Bill Delahunt

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), and a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I think it is very important for the record and for the American people to know that yes, the staff worked hard; the staff, the majority staff and the minority staff, to review 60,000 and some odd pages. But let me suggest that no Member in this House, no member in this committee in good conscience can stand here in this well today and state that he or she adequately reviewed that testimony before its release. And this is a responsibility mandated by the Constitution to Members, not to staff, and that is what this is about today. This is not about defending the President, this is about defending the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the fact that there is limited time for this debate. I think that is, indeed, unfortunate, because I was going on to talk about how we have abdicated our constitutional duties to an unelected prosecutor, how we have released thousands of pages that none of us in good conscience can say that we have read. We violated the sanctity of the Grand Jury so that we can arrive here today to launch an inquiry without an independent, adequate review of the allegations by this body, which is our constitutional mandate. Ken Starr is not the agent of the United States Congress. It is our responsibility. I was going to go on and speak about the proposal put forth by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher), one that would have addressed and would address all of the allegations raised in the Starr referral in a fair way and in an expeditious way without dragging this Nation through hearings that will be interminable in nature. What it really means for this country, is all the President's, any President's, enemies have to do to commence an impeachment process is to name an independent counsel so that we can here just simply rubber stamp that independent counsel's conclusions. I was going to speak about the letter that was referred to by the universally respected chairman of the committee and a gentleman whom I hold in high esteem, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the letter where Mr. Starr is saying that he may make further referrals and keep this inquiry going on indefinitely. That is not a process, Mr. Speaker; it is a blank check. That is what I was going to talk about. But out of deference to others that want to speak, I will conclude by saying, one hour to begin only the third impeachment inquiry in U.S. history is a travesty and a disgrace to this institution. I think that says it all, and besides, I am probably out of time.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, the issue before us today is not just the conduct of the President. The overriding issue is how this committee will fulfill its own responsibilities at a moment of extraordinary constitutional significance. Three weeks ago, the Independent Counsel referred information to Congress that he alleged may constitute grounds for impeaching the President. But it is not the Independent Counsel who is charged by the Constitution to determine whether to initiate impeachment proceedings. That is our mandate. He is not our agent, and we cannot allow his judgments to be substituted for our own. I am profoundly disturbed at the thought that this committee would base its determination solely on the Starr referral. Never before in our history has the House proceeded with a presidential impeachment inquiry premised exclusively on the raw allegations of a single prosecutor. Let alone a prosecutor whose excessive zeal has shaken the confidence of fair-minded Americans in our system of justice. It is the committee's responsibility to conduct our own preliminary investigation to determine whether the information from the Independent Counsel is sufficient to warrant a full-blown investigation. And we have not done that. If we abdicate that responsibility, we will turn the Independent Counsel Statute into a political weapon with an automatic trigger-- aimed at every future president. And in the process, we will have turned the United States Congress into a rubber stamp. Just as we did when we rushed to release Mr. Starr's narrative within hours of its receipt, before either this committee or the President's counsel had any opportunity to examine it. Just as we did when we released 7,000 pages of secret grand jury testimony and other documents hand-picked by the Independent Counsel-- subverting the grand jury system itself by allowing it to be misused for a political purpose. Just as we are about to do again: by launching in inquiry when no member of Congress even now, has had sufficient time to read, much less analyze, these materials. Not to mention the 50,000 pages we have not released. For all I know, there may be grounds for an inquiry. But before the committee authorizes proceedings that will further traumatize the nation and distract us from the people's business, we must satisfy ourselves that there is ``probable cause'' to recommend an inquiry. That is precisely what the House instructed us to do on September 10. The chairman of the Rules Committee himself anticipated that we might return the following week to seek ``additional procedural or investigative authorities to adequately review this communication.'' Yet the committee never sought those additional authorities. Apparently we had no intention of reviewing the communication. That is the difference between the two resolutions before us today. The Majority version permits no independent assessment by the committee, and asks us instead to accept the referral purely on faith. Our alternative ensure that there is a process--one that is orderly, deliberative and expeditious--for determining whether the referral is a sound basis for an inquiry. The Majority has made much of the claim that their resolution adopts the same process--indeed, the very language--that was used during the Watergate hearings of 24 years ago. It may be the same language. But it is not the same process. In 1974, the Judiciary Committee spent weeks behind closed doors, poring over evidence gathered from a wide variety of sources--including the Ervin Committee and Judge Sirica's grand jury report, as well as the report of the Watergate Special Prosecutor. All before a single document was released. Witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the President's own counsel. Confidential material, including secret grand jury testimony, as never made public. In fact, nearly a generation later it remains under seal. It is too late now to claim that we are honoring the Watergate precedent. The damage is done. But is not too late for us to learn from the mistakes of the last three weeks. If we adopt a fair, thoughtful, bipartisan process, I am confident the American people will embrace our conclusions, whatever they may be. If the Majority chooses to do otherwise, it certainly has the votes to prevail. Just as the Democratic majority had the votes in 1974. But the Rodino committee recognized the overriding importance of transcending partisanship. And it earned the respect of the American people. It is our challenge to ensure that history is as kind to the work of this committee.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the resolution of inquiry as reported by the Judiciary Committee. I do so based on the concerns expressed in the Minority's dissenting views, and for the additional reasons set forth below. I On September 9, 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr referred information to the House that he alleged may constitute grounds for impeaching the President. In the 30 days that have elapsed since our receipt of that referral, neither the Judiciary Committee nor any other congressional committee has conducted even a preliminary independent review of the allegations it contains. In the absence of such a review, we have no basis for knowing whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant an inquiry--other than the assertion of the Independent Counsel himself that his information is ``substantial and credible'' and ``may constitute grounds for impeachment.'' I believe that our failure to conduct so much as a cursory examination before launching an impeachment proceeding is an abdication of our responsibility under Article II of the Constitution of the United States. By delegating that responsibility to the Independent Counsel, we sanction an encroachment upon the Executive Branch that could upset the delicate equilibrium among the three branches of government that is our chief protection against tyranny. In so doing, we fulfill the prophecy of Justice Scalia, whose dissent in Morrison v. Olson (487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)) foretold with uncanny accuracy the situation that confronts us.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, on September 18, 1998, the House Judiciary Committee voted to release to the public several volumes of supporting material received from the Independent Counsel nine days ago, including grand jury transcripts and the President's videotaped testimony. In my judgment, the headlong rush to publicize secret grand jury testimony not only endangers the rights of the individuals involved in this particular case, but also undermines the integrity of one of the cornerstones of our system of justice--the grand jury system itself. Unfortunately, the readiness of the majority to ignore these perils also calls into question the fundamental fairness of our own proceedings. the pace accelerates On September 9, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sent the House of Representatives a 445-page report, together with some 2,000 pages of supporting materials, telephone records, videotaped testimony and other sensitive material, as well as 17 boxes of other information. Within 48 hours, the House had voted to release the report and give the Judiciary Committee until September 28 to decide whether any of the remaining material should be kept confidential. While I agreed that we should release the report, I opposed our doing so before either the President's attorneys or members of the Committee had been given even a minimal opportunity to review it. That vote was seven days ago. Since then, the breakneck pace has only accelerated. Today, we were asked to vote--10 days ahead of schedule-- on whether to release what may well be the most sensitive materials of all--the grand jury transcripts, together with the videotape of the President's testimony. Those of us who serve on the Committee had been doing our best to review these materials so that we would be in a position to evaluate whether or not they ought to be released. I cannot speak for other members, but I have been as diligent as possible, and had managed by this morning to get through--at most--some 30 percent of this material. How can anyone make a considered judgment under such circumstances? How can we properly weigh the benefits of immediate disclosure against the harm it might cause? I have done my utmost not to prejudge the outcome of this investigation. I am prepared to follow the facts wherever they lead. But if the American people are to accept the eventual result of our deliberations, they must be satisfied that our proceedings have been thorough, disciplined, methodical and fair. I seriously doubt that an objective observer looking back on these past nine days could characterize our proceedings in that manner. The process continues to careen forward--without a roadmap--a dizzying pace. fundamental fairness One portion of the Independent Counsel's report that I made sure to read--not once, but twice--was Mr. Starr's transmittal letter, which cautioned that these supporting materials contain ``confidential material and material protected from disclosure by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure'' (the rule that provides for the secrecy of grand jury records). The implication of that warning is that the public disclosure of protected grand jury material could do serious and irrevocable harm-- not only to the President, but to the many other individuals caught up in the vast web of the Starr investigation, including innocent third- parties, witnesses, and other potential targets of ongoing (and future) investigations. In the United States, those accused of criminal wrongdoing are presumed innocent--be they presidents or ordinary citizens. Yet if raw, unproven allegations are disclosed to the public before they can be challenged, the ``presumption of innocence'' loses all meaning. Minds are made up, judgments rendered, and the chance for a fair determination of the facts is lost. That is one reason why federal grand jury testimony--whether in printed or in audio-visual form--is explicitly shielded from public disclosure under Rule 6(e). But grand jury secrecy also serves the interests of the prosecution, by encouraging witnesses to come forward and ensuring that prejudicial material will not poison the jury pool and make it impossible to hold a fair trial. This is especially important when the targets and potential targets of an investigation are public figures. The pre-indictment release of secret testimony compromises both objectives--trampling on the rights of the accused and jeopardizing subsequent indictments. Beyond this, it calls into serious question the fairness and integrity of the grand jury system itself. ``laundering'' the evidence Through its action today, the Judiciary Committee has engaged in an abuse of the grand jury process that has enabled it to accomplish indirectly what the Independent Counsel was prohibited from doing directly. The Independent Counsel has developed his case by using the grand jury to compel testimony from various witnesses. Although the grand jury voted to subpoena the President, the videotaped testimony was ultimately obtained under a negotiated agreement, under which the Independent Counsel agreed to treat the testimony as secret grand jury proceedings pursuant to Rule 6(e). It was solely on this basis that the President consented to testify. The Independent Counsel subsequently receive permission from the court to release the videotape, together with the other grand jury material, to the Congress. But the court order did not authorize its further release to the public or the press. By releasing that testimony to the public, we are--in effect-- laundering the evidence so as to nullify the express agreement under which it was obtained. This is an abuse of the grand jury that can only damage the public's faith in that institution and impair its ability to perform its essential role. And what are the benefits that justify these evils? We are told only that the public has a ``right to know''--an interest in the case that entitle sit to the information. Some have even suggested that that interest is a financial one--that the public ``paid'' for this material and is entitled to it. To this, one can only respond that the public pays for the grand jury testimony in every case. The public has an interest in every case-- especially where the case involves high officials or other celebrities. We accommodate that interest by requiring that trials be held in open court. But the public is no more entitled to secret grand jury testimony than it is to classified intelligence. Not even when the case is concluded, let alone while it is still going on. In an ordinary criminal trial, grand jury testimony is disclosed under Rule 6(e) only under certain specific circumstances. For example, criminal defendants are entitled to see grand jury proceedings in order to cross-examine witnesses or challenge their credibility on the basis of prior inconsistent statements. On the other hand, the public release of material of this nature would violate not only Rule 6(e), but Department of Justice guidelines, court precedents and ethical rules binding on prosecutors in every jurisdiction in this country. A party found to have disclosed the material would be subject to sanctions, and the material itself would be excludable in court. The court might even grant a defendant's motion to dismiss the case for prejudice. Looking to Precedent This is certainly not an ordinary case. But neither is it so exceptional as to justify our riding roughshod over precedent and due process. In the one historical precedent that is closest to the present situation, due process was scrupulously observed. Twenty-four years ago, a Republican president was under investigation by a Democratic House. The Judiciary Committee spent seven weeks in closed session, reviewing judge Sirica's grand jury materials prior to their release. President Nixon's lawyers were permitted not only to participate in these sessions, but to cross-examine witnesses before their testimony was made public. While there are obviously major differences between the current controversy and the Watergate affair, President Clinton is entitled to the same due process protections afforded President Nixon in the course of that investigation. In fact, the case for preserving the confidentiality of the evidence is even stronger here than it was in the Watergate case. Mr. Starr's grant jury has made no findings whatsoever with respect to the evidence. The material we have consists merely of selected portions of what the persecutor put before the grand jury, together with his interpretation of that material. The jurors were never asked whether they thought that the video tape--or any other testimony--provided credible evidence of perjury or other wrongdoing. Having used the grant jury as a tool to gather information, the Independent Counsel bypassed it as a fact-finding body. That is his prerogative. But the Judiciary Committee has a duty to see that the material provided to us is handled appropriately. If we act carelessly, and in haste, we will not only cripple this President, but will do lasting harm to the values and institutions we hold most dear.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the bill. This debate is not about ``free trade'' versus ``protectionism''-- though that is how proponents of the fast track proposal often characterize it. It is not about ``engagement'' versus ``isolationism.'' Or ``leadership'' versus ``retreat.'' What this debate is about is whether the most powerful nation on the planet will help create a global economic system in which everyone has a fair share of the wealth. Or whether we will continue to pursue trade policies that magnify existing inequities. That favor huge multinationals and ``agribusiness'' combines over locally-owned enterprises and family farms. That encourage American companies to go where they won't be hampered by fair labor standards, consumer protection laws and environmental regulations. This legislation failed last year and it deserves to fail again. Because the working people of America understand what it will mean for them. For their families. And their communities. They have seen what NAFTA has brought them, and they are not about to allow the Congress to repeat that costly mistake. NAFTA may have generated record profits for some large corporations. But those profits have come at the expense of workers whose jobs moved south. And farmers who couldn't compete with cheap Mexican wages. And consumers forced to buy potentially unsafe produce. Nor are the consequences of NAFTA confined to our side of the border. On a recent trip to Mexico, I saw what NAFTA has meant for the people of that country. Factory workers denied decent working conditions and the right to organize. Agricultural laborers exposed to chemicals banned in the United States. Thousands of subsistence farmers forced off their land to make room for giant export producers. To help address these concerns, I have joined with a number of my colleagues in this House, the Mexican Congress and the Parliament of Canada, in an agreement to establish a Tri-National Commission. The Commission will meet every few months, beginning early next year, to examine the effects of NAFTA in all three countries, and to look at better alternatives. We have been warned that if we fail to approve the bill, we will be shut out while other countries reach agreements. That, I submit, is an appeal to fear and weakness that ill befits a strong and confident nation. A nation with the strongest economy in the world. We should not negotiate because we are afraid we will be left out. Rather, we should negotiate in the secure knowledge that our trading partners need the American market at least as much as we need theirs. That a great nation need not accept what others decree, but can work with them to reshape the structure of international trade. If we fail to do this--if we do nothing to address the growing gulf between the haves and have nots--if we continue to enter into agreements which codify the inequities of the current trading system-- we will have much to answer for. I urge my colleagues to stand with working men and women everywhere in just saying ``no.''

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, it was interesting today to listen to the gentleman from Indiana talk about accountability and referring to some specific incidents. I daresay that if we took the time in this debate and asked the gentleman if those juveniles who committed those crimes were incarcerated, the answer would be in the affirmative. That is because there is some good news out there. We have certainly not achieved utopia. We have not arrived at the promised land. But as the gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary is fully apprised of, juvenile crime is down in this Nation. The States are doing some things that work, and it is important to understand that. In fact, violent crime, which is committed generally by young males between the ages of 15 and 25, is dramatically down all over the country. But if this bill should pass, as amended, 40 States in this Nation are going to have to change their juvenile justice laws so that they can qualify for the hundreds of millions of dollars that would be forthcoming from H.R. 3, which is now part of this bill. They would have to change their juvenile justice laws even if they are working. And let me say that just simply makes no sense whatsoever. For example, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, my home State, in the city of Boston, the capital city of Massachusetts, there has been an incredible drop in terms of juvenile crimes, and Boston is frequently cited as a model for the rest of the Nation. When I first became the district attorney for the metropolitan Boston area back in 1975, within the city of Boston itself there were 140 homicides. In this year it is projected that there will be less than 30 homicides. So there are some good things happening. Yet, if we pass this particular bill, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and some 40 other States would have to change their juvenile justice laws that are working to simply qualify for the Federal monies. That is wrong and it makes no sense. Let me suggest that we vote ``no'' on this bill and demand a simple reauthorization of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as provided for in the original Senate bill.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) for yielding this time to me. As my colleagues know, this is truly a resolution that can be described as a Alice in Wonderland resolution. Up is down and down is up. Marijuana is dangerous for folks who are suffering, who very well may be dying, but cocaine and morphine are okay. In other words, coke and morphine are less dangerous than marijuana. That just does not make any sense whatsoever. It seems to me, if we are going to ban the use of marijuana in the face of growing medical evidence of its therapeutic value, in cases resistant to other treatments, then we should ban morphine and cocaine as well. What are the arguments for treating marijuana differently from these other and arguably far more dangerous drugs? I am sure that if we ask anyone from the law enforcement community, they will tell us that violent behavior is far more endemic to the use and the abuse of cocaine and morphine and related drugs than marijuana. Well, the first argument is that whatever benefits it may have, marijuana is simply too dangerous for us to send a single signal that it is okay. Yet the same signal is sent by, as I said, allowing therapeutic access to cocaine, and yet we allow it nonetheless. If we adopt a different policy with regard to marijuana, what we will be saying is that we are willing to allow patients to suffer excruciating, debilitating conditions so as not to send a signal to others who might wish to use these drugs recreationally. With all due respect, I do not believe that anyone who has watched an AIDS or cancer patient suffer uncontrollable nausea for hours at a time could make such an argument. That is not the signal that we want to send. Proponents of the resolution are quick to point out that the scientific community is divided over the medical benefits of marijuana. They are less quick to acknowledge that both the benefits and dangers of this and hundreds of other medicinal substances are subject to scientific dispute also. It is not our role, I would submit, to prohibit scientists and researchers from continuing to develop sound data regarding the safety and efficacy of marijuana as they do with any other experimental treatment. There is also another reason why Congress has no business legislating in this subject. In November of 1996 Californians approved Proposition 215 which legalized the medical use of marijuana. That same year folks from Arizona supported a measure allowing physicians to prescribe the drug. The Californian measure was approved by a 56 percent majority, the Arizona referendum by 65 percent. I am continually surprised and stunned really at the capacity of some of my colleagues to preach the gospel of States rights while doing everything they can to federalize State prerogatives. In this Congress alone we have had legislation to deny juvenile justice funds to States that do not comply with new Federal mandates to preempt State authority with respect to product liability, tort and security litigation, to curtail State court jurisdiction over class action suits, and to override State and local land use decisions through so-called property rights measures, to name only a few of the more notorious examples. But if we are determined to override State authority, to really bury the concept of evolution, if we are determined to replace sound medical judgment with our own, at least let us not be hypocritical. Let us take morphine and cocaine off the market as well. Let us make it clear to patients who depend on these drugs to control their pain that they will simply have to suffer so that we can send the right signal about drug abuse. I am sure they will understand.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation. But before I proceed with a statement, I do want to acknowledge and commend the bill's sponsor, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions), for his sincere and genuine effort in terms of dealing with this issue. Although he and I disagree, I do want to acknowledge that he has worked cooperatively and hard on this issue, and I know his heart is in the right place. Unfortunately, this is not the right answer. Once again, Congress is taking upon itself the role that it wisely assigned to the sentencing commission to establish appropriate sentences within the sentencing guidelines for a broad range of Federal offenses. We do have a drug problem in this country, and it is a serious problem. We all recognize that. But serious problems require serious solutions, and this is not the answer. We have absolutely no evidence, no data, and none has been presented, to suggest that cutting by half the amount of methamphetamine it will take to trigger the current 5- and 10-year mandatory minimums will have any measurable effect on the problem. None. The only thing we can predict with certainty is that lowering the threshold will waste precious resources incarcerating people for relatively minor nonviolent offenses, resources that are needed to lock up offenders. In other words, Mr. Speaker, we will be putting the wrong people in jail. While it might make sense to impose lengthy sentences on high-level dealers, these mandatory minimums allow for no such distinctions to be made. Whether the offender has 5 grams or 10 grams in his possession does not tell us very much about the situation with which we are dealing, yet these laws allow the judge to consider no other factors in pronouncing sentences and often give no leeway or discretion to the prosecutor in terms of the charging decision. Again, let me suggest that we will be putting the wrong people in jail. Last year a RAND study of cocaine sentencing policy found that the mandatory minimum sentences are not effective in reducing either drug consumption or drug-related crime. The study concluded that it would be more cost effective, it would make sense, to spend the same money on drug enforcement and drug treatment programs. Nearly half of the drug offenders sentenced to long mandatory sentences in Massachusetts' state prisons have no record of violent crime. It simply makes no sense to spend $30,000 to $40,000 a year to keep these people in jail, often for terms that are far greater than the times served for criminals convicted of manslaughter, armed robbery, rape and the whole array of violent crimes. Violent predators are being released in favor of drug addicts. Yet these anomalous results will continue to occur if Congress insists on intruding into the sentencing process wherever the spirit or the polls inspire us to do so. This simply makes no sense, Mr. Speaker. I urge this House to think about that, to think about our present course. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, two days ago, after months of speculation, leaks and revelations, the report of the Independent Counsel was delivered to the House of Representatives. If this resolution is approved this morning, the report will be in the hands of millions of people around the globe by three o'clock this afternoon. I certainly agree that the report should be released. That is not even an issue. It will be released. The only question is when and how it should be done. For in exercising the responsibilities that the Constitution has thrust upon us, we must be sure that we proceed in a manner that observes the principles of fundamental fairness that are at the heart of that document. Only then will the American people accept the results, whatever they may be. Only then will we begin to restore the shaken confidence of the Nation in its political institutions. In that regard, Mr. Speaker, I consider the resolution before us today to be our first test. For in deciding the terms under which the highly sensitive material contained in the report should be released to the public, we must weigh carefully the benefits of immediate disclosure against the damage this might do to the fairness of the investigation. If the resolution is agreed to, the entire 445 pages of the report will be posted on the Internet this very afternoon. Not a page of it will have been examined beforehand by any member of the Committee. Not one page will have been seen first by the President and his attorneys. Some have argued that we should release the report because the essence of it has already been leaked to the press and appears in this morning's editions. If that is true, it is to be deplored, and the Independent Counsel should have to answer for it. But we should not endorse the unauthorized disclosure of pieces of the report by prematurely releasing the rest of it. Some have argued that the President already knows what is in the report because he is the subject of it. This argument suggests, at best, a poor understanding of what goes into a prosecutor's report. Some have argued that we should go ahead and release the report because there are still some 2,000 pages of supporting material that will not be released without Committee review, and this will be sufficient to prevent irreparable harm to lives and reputations. They cite Mr. Starr's request that we treat certain information in the supporting material as confidential, apparently inferring that the information in the report itself does not require such treatment. Yet Mr. Starr did not say this. And even if he had, it is for this House to determine what information should be disclosed. We should not abdicate that responsibility to the Independent Counsel. Apart from whatever damage the abrupt disclosure of the report might cause to innocent third parties, it will clearly be prejudicial to the President's defense. If the Independent Counsel has done his job, the case he has constructed will be a persuasive one. Prosecutors have enormous power to shape the evidence presented to the grand jury. And-- at least at the federal level--they have no obligation to apprise the jurors of exculpatory evidence. The case will seem airtight. Yet until the evidence has withstood cross-examination and the allegations have been proven, they remain nothing more than allegations. Presidents, no less than ordinary citizens, are entitled to the presumption of innocence. They are entitled to confront the charges against them. Yet, if we adopt this resolution, by the time President Clinton is accorded that right, the charges against him will have circled the globe many times. They will be all the public reads and hears. They will take on a life of their own, and the case will be tried, not by Congress, but in the court of public opinion. Given these risks, why rush to judgment, Mr. Speaker? After so many months, what possible harm can come from allowing the counsel for the President a few days to review the report so that they can tell his side of the story? In the one historical precedent we have to look to, that is precisely what was done. Twenty-four years ago, a Republican president was under investigation by a Democratic House. President Nixon's lawyers were permitted to participate in seven weeks of closed sessions, as the Judiciary Committee conducted a confidential review of Judge Sirica's grand jury materials prior to their release. The counsel to the President was even allowed to cross-examine witnesses before their testimony was made public. Whatever the differences may be between the current controversy and the Watergate affair, President Clinton should receive the same due process protections accorded to President Nixon in the course of that investigation. If the people of the United States are to accept our virdict-- whatever it may be--they must have confidence in the fairness and integrity of our deliberations. That--far more than the fate of one particular president--is what is at stake.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, by 3 o'clock today, millions of people around the world will be reading the Starr report, and it will be persuasive, for any prosecutor has the ability to shape the evidence presented to a grand jury. We can claim that these are only allegations, that nothing has been proven, but the reality is by tonight, minds will be made up and judgments will be rendered, and any presumption of innocence will be overwhelmed. I agree that the report should be released. That is not the issue. The question is when and how. After so many months, what possible harm could come from allowing counsel for the President to review the report for a day or 2 so that both sides of the story can be told at the same time? It is only fair. This House went even further to ensure fairness 24 years ago. During 7 weeks of closed-door hearings, President Nixon's lawyers were even allowed to cross-examine witnesses before anything was made public. We should respect that precedent, and it is unfortunate that we have not, for if the American people are to accept our ultimate conclusion, they must have confidence in the fairness of the process. That confidence, far more than the fate of a President, is what is at stake here.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment, which would restore funding for the Legal Services Corporation to current levels. The Legal Services Corporation is a lifeline for thousands of people with no other means of access to the legal system. Last year, LSC resolved 1.5 million civil cases, benefiting over four million indigent citizens from every country in America. Who are these people? Over two-thirds are women, and most are mothers with children. Women seeking protection against abusive spouses. Children living in poverty and neglect. Elderly people threatened by eviction or victimized by consumer fraud. Veterans denied benefits, and small farmers facing foreclosure. These are the people who will be hurt if this amendment is not adopted today. If LSC is forced to absorb the huge cuts made in committee, half of the 1,100 neighborhood legal services offices will have to be closed. This will leave a single lawyer to serve every 23,600 poor Americans. Over 700,000 people in need of legal services will have to be turned away. We cannot--we must not--allow this to happen. I urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment. It's the decent thing to do.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, one of the greatest powers wielded by every American today is the power to choose how we spend our money. In the American marketplace--the strongest economy in the world--the manner in which we make our purchasing decisions is a vote. It's a vote of confidence in a product and a vote of support for the way a company treats its employees, services its customers, or protects the environment. That's not a power to be taken lightly. It reminds corporations that we, as consumers, have a choice. We can reward them for good conduct, or punish them by purchasing from their competitors. The problem is that so-called ``free trade'' agreements take away that choice. Not only do they take it away from you and me, but they take it away from our states, counties, and cities. And although the opponents of this amendment claim that it challenges the balance of power established by the Constitution, all that the amendment strives to do is re-establish the power to choose how we spend our money. In 1996, the Massachusetts state legislature overwhelmingly endorsed a law prohibiting the state from doing any procurement business with companies that invest in Burma, whose abominable human rights record we are all familiar with. The taxpayers of Massachusetts made it clear that they wanted their elected representatives to use taxpayer dollars to support corporations for whom human dignity meant more than an extra tenth of a percent on this quarter's earnings. In doing so, Massachusetts became the first state to enact such a law, joining dozens of counties, towns and cities nationwide where doing business with repressive governments is simply not acceptable. As a result, major firms--including Apple Computer, Hewlett-Packard, and Motorola--have severed their ties to Burma. While the people of Massachusetts broadly support the action taken by their state, the European Union and Japan have filed a World Trade Organization challenge against Massachusetts. The Administration--which promised us, and continues to promise us, that trade agreements do not undermine states' rights--has been quietly pressuring Massachusetts legislators to repeal the law. A coalition of 600 of the largest multinational corporations, for whom profits mean far more than human rights, has filed suit against Massachusetts. These are the same corporations who have fought all efforts to keep consumers informed about the effects of their purchases by opposing even the simplest requirements to label fresh produce with its country of origin, or to establish labels ensuring customers that products were made without child or sweatshop labor. The claim that the Massachusetts law, and others like it, are unconstitutional. Since when is the right of consumers to choose how to spend their money unconstitutional? Since NAFTA? Since GATT? Like many of my colleagues, I would prefer to act on these issues by repealing and renegotiating trade agreements to ensure that human rights, workers, and the environment are protected to the same extent as intellectual property rights and corporate profits. I would prefer to see the impacts of these agreements on states' rights and consumer's rights clearly defined before we commit ourselves. But we all know that's not going to happen. This amendment is a very small step in that direction. We owe it to the people of Massachusetts, San Francisco, New York City, Ann Arbor, Palo Alto, Chapel Hill, and dozens of other American towns with similar laws, to uphold their rights as consumers and their belief in ``what is good'' over ``what is profitable.'' I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Oklahoma. Some who oppose this amendment will express their concern about the unwarranted intrusion this amendment represents into the lives of children and their families in the District of Columbia. Others will address the impact of this amendment on the principle of local control, and wonder what in the world the Congress of the United States is doing meddling with local adoption rules. I share both of those concerns, Mr. Chairman. But tonight I wish to speak as an adoptive parent, who is concerned first and foremost about the well-being of unwanted children. Mr. Chairman, it is a sad fact that not all parents are fit parents. Child abuse and neglect occurs in all kinds of families. Among ``birth families'' no less than adoptive families. Among so-called ``traditional two-parent families'' no less than families of less conventional description. Most of us do our best to love and nurture our children, but no parent is perfect. And we all make mistakes. But I also know that good parents and families come in all shapes and sizes, too. Some of the most loving, nurturing and supportive families would fail Mr. Largent's litmus test. And that would be a tremendous loss for the half a million children now in foster care who would be deprived of the chance to grow up in that kind of environment. There are too many kids out there who need decent homes for us to start deciding which characteristics to require of adoptive parents. Some who value a religious upbringing might want to disqualify prospective parents who are not religious. Others might want to disqualify people who are. Some might feel that only people with a certain level of income, or education, are entitled to adopt. And so forth. But such considerations are really beside the point when it comes to adoption. The only test we ought to apply is the test the law already uses to determine whether a child belongs in a particular family situation or not. That test is whether the situation is in the ``best interests'' of the child. The application of that test is a complex matter. It requires the careful weighing of a multitude of factors by those with the requisite experience and expertise. One thing we can be sure of is that the Congress of the United States is not the agency that is best equipped to do that evaluation. Another thing I'm sure of, Mr. Chairman, is that it is not in the best interests of a child to be in an institution or on the street when he or she could grow up in a stable, loving household. We should ask whether the parents have the means to feed and clothe the child and see to its education. We should ask whether they maintain a home that will offer the child a harmonious, stable and nurturing environment. We should ask whether they have the skills and the commitment it takes to be a good parent. When we find a family that offers all this to a child in need, what kind of society would reject that family because the parents are ``not related by blood or marriage?'' I believe we should embrace that family, Mr. Chairman, and be thankful that a lost child has been given a new home and a second chance in life.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Kansas. The amendment would not only bar the use of federal funds for needle exchange programs in the District of Columbia. It would also prohibit DC government from using its own money of this purpose--money obtained through local taxation for programs that are widely supported by the local citizenry. The gentleman is evidently doing this because he knows that a prohibition on the use of federal funds is both unnecessary and meaningless. Secretary Shalala announced this past Spring that the Administration does not intend to make federal funds available for needle exchange programs. But the gentleman is not satisfied with this. He objects to the fact that local governments across the is country are using their own funds to conduct these programs. Under our federal system of government, there is nothing he can do about this with respect to Boston, or New York, or even Kansas City. So he has chosen to express his displeasure by targeting the one city in the United States in which the normal rules of local autonomy do not apply. This is unfair to the residents of the District of Columbia, who find themselves subject to the gentleman's whim even though they do not live in the gentleman's Congressional district. But it is also a terrible precedent for the country as a whole. Because despite the squeamishness of some Members of Congress at the mere sight of a needle, the truth is that these programs work. They prevent HIV infection. They do not encourage or increase drug abuse. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that they actually help reduce drug abuse by encouraging injection drug abuser to enter treatment. As a former prosecutor and a member of the Judiciary Committee, I take very seriously the epidemic of drug addiction on our society. But we cannot make responsible public policy based on fear and ignorance. Study after study--by such respected agencies as the National Research Council, the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health--have all reached the same conclusion. So have the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, the American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the American Bar Association. In April, the Secretary of Health and Human Services followed suit. Yet instead of announcing that federal funds would be made available, the Administration bowed to political pressure and announced a continuation of the status quo. In other words, needle exchange programs save lives, but cities and towns that want to have these programs must pay for them out of their own funds. That is unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, but at least local jurisdictions are free to do that. If the gentleman's amendment is adopted, the District of Columbia will no longer have that option. That is wrong, Mr. Chairman. It is bad enough for legislators to overrule local decision makers in matters of this kind. But it is the worst kind of irresponsibility for us to substitute our own uninformed opinions for the sound judgment of the public health community. To say, in effect, ``our minds are made up. Don't confuse us with facts.'' I have seen what needle exchange programs can accomplish in Massachusetts, Mr. Chairman, and I know that they have saved lives. If this amendment becomes law, more people in Washington, D.C. will become infected with the AIDS virus. More people will die of AIDS. And their blood will be on our hands, Mr. Chairman. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Tiahrt amendment.

Mr. DELAHUNT

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I was not present, nor did I serve in this body when the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joe McDade) went through the troubles that have been related to during the course of this particular debate. Just let me say this, as a former prosecutor and as an elected representative of the people of the 10th District of Massachusetts, I have got to know the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. McDade), I know him well, and I know of no one who has such unimpeachable integrity as the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and I just simply want to make that statement for the Record. I listened to the debate, and I think we have got to step back and reflect. This is really rather simple. It is about ethics. That is what it is about. It is about ethics, and the existing code of ethics that every single state prosecutor subscribes to ought to be applied to Department of Justice attorneys. I do not think that is asking too much. We have heard a lot about law enforcement concerns, but that should not justify the creation of a lesser standard of ethics for Federal prosecutors. It just does not work. We should pause and think about the power of the prosecutor, and I know that power. I was an elected prosecutor for more than 20 years. I understand that power. I know what it can do to individuals. I know what it can do to families, and it should be exercised judiciously. I submit that most prosecutors, Federal and State, do that. The single admonition that I would instruct each and every assistant district attorney was to never abuse the power of that office, never abuse the power of that office, because it is an enormous power. There is no power greater in a democracy where you have the capacity to take the individual liberties away from an individual. That is the ultimate power, and if that power is abused, it begins the process of the erosion of a healthy democracy. I dare say the prosecutor should be held to the highest possible standards, the highest code of ethics, because the American people have given them an extraordinary power, whether they are independent counsels, whether they are State prosecutors, whether they are United States Attorneys.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that, because the gentleman refers to the National Sheriffs Association, the FBI and the DEA, I think it is important for the Members to understand that the code of ethics that the gentleman is referring to does not apply to investigatory agents.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important, given the statements by my friend from Arkansas, whom I have great respect for, that if somehow you support McDade and Murtha you are somehow assisting or abetting drug cartels in the United States. That simply is not the case. State prosecutors historically have conducted investigations that are multistate in nature, whether it be organized crime, whether it be drug trafficking, whether it be white collar crime. They adjust. As the gentleman from Arkansas indicated, Massachusetts has a very stringent standard in terms of prosecutorial ethics, but it has not caused a problem. It is reminiscent of when the Warren Court issued the landmark cases in Mapp and Miranda. It was going to impede and be the end in terms of law enforcement. I dare say now we have better and more professional law enforcement that is more ethical than ever before.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson). The amendment seeks to strike title VIII of the bill, which consists of the legislation known as the Citizens Protection Act, authorized by my colleagues form Pennsylvania, Mr. McDade and Mr. Murtha. Let me say at the outset that I have reservations about a number of aspects of this legislation. I am also uncomfortable with the process by which it has come before the House. Matters of this complexity and importance ought to be addressed through the normal process of committee deliberation, so that the legislation can be fully examined and perfected before being brought to the floor. Among the aspects of this legislation which I find problematic are the provisions establishing an independent ``misconduct review board''--an entity which I believe could unnecessarily complicate and politicize the law enforcement mission. Nevertheless, I support the ethical standards which comprise the core of this legislation, and I cannot support an amendment to strip it from the bill. Mr. Hutchinson's amendment does not seek to remedy any particular shortcomings of the measure; instead, it seeks to delete it entirely. Given this ``all-or-nothing'' proposition, I would prefer to allow the legislation to go to conference, where those of us who have concerns would have an opportunity to have them addressed. I oppose the Hutchinson amendment and support the underlying legislation for one simple reason: as a former district attorney, I understand the truly awesome power that has become concentrated in the hands of the prosecutor. When abused, that power can and does destroy innocent lives and reputations. And the system provides few checks and balances to prevent such abuse. When I was a district attorney, I hired many brilliant, ambitious young lawyers. I gave them a single admonition: ``understand the power of your office, and do not abuse it. Understand that being a prosecutor is not about winning and losing. It is about seeing that justice is done.'' Most of the prosecutors I have known in the course of my career have wielded their authority with integrity and restraint. But those who fail to do so can be as dangerous to the health of our society as the criminals they pursue. Given this danger, it is necessary and appropriate that prosecutors be held to the standards of professional conduct to which other attorneys are subject. I do not accept the assertion of the Department of Justice that their attorneys should be immune from these ethical rules whenever they find them unduly confining. That is what ethical rules are for. And--whatever its other flaws--the Citizens Protection Act would ensure that prosecutors follow the rules. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I support the legislation and urge defeat of the amendment.