Mike DeWine

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. DeWINE. The answer is no.

Mr. DeWINE. The answer is no.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. I thank my distinguished friend from Kentucky, and I yield the floor.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I would like to express my strong support for the Child Survival and Disease Program Fund. Last year Congress, allocated $650 million plus $50 million in supplemental emergency funds to the Child Survival and Disease Program Fund for Fiscal Year 1999. As in the past, House Subcommittee Chairman Callahan has taken the lead in protecting these child survival programs and I commend him for his leadership on this issue. For FY 2000 the Clinton Administration, however, has budgeted $40 million below the $700 million allocated last year. In order to preserve the benefits of these important programs for children worldwide, as we have done in the past, we should accept in conference the House language that Chairman Callahan proposes. It is a tragedy that millions of children die each year from disease, malnutrition, and other consequences of poverty that are both preventable and treatable. The programs of the Child Survival Fund, which are intended to reduce infant mortality and improve the health and nutrition of children, address the various problems of young people struggling to survive in developing countries. It places a priority on the needs of the more than 100 million children worldwide who are displaced and/or have become orphans. The Child Survival and Disease Programs Fund includes initiatives to curb the resurgence of communicable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. According to the World Health Organization, in 1999 alone, more children will die of tuberculosis than in any other year in history. In the underdeveloped world, the Child Survival and Disease Programs Fund works towards eradicating polio as well as preventing and controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS. Aside from addressing issues of health, the Child Survival and Disease Programs Fund also supports basic education programs. An investment in education yields one of the highest social and economic rates of return--because it gives children the necessary tools to become self-sufficient adults. According to the World Bank, each additional year of primary and secondary schooling results in a 10-20% wage increase. Unfortunately, there are still 130 million primary aged children who are not attending any school, 2/3 of those children are girls. The programs supported by the Child Survival and Disease Programs Fund are effective because they save three million lives each year through immunizations, vitamin supplementation, oral rehydration therapy, and the treatment of childhood respiratory infections, which are the second largest killer of children on earth. If every child received vaccinations, an additional two million children each year would be saved from these terminal diseases. Eliminating the symptoms and causes of this poverty is not only the humane thing to do--it is also a necessary prerequisite for global stability and prosperity. In my view, Congress needs to maintain its support for these valuable programs. It is my hope that the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee will accept the proposed House language. The Child Survival and Disease Programs are effective and are important. They should be continued. I see the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the floor and urge his continued support for that program.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, on behalf of the Majority Leader Lott, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow the Senate will convene at 9:30 a.m. and will debate cloture on the motion to proceed to the Social Security lockbox legislation for 1 hour, to be followed by a cloture vote at 10:30 a.m. If cloture is invoked, the leader will then file a cloture motion on the pending amendment, which is the Social Security lockbox issue. That cloture vote will occur at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, July 16, as under a previous order. Following that action, Senator Specter will be recognized as in morning business for up to 30 minutes. Upon completion of Senator Specter's remarks, the Senate will resume consideration of the Treasury-Postal appropriations bill with the hope of completing that bill during Thursday's session of the Senate. Under a previous consent, all amendments must be offered by 11:30 a.m. on Thursday. It may also be the intention of the leader to debate and vote on the Y2K conference report and to begin consideration of any other appropriations bills cleared for action on Thursday. Therefore, Senators can expect votes throughout the day.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. I ask consent that immediately following that debate, the Senate proceed to a vote on adoption of the conference report with no other intervening action or debate.

Mr. DeWINE. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate proceeds to the conference report to accompany H.R. 775, the Y2K liability bill, the reading be waived and it be limited to the following debate time: Senator McCain, 20 minutes; Senator Dodd, 15 minutes; Senator Wyden, 15 minutes; Senator Leahy, 10 minutes; and Senator Hollings, 50 minutes.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, Senator Lott, I ask unanimous consent that following the cloture vote on Thursday relative to the Social Security lockbox issue, if invoked, the Senate immediately proceed to the bill, and following the offering of the cloture motion on the pending amendment, the bill be laid aside until Friday, July 16. I further ask unanimous consent that 9:30 a.m. on Friday there be 1 hour for debate to be equally divided in the usual form, and that the cloture vote occur at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, July 16, and the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be read a third time and passed, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to this resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 145, S. Res. 21.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and, finally, that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 131 submitted earlier by Senators Lott and Daschle.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, also on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that S. 886, the State Department authorization bill, be printed as passed by the Senate.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I would like to now, on behalf of the leadership, the majority leader, Senator Lott, ask unanimous consent that the Senate immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations on the Executive Calendar: Nos. 109 through 130, and all nominations on the Secretary's desk in the Air Force, the Army, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Navy. I further ask unanimous consent that the nominations be confirmed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the nominations be printed in the Record, that the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then return to legislative session.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss yet again one of the key problems I have been addressing, as a U.S. Senator, over the last four years. The problem is the inflow of illegal drugs into America. I have heard it said that if we eliminate demand, if we address the domestic side of drug abuse, we really don't have to worry about illegal narcotics producers and importers, because they would then have no market for their drugs. Mr. President, this argument makes sense on a superficial level, but it does not reflect reality. I have been, throughout my career as a local, state and Federal elected official, a strong supporter of domestic efforts to reduce drug demand. But I have always believed--and continue to believe--that we need a balanced program to attack the drug problem on all fronts. We need to invest not only in domestic demand reduction and law enforcement programs, but also in international programs to increase interdiction and reduce production of illegal narcotics. We need to do our best to stop drugs from ever reaching our borders. Mr. President, for nearly a year, I have expressed my belief that this Administration is not doing its best to address this problem. Little seems to have changed in one year. Before this Administration took office, almost one-third of our counter narcotics resources were committed to stopping drugs outside our borders. Today, that figure is less than 14 percent. Although overall funding for counter narcotics programs has increased dramatically in the last decade, from $4.5 billion to $17.8 billion, statistics show an increase in drug use among our youngest citizens. I am disturbed by how easily and how cheaply illegal drugs can be purchased. I am disturbed that the Administration is not taking seriously the initiatives Congress passed last year as part of the bipartisan Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. Mr. President, President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2000 provided ZERO funding for any of the initiatives in that Act. In fact, the President's overall anti-drug budget for next year is $100 million less than what Congress provided in 1999. The Coast Guard received no funding to acquire additional ships and planes to stop drug trafficking in the Caribbean; the Drug Enforcement Administration received ZERO funding for new agents; the US Customs Service received ZERO funding to acquire maritime/air assets, and ZERO increases for inspectors. In addition, the Administration has also ignored other key initiatives sought by Congress, including mycoherbicide research and development, and eradication and alternative crop development assistance to our Latin American neighbors, particularly, Colombia and Bolivia. I very much appreciate the efforts of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in working with me on these issues. They have done a remarkable job to incorporate a key anti-drug initiative that was not sought by the President. Specifically, Mr. President, I commend the managers of the bill for accepting the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana, Senator Burns, to fund the mycoherbicide program which we began funding last year under the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. Mycoherbicide technology is a new and promising eradication technique for coca, poppy, and marijuana. The concept is to employ a natural disease that only attacks a specific narcotics plant without harming neighboring vegetation. Mycoherbicides can be applied through aerial spraying and will remain in the soil to prevent future growth of the narcotics crops in that area. Mr. President, this has the potential to be a very cost- effective and low-risk way to drastically reduce drug production at its source. We must pursue this technology and fund the additional research and testing necessary to bring about a deployable product as soon as possible. Mr. President, let me now turn to the subject of eradication and alternative crop development assistance to Colombia and Bolivia. I am particularly concerned about the lack of resources made available by this Administration for what I consider to be our most urgent foreign assistance project--counter narcotics funding. I fear that we are sending a signal abroad that the United States is not entirely serious about the fight against drugs. The report language accompanying this bill makes special mention of the progress made in the drug fight by the Government of Bolivia, and I want to add my voice to the committee report as well. Since coming to power in August of 1997, the Government of President Hugo Banzer and Vice President Jorge Quiroga has undertaken an ambitious plan to remove Bolivia from the illegal narcotics trade by the time they leave office in 2002. Mr. President, many, myself included, were skeptical that this goal could be reached in the time allotted. Now, nearly two years into their ``Dignity Plan,'' the Bolivian Government has shown that this goal can be reached. Since taking office, the Banzer Government has successfully reduced Bolivia's cocaine production potential by a remarkable 40 percent. This has been accomplished by an effective eradication program and an aggressive and successful program of interdiction and control of the chemical precursors which go into cocaine production. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill makes mention of Bolivia's success, and its financial needs. I am deeply concerned that we are not providing sufficient support to the historic effort of the Bolivian Government. They have moved tens of thousands of farmers out of the illegal coca fields and it is absolutely imperative that we help to provide viable commercial alternatives for these farmers and their families. It would be a great tragedy to be within sight of a major victory in the drug war and to lose it for want of resources. The anticipated level of funding in this Bill falls far short of what is required to finish the job in Bolivia in the next two years. Mr. President, I look forward to working with the Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, the Senator from Georgia, Senator Coverdell, and the Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley, to help Bolivia and other countries in their fight against drugs. We will work with the appropriators during conference to provide the highest possible level of funding for this effort. This is a key investment in the future safety of our own streets--and it will bring us closer to the drug-free America our children deserve. amendment no. 1158 At the appropriate place in the bill at the following new section:

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I further ask that the Senate then begin 1 hour of debate prior to the cloture motion to proceed to the Social Security lockbox issue, with time to be equally divided between the two leaders, or their designees, and that the live quorum be waived. I also ask that following the vote, notwithstanding rule XXII, Senator Specter then be recognized up to 30 minutes, as if in morning business.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 9:30 a.m., Thursday, July 1. I further ask that on Thursday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for the next 30 minutes in morning business.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, we have just concluded the foreign operations bill, and I congratulate Senator McConnell, Senator Leahy, and others who have worked so very diligently on this difficult and tough bill. Contained in the bill we just passed, among other things, was a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. This sense-of-the-Senate resolution was proposed and offered by myself and by my colleague from Georgia, Senator Coverdell. It deals with the situation in Colombia and the United States relationship to that troubled country. I want to talk this evening about that sense-of-the-Senate resolution and about the situation in Colombia. For the past several months, United States foreign policy has really been dominated by the crisis in Kosovo. Certainly we have to continue to work with the NATO alliance and Russia to help bring the Albanian Kosovars back to their homeland and to bring a stable peace to the region. But tonight I want to discuss another compelling and very serious foreign policy crisis that is taking place right in our own hemisphere. Like Kosovo, it is a crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, more than 800,000 since 1995, and instead of a small province being ethnically cleansed by its own government, this democratic country is fighting multiple conflicts--a war against two threatening and competing guerrilla groups, a war against paramilitary organizations, and, finally, a war against drug lords who traffic in deadly cocaine and in heroin. I am, of course, talking about the four wars that are taking place tonight in Colombia. While a 19-nation NATO alliance struggles to prevent the disintegration of a small province, the disintegration of an entire nation is going practically unnoticed by our own Government in Washington. The decade-long struggle in the Balkans is being duplicated in Colombia, which is fracturing into politically and socially unstable ministates and is posing a significant threat to our own hemisphere. Colombia is shaping up to be the Balkan problem of the Americas. More than 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. More than 308,000 Colombians were internally displaced in 1998 alone. In Kosovo, 230,000 people were displaced during this same period of time before NATO took action. And like the Albanian Kosovars, Colombians are fleeing their country today in large numbers. More than 2,000 crossed into Venezuela in a matter of a few days recently. A Miami Herald article recently reported a growing number of Colombians leaving for south Florida. Our Nation has a clear national interest in the future of the stability of our neighbor to the south, Colombia. In 1998, legitimate two-way trade between the United States and Colombia was more than $11 billion, making the United States Colombia's No. 1 trading partner, and Colombia is our fifth-largest trading partner in the region. In spite of this mutually beneficial partnership, the United States simply has not devoted the level of time nor resources nor attention needed to assist this important democratic partner as it struggles with drug problems, with violent criminal and paramilitary organizations, and guerrilla insurgents. In fact, in December 1998, a White House official told the Washington Post that Colombia, quote, ``poses a greater immediate threat to us than Bosnia did, yet it receives almost no attention.'' Attention is needed--now more than ever. According to the State Department, Colombia is the third most dangerous country in the world in terms of political violence, and accounts for 34 percent of all terrorist acts committed worldwide. The Colombian National Police reported that Colombian rebels carried out 1,726 terrorist strikes in 1998--that's 12 percent more than in the previous year. Kidnapping is also a significant problem. Approximately 2,609 people were kidnapped in 1998, and there have been 513 reported kidnappings in the first three months of this year. Guerrillas are responsible for a high percentage of these incidents. The wholesale acts of violence that have infected this country are symptoms of four wars that are going on in Colombia. Any single one of them would pose a significant threat to any country. Together, these wars represent a threat beyond the borders of Colombia. Let me describe them in detail. For more than three decades, the guerrilla groups known as Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces--the FARC--and the National Liberation Army--the ELN--have waged the longest-running anti-government insurgency in Latin America. Determining the size of these guerrilla organizations is an inexact science. Most open sources range their combat strength from about 10,000 to 20,000 full-time guerrillas. However, irregular militias, part-time guerrillas, and political sympathizers also play a role that is hard to quantify. The insurgents have their own armament capabilities and are manufacturing high-quality improvised mortars. Organized crime links also have long been suspected. The Chief of the Colombian National Police, General Jose Serrano, has reported in the past that the FARC has completed guns-and-cash-for-drugs deals with organized crime groups in Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya and Uzbekistan. A Colombian army study recently stated that the two main leftist guerrilla groups had raised at least $5.3 billion from 1991 to 1998 from the drug trade, abductions, and extortions to fund their long-running uprising against the state. According to the State Department's 1998 Human Rights Report, the FARC and ELN, along with other, smaller groups, initiated armed action in nearly 700 of the country's 1073 municipalities, and control or influence 60 percent of rural Colombia. Although these groups have had no history of major urban operations, a number of recent guerrilla-sponsored hostage takings recently have taken place. Colombian President Pastrana is trying to make peace at all costs with FARC rebels, who have little incentive to agree to any peace deal. Throughout these negotiations, the FARC has continued to assault and kill dozens of Colombian military and police. The current prospects for peace are dismal. If Pastrana were to accept the demands of the FARC and ELN for political and territorial autonomy, he would have to splinter his country into Balkan-type factions. The effects of this would be increased paramilitary violence and increased regional instability. In fact, one of the FARC conditions already agreed to by President Pastrana was the creation of a temporary, demilitarized zone the size of Switzerland. All Colombian Armed Forces and Police were ordered out of the area. Despite this enormous concession on the part of the Colombian government, the FARC has not agreed to any cease-fire and has made no concessions. In fact, they made it clear to the Colombian Government that they should expect continued guerrilla operations and attacks. ``Farclandia'' is the name some local residents have given to this odd state-within-a-state. The area has over 90,000 residents. Despite its creation as a temporary demilitarized zone, the FARC appear to be cementing control and taking steps to ensure that expulsion from the zone would be extremely difficult, particularly if the talks break down. According to the Catholic Bishop residing in the DMZ area, residents are required to feed the FARC, which is simply a form of taxation. The FARC has attempted to expel a Catholic priest for being an ``enemy of peace.'' The priest argued the FARC is violating human rights, usurping the locally elected government, interfering with economic activity, imposing labor duty, and recruiting minors, teenagers, and married men. The bottom line is that FARC fighters are using their armed stranglehold on the zone to abuse Colombian citizens. In April, FARC leaders asked Pastrana to extend rebel control over another zone in southern Colombia--approximately 7,600 square miles-- that is allegedly the home to some of the most concentrated cocaine- production facilities in the world. The Pastrana Government agreed to place the request on the negotiating table. While the additional zone was not approved, Pastrana agreed to allow FARC rebels to have continued control over the DMZ. This is the second time, since November 1998, that President Pastrana has extended the DMZ to the FARC during the talks. This decision provoked outrage within Colombian military ranks, particularly since military officers had been humiliated by the creation of the original zone. That earlier decision required the withdrawal of hundreds of police and army troops. By the end of May, Colombian Defense Minister Ricardo Lloreda announced his resignation. Following his announcement, dozens of military officers resigned in solidarity with Lloreda. Of the total of 30 Colombian army generals, reports indicate that between 10 and 17 resigned in solidarity with Lloreda. With the exception of Lloreda's resignation, Pastrana did not accept any other resignations. However, as a result of this mass protest, Pastrana agreed that the FARC zone would be demilitarized for only six more months and that a retired general would be included in the negotiating team for the talks. In another important development, the Colombian Congress too is beginning to express its doubt in the peace process. Earlier this month, the Congress rejected a bill that would have given Pastrana sweeping powers to grant political concessions--including an amnesty for convicted guerrillas. Lloreda's resignation was truly unfortunate. I met Defense Minister Lloreda in Colombia last November. Lloreda, described by his peers as someone who could help bring about needed reform in the military, was just beginning to gain some ground. He had already begun rebuilding the army, a difficult task given its record of human rights violations. In fact, he had forced the resignation of Colombian military officers suspected of human rights violations and had others arrested. Lloreda had also lifted the morale among the military, having suffered significant defeats by the FARC forces. According to the Economist magazine, the defense budget has doubled this year to $1.2 billion. In March, the army even managed a successful offensive, which left 50 guerrillas dead. The resignation, however, threw Pastrana's 10-month-old government into crisis and placed the future of the nation's fragile process in doubt. It has also left open important questions about the future of the Colombian military. Mr. President, Colombian military operational mobility is widely acknowledged to be a shortcoming. Colombia is a very large country. One of their departments is as large as the nation of El Salvador. In fighting an insurgency, the state has to defend many critical areas, but also has to have the capability to mass and economize forces to attack guerrilla formations when they present themselves. Colombia's army has barely 40 helicopters for a territory the size of Texas and Mexico combined. El Salvador, 1/50th the size of Colombia, had 80-- twice as many--during its civil war. Although the Army has 122,000 soldiers, most of them are 1-year conscripts. Approximately 35-40% are high school graduates not assigned to combat duties by law. At any time, about 30% are undergoing basic training. A large portion of the remaining force (50-60%) is assigned to static defense of key economic or isolated municipal outposts. That leaves approximately 20,000 soldiers remaining for offensive combat operations. These are the veterans or volunteers that constitute--apart from the officer corps-- the only true repository of combat experience in their army. Now consider that the active guerrilla combatants alone number between 11,000 and 20,000. You do the math. It doesn't look good. It is conceivably a one to one ``fighting'' ratio. How can a military, with limited resources, fight two guerrilla movements which have virtually unlimited resources from drug trafficking, kidnappings, extortion and arms trafficking? The Colombian Army has already suffered a string of military defeats. In 1998, the Colombian Armed Forces suffered three major blows in March, August, and November. In fact, the FARC executed one of its major blows against the military just as President Pastrana was meeting with FARC leaders on the peace talks. The FARC currently holds over 300 military and police POW's. And according to Jane's Intelligence Review, Colombian guerrillas killed 445 soldiers during 1998. If you include Colombian National Police, the figure would rise to 600. The CNP too has experienced significant losses. Over 4,000 policemen have been killed in Colombia in the past decade. As if the FARC weren't enough of a problem, let me complicate this situation further by discussing the war with the ELN. The ELN has been envious of the attention the FARC has been getting, particularly at the negotiating table. As a result, the ELN has resorted to a series of recent hostage takings. Shortly after Pastrana and the FARC announced in April that formal negotiations would take place in the summer, the ELN hijacked a Colombian commercial airliner in mid-April, kidnapping 41 passengers and crew. Then, shortly after Defense Minister Lloreda's resignation, about 30 ELN guerrillas invaded a church service in an upper-class neighborhood in Cali and abducted over 140 worshipers. In response, the Government deployed more than 3,000 soldiers and policemen to locate them. While some hostages have been released from the hijacking and church incidents, approximately 50 are still being held including two Americans. I have outlined, Mr. President, the two main guerrilla groups which are a significant threat to Colombia. Unfortunately, however, I have not yet spoken of another ongoing war which poses an additional and substantial threat--the Colombian paramilitaries. In fact, the Colombian paramilitaries are also seeking a role at the negotiations table. The Colombian paramilitaries are an umbrella organization of about 5,000 armed combatants. Their mission has been to counter the grip of leftist guerrillas. Carlos Castano, the powerful leader of the paramilitary umbrella organization United Self- Defense Groups of Colombia, has been quoted defending the strategy of killing villagers who are guerrilla supporters and sympathizers. The paramilitaries are funded by wealthy landowners and, in some cases, cocaine traffickers. They exercised increasing influence during 1998, extending their presence into areas previously under guerrilla control. The presence of paramilitary groups have driven a wedge in the peace talks because the FARC leadership refuses to negotiate until the government effectively clamps down on the right wing gunmen. The problem is that the government also has a problem in trying to control the paramilitaries. In an attempt to become a player at the negotiating table, Castano's organization kidnapped a Colombian Senator last month. In fact, Castano said shortly after the abduction that his aim was to gain political recognition and a place at the negotiating table for his movement. The Senator was freed after being held for two weeks. The Senator later commented that Pastrana should eventually include Colombia's paramilitary forces in negotiations to end the 35 year civil war. Since the leftist rebels vehemently oppose their participation in the peace talks, prospects for the peace negotiations are complicated even further. Before I talk about the increasing drug threat from Colombia, let me spend a few minutes on the general violence in Colombia. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Colombia led the world in kidnappings in 1998, and may be the most likely place in the world to be abducted. The country averages five people a day snatched by guerrillas or other criminals. Guerrillas from the FAR, ELN and the smaller Popular Liberation Army accounted for approximately 1,600 kidnappings of the 2,609 reported in 1998. A report issued by the Colombian Government's anti-kidnapping office in May calculated that at least 4,925 people have been abducted since January 1996, with the largest total coming in 1998. The problem with this statistic is that many families and businesses prefer to deal directly with kidnappers and not report abductions to the police. Hence, this figure is only the official one. It is understandably difficult to count how many kidnappings truly occur in Colombia. Imagine, if you will, living in a country where you can't send your child on school field trip; where you can't decide to go out of Bogota for the weekend to visit relatives in a nearby city. In fact, the situation is so grave that you think twice about going to the grocery store or even to a movie. A recent New York Times article described the lives of Colombians and the precautions they must take on a daily basis. The article stated that Colombians are refusing to fly on any airplane that is not a jet. They cite the example of ELN hijacking of a prop plane. The Colombian quoted in the article commented that it is almost impossible for guerrillas to take over a big jet and make it land at some little airstrip out in the jungle. In the week before Easter, a traditional vacation time throughout Latin America, travel within Colombia was down 40% over last year, according to a Colombian civic group. With increasing regularity, the five million residents of Bogota are canceling trips to towns that are barely a two hour drive away, while traffic on highways to the Caribbean coast has also dropped significantly. Kidnapping is such a significant threat that a Colombian government study made public estimates that the country's three main guerrilla groups have obtained more than $1.2 billion in kidnapping ransoms in recent years. Mr. President, the situation in Colombia has gotten so bad that the State Department recently issued a warning, advising Americans to not travel to Colombia. You see, Colombians are not the only targets in their country. There have been U.S. casualties as well. In late 1997, the State Department added the FARC to its list of terrorist organizations. In January 1999, guerrillas announced that all U.S. military and law enforcement personnel in Colombia would be considered legitimate targets to be killed or captured. In late February, the FARC viciously murdered three U.S. human rights workers. This horrific execution met with no reaction from the Clinton Administration. A resolution was recently introduced in the House, calling on the Colombian government to pursue the killers, members of the FARC and extradite them to the U.S. Colombian terrorists continue to target Americans, kidnapping over a dozen U.S. citizens in 1999 so far--this is double the total amount for 1998. The 1998 State Department Terrorism Report also suggests that terrorists also continued to bomb U.S. commercial interests, such as oil pipelines and small businesses. There has also been much concern that the civil war in Colombia could spill over into neighboring countries--including Venezuela, where President Chavez is alleged to have had contacts in the past with the ELN. A spill-over into Venezuela would be disastrous for the United States, given that Venezuela is our number one--let me repeat this-- number one supplier of foreign oil. The situation is so grave that Venezuela has sent 30,000 troops to the border with Colombia. There has been a recent exodus of Colombians into Venezuela. In a two day period recently, over 2,000 Colombians began their exodus to Venezuela after death squads massacred about 80 people near a border town. Many of the Colombians were said to be coca farmers. At first, Venezuelan President Chavez said Venezuela was prepared to offer the Colombians temporary refuge until they could return safely to their homes. However, only one day after the recent cross-over began, Venezuela had already started repatriating Colombians back to Colombia. And within a few days, all Colombians have been repatriated. Colombian-Venezuelan relations have been tense. For example, while Chavez has agreed to play a role in the negotiations, in mid-May Chavez announced he was seeking a direct meeting with FARC commander Manuel Marulanda. In fact, two months earlier, he angered President Pastrana by suggesting that the FARC's armed struggle was legitimate and declaring that Venezuela remained ``neutral'' in the conflict. There has also been some concern of a spillover of the conflict into Ecuador, another nation bordering Colombia. In fact, Ecuadoran government officials indicate that rebel forces have crossed over to their nation, primarily for rest and relaxation. With the end of its border dispute with Peru, Ecuador is in the process of relocating 10,000 troops to the Colombian border. In addition, Ecuadoran intelligence has reportedly periodically taken down some guerrilla supply routes. Colombia also borders Panama, which should be of significant concern to our nation. It is a known fact that Colombian rebels have been infiltrating the Darien province in Panama for quite some time in search of supplies. In late May, hundreds of Panamanians fled their homes near the border with Colombia, fearing a violent clash between Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary bounty hunters. Witnesses claim that there were about 500 FARC rebels in Panama. Mr. President, this rebel crossing is occurring just 250 miles southeast of the Panama Canal. And let me remind you that U.S. military forces are departing from Panama. The United States should be extremely concerned. The departure of U.S. forces could encourage Colombian rebel groups to become more active in the deep, inaccessible rainforests of Panama's Darien region. And while Panama has increased a border police force to 1,500, they are no match to the Colombian rebels. Panama has no military, and our total U.S. troop presence is scheduled to depart Panama by the end of this year. We just closed down operations out of Howard Air Force Base in May, and we are about to turn over the Panama Canal and remaining military facilities at the end of this century. Mr. President, while the United States is complying with the Panama Canal Treaties, in terms of giving Panama the Canal at the end of this year, the treaties state that the United States has the continued responsibility to protect and defend the Panama Canal. And the duration of this treaty is indefinite. In the event that something happens to the Panama Canal, just a few hundred miles from Colombia, how would the United States respond then? I have spent most of my time talking about the worsening civil strife in Colombia. But I cannot end this speech without talking about the final war in Colombia. It's the war Americans probably have heard the most about--the war prompted by the fact that Colombia is the world's most important cocaine producer and a leading producer of heroin. According to our State Department, over 75% of the world's cocaine HCL is processed in Colombia. 1998 marked the third consecutive year of significant increase in Colombia coca crop size; recent statistics indicate that about 75% of the heroin seized in the northeast United States is of Colombian origin. Colombian heroin is so pure--roughly 80% to 90%--that in 1998, the number of heroin overdose cases in the United States went up significantly. In fact, in 1998, the number of heroin overdoses in Orlando surpassed the number of homicides. Drug trafficking is profitable, and provides the FARC with the largest share of its income. Sixty percent of FARC fronts are involved in the drug trade. About 30% of ELN war fronts are likewise engaged in drug trafficking. This includes extortion/taxation of coca fields and yields, precursor chemicals and security of labs and clandestine air strips. The insurgents control the southern rural terrain of Colombia where the largest density of cocaine fields and production is found. Mr. President, I have outlined a deteriorating situation in Colombia. I have spoken to you about Colombia's ongoing and escalating four wars. These are significant issues that have a direct impact on our hemisphere and our Nation. The future of Colombia as a unified country, and the stability of an entire hemisphere is at risk. The sad reality is that our country is not yet making an adequate response to this crucial foreign policy challenge. We are simply not paying attention, nor are we adequately responding. U.S. leadership in this Colombian crisis is needed. This is no time to keep our backs turned. Continued inattention will only contribute to continued instability. Like Kosovo, the U.S. should mobilize the international community to play a role in resolving the Colombian conflict. Certainly we should pledge our support to the democratically elected Government. We should also be ready to provide other types of support such as training, equipment, and professional development to help Colombia overcome these threats to democracy and freedom. Finally, we must continue to work to disrupt and dismantle the drug trafficking organizations and to reduce their financial control of antidemocratic elements in Colombia. We are doing some things in Colombia. I had the opportunity to see those myself when I traveled there a few months ago. But we simply have to do more. We have to become more engaged. I remember President Ronald Reagan's profound wisdom in negotiating from a position of strength in his efforts to strengthen our military. This strategic vision led to the crumbling ultimately of our adversaries. Unfortunately, this dynamic has not yet taken hold in Colombia. Because of the Colombian Government's weakness, no incentive appears to exist for its multiple adversaries to respect and to adhere to any agreements. Their only incentive is to extract further concessions from the Government and to further attempt to weaken the Colombian Government. Before I close, let me quote a passage from a report in Time magazine. I quote: The six members of the presidential peace commission did not know where they were headed when their Bell 212 helicopter took off from Bogota at dawn. The pilot had been given the top-secret coordinates minutes before takeoff, but not even he was sure of the destination. Suddenly, the flag of the FARC, the oldest, largest and bloodiest of the country's numerous anti-government guerrilla groups, was sighted in the jungle below. This time, however, the flag signified the making of history, not war. In a small clearing in the Alto de la Mesa rain forest, FARC guerrillas and the government's representatives met to sign a momentous eleven- point cease-fire agreement. While this article seems to depict the present situation in Colombia in terms of peace talks, the fact is that it does not. The main reason is that there has not yet been a cease-fire agreement as a result of this latest round of talks. Let me repeat that. There has not yet, to this day, been a cease-fire agreement as a result of this latest round of talks. The article I quoted appeared in Time magazine's issue dated April 16, 1984. In April 1984, the then-Colombian President triumphantly announced on national television his Government's formal acceptance of that pact with the FARC guerrillas. He thought that he had negotiated an end to the guerrilla conflict with the FARC leadership. Let me note that there have been numerous other accounts by other Colombian Presidents throughout the years to negotiate a resolution to the guerrilla wars in Colombia. Each time the peace talks have failed, and each time the guerrilla groups have been further strengthened. While the current President of Colombia is negotiating with the very same FARC leader, a few things have changed over the last 15 years. Back in 1984, the Time article reported that the FARC consisted of 2,050 guerrillas backed by an additional 5,000 people in ``civil defense cadres'' spread mainly throughout the countryside. But today the FARC has about 10,000 to 15,000 active combatants--quite a change. In 1994, the ELN had roughly 200 men and the Popular Liberation Army had about 275. The ELN today has between 5,000 and 7,000 troops. It is simply amazing to me what a difference 15 years has made in Colombia, a difference, unfortunately and tragically, for the worse. We have gone from seeing Colombia's combat-ready guerrilla number in the 2,000 range--2,000 is what it was--to a situation today where there is likely a guerrilla combatant rebel for every Colombian military combatant person available, a 1-to-1 ratio. My question to this Congress and to this administration is, How can we expect Colombia to overcome these multiple wars? The rebel personnel resources have significantly increased since the mid-1980s and are one of the main reasons behind this rise in the alliance between the guerrillas and the drug traffickers. This strategic alliance, in which each party benefits from the other's involvement, makes it very clear that it is extremely difficult to separate the drug war from guerrilla and paramilitary wars. That is why the United States must play a role to help Colombia overcome all of its wars--not just the drug dealers. We must understand that our drug consumption only further exacerbates the Colombian crisis. And we must be involved in helping them resolve the four wars I have described. In the 1980s, the United States made a major investment in the struggle for democracy and human rights in Latin America. We pretty much succeeded. We basically went from a situation a generation or two ago where half the countries were democratic to a situation today where every country save one is democratic, or is at least moving rapidly towards democracy. We have succeeded. But if we want Latin America to continue to evolve into a stable and peaceful trading partner and a friend of the United States, we will have to make a more serious commitment to Colombia. No one wants to see Colombia devolve into a criminal narcostate. But unless we act soon in partnership with the democratically elected Government of Colombia, unless we act soon to reverse this democratic death spiral, it is only a matter of time before Colombia ceases to exist as a sovereign nation with democratic principles. President Ronald Reagan showed profound wisdom in leading this hemisphere toward democracy and toward free markets. We must do all we can to make sure that this positive tide is not rolled back for our neighbors to the south. I thank the Chair for his indulgence.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I have a long standing interest in Haiti. I have made seven trips to this island nation in the past four years. I have spoken often about the developments in that country here on the Senate floor. I am here today because I am extremely concerned about the tumultuous conditions in Haiti. And, I feel the United States must understand the immediacy and vast importance of the present situation in order to act in an appropriate way. Mr. President, the serious political and financial circumstances leave Haiti at a crossroads. In order to survive, Haiti must act decisively, and the global community must respond accordingly. It is of vital importance that Haiti holds Parliamentary elections this year, and that we respond with our technical and security resources to support and strengthen this process. In addition, the U.S. Governments' policy on limiting financial assistance, which in the past I have whole heartedly embraced and which has been effective, should now be re-thought. Haiti has a heritage of political turmoil and unrest. To understand the present situation, one must first comprehend the series of events in the two years which have led to this unfortunate circumstance. The seriously flawed April 6, 1997 elections, which attracted less than 5 percent of the Haitian electorate, provoked the resignation in June 1997 of Prime Minister Rosney Smarth. For twenty months, a political deadlock existed between President Rene Preval and the majority party in Parliament over the contested April 1997 elections and over President Preval's nominee for Prime Minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis. The political crisis virtually paralyzed the government and delayed millions of dollars in international aid to Haiti. Mr. President, in January of this year, Haiti's drawn out crisis took a very troubling turn when President Preval announced that the Haitian National Assembly's term had expired and that he would proceed to install a government by ``executive order.'' What happened in essence, of course, was that President Preval chose to ignore Haiti's Parliament and rule by decree. Tragically, President Preval effectively disbanded the Parliament and stripped them of their power. Even though Prime Minister Alexis was approved by both Houses before the Parliament was dissolved, the new Prime Minister does not yet have any authority to govern because his cabinet has not been approved by the Parliament. And since there is no functioning Parliament, there can be no confirmation of the Prime Minister's cabinet. We have gone from a long period without a Prime Minister in Haiti to a period now without a governing Parliament. While the political crisis in Haiti deepens, there has been some progress made. In March of this year, President Preval and the opposition political parties agreed on a Provisional Electoral Council, charge with establishing fair and equal elections. And the Council has been effective. Specifically, the Council recently made a brave and bold move by announcing the annulment of the April 1997 elections. Mr. President, I applaud this recent action. We need to support this recent overture and take it to the next level. We must urge the Haitians to have parliamentary elections. We know that the present political vacuum must be filled with a credible government or else, we may risk it being filled by a de facto dictatorship. The global community has the responsibility to take action now. First, the Haitians must have Parliamentary elections before the end of this year. A balance of power is fundamental to an effective democracy. The election of a new Parliament prior to Presidential elections in December 2000, begins establishing this foundational balance, which is in the best interest of Haiti. The United States and the international community have the ability and resources to help in two specific ways, through technical assistance and security reinforcement. In order to ensure that the Haitians hold free, fair, open, and credible elections , the United States, in partnership with the international community, must leverage all available assets in a coordinated effort to support the election process. The United States should provide resources in support of the election process to include the encouragement of political coalition building. The technical assistance can be coordinated by the other countries who are involved in Haiti that can also provide substantial financial help. In addition to the technical assistance, Haiti's security must be strengthened in order for the elections to be held in a safe environment. We must increase support to the Haitian National Police. In addition, provisions should be made so that United Nations Civilian Police--known as the CIVPOL--can continue it's important mission through this election period. There should also be a large and significant presence of international observers during the six to eight weeks prior of the elections. These basic actions taken quickly and with authority will demonstrate that the United States is committed to democracy in Haiti. Second, we need to re-assess U.S. policy on financial assistance to Haiti. For the past several years, the U.S. Government has conditioned assistance to the Haiti due to the Haitian Government's ineptness. While the United States has tried to help Haiti sustain democracy, unfortunately, the Haitian Government has lacked political will. The Haitian Government has not taken action to resolve a number of extrajudicial and political killings in Haiti and there have been numerous human rights violations. The Government has also been extremely slow in privatization of its government owned enterprises, and it has not been accountable in maintaining government institutions through their constitutional and electoral processes. Let me be clear when I say that the objective in our conditioning of assistance to Haiti was to urge the Haitian Government to take the necessary steps to overcome these concerns and challenges. Our conditioning of assistance has produced some positive change in Haiti. With the upcoming Parliamentarian elections in Haiti, however, it is important that we provide flexibility in our assistance to assure that these very important and needed elections are transparent. Today, Mr. President, I am suggesting that the U.S. Government focus its appropriation policy on accountability. While the Congress is not losing the opportunity to review and perform oversight of our appropriated funds to Haiti, this new language sets congressional priorities. Specifically, the top areas include: First, aggressive action to support the institution of the Haitian National Police; second, steps to ensure that any elections undertaken in Haiti with U.S. assistance are full, free, fair and transparent; third, a program designed to develop the indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; fourth, steps to facilitate the continued privatization of state-owned enterprises; and fifth, a sustained agriculture development program. We have also incorporated reporting requirement language so that the Administration can give U.S. a detailed assessment of each benchmark. This new language was drafted by several Senators including myself and Senators Helms, Dodd, and Graham. The ideological and financial crossway that is before Haiti is of national and global importance. The U.S. national interest is served by a stable, democratic, prospering Haiti that cooperates with U.S. counter-drug efforts. We can help ensure this end through our technical and physical support of immediate Parliamentary elections and through lifting the limitations on financial assistance. Our Nation's eyes have been so focused across the Atlantic that I fear we may have forgotten our responsibility in our own hemisphere. But, now is the time to act in order that democracy may take her proper place in this hemisphere.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. I also thank the committee. imf gold sale

Mr. DeWINE. If I might add something to the comments of my distinguished colleague from Georgia. Last year, the Congress added significant new money into our international and interdiction efforts. This was in part a down payment on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, that I introduced in the 105th Congress. It is important that we ensure that the effort begun then is sustained. Having seen first hand the positive benefits of this program in this region. I strongly believe that increased funding for INL should be strongly considered in conference.

Mr. DeWINE

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this bill has great significance to my home State of Ohio. Ohio produces and processes more steel than any other State in the Nation. Ohio steel companies--115 of them at last count--produced and processed steel valued at $5.3 billion in 1996. Ohio is second only to Pennsylvania in the number of employed steelworkers. At last count we had 35,400 steelworkers in the State of Ohio. We are here today because foreign steel producers have illegally dumped millions and millions of tons of steel into the United States. In 1998, 41 million tons were dumped. That represents on average an 83- percent increase. Ohio steel production from the first quarter of 1999 was down significantly. Ohio steel shipments during the first quarter of 1999 were also down nearly 16 percent from the same period in the previous year. Members of the Senate, all of this is no accident. All of this was the result of illegal dumping of steel into the United States. Our steel industry, despite being a highly efficient and globally competitive industry, is in trouble. I have heard from and I have talked directly to steelworkers and their families about this issue. It is estimated that 10,000 steelworkers have already lost their jobs. The Independent Steelworkers predict job losses of as many as 165,000 if steel dumping is not stopped. It is time for the Senate to take action. All eyes are on us. The question is, Will we respond to this crisis? Adopting this bill tells our steel industry, our steelworkers, and the world that we support our industry, we support trade laws, and we will simply not tolerate dumping or subsidization. The bill is tough. It directs the President to impose quotas, tariff surcharges, or negotiate enforceable voluntary export restraint agreements in order to ensure that the volume of imported steel products during any month does not exceed the average volume imported from the 3-month period preceding July 1997. I am a free trader. I believe free trade, though, does not exist without fair trade. Free trade does not mean free to dump, free to subsidize, free to distort the market. However, that is exactly what is happening today. A strong and healthy domestic steel industry is vital to our Nation and vital to our national defense. Let us resolve today to debate and then pass H.R. 975. The House has already done so. I believe it is in our interest and the interest of the country to do so. I thank my colleague from Pennsylvania, Senator Santorum, for his leadership, as well as Senator Rockefeller and the other Members who have worked so hard on this bill.