Bob Corker

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized for up to 20 minutes, to be followed by Senator Collins for 7.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. I was listening to the Senator. The fact is, this carries, in many ways, a greater risk. I would call this son of TARP. This carries a greater risk than the original TARP because the terms under which this money is given to banks is at a lesser rate. So that means the money that is paid back, there is less margin to cover losses. In addition, banks can continue to lower the cost of that capital by putting money out quickly to small businesses. Again, we like to see small business credit expanded, but we like to see it done in a market and healthy way. I hope Senator Dodd will have hearings. My guess is he will over the next several months. But in many ways it is more risky because the rates are lower. The more money we put out, there is going to be a perverse incentive for banks to put money out quickly in ways that could be at a higher credit risk. This is far riskier than the first program. Again, I know there are good intentions. All of us want to see small business thrive. All of us know that 80 percent of the new jobs are created through small business. I know the Senator and I have done as much as we could while we have been here to try to get government off the backs of small business. What I would say to small businesses--and I don't think many of them support this, but to those that do--be careful what you ask for. Once the U.S. Government gets involved in our financial system in this way, putting money out and then directing where it goes, we know how the camel's nose under the tent works in government. We understand what it means for the Federal Government to get more involved in our community banks. I know I had one in particular, when I was in Tennessee, say he wanted me to look at this because he wanted to use these funds to replace TARP funds they had not been able to pay back yet. I don't think this is a good step. I don't think there are many people who support it. I know this probably has some political mileage in this body because it does address an issue we care about, small business. But it is a bad idea directed at something we all support; that is, small business growth. Again, I urge rejection of this amendment.

Mr. CORKER. Madam President, I rise to speak about the vote that is coming up soon, the Landrieu-LeMieux amendment to the small business bill that is before us. First, I want to say that I respect tremendously both Senators. I have enjoyed working with them on so many issues. Many of us in the Congress have worked over this last year to end the TARP that went in place during a time of a financial system meltdown. I supported that, as did many in this body. Seventy-four Senators voted during a time of critical stress in our country's financial system to put that in place. I also have pushed hard to end that program as soon as it was unnecessary, and many of us have tried to end it. Finally that was done when the financial reform bill that passed a couple of weeks ago, or this last week passed and became law yesterday. A lot of times around here we go through this process of erosion; that is, an idea will come up, and it is embraced for one issue, and then, over time, as happened with TARP, as a matter of fact. TARP was there to rescue our financial system so that small businesses, people all across our country, could continue to get payroll checks and do those things our financial system provides. Then it became perverted. Industrial policy was embraced after that, something that was not the intention of TARP. Now we have another perversion of that by virtue of this amendment that has been put forth. Many of us were very concerned about the steps that were taken under TARP during that crisis. We felt it was a crisis and it was necessary. But in many ways, this is more insidious, because not only is the government making an investment in final institutions across this country, it then is telling those institutions what to do with that money. I know that small businesses across this country are hurting. I have been a small businessman most of my life. As a matter of fact, I still am a small businessperson. I still have small business interests. I understand what it means to be a small businessman. I understand what it means to not have access to credit, to have difficulties during crises such as this. I lived through one in 1990 and 1991, and had great difficulties, as so many people are having today. We have had a tremendous explosion in government involvement in the private sector, something I do not think many Americans ever expected to see. I think the last thing we need to do now, as Americans are retrenching, as the economy is beginning to grow, is to take another step back in this direction. I cannot more strongly object to the LeMieux-Landrieu amendment, even though I respect them very much. I urge Members who believe in our market system and want to see us move ahead with a healthy economy, I urge all such colleagues to vote against this amendment. It is another step in a direction that the majority of the country wants to move away from. I yield the floor.

Mr. CORKER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CORKER. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CORKER. Elizabeth Warren is a smart person. There are things I agree with her on, and there are things I disagree with her on. But on that point, I absolutely agree. If we think about the moral hazard issue, that means a business that wants to run its business the way America generally has run business--on their own, they don't want to be involved in government support--they would be at a disadvantage. That is the other moral hazard. An institution in Tennessee or South Dakota that wants to go out and lend more money to small business and goes out and raises equity to do so, that equity is going to cost more than this. So a bank that chooses to take advantage of a government program actually has an advantage over a company that wants to run itself the way most Americans want to see small business and companies run. There are all kinds of moral hazards. I know the notion of small business attracts a lot of people. I hope people on both sides of the aisle will think about this, realize how insidious this is, think about the next idea that comes after this. Again, it is another government investment into the private sector. We have gone from systemic risk to auto companies, to suppliers of auto companies. Now we are looking at going into small business. We sure have gone the gamut here. It is time to go the other way. Tennesseans have spoken loudly about the fact that they don't want to see any more government involvement in the private sector. It is time to stop it now. We thought we had it killed last week with financial regulation when TARP ended. Now it is raising its head again.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CORKER. I wish to speak for a moment about the Dodd-Frank bill that we are going to vote on apparently tomorrow evening. I wanted to talk a little bit about politics, which is not my specialty, and then a little bit about the substance. I know the Presiding Officer has been highly involved in this bill and made a positive contribution. I read recently comments made by our leader, the majority leader here, and the President, and actually the chairman of the Banking Committee regarding the fact that the reason the bill is the way it is is partisan politics, and basically insinuating that Republicans did not want to deal with a financial regulatory bill. Nothing has disappointed me more than the fact that we have a bill that has basically ended up wrapping folks around the axle as they tried to get two or three votes on our side of the aisle to pass this bill. We had a tremendous opportunity to pass a bipartisan bill. We had a tremendous opportunity to pass a bill that would have shown the American people that we in this body have the ability to work together on big issues and solve problems. I think it is a shame we did not do that. I have to say, from my perspective--and I think I put as much time into this bill as anybody here in the Senate--it ended up being about partisan issues. There was an overreach on issues that had almost nothing to do--as a matter of fact, absolutely nothing to do--with this crisis, to advance some political agenda issues, and then, on the other hand, a total denial to deal with some of the core issues that got us in this situation. So I am disappointed. We talk a lot. We have had groups come in, and they talk us to about how they want to see bipartisanship. Then some of us on both sides of the aisle step out from time to time to do that. When it happens, and a lot of effort is expended, and the end product is not achieved, for a lot of forces that exist around here, the very people that you end up reaching out to criticize the fact that we ended up with a partisan bill. Yet, at the end of the day, let's face it, one side has the majority, one side has the minority. In this particular bill, I do not think there was, at the end, a valid attempt to do that. So I am disappointed. We have issues in this country as they relate to our financial system that do need to be addressed. No doubt, any bill of this magnitude, 2,300 pages, has some good things in it. There are good provisions in this 2,300-page bill. In many ways we punted most of the work to regulators. They are going to spend the next 10 to 18 months making rules that leave a lot of instability in our financial system at a time when I think people want to have a degree of certainty. I think the Presiding Officer today tried to actually focus on greater certainty in some areas, and I might have disagreed with some of those. But the fact is, I think part of our job here in legislating is to create a degree of clarity. One of the shortcomings of this bill is that--I think the count keeps going. I have heard a count of 363 rulemakings. I have heard a group come out and say there are 500 rulemakings. In essence, what we did with this bill in many ways is say to the very regulators who had the power, candidly, to do most of what is in this bill anyway, they had that power within their purview, did not do it, and kind of what we said is: Look, we would like for you to make rules. So K Street and government relations folks are going to make a lot of money over the next 12 to 18 months as they now lobby regulators to sort of figure out what the rules of the road are going to be. In the process, again, jobs in the country will be more stagnant. The other piece of this is that this all started with this sort of political agenda: We are going to bash Wall Street. Now Republicans have come out and said, no, this is a Wall Street bailout. So we had Democrats going to bash Wall Street, and Republicans saying, this is a Wall Street bailout. Candidly, I do not know that it is either one. The fact is, I think most folks on Wall Street like this bill. As a matter of fact, I am looking at hedge fund managers right now, reading the Financial Times, many of the folks who probably are involved in the riskiest businesses are now out forming new hedge funds. Now they are moving to a more unregulated area than they were already in. So it is pretty fascinating how we create bills and we do not address the core issues, and then we have lots of unintended consequences along the way, as we are seeing play out right now. I am not supporting this bill, which I had hoped to cosponsor. I am not supporting this bill out of partisanship; I am not supporting this bill because it misses the mark. This is not the worst bill that has ever been created. I am not going to say that. It is not. We just did not do our work. I mean, basically what we have done is, as I mentioned, we left it to regulators. We did not deal with some core issues. I offered an amendment to deal with underwriting. At the end of the day, regardless of everything that people talk about at hieroglyphic levels, we had a lot of loans in this country that were written to people who could not pay them back. We did not have underwriting standards. We still do not have underwriting standards. At the end of the day, we had two entities. I am not one of those who said, these entities were the core reason for the problem. But the fact is, we had two enablers, Fannie and Freddie, that, let's face it, what they do is they allow people to write bad mortgages, pool them together, and then they insure or purchase those. They were enablers. We have not dealt with that. I do not support this legislation, not because it is the worst bill in the world. It is not. As a matter of fact, we do not even know what the outcome of this legislation is. It is interesting, I read the papers and they talk about the fact that this is a historical piece of legislation. We have no idea whether this bill is historical. We will not know for a long time until the regulators decide what they are going to do with this bill, because basically the power is left to a huge number of bureaucrats which, by the way, we have created, which is going to be like a malaise over our financial community because we did not give a lot of clear direction. We left it to regulators. We created a bureaucracy. One other note. I think the issue that in many ways divided us--I know people on the other side of the aisle knew this well, refused to address it, although at one point we got very close and almost had a deal--was this issue of the Consumer Protection Agency. I am all for consumer protection. I think the concern that I had as an individual is we have created a new entity. It has no board. It is an amazing thing. It has no board. Because of the standards against which the way this organization is judged as it relates to its rulemaking, which is expansive across the entire financial industry, because of the standard against which you have to challenge, there is no veto ability. This new organization has a budget anywhere from, I think, $600 million to $1 billion a year, and the only way the Presiding Officer or I will know what direction this organization is going to take is who leads it. This is an incredible place for us to be, for us as a Congress to be. I think it is an incredible place for the administration to be, where we are creating an entity, a consumer financial protection organization, that has incredible rule-writing abilities, that has no board, no real veto ability, and yet on its own, one person--I am not talking about a group of people, but one person is going to decide the nature of what this organization is going to engage in. I find that incredible. For all I know, the fears that I have about it, the fears I have about this organization, may not be borne out--may not be borne out. I think the Presiding Officer very well may support this concept. He will never know whether his hopes for this organization are borne out until we know who the person is and what their bent and flavor is. I think that, again, as a body we had a responsibility to put a balance in place so that we knew what the direction of this organization was going to be over time. I find that to be incredibly irresponsible. As we look at this bill, I think one of the gauges of what it does is, we have the folks on Wall Street who rhetorically my friends on the other side of the aisle wanted to bash, and, candidly, all of America in many ways is upset with Wall Street is loving this bill. They have got teams of compliance officers who have the ability to deal with regulations a consumer protection agency might put out, all these rulemakings. As a matter of fact, typically when we regulate like this, it is the big guys who benefit, and they get bigger. But the community banks, the smaller banks in my State, and I think across this country, are the ones that are concerned. I know we are all concerned about the employment activity in our country. All of us want to see the economy improve. At the end of the day, most Americans have to deal with these smaller institutions. Most Americans want to deal with these smaller institutions. They are people they go to church with, they go to Rotary Club, they see at the grocery store. These are the people they have relationships with. What we are doing in this legislation is we are increasing the cost of capital that is available to most Americans, and we are limiting the amount of that increased cost--that capital is going to cost more--we are decreasing the availability. So we are decreasing the availability of capital in communities across our country, and we are increasing the cost of that. So I find that it is an amazing place where we are. We all care about employment, and yet we put in place policies that are counter to that employment. So, again, I am disappointed in the outcome of this bill. I have appreciated working with many Members on both sides of the aisle to come up with a balanced piece of legislation that will stand the test of time, a piece of legislation, by the way, that will actually deal with the core issues that created this financial crisis. This bill does not do that in every area. It does in some. I want to say that some of the derivatives--clearing houses, I think that is a good contribution. Again, I think we have got end users out across our country now who are panic stricken, farmers and others, who use derivatives in their daily lives. And now maybe--we do not know because regulators will decide down the road. We punted that. We said, we will let the regulators decide. So for a period of time, they are going to be concerned about whether they are able to put up their tractors and barns and other things as collateral against derivatives or be in a more risky position. We have missed the mark. I realize that, ironically, after a year of work, 2,300 pages, hundreds and hundreds of rules that are getting ready to be generated by regulators. It is my understanding there is now already another bill coming to correct this bill. That is pretty amazing to me. I wish to say that politics ends up overcoming substance, I have seen as bills come to the floor. We had an opportunity which we missed to try to get this bill right in a bipartisan way. In spite of the fact that I am disappointed I cannot support this legislation strictly on policy grounds, I do want to say that our staff and our office is going to continue to be engaged with others. I know there is going to be a lot of other activity as a result of this bill, some of the unintended consequences, some of the mistakes that have been made and some of the glaring omissions we did not deal with, things such as--it is hard for me to believe that we would not take the time to upgrade our Bankruptcy Code so that a large entity that fails goes through some of the same things the same entity in Minnesota might go through. It is amazing to me that we did not do that work. But we still have an opportunity. I know the Presiding Officers have now changed. I know the Presiding Officer sitting here today is on the Judiciary Committee. I also know that over the course of the next year or two we will have the opportunity to work on that and try to develop something so that when a large, highly complex financial entity fails, there is actually a sort of standard they go through when they fail that people understand, and they understand the bankruptcy stats, they understand what their rights are going to be. There is a lot of work left to be done. I am disappointed in where we are and what we are going to be voting on tomorrow night. I cannot support it, but I do look forward to working with my colleagues on changes that will have to be made, on the unintended consequences this bill will create and, obviously, the many technical changes that will result because of the fact that we rushed our work. This process began mostly about substance. A lot of people put a lot of time into trying to understand substance. I know the Presiding Officer focused on one particular issue and tried to offer some substance in that regard. At the end of the day, politics took over. November is approaching. It would be nice in the eyes of some people to have a 60-, 61-vote bill. Some are said to like obstruction. I can tell my colleagues, nothing could be further from the truth, especially on this piece of legislation. What I regret most is, I know this bill is going to have the unintended consequence of hurting Tennesseans, hurting people from Oregon and Minnesota and around the country. There is no question that with all that we have laid out in these 2,300 pages, there will be less credit available and the credit that is available will cost more money. What we really have done with this bill is hurt the average American. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. Madam President, I wish to talk for a few moments about the pending legislation. My guess is we will have final passage, after reaching cloture a few minutes ago. I would like to go back and say we began the process of looking at financial regulation after the crisis that occurred a couple years ago, where institutions all across this country made loans--very poor loans--to people who used that money to buy homes. That was the genesis of this crisis, the fact that institutions across this country made those bad loans and made them to people who could not pay them back. Certainly, that was exacerbated by the fact, with all the easy credit that occurred, there was a housing bubble that no doubt was going to put housing back into its normal state at some point. The combination of those two factors created a tremendous crisis in our country. When the banks involved in all these loans got into trouble, there was not a good mechanism to deal with so many of them being in trouble at the same time. We ended up with a moral hazard with which this legislation is trying to deal; that is, we had institutions around this country that had capital injected into them because many people at that time felt the Bankruptcy Code or other mechanisms were not there to deal with these institutions. A process began where we in this body and people on the other side of the Capitol tried to pass legislation to deal with this situation. I know there has been a good attempt to deal with it. I have been involved in some of those negotiations. As my colleagues can tell by my vote, I am disappointed with the outcome of that involvement. Still, it is an issue that is important to this country. In spite of my disappointment with the outcome, I will say, on the front end, I think the process we have had on the floor has been a good one. We have had a lot of amendments voted on, and that speaks well for this body. The one issue we did not deal with in this 1,400-page bill--that I am sure will be lengthened by a managers' amendment and other things--the one issue we did not deal with is the fact that underwriting has been so terrible. This bill absolutely does not address loan underwriting. I offered an amendment to try to deal with that issue, where when Americans apply for a loan, there has to be a verification of their income, people will look at their debt-to-equity ratio to make sure they have the ability, with all their indebtedness, to pay back everything they have before they are able to take out a home mortgage and the fact they would have a 5-percent downpayment. All of us know that in other countries--Canada just to the north of us did not have this crisis because most people there put 15 percent down on their home mortgages. We did not want to deal with that. There is no one in this body who would say the genesis of this crisis was not the fact that a lot of loans were made to people who could not pay them back. We did not deal with that in this bill. That, to me, is a major oversight and one of the reasons I am disappointed with the outcome. I do think, by the way, much of that has been dealt with appropriately. I appreciate the chairman allowing me to work on that title with the Senator from--I say ``allowing.'' We were working on it anyway--allowing us to be engaged in a way that I think helped improve this bill on resolution. One of the issues we did not deal with was trying to strengthen bankruptcy. Resolution, as we discussed over this last year, was to be the last resource--orderly liquidation I guess we would call it. One of the things we had hoped to do was, working with the Judiciary Committee, to strengthen our bankruptcy laws so bankruptcy could work for these large institutions that failed. We did not do that. We not only did not do that, we did not deal with some of the judicial checks that I thought were important as related to ensuring that as we pay creditors off through this resolution mechanism, we do it in a way that is appropriate. I am also disappointed we have not ended up with what I call orderly liquidation. We are now giving the FDIC 5 years to resolve a firm. That means, if a large firm fails in this country, we have the possibility of the FDIC running a large financial holding company for 5 years. I think that is inappropriate. I do not think many Americans would view a government taking over an entity and running it for 5 years as actually resolving it out of business. Obviously, I am disappointed. I do think the chairman and others have tried to deal with resolution in a responsible manner. To me, it did not get to where it needed to go. On derivatives, I agree with the thrust of trying to make sure the derivatives activity that takes place in this country, that major participants actually have to clear and making sure that the plumbing of ensuring things are margined and that people are money bad on that day occurs. I think that is very appropriate. I am very concerned, on the other hand, with the fact that end users still feel--and I think there is still a lot of concern about end users being caught up in this legislation. I handed something to the chairman. I hope there are some clarifications that can occur before this bill actually becomes law. At present, here is what has happened. We have people on Wall Street, obviously, who deal with these on a daily basis. They need to clear. We have, on the other hand, people across this country who are part of our heartland who manufacture products, process products, who use derivatives to make sure metal prices down the road, if they are trying to make heavy equipment, do not fluctuate in such a way that they end up losing money. Maybe they are selling their goods to a company in another country, and they want to make sure the money they are being paid is in U.S. dollars. They might buy a currency swap. The way this legislation is now crafted, there is great question as to whether these people who are spread across this country, who create great manufacturing and other kinds of jobs, are going to be without capital. They are going to have to unnecessarily tie up capital which takes away from their ability to create jobs. For some reason, the Agriculture Committee sent over something called 106 or 716, which basically moves the swap desk out of a commercial bank into an affiliate, which means a whole new round of capitalization has to take place--again, money that is taken out of the markets at a time when we would hope these institutions would be creating loans. What happens when a company is trying to formulate capital? They go to an institution, a commercial bank. They may borrow or have a line of credit to make payroll or maybe even out payments. Their accounts receivable may be uneven. They go there and work out a line of credit. While they are doing that, they also deal with these other activities. They deal with currency swaps. They deal with making sure metal prices are hedged or other commodity prices. What this would do is alleviate the ability for an institution to use capital they already have. I am talking about the actual financial institution. It also makes it far less convenient and far more difficult, I might add, for those people across our country who create these great jobs from being able to do so. There is absolutely no reason for it. People on both sides of the aisle understand this is a problem. My sense is the chairman possibly believes this to be a problem. Yet we still have not dealt with that issue. If this bill passes, which it looks like it may in 3 or 4 hours, we have ended up doing something that accomplishes nothing as relates to financial stability in our country and yet creates a situation where there is less capital available for lending, and it is far more difficult for those institutions that are trying to form that capital. The one thing that is difficult for me to understand is why we did not take the time to deal with Fannie and Freddie. There are people in this body, on both sides of the aisle, who have concerns about these two GSEs against which we all know we have incredible liabilities. We had an amendment that I thought was thoughtful. That was the McCain amendment. It did not prescribe what we did with Fannie and Freddie, but it made sure we as a body dealt with them over the next couple years. We know they have been enablers because of their mixed messages with two divergent missions. They have created lots of problems for this country. They have enabled lots of bad things to happen in this country as relates to home mortgages. I also know they are a big part of the market and we have to deal with them over time. The McCain amendment gave us the ability to do that. This body chose not to deal with underwriting, the core issue, not to deal with creating a Bankruptcy Code that would work, in most cases--I am one of those who believes that even with that, we ought to have some ability to resolve, in the event there is a systemic risk--but we also did not deal with Fannie and Freddie. The credit rating amendment we added is a good step in the right direction. I voted for it. Again, we did not take the time, within our committee, to even understand what we ought to do with credit rating agencies. So we had an amendment that was drafted a day before a vote, and we voted on it. It is pretty draconian, but what it does mean--and I thank my friend from Florida for offering it--is that we will actually deal with credit rating agencies down the road. Right as this bill was in committee, something was sort of air- dropped out of the sky, and that was the Volcker language. Certainly, Chairman Volcker, who used to be head of the Federal Reserve--somebody I respect--came up with some language out of the blue that is a part of this bill. We had one hearing on it and the person who was the author of the Volcker language couldn't even describe to us exactly what he meant. I mean, he said you know it when you see it. So we are going to have this Volcker language, and we may need to do something on it, but I would hope we would have a neutral study first before we decide. In essence, we are doing something and sort of sending it off in a direction. I realize there is still a degree of study language, but we are sending it off in a direction when, in fact, prop trading--as much as people like to talk negative about it--and private equity and hedge funds had absolutely nothing to do with this last crisis. Nada, zero, not a single institution in this country was negatively affected by those activities--not one--as it relates to creating a systemic crisis. Yet, again, it is a part of this bill. I think these types of things go under the adage of what we have heard from the White House for the last year and a half; that is, ``never let a good crisis go to waste.'' Another area of concern is proxy access. I know the Senator from New York has been a proponent of proxy access. For those of you not paying much attention to this, what this means is, if you own a very small portion of a publicly traded company, you have access to their proxy documents and, therefore, you have the ability to call people to be voting on up to 25 percent of the board. To me, all this does is put board members of these companies in the same place we in the Senate and those in the House are in, and that is subject to political whims. You can imagine a special interest group, whether it be labor or an environmentalist group, basically targeting a company in order to make a statement; basically taking those board members away from dealing with the long-term interests of the company. By the way, proxy access has absolutely nothing, zero to do with financial regulation. But this has become a Christmas tree for those kinds of things because people realize it is something that is going to pass. I think the best example I can possibly imagine of using a piece of legislation or using a crisis to create something through legislation that is, in my opinion, way overreaching, is this consumer protection agency. I still am sort of shocked at where we have gone with this. I agree with people in this body that mortgage brokers in many cases took advantage of people who were borrowing money. I agree with that, and I think we ought to have a regulation to deal with that. But instead of dealing surgically with that particular issue, which is something that was a part--a small part but a part--of this crisis, what we have done is create another czar--a czar that has no board. This czar is appointed for 5 years and has absolutely no board, no governance, but does have the ability to create rules with no real veto authority. The agency will have the ability to enforce those rules, and it has a very generous budget. One of the worst issues regarding this agency is that it has the ability to deal with underwriting loans. So we have a consumer organization--not a banking regulator but a consumer organization--that is going to be dealing with underwriting of loans. I know this may sound a little far-fetched, but you can have the wrong person in this position--again, there is no board, no check and balance--and that person could use this organization to create social justice, if you will, in the financial system. On top of that, we have turned back from where we were in having a national banking system. Now we are allowing 50 State AGs across this country to take the rules that are created by this consumer czar, without veto--these rules we now will place on banks and other financial institutions across the country--and for the first time in a long time, these 50 AGs will have the ability to sue those firms over the rules this consumer organization writes--without any check and balance from Congress; certainly no real check and balance, in my opinion, from the prudential regulators that oversee the safety and soundness of these institutions. So, Madam President, I am obviously disappointed. I think I have spent as much time as any Senator on this floor--maybe slightly less than the chairman--on policy regarding our financial system and trying to make sure we create stability for the future. I think any bill--even this bill--has good things in it. There is no question. And I appreciate the thrust. But I think there is a lot of overreaching, and I think not enough time was spent on some of the core issues that are important. To add insult to injury, Madam President, this bill is not paid for. This bill is going to add $17 billion to $23 billion in debt to our country, and we haven't even addressed that in this bill. So I know there has been some discussion of bipartisanship, and I think certainly the chairman put out some effort toward bipartisanship, but I must say it has begun to feel, in many ways--not necessarily as it relates to this bill--that bipartisanship means everybody on the other side of the aisle, with maybe one or two exceptions, being supportive of something, and a few people, less than a handful, on our side of the aisle being supportive. That is not the kind of bipartisanship I thought we were all pushing for when this bill began. So I think the process on this floor has been good--on the Senate floor--but I do wish we had spent more time developing a bipartisan template. I think there have been plenty of missed opportunities. I am proud of the role I was able to play on this bill and believe I have had some input in its shaping, but I wish the policy was far different than it is. It is my hope that in the next 6 months or so there will be a little different balance in this body where we take each other a little more seriously than we now do, and we actually end up with centrist, middle-of-the-road policies. I know the President has to be very happy. It seems to me this bill, as it has turned out, is exactly the bill he talked about some time ago. I know it has to be a major victory for him. In my opinion, it is an overreach. I believe we could have done better, and I am regretful of the fact that we did not do better in the process. I think some steps were made, over the last month in particular, that I hope will cause this body to function better. Obviously, Madam President, I don't support this legislation and wish it could have been better. I think we have had opportunities where we could have made it better, but we didn't. I think over the course of the next decade we are going to be unwinding much of what we have done. It is my hope that in conference--and I think there is actually a possibility of this--many of the issues that are problematic will be unwound. As a matter of fact, I sense there is a desire to do that, and I hope that is the case. Madam President, I came to this body because I wanted to see good policies put in place for this country. I wanted to see us become a stronger country than we already are in the world--the greatest Nation on Earth. I hope, as this piece of legislation moves through conference and comes back to this body, it is strengthened. I did support amendments on this floor that made the bill better. I think some improvements were made, but I think we also stepped backwards in a number of cases. In spite of the outcome, Madam President, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for their efforts in trying to create a piece of legislation for this body.

Mr. CORKER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from Delaware, who is one of those Senators whom I truly enjoy working with. He truly does try to do responsible things in this body. I thank him for that. I enjoy working with him. I do think the Senator is trying to put an amendment in place that will pass, and I thank him for that. Again, I think a half a loaf is a half a loaf; it is not a whole loaf. But I hope everybody on my side of the aisle will support the Carper amendment. I hope everybody on this side of the aisle, obviously, will support the Corker amendment. I do wish to say that the Chamber of Commerce has just sent out a letter. I thought I would make everybody aware they are urging people to vote for both amendments also. As a matter of fact, they are key voting this. This is one of those issues they think is very important. The Chamber of Commerce, as you know, represents all kinds of small businesses across this country that are very concerned about this expansive bill, especially as it relates to consumer protection. Again, I wish to say one more time, an activist, if it turned out to be--my guess is, it will be; everything else in this administration leads me to believe this is going to be a fairly activist organization, OK--can write rules after the fact--after the fact--declaring a practice abusive. I don't know how many people think that is good practice, to write a rule after the fact determining that it is abusive--again, a very vague benchmark. I thank the Presiding Officer for the time. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for the way he has conducted business here on the floor. I certainly wish this was a 50-vote threshold instead of 60, but I realize those things have to take place. I thank him for the way he has conducted himself on the floor. I look forward to both of these amendments being voted on. I urge people on both sides of the aisle to support both amendments, as the Chamber of Commerce has said it does. Thank you very much. I yield my time.

Mr. CORKER. OK. Well, these front rooms back here. Let me just say, if I could: Look, the fact is, we had a bipartisan agreement that has been throttled back. There is a chance--I understand. That is what I am saying. I hope the cosponsors of this amendment will at least support it on the floor. I do not think there has been anything enlightening that has occurred--just the fact that, look, the White House has expressed opposition to this. I understand that, and that is the way things are when the White House is the White House. But what I would say is, the Senator from Connecticut specifically tried to get support for this consumer protection agency by saying that institutions under $10 billion in assets would not be enforced upon directly by this consumer protection agency. But what has happened as a result of the bill is the fact that now, instead of that, we now have State AGs--they are going to enforce against these very institutions on rules that emanate from these Federal statutes. So I would say that is a far worse situation for these community banks and credit unions. I know they view that as far worse from that standpoint. Then, on top of that, we have added language that is vague, language such as ``abusive'', where the AG has the ability to come in after the fact and basically break contracts if, in their view, they decide that something may have been abusive. Again, that is a very vague term. So what I would say to you is that, yes, you are embarking on new territory. You, in essence, are creating a consumer protection agency that has no board. It reports to one person, the President. It has a 5- year term. There is no veto--no veto--authority by the prudential regulators as it relates to the rules. Now you have State AGs all across the country who have the ability to enforce. I think that is a huge step in the wrong direction. I had hoped earlier--a couple months ago it seemed like we had a place that was far more middle of the road than this, that kept the State AGs in place, that allowed them to do the things with State laws they already have the power to do. But I think this is vastly expansive. I realize that with the people talking against my amendment who actually supported my amendment in the past, it is very unlikely my amendment is going to pass. I have heard people on my side of the aisle saying: Look, should we support Carper or not? It is just really not what ought to happen. I would say to my friends on this side: Yes, support the Senator's efforts. It is better than what exists. But there is no question in my mind--and let's face it, the issue that has divided this floor more than anything else is the fact that this consumer protection agency has been created the way it has been created. I think this rulemaking authority it has is the issue that has divided most of us. Now, without my amendment passing, again, what happens is, State AGs, interpreting these in different ways all across the country, will now be taking actions against these institutions on vague language such as ``abusive.'' I think that is inappropriate. I guess I have trouble understanding what that has to do with what we have just gone through. If underwriting is a problem, let's deal with underwriting. We tried to offer language that dealt with loans. That is the core of this crisis. But, no, we do not want to deal with that. We do not want any crisis to go to waste. We want to create another unfettered organization to get into the lives of Americans, to sort of take over, take over and deal with these kinds of things because we do not want any crisis to go to waste. So maybe the Senator from Connecticut was a little arisen a minute ago by me saying what I am saying. Look, the fact is, the White House is, I see, going to have its way probably. I still hope as many people as possible will vote for the Corker amendment. I certainly support the Carper amendment. I wish we had done a more balanced job on this issue. I think we would have far more bipartisan support. I thank the Presiding Officer for the time. I wish to withhold the remainder of my time in case there are other comments that are made. But I do hope the people who originally cosponsored my amendment would at least support it on the floor today.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. CORKER. OK.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I know we have two side-by-side amendments. I know the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Carper, has an amendment which, by the way, I hope everyone on my side of the aisle will support. It has to do with Federal preemption. I think it is a good amendment. I do not think it goes far enough. Let me speak to the differences. First of all, both the Carper amendment and the Corker amendment deal with the fact that if there is a Federal law relating to our banking system, that cannot be preempted, generally speaking, by State law. I think that is a good step in the right direction. Certainly, I commend Senator Carper for doing that. It is something that, by the way, our national banks obviously fully support. They want the ability to operate around the country and know that the rules of the road are basically going to be the same. Where the Carper amendment falls short, and my amendment deals with an issue, is the fact that there are 50 State AGs around the country who, as a result of the Dodd bill, are going to be turned loose on our community banks. What I mean by that is, the consumer protection agency, as it has been created in the Dodd bill, has no check and balance. It has a very large budget. It is renting space, if you will, at the Federal Reserve. So it has no prudential regulator that is overseeing the rules that it creates. This consumer protection agency has the ability to write rules with no veto authority against the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Then it has the ability to enforce those rules. A lot of my friends on the other side of the aisle, and certainly people on my side of the aisle, have sought to protect community banks from this consumer protection agency. Let's face it. A big part of that was to build political support for this bill so that community bankers all across our country would rally because they were not necessarily going to be directly under the enforcement of consumer protection. But the Dodd bill does something else that is very detrimental. That is why they still are very concerned. It allows the 50 State AGs around this country to take actions against credit unions, to take actions against community banks, based on the rules that this consumer protection agency creates. So here we are, we are going to create an organization that has no real check and balance against the rules that it writes. Then when it writes a rule, an AG in Tennessee or an AG in Alabama or an AG in Delaware or Connecticut can take action against a community bank over these rules. So it does not matter anymore that this consumer protection agency does not enforce directly against that. Instead, what we have is these AGs all around the country who now will be suing credit unions, suing small banks over rules this Federal agency is creating that has no check and balance against it. I find that very cumbersome. But to add to that, the Dodd bill adds language called ``abusive.'' In other words, there is a new standard that is going to be created and be the law of the land, a new standard called ``abusive'' that is very vague. By the way, this ``abusive'' language comes in after the fact. So what it means is, if party A and party B enter into a deal and an AG decides that under this abusive standard one party has been aggrieved--this is after the fact--then whatever contract they have entered into, if it was a loan, for instance, which is likely to be the case, that loan is totally done away with. You cannot enforce against it. I think this is one of the worst attributes of this bill. The fact that community bankers all across this country in some ways may have thought originally that they were not going to get caught up in this consumer protection agency--oh, no, that is not the case. The fact is, again, 50 AGs around this country--not based on statutes, based on rules--in other words, you know they have the enumerated statutes in this bill under which they can make rules. Then there has been some added in title X--the definition of ``abusive,'' which, again, is very vague, added into this. But this agency is an agency I believe is going to be very proactive, and I think that is why most people on the other side of the aisle are so excited about this. That is why the White House is very excited about this. They know this is another one of those cases--let no crisis go to waste. We have the opportunity now, because of this crisis, to create this czar, this czar that has no board, and under statutes that are already passed, and some that we are going to pass if this bill passes. This agency can then make rules. I want to say this one more time. They are going to make rules, and then every AG in the country is going to have the ability, after contracts have been entered into, to say: No, that is abusive, and to basically void those. This is going to create so much uncertainty out there. Again, to have an organization like this, unfettered, dealing with these types of issues, and then for the first time, for the first time in years, allowing those State AGs to take actions against some of these smaller institutions, I know people in Tennessee--it is not the people on Wall Street. I think we know CitiGroup and Goldman have all come out and said they support this bill. Why not? The big guys always do better when we create regulations. It is the small guys back in my State who have great concerns. I just want to say, this is one of the most dangerous and problematic attributes of this bill. So in the name of ensuring that our community banks and credit unions and other small institutions across our country are not abused, are not abused as it relates to this bill, what I hope will happen is that people will not only support the Carper amendment, which does half the job--when you have a bill like this, certainly I support half a loaf of improvement. I hope they will support the Carper amendment, but I hope my friends on the other side of the aisle will join what I believe will be almost everyone on this side of the aisle to ensure that those very people we talk about, talk about back home, do not have advantage taken of them by this consumer protection agency that is unfettered, that is going to write rules, that is going to give the ability to State AGs around this country to take actions against State banks, local banks, but also national banks, to take actions against them based on Federal rules--not just Federal laws, Federal rules. I will stop. I know my time is about up. This is a very commonsense amendment. I say to my friends on the other side of the aisle: I have offered no messaging amendments, none. I have tried to offer a few commonsense amendments to deal with frailties in this bill that I believe are real. I know there is a lot of stress on the other side of the aisle with everybody trying to hold together. I know the White House and Treasury are over here meeting in backrooms trying to keep people from supporting things that make common sense. I hope others will join with me to ensure that we don't allow this unfettered organization, this czar over consumer protection, to create rules that then put community banks and others at great risk and have the ability to break contracts after the fact based on very vague language that 50 AGs may interpret in very different ways on a case-by-case basis, in whatever mood they are in on that day. I think that is problematic. I yield the floor. Amendment No. 4071 to Amendment No. 3739 (Purpose: To address the applicability and preservation of certain State authorities, and for other purposes)

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I do hope the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Delaware will support my amendment, since they both cosponsored it originally. I know Treasury has been over and has had a talk with people back in these backrooms. I realize the White House has done that. While there may be discussions about ``striking the appropriate balance,'' the fact is, this was an amendment that had bipartisan support until that occurred. Let me just say----

Mr. CORKER. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. CORKER. Well, it was these rooms back here.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I hope I have the good fortune our Senator from Kansas just had. I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4034.

Mr. CORKER. If I could, I haven't really noticed that much desire to please each other around here, but I do thank you for the fact that it is a 50-vote threshold. I had been told prior to coming down that it was 60, so thank you for that. But I do hope people will try to please both sides of the aisle by voting for both amendments. Thank you very much.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Alabama for the work he has done in trying to craft a bankruptcy title that more fully suits financial institutions. This body is an interesting body because you don't have the chance to do anything but vote yes or no on particular pieces of legislation. Just last week, the Republicans--all Republicans--had a filibuster while they waited for the leaders on each side of the Banking Committee to reach a compromise, and it was supported, I think, 94 or 96 to 1. That compromise was on title II, the orderly liquidation title. So here we have an amendment that basically is to strike something this body, in essence, adopted 96 to 0. I spent a lot of time on that title myself working with Mark Warner. I appreciate greatly the partnership we had working on a resolution title. I thank Senator Shelby and Senator Dodd for the work they did to try to improve that title, and we held out on this side until that occurred. So now we have a vote, the Sessions vote, that would strike that. I wish to say, I am at the point in this bill where I am under no illusion that the bill is going to get any better. I know there are a lot of messaging amendments that will begin to take place, and many of us will have the opportunity, through our votes, to express how we may feel about certain aspects of this bill. When Senator Warner and I were working on the resolution, it was with the intent that bankruptcy be the default. That would be the place where almost every financial institution would go. There may be that rare instance--that rare instance--when resolution was necessary, but it would be due to some systemic risk. It was our hope the Judiciary Committee would actually develop a title that would allow that to happen, but it did not take place. As a matter of fact, many of the judicial reviews that Senator Warner and I wanted to see take place in the resolution title did not occur. There is no judicial review overpayments by the FDIC or those kind of things that we would like to see as part of the rule of law in this country. Well, let me not speak for him--that I would like to see. What has happened is, we have developed a resolution title that was to be used only very rarely because we had hoped a bankruptcy title would be developed that financial companies would go into. That hasn't happened. So what does that mean? That means it is far more likely--far more likely--the resolution title would actually be used instead of bankruptcy. The fact is, I am under no illusion that Senator Sessions' amendment is going to pass. As a matter of fact, I doubt seriously the amendment is going to pass. My intent, in voting for the Sessions amendment, is not to say I disavow the work Senator Shelby and Senator Dodd did. It is not to disavow the work Senator Warner and I spent a great deal of time working on. It is to say I do believe, as part of this bill, we should have done the work necessary to make sure there was a bankruptcy title that would work for financial institutions. That has not been done. I wish to thank Senator Sessions for giving us the opportunity to voice the fact that we believe the Bankruptcy Code in this country should be made so it works far better for financial institutions. I would like for this to have been melded in a little differently than the way the Senator is putting it forth, but I wish to thank him for his work and to signify my intent to support his amendment on the basis of the fact that the bill, the way it has been crafted, should have respected judicial review more than it has been; and secondly, the fact that we should have, as part of this thoughtful process, done something in this bill to greatly expand the ability of the judicial system to deal with a large, highly complex financial company. I yield the floor.

Mr. CORKER. I thank the Senator. I know I spent a great deal of time on the floor. I thank the Senator from Connecticut. First, I thank him for the work he did to make the resolution title better. I know that after he and Senator Shelby finished, I came down and thanked him but expressed concerns about the fact that many of the judicial reviews that I believed were important were not included. Yet the bill was better, and I thank the Senator for that. I realize that in this body, as I said that day on the floor, nothing ever works out exactly as you wish. This bill is not going to be exactly the way the Senator would wish. We are going to pass a bill that, to me, is incomplete. One of the things I think all of us, including the Senator from Connecticut, had hoped would occur is that the Judiciary Committee would actually work on a title that would make the resolution title much less necessary because it would enhance the ability to deal with these complex financial companies. That has not happened. I know we have not dealt with Freddie and Fannie in this bill. I know you would have liked to have dealt with that. I hope you would have liked to. We are not going to deal with it. You are going to be leaving this body after a distinguished career here. But I think what we are trying to say is that, look, we still have work to do. The Judiciary Committee has to develop a better bankruptcy title for financial companies, and I think all scholars have said that is the case. There is no question that we have to deal with Fannie and Freddie. We will do that soon, I hope. I know the outcome of this, and the Senator knows what the outcome of this is going to be. I think there are numbers of us who would just like to see us really focus on this bankruptcy title to do--what you just said is exactly right, and that is that resolution is only used rarely. But right now, the way the Bankruptcy Code is, it is going to be used in every case one of these large companies fails because we haven't done the work we need to do to make the Bankruptcy Code work.

Mr. CORKER. Will the Senator yield for a couple of minutes over here? I know we are under time anyway.

Mr. CORKER

Mr. CORKER. I yield back our time.