Bob Casey

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, when I came to the Senate in 2007 as a Senator-elect, one of the first things I did was to go see Senator Specter. He asked me at the time to go to lunch, and from the moment that I arrived in the Senate, he made it very clear to me, not only did the people of Pennsylvania expect, but he expected as well that we work together. From the beginning of his service here in the United States Senate, way back when he was elected in 1980, all the way up to the present moment, he has been a Senator who has focused on building bipartisan relationships and, of course, focusing on Pennsylvania priorities. I have been honored to have worked with him on so many Pennsylvania priorities, whether it was veterans or workers, whether it was dairy farmers or the economy of Pennsylvania, or whether it was our soldiers, or our children, or our families. He has been a champion for our state, and he has shown younger Senators the way to work together in the interest of our state and our country. That bipartisanship wasn't just a sentiment. He is a legislator who sought compromise that led to results in a Senate often divided by partisanship. His record is long, so I will only highlight a few areas. He helped to lead the effort to dramatically increase funding for the National Institutes of Health, that great generator of discoveries that cure diseases and create jobs and hope for people often without hope because of a disease or a malady of one kind or another. His experience working on a farm as a boy, Kansas not in Pennsylvania, helped him to understand and work on problems affecting Pennsylvania agriculture and farm families. He stood up for Pennsylvania industry and workers against subsidized or dumped products that hurt Pennsylvania's steel industry. He fought to bring Federal funding back to Pennsylvania to create jobs, build infrastructure and invest in local communities. No Senator in the history of the Commonwealth has served longer than Senator Specter. In fact, the Senator that he outdistanced in a sense, in terms of service, was only elected by the people twice after several terms elected by the state legislature. Senator Specter was elected by the people of Pennsylvania five times, but it is the life in those Senate years, the contribution to our Commonwealth and our country in those 30 years that really matter. His impact will be felt for generations, not just decades, but for generations. There was a history book of our State that came out in the year 2002. It was a series of stories, essays and chapters on the history of Pennsylvania, and it is a fascinating review of the State's history. The foreword of that publication, that book, was written by Brent D. Glass, at the time the executive director of the Pennsylvania Historical Museum Commission. He wrote this in March 2002. It is a long foreword which I won't read, but he wrote in the early part of this foreword the following, ``One way to understand the meaning of Pennsylvania's past is to examine certain places around the state that are recognized for their significance to the entire nation.'' Then he lists and describes in detail significant places in Pennsylvania that have a connection to our history, whether it's the Liberty Bell or the battlefield at Gettysburg, whether it's the farms in our Amish communities or whether it's some other place of historic significance. I have no doubt whatsoever that if the same history were recounted about the people of Pennsylvania, the people who moved Pennsylvania forward, the people who in addition to moving our State forward had an impact on the Nation; if we had to make a list of Pennsylvanians who made such contributions; whether it would be William Penn, Benjamin Franklin, you can fill in the blanks from there, I have no doubt that that list would include Senator Arlen Specter, a son of Kansas who made Pennsylvania his home, a son of Kansas who fought every day for the people of Pennsylvania. So it is the work and the achievements and the passion and the results in those years in the Senate that will put him on a very short list of those who contributed so much to our Commonwealth that we love and to our country that we cherish. So for all that and for so many other reasons, I, as a resident of Pennsylvania and a citizen of the United States, but as a Senator, want to express my gratitude to Senator Arlen Specter for his 30 years of service, but especially for what those 30 years meant to the people of Pennsylvania. Thank you, Senator Specter.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, as we continue to work through the amendments, I rise to outline what is at stake in the debate and describe what the world would be like without the New START treaty accord. Every Senator here took an oath to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. We have an obligation to support a strong national defense. First, a world without New START is one in which more nuclear missiles are pointed at Americans. This treaty reduces that number. A world without a New START accord is one in which we have no nuclear inspectors on the ground in Russia. These inspectors have more than a decade of experience inspecting Russian nuclear sites. They were involved in the negotiation process to ensure that there are strong inspection provisions in the treaty. But without New START, these inspectors would not be able to return to work. Furthermore, without onsite inspections, our intelligence services will still be required to collect information on Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure. On December 20 of this year, ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote to the Senate: An extended delay in ratification may eventually force an inordinate and unwise shift in scarce resources from other high priority requirements to maintain adequate awareness of Russian nuclear forces. In a world without New START, our intelligence capabilities will be stretched, which could give the enemies of our troops on the ground an advantage. We cannot allow that to happen. These are just some of the direct effects. What about some of the indirect effects of a world without New START? The cascade effect on U.S. national security interests without New START is substantial. A world without New START is one in which the Russians are less likely to provide land and air access to supply U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network is a crucial supply route for our troops in Afghanistan. This means that just as we have reached full troop strength in Afghanistan, supply lines would become increasingly strained. Today, supply routes through Pakistan are increasingly dangerous. Just the other day, two fuel tankers meant to supply our troops were attacked and the drivers were killed in Pakistan. This is one of the reasons the leadership of our uniformed military want New START ratified. A world without New START is one in which there is more Russian fissile material in existence, material which could be stolen for use in a terrorist attack. There are many reasons top U.S. counterterrorism officials in the International Atomic Energy Agency want New START ratified. A world without New START is one in which Russia's Government is perhaps less likely to help stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. A world without New START is one in which Iran perhaps is given access to Russian S-300 missiles, a weapon capable of reaching the State of Israel. This is one reason the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, and other prominent pro-Israel groups want New START ratified. In a world without New START, there is no way the Russians will agree to decrease their tactical nuclear weapons. Our friends in Eastern Europe and those across the continent will be less secure in the knowledge that threats to their security are not diminishing but could, in fact, be growing. That is the reason 25 European Foreign Ministers want this treaty ratified. A world without New START is one in which the 1970 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT, the cornerstone of preventing nuclear weapons states, is severely threatened. What does this mean in practical terms? The New START accord is a clear demonstration that the United States is upholding our obligations under the NPT, which in turn can help secure support from other countries for a strong arms control regime and assistance on other nonproliferation issues. Many countries see nuclear terrorism as a problem for the United States and for the West. In a world without New START, these countries would seriously question our commitment to the NPT. These countries would question that right away. Without New START, government officials around the world will question the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation itself. They will ask: If the United States is not seriously committed to arms control and nonproliferation, why should we be? A world without New START contains many hard realities for the United States. Ratification of this treaty is not a political victory for one party or another; it is a national security victory for our great Nation, for our nuclear security--from nuclear security, to the security of our troops in Afghanistan, to the security of our ally Israel. A world without New START is one in which the enemies of America will breathe a little easier. Strained U.S. supply lines make life easier for the Taliban. Fewer available intelligence capabilities would make life easier for al-Qaida terrorists in Pakistan tribal areas. A strained U.S.-Russian relationship makes life easier for the government of the regime in Iran. A world without New START makes life easier for terrorists trafficking in fissile material to travel across borders. A world without New START means no negotiations with the Russians to decrease their tactical nuclear weapons. The world I just described isn't a world we have to settle for. A world without New START is not a world we have to accept. We must give the American people some peace of mind as to our national security. That is a world with a New START treaty. We must ratify this treaty and diminish the number of nuclear weapons pointed at the United States today. We must deploy nuclear inspectors to Russia, thus returning stability and transparency to our nuclear relationship, and take the burden off of our intelligence agencies. A world with New START means a more constructive relationship with Russia, which is good for our troops in Afghanistan and bad for the regime in Iran. A world with New START means the beginning of a conversation with the Russians on tactical nuclear weapons. A world with New START is one in which there is less fissile material for terrorists to steal or buy on the black market. A world with New START means increased cooperation with countries combating nuclear terrorism. The most serious threat to U.S. national security is the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. In 1961, at the United Nations, President John F. Kennedy said: Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. Some have observed that in this post-9/11 era of increased terrorism, we may be more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than we were during the Cold War. Today, the sword of Damocles still hangs by the slenderest of threads, but we have the ability to prevent this threat by minimizing access terrorists would have to nuclear material. President Obama's nuclear security summit earlier this year was a historic event. It helped create a foundation upon which other countries will take up the challenge of nuclear security and cooperate with the United States to accomplish the President's goal of securing all fissile material in 4 years. We cannot do this alone. In order to confront this most serious threat to U.S. national security, we need to build stronger ties with our allies around the world, and part of building that trust is rebuilding our own credibility on nonproliferation issues. This New START agreement is a very positive step in that direction. It is an essential predicate for fulfilling our commitments under the nonproliferation treaty--a key marker for many potential allies on a range of nuclear security issues. Upon ratification of New START, we must make progress on securing fissile material around the world. This is a strong resolution of ratification. It passed out of the Foreign Relations Committee by a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. It includes strong language on missile defense, verification, and tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, the American people are watching. According to a November 2010 CNN poll, 73 percent of Americans support ratification of this treaty. They understand the implications of a world without the New START agreement. In a hurricane of partisan rancor and political battles, the national security consensus is as strong as an oak tree in support of the New START agreement--all six living former Secretaries of State, five former Secretaries of Defense, three former National Security Advisers, seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, our intelligence services, the President, and three former Presidents. The American people have a right to expect ratification of New START. They want New START and will hold us accountable if we do not ratify it. Let's vote for New START's resolution of ratification and cast a strong bipartisan vote in favor of our national security. I close with commendations for both our chairman, Senator Kerry, and Ranking Member Lugar and so many others who have worked so hard to make sure we can ratify this treaty. I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I thank Senator Brown, as well as Senators McCain and Kyl, for entering into this agreement. It extends this for a short period of time. It is important as it relates to manufacturing jobs in a State such as ours, where we have lost over 200,000 in less than a decade. I am sure that number corresponds to other States' losses. We are grateful for this extension. We have more work to do.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I wish to offer some remarks in furtherance of what Senator Specter told us about this great institution. I wanted to spend a moment talking about his service to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. When I came to the Senate in 2007 as a Senator-elect, one of the first things I did was go to see Senator Specter. He asked me at that time to go to lunch. From the moment I arrived in the Senate, he made it very clear to me that not only did the people of Pennsylvania expect, but he expected as well, that we work together. From the beginning of his service in the Senate, way back when he was elected in 1980 all the way up to the present moment, he has been a Senator who was focused on building bipartisan relationships and, of course, focusing on Pennsylvania priorities. I am honored to have worked with him on so many priorities, whether it was veterans or workers, whether it was dairy farmers or the economy of Pennsylvania or whether it was our soldiers or our children or our families. We have worked on so many priorities. He has been a champion for our State and he has shown younger Senators the way to work together in the interests of our State and our country. That bipartisanship wasn't just a sentiment; it was bipartisanship that led to results. I wish to point to one example of many I could list: the funding for the National Institutes of Health, that great bulwark and generator of discoveries that cures diseases and creates jobs and hope for people often without hope because of a disease or a malady of one kind or another. That bipartisanship Senator Specter demonstrated every day in the Senate has achieved results for Pennsylvania, for sure, in terms of jobs and opportunity and hope but also results for the Nation as well. I know we are short on time, but I wanted to make one note about the history of his service. No Senator in the history of the Commonwealth-- and we have had 55 or so Senators, depending on how you count those who have been elected and served, but of those 55, no Senator has served longer than Senator Specter. I recall the line--I think it is attributed to Abraham Lincoln, but it is a great line about what years mean and what service means, and I will apply the analogy to Senate service. The line goes something like this: It is not the years in a life, it is the life in those years. I am paraphrasing that. The same could be said of the life of a Senator. It is not just that he served 30 years. That alone is a singular, unprecedented achievement. In fact, the Senator he outdistanced in a sense in terms of years of service was only elected by the people twice. Senator Specter was elected by the people of Pennsylvania five times. But it is the life in those Senate years, the work in those Senate years, the contribution to our Commonwealth and our country in those Senate years that matters and has meaning. His impact will be felt for generations--not just decades but for generations. Let me close with this. There is a history book of our State that came out in the year 2002, and it has a series of stories and essays and chapters on the history of Pennsylvania. It is a fascinating review of the State's history. The foreword to that publication was written by Brent E. Glass, at the time the executive director of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. He wrote this in March of 2002. It is a long foreword which I won't read, but he said in the early part of this foreword the following: One way to understand the meaning of Pennsylvania's past is to examine certain places around the State that are recognized for their significance to the entire Nation. Then he lists and describes in detail significant places in Pennsylvania that have a connection to our history, whether it is the Liberty Bell or the battlefield of Gettysburg; whether it is the farms in our Amish communities or whether it is some other place of historic significance. I have no doubt whatsoever that if the same history were recounted about the people who had an impact on our Commonwealth--the people who moved Pennsylvania forward; the people who in addition to moving our State forward had an impact on the Nation--if we make a list of Pennsylvanians who made such contributions, whether it would be William Penn or Benjamin Franklin--and you can fill in the blanks from there--I have no doubt that list would include Senator Arlen Specter. He is a son of Kansas who made Pennsylvania his home. He is a son of Kansas who fought every day for the people of Pennsylvania. So it is the work and the achievements and the passion and the results in those years in the Senate that will put him on the very short list of those who contributed so much to our Commonwealth that we love and to our country that we cherish. For all of that and for so many other reasons, as a citizen of Pennsylvania, a resident of Pennsylvania, a citizen of the United States but as a Senator--I want to express my gratitude to Senator Arlen Specter for his 30 years of service, but especially for what those 30 years meant to the people, sometimes people without a voice, sometimes people without power. Thank you, Senator Specter. I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on December 21, 2010 at 2:30 p.m.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Thank you. I wish to speak about missile defense and I may be able to do it within that time or less. First of all, I wish to commend the work by this administration for the letter that was sent recently that reiterated once again the commitment of the United States. I would argue that is an unwavering commitment to missile defense, consistent with the goal of having a nuclear arsenal and having defense for this country--but especially as it relates to the nuclear arsenal--that is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. This New START treaty does not place any constraints on our ability to defend ourselves. Over the past few days, this has been made clear by Chairman Kerry on the floor, making these strong arguments, as well as those made repeatedly by our uniformed military leadership. Let me give some flavor of that by reading the following. This is a quotation from LTG Patrick O'Reilly who thinks the New START treaty could actually provide more flexibility in implementing our missile defense plans. He said: The New START treaty reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program in several areas. For example, MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable under the previous START treaty, because it employed the first range of the now-retired Trident 1 SLBM. Under New START, this missile is not accountable, thus we will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures and operationally realistic intercept geometries. That is a very technical summation by LTG Patrick O'Reilly. He is the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. He is not just making some casual observation in a think tank or even as a Member of Congress. We listen to a lot of voices here and many of them are respected voices. But I think when we are listening to the Missile Defense Agency Director, who is a lieutenant general, and he talks about this New START treaty providing more flexibility as it relates to missile defense, I think we should listen very carefully. I know Republicans here in Washington have over many days now directly or indirectly tried to assert that this administration is not committed to missile defense. They are wrong. I think the record is very clear. The President made clear that this administration is inalterably committed--my words--to a missile defense that is effective. I would argue as well to a missile defense that ensures we have a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear arsenal. It is also a missile defense that is capable of growing and adapting to threats posed by countries such as Iran. I have heard a lot of folks here on both sides of the aisle stand up and make statements about the threat caused by Iran's nuclear program. We should listen to voices that are concerned about that in the context of making sure that this ratification is consistent with that, which it is. It is consistent with our efforts to ensure that Iran does not have that capability. So what are these capabilities? Well, here is a quick summation. We currently have 30 ground based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California defending the homeland. Defense Under Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright have asserted that we will continue to improve and further augment these existing ground-based interceptor systems, noting that these ``U.S. based defenses will be made more effective by the forward basing of a TPY-2 radar--which we plan by 2011.'' In Europe, the United States has worked to defend our allies in NATO. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is a network of increasingly capable sensors and standard missile SM-3 interceptors that will provide a capacity to address near term threats, while also developing new technologies to combat future threats. The first stage, to be completed in 2011, will deploy Aegis ships with SM-3 interceptors in Northern and Southern Europe to protect our troops and Allies from short-range medium regional ballistic missile threats. The second phase, estimated to be operational by 2015, it will field upgraded sea- and land-based SM-3s in Southern and Central Europe to expand protection of the continent. The third phase will introduce a more capable version of the SM-3 that is currently under development, which will provide full protection for our allies in Europe from short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles by 2018. The final phase, planned for 2020, it will field an even further improved SM-3 missile with anti-ICBM capabilities to augment current defense of the U.S. homeland from Iranian long-range missile threats. So when you look at it from each of these three points of view-- meaning the three phases--we are going to have in place a system that will defend our homeland and will also help our European allies. Let me conclude with one quotation. I mentioned Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This is what he said about the so-called phased adaptive approach: The Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders and I also fully concur with the Phased Adaptive Approach as outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. As with the Nuclear Posture Review, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders were deeply involved throughout the review process. So whether it is the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, or other commentators, we are going to make sure that in the aftermath of the ratification of this treaty and consistent with and as part of and because of the ratification of this treaty, our missile defense will be as strong as it can be. And we are going to make sure that, without a doubt, we are going to protect the American people and take every step necessary to make sure our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two or three topics in this debate on the START treaty, but first and foremost, one that speaks directly to the amendment that is pending. That is the question of verification--the ability for the United States to verify by way of inspection and other means what the Russian Federation has in terms of its nuclear weapons. First of all, I would say as a foundational principle in this debate, nothing in this treaty will in any way compromise the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. That is critical to make that point, and I think the American people understand that. But as the American people are listening to this debate about verification, I think it is important to outline the distinctions between the amendment and I think what is, in fact, the case in the treaty. The treaty itself allows each party up to 18 short-notice, on-site inspections, and that is each year, with up to 10 so-called type one inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear- powered ballistic missiles, submarines, and finally nuclear-capable heavy bombers. So that is the type one inspections, up to 18 of those, which are short-notice inspections. Secondly, under the type two inspections, these are conducted in places such as storage sites, test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination facilities. Some have asked whether we lose any valuable elements of the original START agreement's inspection regime. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller replied to that question, a similar question I posed during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the verification of the New START treaty. It was a hearing I chaired. He said that under New START, we will conduct, as I said a moment ago, 18 inspections per year for 35 sites; so 18 inspections, 35 Russian sites. Under START I, there were 28 inspections for 70 Russian facilities. We are going from a verification regime where there are 28 inspections for 70 sites to one that goes to 18 inspections for 35 sites. The ratio is actually better under this treaty in terms of the numbers of inspections and sites. Mr. Miller, Under Secretary of Defense Miller, said that the ratio of inspections to facilities ``is improved under the New START treaty relative to the original START treaty.'' That is Under Secretary of State Miller. That is not my words but his. ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated this point on March 26 of 2010 when he said that the New START ``features a much more effective transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications.'' In addition, this does not take into account that some of the inspections under the New START treaty allow us to do two inspections at once, unlike the first START treaty. I would also say the inspection regime we have in place under this treaty has also been changed to reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with the Russian Federation and more than a decade of our experience in conducting inspections. The New START inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than that which was conducted under the original START treaty. We conduct fewer overall inspections under this new treaty because there are, in fact, fewer sites in Russia to inspect, and we have gotten better at inspecting in the years since this has transpired. I would also say we are standing here today on December 20 of 2010, 380 days without inspectors on the ground in Russia. That is one of the reasons why I say ratification of this New START treaty makes us safer than not ratifying this treaty; in fact, makes us less safer. One of the reasons for that--not the only reason, but one of the reasons--is that 380 days have passed without inspectors on the ground. This is, in a word, unacceptable to our national security. I think the American people believe that as well. We need to vote on this treaty. While I and many of our colleagues who have worked on this believe there is a sense of urgency, we also believe the views of the other side of the aisle have been engaged in a serious debate. We have had day after day now of debate on the floor. Of course, all of the debate here now and last week--almost a full week now--all of that was preceded by months and months of work on the Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and other parts of the Senate. This is not new. The President made an agreement back in the spring of this year. We passed this treaty out of our committee back in the fall. We have had a lot of work. More than 900 questions have been asked of the administration and more than 900 questions have been answered by the administration; something like 20 separate hearings among several committees. We have had a lot of time and a lot of work put into this. The pace of this, in my judgment, has not been too fast, but it has been done with a sense of urgency to finally--after all of these months of work, all of these months of debate, all of these months of hearings, we are at a point now where we can ratify this treaty. I think in the end there is going to be bipartisan and broad support for ratification and we look forward to that vote. My decision to support the New START treaty came after informed study of this issue as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and it is based, in large part, on relying upon and asking questions of folks such as Admiral Mullen, to name one--someone who has spent years in the service of this country, concerned about and doing something about the defense and the security of this country. So often we hear in this Chamber we should respect the opinions of commanders on the ground, and we should. We have heard that in the context of the war in Iraq, and we continue to hear it in the context of the war in Afghanistan. We should respect and take into consideration the determinations and judgments made by commanders on the ground, those who have direct experience with military questions and, in this case, have direct experience with the defense of our country. I think when it comes to the New START treaty, we should apply the same rule as well when it comes to Admiral Mullen or any other military leader who has an opinion about this treaty. The commanders on the ground as it relates to this treaty have spoken and they have done so without equivocation and, I would argue, unanimously. On this vital treaty and on this national security issue, they have spoken with one voice: We need to take action to secure our country and we need to take action to defend our country. We need to make sure we are taking actions that will result in a nuclear arsenal that will be safe, secure, effective, and reliable, and one of the steps to get there is to make sure we ratify this treaty. Let me move to one other topic. I know we have colleagues here who wish to speak. Let me ask how much time I have remaining.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise for a few moments to comment on the amendment our colleague from Florida spoke about a few moments ago. Tactical nuclear weapons and how that is addressed was the subject of a long debate yesterday. I wish to reiterate some of those arguments because we had this debate yesterday. It is an important debate. First of all, if we listen to a couple of folks who have not only experience but have a real interest in our urgent priority of addressing tactical nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that the best way to address that issue is, in fact, to ratify this treaty. By way of example, if you want to highlight a country that has much at stake when the question is raised about Russian tactical nuclear weapons, you can point to few if any countries that have more at stake than Poland. The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sikorski, said: Without a [New START] treaty in place, holes will soon appear in the nuclear umbrella that the United States provides to Poland and other allies under article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the collective security guarantee for NATO members. Moreover, New START is a necessary stepping stone to future negotiations with Russia about reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for the successful revival of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. That is not a commentator in Washington; that is the Foreign Minister of Poland, whose country has a lot at stake in this debate. Also, we have had a lot of discussions about the treaty and what is in the treaty or what would come about as a result of the treaty. It is not as if these arguments just landed here when the bill landed on the floor. We had months and months of hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Our ranking member, Senator Lugar, was not just there for those hearings but played a leading role in helping us reach the point where we are now. We have a treaty on the floor because of his good work over many months and, I would argue in his case, many years on this issue. The same is true with the Presiding Officer sitting in on those hearings and asking questions of the relevant parties, many of them military leaders. I note for the record--and I will close with this--that the vote by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a resolution of advice and consent to ratification. Subsection 11 on tactical nuclear weapons says: The Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. It is right in the resolution, and I argue that addresses squarely this amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, today I congratulate the Pennsylvania State University's women's volleyball team on their fourth consecutive NCAA championship. With its December 18, 2010, sweep of the University of California, the Nittany Lions became the only team in division I women's volleyball history to win four consecutive national titles. Prior to this streak, no NCAA women's volleyball team had ever won consecutive national championships. The team was led by Head Coach Russ Rose. Coach Rose has coached the Nittany Lions for the last 32 years. He coached Penn State to an NCAA championship in 1999, and together with the recent four consecutive championships, his five NCAA titles are more than any other coach in division I volleyball history. Coach Rose was aided by assistant coaches Dennis Hohenshelt and Kaleena Davidson, as well as director of Volleyball Operations Adam Hughes. The team members have also distinguished themselves individually. Freshman Deja McClendon was named by the American Volleyball Coaches Association as the national freshman of the year. Her performance during the championship tournament led to her being named the Most Outstanding Player of the final four. Senior Blair Brown became the sixth straight Nittany Lion to be named the Big Ten Player of the Year. She was also recently named as a finalist for the 2010-11 Honda Sports Award. The award is given to the top female collegiate athlete in the sport. Brown, along with fellow seniors Arielle Wilson and Alyssa D'Errico were members of each of the four national championship teams, and have won 24 consecutive tournaments together. Members of the 2010 championship team include: Ariel Scott, Katie Kabbes, Fatima Balza, Jessica Ullrich, Kristin Carpenter, Maddie Martin, Arielle Wilson, Erica Denney, Blair Brown, Darcy Dorton, Alyssa D'Errico, Megan Shifflett, Cathy Quilico, Maggie Harding, Katie Slay, Deja McClendon, Krosby Pabst, Mikinzie Moydell, and Ali Longo. The hard work and dedication of these young women is exemplary. I congratulate them, their coaches, and the students, faculty, staff and alumni of the Pennsylvania State University on a record-setting season.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the vote that will occur in a little more than an hour on the don't ask, don't tell policy. I have some basic thoughts about it, coming from a State where we have contributed probably as many or more soldiers to almost every major conflict we have had over the last 100 years. We are a State that has over 1 million veterans. We have lost soldiers most recently in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, our killed-in-action number was just below 200. At last count, it was about 197. In Afghanistan, it is now up to 61, 62 who have been killed in action. People in Pennsylvania know what war is about, what sacrifice is about, because so many families have contributed to that service and that sacrifice. When it comes to this change in policy we are advocating, I wish to focus on two basic considerations. One is basic integrity and the other is valor. We have had a number of statements made by senior military leaders, part of this administration and others, who have called for repeal of the policy. Secretary Gates, Secretary of Defense for the Obama administration and for a good while under the administration of President Bush, said: I fully support the President's decision. The question before us is not whether the military prepares to make this change but how we best prepare for it. So said Secretary Gates. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in pertinent part: It is my personal belief that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would be the right thing to do. No matter how I look at this issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens. For me personally, it comes down to integrity. His statement goes on from there. Former Secretary of State Powell fully supports the change. I could go on from there, and I know folks have cited military leaders in the debate. I keep coming back to this question. Secretary Mullen talked about integrity and a policy that forces young men and women to lie. Former National Security Adviser Jim Jones said, quoting in pertinent part, that the don't ask, don't tell policy: . . . has to evolve with the social norms. I think times have changed. The young men and women who wish to serve their country should not have to lie in order to do that. I wish to focus on that part of it. How can a policy long endure in this country, especially as it relates to the military, that asks people to lie? Every day they to have get up and prepare themselves for service and sometimes literally for battle, a life and death battle. Every day this policy says: But you have to lie about it. You have to keep it a secret. You can't let anyone know. You have to lie. How can a policy endure in this country that is based upon lying and not telling the truth? That is at the core of our Republic, whether you talk about the rule of law or no man or woman is above the law. All those statements, all that philosophy is undergirded by basic integrity, that we all try to live by the same rules. If we are not telling the truth and we are forcing folks who are willing to serve their country to put themselves in harm's way, which doesn't even begin to describe the sacrifice, some of these soldiers have not only served but been gravely, grievously wounded and some, of course, have been killed in action in the current conflicts and many before that, it is a basic question about integrity. Are we going to continue to support a policy that calls upon people to lie? I don't think the American people support that. Secondly, the basic and related question of valor. We have public officials across the country, Members of Congress, public officials in our States who stand on Veterans Day and all kinds of days when we commemorate and pay tribute to those who have sacrificed, those who gave, as Lincoln said, the last full measure of devotion to their country. There are a lot of speeches given and commendations accorded to people who have served the country. But a lot of that will ring hollow if we are saying there is one group of soldiers whom we may not want to have in the military, and if we want them in, then they are going to have to lie about it. These are young men and women who are the definition, the embodiment of service and valor and courage. We can't just get up as a politician and give a speech about patriotism and then be willing to undermine our argument and undermine our military by saying we have to perpetuate a policy that doesn't work and is in conflict with who we are. I want to read a quotation from someone who has served in the Congress for the last 4 years but someone who has also served our country, someone I know, and he is a friend of mine--I put that on the record--but someone we are very proud of and the work he has done in both forms of service: as a Member of Congress and serving in our military, and that is, Congressman Patrick Murphy from Bucks County, PA. For some who do not know their geography, that is on the east side of our State. He has been here in the Congress for 4 years. He will be leaving this month. But he has been a champion of repealing this policy, and he speaks with an integrity and a commitment which I think is unmatched because he is not speaking about this policy theoretically, he is not speaking about this policy in a textbook sense, he is speaking and has fought for the change in this policy from the vantage point of someone who has served and who served in situations where he could have been killed, sometimes every day of the week. Here is a part of what he has said. There are many things he has said about this, but he said: The paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division in the Army that I served with back in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, they didn't care who you were writing letters back home to, if you had a boyfriend or a girlfriend. They care whether you can handle your assault rifle. Can you kick down a door? Can you do your job so you all come home alive? That is the challenge he presents to all of us, Congressman Patrick Murphy, former member of the 82nd Airborne Division. This policy on the battlefield is not theoretical. It is consequential in at least one sense. If we continue the policy the way it is, we are going to be less effective on the battlefield. If we continue the policy the way it is, we are going to have less people serving at a time when we need extra help. We need soldiers on the battlefield. We need to continue to have young men and women who will volunteer to serve, knowing that once they volunteer, this is not sending you to some base somewhere for a couple of years away from conflict--knowing that when you volunteer today-- maybe this was not true 10 or 15 years ago--but today when you volunteer, the likelihood of you seeing combat is very high. So there is a special category of valor and integrity for those who are willing to volunteer to serve their country, especially when they know they could be sent into a firefight. You do not have to take the word of one or another Senator, but I think we can take the word and base our judgment upon the experience of a Member of Congress, in this case from the House, who has also served in the 82nd Airborne Division. We should remember his words, what folks at home will care about. They care about ``whether you can handle your assault rifle.'' ``Can you kick down a door?'' ``Can you do your job so you all come home alive?'' When we speak about this policy, this is not theory. This is a debate, at least, about two very important principles: valor, and whether we are going to affirm the valor of others who serve and are willing to serve; and whether we are going to have a policy based upon a core foundational principle of our democracy, which is integrity. That is the basic question we have before us. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about legislation that has broad bipartisan support and will have a positive impact, if we pass it, on job creation in the United States. This is H.R. 6517, which is known as the MTB, the miscellaneous terror bill. I will provide some highlights and then ask my colleague, Senator Brown of Ohio, to comment as well. Then we have a consent request. First, this bill supports manufacturing jobs. The National Association of Manufacturers supports the bill. When the last bill was signed into law earlier this year, the last MTB bill, at that time it passed the House by a vote of 378 to 43. This was in July. The national manufacturers praised it as ``a victory for job creation.'' This bill, combined with the last bill of the same kind, is expected to increase U.S. production by at least $4.6 billion over the next 3 years and to support 90,000--imagine that--manufacturing jobs, according to a study. As I said before, and should repeat again, it has strong bipartisan support. The bill has 40 Republican-sponsored provisions and 40 Democratic-sponsored provisions. It has not just bipartisan support but the support of manufacturers across the country. Domestic producers in the United States are relying on the new provisions in the bill to remain competitive, and these same producers are more likely to grow and support good-paying manufacturing jobs, just at a time when we need jobs in general, but in particular, there is a crying need for manufacturing jobs in the United States as well as a State such as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A couple of words about one aspect of the bill and then I will turn to Senator Brown. One of the provisions, of course, is trade adjustment assistance. The 2009 trade adjustment assistance--known by the acronym TAA--those reforms made significant improvements in this program for workers. Since these changes were implemented, more than 155,000 additional trade-impacted workers who would not have been certified under the former program became eligible for trade adjustment assistance for worker benefits and training opportunities. In total, more than 367,000 workers were certified as eligible for that support in that same timeframe. A word about Pennsylvania. We have lost--and I think the corresponding number is similar in other States--but imagine this: Since 2001, less than a decade, our State has lost 200,000 manufacturing jobs. This program, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, has played a vital role in helping those workers who have lost their jobs in that time period. There is much more I could say about Pennsylvania, and I will hold that for later. But I did want to turn to my colleague from Ohio, who has worked tirelessly on this issue here in the Senate and in the years when he was a Member of the House of Representatives.

Mr. CASEY. I thank both of my colleagues. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, let me say by way of response to our colleague from Alabama, I have great respect for and appreciate the sentiments he is expressing for workers and employers in his State, fighting hard for them, and the concern about jobs going overseas. I would say a couple things: No. 1, we did have an opportunity this fall to vote on legislation which would provide both incentives and disincentives to the shipment of jobs overseas by changing the Tax Code. We had a debate about it. One side voted for it--this side--and the other side did not. I just wanted to make that point. But the other point is that, look, we have a disagreement about this. What I would hope we could do is try to find a way to help firms such as the one that our colleague is trying to protect, and that is certainly understandable. But, at the same time, if we do not pass this bill in totality, we are going to shortchange the ability to impact not just the creation of 90,000 manufacturing jobs around the country, including in all of our States, but also trade adjustment assistance. So for the hundreds of thousands of people--tens of thousands in a State such as Pennsylvania, and potentially even more than that, and certainly in all of our States--we have to get this done even if we are trying to work on problems that arise that are specific to one employer or one portion of a particular community.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I cannot understand it, especially when you consider the fact that we have 15 million Americans out of work. I know the numbers are high in all of our States. In Pennsylvania, we are fortunate. We are below 9 percent. We are at about 8.8 percent right now--8.6 percent, actually, is the most recent number. That number has been going down, thank goodness. But it is still just below 550,000 people. It was up above 590,000. So we are making some progress, but we are badly in need of manufacturing jobs, and I know the same is true in Ohio. Mr. President, as if in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 6517, the Omnibus Trade Act, which was received from the House and is at the desk; that the bill be read three times and passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in legislative session and as in morning business for up to 15 minutes.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I am grateful for the work our chairman, Chairman Kerry, has put into this treaty over many months now--in fact, many years when you consider his work as a member and now chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. We are grateful for the debate we have just heard. These are critically important issues we are talking about, and that is one of the reasons why it is critically important we make sure the American people know what the stakes are. Without ratification of this treaty, we are, in fact, less safe than we should be. I think the American people understand that. I also believe the American people want to make sure that even upon ratification of this treaty, the New START treaty, that in no way will our security be undermined as relates to our nuclear arsenal. We can say, without qualification and without hesitation, that ratification of the New START treaty doesn't in any way undermine the safety, security and effectiveness and even the reliability of our nuclear arsenal. So these are critically important issues. We know there has been kind of a side debate about time and timing. We know that in addition to all the living Secretaries of State who have supported ratification, former President George Herbert Walker Bush, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, our leading national security team--but also I think the American people--want to tell us in a very direct way that we are going to continue to work up to and through the holidays, if that is necessary, because I think a lot of Americans agree with what BG John Adams recently said: We have 150,000 United States warriors doing their job over Christmas and the new year. The U.S. Senate should do its job and ratify this treaty. That is not a comment by a public official, that is from BG John Adams. We know similar treaties in the past have been overwhelmingly bipartisan. I think when we finally get to the vote, this will be as well, and there is evidence of that both in the Foreign Relations Committee--a committee I am proud to be a member of, working with Chairman Kerry on this treaty ratification and the work done in the committee--but also we are seeing a lot of bipartisanship as well in the Senate as we are discussing the eventual ratification. I wished to talk about two or three issues but, first of all, ratification as it relates to verification. I think in our own lives, no matter who we are, when we are making an important decision and we are reaching conclusions, we want proof. We want information that is conclusive so we can make important decisions in our own lives. The same is true, and certainly even more urgent, when we are talking about nuclear weapons. When we talk about a treaty that we are working to ratify, we are talking about a couple of basic issues. One of them is verification. What does verification mean? Well, it means that, for example, the American people hope we have in place--and they know we will upon ratification--a verification and tracking system that will give us the assurance that will allow us to be secure in the knowledge we are going to be able to do everything humanly possible to verify. The treaty contemplates ways to do that, and there are four or five I will mention. First of all, invasive onsite inspections, as you would want in any situation in your own life. You would want to make sure you can be onsite. The problem right now is, we have gone all these months without verification in place. So we want to have boots on the ground and experts trained to verify what the situation is when they are reviewing the Russian nuclear weapons. Second, it allows us to use the wonders of American technology to help us on this--the so-called national technical means. Third, what is referred to as ``unique identifiers'' placed on each weapon so you can track each weapon because of that identifier. That is a critically important part of this. The data exchanges between our two countries and certainly the prompt notification of the movement of weapons. This treaty permits up to 18 short-notice, onsite inspections each year to determine the accuracy of Russia's data and to verify compliance. We will talk more about that later. But of course when the American people talk to us, they tell us they expect us to get this right. They want to make sure there is a very strong verification structure in place as we go forward. Without ratification, we would not have that verification in place, and I think a lot of people in the country expect us to ratify for that reason alone, in addition to the other reasons. We had a good debate today about missile defense--a second issue I will address--and I know we are short on time, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made it absolutely clear in the resolution of ratification of the treaty that the treaty itself would not constrain missile defense. Two understandings within that--understandings No. 1 and No. 2--as well as declarations No. 1 and No. 2 specifically address and reiterate the U.S. commitment to developing and deploying missile defenses. Nothing in this treaty will prevent us from having a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal and nothing will constrain our ability to have missile defense. In fact, as Chairman Kerry noted--and it is important to repeat this--the committee's resolution that brought the treaty to the floor goes to great lengths to reaffirm and further clarify the treaty's preamble, and Russia's unilateral statement imposes no limits on our ability to develop and deploy these missile defense systems. I would note also, in connection with missile defense, that our military and civilian leaders--the ones who have studied the treaty, who have vast experience with national security and, in fact, experience with nuclear weapons treaties of the past--have stated that neither the language in the preamble referencing any interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces nor this unilateral statement by the Russians places legally binding obligations on the United States. In fact, that summary of their position appeared in the Wall Street Journal on April 20, 2010. So that is not just a statement by people on this floor, it is cited in the Wall Street Journal. I think when you step back from this, especially on missile defense, in order to reach the conclusion that some have reached and the determination they have made against the treaty--I guess on missile defense grounds alone--you would have to believe it is a logical conclusion that Secretary Gates doesn't seem to be too concerned about missile defense. But apparently he is, and he has spoken to this. You would have to conclude Admiral Mullen, who has said we should ratify this, hasn't made a determination about missile defense. I think he has and I think that is why we can rely upon that support and certainly the support of the Missile Defense Agency Director, LTG Patrick O'Reilly, someone whose job it is to be concerned about this and someone who has experience with and involvement in what missile defense means and what it means to our security. So I think there is ample evidence and ample testimony on the record before our committee and otherwise that indicates in no way does this treaty constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile defense. I know we are short on time, and I will wrap up, and I will have more to say as we go forward. But when you consider the implications for our security that this treaty involves and also think in a larger sense in terms of how people view this debate in Washington, there are a lot of people who are concerned about our economy. They are concerned about their own jobs and concerned about their own family's economic or financial security. That is a chief source of their anxiety. But I think they also worry about our national defense. They are worried about terrorism and they are worried about attacks and they are worried about national security and their own security. We need to give them assurances that at least as it relates to nuclear weapons pointed at the American people, that we are taking a significant step here--a historic step--that will ensure we have both a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to go at any nation that would cause us harm, but at the same time we are taking steps to reduce nuclear weapons across the world to make us, in fact, safer. We all believe this. Both sides of the aisle believe this. We want a strong national defense and we want to be safe. What we have to do in the next couple days--after thousands and thousands of questions being asked of and answered by the administration, after 15 or so hearings just in the Foreign Relations Committee, after months and months of debate, months and months of testimony, after all that--is complete our work. We have to ratify this treaty, give the American people some peace of mind in this holiday season that our defense is strong, that our nuclear arsenal is strong, and that we can come together and ratify a treaty that has been endorsed across the board by experts in national defense, people who care deeply about our security.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, this month, the Obama administration will submit its review of the war in Afghanistan. I expect--and I think a number of Members of Congress expect--that this review will provide answers to the key questions before us, questions the American people deserve answers to. I believe these questions fall into three broad categories: first of all, Afghan governance; second, development and humanitarian efforts; and, finally, establishing a sustainable security environment in Afghanistan. Since the announcement of a new strategy in December of 2009 and the deployment of 30,000 additional troops, I have sought to carefully monitor U.S. progress toward its goals. As part of this effort, I have paid special attention to combating the top killer of U.S. troops, which, of course, is improvised explosive devices. I chaired a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on this topic on November 18 and will continue to press our government and our leaders and governments in the region to do more to restrict the availability of components that make up these terrible weapons, especially, of course, ammonium nitrate, which flows into Afghanistan every day of the week to make IEDs that kill our troops. I am pleased significant progress has been made by the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to coordinate an all-of-government approach to this problem. I wish to applaud the recent efforts of the Afghan security forces that seized one metric ton of ammonium nitrate on Monday in Zabul Province. All the key players appear to be on the same page on this issue, but there still has not been a significant decrease of these deadly weapons in Afghanistan. I trust that the December review by the administration will address the flow of ammonium nitrate, and I look forward to continuing to work closely with the administration on this issue. At a strategic level, too many questions remain as we head into the December review. I would like to list some of those right now. First of all, on the issue of governance, I have two questions I hope the December review will address. First, do we have a political strategy--a political strategy--in place to ensure that the Afghan Government is prepared to enact reforms that concretely show the population it represents their key interests and concerns? I believe our efforts to pressure the Afghan Government have been at best uneven in this area, due, in large part, to a reluctance to pressure the Afghan leadership. Any security gains in Afghanistan can be easily squandered without serious progress on governance. The United States, ISAF, and Afghan security forces are sacrificing too much as the Afghan Government fails to enact reforms in the best interests of the Afghan people. It will be difficult to succeed in Afghanistan without a strategy to help build the institutions of governance, including the judiciary, political parties, and, of course, electoral institutions. As difficult as these interactions may be, the international community must be more willing to confront the Afghan Government on issues of political representation, corruption, and the rule of law. We should stand ready to help build and develop these democratic institutions. The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 parliamentary elections were rife with problems that seriously undermined the confidence of the international community in Afghanistan's ability to conduct elections free of fraud and manipulation. If the electoral process remains deeply flawed, the Afghan people's support for the democratic process itself may well erode. While the government has said it wants to develop a ``strategy for long-term electoral reform that addresses in particular the sustainability of the electoral process,'' few steps have been taken in this direction. The election law is in need of serious reform. The executive branch has nearly exclusive power over the Independent Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission. The single nontransferable vote system impedes the development of political parties, an essential long-term way to organize and represent the interests of the Afghan people. Corruption continues to be a serious issue that affects citizens across Afghanistan, especially in the southern part of the country. A recent public opinion survey conducted by the Washington Post, ABC News, the BBC, and ARD television in Germany showed that 55 percent of respondents in Kandahar say they have been asked for bribes from the police--55 percent--well above the national figure of 21 percent. Moreover, most Kandahar residents say their situation would only get worse if they exercised due process and filed a complaint about a public official. U.S. efforts to improve governance at times compete with our security concerns. There is an inherent tension between the United States and ISAF forces in efforts to engage, to combat extremist elements at the local level and cooperation with warlords who rule over certain areas. While there is an imperative to collect intelligence and conduct operations that may require cooperation with local power brokers, I am concerned the long-term cost of such interaction is very high. Are we empowering another generation of local power brokers who have little regard for representing the interests of the local population? That is a question that needs to be asked over and over, and we need answers to that question. It is a simple fact, disaffection among Afghan citizens with the central government and local power brokers provides recruiting opportunities for the Taliban. This is a serious concern because it gets to the heart of our engagement in Afghanistan: Cooperation with local warlords can provide short-term security gains, but what is the long-term impact? I hope the administration's December review will address this issue. Question No. 2: What is the state of the reconciliation process with the Taliban? I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of negotiations with the Taliban on women and other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan. My concern grew--and I know others' concern as well--our concern grew in reading the poll numbers from Afghanistan recently. There was a 13-percent jump from last year among respondents who say women's rights are suffering. The December review should address the current state of play with respect to these negotiations. The recent Afghan poll showed that nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office. Ultimately, there must be a political solution to end the war in Afghanistan. I am not suggesting we are close at this time to that result, but we need to know the degree to which the administration and the Karzai government are coordinated and headed down the same path. International engagement on any negotiation process will be essential to long-term success. Pakistan has a role to play and is a necessary element to any long-lasting peace agreement. The next area, security. U.S. operations in southern Afghanistan appear to be having a positive impact on Afghan public opinion. Sixty- seven percent of the people in the Province of Helmand describe their security as good, a 14-percent jump from December 2009. Nearly two- thirds of Helmand residents state that Afghanistan is on the right track. This is an indication that positive momentum has been built in Afghanistan's most sensitive region. But such gains can be short-lived, and in order to facilitate a sustainable security, we must take a long- term approach to ensure that the Afghan Government can provide for its own security. The training of the Afghan National Security Forces is a key threshold question. We cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a haven for al-Qaida or other extremist groups to launch attacks against the United States. ISAF forces have denied al-Qaida this haven since 2001. However, we cannot provide this security in perpetuity. The Afghans have to assume more responsibility for their own security, and we must do all we can to prepare the Afghan National Security Forces for that day. So where do we stand at this point? I would have to say the view is decidedly mixed. For years, the international community exercised what can be characterized as gross neglect in building Afghan security forces, and only recently have we begun to take on this task. First, some positive news on this issue. We do not hear enough about this. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Caldwell, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, the so-called NTM-A, has been a source of real progress. The Afghan National Army and Police are exceeding-- exceeding--their recruitment goals. As of August of this year, the Afghan National Army's total strength had grown to 138,164, exceeding the goal for October 2010 by more than 8,000 troops. As of August, the Afghan National Police had an end strength of 119,639, exceeding the 2010 goal of 109,000. These recruitment numbers are an important sign of progress, but serious concerns remain related to the quality of the force, the retention rate, and the low rate of literacy. The Afghan National Army has significant shortages in officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Effective junior leaders are essential to a professional force since they control immediate on-the- ground situations. The Ministry of Defense and the training mission in Afghanistan are working to overcome a shortfall of more than 4,500 Afghan National Army officers. There are more Officer Candidate School units, twice as many seats in the Integration Mujahedeen Course, and larger classes at the National Military Academy. As for noncommissioned officers, the Afghan National Army faces a shortage of more than 10,500. Similar expansions in training capacity and direct entry programs are underway to address this deficiency. According to a recent Pentagon report, the gap will not be closed until the end of 2012. The Pentagon also reports we face a shortfall of more than 900 international trainers in Afghanistan. I hope our allies in ISAF can help to address this very important training need. Many European countries have a proud history of developing elite paramilitary forces. This valued expertise is needed right now in Afghanistan. While expanding capacity is critical to growing the force, I hope the December review by the administration will address not just the efforts to grow more leaders but also describe how these leaders are laying the foundation for professionalizing the Afghan national security forces. Retention and attrition rates. For years, the Afghan national security force's attrition rate has been an issue. Facilitating rapid growth while increasing quality requires that retention rates remain high. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved the goal of developing a force of 305,600 personnel by October 2011. Recruiting efforts compared with increased retention have allowed the force to grow ahead of schedule so far. Moving forward, projections remain uncertain. The Defense Department reports the police have met attrition and retention goals. However, the Afghan National Army still has issues with attrition that may impact its ability to maintain its impressive growth in numbers. This month's review by the administration should clarify projections and detail efforts to boost retention. Literacy is a big problem. The literacy rates are very low in the Afghan Security Force and this must be addressed. Consider this story from Lieutenant General Caldwell. He visited a base in northern Afghanistan where 90 percent of the troops claimed they had been unpaid for months. To limit corruption, the government has been paying the troops by electronic funds transfer instead of cash. The troops had no idea, however, since they could not read their bank statements. Think about weapons security. How can a soldier be sure he has been assigned a weapon if he cannot read the serial number? Illiteracy is widespread in the force: Only 11 percent of enlisted personnel can read, write, or do simple math. This creates significant challenges in professionalizing the security force. In response, a huge literacy program has grown around the fielding of the Afghan security forces. So we have much to do on that. I will move to the last part of our concerns, and that is on development. A qualified Afghan soldier is much cheaper to train and equip on the field than an American, so the overall cost to U.S. taxpayers would certainly diminish as the U.S. forces draw down. But by investing in this large force, there are long-term implications. Do we expect to pay for the Afghan security forces 10 years from now, 20 years from now? At what point will the Afghan Government be able to collect its own revenue to fund its security as well as other priorities? That is, again, why responsible Afghan governance is essential. While the international community will shoulder much of the humanitarian and security burden in the short term, the Afghan Government needs to take steps to increase its domestic revenue collection, as well as put into place a sound legislative framework to encourage investment. They need to develop a minerals framework law, and they also need to put in place changes to bring about a stronger infrastructure. Let me close with a reflection upon our troops. We have the obligation here in the Senate to ask and have answers to very critical questions, whether they relate to development or governance or security, and especially on the question of security. We also have an obligation to remember and keep in mind the human toll.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, last weekend I voted for legislation that would extend tax cuts for all Pennsylvanians. This legislation also included a continuation of expired unemployment insurance, a series of tax incentives that have created jobs in Pennsylvania like the R&D tax credit, the biodiesel tax credit which is essential to companies like Hero BX in Erie, the new markets tax credit and the payroll tax credit known as the HIRE Act. I also voted for permanent extensions of the enhanced child tax credit and earned income tax credit and the expanded adoption tax credit that I included in the health care reform law, all of which place money back into the pockets of working people across the Commonwealth. According to the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, out of 6.5 million filers in the Commonwealth in 2008, 98 percent had adjusted gross income below $250,000. There is a consensus in Congress to extend tax cuts for these families. We should pass the middle income tax cuts, renew the job creation tax cuts and preserve unemployment insurance. We can then have a debate about the upper income tax breaks without using middle-income families and those laid off through no fault of their own as political bargaining chips. However, a long-term extension of tax cuts for upper income taxpayers, multimillionaires and billionaires, is not fiscally responsible for one reason: it adds hundreds of billions to the deficit without creating jobs or stimulating economic growth. In recent months, I spoke to both business owners and economists to get their views on how Congress should handle the expiring tax provisions. What I learned is that certainty and consistency are needed when the economy is in such a fragile condition. We must reach a compromise. At most however, this might entail a short-term extension of upper income tax cuts and other ideas that could bring certainty without unduly increasing the deficit.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Madam President, I commend my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Shaheen. I am proud to join my colleagues this morning in support of the New START accord. Next Sunday will mark 1 year since American inspectors were on the ground in Russia. We need to vote on the resolution of ratification for this important treaty because it will indeed make America safer. Without ratification of this treaty, we are less safe and less secure. We have to maintain what we have always maintained in this country as it relates to our arsenal: a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. This treaty is consistent with that goal. The agreement provides for predictability, transparency, and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. Former National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton Brooks put it best when he said: Transparency leads to predictability; predictability leads to stability. It is that stability that we seek. The opportunity to examine Russian nuclear forces helps to limit the surprises, mistrust, or miscalculation that could result from a lack of information. By building trust with regard to our respective nuclear arsenals, progress on other important issues such as the war in Afghanistan and our policy as it relates to Iran becomes more likely. Some have asked whether we have lost any valuable elements of the original START treaty's inspection regime. In June of this year, I chaired a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee that addressed this very issue. We examined the implementation of the treaty with respect to both inspection and verification and how the treaty would be executed in Russia and the United States. Critics point out that under the original START treaty, the United States was permitted 25 data update, reentry vehicles, and facility inspections a year, while under New START the United States can inspect 18 facilities annually not 25. However, in a previous hearing on the New START treaty, Admiral Mullen noted that when START entered into force there were 55 Russian facilities subject to inspection, but now there are only 35 Russian facilities subject to inspection. I would also assert that the inspection regime has also changed to reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with the Russian Federation, and more than a decade of experience in conducting START inspections. The inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than what was conducted under the first START treaty. We conduct fewer inspections under this treaty because there are fewer sites to inspect. Yet, proportionally, the number of inspections concluded under this treaty has increased not decreased. During that same hearing, Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said: Inspections will help the United States verify that Russia is reporting the status of its strategic forces accurately and complying with the provisions of the New START Treaty. Inspections will not be shots in the dark. Using information provided by requiring data exchanges, notifications, past inspections, and national technical means, we can choose to inspect those facilities of greatest interest to us. Then, through short-notice on-site inspections, our inspectors can verify that what the Russians are reporting accurately reflects reality. So said the Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Miller. After more than 20 hearings by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence, and comprehensive deliberation, it is time to vote on New START. We have examined all sides of the issue. We heard from Republican experts and Democratic experts alike. We have heard from former Secretaries of State and experts in international relations. The U.S. military leadership uniformly supports this treaty. More than 900 questions were submitted from the Senate to the administration on New START, and the administration answered every single question. I wish to close on a historical note. On October 1, 1992, the first START treaty was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 93 to 6. As the debate on the treaty wrapped in this room, the Senate majority leader at the time, George Mitchell, commended President Bush for his role in negotiating the agreement. He read a letter from Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger which encouraged ratification. This expression of bipartisanship at that time was made remarkable by the fact that the Senators assembled would soon return home to campaign in the 1992 election. That election was 1 month away and Democrats and Republicans came together and supported ratification. We all remember the contentious nature of that election, similar to the period we are living through now. Yet even within that environment, both parties came together to do the right thing for national security. We have to do this again. It is critically important that this treaty be ratified. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. This report released today had a number of findings: First of all, that the emergency expansion of unemployment insurance programs in 2007 has benefited 40 million people in the United States of America who have either received or lived with a recipient of these programs. This figure includes 10.5 million children. In line with other studies that have been released, this report by the Council of Economic Advisers states that there are 800,000 more jobs and GDP is 0.8 percent higher because of the expansion of unemployment insurance programs. Without reauthorization through 2011, the one we are debating today in the Senate, at this time next year, in December of 2011, there will be 600,000 less jobs and GDP will be 0.6 percent lower. So there are real consequences to the denial of this reauthorization going forward. To give my colleagues a sense of what that means in a State such as Pennsylvania, without reauthorization of these programs, 353,989 people will lose unemployment insurance coverage by November of 2011. The Pennsylvania economy will be severely impacted without reauthorization. According to the Council of Economic Advisers, there will be 31,228 less jobs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania if we do not reauthorize unemployment insurance. Just to put that in perspective, in the first three quarters of this year, in the midst of a recovery--slow recovery but a recovery nonetheless--our State has gone from losing jobs in 2009 to gaining jobs. In the first three quarters of the year, we have gained roughly 48,000 jobs. Without unemployment insurance, we stand to lose, as I said, more than 31,000 of those jobs. We know the unemployment rate of 9.6 percent nationally means nearly 15 million people are out of work. If you are opposed to this reauthorization, you have to come up with another answer. You can't just say to 15 million people: Well, we couldn't get it done, or things interfered in Washington. In our State, fortunately, we are lower than 9.6. We are 8.8, percent. But 8.8 percent in Pennsylvania means that 560,000 people are out of work. It ballooned up to over 590,000 this summer, but fortunately that has been coming down over the last couple of months and, of course, we want to keep it moving in that direction. Let me just conclude with this thought: For the past six decades, Congress has provided federally funded unemployment insurance benefits. During every recession, the Congress has done that, and thank goodness they did. Finally, without this reauthorization in our State of Pennsylvania, 83,000 Pennsylvanians will exhaust their benefits this month. Of course, across the country, it is some 2 million. Exhibit 1 The Economic Impact of Recent Temporary Unemployment Insurance Extensions

Mr. CASEY

Mr. CASEY. Madam President, thank you very much. First of all, I wish to commend the remarks our colleague from Oregon made. He has great insight into our Tax Code. I think he has reminded us yet again we have a lot of work to do, and we are grateful for his comments today and his charge to us--that we have a good deal of work in 2011 and even as we wrap up 2010.