Member of Congress
Mike DeWine
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- OH
- Party
- Republican
Speeches
OFFICIAL SITE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES MEMORIAL SERVICE1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of H. Con. Res. 171, which was received from the House.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to the resolution appear at the appropriate place in the Record.
NATIONAL TOBACCO POLICY AND YOUTH SMOKING REDUCTION ACT1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, we are ready to close down the Senate tonight, and we are about ready to end, really, the debate on the tobacco bill for this week. This bill will be back in the Chamber. We will be debating it in the future. I think we got off to a very good start. No one ever said that this was going to be an easy bill. This is a very complicated bill. Congress is doing something we have never done before. It is very complex. So we knew going in it was not going to be easy. Nothing important ever is easy. It is important that we continue to push on because there is a lot at stake. I would submit what is at stake, really, is the future of tens of thousands of our young people. We all know the statistics. We all know what the facts are. We all know how important it is we stop young people from starting to smoke. We know the reality that if the child does not start tobacco use at 19 or 20, hasn't smoked, the odds are the child isn't going to smoke. We also know most people start when they are young, start when they are way underage and it is illegal to smoke, cannot smoke if they do, and we know that is when they get started. We have heard the statistics. We know the statistics about the 3,000 children starting to smoke every day. We know the statistics that roughly a third of them will die premature deaths, some horrible deaths, because of smoking. So I think we all know what is at stake. I think it is important as we complete this week to remind ourselves that, yes, it is tough. This is a tough bill. This is a tough world. This is contentious. But that is what we get paid to do. That is why people send us here--to make tough decisions. I think we need to remind ourselves that this really is a historic opportunity. It is a historic opportunity that has been presented the country, and has been presented this Senate, and has been literally put in our laps. We can either take up this opportunity and do what is right and do something very constructive, or we can pass it by. This is a historic opportunity. It was really given to us because of the settlement that was announced last June by tobacco companies and by the attorneys general, an unprecedented settlement, a settlement that cannot go into effect without a comprehensive bill passing the Senate, passing the House, and ultimately being signed into law by the President. Let me commend Chairman John McCain for the work he has done in bringing this bill to the floor. Let me commend him for the work he has done this week, keeping this process moving forward. It is clear that, if we are going to reduce teenage smoking, there has to be a comprehensive approach. It is like most things in life, there are no simple answers. If there were simple answers, we would have found them a long, long time ago. Raising the price of cigarettes, raising the price of tobacco, is an important element to reduce teenage smoking. There is an inverse relationship, clearly, between the cost and the use. But we also know, based on every study that we have seen, everything that we have looked at, I think most of us have come to the conclusion that raising the price of cigarettes alone will not do it, that we have to do other things. We have to stop the advertising for cigarettes that appeal directly to children--get rid of the Joe Camels, or those who will follow Joe Camel; get rid of the Marlboro Man; get rid of the cartoon figures; get rid of the advertising that any parent looks at for 1 second and knows this is clearly targeted at children or, if it is not targeted at children, at least has a tremendous appeal for children. That has to be stopped. We have to have counteradvertising. We have to take all the ingenuity of Madison Avenue and use it, instead of killing people, use that ingenuity and use that talent to save kids. It is available, and it is out there, and we can do it. We have to worry about law enforcement. Again, it is no different than dealing with drugs in that respect. You have to have education, you have to have advertising, but you also have to have law enforcement. We risk, as we increase the price of cigarettes and tobacco, expanding the black market that already does exist in this country. We have to worry about that. We have to worry about the enforcement of the laws that every State has about underage smoking. We have to figure out better ways to enforce that law. So, we have to do all of these things. And as we proceed in the weeks ahead on this bill, and as we talk about it and we debate it and argue this point and argue that point, let's keep our eye on the ball. Let's keep our eye on the objective. For this Senator from Ohio, at least, there is only one objective, and that is to reduce the number of our kids who start smoking. If we can do that, if we can do it in significant numbers, we will have accomplished a great deal. That is what this bill that Senator McCain has brought to the floor is all about, and that is what we have to get accomplished. This is a historic opportunity. It is a unique opportunity. Let me talk for a moment, if I could, about the amendment that Senator Durbin and I have brought to the floor this evening. It is an amendment that we believe will make a difference. It is an amendment that will bring about more accountability, hold the tobacco companies responsible, make them liable for their actions, make them more accountable, and we think will make them do the right thing. Our amendment deals with what we call look-back. I think we have to keep in mind--I have had the opportunity to listen to a portion of the debate from some of my colleagues who followed Senator Durbin and myself, Senator Wyden--who spoke in favor of the amendment. I have listened to what some of my colleagues who have raised some questions about the amendment have had to say. In response, let me make a couple of comments. First of all, the people this is targeted at, the people we are targeting, are the tobacco companies. And the tobacco companies agreed to a look-back provision. They agreed to a very, very significant look-back provision. That was the provision which was included in the settlement that was announced last June. So they agreed to it. They are the ones who thought they could meet the 60-percent reduction target in 10 years, and that is a significant target. But they said, ``We can do it.'' So this isn't something that we dreamt up here in the Senate; this is something that the parties looked at, and all of them said, ``We can do it.'' And it is clear that they can. It makes sense, I think, what we have done in the Durbin-DeWine amendment. That is, we have taken John McCain's very good look-back provision, and I think we have improved it. We have made it more company-specific. What do you mean, company-specific? The original look-back provision was an interesting provision, really, in the sense that it was socialism. I don't know any other word to describe it. It basically said: Look, here are the targets. The tobacco companies agree on these targets. We are going to look back, after 3 years, and then after a few more, and ultimately after 10 years. And every few years, we are going to look back and see if the tobacco companies are hitting their targets in reducing teenage smoking. They said: We can get to 60 percent reduction in 10 years. And we phase that in--they phased it in, in their agreement, over that period of time. Every so often, we are going to look to see how we are doing. And if we determine that the reduction is not taking place, or the targets are not being hit, then the tobacco companies agreed--let me emphasize again--agreed that they would pay a penalty. The interesting thing is, when this was put together, however, how the penalty was calculated. The agreement was that it would be calculated industry-wide. So you would look to see what the total reduction in teenage smoking was. And then, each company--you figure out what that total penalty was. It is the penalty the tobacco companies agreed to. You take that pot of money, that penalty pot, and you divide it up among the tobacco companies, based on their total market share. So if one tobacco company had 30 percent of the market, they would get 30 percent of the cost of the penalty, irrespective of whether or not they were a leader in the sale of cigarettes to young people or whether they didn't sell a cigarette to a young person; it didn't make any difference. We looked at this and came to the conclusion that it really didn't make a lot of sense to base it entirely on that procedure. We came to the conclusion that the tobacco companies should be held accountable for what they did specifically. So we came up with this amendment with a variation of what Senator McCain had done, where he blended the penalties, basically making part of the penalties being applied industry-wide--that form of socialism we talked about--part of the penalties being applied case by case, company by company. We have kept a blend in the Durbin-DeWine amendment, but we put more emphasis on company-specific. We think it makes sense to hold the individual tobacco companies accountable for the reduction in their product that is being sold to kids. Now, some of my friends have come to the floor and said, ``Well, look, that's not really fair. Tobacco companies can't control what they sell to kids.'' With all due respect, that doesn't make any sense. They control it today. They control it by their advertising. They control it by whom they target. They control it by how they market the product. There is a reason that Marlboro has 62 percent of the market. There is a reason they beat everybody else out in getting the kids market, the illegal sales market, the kids-under-18 market. They have been darned good at it. So we have seen, decade after decade, these companies being very good at this and being able to figure out how they can target a niche market and how they can get into kids who are just starting to smoke. To say that, now, if we give them an incentive not to do it, give them a disincentive and charge them not to do it and they agree not to do it, to say they can't control what they are doing makes absolutely no sense. My colleague from Kentucky came to the floor and asked, I think, a very legitimate question--Senator Ford. He said--I will paraphrase what he said, but, basically: Look, you are holding the tobacco companies liable. But the Government is going to be the one who is going to be doing the counteradvertising. And the Government is going to be doing other things to reduce teenage smoking. I think the answer to what Senator Ford said is, yes, that is correct, the Government is going to be involved in countermeasures. The Government is going to be involved in trying to reduce teenage smoking. But that doesn't mean the cigarette companies will still not be players and still will not have things that they can control. Make no mistake about it, under this bill or any of the different versions of this McCain bill, tobacco companies still are going to be able to impact how teenagers smoke, and whether or not their product is marketed to teenagers, and whether their product is sold to teenagers, and whether they target teenagers. How can they do it? Well, they can do it in many ways. They can do it by advertising. The bill has restrictions on advertising. Yet, advertising is still going to be permitted. So how they target that advertising and what kind of advertising they place and where they place it is going to clearly impact on whether or not young kids underage buy cigarettes. Tobacco companies will control that. They will control advertising. They will control how they market the product as they do today. They will control how they target the product as they do today. They can run, if they want to--and this is clearly within their control--their own antismoking campaigns aimed at kids. They clearly can do that. We hope the more money they spend on that, the more emphasis they will put on that, it will reduce the consumption of their own product. Clearly, how the tobacco companies market and advertise will impact youth smoking. They have some responsibility. We have to hold them accountable. My friends, particularly on this side of the aisle, always talk about accountability. We are in an age of accountability, whether we are talking about welfare or whatever we are talking about. We are in an age of accountability where people need to be accountable for their own actions. What the Durbin-DeWine amendment says is the tobacco companies ought to be responsible for their own actions; the tobacco companies ought to be judged not by what they say but by what they do. The tobacco companies ought to be charged and looked at and judged by what the results are. That is all we are saying. I find that to be a pretty conservative point of view, and a point of view that most of my colleagues on this side of the aisle always talk about and, I think, support. If we look at it in this way, this is, in effect, a very conservative amendment. Mr. President, the Durbin-DeWine amendment changes the incentives. We get rid of the profit motive. We give the incentive to prevent kids from smoking. We give that incentive to the tobacco companies. Another issue that was raised a few moments ago in regard to the general look-back provision which our amendment contains and the McCain bill does, of course, is whether or not these surveys are accurate. The statement was made or the assertion was made, ``How in the world can you hold tobacco companies liable for surveys?'' First of all, they agreed to it. They agreed to it. They agreed to the broad survey of looking at the industry and looking at how much teenage smoking was occurring. They agreed to that. Second, these same tobacco companies rely on surveys to do advertising. They rely on surveys to do everything in regard to marketing. Mr. President, I don't think there is one of us in this Senate who has not come to the floor when we talk about illicit drugs in this country, not a one of us has not come to this floor and cited statistics based on surveys about whether the consumption of drugs among our young people is going up or going down. We take them at face value, we rely on them, we make policy based on them and we make decisions based on them. We have had a debate ongoing for the last 6 to 9 months in this Senate in which I have been involved on several different occasions where we have lamented the fact that among the very youngest of our children who are starting to use drugs, the consumption is going up at the same time the fear factor is going down. And we picked that up from the national surveys being done. Drug-Free Youth Group, we rely on that in our decisions. I think it is clear that surveys scientifically done, correctly done, clearly can tell us what percentage of the youth market is smoking and what percentage of the youth market is smoking Marlboros. There is no doubt about it. We can come within a very, very close percentage, a fraction of a percentage of getting that figure. Mr. President, let me conclude by again congratulating Senator McCain for bringing this bill to the floor. It is a comprehensive approach. At the end of the day, when all the days are over and this finally made its way through the Senate, if we are going to have something worthwhile, it has to be a comprehensive approach. We have to be concerned about driving up the cost, the price, because we know that will have an impact. We have to counter advertising. We have to have some control of the advertising and the cigarette companies ultimately need to agree to that. As this process goes through, it is sometimes not a pretty process, it is certainly not an easy process, but it is our process, a democratic process, and I remain optimistic that we will end up with a comprehensive bill that will reduce teenage smoking significantly, that will save lives and that will be a bill of which we can all be proud.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 20 minutes.
EXECUTIVE CALENDAR (Executive Session)1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations on the Executive Calendar: Calendar Nos. 602, 604, 607, 608, 609, 611, 613, 614 and all nominations placed on the Secretary's desk in the Foreign Service. I further ask unanimous consent that the nominations be confirmed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, any statements relating to the nominations appear at the appropriate place in the Record, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then return to legislative session.
HONORING STUART BALDERSON1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
EXPRESSING SENSE OF SENATE REGARDING EUROPEAN UNION1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution and preamble be agreed to, en bloc; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to the resolution be placed at the appropriate place in the Record.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Finance Committee be discharged from consideration of S. Res. 232 and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING EUROPEAN UNION1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to; that the preamble be agreed to; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to the resolution appear at the appropriate place in the Record.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Finance Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Con. Res. 73 and, further, that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
NATIONAL TOBACCO POLICY AND YOUTH SMOKING REDUCTION ACT1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak after Senator Durbin. We have an amendment that we are offering together, and I would like to be able to speak right after his speech.
Mr. DeWINE. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my friend and colleague from Illinois, Senator Durbin, to offer this amendment, an amendment to make the tobacco companies more accountable in our collective effort to reduce youth smoking. Specifically, our amendment would make a few improvements--a few improvements, but significant ones--to the so-called look-back provisions of this current legislation. The look-back provision in the current bill sets targets for the reduction of teen tobacco use. And, then, it imposes assessments, or surcharges, on individual tobacco companies and the entire tobacco industry if these reduction targets are not met. Our amendment would make two simple modifications to Chairman McCain's look-back provision. No. 1, our amendment, like the McCain bill, would impose a surcharge on specific companies as well as the entire industry, if reduction targets are not met. Both our amendment and the McCain amendment are blends of those two formulas. They are different, a different blend, as I will talk about in a moment. Our amendment puts a larger emphasis, though, on the company-specific surcharge. We do this because we believe the threat of a surcharge against specific companies will give them a much stronger incentive to limit teen tobacco use. In a sense, it is sort of the American way. We hold people accountable. We hold them accountable--we give them the benefit of what they do as well as the detriment if they do something wrong. (Mr. BENNETT assumed the Chair.)
Mr. DeWINE. Second, Mr. President, our amendment will increase the targets for reduction of youth tobacco use over what is in the McCain bill. But actually with our amendment, we are restoring, as Senator Durbin has pointed out, the original reduction targets that were agreed to by the industry last year in the global settlement. The net effect of our amendment is to restore what the tobacco companies said and agreed to last year and said that they could do. Let me repeat, we are not increasing the final reduction targets. Rather, we are simply restoring the original targets that were agreed to in last year's settlement. Before getting into the specifics of this amendment, I first congratulate my good friend, John McCain, who has put together a very credible, a comprehensive, a good bill. He has faced a very difficult challenge and has crafted an excellent piece of legislation. This is a comprehensive package that attacks teen smoking in a variety of ways. I believe this thorough approach, when all the pieces of the puzzle are finally put together, will significantly reduce teen smoking. Let's make no mistake about it, that is our objective--to reduce teen smoking; to reduce the number of young people every day in this country who start smoking. I have followed the policy evolution of the look-back provisions since they were first proposed in that global tobacco settlement announced last June, announced by the attorneys general and by the leading tobacco companies' executives. That settlement contained a look-back provision. That settlement contained this brand new and innovative idea--the idea that we could enlist the tobacco industry in our fight to reduce teen smoking by simply giving them a disincentive to hook young people on tobacco. The look-back provision in the original settlement called on the companies to work with us to reduce youth smoking by 60 percent after the passage of 10 years. That 60 percent was to be phased in at several intermediate levels. The settlement negotiators, including the tobacco industry, all agreed to these reduction targets. They obviously believed that they were achievable. The settlement then gave the tobacco industry a big shove, a big shove to meet these targets by calling for an industry-wide surcharge in any year the targets were missed. The amount of the surcharge was to be based on how much the industry missed the reduction targets, up to a maximum or limit, a cap of $2 billion. While I look at this, I recognize really from the beginning, the look-back could be a tremendously useful tool in reducing youth smoking. The tobacco industry, driven by a profit motive, has been incredibly effective in convincing our children to start smoking. If the financial disincentive was strong enough, we would have a way to put the industry's expertise to prevent youth smoking and to turn this whole thing around. After studying the settlement's look-back proposal, I have two basic concerns: First, I was concerned that the proposed surcharges were not high enough to work as a significant deterrent to the tobacco companies. Second, I had some concerns about the settlement's way of distributing the surcharges across the entire industry; in other words, how they determined who was going to pay what. This was an issue I explored in several committee hearings, both in the Judiciary Committee and in our Labor and Human Resources Committee. This approach, frankly, if I can use the term, seems almost socialistic to me, the provision that was originally agreed to. The provision calls for looking back first at the end of 3 years and periodically after that to see how well the tobacco industry had done in reducing youth smoking, and then once we found that out, irrespective of how an individual brand did or individual company did in reducing youth smoking, to then say, ``OK, we're going to spread it out in the industry; in fact, we are going to spread it out, not based on the percentage of youth who were smoking a particular brand, we are going to take that penalty and spread it out among adult users.'' So if a particular company had 20 percent, for example, of the youth market, but 60 percent of the adult market, then, in fact, that company would end up taking 60 percent of the burden of the look-back penalty. It is, in effect, socialism. It is something I think that should offend every Member of the Senate. It is not right, it is not fair, and that is why we are changing it in this amendment. Frankly, that is why Senator McCain put together an amendment, a compromise, that did, in fact, begin to go down this road. Our amendment simply goes a little further. Any company under the original settlement that did its job in reducing youth tobacco use would have to share the benefit of this good behavior with its fellow tobacco companies. Likewise, a company that failed to reduce youth smoking would not bear the brunt of the resulting surcharges because the payments would be spread across the industry. This approach would have the effect really of diluting the incentive for individual companies to work as hard as they can to prevent teens from using their products. After all, why would a company try to prevent kids from smoking its cigarettes, perhaps creating a competitive disadvantage for itself in the larger adult market when other companies would share in the reward for whatever success they had in reducing teen smoking? It just doesn't make sense. The way the payments are allocated to the specific companies in an industry-wide approach on the basis, as I pointed out, of the adult market share, would also dilute the incentive for companies to do a good job. Let's take a quick look at the example of Philip Morris, the maker of Marlboro. This company, through the use of the Marlboro Man and other marketing campaigns, has been unbelievably successful in selling cigarettes to our underage smokers, to our kids, to our children. In 1993, 60 percent--60 percent--of all teen smokers used Marlboro, when in the overall market for adults, Marlboro only had 23.5 percent of the market share. Let's look at how the industry-wide look-back approach would affect Philip Morris. After all, Philip Morris is responsible for a majority of youth smoking. This is the main company at which look-back incentives should be aimed. Industry-wide look-backs allocate the industry-wide assessments to each company based on its adult market share. So if the company misses its reduction targets and is then required to pay, Philip Morris is only responsible for 23 percent of that total, because that is the total market they have, even though Philip Morris is responsible for 60 percent of youth smoking. In the case of Philip Morris, under these statistics, if in a year the tobacco industry did not meet its targets and there was a penalty that had to be assessed under the law, the division clearly would not be equitable. Philip Morris is responsible for 60 percent of the problem, 60 percent of the kids smoking, and yet they would only pay 23 percent under this straight provision. Let me again point out that Senator McCain has changed this and moved it in the right direction. Our amendment moves it even further towards more emphasis on company-specific penalties. Mr. President, what do we think Philip Morris will do under this industry-wide look-back? Will the look-back do what it is supposed to do, get Philip Morris to try to reduce the number of children who it sells to? Mr. President, to me it is pretty obvious what would happen. Because this industry-wide look-back forces other companies to pay for the sins of Philip Morris, I would expect Philip Morris would simply ignore the look-back. The industry-wide look-back in this particular case would fail to do what it is supposed to do. In the case of Philip Morris, it would fail to give the proper incentive to the very company with the most responsibility for stopping kids from using its products. That is why, Mr. President, I started calling for a tougher look-back than the original settlement and for one that would be imposed on individual companies that fail to reach the targets rather than on the entire industry. In other words, an effective look-back proposal is one that would commit each company, each tobacco company to feel the impact--whether good or bad--of its own behavior. And let us not kid ourselves, Mr. President. The tobacco companies will be able to, through marketing techniques, through their dealings with their dealers, through what advertising they will still be able to do, they will be able to have a substantial impact on youth smoking. Yes, the Government is going to come in under this bill and we will have some anticigarette campaigns. The Government will be involved in other things. This will not be brand specific. This will be across the industry. It will, we hope, have the effect we intend it to have. But the fate of each company will still remain in each company's hands. And they should be accountable for what they do. They should be given--sort of the American way, Mr. President--they should be given an incentive to do what is right and they should be, if I can use the term, ``punished'' if they do not do what is right. It is the right way to approach the problem. Mr. President, I worked with the chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, Senator Jeffords, to include a tough company- specific look-back in this legislation. Prior to the Commerce Committee's markup of S. 1415, I wrote to Chairman McCain to request that his legislation's look-back surcharges be higher than the original settlement, and that they be assessed against individual companies. Mr. President, by the time this legislation reached the Senate floor, Chairman McCain and the Commerce Committee had improved the bill's look-back provisions, and they had done it in two very significant ways. I commend them for it. In the version of this bill that came out of the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain increased the level of the industry-wide surcharge and the overall cap in the look-back. This served to provide a stronger incentive for tobacco companies not to target youth. Further, the Senator from Arizona went even further in this regard in the managers' amendment he offered this week. Specifically, Senator McCain added a company-specific look-back surcharge in addition to the industry-wide surcharge. Mr. President, by including both a company-specific look-back and surcharges stronger than those in the settlement, Senator McCain's look-back provision represents a clear improvement from last year's settlement. It will be more effective. It will be fair. What the Senator from Illinois, Senator Durbin, and I are doing as we offer this amendment is to simply refine and improve the McCain look- back provisions. And we do this in two fundamental but necessary ways. Mr. President, the most important modification included in the Durbin-DeWine amendment is a stronger company-specific look-back. The argument for this is simple. The higher the company-specific surcharge is, the more powerful an incentive each company has to prevent children from using its products. By putting more of the burden on individual companies, we can provide a much more powerful incentive for tobacco companies----
Mr. DeWINE. I thank the Chair and my colleague from West Virginia. By putting more of the burden on individual companies, Mr. President, we can provide a more powerful incentive for tobacco companies to meet these reduction targets, especially among those companies that have gained the most from the youth market. Basically, the Durbin-DeWine amendment would direct more of the surcharge amounts to be paid on a company-specific basis. The initial assessments--ones that are charged if a company misses its reduction target by a few percentage points--in our amendment would be higher than in the McCain amendment. In addition, unlike the McCain bill, our amendment would also bump up the surcharge once a company misses its reduction target by more than 5 percentage points. Let us look at one specific example to demonstrate the differences of the two approaches. Suppose we had two cigarette manufacturers--company A and company B. Each controls, let us assume, half the market, including half of the youth market. Let us say company A has succeeded in meeting its reduction goals for reducing youth use, but company B failed to reduce its targets and failed, in fact, by 10 percentage points. Company A has done the job. Company B has not. Here is how the total surcharges, to take a specific example--including both the company- specific and the industry-wide assessments--would break down under the McCain bill and the Durbin-DeWine amendment. Under McCain, company A, the good actor, the good company, is responsible to pay $200 million, but would only pay $100 million under the Durbin-DeWine amendment. Company B, on the other hand, the company that saw the increase, caused the increase in youth smoking, would be charged $750 million under McCain, but would pay $900 million under Durbin-DeWine. That is a 20 percent higher payment under the Durbin-DeWine amendment for the company that failed. More equitable. So, as you can see, our amendment would shift the financial burden toward the company or companies that are responsible for the continued youth smoking, but also away from companies that do the right thing. Because companies will know that they are on the hook for how well they do, they have that much more incentive to prevent children from using their products. Another way to demonstrate this, Mr. President, and to demonstrate the shift we are asking for in our amendment is to look at the overall bottom line. The McCain bill would impose an industry-wide cap, a potential maximum of $4 billion. This cap represents the maximum amount which would be assessed against the entire industry under these provisions. Although there is no cap in McCain for company-specific surcharges, let us assume each and every company missed its target by, say, 25 percentage points. In that case, the surcharges would all add to about $1.6 billion. So that is the bottom line for McCain--$4 billion imposed across the entire industry, shared among all the companies, and about $1.6 billion for the individual companies that had not met its goals. The Durbin-DeWine bottom line is as follows: The industry-wide cap is $2 billion, and the total amount of company-specific surcharges, under similar circumstances, would be $5 billion. That is only for that specific example. Mr. President, the real story I am trying to convey with these numbers is simple: Our amendment has a greater focus on the company- specific look-back and thus provides a stronger incentive for tobacco companies to prevent children from using their products. Mr. President, our amendment makes one other fundamental change to the McCain bill. Our ultimate reduction target--10 years hence--is a 67-percent drop in the number of teens who smoke. In the McCain bill, the end goal or target is 60 percent. On the surface, the McCain target appears to be the same as the 60-percent target in the original settlement the attorneys general reached last June. Again, I remind my colleagues, this is a settlement that everyone agreed to. And the tobacco companies said, ``Yes, we will be held accountable. And, yes, we can get these targets.'' So it seems as if it is the same under the current McCain language. But actually, on closer examination, the McCain target falls a little short of that original target in real terms. The reason why it falls short is the McCain and settlement reduction goals--although the same on the surface; appear the same--each use different starting points or different baselines. The McCain bill calls for a 60-percent reduction from a higher baseline figure than was used in last year's settlement. Because of this, the McCain youth reduction targets are easier to meet than the original settlement. Again, not a great deal of difference. But all our amendment does, very simply, is take us back effectively to that original settlement, which I think was our original intent of what we should do. What the Senator from Illinois and I are doing is restoring the original reduction goals from youth tobacco use from the settlement. The Durbin-DeWine amendment sets a reduction target of 67 percent, but after accounting for the different baselines--our reduction goal is equivalent to what is in the settlement. It is exactly what the tobacco industry last year agreed was reasonable and that they said they could reach. Again, I want to thank my friend from the land of Lincoln, Senator Durbin, and his staff for their work in putting this proposal together. Let me also thank Senator Wyden, who will speak in a moment, Senators Chafee, Wyden, Daschle, Snowe, and Collins for joining us as original cosponsors of this amendment. This is truly a bipartisan amendment. I also appreciate the work of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and others in the public health community for their assistance and support. This amendment also has had the active support of former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop--and I certainly appreciate that. Finally, I am pleased that the New York Times has expressed its support for the amendment in an editorial in yesterday's edition. Mr. President, the choice before us is simple--we have the opportunity here to vote on an amendment that will improve the one basic purpose of this legislation: to reduce youth smoking. By holding individual tobacco companies more accountable for failing to reduce youth smoking, and by restoring the original targets set by the tobacco companies themselves, the Durbin-DeWine amendment will make a real difference in young lives. I urge my colleagues to join us on behalf of our young people and support the Durbin-DeWine lookback amendment. It is the right thing to do.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.
PROGRAM1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow morning at 9:30, the Senate will begin 1 hour for morning business. At 10:30, the Senate will begin the Iran sanctions bill, under a total time of 3 hours. Also, the Senate will consider the ISTEA conference report. Therefore, votes could occur during Friday's session in an effort to conclude several other items prior to the Memorial Day recess.
REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY--TREATY DOCUMENT NO. 105-461998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the following treaty transmitted to the Senate on May 21, 1998, by the President of the United States: Protocol to Extradition Treaty with Mexico (Treaty Document No. 105-46). I further ask unanimous consent that the treaty be considered as having been read the first time; that it be referred, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed; and that the President's message be printed in the Record.
AUTHORIZING TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENT PRODUCTION AND REPRESENTATION OF SENATE EMPLOYEES.1998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 233, submitted earlier today by Senators Lott and Daschle.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to; that the preamble be agreed to; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that a statement of explanation appear at the appropriate place in the Record.
ORDERS FOR FRIDAY, MAY 22, 19981998-05-21
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 9:30 a.m. on Friday, May 22. I further ask unanimous consent that on Friday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate then begin 1 hour for routine morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS ACT1998-05-18
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of S. 1723, the American Competitiveness Act. I'd like to commend Senators Abraham and Hatch for introducing such a well crafted piece of legislation. I think the title of this bill--the American Competitiveness Act--is especially appropriate, since we are talking about a bill that will make our companies stronger and more able to compete in the global marketplace. None of our businesses can run efficiently when they are understaffed--and in today's marketplace there are plenty of overseas competitors who will pick up the slack and take away our customers if we give them that opportunity. When the Commerce Department, using the Labor Department's data, projects that our economy will continue to grow at such a rate that more than 1.3 million new information technology jobs will be created over the next decade--but that our universities will produce less than a quarter of the necessary number of information technology graduates, simple math tells us that there will be a shortage of these highly skilled workers. It may surprise people that the high-tech industry is not just about Silicon Valley. Ohio now ranks 10th in the nation in high-tech employment and 8th in high-tech exports. In Ohio, these jobs, on average, pay close to $14,000 higher than Ohio's average private sector wage--$14,000. I want to keep these jobs in Ohio and I don't want to see them moved overseas. But let's look beyond statistics at what some of the largest employers in our country are telling us. They are the one we need to listen to. NCR, a leading high-tech company based in Ohio, has expressed concern that the estimated 340,000 high-tech worker shortage nationwide could affect NCR's ability to fill key high-tech positions. TRW, which is also based in Ohio, is a good example of how this shortage of skilled workers affects more than just the information technology industry. TRW, which produces safety equipment for the automotive industry and equipment for the defense industry, tells me that only one U.S. citizen for every 10 foreign students apply at TRW when they go onto a college campus to recruit. The company currently has 1,100 openings nationwide. These unfilled jobs are not helping this company to expand and create more jobs. Procter & Gamble is another Ohio-based company that uses H-1B visas to hire about six to ten foreign nationals a year. Some people may wonder why such a low number of employees are so essential to a company's productivity, but these specialized scientists, many with doctoral degrees, are needed for key projects. Reaching this year's arbitrary limit on H-1B visas will prevent all employers from filling such specialized positions until the next fiscal year begins, thus delaying some key projects for up to six months. When those key projects are delayed, this means other American workers cannot work, other American workers will not be able to work on these projects. In our global marketplace, competitiveness demands that our companies be able to beat their overseas competitors to market. Any delay in the product cycle--from innovation or creation to production--impedes such competitiveness and could result in such companies moving their operations overseas where such hiring limitations do not exit for their overseas competitors. Also, in a global marketplace, it only makes sense that small and large domestic companies must cater to a wide range of customer preferences and needs--they must know what the traditions and cultures of all of the countries are that they serve. I would rather have these companies hire a few foreign workers under our H-1B visa program, rather than have these companies move their base of operations--and American jobs--overseas. The best and the brightest of the foreign workforce are brought into our country under the H-1B system. These are productive men and women who create innovative technologies--many receiving patents for the U.S. companies they work for--and whose ideas launch new projects and, thus, create new jobs for our domestic workforce. I am a firm believer in educating and training our domestic workforce from within, so that this shortage of highly skilled labor may one day be solved. I strongly believe that part of the solution to this shortage depends on how we raise and educate our children and teenagers--this is why the 20,000 scholarships per year created under this bill (some for low income students) for math and engineering and computer science majors is such an important part of the bill, and such a strong contribution. I again salute my colleague from Michigan for inclusion of this Provision in the bill. Improving the educational process--whether it is job training focused on teens and adults, or math and science courses for children--is not something that can be achieved overnight. We must realistically face the shortage of highly skilled, high-tech workers and allow our companies to hire the workers they need to stay competitive in this global marketplace. The world will not wait for us to catch up in the math and science fields. We must move forward. The enforcement penalties included in the bill will also help us protect our domestic workforce form those who willfully violate the H-1B program. First, the bill increases penalties for such violators by 5 times the current penalty--by increasing fines from $1,000 to $5,000. The bill also provides for a 5-year probationary period during which spot inspections of the violating firms may occur at the discretion of the Department of Labor. The bill also adds a $25,000 fine per violation, and a two-year debarment from all employment immigration programs, in cases where an employer lays off a U.S. worker and willfully underpays a H1-B worker to replace the U.S. worker. This bill also modifies the per-country limits an employment based visas. This modification will help prevent further discriminatory effects that the current per-country limit creates for otherwise qualified people from China and India. I strongly support Senator Abraham's bill. I believe it contains essential provisions to protect our domestic workforce from willful violators by increasing fines and investigative or probationary periods. Out domestic employers and workforce need to have the cap on H-1B visas raised in order to remain competitive. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to vote in favor of the Abraham bill. Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.
DETERRING TEEN SMOKING: WHAT WORKS1998-05-15
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this coming Monday, the Senate will begin historic debate on tobacco legislation. This debate represents a once- in-a-lifetime opportunity to reduce teenage smoking, a once-in-a- lifetime opportunity to save lives. The window of opportunity opened by last year's tobacco settlement is closing fast, and that means we simply have to keep this process moving. We have to pass a comprehensive bill and we have to pass it now. A comprehensive bill, Mr. President. That means we have to raise the price of tobacco. But it means much more than that alone. It means a public education campaign. It means limits on tobacco advertising. It means punishing tobacco companies if, in the future, we do not meet the goals we set for reducing teen smoking. Finally, it means enhanced enforcement so a black market does not develop. There will be a great temptation as we go through this lengthy debate for us to get sidetracked over the coming weeks into debates on countless side issues. It is important that we not give in to that temptation. We need to keep our eyes firmly on a much larger goal, and that goal is saving the lives of America's children from tobacco and from illegal drugs. Frankly, the only way we can achieve this goal is to pass a comprehensive bill, a comprehensive bill that is focused on our one goal, reducing tobacco and drug use among our young people. For the reasons that I will outline in a moment, a piecemeal approach simply will not work. A piecemeal approach will fail. I commend the majority leader, Senator Lott, for his leadership in bringing this matter to the Senate floor. Now it is up to all of us to make the most of that opportunity. That is what I want to talk about today. When a problem generates this much attention, we have to be all the more vigilant to make sure we pay attention to the light rather than to the heat; the facts, not the rhetoric. Fact: 3,000 children start to smoke every day. Fact: 1,000 of them are going to die early as a result of that. Fact: We now have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to save these lives, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to do this through comprehensive legislation to reduce teenage smoking. Fact: The number of legislative days we have left in this session in which to do this is rapidly shrinking. Fact: If we do not do this now, it may never happen. The opportunity may never come again. Fact: 1,000 early deaths caused every day by smoking. We need to act and we need to act now. These are the facts. We cannot allow tobacco companies to lie about these facts or to obscure the fact that tobacco and illegal drugs together pose America's greatest public health challenge to our children. This is a huge challenge to our future. And we need a truly comprehensive approach to meet this challenge of tobacco and of illegal drugs. What I would like to do over the next few minutes is examine some of the elements of the proposed tobacco legislation in a serious, and maybe even clinical, manner in an effort to try to determine which approaches work best in reducing smoking among our young people. What works, Mr. President? What works to reduce teenage smoking? That is the key question. In fact, it is the only question that we should focus on as we debate tobacco legislation. Let me begin by discussing the most controversial element of the various proposed tobacco bills--a tax on cigarettes. Mr. President, the question of whether tobacco taxes will work in reducing teen smoking comes down to the question of how sensitive teen smokers are to changes in price. The way the economists phrase this question is: How elastic is the demand? How responsive is it? Does it go down when prices go up? Mr. President, writing tobacco legislation would be a very easy task if the demand were very sensitive and responsive to prices. Then all we would need to do is increase the cost of a pack of cigarettes, and kids would stop smoking and their lives would be saved, and that would be it. Regrettably, it is not that simple. Reputable individuals and organizations in the field of public health have studied this very question and are certainly far from a consensus. In 1991, a study published in the Journal of Health Economics concluded that there is no statistically significant correlation between cigarette prices and youth smoking. However, a National Cancer Institute expert panel stated in 1993 that ``a substantial increase in tobacco excise taxes may be the single most effective measure for decreasing tobacco consumption,'' and that ``an excise tax reduces consumption by children and teenagers at least as much as it reduces consumption by adults.'' Mr. President, the confusion continues. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have data indicating that in five of the six States that raised cigarette taxes between 1993 and 1995 that teen smoking actually increased. Yet, two reports published by the Surgeon General in 1994 and 1998 reached the opposite conclusion--that young people are at least as sensitive to price increases as adults. Take all of these different findings together and they raise very serious questions about a tobacco-fighting strategy that is anchored solely by tax increases, or by an increase in the cost of cigarettes. Here is what I think, Mr. President, based on my experience in working over the years against illegal drugs, based on my experience in working against driving under the influence of alcohol, that crusade, that effort: There is no one single remedy. There is no one single solution. I believe that raising tobacco costs will have an impact, but will only have an impact if that is included as part of the comprehensive approach, if the increase in tobacco prices is accompanied by advertising, by counteradvertising, by pulling down the pro-tobacco advertising on TV, by strict law enforcement. All of these things, I believe, have to come together. You cannot succeed in this effort without that kind of comprehensive approach. Raising the cost of tobacco will help, but it is simply not enough. To meet this kind of challenge, we need a comprehensive approach, one that will harness many different elements in the common purpose of saving children's lives. In addition to raising the price of cigarettes, what else must we include in that comprehensive package? I outlined that a moment ago, but I would like to talk now in a little more detail about some of the other things that I think are necessary to do in addition to increasing the price of cigarettes. Public education. Let's start with public education. My own experience with public education on health issues, Mr. President, would indicate to me that it does, in fact, work. Let me give you and my other colleagues an example. Over the last several decades, we in this country have made tremendous progress in making our streets safer from alcohol-impaired drivers. Back when I was in the Ohio State Senate, I wrote legislation toughening our State's law on driving under the influence. But even more important than the laws we passed was the fact that we were able--all of us, collectively, working together--to begin to change public attitudes. This has been done by tough laws, but it has also been done by very effective advertising by groups such as the Mothers Against Drunk Driving. It was a national campaign, and it made a difference. Talk to kids today and you will not find many who believe that driving while under the influence of alcohol is ``cool'' or a great thing to do. The people who do it today are treated with scorn, as they should be. See how often ``designated drivers'' are talked about today--a concept that 20 years ago nobody had ever heard about. Attitudes have been changed because of advertising. They have been changed because of what public officials--not just politicians, but people in the public sector--have been able to do and talk about. We have all, collectively, been able to change the culture. That is what we have done in regard to drinking and driving. That is what we have to do now in regard to teenage smoking. I think we have to implement a similar strategy in regard to tobacco. We have to make a massive national investment in educating our young people and in changing attitudes. We should flood the airwaves with the truth--a positive advertising and education campaign to leave no doubt where America stands on this issue, to leave no doubt what the facts are. Tobacco and the use of it may be legal, but it still kills people. Our message must simply be: stay away from it. Mr. President, we can do this. We have done it in other areas, and everything in our life and common sense indicates to us that it works. Those of us who are Members of the U.S. Senate, every single one of us, use a significant amount of TV advertising to get elected. Why did we do it? We did it because it works. Why do all the major products use advertising? Because it works. Why do all the national efforts in regard to drunken driving use this very creative type of advertising? Because it works. That is what we have to have in regard to this tobacco situation. Let me talk further now about another element, a third element, in regard to this comprehensive package that I think has to be part of the bill that we finally approve. That has to do with limiting the type of tobacco advertising. The third proposal to reduce teenage smoking is to regulate the broadcast media in an effort to block the pro-tobacco message. We begin to run into some constitutional problems here, which I would like to discuss. The more constitutional lawyers look into this suggestion, the more problematic it becomes. Basically, it is going to be hard to achieve this objective without the agreement of the tobacco companies. I think we have to understand that. In recent years, the Supreme Court has struck down as many as a dozen laws attempting to regulate commercial speech. In effect, the Court is reminding those of us in the legislative branch that the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech is an important constitutional value. As we look for national solutions to the tobacco- spawned health crisis, we would do well to remember that Congress cannot unilaterally restrict speech. Specifically, the Court would most likely apply to any of the proposed limits on tobacco advertising the four-pronged test established by the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric corporation versus Public Service Commission. And it is more than likely, Mr. President, that the proposed limits would fail the tests laid out in that case--unless we had the agreement of those whose speech we seek to limit. Those are the facts. Under Central Hudson Gas, the first test to determine whether commercial speech is Constitutionally protected is: Is the speech false, misleading, or unlawful? Mr. President, the days are long gone when tobacco could run ads saying that smoking is good for your health. Those old advertising campaigns may have failed this test. I think today's campaigns are clever enough--and empty enough--not to make any false claims, at least under that court decision. The second test is: Does the limit on speech serve a substantial government interest? This is closely related to the third test: Does the limit on speech directly advance that substantial interest? And on these tests, Mr. President, the weight of Constitutional opinion is against unilateral limits on tobacco advertising. Two of America's foremost Constitutional scholars have testified in Senate hearings on this issue. Floyd Abrams--America's leading expert on First Amendment law--told the Commerce Committee, and I quote: Any legislation of Congress which would purport to do by law what the proposed settlement would do by agreement in terms of restricting constitutionally protected commercial speech is, in my estimation, destined to be held unconstitutional. * * * It is a basic tenet of First Amendment law that * * * the interest in protecting children from harmful materials ``does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech directed at adults.'' * * * The sweep of the proposed settlement's restrictions on speech are simply not tailored to its supposed aim of protecting children. And Harvard's Laurence Tribe--author of one of America's most influential Constitutional law textbooks--testified before the Judiciary Committee that, quote, ``the proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising would raise very serious First Amendment questions if they were to be enacted into law by Congress.'' The fourth and final test under this case asks: Is the limit on speech no more extensive than necessary to achieve the goal? On this too, the critics will note that if the same goal of reducing smoking can be achieved without recourse to speech limits, then the Constitutional claims of the speech regulators would fall. Let me stress, Mr. President, that I am not talking about my own opinion of the Constitutionality of these measures. That would be a subject for another speech, another day. What I am talking about is the immense practical problem posed for us, by the likely opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court based on those previous decisions. It's likely that the Supreme Court would find these unilateral measures unconstitutional. The tobacco companies would love that. They would love to change the subject. We must not allow them to do that. Remember the goal: We are trying to save children's lives. We are driving toward the end zone in the fight against these tobacco companies. We must not--must not--let ourselves get trapped into incurring useless penalties on the way. This fight is too important--we cannot let it be reduced to passing legislation that will never be enforced. Our goal is to pass effective legislation--not legislation that will tie up our anti-smoking measures in court for years and years. It's about results. It's about saving lives. We have to remember that. Let me now turn to a fourth and final element in proposed tobacco legislation--the lookback provision. In my view, Mr. President, the lookback provision is a key component of any solid and effective antitobacco bill. It's a way to hold the tobacco companies liable for the bottom line on this effort to reduce teen smoking. Put simply, Mr. President, the lookback provision says to the tobacco companies: If we fail to achieve our goal of substantial reductions in teen smoking, you--the tobacco companies--will pay. You will pay. You will pay a lot. We think that will serve as a deterrent. We think, Mr. President, that will affect the future conduct of tobacco companies. Now, on this one too, Mr. President, the constitutional lawyers are raining on our parade. They point out that the kind of lookback provision we need may well run afoul of Constitutional guarantees of substantive due process. They could hold the tobacco industry liable for actions and results not strictly under the industry's control--and thus be Constitutionally inadmissible. But I think the solution to this problem--and indeed to that of the First Amendment problem with ad limits--is relatively clear. The government may not be able to do these things by itself. But it can do them, if the industry agrees to them voluntarily. This, Mr. President, gives us--public officials who are concerned with public health--an incentive to insist on a comprehensive solution, and not a piecemeal approach. Acting unilaterally, we can punish the tobacco industry. And let me make clear--there's a great deal to be said for that. Their product has destroyed lives. But if we act not unilaterally, but instead approve a comprehensive solution, then we can harness all our efforts in the interest of the public good. And we can hold the tobacco companies accountable for helping reduce teen smoking. conclusion Mr. President, America's attention is engaged by a children's health crisis caused by tobacco and illegal drugs. This is a rare and unique opportunity for us here in the Congress to create some positive change--change that will save lives. We owe it to the American people to write tobacco legislation that represents the best thinking on what will really work to get kids to turn away from tobacco and illegal drugs, and toward a more promising future. I will continue to work throughout our legislative process to make sure the bill we pass lives up to what the American people deserve. I hope the President of the United States will become more involved in this struggle. This, frankly, is an issue of great national importance--one that cries out for Presidential leadership. Mr. President, even after we pass a bill in the Senate, there will still be a lot of work left to be done on this legislation--and frankly and candidly, it won't get done until everybody sits at the table and gets ready for some heavy lifting. This includes the leadership of the Senate and the House, of course, and also the President of the United States. The President can make a huge difference in this process once he becomes fully engaged. Finally, Mr. President, I remain optimistic that we can pass a strong and comprehensive bill, not just to reduce teen smoking but also teen drug use. Last year's settlement through the States' attorneys general and tobacco companies has given us a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. As this legislation moves through Congress, I believe we have to stay focused. We have to stay focused on the issue of saving children's lives. Let's vow to put together comprehensive legislation that really works. Let's do it now. And let's get it done. Mr. President, it will not be easy. I again congratulate the majority leader for his leadership and for his courage in bringing this bill to the floor. I congratulate all who have worked on this bill and other bills-- Senator McCain, who has worked on this bill and brings this bill to the floor; Senator Hatch and others who have worked on other bills and other approaches. We are all going to have the opportunity next week to have our shot. We are all going to have our opportunity to work to try to fashion a good bill. The main thing, however, is that we keep the process moving, that we keep it moving in the Senate, that we pass a bill that is comprehensive, that is practical, that we send it on to the House of Representatives, and ultimately then get it into a conference committee and to the President of the United States. Frankly, it is only going to be at that time that tough, tough decisions are ultimately going to be made and that the package will finally be put together. But if we do not do our work in the Senate, if we do not keep the process moving, then we will have missed this historic opportunity. So the ball is in our court beginning next week. I fully expect the Senate to take up the bill, and I expect us to do what is in the best interests of our children and in the best interests of the future of this country. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor. Mr. President, at this point I suggest the absence of a quorum.
MORNING BUSINESS1998-05-15
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. I thank the Chair.
10TH ANNIVERSARY OF DUI CRASH IN KENTUCKY1998-05-14
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, today marks the 10th anniversary of the most tragic drunk driving case in our Nation's history. Ten years ago today, on Saturday, May 14, 1988, a school bus filled with children heading home to Radcliff, KY, after having spent a day at King's Island Amusement Park in Ohio--that school bus was hit head-on by a drunk driver heading the wrong way on Interstate 71 near Carrollton, KY, 10 years ago today. The collision caused the front gas tank of the bus to explode in flames. The crash caused the death of 24 children and three adults, and left many of the 36 survivors burned and disfigured. This crash did not just affect the 63 innocent victims who were on the bus that day. It had significant impact and changed forever many of the victims' families, friends and their community. This horrible tragedy helped fuel a nationwide movement which has helped to change our Nation's attitudes towards drinking and driving. This horrible tragedy helped spur State legislatures to enact more stronger drunk driving laws. It led to tougher enforcement and has caused people to think twice before drinking and driving. In short, it is no longer ``cool'' or ``neat'' in our society to drink and drive. And this horrible, horrible tragedy did impact people and has helped to galvanize public opinion in regard to drunken driving. The effects of this attitude change are well documented. In 1986, 24,050 people lost their lives in alcohol-related traffic crashes. A decade later that number had dropped by 28 percent; 17,274 people lost their lives in 1995 in alcohol-related accidents, a drop of 28 percent. This reduction is not attributable to one single event. It is not attributable just to this horrible accident, this horrible tragedy we are commemorating and thinking about today. It was a whole series of actions taken by people across this country--Mothers Against Drunk Driving, SADD chapters, grassroots efforts of survivors, grassroots efforts of victims and members of victims' families. We have begun, over that decade, to significantly change public attitudes. Unfortunately, after 10 years of improvement, after 10 years of fewer people dying every year due to drunken driving, these trends have now been reversed. I think our Nation has lost its focus. We no longer focus on this as a national issue. From 1994 to 1995, fatalities in alcohol-related crashes rose--did not decline--rose, and they rose by 4 percent. That was the first increase in over a decade. In 1995, 41 percent of the 41,798 motor vehicle crash deaths were attributable to alcohol use. Alcohol involvement is the single greatest factor in traffic-related deaths and injuries. In short, the trend is now moving in the wrong direction. We have not done enough. We must move to reverse this trend. I think what we have to do is to refocus and to put the emphasis back, again, and public debate, on this horrible, horrible problem. This year, Congress has the opportunity to help renew our Nation's focus on the evils of drinking and driving. During the Senate's consideration of ISTEA, we took the lead in helping our Nation refocus on the consequences of drinking and driving. Mr. President, there is no one single thing in the Senate's version of ISTEA reauthorization which will change attitudes by itself. Rather, the Senate did a number of things which, when taken together, will help renew our Nation's focus on this effort. First, the Senate voted to adopt an amendment which would encourage States to enact a statute that would make it illegal, in and of itself, to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or higher. This amendment was adopted by a 2-to-1 margin in this Senate Chamber. This was one of the few times I stated on the floor that day that Members of the Senate could come to the Senate floor and cast their vote and know that a ``yes'' vote would, in fact, clearly save lives. The individuals we will never know, but it is clear this legislation, if enacted into law, will save hundreds and ultimately thousands of lives over the next few years. Sixty-one of our colleagues chose to take advantage of that opportunity. Further, in the same bill, the Senate voted to adopt an amendment which would make it illegal to drive with one hand on the steering wheel and the other wrapped around a bottle of whiskey or beer. That is still legal in many places in this country. Under this legislation, it no longer would be tolerated. Finally, we included a provision which would establish mandatory minimum penalties for repeat drunk drivers--the worst of the worst of the worst. I can think of no better way to honor the memories of the victims of the deadliest alcohol-related traffic crash in our Nation's history, as well as the memories of all victims of drunk drivers, than to include these reasonable provisions aimed at renewing our Nation's focus on the tragedy resulting from drinking and driving in the final bill to reauthorize the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. This matter is in conference committee right now. The conferees are dealing with a number of very contentious and very difficult funding issues. We all have our own opinions about those issues. They are very contentious. But there is one issue where the overwhelming majority of the American people have spoken in public opinion poll after public opinion poll, and that has to do with the .08. There is one issue where the members of the conference committee can know that their vote to include the .08 provision will, in fact, save lives. Let me repeat, this Senate has spoken. Sixty-one of the Members of this Senate voted ``yes'' for a nationwide .08 standard. The House of Representatives did not have the opportunity to vote; they were blocked from voting on this measure. But I think anyone who has looked at this clearly understands that the House of Representatives also, if they had been permitted to vote on this, would have approved the .08. What we are asking the conference committee to do is very simple: Include this provision, which passed so overwhelmingly in the U.S. Senate, in the final version of ISTEA. If the members of the conference committee will do that, they will save lives. It has been estimated that between 500 to 1,000 lives in this country will be saved every year by going to a .08 standard. Mr. President, the statistics and facts are clear. The evidence is overwhelming. No one who tests .08 has any business being behind the wheel of a car. Think about it. If you were at a party at a neighbor's house or your own house, and you saw someone, an adult male weighing 160 to 165 pounds, and you watched him drink over an hour period of time--you timed it--four beers or four shots of liquor or four big glasses of wine on an empty stomach, then that person looked at you and said, ``I want to take your little girl Anna to get an ice cream cone,'' would you let your daughter get in the car with that person? We all know the answer. The answer is absolutely not--``Don't get near her; she can't go with you.'' That is all we are saying. Mr. President, it takes that much alcohol consumption to reach .08. What we are saying is, we set a nationwide standard so that, no matter where we go in this country, we have some level of assurance that the laws of whatever State we are in--in my case, whether I drive out of Ohio into Kentucky or Indiana or Michigan or West Virginia, wherever I go, when I put my family in a car, I will have an assurance there is a national .08 standard, a bare minimum standard to protect our families. That is what we are asking for in the conference committee. I again urge the members of the conference committee to do what is right: Follow what the Senate has said, follow the vote in the Senate, and include this very reasonable measure. For my friends, my conservative friends, such as myself--we consider ourselves conservatives--I simply point out, this is the same type legislation that Ronald Reagan approved and supported and pushed through the U.S. Congress, when he was President of the United States, to go to a nationwide standard of 21 as being the age for drinking. It is the same mechanism, the same procedure, and the same basic principle. What Ronald Reagan said then, and I will paraphrase, is very simple: That in some areas of national importance, national concern, we can make small intrusions into States rights, small changes that will have monumental effects to save lives across the country, and in some areas we do need a national minimum standard. I urge the conferees to include this in the legislation. I see my friend, Senator Lautenberg, who has been a tremendous advocate over the years for highway safety, who sponsored the bill I just referenced that Ronald Reagan pushed through and Senator Lautenberg pushed through. Senator Lautenberg was the author of that bill in the 1980s. He and I were at the White House yesterday with the Vice President. We have been there with the President to support this. This is a bipartisan effort to save lives in this country. I yield to my colleague.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR1998-05-14
Mr. DeWINE
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.