Alfonse D’Amato

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today, on behalf of myself and Senator Moynihan, to introduce the Saudi Arabian Arms Sales Limitation Act of 1995. This legislation is designed to rectify a wrong that has been placed on an American company with New York roots by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, this legislation would modify section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export and Control Act to require congressional oversight and scrutiny of all arms sales to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until such time as the Secretary of State certifies and reports to Congress that the unpaid claims of American companies described in the June 30, 1993 report by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 9140(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1993-- Public Law 102-396; 106 Stat. 1939--have been resolved satisfactorily. This would also include the additional claims noticed by the Department of Commerce on page 2 of the report. The claim of a New York company, Gibbs & Hill, Inc., falls under this legislation. The company, which was a large employer in New York, sought to have its claim paid through the special claims process established for the resolution of claims of American companies which had not received fair treatment in their commercial dealing with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Gibbs & Hill claim is the last remaining unpaid claim awaiting resolution under the special claims process. Gibbs & Hill was decimated by financial losses incurred in the design of the desalination and related facilities for the Yanbu industrial city in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970's and early 1980's as a result of the kingdom's failure to honor its contractual obligations and pay for work done for the company. Myself and many of my colleagues wrote to Saudi Ambassador, Bandar bin Sultan, who has authority to pay the claim, to express my concern that outstanding United States commercial claims be successfully resolved. In particular, I stated my concern that American companies may learn of the difficulties faced by United States firms in their efforts to achieve just settlements of their disputes and may become reluctant to do business in Saudi Arabia thereby depriving both countries of a valuable form of business exchange. Now, we have the opportunity to conclude the special claims process established in 1992 for the resolution of claims of American companies for work in the kingdom. The kingdom has made a series of commitments to our Government to favorably resolve the claim for Gibbs & Hill. These commitments date from April 1993 and were reiterated both in Washington and in Riyadh on the eve of the gulf crisis, October 7, 1994, when our Nation once again come to the kingdom's rescue. While we saved the kingdom's assets once again, Gibbs & Hill has yet to be paid. Administration officials, and numerous Senators and Members of Congress have repeatedly expressed their concern that this claims issue be successfully concluded through payment to Gibbs & Hill. The delaying tactics of the kingdom, which stands in stark contrast to our immediate response to their needs, can no longer be tolerated. Further delay simply casts a shadow over our bilateral relationship that eclipses the good-faith efforts which we have exerted together on the claims issue and indeed on all issues. I urge my colleagues in the Congress to support this legislation. I also hope that the ensuing discussion of this legislation will focus on additional measures to ensure that the unfair treatment of Gibbs & Hill in its commercial dealings with the Saudi Arabian Government during the course of performing its work on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government, as well as under the special claims process, is not repeated. It is with the realization of the past unfair treatment of firms such as Gibbs & Hill that I offer this legislation in an effort to fully scrutinize our commercial dealings with the kingdom until such time as the kingdom demonstrates its intention to honor its obligations and commitments. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my support for the Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995. Our colleagues in the House recently passed this legislation. It is a product of bipartisan cooperation and is intended as a temporary measure to deal with an urgent situation. As chairman of the Banking Committee, I believe that immediate action is warranted. I would therefore encourage my colleagues to consider and pass H.R. 1380 immediately. Mr. President, I made reference to an ``urgent situation.'' The situation to which I refer is the potential for devastating liability that threatens our housing finance system in the wake of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Rodash versus AIB Mortgage Co. The Rodash decision has resulted in a wave of litigation and created a threat of wholesale rescissions of mortgages. The threat of rescissions on so massive a scale could wreck havoc on our mortgage lending system and the secondary mortgage markets. If a class-action rescission is granted, every class member would be released from their mortgage lien, and the obligation to pay finance charges and other charges. Class members would also be entitled to reimbursement of all finance charges, as well as other charges that are outside the scope of the finance charge. The 3-year right of rescission in truth in lending entitles the borrower to reimbursement of these charges. The potential for massive rescissions, based on technical disclosures errors of as little as $10, creates a potential for liability that has The granting of wholesale rescissions, and the liability that such rescissions would create, could be devastating to both mortgage lenders, and to the secondary markets that provide the mortgage-market with liquidity. And we must remember that the liquidity of the mortgage markets has helped millions of Americans obtain their dream of home ownership at lower costs. This bill will permit time for careful consideration of this problem. This legislation provides a short-term moratorium that only applies to class action certifications in connection with certain first-lien refinancings and consolidations. This moratorium is narrowly focused on a specific, technical disclosure problems, and will last only until October 1, 1995. This provision is not intended to impede the settlement of class actions. If, for purposes of settlement, the parties stipulate to the certification of a class, a court can approve the stipulation and solely for the purposes of settlement, can certify the class. A class action cannot be settled without certification of the class. This moratorium will provide time to remedy this problem and ensure the continued safety-and-soundness of the mortgage-finance markets.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Health Insurance Portability and Guaranteed Renewability Act of 1995. I am pleased to be joined by Senators Inhofe and Hatch an introducing this important legislation. President Clinton, in his 1993 joint session address, said that ``Millions of Americans are just a pink slip away from losing their health insurance, and one serious illness away from losing all their savings.'' While the President's statement was right, his prescription for reform--as the American people told us in no uncertain terms--was dead wrong. We must find a way to give Americans greater health security without turning the whole system over to the Federal Government, as the President had proposed. We must address the public's insecurities regarding their health insurance while preserving what works in the American health care system and allowing the free market to work. That is why I am today introducing the Health Insurance Portability and Guaranteed Renewability Act of 1995. This is a bill which I am confident will go a long way toward accomplishing these goals. First, our bill would eliminate job lock by guaranteeing that people who change jobs will be covered by their new employer's plan without regard to preexisting medical conditions. It will expand COBRA to provide for continuation of coverage for all individuals employed by firms of two or more employees, and extends COBRA coverage from 18 to 36 months. Therefore, employees losing their jobs will have the opportunity to continue their health coverage for an additional 18 months under their current plan. Present COBRA law benefits only those employers with more than 20 employees. It will help control health costs by changing the tax law to allow tax-free medical savings accounts. Empirical evidence demonstrates that medical saving accounts can control costs and promote wellness without jeopardizing quality of care. Money saved in such accounts by employees can be used to pay COBRA premiums, if needed. It will provide a safety net for people who cannot qualify for health insurance by giving them access to health insurance through high-risk pools. Finally, it will prevent insurance companies from singling out any individual or small group for rate increases or cancellation based on claims experience. I believe this bill goes a long way toward giving the American people what they want--greater health security without a Big Government takeover of our Nation's health care system. The fact that it can be implemented without new taxes, and without adding to the deficit, is further reason that the Health Insurance Portability and Guaranteed Renewability Act of 1995 should be enacted without delay.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. I recognize the situation and the dilemma that the Senate finds itself in in confronting the necessity of moving forward with this bill. I recognize that we are moving up against a time deadline. Mr. President, I am going to say now that I am not going to pursue this amendment for two reasons. Number one, I do not want to be accused of scuttling a very difficult agreement that has been worked out, where other of my colleagues have stepped back, and insist that I be the only one that goes forward. Having said that, I want to indicate very clearly that this Senator is deeply troubled by the manner in which we are discharging our constitutional responsibility as it relates to Mexico and the attempt of this administration to help them. And I want to help. But this Senator wants to see to it that the dollars that we are committing are used appropriately. I think at the very least we are entitled to the kind of accountability that we would be if it were a foreign aid program and even more since it is a clear circumvention of the manner in which foreign loans should be made. To that extent, I suggest that the second-degree amendment which was offered by Senator Murkowski is absolutely, totally appropriate; that the legislative initiatives undertaken by Congressman Cox should be, without question, something that is carried out in terms of making information available to us as it relates to what preceded the crisis in Mexico before it became public and the collapse of the Mexican economy. What was our role and what has been our role since then? And what do we anticipate as we move along? Again, I will press this matter. I do not claim that the legislative initiative that I have undertaken should be adopted in its present form, but I do believe that when we are talking about sending billions of dollars, taxpayers' dollars, to a program that may or may not work-- and the administration has testified before the Banking Committee that it may not work--that we have an absolute obligation to know what is taking place and how it is administered, at the very least. I do not think that those who say this is without doubt within the administration's prerogative would deny us that. I believe that is giving tremendous latitude. When we come back from our recess, undoubtedly billions of dollars more of American moneys will have been placed into this program. The question as to whether or not we will ever have repayment is a very legitimate question. But how far do we go, in a very important but a very risky undertaking; how far do we go before we say, ``Wait, this may not be working''? Do we leave this just in the prerogative of the Secretary of the Treasury to determine if it is working, or should we not at the very least have that information? Mr. President, I tell the majority leader that I will move forward by way of legislation, if necessary, to at least obtain that information, obtain the facts. And, in addition thereto, if we find, and if I am not convinced, that the program is working or that there is a chance of us recovering moneys, I will then move by legislative action again to accomplish the things that I have said before on this floor and to cut off further dollars. By the time we come back, there is no doubt in my mind that we will have committed directly from the United States probably in the area of $10 billion or more. That is a lot of money. We are working on a rescission package to try to save money. We certainly, at the very least, are entitled to know that those dollars are being used wisely, appropriately, and that there is some chance of success, a bona fide chance of success. That is what troubles this Senator. So with that statement, I will say that I do want to accommodate my colleagues, but I also want them to know that there may be more legislation moving through this Senate, and I reserve the right, as all of us have that right, to move forward with this initiative. It will be at a time when there is legislation that may be critical, that the administration needs or that people are interested in. I will not move on a piece of legislation that is not critical and therefore be denied bringing this matter to a vote. At some point in time, it is my belief that this Congress and this Senate should be required to vote as to whether or not we should continue this program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the pending amendment, amendment No. 427.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, two mornings ago I gave a radio interview on the Imus talk show program. I am here on the Senate floor to give a statement as it relates to that episode. It was a sorry episode. Mr. President, as an Italian-American, I have a special responsibility to be sensitive to ethnic stereotyping. I fully recognize the insensitivity of my remarks about Judge Ito. My remarks were totally wrong and inappropriate. I know better. What I did was a poor attempt at humor. I am deeply sorry for the pain I have caused Judge Ito and others. I offer my sincere apologies. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I submit a sense-of-the-Senate resolution condemning the violent suppression of a protest in Southern Teheran yesterday by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the political militia. The protesters were demonstrating against the doubling of public transportation, gasoline, basic foodstuffs, and drinking water. When the protesters gathered in the morning of April 4, 1995, their numbers were few. By the afternoon, the crowd swelled to over 100,000. According to Iranfax, a daily brief on Iranian affairs, the crowd overwhelmed police who were shooting tear gas at them and seized their weapons. As the protests spread to other districts in Teheran, the Government called out the Revolutionary Guards and the Bassidj, a political militia, to quell the riots. Soon, helicopter gunships and troops arrived and began to fire into the crowds. According to the latest reports, at least 150 people died in the attacks. We have no way of knowing how many were injured. Owing to the order of last year that allowed for a shoot-to-kill policy by government troops against civilians, this outcome should have been expected. Nor should this be surprising because it came from this terrorist regime. Any government willing to do this to its own people, will have no qualms about killing and maiming foreigners. This is why Iran is so dangerous. This resolution is simple. It requests that the President immediately condemn this brutal act and instruct the United States Ambassador to the United Nations to bring this matter before the Security Council with the intent of pursuing a Security Council condemnation of Iran. Mr. President, we cannot allow Iran to slaughter its people. This brutal regime has abused the human rights of so many people, inside its country and outside. The time for their atrocious abuses to end is now. I hope that my colleagues join me in support of this important resolution.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise to briefly discuss Iran. While this administration contemplates its next move regarding Iran, the brutal terrorist regime in Iran is plotting its next move. Will it reinforce its troops on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf, or will it add to its weapons stocks in the region? Only the regime in Teheran knows. What we do know, is that this band of terrorists is planning an offensive military buildup. It is planning for the projection of its aggressive actions even further in the region. This administration should take this to heart and not appease these terrorists like it did with the dictators in Pyongyang. What the administration should do is support my legislation banning all trade with Iran and place sanctions on those foreign corporations that continue to trade with Iran. To this end, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, following the text of my remarks, the February 1995 edition of the Focus on Iran. This publication details current events in Iran, with this particular issue centering on Iran's ongoing efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. This is a vitally important issue and this important brief will shed further insight into a dangerous regime bent on violence and aggression.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. D'AMATO. Greece.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the legislation sponsored by my esteemed colleague from Maine, Senator Cohen, to reform the legal doctrine known as D'Oench, Duhme. This doctrine has been expanded by banking agencies and courts far beyond it original intent. D'Oench, Duhme robs citizens of legal defenses after they have been defrauded by their lending institutions, and those institutions have, in turn, been taken over by the FDIC and RTC. In 1942, the Supreme Court decided D'Oench, Duhme & Co. versus FDIC. D'Oench, Duhme & Co.--``D'Oench''--executed unconditional promissory notes to the Bellville Bank & Trust Co. O'Oench entered into a secret agreement with the bank that the notes would not be called for payment. In 1938, the bank failed and the FDIC acquired the notes. The FDIC demanded payment and learned of the secret agreement. The Court held that the notes were enforceable and dismissed the agreement between D'Oench and the bank. In 1950, Congress attempted to codify the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [FDIA]. The statute set forth requirements for agreements which would defeat the interest of the FDIC in an asset of an acquired institution. Such agreements are unenforceable unless they are in writing, have been formally recorded in bank records, and have been approved by the bank's board of directors. The statute expanded the D'Oench decision by allowing the FDIC to use the doctrine against borrowers who did not commit fraud or enter into a secret agreement. However, the statute limited the doctrine by applying it only to the FDIC's interest in an acquired asset. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was originally adopted to protect taxpayers from secret agreements between banks and borrowers. Narrowly construed, D'Oench, Duhme allows the FDIC and RTC to collect on an institution's loans and save taxpayer dollars. Unfortunately, the doctrine has been distorted into a weapon against innocent fraud victims. Under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, courts have routinely ignored the asset requirement for consideration. Courts have also regularly applied the doctrine to innocent borrowers who did not commit fraud or enter into secret agreements. Some courts have granted the FDIC and RTC the status of holder in due course. A party who gains this status takes an instrument free from virtually any defenses. Therefore, a holder in due course is immune to a defense of fraud in the inducement, as well as any of the other personal defenses. It makes no sense to punish fraud victims for the misconduct of their lending institution, but that is exactly what the doctrine does. The Federal banking agencies have zealously applied the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. Cleaning services and other private vendors have not been paid because the agencies have used the doctrine to avoid making payments to them. Innocent small businesses should not be left bankrupt because the institution which hired them was taken over by the FDIC and RTC. ensure that fraud victims can assert valid legal defenses. Claims commenced before the appointment of an agency as receiver would not be cut short by D'Oench, Duhme. Fraud claims could be asserted after the appointment of an agency only if the party asserting the claim did not participate in any part of the fraud. Under this bill, the Federal banking agencies could not gain the status of a holder is due course unless they meet the requirements for such status under the applicable state law. Agreements made by a lending institution for the purchase of goods and services would be enforceable against the FDIC and RTC. The D'Oench, Duhme Reform Act would not automatically grant relief to people who claim they were defrauded. Secret agreements would remain unenforceable. This bill would simply give fraud victims their day in court. Mr. President, innocent people are losing their homes and businesses. Hardworking, honest people are defrauded, and then they are victimized again by the banking agencies. The FDIC and RTC are railroading these people into foreclosure. This practice is grossly unfair and must be stopped. Mr. President, the D'Oench, Duhme Reform Act will do just that.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I will be delighted.

Mr. D'AMATO

Mr. D'AMATO. I thank my friend and colleague. Just so that we understand, and I know every utterance that we make we like sometimes for people to pick up--usually they pick up the ones we do not want them to pick up--but on the 31st, I did have a hearing. And at that hearing, I indicated my very strong concern about this. I indicated that I did not think we were doing the right thing. I indicated that I would withhold saying anything further until we can get more facts, in terms of the implementation. That was on the 31st. On the 8th, I came out about 8, 9 days thereafter raising very strong positions and concerns in regard to the manner in which we were moving forward. I just share that with my friend and colleague because this Senator did not want to be an obstructionist, yet I was not afraid to express my concerns. I just share that.

Mr. D'AMATO. Will my colleague yield for an observation?

Mr. D'AMATO. Let me conclude, and I know my colleague has been patient--he wants to ask a question or make a statement--and I am going to sit down or be available to answer his question. Let me conclude by saying this. I am very willing to withdraw this amendment, if we can agree to a time certain so that we can have a full debate. And if we want more than 5 hours or 10 hours or 15 or 20 hours or 24 hours, I have no problem with that. But I think it is fair and I think it is our responsibility to the American people that we have a time certain for a vote, otherwise I can assure my colleagues that there will be a piece of legislation that will be moving through the administration will want. If I am placed in the position that this is the only way that I can get a vote, that the American people who are my constituents from Rochester and Syracuse and Buffalo and Long Island, the people who I represent, the people who say they are opposed to this, there will be another time. Now, I am willing to set up a time. I am willing to withdraw, because it is fact of life. We have to get this important business through. Let us set it aside for Monday. Let us set it aside for Tuesday. Let us pick out an appropriate length of time and come to a vote. I have no illusions. My colleagues who are concerned do not want to be blamed for the collapse. I understand that. And I say Mexico has collapsed already. You will have an opportunity to vote for or against my bill. I will do that. There are a number of Senators who have said it is inappropriate to bring it up here. Fine. I will be willing--and I leave this to my colleagues on the other side--to work out a time when we can bring it up and have a vote, and I will not say anything more on that. I thank my colleagues for giving me the courtesy of this response.

Mr. D'AMATO. They have been supportive of this, as I have indicated to you, in terms of this program, in terms of calling it essential, and I disagree respectfully.

Mr. D'AMATO. Well, they have been solicited. Indeed, the Secretary of the Treasury is adamantly opposed to this legislation. But let me say I am adamantly distressed, deeply distressed at the manner in which taxpayers' funds have been used to date. The lack of accountability-- and I am not suggesting bad faith, but just as the process has evolved, the lack of accountability, and the accountability that we do have, leaves me very, very distressed. I would like to know how it is that we can justify, when we are here making these cuts, that we are going to send more money down while the Mexican Government keeps printing pesos, they keep printing them and we think that we are going to help the economy and we are going to help the Mexican people by just shoveling money out in a manner that lacks business prudence. I will tell you, you can have all the highfalutin people in the world to say this is important, this is good; they are not signing the notes. They are not making this their own business deal. They would never enter into a situation like this. There is no real collateral. There is no lien against that oil. As one of my colleagues said, you would have to send in the 82d Airborne if you wanted to try to exercise that. We know that is ridiculous. So while it sounds good and while it may be well-intentioned--and I do not question the motivation for a minute--two things strike me. No. 1, it has not been carried out in a businesslike, prudent manner. No. 2, we have the constitutional obligation that we cannot and should not delegate to the administration as it relates to the expenditure of these sums. The legalistics that have been turned around to give us this so- called jurisdiction and the opinions that came from the Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department and the counsel of the Treasury are mind-boggling: You would really have to say that this is not a foreign aid package. Of course, it is a foreign aid package; you would really have to say that this loan is so collateralized that there is no chance that it will fail. Nobody can tell you that, even the administration. They say, ``Well, we don't think it will.'' And that itself flies in the face of the underlying legal opinion that says you can do this.

Mr. D'AMATO. Certainly. Let me complete this. In addition to the money that has come from the World Bank, and I believe that we will be getting ready, from what I understand, to draw down on billions more from the United States. Now, this is an unprecedented use of the fund, and, yes, Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich have indicated that they wanted to help and they were supportive. Let me remind my colleagues in fairness to Senator Dole-- colloquy. My questions have been answered. It would seem to me, in a sense of fairness, indeed, the Senate would want to know what would be the views of Mr. Greenspan, perhaps the Secretary of Treasury, and others specifically addressing the Senator's proposal. Will those responses be available or have they been solicited?

Mr. D'AMATO. We are. We are the principal casualty as it relates to the cash flow. And let me assure the Senator where we were initially told in briefings which the Senator attended that there would be no risk, that we would not have to put up any money, now we are hearing, well, certainly there is some risk, and now we are hearing, yes, there is $5 billion. I remember when the head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, said--and I respect him tremendously--if you have to start a drawdown on these funds the program is not working. Well, we have drawn down $5 billion, in addition to the money from the IMF.

Mr. D'AMATO. It was the administration. It has been as high as the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and others in the Treasury Department. And it is because we were told that they just went along on the basis that it cannot be done, you cannot ascertain who the people are. Well, let me tell you something. That is nonsense. They never made that a priority. So you can say well, why are you complaining now? We complained before they started the repurchase of these agreements, we complained about it while they were doing it, and we are complaining about it now. And now $5 billion have been expended. How much more before we say we do question the adequacy of the manner in which these dollars were being used? I do not question for one moment the good intentions, indeed, of congressional leadership, Republicans, Democrats. This Senator said certainly we have a special obligation as it relates to Mexico and its stability. But, my gosh, we have an obligation to be realistic and to see that these funds are being used appropriately, that we are getting the most for our money. How does repaying a Eurobond or how does the repurchasing of a tesobono from someone from Germany or Japan or from the United States dollar for dollar plus 20-percent interest in some cases, 25 percent interest in other cases, how does that benefit the Mexican worker, the Mexican economy? Do we really think that as a result of our purchasing these agreements people are now going to rush to Mexico and put money back in there? I think you have to be rather naive to think so.

Mr. D'AMATO. No. Unfortunately, we will not learn for at least a year who the holders of these bearer bonds were, and only then maybe as it relates to those citizens of the United States. Obviously, we have no way to know. And this is one of the things that we brought up before this agreement was implemented. Who are the holders of these Eurobonds? Who are the holders of the tesobonos? We were told that we could not get that information. Now, it seems to me that if we are going to make American dollars available we had a right, that our Treasury people had a right to say we want to see who they are and we want to negotiate with them. We want to see if we cannot restructure the repayment so that instead of paying it all plus 20 percent, we would restructure on the basis of maybe 60 cents on a dollar, 70 cents on a dollar, or maybe pay it over a period of time. Now, that would have been--and that, by the way, was suggested by Bill Seidman, former head of RTC, the former head of the FDIC, who said it makes sense to restructure. Do not just shovel out American money dollar for dollar. And my friend from Virginia touched exactly on it. To date, when we have asked for the records, when we have asked how this money has been used, we are told, ``We don't know.'' As it relates to who received it; they were bearer bonds, ``We don't know.'' They knew the Congress wanted this information.

Mr. D'AMATO. We finally have a plan that has been put forth as it relates to the utilization of these dollars. We know that Eurobonds, we know that tesobonos have been facilitated as a result of repurchasing them by the Government. We know that the loan programs, the Mexican Government has received and been the beneficiary of these dollars. And we also recognize that the economy, notwithstanding the claims that it has moved forward--as a matter of fact, the stock market yesterday in Mexico dropped 1.2 percent--we understand marginal movements up and down. But the fact is that some of the so-called petroleum reserves that are going to be used as collateral--there is a very real question about whether or not during the lifetime of these loans, there will be sufficient collateral or revenues available. We have learned that there is great civil unrest as it relates to the people of Mexico, and that they are angered at the United States for imposing these conditions in terms of raising interest rates, raising tax rates; a 50-percent consumer tax increase, from 10 to 15 percent. So we are aware of that. We are also aware that we have not received the kind of information that foreign investment is returning, which is the cornerstone of this so-called economic recovery, if it is to take place. We have also learned that it is very doubtful that in the months ahead, they are going to be able to deal with short-term as well as long-term repayment schedules. We are talking about $170-billion-plus which the Mexican Government owes; $70 billion short term. I say to my friend and colleague, $50 billion worth of guarantees does not stop or is not sufficient as it relates to the repayment of $70 billion worth of short-term Mexican debt this year. That we have learned. We have also learned, unfortunately, in the tabloids, of the incredible unrest and, yes, the incredible instability of the institutions to be able to perform and to carry out any kind of meaningful transformation. We know, for example, that the oil monopoly, PEMA, cannot and will not be producing at a rate today that it is in the future. That does not portend good things. We know that capital will not be made available because the Mexican people, and indeed the Mexican Government, understands that you cannot look to the free enterprise system as it relates to the oil monopoly which does have vast value. So the premise upon which these agreements were made--by the way, we do know that billions of dollars' worth of investments that were made have been paid. They have been paid by U.S. taxpayer dollars redeeming speculative investments.

Mr. D'AMATO. Yes.

Mr. D'AMATO. In an attempt, Mr. President, to move the process, I have attempted to work out an agreement with my colleagues who share a concern as it relates to the inadequacy of time to debate this very important legislative proposal. I must say to you, I have no disagreement with providing ample time. Yet, if we were to have more extensive debate--and we have had 3 hours plus--I recognize that would impede us from going forward on this important legislative initiative. Therefore, it is in that spirit, that spirit with my colleagues, that I have indicated I am willing to withdraw this amendment at this time, to offer it as a freestanding resolution, to bring it up Monday at noon or anytime thereafter, to have extensive debate, to divide the time equally, and to have a time certain to vote--for a reasonable time, to put in 5 hours equally divided. But by no means am I suggesting that it should be limited to 5 hours if 6 hours is necessary or 7 hours or 8 or 10 hours or 12 hours or 24 hours. But at some point in time I want to be assured, because of the importance of this, that we have a vote, that my colleagues truly have an opportunity to vote. Indeed, this may not carry. I have no illusions. I think probably it will be defeated. I have a sense that there are lots of my colleagues who would just as soon stay out of this situation. They will let the President do it, and if Mexico deteriorates, we did not do anything. That is what is taking place. I think it is a question of our constitutional responsibility. We are talking about making billions--by the way, I did not have sufficient time to respond as it relates to the appropriateness of this measure. We are talking about rescissions of $14 billion. Here is $20 billion going to Mexico; $5 billion has already gone down. Another $5-billion- plus will go down in the next 2 or 3 weeks, or 4 weeks. If you want to talk about aid, I want to give aid to the communities that need it. Orange County, I would rather give them a loan guarantee with this money. How about the District of Columbia? Let us help them. In my State, we have a $4 billion deficit we inherited. Let us help them out. Then, after that--that only accounts for $4 billion, $2 billion, $6 billion, $7 billion--then let us give the other $13 billion to deficit reduction, if you want to help. Talk about relevance. I mean, if the Senators come and say they are concerned about the children, if you are concerned about the children, here is the opportunity to give them that money instead of shipping it away. I think it is very relevant why we are cutting back programs over here in this country. We are supposed to say no; we should not have the responsibility for voting on an appropriations which is an appropriation as it relates to bailing out another country-- unprecedented. By the way, this fund has never been used for any countries that some of my colleagues--Israel has never been a beneficiary of this. The United Kingdom has never been a beneficiary of this. Only one country has ever gone up to $1 billion: Mexico. They paid that back in 12 months. When I hear people telling me, ``Oh, my god. It will be the end of the world if we do not have this authority,'' unprecedented circumvention of the constitutional responsibilities of this Congress. Let me tell you, if you do not want to vote on it, but you will have to vote on it, do we say that this is the way to do business? By the way, I respect people who say, ``Alfonse, we have to do something to help Mexico.'' Let us do it the right way. If it means we have to get a majority of our colleagues to vote to appropriate, then let us do it in that manner.

Mr. D'AMATO. Yes, the quorum call was called off. The quorum call was called off. The Senator yielded the floor and I am making a statement. I believe I have the floor.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, let me say that I am desirous of attempting to accommodate my colleagues, particularly the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, and those who are interested.