to human life and property of such a terrorist attack, the economic impact of closing the ports could be comparable to both the attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. We cannot afford that type of devastation. Instead, we must secure our supply chain before we pay the high price of an attack and seek the appropriate balance between two often competing priorities: security and speed. Former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Bonner had the vision to address this grave threat and balance those two priorities after the September 11 attacks. This balancing act resulted in the creation of two prominent homeland security programs--the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. CSI effectively pushed our borders out by placing CBP offices in foreign ports to inspect containers before they reach our shores. C-TPAT exemplified a true public-private partnership, in which the private sector took a leading role in securing its supply chain. These programs alone are laudable--but due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge of securing the global supply chain--we must continue to improve upon these promising initiatives. With that in mind, as chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I have directed the subcommittee's 3-year effort to bolster America's port security and supply chain security. We have identified numerous weaknesses in our programs that secure the global supply chain. A brief overview of these problems illustrates the challenges confronting these efforts: In CSI, the subcommittee found that only a de minimus number of such high-risk containers are actually inspected. In fact, the vast majority of high-risk containers are simply not inspected overseas. To make matters worse, the U.S. Government has not established minimum standards for these inspections. The subcommittee initially found that an overwhelming proportion of C-TPAT companies enjoy the benefits before DHS conducts a thorough on- site inspection, called a validation. As of July 2006 this proportion has improved considerably to where 49 percent of the participating companies have been subjected to a validation. But this still leaves 51 percent of companies that have not been subjected to any legitimate, on-site review to ensure that their security practices pass muster. The subcommittee found that DHS uses a flawed system to identify high-risk shipping containers entering U.S. ports. According to CBP officials, this system is largely dependent on ``one of the least reliable or useful types of information for targeting purposes,'' including cargo manifest data and bills of lading. Moreover, the subcommittee found that this targeting system has never been tested or validated, and may not discern actual, realistic risks. Currently, only 70 percent of cargo containers entering U.S. ports are screened for nuclear or radiological materials. One part of the problem is that the deployment of radiation detection equipment is woefully behind schedule. As of August 29, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security has deployed only 43 percent of the necessary radiation monitors at priority seaports. These are just a handful of the significant problems the Subcommittee discovered. In short, America's supply chain security remains vulnerable to proverbial Trojan Horse--America's enemies could compromise the global supply chain to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction, WMD, or even terrorists, into this country. This legislation tackles these concerns--and many other weaknesses-- head-on. Here are some highlights of this important legislation: This bill addresses the problem of inadequate nuclear and radiological screening, by requiring the Secretary of DHS to develop a strategy for deployment of radiation detection capabilities and mandating that, by December 2007, all containers entering the U.S. through the busiest 22 seaports shall be examined for radiation. The bill will require DHS to develop, implement, and update a strategic plan improve the security of the international cargo supply chain. In particular the plan will identify and address gaps, provide improvements and goals, and establish protocols for the resumption of trade after a critical incident. Instead of the unreliable data that CBP currently demands to target high-risk containers, DHS would be required to identify and request essential information about containers moving through the international supply chain. Under this bill, DHS would be required promulgate a rule to establish minimum standards and to procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S. The bill provides ongressional authorization for the CSI program, empowering CBP to identify, examine or search maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded in a foreign port. DHS would establish standards for the use of screening and radiation detection equipment at CSI ports. Congress also authorizes C-TPAT, the voluntary program that strengthens international supply chain and border security and facilitates the movement of secure cargo. The bill establishes certain minimum security and other requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for C-TPAT. As you can see from this brief recap, this bill is wide-ranging and addresses many of the critical problems facing the security of our ports. It is therefore crucial that we pass this important legislation. Even if we pass this bill, however, our job is not yet done. We still need to look to the future and develop even more effective and advanced programs and technology. Last December, I traveled to Hong Kong to examine the world's largest port. In addition to meeting the impressive CSI team and observing the close relationship between Hong Kong Customs and CBP, I examined a promising screening concept piloted by the association that operates Hong Kong's container terminal. There, containers are screened with both x-ray and radiation detection equipment. Effectively screening containers with both an x-ray a radiation scan is the only definitive answer to the perplexing and most important question of ``what's in the box?'' However, in Fiscal Year 2005, only 0.38 percent of containers were screened with a nonintrusive imaging device and only 2.8 percent of containers were screened for radiation prior to entering the United States. DHS' efforts have improved somewhat from last year's paltry numbers, but we have more work to do. To date, DHS still uses a risk-based approach that targets only high- risk containers. While this approach is fundamentally sound, the system used to target high-risk containers has yet to be validated or proven to accurately identify high-risk containers. Moreover, the validity of the intelligence used to enhance this system's targeting ability is increasingly in question. Thus, we need to both enhance our targeting capability and use technology to enhance our ability to increase inspections--without impeding the flow of commerce. I believe the Hong Kong concept holds great promise to achieve this goal of enhancing inspections without impeding commerce. While the United States currently inspects approximately 5 percent of all maritime containers, the pilot project in the Port of Hong Kong demonstrates the potential to scan 100 percent of all shipping containers. Each container in the Hong Kong port flows through an integrated system featuring an imaging machine, a radiation scan, and a system to identify the container. Coupling these technologies together allows for the most complete scan of a container currently available. The Hong Kong concept or similar technology, which is described in detail in this report, holds great promise and could lead to a dramatic improvement in the efficacy of our supply chain security. These improvements would help ensure that the threat of Trojan horse infiltration by terrorists never becomes a reality. I am pleased to say that this legislation develops a pilot program in three foreign seaports, each with unique features and varying levels of trade volume to test integrated scanning systems using non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment. It requires full-scale pilot implementation within 1 year after enactment and an evaluation report would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days after full implementation of the pilot. If the pilot programs prove successful, then full scale implementation would expeditiously follow. The bottom line is this: we are safer now than we were yesterday, but we are not safe enough. The question then becomes: how do we get there? In the words of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky, ``A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be.'' In other words, we cannot safeguard a post-9/11 America by using pre-9/11 methods. If we think that the terrorists are not plotting their next move, we are mistaken. We must find where the gaps are in our Nation's homeland security and close them before an attack happens. That is the only way to guarantee our security. The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 closes gaps in our homeland security and makes us safer. In closing, I want to say that it has been an honor to work with such a distinguished and bipartisan group of Senators such as Senators Stevens, Collins, Grassley, Inouye, Baucus and Lieberman. This legislation is cogent and will be effective because of the knowledge and experience of this group of Senators. I am proud to be an original sponsor of this legislation. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a Washington Post editorial dated June 1, 2006, be printed in the Record.
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT2006-09-13
Mr. COLEMAN
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and ask for the immediate consideration of amendment No. 4982.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. COLEMAN. First, before I begin talking about my amendment, I wish to thank the Chair of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Collins, and her cosponsor for the work they have done on port security. The Senator from Washington has been a champion. Although she is not on our committee, she has spent as much time sitting in on these hearings as many committee members. It has been a magnificent display of bipartisanship and a magnificent display of the best in the U.S. Senate. Looking at the issues today, we have serious challenges, and I believe the bill before us does a magnificent job of addressing some of the greatest vulnerabilities our Nation faces. We have vulnerabilities, and our subcommittee did its own work in looking at some of these areas. For about 3 years, we have looked at these issues of trying to bolster America's port security and supply chain security. During the course of that, we identified numerous weaknesses. The subcommittee found at one point in time that only a de minimis number of high-risk containers were actually inspected. It was a very serious problem. The subcommittee found that an overwhelming proportion of C-TPAT companies that Chairman Collins talked about enjoy the benefits without having been inspected, without having the certifications you need to make sure that if you are going to give people the benefit of operating this program, they do it the right way. We found a flawed system that Homeland Security uses in identifying high-risk containers entering the United States. We raised concerns about the percentage of cargo containers entering U.S. ports that are actually screened with radiological devices. So these are just a handful of the significant problems we discovered. The bottom line is that the underlying legislation tackles these concerns and many other weaknesses head-on--head-on. So as someone who has spent 3 years looking at this issue, I look at the underlying bill and say the concerns that the subcommittee raised in terms of inadequate nuclear and radiological screening will be taken care of in a set period of time. There are deadlines in here. When Secretary Chertoff testified before our committee this week, he indicated that by the end of next year, 2007, we will have 100 percent screening of radiological material in this country. So the bill addresses it. The actions of the committee have moved the agency forward, and I think that is a good thing, although there is more to be done. One of the things I have been a champion of is the idea of screening and scanning all containers coming to our country. That is a goal. There are 11 million--11 million--that enter into our country, and the goal is it would be ideal to be able to scan every one. It is important, by the way, that we screen every one. One of the things we worry about here as we get closer to election season is that some language is generating some fears on the part of the American public about our vulnerability. People in this country should know that every container is screened. There is a system in place. Our chairman did a tremendous job of describing the layered security that is employed. There are layers of security that highlight high risks and allow us then to do a targeted job of dealing with the issue of security. We never have a 100-percent guarantee. We live in a world where there are few 100-percent guarantees. But we have a system that allows us to have this layered security, improved substantially by this bill, that allows the flow of commerce to go through. If my colleagues recall, Osama bin Laden said he wanted to destroy us economically. He wanted to cripple this country. He understood that if you destroy the economy, you destroy the country. So as we deal with this issue of supply chain security, we have to do everything we can to make sure we are secure. We also have to make sure we don't put things in place that achieve the goal of the terrorists, which is to destroy the flow of commerce and destroy the economy. That is the balance, and it is difficult. We are always erring on the side of safety. One of the things we saw during the course of our investigation--I had a chance to go to Hong Kong as well as the Port of Los Angeles and other ports throughout this country. But we saw in Hong Kong a system where they actually scanned every container. It was a very good system, by the way, in terms of getting a picture--I would call it kind of a moving CAT scan. The Senator from Maine talked about the systems we have here--a very slow process. Literally, the container is in one place and the system goes over it. In Hong Kong, they have a system that scans on kind of--I would call it a moving CAT scan. The trucks come through, they never stop, they are rolling right through, and on each and every one of them there is a picture taken and you get a scan, and then there is a radiological detection device that is over that and it goes through and it is magnificent. I think some of my colleagues saw that and said: We have to have that right here, right now. That sounds wonderful. It is important to note that, in fact, there are 40 lanes of traffic in Hong Kong, and only 2, only 2 have this system. So what we have in the underlying bill is an amendment that says we are going to set up a pilot project, and in that pilot project what we are going to do is we are going to test this system. By the way, it is also important to note that of all the images we get, they are not processed. We have a library of images where, God forbid there was an attack, we could go back and pinpoint where it came from and not shut down every port. But there is no use of those images today. They are not being fed into Langley, they are not being fed into our intelligence system, they are not being fed into anything. So in the end, when the Senator from Maine talks about an integrated system, integration means not just integration of a standing image with a radiological detection device but integration of the information that is being gathered, which is substantial, to be used then in terms of our own analysis of what is in that cargo--does it represent high-risk, et cetera. There is a great opportunity here, a great opportunity. But we are only at a point now where we have in one place in the world--we have two lanes of traffic that are using a system, and we now have the opportunity in this bill to get a pilot project, and I think it is magnificent. But there are also weaknesses we have which we then can address with this amendment, amendment No. 4982. What it says is--we kind of walked through and looked at what was in the bill, and we realized that, in operation, 100 percent of high-risk containers weren't being screened. This amendment says they will be. So every citizen out there should know that 100 percent of those containers which are identified as high risk will be screened, and that is important. Then we go to the next step, and we do it in a responsible way. I have always believed that good policy is good politics. We do this in a good-policy way. We say that the Secretary shall ensure that 100 percent of the containers that have been identified as high risk are scanned before such containers leave a seaport facility. And then we say: The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and foreign partners, shall fully deploy integrated scanning systems to scan all containers entering the United States before such containers arrive in the United States as soon as the Secretary determines that-- and this is the key--the integrated scanning system has a sufficiently low false alarm rate, is capable of being deployed and operated in ports overseas, meets certain requirements set forth in the statute-- very basic requirements--does not significantly impact trade capacity and flow of cargo at foreign and U.S. ports. So we have a system that says: OK, Mr. Secretary, this is what you have to do, because we want this system in place, but we want it to be done in a way that doesn't cripple the supply chain and that practically can be done. It is nice to be able to say we want 100 percent. I think we have about 704 operational seaports in 147 countries today, and we have a scanning system that is used in 2 lanes and one that is not even integrated into our entire system. We are not there yet. We want to get there. This amendment puts us on a course to get there. Then, to make sure we are not simply leaving it to the discretion of the Secretary to say when he decides it should be done, we tell him to come back to us, to come back to our colleagues in Congress, and we want to know where you are. So it says that not later than 6 months-- and the underlying pilot project requires the Secretary to come back-- it is a 1-year pilot project--come back within 120 days with a report and tell us how the pilot project worked. And then this amendment says that not later than 6 months after the submission of this report and every 6 months thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the status of full- scale deployment under subsection B and the cost of deploying the system at each foreign port. So what we have in place here is what I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle would say is the right way to go. We set in place a pilot project. We ask that the pilot project be evaluated. The Secretary is required to give us a report on how that pilot project is working, and then we tell the Secretary: Every 6 months, come back, because we want to know how close we are to getting to 100 percent scanning, how close we are and what else has to be done. It gives us the opportunity in a responsible way--a responsible way--to come back to see if we can put in place a system where we scan 100 percent. But scanning 100 percent on arbitrary deadlines, scanning 100 percent on impossible deadlines doesn't make any sense, and I am glad we are not at that point right now. We are at the point right now where we have in place the ability to significantly improve the level of safety and security in those 11 million cargo containers which are entering the United States. We have an underlying bill that does a magnificent job of addressing weaknesses that have been identified, and now we will take care of them. We have an amendment in place that builds on a pilot project, and building on that pilot project puts certain obligations on the Department of Homeland Security to come back to us in Congress and tell us how you are doing, and if you are not moving quick enough, we will be on your case. We will be on your case. We know what the goal is, and we share a common vision, and we have now a responsible way of doing it. That will allow the free flow of commerce, will allow jobs to grow, giving people economic security at the same time that we protect national security. Mr. President, I yield the floor.