Tom Daschle

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. General Butler summarizes his experience in the following terms: I came to a set of deeply unsettling judgments. That from the earliest days of the nuclear era, the risks and consequences of nuclear war have never been properly weighed by those who brandished it. That the stakes of nuclear war engage not just the survival of the antagonists, but the fate of mankind. That the likely consequences of nuclear war have no politically, militarily, or morally acceptable justification. And therefore, that the threat to use nuclear weapons is indefensible. General Butler goes on to note that for much of the Cold War period up to the present, America's massive nuclear arsenal was justified and sustained on the basis of a single concept: deterrence. However, his experience and analysis led him to the inherent flaw in the concept of deterrence. Deterrence failed completely as a guide in setting rational limits on the size and composition of military forces. To the contrary, its appetite was voracious, its capacity to justify new weapons and larger stocks unrestrained. Deterrence carried the seed . . . that spurred an insatiable arms race. Mr. President, the consequences of this paradox remain with us today--despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Consider where the world is with respect to nuclear weapons as we approach the end of the 20th century--over 50 years since man developed the first nuclear device. First, the United States and Russia together still field nearly 15,000 strategic nuclear weapons--each with a destructive power tens or hundreds of times greater than the nuclear devices that brought World War II to a close. The closest rival, friend or foe, has less than 500 strategic weapons. Second, the United States and Russia each still deploy large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. According to unclassified sources, the United States has about 500 to 1,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons, and the Russians have about 4,000. Third, both the United States and Russia continue to operate large numbers of their strategic weapons, roughly 5,000 weapons between them, on a high level of alert, ready to be launched at a moment's notice. As noted by Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. Bruce Blair, ``while [this] practice may have been necessary during the Cold War, today it constitutes a dangerous anachronism.'' Fourth, the United States and Russia continue to adhere to nuclear plans that permit the first use of nuclear weapons and allow for the launch of weapons after receiving warning of attack but before incoming warheads detonate. Mr. President, this is truly a very troubling state of affairs, made all the more so by the fact that the Cold War has dissipated and our major adversary during this period, the Soviet Union, has long since ceased to exist. General Butler's conclusion is that the United States and the world should aspire to the abolition of all nuclear weapons. General Butler makes a very compelling case for this lofty yet pragmatic goal. And, as General Butler will be the first to note, it is not one that can be quickly or easily achieved. It will essentially require putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle and being able to verify that no country tries to let it out. This is a very difficult task to say the least, and one that ultimately may not be achievable. But that is no reason not to try. There is an old saying that, if you shoot for the stars and miss, you still could hit the moon. If in shooting for the ultimate objective of nuclear elimination we take lesser steps that enhance our security, then the journey will have been worthwhile. At his National Press Club speech, General Butler released a letter signed by 117 leaders from 46 countries that calls for the immediate removal of nuclear weapons from alert status, an end to nuclear testing, the beginning of discussions on deeper reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, and the development of a plan for eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Among the signatories were Mikhail Gorbachev, President Carter and Helmut Schmidt. In this regard, there are 3 initiatives the United States could take immediately to begin this journey to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons: dealerting a portion of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and pushing for much deeper reductions in nuclear weapons than currently contemplated in START II. Each of these steps make sense in isolation. Together, they will lead to a safer world, and one much closer to that envisioned in the poignant remarks delivered by General Butler. Exhibit 1 The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Super Powers to Rogue Leaders (An Address by Gen. Lee Butler to the National Press Club, Washington, DC., 2 February 1998) Thank you, and good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Dorene and I are honored by your presence and gratified by your welcome. Although we are now proud residents of Nebraska-- note the obligatory display of home team colors--Dorene and I feel very much at home in this city. I see many familiar faces in this audience, which makes the moment all the more special. I have two roles to serve this afternoon, both very much akin to the events marking my appearance here just over a year ago. As your speaker, I intend to address two matters that go to the Heart of the Debate over the Role of Nuclear Weapons: Why these artifacts of the cold war continue to hold us in thrall; and the severe penalties and risks entailed by policies of deterrence as practiced in the nuclear age. But first, it is my privilege to announce a compelling addition to the roster of distinguished international figures who have joined their voices in calling publicly for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Last year General Goodpaster and I unveiled a list of some 60 retired generals and admirals from a host of nations who declared their strong conviction that the world would be better served by the total elimination of these weapons. Today, at a press conference following my remarks, Senator Alan Cranston and I will present the names of more than one hundred present and former heads of state and other senior civilian leaders who have signed their names to a powerful statement of common concern regarding nuclear weapons and who have endorsed a reasoned path toward abolition. The willingness of this extraordinary assembly to speak so publicly and directly to these issues is very much in keeping with what I have experienced since I became engaged in the abolition debate some two years ago. I have met legions of remarkable men and women from every corner of the earth who have labored long and patiently in this cause. Their ranks have now been swelled by tens of millions of citizens of our planet who reject the prospect of living in perpetuity under a nuclear Sword of Damocles. My purpose in entering the debate was to help legitimize abolition as an alternative worthy of serious and urgent consideration. My premise was that my unique experience in the nuclear weapons arena might help kindle greater antipathy for these horrific devices and the policies which justify their retention by the nuclear weapon states. My purpose this afternoon is to share with you the abiding concern I harbor about the course of the debate. I accepted the Press Club invitation because I believe this forum is well suited to speak to that concern. In so doing, I intend to render a much more explicit account than I have given to date of the lessons I have drawn from over thirty years of intimate involvement with nuclear weapons. Permit me, however, to preface my remarks by postulating that with respect to legitimizing the prospect of abolition, there is much to applaud on the positive side of the ledger. Nuclear issues now compete more strongly for the attention of policy makers and the media that often shapes their interest. Converts are being won on many fronts to the propositions that these issues matter, that nuclear arsenals can and should be sharply reduced, that high alert postures are a dangerous anachronism, that first use policies are an affront to democratic values, and that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a clear and present danger. I am persuaded that in every corner of the planet, the tide of public sentiment is now running strongly in favor of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons. Indeed, I am convinced that most publics are well out in front of their governments in shaking off the grip of the cold war in reaching for opportunities that emerge in its wake. Conversely, it is distressingly evident that for many people, nuclear weapons retain an aura of utility, of primacy and of legitimacy that justifies their existence well into the future, in some number, however small. The persistence of this view, which is perfectly reflected in the recently announced modification of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, lies at the core of the concern that moves me so deeply. This abiding faith in nuclear weapons was inspired and is sustained by a catechism instilled over many decades by a priesthood who speak with great assurance and authority. I was for many years among the most avid of these keepers of the faith in nuclear weapons, and for that I make no apology. Like my contemporaries, I was moved by fears and fired by beliefs that date back to the earliest days of the atomic era. We lived through a terror-ridden epoch punctuated by crisis whose resolution held hostage the saga of humankind. For us, nuclear weapons were the savior that brought an implacable foe to his knees in 1945 and held another at bay for nearly a half-century. We believed that superior technology brought strategic advantage, that greater numbers meant stronger security, and that the ends of containment justified whatever means were necessary to achieve them. These are powerful, deeply rooted beliefs. They cannot and should not be lightly dismissed or discounted. Strong arguments can be made on their behalf. Throughout my professional military career, I shared them, I professed them and I put them into operational practice. And now it is my burden to declare with all of the conviction I can muster that in my judgment they served us extremely ill. They account for the most severe risks and most extravagant costs of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. They intensified and prolonged an already acute ideological animosity. They spawned successive generations of new and more destructive nuclear devices and delivery systems. They gave rise to mammoth bureaucracies with gargantuan appetites and global agendas. They incited primal emotions, spurred zealotry and demagoguery, and set in motion forces of ungovernable scope and power. Most importantly, these enduring beliefs, and the fears that underlie them, perpetuate cold war policies and practices that make no strategic sense. They continue to entail enormous costs and expose all mankind to unconscionable dangers. I find that intolerable. Thus, I cannot stay silent. I know too much of these matters, the frailties, the flaws, the failures of policy and practice. At the same time, I cannot overstate the difficulty this poses for me. No one who ever entered the nuclear arena left it with a fuller understanding of its complexity nor greater respect for those with whom I served its purposes. I struggle constantly with the task of articulating the evolution of my convictions without denigrating or diminishing the motives and sacrifices of countless colleagues with whom I lived the drama of the cold war. I ask them and you to appreciate that my purpose is not to accuse, but to assess, to understand and to propound the forces that birthed the grotesque excesses and hazards of the nuclear age. For me, that assessment meant first coming to grips with my experience and then coming to terms with my conclusions. I knew the moment I entered the nuclear arena I had been thrust into a world beset with tidal forces, towering egos, maddening contradictions, alien constructs and insane risks. Its arcane vocabulary and apocalyptic calculus defied comprehension. Its stage was global and its antagonists locked in a deadly spiral of deepening rivalry. It was in every respect a modern day holy war, a cosmic struggle between the forces of light and darkness. The stakes were national survival, and the weapons of choice were eminently suited to this scale of malevolence. The opposing forces each created vast enterprises, each giving rise to a culture of Messianic believers infused with a sense of historic mission and schooled in unshakable articles of faith. As my own career progressed, I was immersed in the work of all of these cultures, either directly in those of the Western World, or through penetrating study of communist organizations, teachings and practices. My responsibilities ranged from the highly subjective, such as assessing the values and motivation of Soviet leadership, to the critically objective, such as preparing weapons for operational launch. I became steeped in the art of intelligence estimates, the psychology of negotiations, the interplay of bureaucracies and the impulses of industry. I was engaged in the labyrinthian conjecture of the strategist, the exacting routines of the target planner and the demanding skills of the aircrew and the missilier. I have been a party to their history, shared their triumphs and tragedies, witnessed heroic sacrifice and catastrophic failure of both men and machines. And in the end, I came away from it all with profound misgivings. Ultimately, as I examined the course of this journey, as the lessons of decades of intimate involvement took greater hold on my intellect, I came to a set of deeply unsettling judgements. That from the earliest days of the nuclear era, the risks and consequences of nuclear war have never been properly weighed by those who brandished it. That the stakes of nuclear war engage not just the survival of the antagonists, but the fate of mankind. That the likely consequences of nuclear war have no politically, militarily or morally acceptable justification. And therefore, that the threat to use nuclear weapons is indefensible. These judgements gave rise to an array of inescapable questions. If this be so, what explained the willingness, no, the zeal, of legions of cold warriors, civilian and military, to not just tolerate but to multiply and to perpetuate such risks? By what authority do succeeding generations of leaders in the nuclear weapons states usurp the power to dictate the odds of continued life on our planet? Most urgently, why does such breathtaking audacity persist at a moment when we should stand trembling in the face of our folly and united in our commitment to abolish its most deadly manifestation? These are not questions to be left to historians. The answers matter to us now. They go to the heart of present day policies and motivations. They convey lessons with immediate implications for both contemporary and aspiring nuclear states. As I distill them from the experience of three decades in the nuclear arena, these lessons resolve into two fundamental conclusions. First, I have no other way to understand the willingness to condone nuclear weapons except to believe they are the natural accomplice of visceral enmity. They thrive in the emotional climate born of utter alienation and isolation. The unbounded wantonness of their effects is a perfect companion to the urge to destroy completely. They play on our deepest fears and pander to our darkest instincts. They corrode our sense of humanity, numb our capacity for moral outrage, and make thinkable the unimaginable. What is anguishingly clear is that these fears and enmities are no respecter of political systems or values. They prey on democracies and totalitarian societies alike, shrinking the norms of civilized behavior and dimming the prospects for escaping the savagery so powerfully imprinted in our genetic code. That should give us great pause as we imagine the task of abolition in a world that gives daily witness to acts of unspeakable barbarism. So should it compound our resolve. The evidence to support this conclusion is palpable, but as I said at the outset of these remarks for much of my life I saw it differently. That was a product of my both my citizenry and my profession. From the early years of my childhood and through much of my military service I saw the Soviet Union and its allies as a demonic threat, an evil empire bent on global domination. I was commissioned as an officer in the United States air force as the cold war was heating to a fever pitch. This was a desperate time that evoked on both sides extreme responses in policy, in technology and in force postures: Bloody purges and political inquisitions; covert intelligence schemes that squandered lives and subverted governments; atmospheric testing with little understanding or regard for the long term effects; threats of massive nuclear retaliation to an ill-defined scope of potential provocations; the forced march of inventive genius that ushered in the missile age arm in arm with the capacity for spontaneous, global, destruction; reconnaissance aircraft that probed or violated sovereign airspace, producing disastrous encounters; the menacing and perilous practice of airborne alert bombers loaded with nuclear weapons. By the early 1960's, a superpower nuclear arms race was underway that would lead to a ceaseless amassing of destructive capacity, spilling over into the arsenals of other nations. Central Europe became a powder keg, trembling under the shadow of Armageddon, hostage to a bizarre strategy that required the prospect of nuclear devastation as the price of alliance. The entire world became a stage for the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. International organizations were paralyzed by its grip. East-West confrontation dominated the nation-state system. Every quarrel and conflict was fraught with potential for global war. This was the world that largely defined our lives as American citizens. For those of us who served in the national security arena, the threat was omnipresent, if seemed total, it dictated our professional preparation and career progression, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of men and women, in and out of uniform. Like millions of others, I was caught up in the holy war, inured to its costs and consequences, trusting in the wisdom of succeeding generations of military and civilian leaders. The first requirement of unconditional belief in the efficacy of nuclear weapons was early and perfectly met for us: Our homeland was the target of a consuming evil, poised to strike without warning and without mercy. What remained for me, as my career took its particular course, was to master the intellectual underpinning of America's response, the strategic foundation that today still stands as the central precept of the nuclear catechism. Reassessing its pervasive impact on attitudes toward nuclear weapons goes directly to my second conclusion regarding the willingness to tolerate the risks of the nuclear age. That also brings me to the focal point of my remarks, to my purpose in coming to this forum. For all of my years as a nuclear strategist, operational commander and public spokesman, I explained, justified and sustained America's massive nuclear arsenal as a function, a necessity and a consequence of deterrence. Bound up in this singular term, this familiar touchstone of security dating back to antiquity, was the intellectually comforting and deceptively simple justification for taking the most extreme risks and the expenditure of trillions of dollars. It was our shield and by extension our sword. The nuclear priesthood extolled its virtues, and bowed to its demands. Allies yielded grudgingly to its dictates even while decrying its risks and costs. We brandished it at our enemies and presumed they embraced its suicidal corollary of mutual assured destruction. We ignored, discounted or dismissed its flaws and cling still to the belief that it obtains in a world whose security architecture has been wholly transformed. But now, I see it differently. Not in some blinding revelation, but at the end of a journey, in an age of deliverance from the consuming tensions of the cold war. Now, with the evidence more clear, the risks more sharply defined and the costs more fully understood, I see deterrence in a very different light. Appropriated from the lexicon of conventional warfare, this simple prescription for adequate military preparedness became in the Nuclear Age a formula for unmitigated catastrophe. It was premised on a litany of unwarranted assumptions, unprovable assertions and logical contradictions. It suspended rational thinking about he ultimate aim of National security: to ensure the survival of the Nation. How is it that we subscribed to a strategy that required near perfect understanding of an enemy from whom we were deeply alienated and largely isolated? How could we pretend to understand the motivations and intentions of the Soviet leadership absent any substantive personal association? Why did we imagine a Nation that had survived successive invasions and mindnumbing losses would accede to a strategy premised on fear of Nuclear War? Deterrence in the cold war setting was fatally flawed at the most fundamental level of human psychology in its projection of Western reason through the crazed lens of a paranoid foe. Little wonder that intentions and motives were consistently misread. Little wonder that deterrence was the first victim of a deepening crisis, leaving the antagonists to grope fearfully in a fog of mutual misperception. While we clung to the notion that Nuclear War could be reliably deterred, Soviet leaders derived from their historical experience the conviction that such a war might be thrust upon them and if so, mut not be lost. Driven by that fear, they took Herculean measures to fight and survive no matter the odds or the costs. Deterrence was a dialogue of the blind with the deaf. In the final analysis, it was largely a bargain we in the West made with ourselves. Deterrence was flawed equally in that the consequences of its failure were intolerable. While the price of undeterred aggression in the age of uniquely conventional weaponry could be severe, history teaches that Nations can survive and even prosper in the aftermath of unconditional defeat. Not so in the nuclear era. Nuclear weapons give no quarter. Their effects transcend time and place, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants for generation upon generation. They leave us wholly without defense, expunge all hope for meaningful survival. They hold in their sway not just the fate of Nations, but the very meaning of civilization. Deterrence failed completely as a guide in setting rational limits on the size and composition of military forces. To the contrary, its appetite was voracious, its capacity to justify new weapons and larger stocks unrestrained. Deterrence carried the seed, born of an irresolvable internal contradiction, that spurred an insatiable arms race. Nuclear deterrence hinges on the credibility to mount a devastating retaliation under the most extreme conditions of war initiation. Perversely, the redundant and survivable force required to meet this exacting text is readily perceived by a darkly suspicious adversary as capable, even designed, to execute a disarming first strike. Such advantage can never be conceded between nuclear rivals. It must be answered, reduced, nullified. Fears are fanned, the rivalry intensified. New technology is inspired, new systems roll from production lines. The correlation of force begins to shift, and the bar of deterrence ratchets higher, igniting yet another cycle of trepidation, worst case assumptions and ever mounting levels of destructive capability. Thus it was that the treacherous axioms of deterrence made seemingly reasonable nuclear weapon stockpiles numbering in the tens of thousands. Despite having witnessed the devastation wrought by two primitive atomic devices, over the ensuing decades the superpowers gorged themselves at the thermonuclear trough. A succession of leaders on both sides of the East-West divide directed a reckless proliferation of nuclear devices, tailored for delivery by a vast array of vehicles to a stupefying array of targets. They nurtured, richly rewarded, even revealed in the industrial base required to support production at such levels. I was part of all of that. I was present at the creation of many of these systems, directly responsible for prescribing and justifying the requirements and technology that made them possible. I saw the arms race from the inside, watched as intercontinental ballistic missiles ushered in mutual assured destruction and multiple warhead missiles introduced genuine fear of a nuclear first strike. I participated in the elaboration of basing schemes that bordered on the comical and force levels that in retrospect defied reason. I was responsible for war plans with over 12,000 targets, many struck with repeated nuclear blows, some to the point of complete absurdity. I was a veteran participant in an arena where the most destructive power ever unleashed became the prize in a no holds barred competition among organizations whose principal interest was to enhance rather than constrain its application. And through every corridor, in every impassioned plea, in every fevered debate range the rallying cry, deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. As nuclear weapons and actors multiplied, deterrence took on too many names, too many roles, overreaching an already extreme strategic task. Surely nuclear weapons summoned great caution in superpower relationships. But as their numbers swelled, so mounted the stakes of miscalculation, of a crisis spun out of control. The exorbitant price of nuclear war quickly exceeded the rapidly depreciating value of a tenuous mutual wariness. Invoking deterrence became a cheap rhetorical parlor trick, a verbal sleight of hand. Proponents persist in dressing it up to court changing times and temperaments, hemming and re-hemming to fit shrinking or distorted threats. Deterrence is a slippery conceptual slope. It is not stable, nor is it static, its wiles cannot be contained. It is both master and slave. It seduces the scientist yet bends to his creation. It serves the ends of evil as well as those of noble intent. It holds guilty the innocent as well as the culpable. It gives easy semantic cover to nuclear weapons, masking the horrors of employment with siren veils of infallibility. At best it is a gamble no mortal should pretend to make. At worst it invokes death on a scale rivaling the power of the creator. Is it any wonder that at the end of my journey I am moved so strongly to retrace its path, to examine more closely the evidence I would or could not see? I hear not the voices long ignored, the warnings muffled by the still lingering animosities of the cold war. I see with painful clarity that from the very beginnings of the nuclear era. The objective scrutiny and searching debate essential to adequate comprehension and responsible oversight of its vast enterprises were foreshortened or foregone. The cold light of dispassionate scrutiny was shuttered in the name of security, doubts dismissed in the name of an acute and unrelenting threat, objections overruled by the incantations of the nuclear priesthood. The penalties proved to be severe. Vitally important decisions were routinely taken without adequate understanding, assertions too often prevailed over analysis, requirements took on organizational biases, technological opportunity and corporate profit drove force levels and capability, and political opportunism intruded on calculations of military necessity. Authority and accountability were severed, policy dissociated from planning, and theory invalidated by practice. The narrow concerns of a multitude of powerful interests intruded on the rightful role of key policymakers, constraining their latitude for decision. Many were simply denied access to critical information essential to the proper exercise of their office. Over time, planning was increasingly distanced and ultimately disconnected from any sense of scientific or military reality. In the end, the nuclear powers, great and small, created astronomically expensive infrastructures, monolithic bureaucracies and complex processes that defied control or comprehension. Only now are the dimensions, costs and risks of these nuclear nether worlds coming to light. What must now be better-understood are the root causes, the mindsets and the belief systems that brought them into existence. They must be challenged, they must be refuted, but most importantly, they must be let go. The era that gave them credence, accepted their dominion and yielded to their excesses is fast receding. But it is not yet over. Sad to say, the Cold War lives on in the minds of those who cannot let go the fears, the beliefs, and the enmities born of the nuclear age. They cling to deterrence, clutch its tattered promise to their breast, shake it wistfully at bygone adversaries and balefully at new or imagined ones. They are gripped still by its awful willingness not simply to tempt the apocalypse but to prepare its way. What better illustration of misplaced faith in nuclear deterrence than the persistent belief that retaliation with nuclear weapons is a legitimate and appropriate response to post-cold war threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. What could possibly justify our resort to the very means we properly abhor and condemn? Who can imagine our joining in shattering the precedent of non-use that has held for over fifty years? How could America's irreplaceable role as leader of the campaign against nuclear proliferation ever be re- justified? What target would warrant such retaliation? Would we hold an entire society accountable for the decision of a single demented leader? How would the physical effects of the nuclear explosion be contained, not to mention the political and moral consequences? In a singular act we would martyr our enemy, alienate our friends, give comfort to the non-declared nuclear states and impetus to states who seek such weapons covertly. In short, such a response on the part of the United States is inconceivable. It would irretrievably diminish our priceless stature as a nation noble in aspiration and responsible in conduct, even in the face of extreme provocation. And as a nation we have no greater responsibility than to bring the nuclear era to a close. Our present policies, plans and postures governing nuclear weapons make us prisoner still to an age of intolerable danger. We cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it. We cannot hold hostage to sovereign gridlock the keys to final deliverance from the nuclear nightmare. We cannot withhold the resources essential to break its grip, to reduce its dangers. We cannot sit in silent acquiescence to the faded homilies of the nuclear priesthood. It is time to reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Chair. I will use that time for some remarks this morning.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

Mr. DASCHLE. The Senator from Minnesota is absolutely right. We will have the opportunity on countless occasions over the course of the next 10 months to revisit this issue, which obviously we will be in a position to do and be prepared to begin at some point either this week or next week. But we will certainly pursue this in other ways.

Mr. DASCHLE. That is correct.

Mr. DASCHLE. Parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. DASCHLE. What constitutes a sufficient second in this case?

Mr. DASCHLE. I appreciate the majority leader's yielding. I ask the Chair, what would constitute a sufficient second, given the number of Senators on the floor currently?

Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his comments, and I yield the floor. Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DASCHLE. Did the majority leader ask unanimous consent to do that? In that case, we will be compelled to object.

Mr. DASCHLE. I file two cloture motions, one on the McCain-Feingold amendment and then on the Snowe--first on Snowe and then on McCain. Cloture Motion

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, here we go again. I thought that we had an understanding about the opportunity that we would be presented to have a good debate. In fact, I am going to go back to the Record and check, but I am quite sure that there was some understanding that there would not be any need to fill trees and to prevent open and free debate, because we saw what happened the last time we tried this. It locked up the Senate for weeks on end with absolutely no result. I would ask my colleagues, what are you afraid of here? Why are our colleagues on the other side not willing to allow this body to work its will? Why is the majority party filibustering legislation that the majority of Senators supports? Mr. President, I am disappointed and frustrated. I am prepared to take this to whatever length is required to bring it to a successful resolution this week, next week, at some point in the future. We have a lot of work to do here, and I want to work with the majority leader to find a way to accomplish all that must be done. But I can't think of a better way to slow progress, to stop progress, to preclude us from getting our work done than to deny this body the opportunity to have a good debate and some votes on this important issue. I must say, it is, again, a reminder to the Democratic caucus that when we enter into these agreements, we better check the writing, we better check the specifics, we better ensure we have a clear understanding of what the agreement is. There was a colloquy just a moment ago about whether or not we could have an up-or-down vote on the Snowe amendment. Clearly, with this scenario, there is no way you can have an up-or-down vote on the Snowe amendment. This is a tree so loaded that the branches are breaking. And so I suppose I could dream someday of drafting a scenario that would allow us to get to the amendment of the Senator from Maine. It ain't going to happen. With the tree as filled as it is right now, there is no way there will be a vote on the Snowe amendment. I note, and the majority leader even noted, that there is maybe another option, another route, another bill, maybe, as the Senator from Arizona suggested, an appropriations bill. I suspect that this loaded tree will provide both sides with ample opportunity to offer amendments and bills to other amendments, and with a limited period of time, we all know what that means. But if those are the cards we are dealt, I am prepared to accept that as the circumstance and deal with it. It is really amazing to me that there are those in the Senate who profess to support a process by which we can accomplish all of our legislative goals, but then continue to put obstacles in the path of resolution to the objectives in reaching those goals. So, I am disappointed and, frankly, somewhat amazed that we have not learned our lessons of the past. But so be it, the tree is filled, the opportunities will be there, either this week, next week, the week after, but they will be there, just as they were last fall.

Mr. DASCHLE. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I hope we will count carefully, because I think we are getting very close here to whether or not we have a sufficient second. I appreciate the answer of the Chair. Amendment No. 1653 To Amendment No. 1651 (Purpose: To prohibit new welfare for politicians)

Mr. DASCHLE. There is no doubt about it. Again, Senator Lott, and I quote a comment he made to reporters that very day, said: ``As far as I can tell at this point, amendments would certainly be in order, would be considered, they might be second-degreed and they certainly would be given a third degree.'' There is no question that we had the clear understanding that there would be an opportunity to have a good debate, offer amendments, have them voted upon and ultimately dispose of this issue. So I am really disappointed we have not been able to reach that point in this debate to date, and this, in my view, is not what we had agreed to last fall.

Mr. DASCHLE. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. DASCHLE. The Senator from North Dakota is absolutely correct. I think we can all go back and look through the Record and, again, as I say, we have to look at the meaning of each word in these agreements with perhaps greater skepticism. This idea of filling the tree is great short-term strategy. It has a horrible long-term effect, long-term effect on the comity of the of the Senate, long-term effect on getting legislation accomplished. So we are compelled, once again, to use the techniques and methods we have used in the past. It is very likely that we will be relegated to using them again in the future. The Senator is right, clearly we had an understanding that we would have an opportunity to debate issues, to offer amendments and ultimately to resolve this issue. We have been denied that as a result of the actions taken just now, and I deeply regret it.

Mr. DASCHLE. I will be happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I want to thank those who have participated thus far in this debate about campaign reform. I am sure that many of those who view C-SPAN with any regularity are experiencing a sense of deja vu about this debate, wondering whether or not we haven't already had debate very similar to this and whether we are not stuck in the same spot, whether we are ever going to stop talking about it and actually start moving toward some resolution. Today we are about to find out. This will give us the opportunity for the first time to vote this afternoon at 4 o'clock to indicate to the American people that, indeed, we have resolved to deal with the extraordinary problems that we have in campaign finance today. This is probably going to be our best chance in a generation for meaningful campaign reform, and a clear-cut vote is something that will allow us to move to that next step toward resolution. We do not need any procedural excuses, no amendment trees, no obfuscation. This will be clearly an up-or-down vote on the McCain-Feingold bill, through a tabling motion, that we have sought now for some time. The vote on Senator McCain's amendment answers the question, are you for reform or not? A vote against McCain-Feingold is a vote, in my view, to end reform, at least for this Congress, once again. I am very proud of the fact that each one of the members of the Democratic caucus will stand up and be counted. And my hope is that a number of Republicans will join us in this effort. The only question is how many Republicans and Democrats will come together in the middle to make this a reality this afternoon. I believe the fate of campaign reform rests in the hands of those who have not yet publicly taken their positions with regard to campaign reform. It has been a generation since the last time we passed any meaningful legislation having to do with campaigns. In 1971 and in 1974, Congress enacted major reforms that first limited the amount of money in politics and, second, required candidates for the first time to disclose how they got their money. Today those laws are outdated and virtually useless, and some have been circumvented by new decisions and, as a result of those decisions, loopholes that have been created in the campaign finance law. Other aspects of that reform effort in 1971 and 1974 today are unenforced or completely unenforceable because of the systematic defunding of the FEC, the Federal Election Commission. Still others have been overturned by narrow and, many believe, incorrect court decisions. Many reforms were thrown out by the Supreme Court in 1974 in the 5-to-4 ruling, a very controversial ruling, in Buckley v. Valeo. So, for the last 23 years now, Democrats have tried to overcome obstacles put in place by the Buckley ruling and to pass a campaign finance reform modification, a realization that what happened in 1974, and what was addressed in that Court decision, needs to be addressed with clarification in statute. So, consider the record of a decade, beginning in 1988. At the opening of the 100th Congress, then majority leader Robert Byrd introduced a bill to limit spending and reduce special interest influence. We had a record-setting eight cloture votes when that happened. Democratic sponsors modified the bill to meet objections, but the fact is that it was killed in a Republican filibuster. In the Democratic-led 101st Congress, the House and the Senate passed campaign finance bills. President Bush threatened to veto the bill, effectively killing it, because it contained voluntary spending limits. In the 102d Congress, also a Democratically-led Congress, again the House and Senate passed campaign finance reform bills and President Bush vetoed the bill with the backing of all of his Republican filibuster. In the Democratic-led 101st Congress, the House and the Senate passed campaign finance bills. President Bush threatened to veto the bill, effectively killing it, because it contained voluntary spending limits. In the 102d Congress, also a Democratically-led Congress, again the House and Senate passed campaign finance reform bills and President Bush vetoed the bill with the backing of all of his Republican colleagues. In the 103d Congress, again under Democratic control, we passed a campaign finance reform bill with 95 percent of the Democrats in the Senate and 91 percent of the Democrats in the House voting for reform. Again, Republicans filibustered the move to take the bill to conference. That brings us, then, to the 104th Congress, supposedly the reform Congress. Senators McCain and Feingold introduced their bipartisan reform plan, and reform at that point, for the first time in almost 2 decades, actually seemed to be within reach. Republicans, again, in the Senate, filibustered the measure, while Republicans in the House introduced a bill to allow more spending--a family of four would have been able to contribute $12.4 million in Federal election. The legislation again failed to produce results of any kind. As a result of that impasse, nothing was done for the remaining months of the 104th Congress, which now brings us to this Congress and last year. In his State of the Union Message in January of 1997, President Clinton called on Congress to pass campaign finance reform by July 4, 1997. In the House, Republicans have voted time and again against bringing campaign finance reform to the floor. Speaker Gingrich has promised consideration this year, but also shook hands with the President on a campaign reform commission that really never came to pass. Here in the Senate, we have traveled a tough road to get here today. We forced our way to the floor and refused to yield; poison pills, amendment trees and cloture votes were all tactics used, and this is probably the last opportunity we have to do something meaningful in the 105th Congress. The problem is really one that can be described in one word: money. The amount of money, after two decades of delay, has skyrocketed. That is the fundamental problem. We hear talk in this debate about hard money and soft money, this money and that money. They are not the core of the problem. The core of the problem is that there is just too much money in politics, period. Total congressional campaign spending in 1975 was $115 million; in 1985, $450 million; in 1995, $765 million. We are expected, for the first time in this cycle, to exceed $1 billion in election year spending, shattering every other record we have ever seen in politics in 220 years. A 73 percent increase over the previous Presidential cycle is anticipated in the year 2000. In other words, what we spend in 2000 on Presidential politics will exceed by 73 percent what we spent in 1996 on Presidential politics. To put that in perspective, wages rose 13 percent, college tuition rose 17 percent-- politics has increased in spending 73 percent. The average cost of winning a Senate seat in 1996 was $4.5 million. To raise that much money, a Senator has to raise approximately $14,000 a week every week for 6 years. Given the current political rate of inflation, by the year 2023, in just 25 years, it will cost $145 million to run for the U.S. Senate. We have pages on the right and left, Republican and Democratic pages. I talk to them; I look at them; I encourage them to run for public office. But how can I tell them that I want them to run if in their lifetime they will be asking the question: How do I raise $145 million to have the position you have today, Senator Daschle? I can't answer that. I don't know the answer to that. And I am troubled by that. What happens if the U.S. Senate is only made up of those who have $145 million to spend? Is it a truly democratic legislative body if we lose the opportunity to bring in families who pay their bills and confront all of the many, many challenges that an American family faces today and has a real appreciation of the enormity of those challenges? If that vacuum, that void, is demonstrated cycle after cycle, year after year here in the Senate, what kind of decisions will this body actually make affecting those working families? If we don't have the broad representation anticipated by our Founding Fathers, do we then have the kind of democracy so anticipated? Mr. President, I don't think we do. So, indeed, it is not a question of soft money or hard money; it's really a question of money. Do we tell our pages, we want you to be women and men in the U.S. Senate in your lifetime, but we also expect that sometime, if you choose to do so, in order to be successful you will have to raise $145 million? I hope not. Obviously, this legislation is not going to solve that problem entirely, but it is going to give us an opportunity to deal with it more effectively. At the very least, what we ought to do is recognize that if we do not solve this problem, we are never going to be able to encourage effectively people getting into public life, people expecting to serve in public office. The antipathy, the skepticism, is reflected in the polls taken of the American people these days. They understand the circumstances. They understand that it is not just a question of a Senator or a Congressman spending inordinate amounts of time and effort raising money. They understand that there is a problem that goes beyond whether or not a young person today, contemplating public office, can come up with $145 million. What they understand is that just the sheer effect of money is as important as the amount of money. In the eyes of most Americans, the current system makes Congress appear to be for sale to the highest bidder. The recent Harris poll shows it very clearly. Mr. President, 85 percent of people think special interests have more influence than voters; 85 percent, almost 9 out of 10 Americans today, said if you put a special interest and a voter side by side, there is more likelihood that a Senator is going to listen to the special interest than he is to the voter. Three-quarters of voters think Congress is largely owned by special interests. Voter turnout has plummeted, public confidence in this institution has eroded, and democracy simply can't survive with the cynical atmosphere that exists today. It is just amazing to me as I talk to world leaders who come from all parts of the world, who have not experienced democracy until just recently--they are from countries where they have not had a chance to vote; they are from countries where totalitarian regimes are the order of the day, where their whole lives were dictated by government in large measure that had everything to do with every facet of their lives. Now they have this new-found freedom, and, in an explosion of interest in democracy and the joy of participation, we are seeing record numbers of turnout, 80, 90 percent at the polls. They come from Eastern Europe, they come from Africa, they come from Asia, all expressing to us this profound joy that they now have democracy. But do you know what they say to us? They say, what is amazing to us is that when we look at your country, you have more freedom than we even have today and yet your participation in that freedom is the lowest of any country in the world. How is it that you can be so free and yet so callous towards that freedom, so unwilling to commit to prolonging that freedom, that democracy? And they worry out loud about how long our freedom can last if no one cares; how long will it be before we lose part or all of it because we don't care. Mr. President, it is so critical that we restore trust and confidence in our democracy, that we recognize we are dealing here with a very, very fragile institution that will rise or fall based in large measure on whether or not we care enough to make participation in democracy a real aspect of this country's future. So that is, in part, what this is about. Do we care enough? Are we prepared to take the responsibilities seriously that we hold as U.S. Senators to bring back participation, to allow the voters more confidence that we are listening to them and not the special interests, and to deal with the reality--the reality that I can't ask a young person today to come up with $145 million when he or she is my age and wants to run for the U.S. Senate? We also have a serious problem with regard to the ads themselves and all that comes from spending this money. It is the amount of money, the perception of to whom we are indebted, but now we also have a problem with the virulent advertising that comes from it. I believe that negative advertising is the crack cocaine of politics. We are hooked on it because it works. We are hooked on it because we win elections using it. There is no accountability, no reporting; it is publicly not tied to any candidates. And I expect that in 1998 we are going to see a meltdown of the process, because we are going to see more virulent ads than we have ever seen in our lifetimes. The crack cocaine of politics will be at work again. Negative ads from anonymous sources push candidates to the margins. Candidates become bit players in their own races. How many times have I heard candidates actually say, ``I couldn't keep track of who was on my side. I'd watch television and I'd hear my name used pro and con, and I didn't have anything to do with those ads. I am sitting like a man at a tennis match, watching both sides play it out.'' And the debate now is defined by who has the most money; that is how it is defined. The solution to all of this is not going to be achieved today. There are those who look at all of this and contend that nothing is wrong. Some have argued that the system is not broken, that we actually need more money in politics. We believe the system is badly broken, and so do the American people. They don't want to be subjected to this barrage of negative advertising that we know we are going to see again. They don't want to see the dumbing down of politics year after year, in spite of the fact that we see the creeping up of costs, the explosion in increases in costs. So it brings us really to the issue of the day: McCain-Feingold. It does not cover all the critical components of reform, overall spending limits, but it lets us at least get off dead center. If it doesn't address the central problem, it does address several problems, including banning one very, very difficult aspect of campaign finance today--soft money; setting restrictions on independent expenditures; better disclosures so people have an idea of who is giving how much to which candidate and why; and it limits the ability of the superrich to buy political office. So we are here and all 45 Democrats stand ready to pass it. We have made a lot of changes to pick up Republican support. We have dropped spending limits, we have dropped reduced TV rate, we have dropped PAC restrictions, we codified the so-called Beck decision having to do with labor contributions. There is no more we can do, particularly since McCain-Feingold is the least we should do. We want to do more. If we were in the majority, we would fight to cap spending. The Valeo decision, as I said, was 5 to 4. Mr. President, 126 scholars have said spending limits are constitutional. But we simply can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. We are confronted with a systemic problem, and we need a systemic solution. We have a chance to make some changes we plainly know are needed to restore some dignity and sanity to this process. So much time and money in this Congress has been spent already to investigate perceived abuses in the 1996 election. There are cries of outrage, cries of shock and indignation. The American people are cynical because they don't think Congress is going to do anything about it. They believe that the politicians' self-interest will again override the public good. If, after all the hearings, all the press releases, all the statements, all the reports, all the votes, we do nothing, then frankly, Mr. President, that cynicism will be justified. The American people get it. They know the system is broken. They know we have an opportunity to fix it, but they don't think we will. We should surprise them. We need sincere bipartisan efforts to clean up our own house. We need Republicans to join with Democrats to make that happen this afternoon. People who think they can quietly kill this effort are wrong. One day, hopefully today, but one day we will succeed. We will not give up. But this is the time to do it. If we squander this opportunity, it will not go unnoticed. If we seize this moment, we can make history and do the right thing for those people who want to be a part of the process, for all Americans, for people who want once more to participate in our Federal elections system. This is our opportunity. Let's do it right. Let's do it this afternoon. I yield the floor.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, it is my pleasure today to introduce the Missouri River Erosion Control Act of 1998, a bill to provide much- needed assistance to homeowners who live along the Missouri River. Over the past several years, many South Dakotans have seen property values drop and homes nearly destroyed by shoreline erosion. This legislation will help these families to work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take responsible steps to prevent these problems. My colleague, Senator Johnson, is joining me as an original cosponsor of this legislation. While erosion occurs naturally on any river, shorelines on the Missouri are particularly vulnerable to it. Releases from the hydroelectric dams that span the river in South Dakota cause its depth and speed to fluctuate drastically, sometimes with dangerous consequences. Following last year's flooding disaster, the rapid, swirling current caused by sustained high releases from the dams swept away half an acre of land near Burbank, South Dakota, in just 3 hours. A subsequent release destroyed an additional 40 feet of land, bringing the river's edge to the foundation of the home of Neil and Eileen Helvig. Thanks to last minute work by the Corps of Engineers to stabilize the shoreline, the Helvig's home, and several others nearby, were saved. However, this is not the only case when bank erosion has posed a threat to residential homes and without a comprehensive program in place to provide help to others in need, we may not be so lucky in the future. Over the last several years, Mrs. Lois Hyde of rural Lake Andes has watched the river work its way to within a stone's throw of her home-- an original homestead first settled by her family over 100 years ago. Without additional help, it is likely that she may be forced to abandon her farm. I believe it is our responsibility to give individuals like her the help they need to protect their homes. The Missouri River Erosion Control Act of 1998 will give homeowners the opportunity to take responsible steps to protect their property. The bill amends current law to permit homeowners to work in partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take steps to stabilize their shoreline. Under the my bill, the Corps of Engineers will accept applications from private property owners along the Missouri River and rank those applications in order of need. The most vulnerable stretches of the shoreline would then be targeted for assistance. Like other erosion control programs, the bill requires a 35 percent non-federal cost share, while the federal government will provide the other 65 percent of the cost. For many years the Corps of Engineers has been reluctant to work with private property owners to prevent damage to private property from erosion. Nevertheless, new circumstances require new thinking. Particularly in the wake of last year's disaster in South Dakota, circumstances have made it clear that we must help families take the steps they need to protect their homes. Homeowners want to take responsible measures to protect their property. We must give them that opportunity. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, it is my pleasure today to introduce the Missouri River Erosion Control Act of 1998, a bill to provide much- needed assistance to homeowners who live along the Missouri River. Over the past several years, many South Dakotans have seen property values drop and homes nearly destroyed by shoreline erosion. This legislation will help these families to work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take responsible steps to prevent these problems. My colleague, Senator Johnson, is joining me as an original cosponsor of this legislation. While erosion occurs naturally on any river, shorelines on the Missouri are particularly vulnerable to it. Releases from the hydroelectric dams that span the river in South Dakota cause its depth and speed to fluctuate drastically, sometimes with dangerous consequences. Following last year's flooding disaster, the rapid, swirling current caused by sustained high releases from the dams swept away half an acre of land near Burbank, South Dakota, in just 3 hours. A subsequent release destroyed an additional 40 feet of land, bringing the river's edge to the foundation of the home of Neil and Eileen Helvig. Thanks to last minute work by the Corps of Engineers to stabilize the shoreline, the Helvig's home, and several others nearby, were saved. However, this is not the only case when bank erosion has posed a threat to residential homes and without a comprehensive program in place to provide help to others in need, we may not be so lucky in the future. Over the last several years, Mrs. Lois Hyde of rural Lake Andes has watched the river work its way to within a stone's throw of her home-- an original homestead first settled by her family over 100 years ago. Without additional help, it is likely that she may be forced to abandon her farm. I believe it is our responsibility to give individuals like her the help they need to protect their homes. The Missouri River Erosion Control Act of 1998 will give homeowners the opportunity to take responsible steps to protect their property. The bill amends current law to permit homeowners to work in partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take steps to stabilize their shoreline. Under the my bill, the Corps of Engineers will accept applications from private property owners along the Missouri River and rank those applications in order of need. The most vulnerable stretches of the shoreline would then be targeted for assistance. Like other erosion control programs, the bill requires a 35 percent non-federal cost share, while the federal government will provide the other 65 percent of the cost. For many years the Corps of Engineers has been reluctant to work with private property owners to prevent damage to private property from erosion. Nevertheless, new circumstances require new thinking. Particularly in the wake of last year's disaster in South Dakota, circumstances have made it clear that we must help families take the steps they need to protect their homes. Homeowners want to take responsible measures to protect their property. We must give them that opportunity. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.